Outside options, component efficiency, and stability
- In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value._x000D_
| Document Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | André Casajus |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| URL: | http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825607000747 |
| Year of Completion: | 2009 |
| Note: | In: Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (2009) 1, 49–61 |