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Cohesive efficiency in TU-games: axiomatizations of variants of the Shapley value, egalitarian values and their convex combinations

  • We relax the assumption that the grand coalition must form by imposing the axiom of Cohesive efficiency: the total payoffs that the players can share is equal to the maximal total worth generated by a coalition structure. We determine how the three main axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value are affected when the classical axiom of Efficiency is replaced by Cohesive efficiency. We introduce and characterize two variants of the Shapley value that are compatible with Cohesive efficiency. We show that our approach can also be applied to the variants of more egalitarian values.

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Document Type:Article
Author:Sylvain Béal, André CasajusORCiD, Eric Rémila, Philippe Solal
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Parent Title (English):Annals of Operations Research
Year of Completion:2021
First Page:23
Last Page:47
Tag:Balanced contributions; Cohesive efficiency; Consensus values; Equal (surplus) division; Shapley value
Content Focus:Academic Audience
Peer Reviewed:Yes
Rankings:AJG Ranking / 3
VHB Ranking / B
SJR Ranking / Q1
Licence (German):License LogoUrheberrechtlich geschützt