Weakly balanced contributions and solutions for cooperative games
- We explore a relaxation of the balanced contributions property for solutions for TU games that requires the direction (sign) of one player's change of payoffs when another player leaves the game to equal the direction (sign) of the latter player's change of payoffs when the former leaves the game. There exists a large class of solutions that satisfies both efficiency and this weak balanced contributions property. The Shapley value is the unique solution that also obeys weak differential marginality._x000D_ Keywords TU game, Shapley value, balanced contributions, weak balanced contributions, weak differential marginality_x000D_ JEL Classification C71, D60
| Document Type: | Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | André CasajusORCiD |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| Series (Serial Number): | HHL-Arbeitspapier / HHL Working paper (166) |
| Year of Completion: | 2017 |
| Note: | HHL Working Paper 166. Leipzig: HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, 2017 |