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Institute
Purpose
This study explores the negotiation behaviors and strategies employed by experienced entrepreneurs to secure venture capital (VC) funding.
Design/methodology/approach
Using a qualitative approach, we conducted interviews with 32 accomplished founders with track records in securing VC funding. Our conceptual underpinning rests upon an existing negotiation competency model. This study employed a systematic and iterative data analysis method, following an inductive approach grounded in Gioia et al.’s (2013) methodology to conceptualize the unprocessed interview data.
Findings
We identified three dimensions characterizing entrepreneurial negotiation behavior in VC negotiations: negotiation competencies, power tactics, and negotiation style. Furthermore, we identified specific behaviors in these dimensions and explored how entrepreneurs apply these skills in the VC context.
Research limitations/implications
This study contributes a nuanced understanding of entrepreneurs’ negotiation behaviors, opening avenues for further research on effective strategies in entrepreneurial finance.
Practical implications
Entrepreneurs can leverage the identified negotiation strategies to enhance their skills and navigate VC negotiations more effectively, potentially leading to better funding outcomes. Furthermore, training programs can be crafted to encourage the cultivation of these behaviors.
Originality/value
This study is the first to systematically examine the negotiation behaviors and strategies employed by experienced entrepreneurs in VC negotiations, revealing entrepreneurs’ specific behaviors and elucidating how these behaviors are employed within negotiations to provide practical insights.
There is a wide consensus that first offers have a significant impact on negotiation outcomes by causing an anchoring effect. Many aspects of first offers have been analyzed, including factors that lead to making the first offer and characteristics that strengthen the impact of first offers. However, a holistic view of the process of first offers in negotiations remains missing, and significant research gaps must be filled to fully understand the mechanisms of first offers. Furthermore, while extant research contains anecdotal advice for negotiators, no holistic overview of research findings has been presented to date. This study conducted a structured review of 119 journal articles published since 1967, contributing to the field in four main ways: (a) proposing a definition of first offers, (b) integrating previous findings into a process model of first offers in negotiation, (c) summarizing the results to date in a structured literature review, and (d) identifying crucial research gaps that must be addressed. Future research should conduct systematic investigations of the influence of first offers on negotiation outcomes, employing a “negotiation lens” to emphasize the dyadic and interactive character of negotiations.
Beyond the first offer
(2023)
First offers play a significant role in negotiations as they anchor negotiators’ perceptions and influence negotiation outcomes in favor of the first-offer proposer. However, negotiation is a joint decision-making process in which a first offer is typically succeeded by a counteroffer. The impact of a counteroffer has not yet been systematically researched. We propose that a counteroffer influences negotiation outcomes like a first offer. In addition, we conceptualize the “anchor zone” as the distance between the first offer and the counteroffer. We theorize that the anchor zone influences negotiation outcomes because it captures additional information compared to a single offer. To test our hypotheses, we conducted two studies: Study 1 was a vignette study (n = 190) in which participants reacted to a counteroffer that they received based on their first offer as part of a simulated negotiation. Study 2 was an online experiment (n = 212) in which participants negotiated by exchanging offers with no further communication. Our analysis suggests that the counteroffer is a significant predictor of economic outcomes. Thus, it works like a first offer, but with a lower impact. In addition, the anchor zone predicted how far the final agreement was from the first offer. Furthermore, we found that the third offer, the average concessions, and the number of offers mediated the effects of the counteroffer and anchor zone on economic outcomes. Finally, we discovered that a more aggressive counteroffer reduced the subjective value of both negotiators.
Purpose:
Extensive empirical evidence suggests that procedural justice (PJ) and distributive justice (DJ) are key success factors for achieving durable peace negotiations. This paper aims to investigate how complexity affects these factors and the outcomes in negotiations. Design/methodology/approach:
The qualitative study is based on an examination of the peace negotiations that led to the 2016 agreement between the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia - Ejercito del Pueblo and the Colombian Government. Based on document analysis, the authors examined in detail how and where in the process the principles of PJ and DJ were applied. The authors then examined the implementation progress after 2016 and placed the peace process in the overall context of the Colombian conflict.
Findings:
The authors found that the principles of PJ and DJ were present in both the negotiation process and the agreement. The negotiations were successful and satisfactory solutions could be found for all issues. The complexity of the conflict is reflected in the limited coverage of the peace negotiations. Not all groups, interests and subconflicts could be included in the negotiations. This limits their contribution to a durable peace in Colombia. Conflicts that remain unresolved also have a negative effect on the implementation of the agreement.
Practical implications:
For conflict management, this implies that the negotiations should not be viewed as "one-and-done" but rather as a progressive, ongoing process. The agreement is only the nucleus for achieving total peace. It must be actively advanced and defended.
Originality/value:
This study offers new qualitative insights into how PJ and DJ function in negotiations. It also establishes a systematic connection between PJ and DJ and complexity, introduces the notion of coverage and, thereby, opens a new perspective on the management of conflict complexity.
Purpose
Negotiations with venture capitalists (VCs) play a crucial role in the entrepreneurial financing process. Habitual entrepreneurs are generally able to secure more venture capital funding and on better deal terms than novices. This study investigates the disparities in negotiation competencies between habitual and novice entrepreneurs during VC funding negotiations.
Design/methodology/approach
This study employed a qualitative approach to investigate the variation in negotiation competencies between habitual and novice entrepreneurs, utilizing the negotiation competency model (NCM). The data analysis and interpretation adopted an inductive concept development approach. A total of 21 semi-structured interviews were conducted with seasoned VCs located in Europe, all of whom had actively engaged in funding negotiations with both habitual and novice entrepreneurs.
Findings
The findings revealed substantial disparities between novice and habitual entrepreneurs in VC negotiations. Although not all competencies of the NCM exhibited variances, the results indicate three primary dimensions contributing to these differences: expertise, reputation, and negotiation competence.
Originality/value
This study is groundbreaking as it represents one of the earliest empirical investigations into the entrepreneurial negotiation competencies within VC negotiations. The findings endeavor to narrow the gap between novice and habitual entrepreneurs in VC negotiations by pinpointing the distinct variations between these two groups, which hold significant practical implications. Furthermore, this study expands the conceptual framework of the NCM by identifying supplementary competencies within the realm of VC negotiations.
“What is your best price?”
(2023)
Much attention has been devoted to the “first offer” in negotiation research. Rightly so, as strong empirical evidence shows that the first offer has a significant impact on the negotiated outcome and, therefore, is a highly relevant topic for negotiation scholars and practitioners. Scholars typically recommend making the first offer. However, in the field, we have observed an alternative opening tactic—asking for the best price that the counterpart is willing to accept. This question represents a real alternative to making the first offer by initiating the discussion of specific settlement proposals, provided the counterpart answers the query. Does it, however, lead the other side to make a better offer? How does the question impact the economic and relational outcomes of the negotiation? Is it advisable to use this tactic in negotiations? We investigated these questions based on a controlled laboratory experiment, in which 227 dyads of cellphone buyers and sellers negotiated synchronously via a text chat. We found that the best-price question has an impact on not only the first offer but also the negotiation outcome. When the buyers in our experiment asked the question, the results were not significantly different than those from negotiations in which they made the first offer. This effect was driven by the first offer in response to the question. Additionally, we found that the best-price question did not negatively impact the relational outcome. Moreover, the effect was reduced when list price information was available. These findings suggest rethinking the traditional view of the offer-counteroffer sequence and provide an alternative opening tactic to making the first offer in the context of high information asymmetry.