Non-dictatorial social choice through delegation
- We extend the setup of Arrow’s General Possibility Theorem by introducing as additional policy alternatives the delegation of certain decisions to an external institution or random device. We show that in this extended setting there exists a Social Welfare Function with universal domain which satisfies the Pareto principle and is independent of irrelevant alternatives, while also being non-dictatorial.
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD, Guido Olschewski |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| Parent Title (German): | HHL-Arbeitspapier |
| Series (Serial Number): | HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (72) |
| Place of publication: | Leipzig |
| Publisher: | HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management |
| Year of Completion: | 2006 |
| Page Number: | 9 |
| Tag: | Arrow's impossibility theorem; Delegation; Non-dictatorial; Social choice |
| Licence (German): |  Urheberrechtlich geschützt |