The tax shield as present value of debt-related tax savings plays an important role in firm valuation. Driving the risk of future debt levels, the firm’s strategy to adjust the absolute debt level to future changes of the firm value, labeled as (re-) financing policy, affects the value of tax shields. Standard discounted cash flow (DCF) models offer two simplified (re-) financing policies originally introduced by Modigliani and Miller (MM) as well as Miles and Ezzell (ME). In this paper, we introduce a discontinuous financing policy that refers to the refinancing intervals, i.e., the maturity structure of the firm’s debt. By deriving APV valuation and beta unlevering equations that allow for this discontinuous financing policy, we show the MM and ME policies to be special cases of the proposed extension. While we document the effect of discontinuous refinancing to be economically significant when leverage is high and refinancing periods are extremely long, our results suggest that for low-levered firms with short refinancing periods, the traditional continuous refinancing-based models (like the Miles/Ezzell model) produce relatively robust value estimates. Combining capital structure and maturity structure choices, our model extends the set of feasible financing policies in DCF valuation models.

This paper uses GLOBE’s performance orientation (PO) dimension to iestigate the relationship between national culture and private equity (PE) performance. We argue that high PO has negative performance implications as it provides the lowest potential for portfolio firms to benefit from a spillover of the distinct PE performance focus, and vice versa. To test this hypothesis, we analyze operating performance metrics of 946 deals from 26 European countries and exit channels of 5093 global deals from 67 countries. Consistent with the “spillover hypothesis”, we find that higher levels of PO are detrimental to efficiency improvements and increase the probability for unsuccessful exits. These findings hold after addressing endogeneity concerns, confounding and measurement error

Under German law the corporate endgame process of obtaining full control over a company offers multiple investment opportunities for investors with high investment flexibility, and is therefore particularly attractive to hedge funds. This paper investigates the determinants of hedge fund investment in corporate endgame processes based on a sample of 76 endgame situations of publicly listed German companies and investment data of 326 hedge funds. Examining characteristics of investment targets, we find that hedge funds invest in companies with a non-dominant majority owner and a high stake of index funds as latter’s limited ability to react in change of control situations creates a supportive investment environment. Hedge funds are most likely to invest after takeover consummation and before announcement of a new endgame transaction. Investigating the determinants of ongoing engagement after initial investment, we find that the ownership of other institutional investors, especially hedge funds, positively affects engagement likelihood, serving as a validation of the own investment approach. Abnormal performance and trading liquidity of target stock also positively affect hedge funds’ engagement. The results indicate that the endgame process in Germany is an attractive investment opportunity for hedge funds, while their involvement also adds complexity to the corporate control process.

Der Lehrstuhl Finanzmanagement und Banken an der HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management ermittelt vierteljährlich Multiplikatoren, Beta-Faktoren und Eigenkapitalkosten für den deutschen Kapitalmarkt und stellt diese auf der Internetseite www.finexpert.info und in CORPORATE FINANCE zur Verfügung. Die Daten zeichnen sich durch Transparenz und Nachvollziehbarkeit aus. Im Folgenden finden Sie die entsprechenden Daten zum Stichtag 15.04.2018.