Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value
- The principle of differential marginality for cooperative games states that the differential of two players‘ payoffs does not change when the differential of these players‘ productivities does not change. Together with two standard properties, efficiency and the null player property, differential marginality characterizes the Shapley value. For games that contain more than two players, we show that this characterization can be improved by using a substantially weaker property than differential marginality. Weak differential marginality requires two players‘ payoffs to change in the same direction when these players‘ productivities change by the same amount.
Document Type: | Working Paper |
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Language: | English |
Author: | André Casajus, Koji Yokote |
Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
Parent Title (English): | HHL Working paper |
Series (Serial Number): | HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (155) |
Place of publication: | Leipzig |
Publisher: | HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management |
Year of Completion: | 2016 |
Page Number: | 11 |
Tag: | Differential marginality; Shapley value; TU game; Weak differential marginality |
Licence (German): | ![]() |