Volltext-Downloads (blau) und Frontdoor-Views (grau)

Characterizations of weighted and equal division values

  • New and recent axioms for cooperative games with transferable utilities are introduced. The nonnegative player axiom requires to assign a non-negative payoff to a player that belongs to coalitions with non-negative worth only. The axiom of addition iariance on bi-partitions requires that the payoff vector recommended by a value should not be affected by an identical change in worth of both a coalition and the complementary coalition. The nullified solidarity axiom requires that if a player who becomes null weakly loses (gains) from such a change, then every other player should weakly lose (gain) too. We study the consequence of imposing some of these axioms in addition to some classical axioms. It turns out that the resulting values or set of values have all in common to split efficiently the worth achieved by the grand coalition according to an exogenously given weight vector. As a result, we also obtain new characterizations of the equal division value.

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar


Document Type:Article
Author:Sylvain Béal, André CasajusORCiD, Frank HuettnerORCiD
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Year of Completion:2015
In: Theory and Decision, (2015) Online First article, 1-19