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Sign symmetry vs symmetry : Young’s characterization of the Shapley value revisited

  • We revisit Young's (Int J Game Theory 14, 1985, 65-72) characterization of the Shapley value by efficiency, symmetry, and marginality or strong monotonicity. In particular, we suggest a relaxation of symmetry called sign symmetry. While symmetry requires equally productive players to obtain the same payoffs, sign symmetry only requires their payoffs to have the same sign. It turns out that sign symmetry can take the place of symmetry in Young's characterization.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author:André CasajusORCiD
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2018.05.017
Parent Title (English):Economics letters
ISSN:0165-1765
Volume:169
Issue:August 2018
Year of Completion:2018
First Page:59
Last Page:62
Tag:Marginality; Shapley value; Sign symmetry; Strong monotonicity; Symmetry; TU game; Weak differential monotonicity
Content Focus:Academic Audience
Peer Reviewed:Yes
Rankings:AJG Ranking / 3
VHB Ranking / B
SJR Ranking / Q2
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt