The Shapley value, the Owen value, and the veil of ignorance
- We show that the Owen value for TU games with a cooperation structure extends the Shapley value in a consistent way. In particular, the Shapley value is the expected Owen value for all symmetric distributions on the partitions of the player set. Similar extensions of the Banzhaf value do not show this property.
| Document Type: | Article |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | André Casajus |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| DOI: | https://doi.org/10.1142/S0219198909002431 |
| Year of Completion: | 2009 |
| Note: | In: International Game Theory Review, 11 (2009) 4, 453-457 |