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Non-dictatorial social choice through delegation

  • We extend the setup of Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem by introducing as additional policy alternatives the delegation of certain decisions to an external institution or random device. We show that in this extended setting there exists a Social Welfare Function with universal domain which satisfies the Pareto principle and is independent of irrelevant alternatives, while also being non-dictatorial.

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Document Type:Working Paper
Author:Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD, Guido Olschewski
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Parent Title (German):HHL-Arbeitspapier
Series (Serial Number):HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (72)
Place of publication:Leipzig
Publisher:HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Year of Completion:2006
Page Number:9
Tag:Arrow's impossibility theorem; Delegation; Non-dictatorial; Social choice
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt