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Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games

  • We explore a relaxation of the balanced contributions property for solutions for TU games that requires the direction (sign) of one player's change of payoffs when another player leaves the game to equal the direction (sign) of the latter player's change of payoffs when the former leaves the game. There exists a large class of solutions that satisfies both efficiency and this weak balanced contributions property. The Shapley value is the unique solution that also obeys weak differential marginality.

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Document Type:Working Paper
Author:André Casajus
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Full text/ URN:urn:nbn:de:0217-2613
Parent Title (English):HHL Working paper
Series (Serial Number):HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (166)
Place of publication:Leipzig
Publisher:HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management
Year of Completion:2017
Page Number:9
Tag:Balanced contributions; Shapley value; TU game; Weak balanced contributions; Weak differential marginality
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt