Using a global sample of 26,444 M&A transactions, we empirically iestigate the main drivers of serial acquirer takeover performance, focusing on the benefits of organizational learning and the detriments of post-merger integration (PMI) problems. Taking single acquirers as a control group, we find that multiple deal makers exhibit a 0.4 percentage points lower short-term abnormal return, equal to a $31M shareholder value disadvantage. While learning through experience does not depend on the quantity of acquisitions, serial acquirers can gain proficiency in some specific types of deals (specialized learning hypothesis). When looking at the PMI process, the time between two consecutive transactions and relative deal size are key success factors, suggesting that the capacity of an organization to integrate is limited. This is strong support for the existence of the indigestion hypothesis. Furthermore, we are able to document that overconfidence is a driving force of such problems.

Acquirers paying with shares exhibit significantly lower announcement returns (Andrade et al. (2001)). Further, cash-rich firms tend to make value-decreasing acquisitions due to possible agency conflicts between managers and owners (Harford (1999)). I iestigate the interaction effects of cash-richness and method of payment on an international sample of acquirers. I find that there is a positive interaction between share deals and cash-richness. This is counter-intuitive since share deals signal overvaluation (Myers and Majluf (1984)) and cashrichness signals agency conflicts to the market (Jensen (1986)). The effect is even stronger when using the mode of financing instead of method of payment. An explanation might be that cash-rich firms are not overvalued in the first place because of agency problems or that overvaluation is not that high because the market can value cash more accurately than net assets.

Mit Einführung des Gesetzes zur Angemessenheit der Vorstandsvergütung (VorstAG) kann in Deutschland seit August 2009 die Verwaltung eines börsennotierten Unternehmens die Aktionäre mittels einer nicht-bindenden Abstimmung in die Diskussion um das System der Vorstandsvergütung einbinden. In einer breit angelegten, die deutschen Prime Standard Unternehmen umfassenden Studie untersuchen wir unter welchen Voraussetzungen es zu einer derartigen ‚Say-on-Pay‘-Abstimmung kommt und welche Faktoren ihren Ausgang beeinlussen. Wir inden, dass die Wahrscheinlichkeit einer Abstimmung mit zunehmendem Streubesitz und hoher Medienpräsenz ansteigt. Im Falle einer Abstimmung erhöht sich die Zustimmungsquote mit der Stimmmacht von Paketaktionären. Auch die Einführung eines neuen Vergütungssystems führt zu einer höheren Zustimmung. Wir argumentieren, dass die Verwaltung der Gesellschaft mittels Abstimmung zum einen das Vorstandsvergütungssystem zu legitimieren und zum anderen mögliche Reputationsschäden bei Nichtabhaltung zu vermeiden sucht. Since 2010 the German law allows for non-binding votes on management compensation by shareholders during the annual meeting. In a broad study covering all non-financial German Prime Standard firms we examine determinants affecting (i) the likelihood of a voting and (ii) the result of a vote. We find that the probability of a voting increases with a higher free float and strong media exposure. The approval rate increases with the voting power of blockholders. Moreover the introduction of a new remuneration system also leads to a higher approval rate. We argue that the company’s administration is interested in legitimating the new remuneration system by allowing shareholder to vote and in avoiding reputational losses in case of non-voting. Note: Downloadable document is in German. Keywords: management compensation, remuneration, say-on-pay, corporate governance, Germany, shareholder meeting

available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1100582