Nash bargaining, Shapley threats, and outside options
- We introduce a weighted version of the component efficient [Casajus, A., 2009. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability. Games and Economic Behavior 65 (1), 49–61] for TU games with a coalition structure. We provide characterizations both for a symmetric and for an asymmetric treatment of outside options. Further, the stability of coalition structures is explored. These concepts are applied to apex games._x000D_
| Document Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | André Casajus |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165489613000528 |
| Year of Completion: | 2013 |
| Note: | In: Mathematical Social Sciences, 66 (2013) 3, 262–267 |