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We suggest two economically plausible alternatives to the Lovász-Shapley value for non-negatively weighted TU games (Casajus and Wiese, 2017. Int. J. Game Theory 46 , 295-310), the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley² value. Whereas the former is based on the Lovász extension operator for TU games (Lovász, 1983. Mathematical Programming: The State of the Art, Springer, 235.256; Algaba et al., 2004. Theory Decis. 56, 229.238.), the latter two are based on the dual Lovász extension operator and the Shapley extension operator (Casajus and Kramm, 2021. Discrete Appl. Math. 294, 224.232), respectively.
Asymptotic stability in the dual Lovász-Shapley and the Shapley replicator dynamics for TU games
(2022)
Casajus, Kramm, and Wiese (2020, J. Econ. Theory 186, 104993) study the asymptotic stability in population dynamics derived from finite cooperative games with transferable utility using the Lovász-Shapley value (Casajus and Wiese, 2017, Int. J. Game Theory 45, 1-16) for non-negatively weighted games, where the players are interpreted as types of individuals. We extend their analysis to the population dynamics derived using the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley² value for non-negatively weighted games (Casajus and Kramm, HHL Working Paper 196, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, Germany). As the former, we provide a complete description of asymptotically stable population profiles in both dynamics. In the dual Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic, for example, any asymptotically stable population profile is characterized by a coalition: while the types in the coalition have the same positive share, the other types vanish. In the dual of the game, the per-capita productivity of such a stable coalition must be greater than the per-capita productivity of any proper sub- or supercoalition. In simple monotonic games, this means that exactly the minimal blocking coalitions are stable.
We suggest two alternatives to the Lovász-Shapley value for non-negatively weighted TU games, the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley2 value. Whereas the former is based on the Lovász extension operator for TU games, the latter two are based on extension operators that share certain economically plausible properties with the Lovász extension operator, the dual Lovász extension operator and the Shapley extension operator, respectively.
We study the asymptotic stability in replicator dynamics derived from TU games using the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley2 value for non-negatively weighted games. In particular, we provide a complete description of asymptotically stable population profiles in both dynamics. In the dual Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic, for example, asymptotically stable populations for simple monotonic games correspond to their minimal blocking coalitions.
An extension operator assigns to any TU game its extension, a mapping that assigns a worth to any non-negative resource vector for the players. Algaba et al. (2004) advocate the Lovász extension (Lovász, 1983) as a natural extension operator. This operator is determined by the minimum operator representing one particular CES (constant elasticity of substitution) technology. We explore alternative extension operators, the dual Lovász extension and the Shapley extension, that are based on the only two alternative CES technologies that induce an economically sound behavior of extensions in some sense, the maximum operator and the average operator.
We derive population dynamics from finite cooperative games with transferable utility, where the players are interpreted as types of individuals. We show that any asymptotically stable population profile is characterized by a coalition: while the types in the coalition have the same positive share, the other types vanish. The average productivity of such a stable coalition must be greater than the average productivity of any proper sub- or supercoalition. In simple monotonic games, this means that exactly the minimal winning coalitions are stable. Possible applications are the analysis of the organizational structure of businesses or the population constitution of eusocial species.