Volltext-Downloads (blau) und Frontdoor-Views (grau)
Schließen

On the stability of coalition structures

  • We resolve a seeming conflict between a non-existence result on solutions to coalition formation in hedonic games [Barberà, S., Gerber, A., 2007. A note on the impossibility of a satisfactory concept of stability for coalition formation games. Economics Letters 95, 85–90] and the universal existence of stable coalition structures in TU games under the χ-value [Casajus, A., 2008. Outside options, component efficiency, and stability, Games and Economic Behavior (forthcoming). doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2007.04.003].

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar

Statistics

frontdoor_oas
Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author:André Casajus
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2008.02.007
Year of Completion:2008
Note:
In: Economics Letters, 100 (2008) 2, 271-274