Volltext-Downloads (blau) und Frontdoor-Views (grau)

Scarcity, competition, and value

  • We suggest a value for finite coalitional games with transferable utility that are enriched by non-negative weights for the players. In contrast to other weighted values, players stand for types of agents and weights are intended to represent the population sizes of these types. Therefore, weights do not only affect individual payoffs but also the joint payoff. Two principles guide the behavior of this value. Scarcity: The generation of worth is restricted by the scarcest type. Competition: Only scarce types are rewarded. We find that the types’ payoffs for this value coincide with the payoffs assigned by the Mertens value to their type populations in an associated infinite game.

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar


Document Type:Working Paper
Author:André CasajusORCiD, Harald Wiese
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Parent Title (English):HHL Working paper
Series (Serial Number):HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (143)
Place of publication:Leipzig
Publisher:HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Year of Completion:2015
Page Number:14
Tag:Lovász extension; Mertens value; Partnership; Shapley value; Strong monotonicity; TU game; Vector measure game
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt