TY  - RPRT
U1  - Arbeitspapier
A1  - Casajus, André
T1  - Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Shapley value
T2  - HHL Working paper
N2  - We show that the Shapley value is the unique efficient one-point solution for cooperative games with transferable utility that reflects the players‘ second-order productivities in terms of their second-order payoffs. Second-order productivities are conceptualized as second-order marginal contributions, that is, how one player affects another player‘s marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them by entering these coalitions. Second-order payoffs are conceptualized
as the effect of one player leaving the game on the payoff of another player.
T3  - HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper - 187 
KW  - TU game
KW  - Shapley value
KW  - Second-order marginal contributions
KW  - Second-order symmetry
KW  - Second-order marginality
Y1  - 2020
U6  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020122213304306648128
UN  - https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020122213304306648128
SP  - 19
S1  - 19
PB  - HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
CY  - Leipzig
ER  -