Matthias Höltken

• Since 2005, listed firms in Germany have been subject to the hybrid enforcement system that aims at ensuring consistent and faithful application of relevant accounting standards and in particular IFRS. Being first of its kind, the German enforcement system combines cooperative iestigations conducted by a private financial reporting enforcement panel (FREP) and federal powers through downstream iolvement of the German Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). The hybrid enforcement system’s main deterrent is adverse disclosure which iolves public dissemination of financial misreporting. In this dissertation, which comprises five separate manuscripts, I analyze both foundations and consequences of adverse disclosure in Germany. The first two manuscripts address different questions related to institutional premises and deduce avenues for future research. The remaining three manuscripts elaborate on selected research questions related to consequences of financial misreporting and their determinants. In summary, this dissertation has material impact on the understanding of hybrid enforcement systems