Second-order productivity, second-order payoffs, and the Shapley value
- We show that the Shapley value is the unique efficient one-point solution for cooperative games with transferable utility that reflects the players‘ second-order productivities in terms of their second-order payoffs. Second-order productivities are conceptualized as second-order marginal contributions, that is, how one player affects another player‘s marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them by entering these coalitions. Second-order payoffs are conceptualized as the effect of one player leaving the game on the payoff of another player.
Document Type: | Working Paper |
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Language: | English |
Author: | André CasajusORCiD |
Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
Full text/ URN: | urn:nbn:de:101:1-2020122213304306648128 |
Parent Title (English): | HHL Working Paper |
Series (Serial Number): | HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (187) |
Year of Completion: | 2020 |
Page Number: | 19 |
Content Focus: | Academic Audience |
Licence (German): | ![]() |