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Weak differential marginality and the Shapley value

  • The principle of differential marginality for cooperative games states that the differential of two players‘ payoffs does not change when the differential of these players‘ productivities does not change. Together with two standard properties, efficiency and the null player property, differential marginality characterizes the Shapley value. For games that contain more than two players, we show that this characterization can be improved by using a substantially weaker property than differential marginality. Weak differential marginality requires two players‘ payoffs to change in the same direction when these players‘ productivities change by the same amount.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Working Paper
Language:English
Author:André Casajus, Koji Yokote
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Parent Title (English):HHL Working paper
Series (Serial Number):HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (155)
Place of publication:Leipzig
Publisher:HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Year of Completion:2016
Page Number:11
Tag:Differential marginality; Shapley value; TU game; Weak differential marginality
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt