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A parallel machine schedule updating game with compensations and clients averse to uncertain loss

  • There is a finite number of non-cooperating clients, who are averse to uncertain loss and compete for execution of their jobs not later than by their respective due dates in a parallel service eironment. For each client, a due date violation implies a cost. In order to address the minimization of the total scheduling cost of all clients as a social criterion, a game mechanism is suggested. It is designed such that no client has an incentive to claim a false due date or cost. The game mechanism allows the clients to move their jobs to complete earlier in a given schedule. However, they must compensate costs of those clients whose jobs miss their due dates because of these moves. Algorithmic aspects are analyzed. Furthermore, that determines an equilibrium of the considered game is suggested and embedded into the game mechanism. Computational tests analyze the performance and practical suitability of the resulting game mechanism.

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Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author:Mikhail Y. KovalyovORCiD, Dominik KressORCiD, Sebastian Meiswinkel, Erwin PeschORCiD
Center:Center for Advanced Studies in Management (CASiM)
DOI:https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cor.2018.11.003
Parent Title (English):Computers & Operations Research : An International Journal
ISSN:0305-0548
Volume:103
Issue:March 2019
Year of Completion:2019
First Page:148
Last Page:157
Tag:Logistics; Scheduling; algorithmic mechanism design; game theory
Content Focus:Academic Audience
Peer Reviewed:Yes
Rankings:AJG Ranking / 3
VHB Ranking / B
SJR Ranking / Q1
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich gesch├╝tzt