TY  - JOUR
U1  - Zeitschriftenartikel, wissenschaftlich - begutachtet (reviewed)
A1  - Casajus, André
T1  - Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules
N2  - In this paper, we analyze judicial review according to the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, §§ 243 et seqq.) and its blocking effect with the help of concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we suggest variable qualified majority rules as ingredients of arrangements which balance the interests of a majority shareholder and of the minority shareholders._x000D_
Y1  - 2009
UR  - http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10657-009-9096-8
N1  - In: European Journal of Law and Economics, 28 (2009) 1, 9-18
ER  -