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Correlated equilibria of classical strategic games with quantum signals

  • Abstract: Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We iestigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Author:Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Full text/ URN:urn:nbn:de:0217-9850
Parent Title (German):HHL-Arbeitspapier
Series (Serial Number):HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (61)
Place of publication:Leipzig
Publisher:HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Year of Completion:2003
Page Number:10
Tag:Spieltheorie
Game theory
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt