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Outside options, component efficiency, and stability

  • In this paper, we introduce a component efficient value for TU games with a coalition structure which reflects the outside options of players within the same structural coalition. It is based on the idea that splitting a coalition should affect players who stay together in the same way. We show that for all TU games there is a coalition structure that is stable with respect to this value._x000D_

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Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author:André CasajusORCiD
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
URL:http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0899825607000747
Year of Completion:2009
Note:
In: Games and Economic Behavior, 65 (2009) 1, 49–61