## Chair of Economics and Information Systems

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- TU game (13)
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#### Institute

Gamson-Shapley Laws
(2023)

We consider a set of empirical assumptions formulated by Gamson (1961), namely, Gamson’s Laws, which remain at the heart of government formation forecast in parliamentary systems. While the critical resource postulated in Gamson’s approach is the proportion of votes received by each party, other versions of Gamson’s Laws can be defined by a different choice of critical resource. We model coalition formation as a cooperative game, and provide axiomatic foundations for a version of Gamson’s Laws in which the critical resource is identified with strategic influence, as measured by the Shapley value. We compare the empirical accuracy of the resulting Gamson–Shapley theory against the original Gamson’s Laws in a panel of 33 parliamentary elections, and find that it leads to significantly more accurate predictions of both coalition structure and power distribution. Finally, we propose an extension of the Gamson–Shapley approach which also incorporates information about policy distance among coalition partners. In particular, we discuss the advantages of the extended approach in the context of the German elections in 1987 and 2017.

We consider an analytic formulation of the class of efficient, linear, and symmetric values for TU games that, in contrast to previous approaches, which rely on the standard basis, rests on the linear representation of TU games by unanimity games. Unlike most of the other formulae for this class, our formula allows for an economic interpretation in terms of taxing the Shapley payoffs of unanimity games. We identify those parameters for which the values behave economically sound, i.e., for which the values satisfy desirability and positivity. Put differently, we indicate requirements on fair taxation in TU games by which solidarity among players is expressed.

We study the asymptotic stability in replicator dynamics derived from TU games using the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley2 value for non-negatively weighted games. In particular, we provide a complete description of asymptotically stable population profiles in both dynamics. In the dual Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic, for example, asymptotically stable populations for simple monotonic games correspond to their minimal blocking coalitions.

The states of the qubit, the basic unit of quantum information, are 2×2 positive semi-definite Hermitian matrices with trace 1. We contribute to the program to axiomatize quantum mechanics by characterizing these states in terms of an entropic uncertainty principle formulated on an eight-point phase space. We do this by employing Rényi entropy (a generalization of Shannon entropy) suitably defined for the signed phase-space probability distributions that arise in representing quantum states.

We suggest two alternatives to the Lovász-Shapley value for non-negatively weighted TU games, the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley2 value. Whereas the former is based on the Lovász extension operator for TU games, the latter two are based on extension operators that share certain economically plausible properties with the Lovász extension operator, the dual Lovász extension operator and the Shapley extension operator, respectively.

The Coleman–Shapley index
(2019)

The Coleman power of a collectivity to act (CPCA) is a popular statistic that reflects the ability of a committee to pass a proposal. Applying the Shapley value to that measure, we derive a new power index—the Coleman–Shapley index (CSI)—indicating each voter’s contribution to the CPCA. The CSI is characterized by four axioms: anonymity, the null voter property, the transfer property, and a property stipulating that the sum of the voters’ power equals the CPCA. Similar to the Shapley–Shubik index (SSI) and the Penrose–Banzhaf index (PBI), our new index reflects the expectation of being a pivotal voter. Here, the coalitional formation model underlying the CPCA and the PBI is combined with the ordering approach underlying the SSI. In contrast to the SSI, voters are ordered not according to their agreement with a potential bill, but according to their vested interest in it. Among the most interested voters, power is then measured in a way similar to the PBI. Although we advocate the CSI over the PBI so as to capture a voter’s influence on whether a proposal passes, our index gives new meaning to the PBI. The CSI is a decomposer of the PBI, splitting the PBI into a voter’s power as such and the voter’s impact on the power of the other voters by threatening to block any proposal. We apply our index to the EU Council and the UN Security Council.

Is the world quantum? An active research line in quantum foundations is devoted to exploring what constraints can rule out the postquantum theories that are consistent with experimentally observed results. We explore this question in the context of epistemics, and ask whether agreement between observers can serve as a physical principle that must hold for any theory of the world. Aumann’s seminal Agreement Theorem states that two observers (of classical systems) cannot agree to disagree. We propose an extension of this theorem to no-signaling settings. In particular, we establish an Agreement Theorem for observers of quantum systems, while we construct examples of (postquantum) no-signaling boxes where observers can agree to disagree. The PR box is an extremal instance of this phenomenon. These results make it plausible that agreement between observers might be a physical principle, while they also establish links between the fields of epistemics and quantum information that seem worthy of further exploration.

An extension operator assigns to any TU game its extension, a mapping that assigns a worth to any non-negative resource vector for the players. Algaba et al. (2004) advocate the Lovász extension (Lovász, 1983) as a natural extension operator. This operator is determined by the minimum operator representing one particular CES (constant elasticity of substitution) technology. We explore alternative extension operators, the dual Lovász extension and the Shapley extension, that are based on the only two alternative CES technologies that induce an economically sound behavior of extensions in some sense, the maximum operator and the average operator.

We introduce the concepts of the players’ second-order productivities in cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) and of the players’ second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for TU games. Second-order productivities are conceptualized as second-order marginal contributions, that is, how one player affects another player’s marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them by entering these coalitions. Second-order payoffs are conceptualized as the effect of one player leaving the game on the payoff of another player. We show that the Shapley value is the unique efficient one-point solution for TU games that reflects the players’ second-order productivities in terms of their second-order payoffs.

Contextual mechanism design
(2019)

We provide a concise characterization of the class of positively weighted Shapley values by three properties, two standard properties, efficiency and marginality, and a relaxation of the balanced contributions property called the weak balanced contributions property. Balanced contributions: the amount one player gains or loses when another player leaves the game equals the amount the latter player gains or loses when the former player leaves the game. Weakly balanced contributions: the direction (sign) of the change of one player’s payoff when another player leaves the game equals the direction (sign) of the change of the latter player’s payoff when the former player leaves the game. Given this characterization, the symmetric Shapley value can be “extracted”from the class of positively weighted Shapley values by either replacing the weak balanced contributions property with the standard symmetry property or by strengthening the former into the balanced contributions property.

We relax the assumption that the grand coalition must form by imposing the axiom of Cohesive efficiency: the total payoffs that the players can share is equal to the maximal total worth generated by a coalition structure. We determine how the three main axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley value are affected when the classical axiom of Efficiency is replaced by Cohesive efficiency. We introduce and characterize two variants of the Shapley value that are compatible with Cohesive efficiency. We show that our approach can also be applied to the variants of more egalitarian values.

We introduce the concepts of the components' second-order productivities in cooperative games with transferable utility (TU games) with a coalition structure (CS games) and of the components' second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for CS games as generalizations of the players' second-order productivities in TU games and of the players' second-order payoffs for one-point solutions for TU games (Casajus, 2021, Discrete Appl. Math. 304, 212-219). The players' second-order productivities are conceptualized as second-order marginal contributions, that is, how one player affects another player's marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them by entering these coalitions. The players' second-order payoffs are conceptualized as the effect of one player leaving the game on the payoff of another player. Analogously, the components' second-order productivities are conceptualized as their second-order productivities in the game between components; the components' second-order payoffs are conceptualized as their second-order payoffs in the game between components. We show that the Owen value is the unique efficient one-point solution for CS games that reflects the players' and the components' second-order productivities in terms of their second-order payoffs.

Asymptotic stability in the dual Lovász-Shapley and the Shapley² replicator dynamics for TU games
(2022)

Casajus, Kramm, and Wiese (2020, J. Econ. Theory 186, 104993) study the asymptotic stability in population dynamics derived from finite cooperative games with transferable utility using the Lovász-Shapley value (Casajus and Wiese, 2017, Int. J. Game Theory 45, 1-16) for non-negatively weighted games, where the players are interpreted as types of individuals. We extend their analysis to the population dynamics derived using the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley² value for non-negatively weighted games (Casajus and Kramm, HHL Working Paper 196, HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management, Leipzig, Germany). As the former, we provide a complete description of asymptotically stable population profiles in both dynamics. In the dual Lovász-Shapley replicator dynamic, for example, any asymptotically stable population profile is characterized by a coalition: while the types in the coalition have the same positive share, the other types vanish. In the dual of the game, the per-capita productivity of such a stable coalition must be greater than the per-capita
productivity of any proper sub- or supercoalition. In simple monotonic games, this means that exactly the minimal blocking coalitions are stable.

We suggest two economically plausible alternatives to the Lovász-Shapley value for non-negatively weighted TU games (Casajus and Wiese, 2017. Int. J. Game Theory 46 , 295-310), the dual Lovász-Shapley value and the Shapley² value. Whereas the former is based on the Lovász extension operator for TU games (Lovász, 1983. Mathematical Programming: The State of the Art, Springer, 235.256; Algaba et al., 2004. Theory Decis. 56, 229.238.), the latter two are based on the dual Lovász extension operator and the Shapley extension operator (Casajus and Kramm, 2021. Discrete Appl. Math. 294, 224.232), respectively.

The principle of differential monotonicity for cooperative games states that the differential of two players' payoffs weakly increases whenever the differential of these players' marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them weakly increases. Together with the standard efficiency property and a relaxation of the null player property, differential monotonicity characterizes the egalitarian Shapley values, i.e., the coex mixtures of the Shapley value and the equal division value for games with more than two players. For games that contain more than three players, we show that, cum grano salis, this characterization can be improved by using a substantially weaker property than differential monotonicity. Weak differential monotonicity refers to two players in situations where one player's change of marginal contributions to coalitions containing neither of them is weakly greater than the other player's change of these marginal contributions. If, in such situations, the latter player's payoff weakly/strictly increases, then the former player's payoff also weakly/strictly increases.