Correlated equilibria of classical strategic games with quantum signals
- Abstract: Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We iestigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even better efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive.
Document Type: | Working Paper |
---|---|
Language: | English |
Author: | Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD |
Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
Full text/ URN: | urn:nbn:de:0217-9850 |
Parent Title (German): | HHL-Arbeitspapier |
Series (Serial Number): | HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (61) |
Place of publication: | Leipzig |
Publisher: | HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management |
Year of Completion: | 2003 |
Page Number: | 10 |
Tag: | Spieltheorie Game theory |
Licence (German): | Urheberrechtlich geschützt |