Volltext-Downloads (blau) und Frontdoor-Views (grau)
Schließen

Correlated equilibria of classical strategic games with quantum signals

  • Correlated equilibria are sometimes more efficient than the Nash equilibria of a game without signals. We iestigate whether the availability of quantum signals in the context of a classical strategic game may allow the players to achieve even greater efficiency than in any correlated equilibrium with classical signals, and find the answer to be positive. _x000D_ _x000D_

Export metadata

Additional Services

Search Google Scholar

Statistics

frontdoor_oas
Metadaten
Document Type:Article
Language:English
Author:Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD
Chairs and Professorships:Chair of Economics and Information Systems
Year of Completion:2005
Note:
In: International Journal of Quantum Information, 3 (2005) 1, 183-188