@techreport{Casajus,
type = {Working Paper},
author = {Andr{\´e} Casajus},
title = {Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values},
series = {HHL Working Paper},
url = {https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0217-23466},
pages = {9},
abstract = {We revisit Kalai and Samet's (Int J Game Theory 16, 1987, 205--222) first characterization of the class of weighted Shapley values. While keeping efficiency, additivity, and the null player property from the modern version of the original characterization of the symmetric Shapley value, they replace symmetry with positivity and partnership consistency. The latter two properties, however, are neither implied by nor related to symmetry. We suggest relaxations of symmetry that together with efficiency, additivity, and the null player property characterize classes of weighted Shapley values. For example, weak sign symmetry requires the payoffs of mutually dependent players to have the same sign. Mutually dependent players are symmetric players whose marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them are zero.},
language = {en}
}