Negotiation-range mechanisms: exploring the limits of truthful efficient markets
- This paper introduces a new class of mechanisms based on negotiation between market participants. This model allows us to circumvent Myerson and Satterthwaite's impossibility result and present a bilateral market mechanism that is efficient, individually rational, incentive compatible and budget balanced in the single-unit heterogeneous setting. The underlying scheme makes this combination of desirable qualities possible by reporting a price range for each buyer-seller pair that defines a zone of possible agreements, while the final price is left open for negotiation. The article is available from the ACM Web site, <a target="_blank" href="http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/988772.988775">http://doi.acm.org/10.1145/988772.988775</a>, accessed November 2004. "
| Document Type: | Conference Proceeding |
|---|---|
| Language: | English |
| Author: | Pierfrancesco La MuraORCiD |
| Chairs and Professorships: | Chair of Economics and Information Systems |
| Year of Completion: | 2004 |
| Note: | In: Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, New York, NY, USA, May 17-20, 2004, ed. by J. Breese, J. Feigenbaum and M. Seltzer, New York, NY: ACM Press, 2004, 1-8 |