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In November 2015 German parliament passed a law regulating delisting offers requiring companies to offer shareholders a compensation at least equal to the six-month volume-weighted average price (VWAP) of the stock. This paper analyzes a sample of delisting offers made under the new regulations. We identify two primary motives for delisting. First, delistings linked to preceding takeover offers aim to pressure remaining shareholders into tendering their shares. Second, majority shareholders, leveraging private information, opt to delist and present an offer to minority shareholders when the stock is undervalued. Since institutional investors are often restricted to holding shares listed on regulated markets, they are effectively forced to accept such offers. Our findings suggest that majority shareholders may use delisting offers to take advantage of significant undervaluation caused by external shocks.
Die Bedeutung von ESG (Environmental-, Social, Governance)-Kriterien hat für Anlageentscheidungen von Investoren deutlich zugenommen. Dabei spielt die Diversität des Managementteams eine wichtige Rolle; dahingegen gilt die Private-Equity-Branche nach wie vor als von „weißen Männern“ dominiert. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in diesem Beitrag ein Index dargestellt, der nicht nur die Diversität des Managementteams von Fonds abbildet, sondern diese Diversität auch mit der Performance des Fonds verbindet.
German Takeover Report 2025
(2025)
Der German Takeover Report bildet die Entwicklung wichtiger Größen deutscher Übernahmeangebote nach dem WpÜG ab: Anzahl und Volumen des Übernahmeangebots, gebotene Prämien und Erfolg des Offers. Zusätzlich werden die wichtigsten Eigenschaften der dem Übernahmeangebot nachfolgenden Strukturmaßnahmen (BGAV, Squeeze Out) erfasst. Die aktuelle Ausgabe verdeutlicht für das Jahr 2024 eine weitere leichte Erholung.
“Multiple arbitrage” is an effect on private equity (PE) deal performance connected to buy-and-build (B&B) strategies. Under this strategy, a PE fund acquires a platform company and then sequentially buys other companies (so-called “add ons”) to combine them with the platform company. If the add-on transactions command lower multiples, the average entry multiple of all acquired companies is decreasing with the additional transactions. The reduction of the overall entry multiple contributes positively to the multiple conversion as part of the deal performance. This effect is called multiple arbitrage.
Secondary buyouts (SBOs) appear paradoxical because the surge in SBO activity is met with scepticism from the public and investors regarding their performance. In this paper, we undertake a comprehensive analysis of SBO performance through two distinct lenses: First, we address the prevailing notion of SBOs as “lemons”. These are perceived as opportunities that, following a successful primary buyout (PBO), seemingly leave little room for further value creation. To investigate this “negative correlation hypothesis”, we employ a unique back-to-back sample of 276 cases involving the same firm in both a PBO and an SBO. Analysing the correlation between the internal rate of returns (IRRs) of back-to-back PBO/SBOs, our results do not support the “negative correlation hypothesis”. Second, we directly compare the deal performance of the two related back-to-back buyout rounds. For our back-to-back sample, we find that PBOs display significantly higher IRRs than SBOs. However, after performing a matched comparison adjusting for size and holding period differences, which are two well-known pitfalls of IRR rank orders, our findings suggest that there is no systematic outperformance of SBOs against their PBO comparables. Finally, we analyse differences in operating performance between PBOs and SBOs. Our results do not indicate a significant difference, either based on the back-to-back sample or when comparing PBOs and SBOs against matched public peers. In the light of our findings, we advocate for a reevaluation of the current perception of SBOs. Rather than being dismissed as “second-hand” opportunities, they should be recognised as “second-generation” opportunities deserving closer consideration.