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Markets for corporate control can foster innovation and growth due to the reallocation of resources and are thus vital for the efficiency of global economies. But, to efficiently reallocate resources, markets for corporate control have to be efficient themselves. The aim of this dissertation is to shed light on both, inefficiencies such as persistent principle-agent conflicts and the effect of the regulatory environment on corporate transactions in Germany. The first section serves as an introduction to reflect on research regarding corporate transactions, the principle- agent theory and market regulations as well as to summarize the three research papers and their current publication status. The first paper focusses on the effect of personal preferences of target CEOs on corporate transactions and is presented in the second section. Based on these insights, the second paper is dedicated to Fairness Opinions and their effect on corporate transactions and is presented in the third section. To further analyze the regulatory environment, the third paper focusses on legal thresholds that bidders have to surpass to gain full control over targets in the German market for corporate control and is presented in the fourth section.
This cumulative dissertation explores investor behavior across three key groups: insurance companies, ETF investors, as well as financial advisors.
First, it examines how different organizational forms of insurers influence investment and underwriting decisions. Because Insurers act as agents of their clients, they face conflicts of interest between policyholders and owners. This dissertation analyzes how mutual and stocklisted insurers approach risk, finding that mutual insurers are less likely to engage in risky underwriting.
Second, ETF investor primarly implement passive strategies, but frequently make active allocation and timing decisions. This dissertation investigates whether such behavior results in superior or inferior returns, concluding that ETF investors' performance overall corresponds to 'dumb money' behavior as seen in mutual funds.
Third, the dissertation analyzes the effect of a commission ban on household returns. It finds that these bans so far significantly increase household returns by reducing conflicts of interest and promoting a different asset allocation.
The private equity industry has experienced a decade marked by substantial growth. However, as the investment landscape for capital providers has become more complex, the leadership team of private equity firms plays a more crucial role in navigating significant challenges. Focused on two themes, this dissertation explores the background of top management teams (TMTs) in private equity firms, its correlation with fund performance, and the backgrounds of deal lead partners and their risk assessment of leveraged buyout (LBO) investments. The first essay investigates TMT diversity, emphasizing its multi-dimensional connection with fund performance. The study differentiates between socio-demographic and occupational diversity, uncovering various effects on fund outcomes. The second essay constructs a diversity index based on a comprehensive methodology to maximize the correlation between TMT diversity and private equity fund performance. The third essay explores the risk profiles of private equity partners in LBO investment decisions, establishing a link between socio-demographic backgrounds and distinct risk assessment archetypes. This dissertation contributes to the literature in the intersection of private equity and TMT, providing insights for scholars and practitioners alike.
Exploring takeover dynamics, this dissertation uncovers CEO influence in deal negotiations, revealing a quad-ratic relationship between target CEO age and offer success. It examines Fairness Opinions' role in corporate control, emphasizing their impact on management recommendations and takeover success, particularly with independent assessors. The study outlines how signaling in corporate transactions can be both beneficial and potentially manipulative, depending on the alignment of incentives and the availability of information.
Interactions involving multiple parties and necessitating their agreement are pervasive in both market and non-market settings. As the number of participants increases, these situations become progressively complex to describe and analyze. Despite the prolific nature of such scenarios, a comprehensive conceptual framework addressing such settings is often lacking. The focus of this dissertation lies in a distinct type of multilateral interaction, where a commitment of a group, or a coalition, of participants is required for achieving a positive surplus. The analysis encompasses three scenarios, namely, government formation in parliamentary democracies, bilateral trading on a market with multiple buyers and sellers, and resource allocation in the US presidential campaign. This dissertation proposes an approach that provides axiomatic foundations for a theory of coalition formation in these settings, and, for two of these scenarios, simultaneously provides an empirically accurate forecast methodology.