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Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules

  • In this paper, we analyze judicial review according to the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, §§ 243 et seqq.) and its blocking effect with the help of concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we suggest variable qualified majority rules as ingredients of arrangements which balance the interests of a majority shareholder and of the minority shareholders._x000D_

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Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author:André Casajus
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
URL:http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fs10657-009-9096-8
Year of Completion:2009
Note:
In: European Journal of Law and Economics, 28 (2009) 1, 9-18