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Null players, outside options, and stability : the conditional Shapley value

  • We suggest a new component efficient solution for monotonic TU games with a coalition structure, the conditional Shapley value. Other than other such solutions, it satisfies the null player property. Nevertheless, it accounts for the players‘ outside options in productive components of coalition structures. For all monotonic games, there exist coalition structures that are stable under the conditional Shapley value. For voting games, the stability of coalition structures under the conditional Shapley value supports Gamson‘s theory of coalition formation (Gamson, Am Sociol Rev 26, 1961, 373-382).

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Document Type:Working Paper
Author:André CasajusORCiD, Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Parent Title (English):HHL Working Paper
Series (Serial Number):HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (183)
Issue:183 (April 2020)
Year of Completion:2020
Page Number:12
Tag:Gamsonís law; Null player; Outside option; Shapley value; Stability; TU Game
Content Focus:Academic Audience
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt