Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Shapley value
- We show that the Shapley value is the unique efficient one-point solution for cooperative games with transferable utility that reflects the players‘ second-order productivities in terms of their second-order payoffs. Second-order productivities are conceptualized as second-order marginal contributions, that is, how one player affects another player‘s marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them by entering these coalitions. Second-order payoffs are conceptualized as the effect of one player leaving the game on the payoff of another player.
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | André Casajus |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| Full text/ URN: | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020122213304306648128 |
| Parent Title (English): | HHL Working paper |
| Series (Serial Number): | HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (187) |
| Place of publication: | Leipzig |
| Publisher: | HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management |
| Year of Completion: | 2020 |
| Page Number: | 19 |
| Tag: | Second-order marginal contributions; Second-order marginality; Second-order symmetry; Shapley value; TU game |
| Licence (German): |  Urheberrechtlich geschützt |