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The significant heterogeneity among family firms has emerged as a commonly accepted paradigm in the research field. This systematic literature review establishes how the heterogeneity affects the board of directors, an institution that typically forms the most important pillar in the formal governance system of family businesses. As one of the first, the review provides an overview on the family-related factors that determine the board of directors’ tasks, composition, and processes. The systematic analysis, clustering, and synthesis of previous research yields six main determinants that are specific to the boards of family firms, namely generational stage, family culture, family power, family experience, CEO family stakes, and director kinship ties. From a methodological perspective, a heavy reliance on survey-based quantitative research can be observed in existing studies. For future research, I suggest a stronger focus on the dynamic evolution of the board over time, an integration of alternative theories in addition to agency theory, as well as the use of qualitative research strategies, such as case study research, to better understand the internal processes and evolution of family firm boards.
This cumulative dissertation covers four papers on the management and governance of family firms. The first paper provides a systematic review of the literature on family-related determinants of the board of directors’ tasks, composition and processes in family firms. The review clusters and synthesizes the literature into six major determinants, details the methods used, and provides recommendations for future research in the field. The second paper develops a contingency approach to board task needs of family firms. The paper identifies five contingency factors and demonstrates how board task needs typically evolve over the ownership stages of family businesses. The third paper constitutes a qualitative empirical study on the role of board control in controlling owner family businesses. Based on a multiple case study approach, the study shows that controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing mechanism to mitigate self-control problems. Additionally, the study provides insights on favorable board processes and board composition in the controlling owner setting. Overall, the dissertation underlines the importance of factoring in the influence of family firm heterogeneity on the board of directors. The fourth paper concludes the dissertation with a teaching case study on a small family firm that is exposed to the threat of a disruptive innovation in its industry.
Outsourcing von Transaction Services im Kontext des Lean Bankings BR Deutschland vs. VR China
(2006)
ATB
(2016)
In 2015, Automaten Technik Baumann (ATB) was dismayed to learn that Volkswagen Financial Services had acquired a 92 per cent stake in Sunhill Technologies, one of Europe’s largest providers of mobile parking and ticketing solutions. ATB had focused on the production of parking meters for several decades, but was now seeing a threat to its existing business due to the rise of mobile parking providers. Consumers could now use their smartphone to pay for parking—making parking meters obsolete. Should ATB take the rise of new entrants seriously? Would ATB need to adjust its business model?
Learning Objective:
This case is suitable for business programs at the MBA level, for courses in strategic management, business models, and disruptive innovation. After completion of the case, students will be able to:
- demonstrate that threats from disruptive innovations can affect small-and medium-sized firms, as well as large companies;
- demonstrate that technological innovations are often combined with new business models;
- outline reasons for why it is difficult for incumbents to react to new entrants and innovations;
- and identify and discuss the various strategic alternatives to disruptive market shifts.
Our study examines the role of board control tasks in mitigating self-control problems in controlling owner family businesses. We challenge the common perception that controlling owners do not require and use board control because of the concentration of ownership and management in a single individual. We argue that self-control problems, that is agency problems with oneself, have often been overlooked by existing studies on the relevance of control tasks. By using a multiple case study design, we demonstrate that controlling owners frequently use board control as a self-governing mechanism and develop several propositions on favorable board processes and compositions. Rather than independence, we propose that controlling owners should select their board members based on trust and expertise. Moreover, we propose that probing and challenging behavior by board members in combination with the controlling owner’s willingness to prepare in a formalized manner support the reduction of self-control problems.
One decade after the publication of Corbetta and Salvato (2004), we develop an extension of the contingency approach to the boards of directors of family firms. We argue that the diverging interests among family members are not sufficiently represented in existing contingency factors, and the existing static perspective on boards fails to emphasize the need for board adaptation over time. Consequently, we develop an extended conceptual model of the relationships between ownership stages, contingency factors, and board task needs of family firms. Our propositions highlight a need for board adaptations to ownership stages and recognition of the importance of individual family member interests. Particularly, our theoretical considerations show that controlling owners have a strong need for board advice while the transition to a sibling partnership and cousin consortium gradually push the need for controlling and mediating activities to the forefront. The iolvement of non-family managers is likely to moderate this development. Referring back to the initial contingency model, we propose that not only is one board unlikely to fit all family firms, but one board cannot be expected to fit the entire life-span of a family firm.