Joint Africa EU Strategy

Action Plan 2011-2013

Introductory Part

(1) On the basis of the Joint Strategy, the Summit meeting adopted the Action Plan 2011-2013, welcomed the major achievements which have been realized since the previous Summit (Dec. 2007) and recognized the Joint Strategy's potential to deliver more and better results.

(2) In view of the overarching Summit theme "Investment, economic growth and job creation" the meeting underlined the essential link between a reinvigorated economic cooperation and regional integration via different sectors, including the private sector, with a reinforced cooperation in the thematic partnerships under the Joint Strategy: peace and security, democratic and economic governance and respect for human rights are prerequisites of development. These assets are essential for the creation of an investment-friendly environment that makes best use of domestic resources and attracts investments. The development of Africa's vast human capital requires a focus on skills-development, innovation and entrepreneurship, which should be complemented with a comprehensive approach to social and labour market policies. Without a food-secure, educated and healthy population, both economic growth and poverty reduction remains elusive. Regional Integration, trade, migration and mobility, adaptation and mitigation regarding climate change together with sustainable investment in key sectors such as ICT, energy, raw materials or Science and Technology, agricultural research can build on these foundations to foster sustainable, knowledge-generating and competitive economies.

(3) In view of these interdependencies, the Action Plan 2011-2013 will focus on the following partnerships:

Partnership 1: Peace and Security

(4) The Summit welcomed the progress achieved in the implementation of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) and agreed to build upon the operationalisation of APSA to address peace and security challenges in the African continent. Further work will build on ongoing cooperation with the African regional organizations, the results of AU-conducted APSA assessment and the AU/RECs/RMs indicative APSA Road Map, which will, once finalized, serve as a reference document for future support to APSA by the EU and other partners.

(5) The Summit stressed importance of the follow-up given to the Prodi-Panel Report on predictable, sustainable and flexible funding for African Peace-support operations. Future capacity building measures, including a new cycle of Amani Africa will be priorities with the objective to fully integrate the actual requirements of ongoing conflict prevention initiatives and crisis management operations. The accompanying political dialogue will be reinforced, including with the UN.

(6) The Summit expressed its firm determination to stand united in the protection of civilians in armed conflict, including children, following up on 1674 and UNSC-R 1894. Particular attention should also be paid to women, peace and security, following up on UNSC-R 1325 and UNSC-R 1820, ensuring the equal participation and full involvement of women in all efforts for the maintenance and promotion of peace and security, including peacebuilding.

(7) Furthermore, it agreed to pursue cooperation with a view to building up local resilience capacities to address the transnational security threats posed interalia by Climate Change, crime and terrorism in an integrated and comprehensive manner.

Partnership 2: Democratic Governance and Human Rights

(8) The promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central objective of the Africa-EU partnership. In this respect, the newly established Platform for Dialogue on Governance and Human Rights should enable Africa and the EU to jointly address key issues of common concern with a view to formulate shared governance agendas and recommendations and to enhance the Africa -EU Partnership. This should include coordinated action in responding to political crises, support for the African Governance Architecture and economic governance. In this context, the AU decision to dedicate the January 2011 AU Summit to Shared Values was welcomed.

(9) The Summit emphasised the importance of an effective multilateral system and reaffirmed the joint determination to strengthen their cooperation in these multilateral fora. In this context, both sides have committed to work together to ensure a better African and European cooperation in relevant international bodies, including the UN.

(10) The Summit confirmed the joint determination to strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation.

Partnership 3: Regional integration, Trade and infrastructure

(11) Regional Integration, Trade and Investment are vectors of economic stability and inclusive and sustainable growth. Well integrated regional markets with efficient infrastructure will attract investment and facilitate business, enhance employment creation and revenues, and improve access to better and more goods and services. The Summit agreed to engage in political dialogue at the appropriate level with a view to finding solutions to common concerns on Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as well as to exchange views and information on the development dimension and the impact on African economies of EU-Africa trade agreements. This includes the strengthening of the cooperation in the fields of internal markets and financial services, including the sharing of experiences.

(12) Building on the ongoing dialogue regarding cooperation on raw materials, the Summit agreed to cooperate on issues such as capacity building, governance, infrastructure and investment and geological knowledge and skills, and transparency of mining contracts.

(13) Recognising the crucial role of infrastructure development in regional integration, focus will be on areas such as energy, transport, agriculture health, water and ICT infrastructure development in Africa, reinforcing the necessary interconnections within Africa and between Africa and Europe. There is a shared and clear commitment to strengthen the policy and regulatory dialogue in this domain, and enhance concrete cooperation, notably as regards the policy and regulatory framework to attract and to facilitate African and European private direct investment and the development of private-public-partnership (PPP) schemes.

(14) Both sides were committed to intensifying the cooperation on information and communications technologies and space applications with the objective to strengthen Africa's participation in the Information Revolution.

Partnership 4: MDGs

(15) The Summit underlined the need to live up to the respective commitments taken at the UN High Level Event on the MDGs in September 2010 in New York to mobilize the necessary resources, actors and policies, with the aim to accelerate progress towards the attainment of all the MDGs in Africa by 2015. They are all interlinked, mutually dependent and reinforcing and thus require a holistic, rights-based approach which addresses the impact of off-track MDGs on the achievement of progress in all areas. Priority was set to achieving the MDGs in promoting gender equality, health, food security, education and to accelerate progress on underlying policy and structures, including statistics. The implementation of the 2nd Action Plan will be instrumental in this regard, including its specific activities on maternal, newborn and child health, gender, primary and secondary education, land policy and sustainable development, access to water and sanitation and people with disabilities.

(16) In this context, the Summit agreed to further align initiatives of EU and AU Member States behind the CAADP processes for food security and agriculture and to foster the cooperation on accelerating the implementation of the African Land Policy Guidelines.

(17) The Summit recalled the role of agriculture as a dominant economic sector in which Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) standards are central and agreed to work together towards the harmonization and enhanced capacities of SPS frameworks in Africa, with reference to international food safety, animal health and plant health standards. Capacity building in SPS standards is of great importance for African agricultural sector. In this regard, the Summit agreed to promote intensive cooperation in this area with a view to enhance African capacities. The EU could provide assistance to the African countries in this area.

Partnership 5: Energy

(18) Access to sustainable and affordable energy and energy services is a key issue for African and European citizens. With its vast and untapped natural resources, Africa is an ideal place to develop new technologies and renewable energies, while the EU is particularly well equipped to support capacity building and provide renewable energy and energy efficiency technologies and assistance for the establishment of an adequate regulatory- and investment framework.

(19) The Summit fully supported the implementation of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme and the political targets agreed at the Vienna High Level Meeting on Energy in September 2010, to be reached by 2020, including to bring access to modern and sustainable energy services to an additional 100 million Africans; to double the capacity of cross border electricity connections both within Africa and between Africa and Europe; to double the use of natural gas in Africa as well as to increase African gas exports to Europe; to increase the use of renewable energy in Africa and to improve energy efficiency in Africa in all sectors.

Partnership 6: Climate change and Environment

(20) Sustainable inclusive growth and development requires strategies that address economic, social and environmental challenges. The development of a 'Green Economy' provides both Africa and the EU with opportunities for new jobs and growth. To this end, cooperation on climate friendly technologies will be intensified and CDM and new emerging mechanisms utilized to the greatest possible extent. In this perspective, the meeting reaffirmed the shared post-Copenhagen objective to finalize an ambitious, legally binding post-2012 agreement.

(21) Having aligned their positions in the preparatory phase, the EU and Africa will unite their efforts for a successful outcome of Cancun, underlining the need of a balanced approach as regards adaptation and mitigation; of reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to prioritise adaptation funding on the most vulnerable developing countries, particularly in Africa, including through the implementation of the 2nd phase of the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI) and the ClimDev initiative.

(22) The Summit recalled the commitment made by European leaders to make available 7.2 bn € in 2010-2012 for fast-start Climate Change projects and initiatives, out of which a significant part will be available for Africa.

Partnership 7: Migration, Mobility and Employment

(23) The Summit stressed the need to facilitate mobility and better manage legal migration in order to enhance the development impact of migration. The importance of eradicating the trafficking in human beings was underlined. Particular emphasis was put on illegal or irregular migratory flows and the further reduction of them, including through application of existing readmission provisions. The need to ensure the human rights of migrants, and strengthen protection for asylum seekers and refugees was also underscored.

(24) The Summit confirmed the commitment of all partners to create more and better jobs through the promotion of sustainable and inclusive growth, acknowledging the role of all stakeholders, including social partners and the private sector. It agreed to further intensify dialogue and cooperation in this area, focusing in particular on questions related to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa

(25) With respect to the mobility of students and academics, it was agreed to reinforce existing programmes such as Eramus Mundus, Edulink and Nyerere, together with initiatives such as the Pan-African University and Tuning Educational Structures and Programmes

(26) The Summit emphasized the need to strengthen the role of Diasporas in the African development process, and maximize the development benefits of remittances.

Partnership 8: Science, Info Society and Space

(27) Actions under this partnership, including capacity building, will leverage faster inclusive economic growth and social development in Africa. The resulting knowledge-generating/knowledge based economy will help address more efficiently the major common problems and global challenges, and will be able to compete more effectively in rapidly evolving world markets. The Summit therefore welcomed progress thus far and encouraged all stakeholders to contribute to the timely implementation of the Second Action Plan for Science, Information Society and Space.

(28) The Summit agreed to launch a high-level Science and Technology policy dialogue at Senior Officials- and at Ministerial level to strengthen the Science and Technology cooperation framework and to ensure the necessary guidance in the pursuit of agreed objectives.

Delivering Results: from commitments to joint action

(29) The Summit recalled some of the deliverables achieved under the JAES so far, including the € 1 billion to support the African Peace and Security Agenda and Architecture, the 1bnFood Facility, the training for Election observers, the € 168 million in grants which have mobilised a total financing of about €2 billion for infrastructure projects in Africa, the creation of a Diaspora Network, the access to sustainable energy services for 2.5 million people, the Joint Climate Change Declaration endorsed at this Summit meeting, and the African Research Grants and awards to promote science and technology in Africa. These demonstrate the ability of the two continents to produce visible results that benefit African and European citizens and the potential of the Joint Strategy to deliver more and better in the future.

(30) With respect to the implementation of the Action Plan 2011-2013, the Summit confirmed the principles of shared efforts and responsibilities, and underlined the readiness to cooperate with all committed African and European stakeholders (civil society, parliaments, private sector, local authorities) and with interested international partners.

(31) As a driving force behind the development of African and European economies and translating the above mentioned political objectives into a partnership of concrete results, a stronger engagement of the private sector will be essential. It will be equally important to establish closer relations with EU and International Financial institutions (EIB, WB, AfDB and BADEA). Moreover, following the recent AU Summit in Kampala, both sides agree to further engage in the discussions on the African proposals to jointly establish an African Integration Facility to support the implementation of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan.

(32) The Summit agreed to examine flagship initiatives in each of the five African regions as soon as they are jointly identified on the basis of existing instruments; NPCA was identified as a key instrument to support and coordinate such agreed initiatives. There was agreement to build future implementation activities on a reinforced cooperation with the Regional Economic Communities concerned.

(33) Finally, the Summit urged all stakeholders to deliver concrete results which will positively and directly affect people's life. Each partnership should be assessed on this basis. With the Lisbon Treaty entering into force, relations with Africa have become an integral part of the EU's overall political, economic, social and humanitarian agenda. This will ensure greater consistency and coherence between the EU's Africa policy and its overall interests, ambitions and policies. It will also offer Africa, which is consolidating its institutional architecture, a chance to better engage with the EU on a strategic level, and allow both partners to coordinate or align their positions in the run-up to major international events and ensure greater impact.

JAES Action Plan 2011-13:

Cross-cutting issues

Both sides agree on the following options on cross-cutting issues to enhance the effectiveness of the Action Plan and to improve its working methods.

Introduction

The Action Plan 2011-2013 provides a framework to implement JAES priorities collectively agreed upon and adopted at the Summit in November 2010 by the African and European Heads of State and Government. The AU and EU Commissions will continue to play an active role in the implementation, but cannot deliver alone on the Action Plan's ambitious commitments. Therefore, priority will be given to better define how activities implemented at the national, regional and continental levels by African and European Member States, RECs and other key stakeholders including the private sector will contribute to deliver on the collective commitments and improve the impact and visibility of the Action Plan 2011-2013.

I. JAES: **enhanced political dialogue and coordination**

Political and policy dialogue:

Currently, African and European Heads of State and Government meet every three years at Summit level to take decisions concerning relations between the two continents, embedded within the Joint Africa-EU Strategy. In between Summits, six-monthly Ministerial meetings carry the political dialogue forward, review the implementation of the Joint Strategy / Action Plans, and provide political guidance as necessary. Recently, these dialogues of Foreign Ministers have started to be complemented by sector-specific Ministerial or Senior Officials meetings and which were prepared by experts, taking into account inputs from JEGs and the Joint Task Force.

1. Political dialogue at the level of Heads of State and Government and Foreign Ministers: Following the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the EU side, the representation of the EU in Political Dialogue meetings at Summit and Foreign Ministers level has changed. The African side will decide on its mode of representation at a later stage. Both sides agree to seize the opportunities offered by the EU's new institutional arrangements to further intensify the formal and informal contacts between European and African Leaders and their respective services on regular and ad hoc basis.

2. Sectoral political / policy dialogue: Africa and EU have agreed to enhance the frequency, scope and effectiveness of their thematic policy dialogue in key priority areas. Joint Experts Groups and other competent African and EU bodies will assess the possibility of holding sectoral Ministerial / SOM meetings, including in the margins of African, European or international high level events, which need to be adequately prepared by the competent bodies on both sides. The AU and EU Commissions will seek to enhance the effectiveness of sectoral policy dialogue in the annual College-to-College meetings, including through broader participation of their respective line DGs, departments and services in the preparation and follow-up.

3. Dialogue at national and at regional level: The Joint Strategy and the implementation of the Action Plan 2011-2013 will be systematically included in political dialogue meetings between African regions and countries and the EU.

4. Cooperation in the UN, in international financial institutions and in other international fora: Dialogue and cooperation between African and European Heads of Missions (HoMs) and experts in New York, Geneva and elsewhere will be systematically strengthened, notably with a view to better understand respective positions, to define and defend common approaches, and to follow-up initiatives in the various partnerships. EU Delegations and the AU representations and other African counterparts will engage on a more systematic basis, including through the setting up of appropriate flexible EU-Africa dialogue- and coordination arrangements.

Coordination

5. AU and EU Commissions: The two Commissions will further strengthen their respective internal coordination mechanisms for the implementation of the Joint Strategy.

6. Coordination of European partners:
   a. EU Coordination in Brussels: Efforts will be made to strengthen the coordination between capitals and Council working groups in Brussels to ensure coherence and complementarity between bilateral initiatives and collective EU commitments, and to ensure stronger coordination and collaboration between the different geographical working groups dealing with Africa, in line with the principle of treating Africa as one.

   b. EU Delegations: With the establishment of the European External Action Service (EEAS), the role of EU Delegations in African capitals has been strengthened. All EU Delegations in Africa, but more particularly the EU Delegations to the AU and in RECs capitals, will play an important role in ensuring effective EU coordination and in promoting awareness and ownership among Member States.

   c. EU coordination in Addis: The coordination between the EU Delegation and Member States' representations will be strengthened with a view to enhancing coherence and visibility of EU positions, including within the AU PG.

7. **Coordination of African partners**:

   a. AU coordination in Addis Ababa: steps will be taken to strengthen the coordination between the AU-PRC and its relevant sub-Committees on the one hand, and the African capitals and Group of African Ambassadors in Brussels on the other hand.

   b. Coordination with RECs: efforts will be made to systematically address all JAES-related issues within the framework of the 6-monthly AU-RECs coordination meetings;

c. AU Delegation to the EU: The AU Permanent Mission to the EU and the ACP Group follows the Africa-EU cooperation, the coordination of the group of African ambassadors in Brussels and the implementation of the Cotonou ACP-EU partnership agreement, and represents the AU in the 27 EU Member States. The role of the AU Mission in the effective implementation of the Strategy and the Action Plan will therefore be enhanced. If need be, its capacity will be further strengthened to enable it better perform this role.

8. Synergies and coordination between the Joint Strategy / Action Plan and other EU-Africa cooperation frameworks: Both sides agree to strive for more synergies and better coordination between the Joint Strategy and other existing cooperation frameworks and – instruments between the EU and African Partners (Cotonou-Agreement for sub-Saharan countries, ENP/Union for the Mediterranean for Northern Africa, TDCA/DCI for South Africa), notably through coordination meetings in the margins of the meetings of the respective joint cooperation meetings and institutions.

II. JAES institutional architecture and working arrangements

9. Joint Expert Groups (JEGs): Guidelines defining the mandate, composition and working methods for JEGs have been endorsed by the 11th Africa-EU Ministerial Troika[1] as a living document to steer the Joint Experts Groups in their work. The Ministerial Meeting on 26.04.2010 endorsed a joint paper with options to improve the implementation of the Joint Strategy. JEGs will actively re-examine these options and implement the necessary arrangements to improve their functioning. Such arrangements could include an agreement of internal working guidelines or on handing over responsibilities for coordinating the implementation of specific aspects of the partnerships to other existing bodies such as the African Peace Facility JCC or the Steering Committee of the Infrastructure Partnership.

10. While avoiding a "one size fits all approach, JEGs will also address, in addition to the specific proposals to enhance the effectiveness of their individual work, the following cross-cutting issues:

    a. Co-chairs and the two Commissions will consult their respective constituencies ahead of JEG meetings, by convening coordination meetings.

    b. JEGs will seek a better connection of their work with the political decision making process, and will examine possibilities to provide inputs to and to receive the necessary guidance from competent political bodies, sectoral Senior Officials or Ministerial meetings (cf. para.2 above)

11. Both sides will seek to involve the the African Development Bank (ADB), the European Investment Bank (EIB), and national or regional development finance institutions more actively in the implementation of the Partnerships.

[1] http://www.africa-eu-partnership.org/sites/default/files/20081121_final_jeg_guidelines_and_mandate_1.doc

12. Africa-EU Joint Task Force (JTF): The participation in the JTF has been enhanced to allow stakeholders to contribute more actively to the implementation of the Joint Strategy. The JTF will improve coordination between the key actors for the Action Plan's implementation, namely the two Commissions, the EU External Action Service, the two Parliaments, African and EU JEG co-chairs, chefs de files, RECs, private sector and civil society representatives (for the African side through AU-ECOSOCC). The JTF will address the cross-cutting issues and difficulties, and identify synergies across partnerships. The JTF will also contribute to preparing the JAES-related decisions, which will continue to be taken at the political level in Ministerial meetings

III. JAES financing

13. The Strategy's success is a joint Afro-European responsibility and requires significant political and operational resources to deliver on the ambitious agendas. The implementation, including financing of the JAES, is a joint task for all stakeholders: European and AU Commissions, Member States, Financing Institutions, RECs, as well as private sector and civil society on both sides. It is essential that European and African actors engage at continental, regional, national levels to provide the necessary inputs. This will require in particular the continuing mainstreaming of the JAES in existing instruments. The EU and Africa will therefore cooperate closely to secure the appropriate funding to implement the Action Plan 2011-2013. To this end, the JAES will be mainstreamed and promoted in all relevant instruments, be they managed by the EU institutions (EDF, ENPI, DCI, IfS, EIDHR, EIB instruments…), EU Member States' bilateral instruments, or African contributions. In the same vein, both sides agree to further engage, without delay, in the discussions on the African proposals to jointly establish an African Integration Facility to support the implementation of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plan. These discussions should be concluded as soon as possible.

14. As a Joint political framework, the JAES shall steer policy choices and improve the coherence and complementarity of the EU's and Africa's action. The Joint Strategy will be used to orient the programming of existing instruments, and the priorities of this Action Plan shall be consistently integrated in relevant (African) Strategic Plans and (joint) programming processes of relevant instruments, according to their respective scope and general objectives. Both sides will make further progress to make the relevant financial instruments supportive of the Action Plan. Existing joint programming mechanisms (such as the dialogue between the EU and African National and Regional Authorising Officers and the ACP Secretariat) will be more efficiently used by both sides to ensure JAES priorities are adequately reflected.

15. Both sides will also pursue efforts to translate the Lisbon commitments to treat Africa as one into a reality. All involved actors will work to reinforce synergies between the various policy frameworks and accompanying financial instruments, to increase efficiency in dealing with pan-African challenges. Existing bridges between cooperation instruments will be used to support the continental dimension of the Action Plan activities.

16. Efficiently use capacity building programmes to enhance AU capacities to implement the JAES: Through the EDF's Institutional Support Programme for the AU and similar bilateral initiatives, the EU will continue to provide an integrated and comprehensive support to strengthen the financial, administrative management and the policy making capacity of AU institutions, and to enable the AU Commission to play an effective role in the implementation of the Strategy and the Action Plan, notably through the support of its institutional transformation process. Under the 10th EDF Intra-ACP envelope, the future capacity building programme will ensure continuity with the current initiatives under the 9th EDF. Both sides agree to use this programme to support the capacities of the African Union and its organs to implement the Joint Africa-EU Strategy and the 8 thematic partnerships of the Action Plan 2011-2013, in particular through a strengthening of the necessary competencies in the field of policy-making, programme design and implementation, monitoring and follow-up (but excluding the possibility of supporting operational costs of specific projects). This will include in particular a better integration and streamlining of the 8 thematic JAES partnerships in the AUC's structures and work programmes. Finally, cooperation with other international partners supporting the AU capacities will be sought.

17. Set-up the complementary support mechanisms for specific needs / technical support: Based on the experience of the JAES Action Plan 2008-10, both sides will examine the possibility of establishing a small, flexible and demand-driven assistance mechanism to address implementation difficulties and to provide the necessary technical, administrative and secretarial support for the implementation of the JAES Action Plan 2011-2013. Such a mechanism should support, on a demand-driven basis, the functioning of the thematic partnerships (notably the expert groups and their co-chairs in preparing and following-up their meetings, and in facilitating communication and continued work between meetings), and facilitate the engagement of Non-State Actors. The support mechanism should also assist the preparation of bankable projects, for example through the preparation of feasibility studies and other project-preparation activities, provided that the necessary resources are being made available.

18. Both sides agree on the need to communicate better and to increase the visibility of the JAES both in Africa, EU and internationally. The media is a key multiplier of information and can contribute to enhance the people centred dimension of the Africa-EU Partnerships. Both sides agreed to continue implementing communication activities so far undertaken, including the joint JAES website (www.africa-eu-partnership.org), on-line since 1st October 2008.

19. Explore innovative financing options: Both sides agree to explore innovative financing mechanisms such as "Auction Floors" and Public Private Partnerships to reach out actively to the private sector as an essential stakeholder of this Action Plan, and to put in place the conditions to foster more effective participation of the private sector, particularly in the areas of transport, energy and infrastructure. Innovative approaches should be developed to better engage with the private sector and leverage funding, skills and competences, which can contribute to more sustainable and inclusive economic growth.

IV. A people-centred partnership

20. Last, but certainly not least, both sides agree to support the active involvement of the European and Pan-African Parliaments (EP, PAP) in the implementation and the monitoring of this Action Plan, in line with the principles agreed in Lisbon and the arrangements endorsed by the Ministerial Troika of 28 April 2009.

21. Both sides also agree to support the active involvement of the Civil Society (including through ECOSOCC on the African side) to facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on Peace and Security

Overview

Progress has been achieved throughout the implementation of the first Action Plan in the three main areas of focus:

Political dialogue has grown and continues to grow, in order to reach common positions and implement common approaches on challenges and security in Africa, Europe and globally, at two levels: The structural and systematic linkages between decision making organs, such as the EU PSC and the AU PSC, the EUMC and the AU MSC, Crisis management teams on both sides, have been strengthened. African and EU heads of delegations in Addis Ababa, Brussels and New York are in regular consultation. Nevertheless, these exchanges of mutual understanding need to be extended into a more technical and operational cooperation.

The substance of the dialogue has been globally organised around conflict situation and crises. However, thematic issues such as terrorism, and its various sources of financing, disarmament, post conflict reconstruction and development, already listed under this chapter in the first action plan, should become more prominent areas of dialogue and cooperation. New thematic issues such as cross border cooperation and maritime safety and security are added to make this dialogue more comprehensive and sustainable. The EU and the AU will review progress annually in the implementation of UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1894.

Progress has been made in the **operationalization of the APSA.** However much remains to be done in order to sustain and consolidate this progress and to achieve a functional Architecture including smooth and effective interaction between all components of the APSA. EU funding for the next three years Action Plan will be jointly articulated on the basis of an AU-RECs-EU operational Roadmap.

Finally, good progress was made to ensure **predictable funding** for Peace Support Operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority. Within the framework of the UN Security Council responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, and in light of the role of Regional arrangements in accordance with Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, a dedicated dialogue has been pursued through the Prodi Panel Report on support to Africa-led peace keeping operations and subsequent elaboration of the UN Secretary-General's Reports on its implementation. Within the framework of this Partnership, through the 1st and 2nd African Peace Facility, predictable support to Africa-led peace support operations has been largely provided for, in parallel with efforts to support AU and RECs Capacity Building programmes. However, the initial objective "to financially enable the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct Peace Support Operations" has not been fully achieved. Further exchanges are required on AU efforts to mobilise additional resources from within the continent, including through the AU Peace Fund. There furthermore remains an acute need for more concerted action between the AU, the EU and the UN to move forward the process of implementation of the recommendations contained in the Prodi Panel's and subsequent UNSG Reports.

1. OVERALL OBJECTIVES

1. Political Dialogue:

1) To jointly contribute to the global security related governance in Africa, Europe and world-wide, and make the dialogue more effective.

2) Address crises and challenges to peace, security and stability in Africa, Europe and elsewhere and capitalize on commonalities of positions.

Expected results:

- Reinforced structural interaction on conflict situations and crises between the EU, the AU and the RECs.
- Building upon the APSA pillars and the African security agenda, policies such as, Small Arms and Light Weapons, Antipersonnel Landmines, Explosive Remnants of War, Counter-Terrorism, Mediation, Protection of Civilians (UNSCR 1894), Women Peace and Security (UNSCR 1325 and UNSCR 1820), and issues related to Children in Armed Conflicts (UNSCR 1675) will be considered under a more comprehensive approach to contribute to eliminate root causes of conflict, conflict prevention, crises management and resolution, long-term post-conflict reconstruction and peace-building.
- The cooperation aspects of the security-development nexus are systematically assessed.
- Enlarged political dialogue to include RECs/RMs, in the light of the provisions of the EU and AU protocols and MoUs.
- Strengthened dialogue and coordination of positions within the UN framework by respective groups, including jointly sponsored UN Resolutions addressing global risks such as terrorism, Chemical-Biological-Radiological and Nuclear threats and the illicit spread and accumulation of firearms.
- As part of African and European regional organisations' contributions to effective multilateralism, the AU- and EU will work with the UN to address global threats to peace and security as well as the financial and operational capacity of the AU and regional mechanisms to plan and conduct peace support operations.
- Comprehensive and co-ordinated responses to regional security threats, involving political, operational and financial stakeholders and partners.
- Enhance conflict management cooperation and EU support to Peace and Security initiatives undertaken under the auspices of the AU.

2. Operationalization of APSA

Effective functioning of the African Peace and Security Architecture to address peace and security challenges in Africa.

Expected Outcomes:

- Building upon progress already achieved by APSA structures at continental and regional level, and new evolutions, well reflected by the AU-RECs APSA assessment and by the outcome of Amani Africa, adoption of a comprehensive AU-RECs Roadmap for the operationalization of the APSA.
- Establishment of a EU-AU-RECs APSA operational programme based on the comprehensive AU-RECs APSA Roadmap in line with the Protocole establishing the Peace and Security Council and the AU-RECs MoU.
- Implementation of the EU-AU-RECs programme, leading to a coherent support by the EU institutions and EU MS to different components and policies.
- This operational programme will be developed taking into account other capacity building programmes, including support provided by the UN and other partners.
- A coordinated and concerted partner support for AU and RECs/RMs including a consolidated and institutional liaison mechanism. (e.g. replicate at RECs/RMs level the Addis Ababa based AU Partner Group).

3. Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations undertaken by the AU or under its authority

Make available adequate resources (financial, material, human resources, etc) to plan, equip, deploy, and support, African led peace support operations.

Expected results:

- In view of 2011 UNSG Report on predictable, flexible and sustainable funding of Africa-led Peace Support Operations, based on the EU involvement, on the experience with the APF, and lessons learned from a number of peace support operations so far, elaboration of practical ways ahead on the implementation of the Prodi Panel and UNSG Reports suggestions.
- In view of the elaboration and adoption of a programme under the APF 3, the AU will make efforts to mobilise increased resources from within the continent, including the AU Peace Fund.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

1. Political Dialogue

Initiative 1) Completion and implementation of the **political dialogue** framework by establishing systematic and structural linkages between EU COPS-AU PSC, EU and AU Chiefs of Staff, and between the new EU (EEAS) structures, the AUC and RECs Peace and Security Departments. The objective is to increase the involvement at this political level in reviewing actions already undertaken, and on providing increased political guidance for the future.

Initiative 2) Consultations between the Africa Group and the EU will be established in New York on the basis of major global challenges discussed in UNSC and UNGA (e.g. conflicts, terrorism, CBRN proliferation and conventional disarmament). Programmes and agenda for such consultations will be established on a yearly basis and be reviewed every six months in order to allow adequate preparation of the meetings at Headquarters levels.

Initiative 3) Exert coordinated and concerted efforts to combat piracy, including in the framework of the UN; and consider the elaboration of legal instruments which may be deemed appropriate to enhance cooperation on all piracy related issues.

Initiative 4) In addressing crises and challenges to P&S in Africa, Europe and elsewhere, specific Africa-EU ad hoc thematic teams will be established in order to ensure co-ordination and co-operation. To this effect, the added value of these teams might be particularly beneficial for tackling post-conflict stabilisation, reconstruction and development, and strengthening the role of women in all stages, to consolidate the progress made in resolving conflicts in Africa and take advantage of the experience and capabilities of Europe. These teams will involve the International Community stakeholders as appropriate, and will optimize the follow-up to the AU Policy on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD). In this regard, the African Union will complete a study on the establishment of a Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development Centre.

Initiative 5) Thematic cluster sessions with experts from AU/RECs/RMs/MS/EU will be created on operational objectives in areas such as climate change and security, AU border programme, including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation, development of legal instruments, and disarmament issues (including Explosive Remnants of War), or focusing on geographical areas. These initiatives could lead to the organization of Europe-Africa conferences on these themes.

Initiative 6) Informal consultations between the AU, EU and UN, to follow-up the recommendations of the AU/UN Report chaired by Mr. Romano Prodi, and the UN Secretary General Report of September 2009, should enable the three organisations to advance their respective agendas. Practical suggestions from experts should help to make progress in providing sustainable, flexible and predictable support for peacekeeping operations launched within the framework of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter and undertaken by the AU or under its authority with the consent of the UN Security Council.

Initiative 7) Building on the AU Border Programme, as well as on the rich experience of the EU in this field, we will programme activities to be undertaken together, including exchange of experience, capacity building, cross-border co-operation and development of legal instruments. This initiative could also be extended, through the support of EU Member States, to exchanges of experience on delimitation and demarcation of borders.

Initiative 8) In pursuit of the reinforcement of the Preventive, Peace Building and Post Conflict policies and measures of the APSA at continental and regional levels, plans of action will be drawn up and implemented so as to deal with thematic issues such as: SSR, DDR, AU Border programmes, Early Warning systems, Women Peace and Security, Mediation-Negotiation capacity, and Counter-terrorism.

Initiative 9) The ongoing co-operation to combat the illicit trafficking of SALW will be reinforced through a comprehensive and concrete Plan of Action in support of the implementation of the AU SALW Strategy, in co-ordination with the IC. Similarly, an Action Plan will be drawn up to support the implementation of the Pelindaba Treaty and of the three additional protocols, notably the safe, secure and peaceful use of nuclear energy.

2. Adoption and implementation of a comprehensive AU-RECs strategic Roadmap for the **operationalization of the APSA** in the long term, reflecting regional, continental, and global security priorities of the AUC, RECs and AU MS and capable of ensuring coherence of purpose across the different policies addressed.

Initiative 1) As a follow-up to the first action plan and of different evaluations regarding African training needs and capacities for ASF, implement operational and concrete AU/RECs/EU agreed measures to improve the required capacities and capabilities of African training centres.

Initiative 2) Adoption of an APSA AU-RECs Strategic Roadmap consisting of an articulated long-term perspective of the APSA goals and processes through which to achieve them. This AU roadmap, which the EU will support will ensure coherent, co-ordinated and concerted decisions and priorities between the regional and continental levels of the APSA and EU's continental, regional and country instruments. A strengthened framework for a follow-up assessment of the interaction between the different components of the APSA and respective responsibilities will be made available and will give clear indications for further operational support.

Initiative 3) Identify and set priorities and strict timelines for the short-term implementation phase (three-years) of the AU-RECs Roadmap. This short term phase, which covers the period of the second action plan, will build on the conclusions of the APSA needs assessment, lessons learned from the AMANI Africa training cycle, including regional training exercises, and the draft of the AU African Standby Force 3rd roadmap, and will address the APSA policies (captured in the AU-RECs MoU on APSA). The prioritised activities and the sequencing of the steps required to achieve the operational objectives will be assessed on a regular basis to ensure a functional APSA consisting of components that interact in a coordinated way. This plan will become the trilateral AU-RECs-EU APSA Roadmap detailing EU support for envisaged activities.

Initiative 4) Further develop and endorse concepts, doctrines and procedures related to ASF in general (including rapid deployment capabilities, logistics, and maritime components), to APSA (functional connections between Early Warning and Planning Elements at regional and continental level and decision making bodies, training, mediation) and to other security issues (SSR, DDR, SALW, counter-terrorism,).

Initiative 5) Develop human rights and gender training programmes for peace keeping missions in Africa, as requested by the EU-AU human rights dialogue agenda.

Initiative 6) Organise a second training cycle of the APSA structures, according to the AU-set main objectives for the short term (three years) and taking into account lessons learned from the first AMANI AFRICA cycle.

3. **Predictable funding for Peace Support Operations** undertaken by the AU or under its authority.

Initiative 1) The issue of predictable funding for Africa-led PSOs will also be integrated under the relevant initiatives in the first and second priority areas of this Action Plan. In this context and in view of the elaboration and adoption of a programme under the APF 3, a dedicated political and technical forum on the AU Peace Fund will need to connect African political and financial decisions in this area with EU engagements.

Initiative 2) Launch a dedicated, albeit informal, UN-AU-EU dialogue within the UN framework to propose practical steps forward to the Prodi Panel and UNSG Reports.

Initiative 3) Based on to the AU-RECs-EU operational Plan for the APSA operationalisation and on the African Peace and Security Agenda and on the progress under Initiative 1, the EU, AU and RECs will work together in defining the 3rd APF programme.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on Democratic Governance and Human Rights

Overview

Democratic Governance and Human Rights are key for sustainable development and for cooperation between partners, and are an integral part of both the EU's and AU's core values. The Africa-EU Partnership on Governance and Human Rights will enable a comprehensive continent to continent dialogue and cooperation on aspects and concepts such as local capacity strengthening, the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, democratic principles, the rule of law and equitable access to legal systems, management of natural resources, the fight against corruption and fraud, accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, global governance and security sector reform.

I. Overall Objectives

- To strengthen the open and inclusive Africa-EU dialogue on democratic governance and human rights. This shall also contribute to enhancing the joint influence of Africa and the European Union in international fora and at global level in these fields.

- To contribute to the establishment and strengthening of the African Governance Architecture with coordinated EU support

- To strengthen the close cooperation between Africa and the EU in the area of cultural goods and other cultural activities

- To strengthen synergies and linkages between human rights and democratic governance in its political, economic and social dimension and other areas of the Africa/EU partnership

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

Priority 1: Enhanced dialogue and cooperation at the global level and in international fora

Activities

1. The Africa-EU DGHR Platform for Dialogue will act as an open and inclusive forum on governance with a view to promoting dialogue and contributing to the formulation of shared governance agendas and recommendations that can feed the political dialogue between Africa and the European Union and deepening their partnership
2. Exchange views and best practices on matters of joint interest within international fora, including NY, Geneva, Vienna and Paris, in particular on UPR, rights of the child, rights of persons with disabilities, economic and social rights and combating racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and incitement to hatred and other areas of mutual interest
3. Continue a dedicated AU-EU Political Human Rights Dialogue in Troika format, flanked by the Africa-EU Civil Society Human Rights Seminars
4. Cooperate with other thematic partnerships to promote sectoral governance and strengthen synergies to cover cross-thematic issues

Expected Results

- Open and regular dialogue which builds trust, mutual understanding and contributes to developing common agendas and approaches that feed into the political level and decision making process
- Extended dialogue to issues where diverging views prevail
- Enhanced coordination and cooperation on issues of common interest in international fora such as the 2nd and 3rd Committee of UNGA, the UN Convention against Corruption and the Human Rights Council
- Increased awareness of the importance of the relevant governance and human rights dimensions in the other partnerships

Actors

- African States, AU Commission/NPCA, Pan African Parliament, African Court of on Human and Peoples' Rights, African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, other Pan-African Institutions, RECs, African think tanks;
- EU Member States and Council, European Commission, European Parliament, other EU Institutions and Agencies, European Court of Justice;
- Decentralized authorities, Parliaments, and Civil society organizations;
- UN agencies and programmes and specialised international organisations including the Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC).

Priority 2: Cooperation in the area of Governance Initiatives

Activities

1. Strengthen and increase intra-African dialogue on AU principles and issues of shared values.
2. Step up and coordinate support to the African Governance Architecture, including the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance in line with Africa's priorities
3. Strengthen the dialogue on the APRM process and the cooperation on the implementation of its recommendations
4. Strengthen cooperation with and among Parliaments, local authorities, civil society and the private sector
5. Strengthen capacities of the AU, regional, national institutions and public authorities in the field of election organisation/observation and of civil society and media in election observation
6. Support the role of public and private media to foster democratic governance

Expected Results

- The African Governance Architecture is consolidated and operational
- Coordinated EU actions to support pan-African governance initiatives
- Balanced and effective support to the APRM at the continental and national level, including to the implementation of the national plans of actions
- The core International and continental instruments related to Governance and Human Rights are ratified, domesticated and implemented
- A structured dialogue about the role of media with a view to strengthening the regulatory framework for the development of free and independent media

Actors

- African States, AU Commission/NPCA, APRM Secretariat, Pan African Parliament, other Pan-African Institutions, RECs;
- EU Member States and Council, European Commission, European Parliament, other EU Institutions and Agencies;
- Local and decentralized authorities;
- Civil society actors, universities and research institutes;
- UN organizations and specialized international organizations.

Priority 3: Strengthen cooperation in the area of cultural goods and other areas of cultural cooperation

Activities

1. Finalize and validate the outcomes of the inventory of cooperation in the area of cultural goods and identify consequent priority actions of cooperation between African and the EU
2. Conduct an effective dialogue and cooperation in the area of the fight against illicit trafficking of cultural goods in line with the UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property and other relevant international conventions, including the exchange of experiences on the return of illegally exported or acquired goods to their countries of origin and encouraging setting up relevant mechanism for sharing best practices including on addressing archives issues
3. Facilitate the access to information on important African cultural goods in EU and African countries,
4. Identify pilot Museums and cultural institutions in Africa and EU and facilitate the establishment of cooperation, twinning and capacity building agreements on cultural goods including inventory systems, security and safety systems, sites management
5. Extend and institutionalize joint cultural events and cultural exchange programmes between Africa and EU, such as the Africa-EU Cultural week
6. Develop and launch joint advocacy and communication campaign for the ratification and implementation of cultural goods related international instruments and conventions in Africa and in Europe, as well as the introduction of these commitments within national legislations.

Expected Results

- Enhanced cooperation to facilitate the protection and promotion of cultural expressions and cultural diversity as well as intercultural dialogue
- Common positions on policies, strategies and cooperation in the area of cultural goods;
- Progress in the implementation of relevant international instruments to facilitate the protection and promotion of cultural goods, and in the joint fight against illicit trafficking of cultural goods.

Actors

- AU Commission/NPCA, African States, Pan African Parliament;
- European Commission, EU Member States, European Parliament;
- UNESCO and other international organisations;
- Civil society actors in the field of culture and sports;
- Museums, Universities and Research institutions.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on Regional Economic Integration, Trade and Infrastructure

This Partnership comprises three components, namely Regional Integration, Trade and Infrastructure.

I. Overall Objectives:

Support of African economic integration and development agenda in line with the Abuja Treaty and its implementing strategies, notably the African Minimum Integration Programme and Action Plan (MIP), Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) Action Plan, the Africa Mining Vision (AMV) and the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

Support to the AUC, RECs and African States efforts for rationalising and harmonizing trade and investment laws, regulatory frameworks and procedures with a view to improving the investment climate.

With respect to Infrastructure:

a. Pursue priority regional and continental-level infrastructure (transport, energy, ICT, water sectors) for increased interconnectivity through continued project development, reinforced coordination and advocacy for backbone infrastructure.

b. Promote safe and efficient transport services through application of modern technology and support for harmonisation and enforcement of policies and regulations, notably in air and maritime sectors

c. Support institutional reinforcement and capacity building in continental and regional-level institutions.

d. Promote digital infrastructures as multi-purpose platforms for safe and efficient regional service delivery including appropriate interconnections and support coordination with capacity development on innovative technologies and applications implemented in sectors such as health, environment or education.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

A. Regional integration:

Priority 1: Dialogue on the political dimension, policies and experiences on regional integration in Europe and in Africa and on integration in the global economy, including on:

Activities:

1. exchange of information between the EU, AU and RECs on integration processes;

2. the development dimension and impact on the African economies of existing (EU-MED, TDCA, African regional economic agreements) and up-coming (EPAs) trade agreements to which African States are parties

3. the impact of the implemented agreements on the Africa overall integration agenda

4. the EU experience of developing and implementing common institutions and policies

5. Cooperation on liberalisation of Trade and services ;

6. The findings of the all-ACP study on regional integration monitoring and the AUC study on the Minimum Integration Programme (MIP) and follow-up to be given.

   Expected Results: Platform for policy and political dialogue and exchange of information on the regional integration process in Europe with the view to assisting regional integration process in Africa is established

   Main actors: AUC, RECs, Africa and EU MS, EC (DG DEV, TRADE, MARKT) and concerned International Organisations.

B. Trade

Priority 2: Customs and Trade Facilitation:

Activities:

1. Facilitate cooperation between EU and African customs administrations on customs reforms to conform to internationally agreed standards, in particular in the context of supply chain security as well as on the current African process for development of common Transit procedures, on training and capacity building, including the organisation of Customs Blueprints seminars.

2. Exchange of information with a view to support the interconnectivity of computerized Customs systems within Africa, taking into account existing customs computer projects, e.g.UNCTAD Asycuda.

Main actors: EC (TAXUD; DEV), the AUC, African and EU Member States, African business community and concerned donors or international organisations such as the World Customs Organisation.

Financing: Different sources can be considered within the European Development Fund (e.g., depending on commitments already made, AUC support programme; ongoing regional or all-ACP programmes with trade, customs, fiscal or capacity components; regional technical cooperation facilities (TCF) or within the cooperation or training programmes of EU Member States.

Expected Results: Creation of efficient customs systems in Africa, enhanced dialogue on NTB issues and improved trade within Africa and between Africa and EU.

Priority 3: Improve the competitiveness and the diversification of African agriculture and industry notably by strengthening African capacities in the area of rules, standards and quality control:

Activities:

1. As far as agriculture and agro-industry is concerned, enhance the capacity of administrations, producers and exporters at all levels to meet the regulatory requirements of export markets within Africa and the EU and strengthen harmonization of SPS frameworks within Africa
2. As far as industry is concerned, enhance the capacity of administrations, producers and exporters at all levels to meet the regulatory requirements of export markets within Africa and the EU and support development of quality infrastructure in Africa
3. enhance competitiveness of African agriculture and agri-food industry through particular attention to Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary standards (SPS);
4. follow up to the 2010 pre feasibility study on TBT

Expected Results: Improved competitiveness and diversification of African agriculture and industry.

Main actors: AUC, RECs, Africa and EU MS, EC, UNIDO

Priority 4: Operationalization of Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa (AIDA) Plan of Action in cooperation of UNIDO, RECs and other institutions:

Activities:

1. Support the implementation of the Accelerated Industrial Development Plan of Action to facilitate, among others, the upgrading of productive and trade capacities
2. Discussion on the African Agribusiness and Agro-industry development initiative (3ADI) and explore possible avenues for cooperation
3. Discuss a policy framework on an enabling environment for promotion of industrial SMEs and explore possible avenues for cooperation.

Expected Results: Progress towards the operationalisation of AIDA

Main actors: AUC, RECs, EC, UNIDO, Africa and EU Member States

Priority 5: Raw materials

We should work toward a coherent vision on development, mining and raw materials, to support African capacity at the appropriate national, sub-regional or continental level and within the available cooperation instruments, in particular:

Activities:

1. <u>On governance:</u>

   - Promoting natural resources governance including increasing revenue transparency(e.g. implementation of EITI and AMV), applying appropriate fiscal regimes and involving relevant stakeholders including the civil society;
   - Promote and provide training on best practices to negotiate mineral contracts;
   - Assist in developing policy scenarios for promoting trade and the sustainable development of the mining sector;

2. <u>On investment:</u>

   - Help develop analytical tools for mapping mining development corridors for investment promotion, consistently with any general investment promotion strategy in place;
   - Cooperate to assess opportunities for increasing local content and value-added through local processing of African mineral resources, particularly by SMEs;
   - Assist in improving mineral policy and related regulatory frameworks including on land use planning for minerals and authorization process in order to promote the investment climate;
   - Promote Corporate Social Responsibility;

3. <u>On geological knowledge and skills:</u>

   - Facilitate exploring mineral resources potential in Africa;
   - Foster further co-operation between African and European geological surveys;
   - Support capacity building to help improve material stewardship, meaning the responsibility for environmental quality shared by all those actions affect the environment, including on rehabilitation of mining sites and management of secondary raw materials (recycling).

Expected Results: Improved governance, infrastructure and investment and geological knowledge and skills.

Main actors: DG ENTR; TRADE; DEV, EIB, the AUC, UNECA, Africa and EU Member States, geo-surveys, civil society, private sector and concerned donors or international organizations.

Priority 6: Improve the investment climate

Activities:

1. Facilitate the exchange of best practices in the area of regional investment codes with a view to supporting harmonization, as foreseen in the Africa Action plan
2. Strengthen the African regional and continental private sector and Investment Promotion Agencies (IPAs) networks, such as AfrIPAnet, and create links with European partners building on solid business data and tools.
3. Strengthen the Africa-EU business forum as a platform to promote business between Africa and Europe

Expected Results: Improved investment climate.

Main actors: AUC, RECs, Africa and EU MS, EC, UNIDO, Regional investment agencies

Priority 7: Support quality statistics in Africa

Activities:

1. Support the provision of quality statistical services in Africa through the Implementation of the Charter on Statistics and of the strategy on the harmonization of statistics in Africa (SHaSA);

2. Strengthening the AUC capacity in statistics, notably transforming the Statistics Unit into a Division as decided by the AU Executive Council.

Expected Results: Improved quality statistics in Africa

Main actors: AU statistical unit (also called AUSTAT), Eurostat, in particular the ACP section of unit D2 (International Statistical Cooperation), statistical services of RECs and Africa and EU MS

C. Infrastructure

The EU and the AU established a partnership on Infrastructure (Energy, Transport and Telecoms/ICT) to raise awareness and encourage participation with regard to the aims and roles of the Partnership.

The EU – Africa Partnership for Infrastructure aims at becoming the EU's response to the infrastructure gap that hinders Africa's economic development. It should be implemented by the RECs and come under the EU - Africa Strategy. The EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructures will continue to be managed and implemented according the institutional architecture approved by both parties through the Steering Committee assuming the role of the Joint Working Group.

Priority No 1: Support to AFUR and African Power Pools

Activities:

- Institutional reinforcement and capacity building (training, exchange programs) in energy market trading and management,
- Transmission grid development, including grid connections in Africa and between Africa and EU,
- Environment and social assessments,
- Project packaging and financing and governance (policies, codes and standards).

Expected Results:

- Increased capacity of AFUR and African Power Pools to sustain and further develop their activities and support their increased role as trade facilitators and coordinators and as main planners of regional energy infrastructure programmes

Actors: AUC, AFUR, Power Pools, RECs, AFREC, AFSEC, EU related institutions

Priority No 2: Support to Air Transport Sector and Satellite Navigation

Activities:

- Harmonisation of aviation policies and regulations,
- Support for aviation safety and security, surveillance and certification of air traffic management (ATM) activities and single sky for Africa and
- Technical assistance for implementation of new satellite based technologies for communication, navigation and surveillance and associated ATM procedures.
- For SBAS, setup and activity of Working Groups, staffing of African GNSS programme management entity, training of African experts, preliminary backbone infrastructure development and initial operations.

Expected Results:

- Strengthening of African continental and regional entities in charge of aviation legislation, regulation and enforcement, promoting liberalisation and improving air traffic management and air navigation services.
- Building of core technical capacity for SBAS (Satellite Based Augmentation Service) within relevant African organisations in each region and implementation of preliminary backbone infrastructure.

Actors: AUC, RECs, UNECA, ASECNA, AFCAC, ACAC, EU related institutions (ESA, EASA, SESAR)

Priority No 3: Maritime Transport Sector: enhancement of Maritime administration and Safety

Activities:

In West African region:

- Strengthening port state control regimes and coast guard service capability and sub-regional maritime educational institutions and
- Enhancing vessel traffic monitoring and information.

In Horn of Africa region:

- Support to implementation of maritime projects comprising capacity building, technical assistance and resource strategic planning and coordination,
- Implementation of plan of action, establishment of coast guard network and institutional strengthening.

Expected Results:

- Enhancing maritime security, safety, environment protection and strengthening law-enforcement capability in West Africa and Horn of Africa regions

Actors: AUC, RECs, IMO, EU related institutions

Priority No 4: Transport Sector Development

Activities:

- Selection and appointment of TAH Corridor Coordinators and support team at AUC, strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors, including RECs ;
- Support to transport policy development and related studies, including trade facilitation
- Technical support for project preparation and monitoring, training activities to project stakeholders (AUC, RECs, specialised organisations and national bodies, where appropriate).
- Coordination with PIDA programme and support for Steering Committee of the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership

Expected Results:

- Appointment of TAH Corridor Coordinators,
- Updated policy for transport and improved sector governance, including study of new areas
- Strengthened institutional coordination structures ,
- Capacity building with African actors, including RECs, revised transport policy framework.
- Support to the coordination activities related to the PIDA programme in line with its road map and the EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership agenda.

Actors: AUC, RECs, UNECA, SSATP, ICA, EU related institutions

Priority No 5: Establishment of a geo-database

Activity:

- Initiate and coordinate the establishment of a database with other stakeholders, notably ECA, RECs, and Specialised Institutions, and with respect to actions planned under PIDA.

Expected Results:

- Established geo-database.

Priority No 6: Support to Improving water governance for trans-boundary water resources in Africa through promoting Integrated Water Resource Management

Activities:

- Institutional reinforcement and capacity development of ANBO and RBOs, information and knowledge management,
- Development and implementation of IWRM plans linked to national and regional development plans, resources mobilisation.

Expected Results:

- River Basin Organisations in Africa have developed and are implementing basin wide Integrated Water Resource Management and Development (IWRM&D) Plans.
- African Network of Basin Organisations (ANBO) has facilitated the integration of water aspects into national and regional planning, and ANBO/AMCOW effectively participate in the Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA).

Actors: ANBO, AMCOW, RBOs, AUC, RECs, GWP

Priority No 7: Support of PIDA programme

Activity:

- Assignment ongoing; Sector studies, validation workshops and sector regional meetings.

Expected Results:

- Summary prospects and Program Outlines,
- regional and continental policy proposals and program orientations,
- Formulation of Strategic Framework and Programs

Financing: Various sources including contribution of 9th EDF

Priority No 8: Strengthening of institutional coordination structures and capacity building with African actors including RECs

Activity:

- Review of institutional arrangements and recommendations for coordination and dialogue mechanisms,
- Communication, consultations and workshops with the different stakeholders to assign roles and functions on a consensual and participative basis and
- Preparation of the terms of reference for the rest of the process
- Creation of an enabling platform for planning, implementation and delivery of PIDA;
- Building capacity for programme planning, implementation, monitoring and delivery;
- Setting clear mechanisms and platforms for technical cooperation and resource mobilization with a focus on indigenous resources and the enhancement of the role of African Regional Banks ;

Expected Results:

- Improvement of institutional architecture structures which will increase regional integration.

Priority No 9: Improving regional connectivity and basic access to infrastructure services through the implementation in Energy, Water, Transport and ICT sectors of the EDF and other instruments and institutions: National Indicative Programmes, Regional Indicative Programmes, EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund, Port Moresby and Energy and Water Facilities; as part of the integrated strategic framework under this Partnership.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on the Millennium Development Goals

Overview

It has been agreed that the MDG Partnership should focus on a limited number of areas where we think that it can really add value and make a difference. Specific Task Groups will take forward work in the agreed areas – initial suggestions are outlined below. We would expect these groups to be time-bound. Therefore, new areas could be selected on a rolling basis. The same overarching themes of Policy, Education, Health and Food Security will remain.

There is a cross-over in some of the areas below, which are naturally cross-cutting. There is also the potential to set up joint Task Groups with other Partnerships.

We do not downplay the importance of other areas not outlined here. Where they are not included this is likely to be because there is intense work already happening in other fora or we think that more can be achieved by concentrating initially on these areas. There is also a working document for the MDG Partnership which contains other options and for which Task Groups could be established providing the criteria are met.

A Task Group will only be established where the following criteria are met:

- A number of participants on both the African and European sides expressing an interest in being part of a Task Group in a particular area.
- Willingness of Member States or Commissions to lead the Group.
- Commitment to resource (not necessarily financial) and to regular and active participation of specific experts.
- No duplication of the activities of other fora.
- The Task Group can achieve specific objectives that add value.

I. Overall Objectives

i. Increased commitment among EU and African Member States to meeting the MDGs.

ii. Take forward concrete activities, initially in the areas of health, gender, education, agriculture, water and sanitation and disability.

II. Specific Initiatives

The suggested areas are not set in stone for the three-year period, but must be responsive to the latest developments. If an issue arises where a Task Group can perform a genuinely useful role, then this can be taken forward. This could be raised initially through any participant/stakeholder in the Partnership, though the Co-chairs and the Steering Group (see structure below).

The Task Groups will establish the activities, objectives/outcomes expected, participants and timescales in more detail. However, based on the initial suggestions, specific activities are likely to include, but are not limited to, the following:

Priority Action 1: Health

Activities

1. Launch the Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) in the AU Members States where it has not yet been launched and provide guidance and technical support for implementation of the strategy in accordance with the ICPD Programme of Action.
2. Facilitate integration of the CARMMA strategy into national health strategies in accordance with the ICPD Programme of Action.
3. Collect and disseminate through a forum convened at regional or continental level best practices on Maternal, Infant and child Health
4. Assess the impact of CARMMA, including collection of statistical data.
5. Advocacy for and support Member States' improvement of human resources for health capacity through development of policies /strategies and plans of action where these don't exist and support their implementation where they exist.
6. Monitor the progress of the implementation of the Maputo Plan of Action.
7. Collect and Disseminate best practices and Support Member States in their implementation of the 'Abuja Call' with its new set of indicators as aligned to MDG6.

Expected results

- By 2013 the Campaign for Accelerated Reduction of Maternal Mortality in Africa (CARMMA) which covers the Maputo Plan of Action to have been launched in all 53 AU Members States and its strategy which includes child health, implemented in at least 25 Members States
- By 2013 to have More Member States with improved access to HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria services by implementing the 'Abuja Call' with its new set indicators aligned with those of MDG 6.
- By 2013 to have more Member States to have strengthened their health systems through improved Human Resources for Health
- **Main actors:** AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN

Priority Action 2: Gender

Activities

1. Develop a medium-term strategy of cooperation on gender equality and women's empowerment.
2. Identify and take forward specific measures, including empowering women with disabilities.
3. Work with other Partnerships to include gender equality in their activities.
4. Establishment of gender observatory for collection and reporting of data on gender.

Expected results

- By 2011 EU and AU have developed a medium-term strategy of cooperation on gender equality and women's empowerment.
- The medium-term strategy foresees measures for empowering the poorest and most disadvantaged women and girls including those with disability.
- Specific outcomes in 2012 linked to the strategy.
- Increased number of girls that pass secondary education.
- Increased number of women holding seats in parliaments.
- Provision of data on gender.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN

Priority Action 3: Education

Activities

1. Work with the International Task Force on teachers in the framework of its plan of action and develop networking and sharing information.
2. Work towards establishing centers and enhancing regional networks to strenghten teachers training on disability issues.
3. Encourage use of FTi Equity and inclusion guidelines in education sector planning and reviews.
4. Pilot approaches to making teaching and learning materials available in accessible formats.
5. Take forward activities to strengthen science teaching, including establishing regional centre and enhancing regional networks.
6. Take action to accelerate the implementation of the AU's 2nd Decade for Education, in particular work with the Association for Development of Education in Africa (ADEA) in the preparation of the next ADEA's *trienale* in Ougadougou - Dec-2011- to "promote critical skills for sustainable development in Africa;
7. Work on methods for monitoring the Plan of Action.
8. Institutionalize actions (notably school feeding programs in the framework of national education plans) aimed at encouraging school attendance and learning performance in coherence with health and nutrition programs.

Expected results

- Accelerated implementation of specific actions under the AU's 2nd Decade for Education: establishment of the Education Observatory for monitoring the progress made in the implementation of the Plan of Action.
- Regional centres established and regional networks enhanced for the teaching and learning of Science and Mathematics (possible linkages with the International Teachers Task Force created in 2008 and working to address the teacher gap, particularly in Africa).
- Increased awareness of disability issues.
- Enhanced levels of government incentives to reduce economic barriers to education at all levels, such as school fees.
- Increased numbers of children that pass secondary education.
- Literacy for adults, particularly women, which leads to reduced poverty.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, ADEA, IPED, CSO, Private sector, PAP, UN

Priority Action 4: Agriculture

Activities

1. Increase political support for African agriculture, improve CAADP implementation, produce quality CAADP Round Table Processes at national and regional levels, and mobilize resources to fund CAADP Compacts/investment plans.

2. Promote the Protocol for African common market and its implementation in order to increase the development of regional value chains for strategic commodities (rice, maize, cotton, cassava, and livestock) and regional integration in food and agriculture;

3. Improve the policy and regulatory environment for enhanced sustainable and responsible investments in agriculture through : _
    a. Accelerated integration of the principles of sustainable development into country policies and programmes to preserve the capacity of ecosystems to provide ecosystem services and accelerate reduction of biodiversity loss;
    b. Accelerated implementation of the *Framework and Guidelines on Land Policy in Africa*, trough notably enhanced capacity building of stakeholders in land policy development, and improved land information systems, increased networking, lesson learning and knowledge sharing among practitioners in land policy;
4. Jointly explore ways to facilitate the sustainable intensification of smallholder agriculture, including through efficient input provision. In this connection also jointly assess the opportunities offered by the African Fertilizer Financing Mechanism
5. Support the Panafrican Farmers Forum and more generally facilitate an increased participation of civil society and farmers' organisations, representing both male and female farmers, in policy making, implementation and evaluation.

6. Promote demand-led agricultural research for development, extension and innovation and strengthen the capacity (financial, human, and institutional) of research institutions. Work jointly on the development of agriculture and food security information systems at national, regional and continental level.

Expected results

- Increased financial support for African agriculture by national Governments, development partners and private sector as well as increased number of African countries allocating at least 10 percent of the national budget to agriculture and developing and implementing CAADP Compacts and investment plans.
- Improved access to markets for small-scale farmers.
- Development has taken into account principles of sustainable development.
- Accelerated implementation of the African Land Policy Guidelines, involving national stakeholder platforms to disseminate their content at country level.
- Sustainable intensification of smallholder agriculture facilitated through targeted initiatives.
- Greater participation of civil society and farmers' organisations, representing both male and female farmers, in policy making, implementation and evaluation.
- Enhanced levels of financing of demand-led agricultural research for development, extension and innovation, involving coordination by the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), sub-regional research organisations and the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA) and sub-regional research organisations.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN

Priority Action 5: Water & sanitation

Activities

1. Accelerate the work of the Africa-EU Partnership on Water Affairs and Sanitation as a Task Group of the MDG Partnership.
2. Take action on the AU 'Commitments for accelerating achievement of water and sanitation goals' (Sharm el Sheik 2008).
3. Support the EU Water Initiative's Africa Working Group and African partners by profiling its work and encouraging broader participation and catalysing financial contributions, with the aim to progress towards strategic objectives and annual work plans of the Africa-EU Partnership on water affairs and sanitation (in coordination with UN).
4. Strengthen capacities of AMCOW to provide leadership and of civil society to contribute to progress and to hold governments and development partners to account.
5. Enhance efforts by EU and AU Member States to implement the AU 'Commitments for accelerating achievement of water and sanitation goals' (Sharm el Sheik 2008), including the agreement of a joint action plan under the EU-Africa Partnership for water affairs and sanitation, by 2011.

6. To ensure that by 2013 the majority of countries have developed and adopted national water, sanitation and hygiene policies, strategies and implementation plans based on broad stakeholder participation (SWAP), sustainable use of resources (IWRM) and realistic financial planning (SFP) and are transforming those plans into actions
7. To reduce the number of 'off track' countries for MDG-7, with a specific focus on sanitation being the most off-track MDG in Africa, by increasing domestic financial resources and better targeting of aid where it is most needed.
8. Development and promotion of common views and understanding on the role of water supply, sanitation and hygiene and integrated water resources management for public health and economic development based on multi-sectoral dialogue.
9. In relation to the above outcomes, particular attention to be given to the challenges of urbanisation, fragile states and better development partner coordination around country led plans.

Expected results

- By 2013 the majority of countries have developed and adopted national water, sanitation and hygiene policies, strategies and implementation plans based on broad stakeholder participation (SWAP), sustainable use of resources (IWRM) and realistic financial planning (SFP) and are transforming those plans into actions.
- The number of 'off track' countries for MDG-7 have reduced.
- Increased knowledge generation and exchange among regional actors leading to better governance and informed decision making, including support to the development of early warning systems and collaboration with the African Water Centres of Excellence.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN

Priority Action 6: Disability

Activities

1. Establish collection of statistics in a coherent manner to enable baselines and measures of disabled people's access to services.
2. Joint advocacy to promote inclusion of sex disaggregated information on disability in new statistics initiatives.
3. Support the African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI) to monitor the implementation of the AU programme on disabilities.
4. Support implementation of AU strategy on people with disabilities.
5. Inclusion of people with disabilities across sectors.
6. Engagement of African CSOs in the JAES. Active participation of disability CSOs including attendance of both EU and African civil society at JEGs/Task groups (as appropriate).
7. Disseminate WHO guidelines and report on progress.
8. Information and good practice sharing.
9. Joint advocacy for disability to be included as part of the overall effort to achieve the MDGs from 2010-2015 (particularly in light of two African-sponsored resolutions on people with disabilities).
10. Encourage EU and AU member states sign and ratify the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
11. Establish a system to address the rights of persons with disabilities and vulnerable groups in interventions to achieve the MDGs.

Expected results

- By 2013 more EU and AU Member States have signed and ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities.
- More national and international statistical data sets contain disaggregated information about people with disabilities.
- More girls and boys with disabilities have access to education.
- African Rehabilitation Institute (ARI) is able to monitor and implement the AU programme on disabilities.

Main actors: AUC, EC, African/EU MS, RECs, CSO, Private sector, PAP/EP, UN

- **PROPOSED MDG PARTNERSHIP STRUCTURE**



JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on Climate Change and Environment

Overview

The first Action Plan (2008-2010) for the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy (JAES) adopted in Lisbon Summit on December 2007 identified two priority actions in Africa-EU Partnership on Climate Change:

- Build a common agenda on climate change policies and cooperation; and
- Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the Great Green Wall for the Sahel and Sahara Initiative.

The first joint work undertaken by the Joint Expert Group (JEG) of this partnership in November 2008 was the development of an *Africa-EU Joint Declaration on Climate Change* specifying the context, the framework of work and the 13 priority areas of the Partnership. The roadmap for the implementation of the 1st Action Plan adopted in April 2009, identified among the 13 priority areas five components on Climate Change partnership: *Capacity Building of African countries, RECs and AUC for climate change; Strengthening African capacities to better exploit opportunities under the* carbon market; *Water resources management and adaptation in the field of agriculture; Sustainable land management, fight against desertification and avoid deforestation; and Implementation of the Global Climate Change Alliance in Africa (GCCA).*

Deliverable initiatives from the five components have been identified and prioritized. The first priorities concern the Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative (GGWSSI); the CLIMDEV and AMESD programs; the activity of building and enhancing African negotiators' capacity in negotiations under the UNFCCC; the GCCA and the fight against deforestation.

The other components of the Joint Declaration including the 13 priority areas remain valid and are still part of the overall objectives of the second Action Plan. The latter will focus on the initiatives identified below.

I. Overall Objectives

- To strengthen African capacities for climate change adaptation and mitigation including for reducing disaster risk and for combating desertification and deforestation.
- To work towards reaffirming and reinforcing our common positions on climate change issues namely our attachment to the principles and priorities of the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.
- To reinforce coherence between the international climate change negotiations carried out under the aegis of UNFCCC and the Africa/EU partnership.

Expected outcomes

- Improved integration of climate change/desertification/deforestation issues into African national and regional development strategies as well as in Africa-EU development cooperation.
- Concrete initiatives in enhancing Africa's capacity to adapt and mitigate to adverse effects of climate change through:
    - Capacity building of the national delegations for climate negotiations.
    - Improved access to the carbon market including capacity building.
    - Operationalisation of the CLIMDEV Africa Programme.
    - Fight against deforestation and soil degradation through the implementation of GGWSSI and similar initiatives.
    - Enhanced implementation of Climate adaptation measures including through the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA).
    - Capacity building for planners and policymakers on the use of earth observation data for planning and policy makers.
- A strengthened Africa-EU dialogue on climate in particular linked to the other two Rio conventions (the Convention on Biological Diversity and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification).
- Harmonised approaches to adaptation and mitigation in order to efficiently coordinate actions aimed at reducing the negative impacts of Climate change.
- Integration of earth observation data in national development processes is facilitated.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

Priority Action 1: Great Green Wall of the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative

The GGWSSI was conceived and launched by African political leadership. The first Action Plan identified the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative as the pillar of one of the two priority actions of this partnership: "Cooperate to address land degradation and increasing aridity, including the Great Green Wall for the Sahara and the Sahel Initiative". In the future, the initiative could be extended to other areas in Africa affected by desertification. It is progressively strengthening its impact by building on and cooperating with all key related initiatives and actors, such as the Panafrican Agency of the Great Green Wall and the Terr'Africa initiative.

During the first Heads of States and Governments Summit on the Great Green Wall which took place in N'Djamena on 17 June, 2010 in the presence of four Heads of State (Senegal, Chad, Mauritania and Djibouti), of the Vice-president of Nigeria, the Prime Minister of Niger, the Secretary of State to the Agriculture and the Sustainable Development of Ethiopia and of the Ambassadors of Sudan and Chad, a convention creating a Pan-African Agency of the Great Green Wall was signed.

For the implementation of the initiative, two phases are foreseen: an initial phase (2 years) which will put in place an institutional and financial environment facilitating the implementation of the Great Green Wall program and to initiate a certain number of activities in some pilot countries and a second phase of implementation which could be spread out over a longer period split into project phases of ten years.

The GGWSSI targets the arid ecosystems of the Sahara and the Sahel and covers issues related to sustainable management of soils (including the three interdependent factors: desertification, climate change and deforestation). The GGWSSI should not be regarded as a separate and new program it should rather be seen as a federated platform, making it possible to link sustainable development, reduction of poverty and integrated land management. The objective of the priority action is to assist the countries concerned with the GGWSSI in the development of their national action plans, to support the development of trans-border programs and to bring support to the development of the capacities of the sub-regional organizations such as IGAD, UMA, ECOWAS, CILSS and CEN-SAD.

Activities

- Support the development of a regional harmonized strategy for the implementation of the GGWSSI and the mobilisation of the resources for this purpose;
- Support the concerted formulation of national plans of implementation of the GGWSSI;
- Support the identification and the development of trans-border projects;
- Develop a program for reinforcement of the capacities of the various actors involved in the implementation of the Great Green Wall (in particular for the planning and the coordination of the initiative at the regional level);
- Develop and run a network and a platform to exchange information to reinforce shared knowledge between the various stakeholders of the GGWSSI.

- Support the implementation of the GGWSSI and clearly identify issues and areas where there is a need for action at trans-border level and for coordination. Formulation of thirteen National Action Plans.[2]

Expected Results

This first phase will lead to the formulation of a financing program of greater width to implement the actions identified.

- National action plans by the countries concerned are developed.
- Trans-border programs are identified and implemented;
- Enhanced capacity of sub-regional organizations, such as IGAD, UMA, CILSS and CEN-SAD to clearly identify issues and areas where there is a need to mobilise action at trans-boundary levels and for the coordination of those actions.

Actors: EU and African Member States and other development partners, AU Commission and European Commission, FAO, CENSAD, ECOWAS IGAD, UMA, CILSS, OSS and Regional centres of excellence, national GGWSSI focal points, civil society experts working in this field, including farmers and women organizations.

Priority Action 2: CLIMDEV and Climate Information Services using Earth Observation data

Climate Information for Development in Africa Program (CLIMDEV Africa) is a joint initiative of the African Union Commission (AUC), the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and African Development Bank (AfDB), that seeks ways of overcoming the lack of necessary climate information, analysis and options required by policy and decision-makers at all levels. The project is supported by various EU Member States and by the European Commission through the GCCA, AUC, ECA and AfDB, and is currently ongoing.

Both African and EU partners endeavor to construct a solid foundation in Africa for the response to climate change, building on solid science and observational infrastructure, enabling strong partnerships between government institutions, private sector, civil society and vulnerable communities, and creating and strengthening of knowledge frameworks to support decision-making and integrate the actions required. Likewise, the AMESD program has been involved in the establishment of the necessary infrastructure for climate information services.

Activities (CLIMDEV)

- Further operationalise the CLIMDEV Fund at the African Development Bank
- Support to the operationalization of the African Climate Policy Centre, the CLIMDEV capacity hub.

[2] An existing FAO project foresees the preparation of five National Action Plans: Chad, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Niger and Mali. A complementary EU project aims at preparing a further eight National Action Plans: Senegal, Gambia, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, Sudan, Algeria and Egypt.

- Support the coordination capacity of the AU Commission in the area of climate change and desertification.

- Contribute to a coherent framework for coordination of climate activities at African continental level, with a strong capacity building function.

Expected results

- African Climate Policy Centre fully operational.

- CLIMDEV Special Fund at the African Development Bank fully operational.

- Enhanced AU Commission coordination capacity for Climate Change and Desertification

- A coherent African climate change strategic continental approach.

- The structure of CLIMDEV would facilitate the launching of other initiatives such as access to Clean Development Mechanisms (CDM) and capacity building regarding access to Carbon Markets.

Actors: AUC, EC, RECs, UNECA, Regional centres of Excellence, EU and African Member States, civil society experts working in this field,

Activities (AMESD)

The AMESD project (African Monitoring of the Environment for Sustainable Development) currently implemented by the African Union Commission (Phase I, 2007-2012) is strengthening the capacities of African institutions to use satellite-based Earth Observation information for decision-making in various environmental themes that are impacted by climate change (agriculture, land degradation, water management, etc.). AMESD is since its inception a major contributor to the objectives of the partnership in general.

- Enhancing the African capacities for the operational monitoring of climate change and variability, vegetation, water resources, land degradation, carbon dioxide emissions, etc., in support of decision-making processes in this area.

- A coherent African continental approach, including in international negotiations.

- Facilitate the integration and institutionalization of earth observation data and AMESD products and services into national and regional development processes.

- Support programs of the post AMESD (Phase II) within the framework of Global Monitoring for Environment and Security (GMES) Africa as adopted in the Ouagadougou Declaration in September 2010.

Expected results

- Improved quantity and quality of earth observation data.

- Improved decision making by key policy makers.

- Empowerment of the five regional implementation centers and associated regional networks and the development of infrastructure for environmental monitoring and strengthening of African capacities to exploit Earth Observation data for continental and regional decision-makers.

Actors: AUC, EC, RECs, UNECA, WMO, EUMETSAT, UNEP, EU and African Member States, civil society experts working in this field,, Regional Implementation Centres (RICs).

Priority Action 3: Strengthening climate adaptation

Enhanced action on climate adaptation is a key priority area of the Global Climate Change Alliance (GCCA), which was launched at the end of 2007 in the margin of the UN negotiations on climate change in Bali. This initiative aims to enhance the policy dialogue between the EU and developing countries most affected by climate change and to step up financial and technical cooperation. Adaptation support builds on the National Adaptation Programmes of Action or similar programmes when these are available and covers in particular agricultural improvements and water management. Special attention is given to integrate adaptation into wider development strategies. In addition to adaptation, the GCCA also supports capacity building for climate negotiations, reducing deforestation and enhancing participation in the carbon market.

In 2008-2009 the GCCA entered its implementation phase. Ongoing work in Africa includes €21 M support earmarked for six African countries: Tanzania, Mali, Mauritius, Rwanda, Senegal, and Seychelles). Programming work is advanced for two additional African countries: Mozambique and Ethiopia, and four more should be included soon. In 2009 a regional GCCA support programme was decided under the 10th European Development Fund intra-ACP budget covering a) €8 M support for CLIMDEV and capacity enhancement of the Department of Rural Economy and Agriculture (climate change and desertification coordination), and b) €8 M support programme for COMESA and ECOWAS/CILSS.

Activities

- Implementation of the EU Global Climate Change Alliance at country and regional level.
- Continued activities with the following priority axes:
  - Adaptation to the impact of climate change in most relevant sectors (agriculture, water, etc.).
  - Reduction of emissions from deforestation.
  - Improved access to investments through the Clean Development Mechanism.
  - Increased capacity for integrating climate change challenges in national development strategies.
- Strengthen the involvement of the African Union Commission in the implementation of GCCA in Africa.

Expected results

- Adaptation to climate change increasingly mainstreamed in national development strategies.
- Six to eight additional GCCA country interventions designed and implementation started in three to four countries.
- Enhanced capacity of COMESA and ECOWAS to deal with climate change adaptation.

Actors: African and EU Member States, European Commission, AU Commission, development partners, Regional Economic Communities, civil society organizations experts working in this field,

Priority Action 4: Fight against deforestation

Progress has been achieved under the UNFCCC negotiations on the issue of Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD-plus) the follow-up of Copenhagen included the Paris and Oslo Conferences (February and May 2010 respectively)that led to the creation of the REDD+ Partnership involving more than 60 countries including the major African forest countries. Its core objective is to contribute to the global battle against climate change by serving as an interim platform to scale up REDD+ actions and finance. This partnership will support and contribute to the UNFCCC process. It will also promote transparency around international financing initiatives to reduce deforestation and degradation of tropical forests. Globally, around 4 billion USD will be made available for measures to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries, and partners have expressed their willingness to substantially scale up financial support after 2012.

Improved forest governance is a key element of reducing emissions from deforestation. Therefore, it is important to exploit the synergies between the Forest Law Enforcement, Governance and Trade (FLEGT) initiative and REDD+ as well as the link with sustainable forest management.

The fight against deforestation is also an aspect of the GGWSSI (to counter the progress of desertification) that could be implemented in African countries not already covered.

Activities

- Facilitate actions that would qualify African projects as REDD+ projects; help definition and implementation of pilot projects in Africa.
- Continue FLEGT negotiations with the major African forest countries.
- Underline and strengthen the links between REDD+ and FLEGT in Africa.

Expected results

- Africa to be an active partner in the interim REDD+ Partnership, and to benefit from the REDD+ financing coherent with the magnitude of the deforestation and forest degradation issues that the continent is facing.
- Conclude negotiations on FLEGT in several countries.
- Coherence between REDD+ and FLEGT initiatives in concerned countries.

Actors: AU Commission and European Commission, European and African countries members of the Partnership, RECs, UNDP, UNEP, World Bank, African Development Bank, and regional development banks.

Priority Action 5: Enhancing African negotiators' capacity in negotiations including the UN Framework of the Climate Change Convention (UNFCCC) and Kyoto Protocol

The complexity of the climate negotiations calls for a wide range of expertise to be available in the participating countries. Lack of negotiating capacity is one of the constraints faced by African countries in the UNFCCC. There are a number of initiatives including the Global Climate Change Alliance that involve training to upgrade climate negotiation capacities.

Activities

- To provide the opportunity for African negotiators to be trained in climate change negotiations possibly in liaison with Universities.
- To provide short or long term training for practical experience in EU environmental services and African-based climate institutions e.g. African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD), IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), AGHRYMET, SADC Drought Monitoring Centre, RECTAS etc.
- To identify selected African countries, representing the five regions and representatives from RECs, especially those involved in the international negotiations in need of building and strengthening their capacities in the concerned areas.

Expected results

- Strengthened capacity of African negotiators in negotiations under the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol.

Actors: European Commission, African Union Commission, selected African countries, RECs and Africa-based climate institutions.

Priority Action 6: Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR)

(1) There is a close link between climate change adaptation and disaster risk reduction (DRR), both aiming at reducing people's vulnerability. There is an increase in climate-related disasters that affect the African continent. On-going discussions between the two Commissions are looking at priority areas to support Africa in line with the Programme of Action for the implementation of the Regional Strategy on Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) (2006 – 2015). This discussion falls within the EU Disaster Risk Reduction Strategy for Developing Countries.

Activities

- Support African Member States and RECs to establish multi-sectoral national platforms on DRR.
- Support preparatory work enhancing national and regional capacities to mitigate exposure to disasters.
- Support the creation and the networks of five regional centers of excellence for DRR.

Expected results

- DRR becomes a regional, sub-regional and national priority, with strong institutional frameworks, adequate resources and multi-stakeholder participation.
- DRR institutions have the requisite authority and capacity to coordinate across relevant sectors and from national to local levels.

Actors: EU and African Member States, the European Commission, the AU Commission, NPCA, RECs, civil society experts working in this field,

Priority Action 7: Biodiversity Conservation Initiatives

Healthy ecosystems and biodiversity are crucial for the livelihood and food security of African populations. The successful conclusion under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) of the Nagoya Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing will contribute to fair and equitable sharing of benefits of ecosystems. Ecosystem conservation also contributes to climate adaptation and reduced deforestation. The Nagoya Conference also agreed on new targets for protected areas.

Activities

- Enhance the understanding of the economics of ecosystem services and biodiversity.
- Promote the integration of biodiversity frameworks in national development and planning processes.
- Support African countries with implementation of the Protocol on Access and Benefit Sharing (ABS) and with the targets on protected areas.
- Promote participation and potential accession of the AU Commission in the processes of the Convention on Biological Diversity.
- Assist the AU Commission in coordinating African negotiators on bio-diversity and the regional, continental, and global fora.

Expected results

- Better understanding of the economic importance of ecosystems and biodiversity.
- Biodiversity frameworks and programs into national development and planning processes.
- Increased capacity to deal with ABS and with protected areas targets.
- Enhanced participation of the AU Commission in CBD processes
- Enhanced support for African negotiators on biodiversity supported

Actors: European Union and African states, RECs, UNEP, AMCEN, African negotiators.

III. Specific suggestions to improve the functioning of the Climate Change Partnership

- Encourage a stronger engagement of African and EU States in the climate change partnership.
- Strengthen the links between the partnership and various international, continental and regional climate conferences inter alia UNFCCC, CAHOSCC and AMCEN e.g. for the UNFCC Conferences in Cancun and South Africa in December 2010 and 2011 respectively; publish on the Africa-EU partnership website, the UNFCCC side events related to the priorities of the climate change partnership and vice-versa.
- Ensure that the partnership meetings benefit from support and dedicated resources for their smoother functioning. This includes interpretation, translation services and secretariat support to ensure and enhance effective participation of all concerned stakeholders and encourage sub-regional representation.
- Organise monthly "update" meetings through video conferences bringing together the JEG co-Chairs, the EC, the AUC, the AU Permanent Mission to the EU and the EU Delegation to the AU to facilitate a regular information flow.
- Enhance and diversify resource mobilization mechanisms including the translation of multilateral and bilateral financial pledges into concrete actions.

- Promote coordination and exchange of information among relevant stakeholders to enhance aid efficiency
- Strengthen synergies with the Africa-EU partnerships relevant to climate change such as those on Energy, Migration, Peace and Security; Science Information, Society and Space and MDGs
- Ensure regular participation of representatives of RECs, NPCA Planning and Coordinating Agency (NPCA), UNECA and regional financial institutions such as the AfDB and other regional and pan-African organisations, including African-based climate institutions such as the African Centre of Meteorological Applications for Development (ACMAD), IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC), AGHRYMET, SADC Drought Monitoring Centre, RECTAS etc. Research and private sectors also need to be increasingly involved.
- Integrate the work and objectives of the Africa-EU Partnership on Water and Sanitation launched in Johannesburg in 2002 in coordination with other partnerships and the Africa Working Group of the EU Water Initiative and building on the commitments of the 2008 Sharm el Sheikh Declaration.
- Link and further strengthen synergies with various activities of relevant stakeholders that could enhance the work of the partnership.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on Energy

Overview

The AEEP is a long-term framework for structured political dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the EU on energy issues of strategic importance, reflecting African and European needs. Through the Partnership, Africa and Europe will work together to develop a shared vision and common policy answers, and to stimulate specific actions that address the energy challenges of the 21st century.

The first Ministerial High Level Meeting of the AEEP held on 14 September 2010 in Vienna, Austria[3], agreed on political targets to be achieved by 2020. The implementation of these targets is the joint responsibility of Africa and the EU. The monitoring of implementation of the targets will be undertaken by the Joint Experts Group (JEG) which brings together the African and EU Implementing Teams and their co-chairs. The Implementing Teams comprise of the AUC, EC, interested African countries and EU member states, African Regional Economic Communities (RECs), Power Pools and specialized institutions. The details of implementation will be agreed by the JEG during the AEEP 2nd Action Plan (2011-2013).

The Expected Results of the 2nd Action Plan will contribute to the achievement of the AEEP targets for 2020. At the end of the 2011-2013 period these outcomes will allow the monitoring of progress towards the realisation of the political targets.

I. Overall objective

The overall objective of the AEEP is improved access to reliable, secure, affordable, cost-effective, climate friendly and sustainable energy services for both continents, with a special focus on achieving the MDGs in Africa.

In order to achieve its Overall Objective, the AEEP will focus its efforts on concrete, realistic, visible targets, to be attained by 2020, as agreed by the Ministerial High Level Meeting held in Vienna on 14-15 September 2010. Action will contribute to the realisation of existing national, regional and continental energy objectives and strategies in Africa, and will take into account the necessary social and environmental standards.

[3] The HLM of the AEEP brought together over 300 participants, including ministers, ambassadors and other high-level decision-makers from 21 European and 23 African countries, and commissioners from the AU and the EU, as well as academics, business leaders and members of civil society from across Africa and Europe.

II. Specific Initiatives

Priority 1: Energy Access

Activities

1. Continue to implement 64 projects in 34 African countries under the first ACP-EU Energy Facility, benefiting more than 6 million people, with a total budget of €400 million, including a contribution of €180 million from the EC.
2. Start to implement 60 energy access projects in 35 African countries under the second ACP-EU Energy Facility with a total EC contribution of around € 180 million
3. Further implement and expand bi-lateral energy access initiatives and projects such as the Dutch-German Energising Development (EnDev) programme.
4. Create adequate political and regulatory frameworks to achieve regional and national energy access goals.
5. Develop innovative, sustainable financial schemes to implement access to energy programmes in Africa; and assist African countries to reform their electricity tariff systems ultimately aiming for cost-recovery.
6. Support the creation and/or operationalization of rural electrification funds and other African energy funds contributing to access.
7. Develop biomass energy strategies, covering all forms of biomass, including for improved traditional cooking, as well as the sustainable production of modern solid, liquid and gaseous fuels.
8. Support efforts to make energy programmes gender sensitive, taking into account the preponderant role of African women in producing and consuming energy.
9. Support sharing of best practices and peer-learning from countries with high levels of energy access through African institutions and networks in the energy sector.

Expected Results

Increased access to modern and sustainable energy services in Africa, focusing on sustainable models: to provide energy for basic services (health, education, water, communication); to power productive activities; and to provide safe and sustainable energy services to households.

This result is a contribution to the AEEP Political Target for 2020 to bring access to modern and sustainable energy services to at least an additional 100 million Africans, focusing on sustainable models: to provide energy for basic services (health, education, water, communication); to power productive activities; and to provide safe and sustainable energy services to households.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

<u>Priority 2</u>: Energy Security

Activities

1. Support regional energy master plans, policies and strategies on access, electricity and regional infrastructure through the "Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa" (PIDA).
2. Further implement regional interconnection projects agreed and ongoing under the EU-Africa Infrastructure Trust Fund and other instruments that strengthen African regional power pools.
3. Support priority projects on electricity and gas interconnection infrastructure of regional power pools and RECs that will be jointly agreed and selected according to criteria of bankability and contribution to energy access to meet the 2020 political targets.
4. Support and promote the implementation of the "Hydro 2020 Initiative" aiming at increasing the production capacity, interconnections and energy trade.

Expected Results

Increased capacity of cross border electricity interconnections, both within Africa and between Africa and Europe, thus increasing trade in electricity while ensuring adequate levels of generation capacity.

Increased use of natural gas in Africa, as well as African gas exports to Europe, by building natural gas infrastructure, notably to bring currently flared gas to market.

These results are a contribution to the AEEP Political Targets for 2020 to double the capacity of cross border electricity interconnections, both within Africa and between Africa and Europe, thus increasing trade in electricity while ensuring adequate levels of generation capacity; double the use of natural gas in Africa, as well as doubling African gas exports to Europe, by building natural gas infrastructure, notably to bring currently flared gas to market.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

<u>Priority 3:</u> Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency

Activities

1. Develop subsequent phases of the Africa-EU Renewable Energy Cooperation Programme (RECP) and support management, coordination and monitoring of the start-up phase.
2. Implement support to renewable energy policies and development of markets.
3. Support capacity development for project preparation and mobilization of financing.
4. Promote renewable energy applied research, development and technology transfer.
5. Support existing and new regional centers for renewable energy and energy efficiency to aid in formulating and disseminating policies promoting renewable energy and energy efficiency and to provide a platform for the regional exchange on policy issues and technological questions.
6. Further the creation and support existing funds or facilities to strengthen the role of small and medium-sized enterprises, and to stimulate the market for decentralized, renewable energy
7. Develop joint approaches to support and facilitate implementation of regional and continental priority projects jointly agreed on renewable energy (in hydropower, solar and geothermal).
8. Develop a programme on increasing energy efficiency in the electricity systems (supply and demand sides) and support existing regional energy efficiency initiatives such as SAPPs "demand-side management virtual power station".

Expected Results

Increased use of renewable energy in Africa: by building new and/or rehabilitating existing hydro-power, wind power and solar energy facilities and other renewable facilities, such as geothermal and modern biomass.

Improved energy efficiency in Africa in all sectors, starting with the electricity sector, in support of Africa's continental, regional and sectoral targets.

These results are a contribution to the AEEP Political Targets for 2020 to increase the use of renewable energy in Africa: by building 10 000 MW of new hydro-power facilities; by building at least 5 000 MW of wind power; 500 MW for all forms of solar energy; and by tripling the capacity of other renewables, such as geothermal, and modern biomass improve energy efficiency in Africa in all sectors, starting with the electricity sector, in support of Africa's continental, regional and sectoral targets.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

Priority 4: Institutional Capacity Building

1. Strengthen existing and launch new capacity building initiatives and activities for national, regional and continental institutions in Africa with a focus on coordination, information systems, databases, planning, standardisation, innovative financing mechanisms to leverage local and international finance.
2. Intensify efforts to facilitate cooperation among African and European private sector investors, with particular focus on attracting European and international investment to Africa.
3. Intensify cooperation with research institutions and civil society in order to improve their ability to engage in energy issues.
4. Develop a distributed AEEP Monitoring and Evaluation tool. The tool will have a double purpose: retrospective, to measure the impact of AEEP efforts in view of realizing our common targets; prospective, to benefit from experience gained in order to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public intervention in the energy sector. The efforts to monitor AEEP activities will focus on access to energy for basic needs, for social services and for productive activities.

Expected Results
Improved institutional capacity for national, regional and continental institutions in Africa (RECs, regional power pools, specialized institutions, etc.) on coordination, information systems, databases, planning and standardization
Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

Priority 5: Scaling up Investment

1. Support regulatory reforms and good governance in the energy sector to provide for an enabling environment.
2. Mobilize internal resources for increased access to services, e.g. by making utilities more effective and efficient.
3. Focus on using available public resources to attract private capital for energy access activities.
4. Support public and private investment in grid and off grid power.
5. Support efforts to better identify barriers for project financing, and to make recommendations on how best to mobilize private and public resources for investment in the energy sector.

Expected Results
Increased investment in the energy sector (public and private).

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

<u>Priority 6:</u> Dialogue

1. Africa and the EU will strengthen dialogue at multiple levels on energy issues of mutual interest, including research institutions, the private sector and civil society.
2. Specific events - including broad representation of the private sector, civil society and research institutions – will be organised on key issues of the AEEP:
   - Continental and intercontinental infrastructure: a tool for energy security;
   - Governance of the energy sector: a tool to achieve universal access;
   - Renewable energy and energy efficiency: keys to access and energy security.

Expected Results

On the basis of the monitored results of the Action Plan the above-mentioned targets will be reviewed and updated, also in the light of new political developments and joint agreements.

Actors: African countries and EU member states, RECs, RPPs, AUC, EC, as well as civil society, private sector and research institutions of both continents.

JAES Action Plan 2011 – 2013

Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment

I. Overview

The Africa-EU Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment aims to provide comprehensive responses to migration and employment challenges, in the interest of all partners, and with a particular focus on creating more and better jobs for Africa, on facilitating mobility and free movement of people in Africa and the EU, on better managing legal migration between the two continents, on addressing the root causes of migration and refugee flows, on the conditions of and access to employment, on the fair treatment of all migrants under applicable international law, on finding concrete solutions to problems posed by irregular migration flows and trafficking of human beings and to ensure that migration and mobility work for development. All these orientations should be addressed in a balanced and comprehensive way. These objectives were already set out in the Action plan 2008-2010 and will continue to steer this Partnership, also in the Action plan 2011-2013.

Following the Lisbon Summit of December 2007 dialogue and cooperation between Africa and the EU on migration, mobility and employment issues have intensified. Yet actual results are uneven and scattered, depending very much on the political interests and institutional capacities of the concerned African and EU States. Both in Africa and in the EU, competences and responsibilities for migration and employment policies are still very much at the national level, with the regional and continental dimensions being recognised, but not yet encompassed.

II. Overall objectives

The new Action Plan will further strengthen inter-regional, continental and inter-continental dialogue and cooperation in the area of migration, mobility and employment among countries of origin, transit and destination. In addition, higher education appears as a more visible and integrated part of this partnership. Through this Action Plan Africa and the EU renew their commitment to the implementation of (a) the Declaration of the 2006 Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, (b) the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children, and (c) the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

The new action plan will have two main strands: (1) enhancing dialogue, and (2) identifying and implementing concrete actions, both of them encompassing the inter-regional continental and inter-continental dimension of the partnership.

The major challenge for the period 2011-2013 will be to **further strengthen and enrich the political and policy dialogue** on migration, mobility and employment as well as tertiary education issues between the two continents, whilst encompassing dialogues and cooperation taking place on national and regional levels.

In the area of **migration and mobility** this dialogue will be informed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy agreed in Lisbon in December 2007[4], as well as the Declaration of the 2006 Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, the EU-Africa Plan of Action on

[4] In particular paragraphs 68, 69 and 70.

Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children, and the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa.

For the period 2011 – 2013 the agenda for the dialogue between Africa and the EU on these topics will be comprehensive and balanced, taking into account concerns of countries of origin, transit and destination. It will include topics such as

a. diasporas, remittances, brain drain, migrant rights, social consequences of migration;
b. regular migration, including circular migration, mobility, visa issues,
c. illegal migration, trafficking in human beings, smuggling of migrants, readmission and return, and
d. refugees, asylum and protection

Both parties will deepen their political dialogue on the human rights, including social, economic and cultural rights of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers in this partnership and in other relevant fora. In the framework of this dialogue, both parties will notably exchange views on lessons learnt and best practices on the implementation of existing instruments, such as the 1969 OAU Convention on refugees, the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the status of refugees and its 1967 Protocol, the 2009 AU Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa, and other relevant human rights instruments as well as international humanitarian law instruments. This dialogue will also address issues related to sex trade, sex tourism and cheap labour. The dialogue on visa issues will look at conditions and procedures for delivery of visa, and facilitating mobility for commercial, professional and study reasons.

In the area of **employment**, the dialogue will focus on strategies and initiatives targeting job creation and sustainable and inclusive growth, acknowledging the role of relevant stakeholders, including social partners and the private sector. Furthermore, the dialogue will focus on the questions related to the implementation of the Ouagadougou Action Plan and the global 'Decent Work Agenda' with special emphasis on the *creation of more, more productive and better jobs* in Africa and the link to *social protection* as well as to the *informal and social economy*.

In direct relation to strategies on employment, mobility and the harnessing of brain drain the parties will extend their dialogue to the area of **higher education**. This dialogue will look, inter alia, at ways of supporting the *mobility of students and scholars* and the realisation of the *African higher education harmonization process.*

Dialogue on all these topics will in particular focus on the question of how to enhance coherence and synergies between migration, mobility, employment, education policies and *development/ poverty reduction strategies*.

It is envisaged that the dialogue process will yield ideas for further concrete actions that may be added to the Action Plan in the coming years.

III. Specific initiatives and activities

The second strand of the Action Plan 2011 – 2013 consists of a number of **concrete actions**. Some of these were already initiated or launched under the Action Plan 2008-2010 and are reaching their implementation stage under the next Action Plan. Several of the employment related initiatives that have been identified and discussed at the June 2010 AUC-EC Workshop on Employment, Social Protection and Decent Work in Dakar will inform the relevant employment initiatives of this Action Plan.

At the moment the following initiatives are envisaged for the Action Plan 2011-2013[5]:

1: ***Facilitation of the dialogue***. To organise and facilitate the Africa – EU dialogue a € 3 million support project has been launched in 2010. The project will engage in the organisation of *workshops and meetings, information exchange and capacity building.* The project is implemented by a consortium of three organisations (ICMPD, IDEP, FIIAPP), under the responsibility of a Steering Committee led by AUC and EC, and a consultative role of the Joint Expert Group (JEG).

2: ***African Remittances Institute***. The preparatory phase project (technical and consultative) designed to facilitate a structured and deepened reflection on all aspects of the prospective establishment of the African Remittances Institute (ARI) was launched in 2010, involving the World Bank in association with AUC and EC, as well as IOM and AfDB. The Steering Committee that has been established is led by the AUC Preparatory activities will encompass, consultations research, capacity building and networking. It is envisaged that the Institute, once established, will facilitate better, more effective and safer remittances' transfer system, which will fully take into account the specificities of African countries.

3***: Human Trafficking Initiative.*** The AUC, in partnership with the EC, will assist RECs in developing and implementing *regional action plans* to strengthen protection, prevention and prosecution of trafficking in human beings, in line with the Ouagadougou Action Plan and AU.COMMIT, that cover countries of origin, transit and destination. Furthermore a *monitoring and evaluation tool* will be designed and implemented at regional level to enable measurement of implementation and impact as well as to assist in the *identification of best practices* for the African Continent.

4: ***Diaspora Outreach Initiativ*e.** The Partners will establish an Africa–EU Diaspora cooperation framework, with the objective of engaging the Diaspora in the development of Africa and to build capacity and transfer skills, knowledge and technologies from the Diaspora to the African continent. This cooperation framework will be built on the AU Diaspora Initiative, and create synergies between the following three existing programmes: (a) Global Mapping of Africa Diasporas (AUC – WB), (b) Capacity building for Diaspora ministries in Africa (NL/DE), (c) EU-wide networks of African Diaspora organisations working in the field of development.

[5] For each initiative a fiche has been prepared, indicating the objectives, activities, funding and actors involved.

Priority actions that will be developed are: (1) Mapping of African Diaspora organisations in the EU, (2) Programmes addressing specific sectoral needs, such as a Diaspora Health Network, (3) AU regional network on African diasporas in Europe.

5: ***Observatory on Migration***. The ACP Observatory on Migration will create a network of researchers and research centres to provide policy makers, civil society and the public at large with reliable and harmonised data on migration. In order to achieve this objective it may establish links with other relevant observatories. It will run a website, and publish research studies and papers. It will furthermore function as an exchange platform for migration research papers and expertise. The Observatory initiative will be launched in October 2010. This initiative could serve as a starting point to develop future activities covering all the African continent.

6: ***Decent Work Initiative***. AUC and EC will jointly launch a project with the objective of extending social protection coverage in particular in the informal economy. The two Commissions will organize an event to allow the exchange of experiences between relevant experts and other key stakeholders including governments, private sector, social partners, civil society and international organisations. Furthermore, the AU Programme on Upgrading the Informal Economy and the Productivity Agenda for Africa will continue to provide support to a multi-level dialogue and policy development on the informal economy (mainstreaming of the informal economy, empowerment and social dialogue, productivity improvement, knowledge and data base management, etc). This dialogue may also involve Asian and Latin American countries.

7: ***Labour market governance and capacity building***. This initiative aims at strengthening the institutional capacity of the labour market institutions in Africa, so that they can play effectively their role in the social and economic development in the continent. The initiative will target public employment services and labour administrations. It will aim to harmonise and coordinate labour market information systems (also in connection to the network of Employment and TVET[6] Observatories currently implemented in African countries). Support will be provided at national, regional and continental level. The initiative furthermore aims at the mapping of skills required and available at national, regional and continental level, identifying the gaps and working for the improvement of employment opportunities and employability.

8: ***Regional and sub-regional fora on employment, labour, social protection and labour migration.*** In cooperation with RECs, fora will be strengthened to allow organizing consultations on thematic policies of common concern, and to contribute to enhancing the functioning of the labour market, supporting the harmonization processes of the labour and social protection frameworks at regional levels. Furthermore, partners will establish a platform for social dialogue between the African Union and the European Union including an effective representation of all stakeholders, including non-state actors such as representatives of civil society, the private sector, trade unions and parliamentarians, with a particular focus on the informal economy.

6 TVET: Technical and Vocational Education and Training

9: **Access to finance and guarantees**. The European Union and Africa will intensify their cooperation in the area of job creation, building on the 2004 Ouagadougou Declaration and Action Plan on Employment and Poverty Alleviation in Africa. Special attention is devoted to improve the access to financial services for the poorest and underserved, through support of the microfinance sector and through enhancing the small- and medium-sized enterprises' (SMEs) access to long term finance.

One such initiative is the progressive development of the African Guarantee Fund (AGF) supported by the African Development Bank (AfDB), Denmark, and Spain. Access to finance and guarantee will be developed taking into account existing guarantee schemes, including at regional level and in close cooperation with other donors as well as with the European Investment Bank (EIB). The potential for co-guaranteeing SME-portfolios in Africa will be systemically explored.

10: ***Nyerere Programme***. This programme was initiated by the AUC in 2005. Its aim is to contribute to high level African human resource development and retention; while supporting intra-African academic mobility, and thereby mitigate the effects of brain drain. This enhanced scholarship programme will be launched in November 2010. Under the scheme, African students, scholars and academic staff will receive scholarships for master and PhD level studies and to allow exchange of academics and university administrative staff. Overall, it is expected that over the five consecutive rounds of selection more than 2000 participants will benefit from the scheme.

11: ***Pan-African University.*** The Pan-African University is a project by the African Union, aiming to exemplify excellence, relevance and global competitiveness of African higher education and research. It is a network of African higher education and research institutions, with thematic hubs in each of the five geographic regions of Africa (Eastern, Western, Central, Southern and Northern Africa). It is expected that the first four thematic institutes will be launched in 2011.

12: ***African Higher Education Harmonisation and Tuning***. This initiative aims to review the state of implementation of mutual recognition of higher education certificates and qualifications in Africa. It will involve assessment of the potential of using the European approach of 'Tuning'[7] . The initiative includes the implementation of the African Quality Rating Mechanism, the popularisation of the revised Arusha convention, and the development of a roadmap for the harmonisation of higher education in Africa. A pilot phase on the potential of using this tuning approach is expected to begin in 2011.

The above initiatives may be further developed and strengthened during the course of implementation of this Action Plan. Other initiatives might be jointly identified and agreed throughout the period of validity of the Action Plan if specific needs are identified by the partners.

[7] "Tuning' is a methodology which allows universities to understand and fine-tune curricula and make them comparable on a transnational basis. It focuses on a specific subject area's generic competences or transferable skills, subject specific competences, learning outcomes, credits, approaches to learning, teaching and assessment, quality assurance and employability.

As for the *financing* of these initiatives the Partnership will continue to rely on resources available in the EU, the AU as well as in African and EU States. Partners agree to make efforts to increase the *visibility, transparency and accessibility of these resources,* including through enhanced coordination in the framework of this MME Partnership. The two Commissions will conclude the examination of the feasibility of setting up a fund as provided for in the outcome document of the Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development of November 2006.

The joint experts group will monitor the implementation of this action plan and will evaluate the progress made.

JAES Action Plan 2011-2013

Partnership on Science, Information Society and Space

I. Overall Objectives

This Partnership interlinks three Priorities for development policy, which singly and in conjunction with one another can leverage faster socio-economic development in Africa: science, information society and space applications. By strengthening their cooperation to produce knowledge-based societies and economies, Africa and the EU recognise that:

- the development of science, technology and innovation, as well as the spreading of the digital era to all sections of society are key motors of socio-economic growth and sustainable development;

- competitiveness in the world economy rests increasingly on knowledge and application of modern technologies and:

- attainment of the MDGs requires a general effort to raise S&T capacities in Africa and enable widespread use of ICTs and related services.

In that respect, this Partnership is cross-cutting in nature, contributing to the attainment of all other development objectives. For optimal effectiveness, there should therefore be close coordination with other JAES Partnerships (particularly infrastructure, climate change Migration Mobility and Employment(MME) and MDGs); In addition, clear articulation with the formal institutional apparatus governing EU-Africa relations should be developed.

II. Specific initiatives and activities of Action Plan 2011-2013 by priority area

PRIORITY ACTION 1: S&T capacity building for the implementation of Africa's Science and Technology Consolidated Plan of Action (CPA)

Objectives: To strengthen African Capacities in the area of science and technology, in order to enhance the use of science and technology and to improve S&T cooperation.

Expected outcomes

- Strengthened African S&T capacities and EU capacities for working with Africa to enhance coherence of cooperation
- Improved training, and hence increase the quality and number of African and EU scientists, technicians and engineers
- Improved training and exchange programmes for African and EU scientists, technicians and engineers
- The mainstreaming of S&T into REC's sectoral programmes and projects, including those in EDF RIPs
- Improved pan-African infrastructure and facilities for R&D
- The active pursuing of AU-EU high-level policy dialogue
- Enhanced S&T cooperation at all levels (bilateral, bi-regional, bi-continental, REC-level) in key areas of the CPA
- Enhanced innovation capability of African and European SMEs
- Development of STI evidence–based AU EU policy making, including support to the Africa STI observatory

Activities

- Awareness-raising at all levels (policy makers/government; parliament; local stakeholders/communities; private sector; civil society) on the opportunities for S&T to contribute to national/regional/pan-African development and to respond to major challenges that both Africa and Europe are faced with
- Consolidate and implement national/regional/pan-African S&T policies consistent with regional or continental social and economic development agendas. This will include supporting the AU objective of designing a multi-annual African Research Framework, inter alia by implementing the African Research Grants Initiative, as well as providing the AUC with the requisite experience and management capacity
- Enhance EU (Commission and Member States) cooperation, in partnership with RECs (through a well-defined framework with the AU) on mainstreaming science and technology for socio-economic sustainable development and support the strengthening of their capacities in this area
- Complete formulation of the *Science and Technology for the development of African Small and Medium Enterprises and Business Incubators network* Lighthouse project and seek its financing by mobilizing further European (EC; Member States; Private sector and Local authorities) and African national, regional and continental financial instruments, the Private Sector, NGOs and any other interested stakeholder organisations
- Explore all possibilities for Africa to support the deployment of regional, global and high quality research infrastructures
- Set up an adequate mechanism to promote an African brain-gain programme
- Cooperate in capacity building in R&D and R&D policy in Africa and the EU
- Stimulate and support collaborative research in the areas of the CPA. This will be done by exploiting opportunities of new programmes focused on developing bi-regional funding frameworks
- The S&T related activities will be implemented in line with the CPA with a focus on the grand challenges Africa and Europe are faced with. Priority will be given to joint strategic initiatives where a particular impact of S&T is expected, for example, Climate Change/Energy, Sustainable Agriculture and Food Security and Global Health (emphasis on Maternal and Child Health and Infectious Diseases). Strategies will be developed to further adapt and open the existing 7th FP instruments to African scientists
- Pursue the EUC–AUC Exchange programme, extend it to Member States and include RECs, following the development of an exchange strategy by the AUC-EC
- Seek active coordination and cooperation with university related activities in order to improve the value of S&T within national policies including budget allocation to science and research
- Ensure coordination with the proposed new high-level AU-EU science and technology policy dialogue.

Actors

§ AU Commission/NPCA; RECs; African States; AfDB and associated Economic Blocs

§ European Commission; EIB; EU Member States and associated economic regions

§ Private Sector; universities; science and technology institutions and associated research centers

§ International Finance Institutions

§ UNESCO, UNECA and other UN agencies

Finance

§ Dedicated financing tools

§ 10th EDF; DCI; FP 7; ENPI; EIB; AfDB

§ Bilateral contributions from EU and AU Member States, from the RECs and the European regions and from local authorities

§ Multilateral cooperation between MS, eg. a grouping of African and European MS, who initiate and finance joint projects of mutual interest

§ Private Sector and Foundations that support R&D

PRIORITY ACTION 2: Support the development of an inclusive information society in Africa

Objectives: Complement and develop new strategies to support investments made on ICT infrastructures deployment, as planned in the EU-Africa Partnership on Infrastructures. This will be done by exploiting synergies between the EU 2020 Digital Agenda and the AU ICT development frameworks as well as with support to capacity-building initiatives for mass diffusion of ICTs and related services considered as key enablers for poverty reduction, economic growth, social development and regional integration

Expected Outcomes

- A successful implementation of the AU ICT development frameworks including ARAPKE (the African Regional Action Plan for the Knowledge Economy), the Reference Framework for ICT Policy Harmonization and the 2010 Addis Ababa AU Summit Declaration on ICT for Africa's development

- A more inclusive and affordable access to ICT applications and services and widespread use of ICTs (e.g. the internet and mobile applications), across all socio-economic sectors in order to fast-track the MDGs objectives, notably in health (e.g. use of telemedicine and the creation of bio-data banks) and the education sector

- Stronger cooperation regarding the digital economy and the reduction of the digital divide, including private sector, international financial institutions and UN agencies

- A more competitive African economy through ICT uptake and innovation

- Consultation on African-EU positions and approaches in international and regional ICT fora to enhance mutual understanding

- Mutual beneficial economic collaboration for AU-EU industries and SMEs involved in ICTs

Activities

- Set up an AUC-EC Information Society Dialogue, in partnership with Member States, addressing all ICT-related cooperation issues in a comprehensive and integrated way, with the view to better bridge policies, programmes and practices related to the implementation of the EU 2020 Digital Agenda and AU ICT development frameworks, and to coordinate EU and African positions in global ICT fora. These can include e.g. enhancement of digital literacy, skills and inclusion, skills for research and technological development, regulatory issues, infrastructure deployment with promotion of the use of e-applications in various sectors of governance.

- Establish a multi-stakeholders implementation group, co-chaired by the AUC and EC and gathering ICT representatives from European and African Member States, RECs, research community, private sector, civil society and NGOs, international financial institutions and international organizations in order to facilitate cooperation and better coordination of national and regional programmes, as well as to identify concrete initiatives of mutual interests in support of EU and AU priorities and mobilize funds accordingly. The implementation group will notably focus on the following activities :

- Build on the current *Harmonisation of ICT Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa* (HIPSSA) initiative to ensure the full participation of African non ACP member states and to further support implementation of ICT regulatory and policy reforms and regional harmonization in view of creating the right enabling environment to foster private investment and market development while ensuring affordable service costs and the widest diffusion of ICTs and e-services
- Promote the diffusion and sharing of ICT best practices and successful public-private partnerships, notably by establishing close interaction with the EU-Africa Business Forum and support for Africa EU networking platforms as well as linking national initiatives to existing regional and global platforms and networks, notably to those provided by international financing institutions and private sector fora
- Design appropriate e-skills and digital literacy initiatives, supporting the development of local digital content and applications of high socio-economic impact, notably in the fields of health and education in order to fast-track attainment of the MDGs
- Upgrade ICT research cooperation, local ICT innovation and entrepreneurship, exploiting in particular the potential of mobile and fixed wireless technologies as well as promoting ICT business incubators and living labs, including notably the *Africa Incubators Network* and the *European Network of Living Labs*

Promote cooperation in Research and Education Networking by exploiting interconnection between the European GEANT network and established African regional networks and supporting the development of an integrated pan-African Research and Education Network.

Actors

- AU Commission/NPCA; RECs; African States
- European Commission; EIB; EU Member States; Regions
- Research Community
- Private Sector
- Civil Society and NGOs
- Local Authorities
- International Financing Institutions
- UN specialized agencies and international organizations

Finance

- Dedicated financing tools and appropriate financing sources in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to objectives and activities concerned, their specificity and eligibility criteria, such as the 10th EDF; ENPI; DCI; EU-Africa Infrastructures Trust Fund and FP7

- Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African States

- Private sector; NGOs; local authorities; financial institutions

PRIORITY ACTION 3: Enhance Cooperation on Space Applications and technology.

(2) OBJECTIVE: ENHANCED COOPERATION IN THE USE OF SPACE APPLICATION AND TECHNOLOGY TO SUPPORT AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT

Expected outcomes

- Strengthening and developing of Pan African Institutions

- Integration of Space-related issues fully in specific dialogues and cooperation initiatives in areas such as navigation, telecommunications and Earth observation for the environment and resource management, climate change, peace and security

- Development of specific projects (such as telemedicine), based on existing space infrastructure to achieve regional and global development goals.

Activities

- **GMES and Africa :** Pursue the process initiated in 2007 at the Lisbon Summit, taking into consideration the on-going deliberations and guidance on the process

  Finalise, expedite and implement the Action Plan on GMES and Africa, in particular:
  - establish a secretariat to drive the GMES and Africa Initiative
  - Complete the identification of user communities and validation of requirements
  - Complete the mapping of contributing organisations, projects and activities
  - Promote harmonisation and prioritise future actions
  - Fully integrate Earth-observation data, products and methodologies in support to policies in areas such as climate change, food security, water management, monitoring of natural resources, peace and security, etc.
  - Allocate adequate (approx € 20 million) for the preparatory phase of the GMES and Africa
  - Fully exploit synergies with relevant GMES-Europe Services and other established European missions such as Meteosat and Envisat among others
  - Take full benefit of the current programme and cooperation in earth observation, including research projects
  - Identify adequate funding mechanism (FP; EDF; ENPI; African institutions etc) and kick-off priority projects

Identify, develop, finance and pursue the necessary capacity building efforts at continental, regional and national level so that the African technical and policy institutions have the necessary resources to fully exploit available Earth observation-based information and products in support of the establishment and monitoring of their policies by identifying, developing and financing the capacity building programmes

Design and implement the appropriate coordination and governance mechanisms aiming at a long-term cooperation in the area by developing frameworks to:

- § Ensure adequate mechanism for coordination between continental, regional and national level
- § Ensure adequate representation of user communities in the governance mechanism to ensure that GMES and Africa is being developed in response to user and development needs
- § Implement adequate and inclusive monitoring mechanisms to assess impact on development policies and compliance with user requirements
- § Estimate resources needed up to 2020 based on current level of investments and priority actions reflecting the conclusions of the "GMES and Africa" Action Plan
- § Promote dissemination of information and transparency through Workshops and other suitable information mechanisms.

- **Reformulate and support the implementation of the African Geodetic Reference Frame (AFREF)** to establish a foundation for space applications in Africa by providing an essential element for regional and multinational projects requiring precise positioning and geo-referencing.

- **On the basis of appropriate African initiatives, jointly develop the concept and establish a strong African institutional and policy framework for**:

  - **Promoting the exploitation of space-based applications** and technologies in support of development goals

  - **Assess the feasibility of an autonomous African Space Agency** to assist the continent to coordinate continental space activities in an integrated and sustainable way, drawing on the expertise of the European and African Commissions, ESA, EUMETSAT and committed African States (such as Algeria, Egypt, South Africa, Nigeria, Kenya and others).

Actors

- AU Commission/NPCA; UNECA and UN agencies; African States; RECs and other existing African regional space technology organisations, agencies and facilities
- European Commission, EU Member States
- European agencies such as the European Space Agency (ESA) and EUMETSAT
- Research institutes and organisations
- Private Sector, NGOs and other related organisations and Development partners.

Finance

- Identification of dedicated financing instruments
- The 10th EDF, ENPI, DCI.
  - EU Framework Programme for RTD
  - Complementary programmes managed by other European actors (e.g. ESA; EUMETSAT)
  - Bilateral contributions from EU Member States and African States
  - Private sector

THE AFRICA-EU STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP

A Joint Africa-EU Strategy

I. CONTEXT, SHARED VISION AND PRINCIPLES

1. Context

1. Africa and Europe are bound together by history, culture, geography, a common future, as well as by a community of values: the respect for human rights, freedom, equality, solidarity, justice, the rule of law and democracy as enshrined in the relevant international agreements and in the constitutive texts of our respective Unions.

2. Since the historic first Africa-EU Summit in Cairo in 2000, where our partnership was strengthened through the institutionalisation of our dialogue, considerable change has taken place on both continents. Democratisation and reform processes have been launched and are being deepened in both Africa and Europe and efforts have continued on both continents to address conflict and crisis situations. At the same time, integration processes on both continents have accelerated – on the one hand, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) has been transformed into the African Union (AU) with its socio-economic programme, the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD); on the other hand, the European Union (EU) has nearly doubled in size and is in the process of deepening the Union. The world has also changed: new international and global challenges have emerged, globalisation has accelerated and the world has become increasingly interdependent.

3. In response to these changes, cooperation between Africa and the EU has rapidly developed and diversified. Both sides have developed political strategies and policy documents to guide their cooperation, including the AU Constitutive Act and Strategic Framework 2004-2007 and the EU Africa Strategy of 2005. However, it is now time for these two neighbours, with their rich and complex history, to forge a new and stronger partnership that builds on their new identities and renewed institutions, capitalises on the lessons of the past and provides a solid framework for long-term, systematic and well integrated cooperation. There is now a need for a new phase in the Africa-EU relationship, a new strategic partnership and a Joint Africa-EU Strategy as a political vision and roadmap for the future cooperation between the two continents in existing and new areas and arenas.

2. Shared Vision

4. The purpose of this Joint Strategy is to take the Africa-EU relationship to a new, strategic level with a strengthened political partnership and enhanced cooperation at all levels. The partnership will be based on a Euro-African consensus on values, common interests and common strategic objectives. This partnership should strive to bridge the development divide between Africa and Europe through the strengthening of economic cooperation and the promotion of sustainable development in both continents, living side by side in peace, security, prosperity, solidarity and human dignity.

5. This Joint Strategy, which will provide an overarching long-term framework for Africa-EU relations, will be implemented through successive short-term Action Plans and enhanced political dialogue at all levels, resulting in concrete and measurable outcomes in all areas of the partnership.

3. Principles

6. This partnership and its further development will be guided by the fundamental principles of the unity of Africa, the interdependence between Africa and Europe, ownership and joint responsibility, and respect for human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law, as well as the right to development. In the light of this new partnership, both sides also commit themselves to enhance the coherence and effectiveness of existing agreements, policies and instruments.

7. The partnership will furthermore be governed by strengthened political dialogue, co-management and co-responsibility in our bilateral cooperation and towards global issues, burden-sharing and mutual accountability, solidarity and mutual confidence, equality and justice, common and human security, respect for international law and agreements, gender equality and non-discrimination and, not least, a long-term approach.

II. OBJECTIVES

8. The four main objectives of this long-term strategic partnership are:

   i. To reinforce and elevate **the Africa-EU political partnership** to address issues of common concern. This includes strengthening of institutional ties and addressing common challenges, in particular peace and security, migration and development, and a clean environment. To this end, both sides will treat Africa as one and upgrade the Africa-EU political dialogue to enable a strong and sustainable continent-to-continent partnership, with the AU and the EU at the centre.

   ii. To strengthen and promote peace, security, democratic governance and human rights, fundamental freedoms, gender equality, sustainable economic development, including industrialisation, and regional and continental integration in Africa, and to ensure that all the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) are met in all African countries by the year of 2015.

   iii. To jointly promote and sustain a system of effective multilateralism, with strong, representative and legitimate institutions, and the reform of the United Nations

(UN) system and of other key international institutions, and to address global challenges and common concerns such as human rights, including children's rights and gender equality, fair trade, migration, HIV/AIDS, malaria, tuberculosis and other pandemics, climate change, energy security and sustainability, terrorism, the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and the illicit trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons, and knowledge-based society issues such as ICT, science, technology and innovation.

iv. To facilitate and promote a broad-based and wide-ranging people-centred partnership, Africa and the EU will empower non-state actors **1** and create conditions to enable them to play an active role in development, democracy building, conflict prevention and post-conflict reconstruction processes. Both sides will also promote holistic approaches to development processes, and make this Joint Strategy a permanent platform for information, participation and mobilisation of a broad spectrum of civil society actors in the EU, Africa and beyond. Ongoing dialogue with civil society, the private sector and local stakeholders on issues covered by this Joint Strategy will be a key component to ensure its implementation.

III. NEW APPROACHES

9. In order to meet these fundamental objectives, Africa and the EU will need to jointly address a number of key political challenges that are essential for the success of the new partnership, including:

a) To move away from a traditional relationship and forge a real partnership characterised by equality and the pursuit of common objectives.

b) To build on positive experiences and lessons learned from our past relationship where successful mechanisms and instruments have been applied in specific policy areas and learn from shortcomings in other areas.

c) To promote more accurate images of each other, in place of those that are dominated by inherited negative stereotypes and that ignore the overwhelmingly positive developments on the two continents.

d) To encourage mutual understanding between the peoples and cultures of the two continents and promote better and more systematic use of our shared cultural and social heritage and our cultural diversity, as well as the economic wealth and opportunities that exist in Europe and Africa.

e) To recognise and fully support Africa's efforts and leadership to create conducive conditions for sustainable social and economic development and the effective implementation of partner-supported development programmes and to, in this context, underline the importance of strong African political commitment and responsibility in

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1 In the context of this Joint Strategy, the term non-state actors is understood as comprising : i) private sector, ii) economic and social partners including trade union organizations and iii) civil society in all its forms according to national characteristics.

support of the objectives and priorities of the partnership.

f) To work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks, as well as relevant cooperation instruments and mechanisms, to the needs and objectives of the partnership, and to set up a framework that better addresses each others' concerns.

g) To ensure that bilateral relations, dialogue and cooperation between one or more European and African countries contribute to the achievement of the objectives set out in this Joint Strategy.

h) To integrate in our agenda common responses to global challenges and strengthen our dialogue and cooperation in the multilateral context.

i) To encourage the full integration of members of migrant communities/diasporas in their countries of residence, while at the same time promoting and facilitating links with their countries of origin, with a view to providing concrete contributions to the development process.

j) To bear in mind that we can only achieve our objectives if this strategic partnership is owned by all stakeholders, including civil society actors and local authorities, and if they are actively contributing to its implementation.

IV. STRATEGIES

1. Strategic Framework

10. The four main objectives of this long-term strategic partnership set the comprehensive framework within which specific strategies will have to be put in place in the following areas: (a) peace and security, (b) governance and human rights, (c) trade and regional integration and (d) key development issues.

11. In the implementation of this new partnership, the principle of policy coherence for development will be applied by both African and EU partners by identifying and promoting interactions and positive complementarities between sectoral policies and strategies, while ensuring that measures taken in one policy area do not undermine results in other areas.

2. Strategic Priorities

12. In order to meet our objectives, Africa and the EU will need to take concrete action and to make significant progress in the following strategic inter-related priority areas:

a) Peace and Security: Promoting a Safer World

13. Due to their history and experience, Africa and Europe understand the importance of peace and security as preconditions for political, economic and social development. On this basis, the two continents have laid the foundation for successful cooperation based on the need to promote holistic approaches to security, encompassing conflict prevention and long-term peace-building, conflict resolution and post-conflict

reconstruction, linked to governance and sustainable development, with a view to addressing the root causes of conflicts.

14. However, there is today a clear determination by both Africa and the EU to bring this partnership to a new and strategic level, not only to foster peace and security in both continents, but also to address issues of common concern in the global arena.

Promotion of Peace, Security and Stability in Africa and Europe

15. At the core of the partnership between Africa and the EU is the need for a strengthened dialogue and institutional cooperation that not only addresses issues of peace and stability in Africa, but also challenges that Europe is facing. The two sides therefore undertake to share information, perspectives and lessons learned, as well as to consult on issues of common concern. Not only will this enhance the ability of both continents to respond timely and appropriately to peace and security threats, but it will also facilitate the coordination of efforts in relevant international fora, in particular the United Nations Security Council.

16. Under the leadership of the AU, the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) is taking shape. African peace-making, peace-keeping and peace-building mechanisms are being strengthened at the continental, regional and national levels. Continentally or regionally sponsored peace agreements are the norm on the continent today, and most African countries now enjoy peace and stability. The EU has been a key partner for African countries and organisations to help create conditions for lasting peace and stability.

17. In view of their expertise, financial and human resources and experience, the EU and its Member States are well placed to provide continued and increased support for the AU in its efforts to – in cooperation with the relevant African regional organisations – operationalise the APSA, including through long-term capacity building for the various structures provided therein, including the Continental Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, and the African Standby Force. The AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) will play a key coordinating role in this process. This support will, moreover, aim at facilitating the implementation of other relevant AU instruments such as the Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development, the Declaration on the Border Program and relevant instruments on disarmament issues. In this context, efforts will be made to ensure coherence with wider international efforts.

18. EU support to Africa has been and continues to be guided by the principle of African ownership. At the same time, valuable guidance for the cooperation will, as appropriate, be drawn from the EU Concept for Strengthening African Capabilities for the Prevention, Management and Resolution of Conflicts and relevant parts of the EU Joint Policy Framework on Security Sector Reform and the EU Concept on Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration, and from lessons learned from the implementation of the African Peace Facility (APF), and from wider international experience. EU support will be provided through a number of different instruments, in particular the capacity building component of the APF, EU crisis management instruments as well as other EU programmes, such as Euro-RECAMP, and through bilateral Member States' support.

19. Building capacity should go hand in hand with contributing to adequate, coherent and sustainable financing of the activities undertaken by the AU and the Regional Mechanisms for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution, both with respect to civilian crisis management and post-conflict reconstruction and development.

20. Sustainable, predictable and flexible funding for African-led peace support operations is another major challenge. The APF has made a substantial contribution and is a good example of how partner support can complement and reinforce African funding for African-led peace support operations, including from the AU Peace Fund. However, experience over the past years has clearly shown that additional financial support is urgently needed, together with sound and accountable management systems. The EU is committed to taking steps towards establishing a predictable and sustainable funding mechanism, building on the experience of the APF and EU Member States' bilateral contributions, as well as on the determination of Africa to raise additional resources from within the continent.

21. At the same time, the EU will back Africa's efforts to widen the funding base and mobilise additional resources from G8 and other international partners. Africa and the EU will also work together for the establishment, within the context of Chapter VIII of the UN Charter, of a UN mechanism to provide predictable, flexible and sustainable funding for peace keeping operations undertaken by the AU, or under its authority, and with the consent of the UN Security Council.

22. Africa and the EU together commit themselves to support and promote the role of civil society and non-state actors in underpinning a comprehensive approach, emphasising the importance of conflict sensitivity. The two sides also commit themselves to the implementation of UN Security Council Resolutions 1325 on Women in Peace and Security and 1612 on Children in Armed Conflicts.

Common and Global Peace and Security Challenges

23. While today's global environment has opened up new opportunities to enhance international peace and security, it has also come with new security challenges, which in a world of increasing interdependence and close links between the internal and external aspects of security, only can be addressed through concerted international action, including in a UN context. Issues relating to transnational organised crime, international terrorism, mercenary activities, and human and drugs trafficking, as well as the illicit trade in natural resources, which are a major factor in triggering and spreading conflicts and undermining state structures, are of particular concern.

24. It is also recognised that the illicit proliferation, accumulation and trafficking of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and their ammunition, explosive remnants of war and the continued use of anti-personnel landmines, are all major common concerns, as is the issue of the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs). Africa and the EU will work together on all these issues, and seek to promote, as appropriate, the adoption of multilateral, regional and national instruments, and support the implementation of commitments made, including in the context of UN Security Council Resolutions. This cooperation, which will include matters relating to counter-terrorism,

will take place through the exchange of information, law enforcement and institutional capacity building and judicial cooperation.

25. Furthermore, over the past years a number of new global, and human security challenges have emerged, relating to issues such as climate change, environmental degradation, water management, toxic waste deposits and pandemics. There is a need for Africa and the EU to deepen their knowledge of the security challenges involved and jointly identify responses that could be formulated towards, and together with, the larger international community.

26. Looking beyond Africa and the EU, the two sides will also coordinate their actions and bring their influence to bear in the search for lasting solutions to crises and conflicts in other parts of the world that undermine international peace and security, in particular in the Middle East region.

b) Governance and Human Rights: Upholding our Values and Principles

Common and Global Governance and Human Rights Challenges

27. The promotion of democratic governance and human rights constitutes a central feature of the Africa-EU dialogue and partnership. The two continents will join efforts towards the enhancement of the effectiveness of the multilateral system and the promotion of the values of democracy, rule of law and human rights. In this regard, the Africa-EU strategic partnership will facilitate an open, intensive and comprehensive dialogue on all aspects and concepts of governance, including human rights, childrens' rights, gender equality, democratic principles, the rule of law, local governance, the management of natural resources, the transparent and accountable management of public funds, institutional development and reform, human security, security sector reform, the fight against corruption, corporate social responsibility, and institution building and development. This dialogue should help both parties to define the issues at stake, agree on common positions on issues of common concern and jointly undertake specific initiatives and actions.

28. In the context of situations of conflict, crisis, instability, severe democratic deficit, and/or institutional weakness, and on the basis of discussions in various international fora, Africa and the EU will also hold a dialogue on the concept of "situations of fragility" aimed at reaching a common understanding and agreeing on steps that could be taken.

29. With regard to human rights, Africa and the EU will work together to protect and promote the human rights of all people in Africa and Europe, including through enhanced dialogue between relevant institutions from both continents, such as the European Court of Human Rights of the Council of Europe, the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights and the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Committee on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, and African and European national human rights institutions.

30. Similarly, Africa and the EU will also work together on a global level and international fora, including in the UN Human Rights Council, for the promotion and protection of

human rights and international humanitarian law and for the effective implementation of international and regional human rights instruments. Both sides also commit themselves to fight impunity in all its forms. The most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole, especially crimes against humanity, war crimes and genocide, should not go unpunished and their prosecution should be ensured by measures at both domestic and international level. In this context, the partners agree that the establishment and the effective functioning of the International Criminal Court constitute an important development for peace and international justice.

31. Africa and the EU stress the importance of having a better knowledge of African cultural goods and call for the exchange of information between EU and African countries on existing African cultural goods in the EU and Africa. Africa and the EU will continue to cooperate in the fight against the illicit trade in cultural goods, and facilitate and support the return of illegally acquired cultural goods to their countries of origin, as set out in the relevant UNESCO and UNIDROIT conventions and other commonly agreed legal instruments. Africa and the EU will also cooperate through the exchange of best practices and lessons learned, by raising public awareness and by providing capacity building in, and technical assistance to, African countries.

Cooperation between Africa and the EU on Democratic Governance

32. The AU is putting into place a new pan-African governance architecture and Africa is developing its public and private institutional capacity at all levels – national, regional and continental. In this context, the EU is committed to supporting institutional development, knowledge-sharing and capacity-building. EU support, based on dialogue and incentives, will build on the approach followed to integrate governance in the EDF programming, under the Governance Initiative, under which additional funding is provided to partner countries committed to engaging in reforms. EU support provided will apply the principle of African and local ownership and should follow African agendas.

33. Two particularly promising cases of Africa-owned governance reform programmes and democracy-building efforts are the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance. To support the APRM process and the implementation of the Charter, and more broadly the pan-African governance architecture, the EU will set up an instrument that takes into account the positive experience with the African Peace Facility and which combines strong African ownership of programme design and implementation with provisions for strategic and political EU-level involvement. Specific support and cooperation are foreseen with the African Court for Human and Peoples' Rights, the African Commission for Human and Peoples' Rights, the Pan-African Parliament and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC).

34. Africa and the EU will together support the strengthening of the rule of law in Africa, through enhanced support for national Human Rights Commissions, national Parliaments and independent electoral commissions, as well as civil society organisations.

35. The AU and EU will also work together to support democratic elections in accordance with international and regional standards, including the AU standards for elections, through election assistance and electoral observation. To that end they will strive to reinforce the role of the AU, the regional organisations and of civil society in election observation in line with the UN-endorsed Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation of 2005 and the Durban Declaration on the Principles Guiding Democratic Elections in Africa.

36. Africa and the EU will enhance cooperation in the context of international initiatives to counter the illicit trade and to promote the transparent and equitable management of natural resources, such as the Kimberley certification process, the Forest Law Enforcement Governance and Trade (FLEGT) and the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI). Africa and the EU will also, together, address issues relating to the fight against corruption, bribery, counterfeiting, money-laundering, tax-fraud, as well as other aspects of economic governance. In this context, both sides will take measures to facilitate the investigation and return of illegally acquired assets, including funds, to their countries of origin.

37. On all these issues, Africa and the EU recognise that civil society, the media and democratic institutions have important roles to play in ensuring transparency and accountability.

c) Trade and Regional Integration: Raising Potential and Using Opportunities

38. The improvement of economic governance and the investment climate are essential elements to build Africa's economic strength and allow Africa to move away from continuous donor support and find its place in global markets. In this regard, the development of domestic markets and regional integration are key in creating larger and more integrated markets that, in conjunction with enhanced regulatory convergence, will help to attract investment, increase productive capacities and therefore foster sustainable economic growth and development.

39. One of the priorities of the Africa-EU partnership will be to help Africa improve its productive capacities, move up the value-added scale and become less dependent on raw materials and simple processed products, which in the long term is the best way to avoid a deterioration of the terms of trade and participate in, and benefit from, the global economy. Africa and the EU will also, together with other international partners, work to promote fair trade. In order to achieve this, the key goals which will be pursued by Africa-EU cooperation on trade and regional integration will be: (i) private sector development, supported by foreign investments, to strengthen the supply side of African economies; (ii) the development and strengthening of physical infrastructure networks and related services, which are needed for the movement of persons, goods, information; and (iii) trade integration, which is essential to increase both South-South and North-South trade flows.

Private Sector Development

40. The promotion of an investment and business friendly environment is a core prerequisite for the development of the private sector, within the framework of a stable

political environment and governance-related reform. These efforts should be underpinned by appropriate African economic growth strategies aiming at maintaining macroeconomic stability, promoting regulatory reform and harmonisation, protecting intellectual property rights and standards, promoting investment codes, and establishing credible laws and guarantee systems. In this context, it will also be necessary to address key investment disincentives such as fraud, corruption, money laundering and organised crime.

41. Cooperation between Africa and the EU in this field will aim to promote stable, efficient and harmonised legal frameworks for business, free of unnecessary administrative red tape, as well as to promote Corporate Social Responsibility. Both sides will cooperate on technology development and transfer, quality infrastructure and skills development in support of the industrialisation process. It will also aim at enhancing appropriate business support services, and facilitate better access to credit, especially for converting activities from the informal to formal sectors, which is also a key contribution to enabling more women to participate in the formal economy and to facilitating investment and business activities by members of diasporas.

42. The partnership will, furthermore, contribute to the facilitation and strengthening of the dialogue between, and within, governments and with the private sector on both continents via appropriate continental and regional networks. In this regard, the EU-Africa Business Forum will play a key role in bringing together entrepreneurs and public and private investors from both Europe and Africa in order to discuss ways of improving the investment and business climate and to raise the profile of doing business in Africa.

Trade and Integration

43. In line with the Abuja Treaty, establishing the African Economic Community, trade and integration are recognised as essential components of the wider process of regional integration and development, which shall be duly promoted by the present partnership. Regional Economic Communities will play an essential role as building blocks of the continental integration process. In order to do so, Africa and the EU will work together to make trade rules and regimes more coherent and harmonised. This will require the gradual harmonisation of trade, customs and industrial policies, laws, regulations and procedures. Africa and the EU will cooperate to put in place programmes and mechanisms to develop norms, standards and quality control at regional and pan-African levels with reference to international standards.

44. One key area will be regulations and technical standards, including sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) measures. It is widely recognised that meeting international SPS standards is a key component for advancing the competitiveness and market access of African agriculture and food processing industry. Improving African standards will therefore enable greater access to international markets, the promotion of South-South trade and the diminution of non-tariff barriers to trade. Both sides will continue to promote market access for African goods and services to international markets, in particular the EU market. Another key area will be enhancing pharmaceutical production capacities in accordance with international rules on good manufacturing practices (GMPs) and efficient regulatory procedures, including the control of

counterfeit medicines and of other products, while promoting access to affordable essential generic medicines, vaccines and commodities for major prevailing diseases and epidemics. In this regard, the capacity of African countries to make full use of flexibilities in TRIPs, in line with the Pharmaceutical Manufacturing Plan for Africa, will be developed. A third key area will be preferential market access for environmentally friendly technologies and products.

45. Africa-EU cooperation will be underpinned by stronger bilateral development-oriented trading relationships between Africa and the EU: (i) through the implementation of Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) with African EPA regions (West Africa, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa and the Southern African grouping), which involve the RECs and other African organisations[2], and the implementation of the EU-Mediterranean Free Trade Agreement with the countries of North Africa, (ii) by supporting African business in its efforts to meet EU norms and standards and to develop its productive capacity , and (iii) by cooperating in developing export strategies and business-to-business relations. The EPA-agreements, as instruments for development, are to be implemented at the sub-regional level, however, the AU-EU dialogue is relevant to the overall process of regional integration and interface with developing Regional Economic Communities. Both sides stress the need for the EPA process to be supportive of Africa's regional and continental integration agenda on the basis of the Abuja Treaty.

46. The above efforts, in particular the EPA implementation process, as well as more general efforts to better integrate into the rules-based world trading system and to more effectively use trade in the promotion of growth and the eradication of poverty, will be supported by the Community (EDF and other instruments) and EU Member States in accordance with the EU Aid for Trade Strategy, as well as by contributions from other development actors. In coherence with the efforts to further integrate at sub-regional level, efforts to better integrate at continental level will also be supported.

47. At the global level, Africa and the EU will seek to promote global economic governance, and sustain Africa's efforts to integrate into the world economy. To achieve this, the coordination of African and EU positions in international fora will be promoted. Africa and the EU will seek to join efforts to conclude the Doha Development Agenda as soon as possible. This could involve, in particular, seeking common ground to address key issues for development, such as reductions in trade distorting subsidies, greater access to the markets of all WTO members, reductions in tariff peaks, better anti-dumping rules, as well as the implementation of reforms in view of facilitating trade and ensuring the security of the supply chain. In this context, Africa and the EU will cooperate to build technical and institutional capacity for negotiations in trade and related areas, such as quality and food safety, industrial goods, TBT/SPS and commodities issues in order to promote African trade and safeguard the health and rights of consumers.

48. Finally, Africa and the EU will strengthen their cooperation in the field of statistics with the aim of helping policy makers and other users of statistics and enhancing ongoing

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[2] The regional economic communities (RECs) and other organisations involved in the EPA negotiations are: ECOWAS, UEMOA, ECCAS, CEMAC, COMESA, SADC, SACU, EAS, EAC and IOC.

efforts in the coordination and harmonisation of statistics in Africa within the framework of the African Charter for Statistics.

d) Key Development Issues: Accelerating Progress towards the MDGs

49. For the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to be achieved, African countries need to sustain economic growth and equitable social development, and both Africa and the EU have to boost their investments, better focus their policies and deliver on the promises made. Mid-way between 2000 and 2015, supporting Africa's efforts to achieve the MDGs remains the key challenge for the EU's external and development cooperation policy vis-à-vis the continent. In this regard, efforts should focus on making a key contribution to the achievement of the 8 MDGs on (1) poverty and hunger, (2) universal primary education, (3) gender equality and empowerment of women, (4) child mortality, (5) maternal health, (6) HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, (7) environmental sustainability, and (8) the development of a partnership for development.

Development Cooperation

50. In order to achieve the objectives set out in the present Joint Strategy, partners should urgently work on more predictable and less volatile aid, focusing on results. The EU therefore reaffirms its determination to reach the targets agreed in the context of the Monterrey consensus in May 2005 to increasing ODA volume to individually achieve 0.51% ODA/GNI for those Member States which joined the EU before 2002; to strive to achieve 0.17% for those Member States which joined the EU after 2002 within their respective budget allocation processes, and collectively achieve 0.56% ODA/GNI by 2010 as an intermediate step towards achieving the UN target of 0.7% by 2015. By 2010, attaining the 0.56% ODA/GNI should correspond to at least an additional €20 billion in ODA per year, and no less than 50% of this increase will benefit the African continent. The EU will respect and implement these commitments and will take appropriate measures to guarantee a timely delivery of aid commitments towards Africa. Partners will also make further efforts to keep debt at sustainable levels and, where debt becomes unsustainable, consider debt cancellation in the framework of existing initiatives and fora.

51. Africa and the EU will also strengthen their cooperation in the implementation of the Paris Declaration on aid effectiveness. They will further promote alignment and harmonisation of development aid instruments, increase the use of general and sectoral budget support where circumstances permit, and cooperate closely to implement the EU's commitments to promote complementarity and division of labour.

52. The predictability of development aid should be promoted and the EU will work toward a limitation of conditionalities and further move towards result-oriented aid, with a clear link with MDG indicators and performance. In this context, Africa and the EU will also improve and expand their cooperation in the field of statistics so that policies and decisions are made on the basis of clear evidence.

53. Moreover, the two sides fully recognise that development cooperation alone is not enough to achieve these objectives and that non-aid policies on both sides need to be better geared towards attaining the MDGs, including by enhancing Policy Coherence

for Development (PCD). To this end, the EU and the AU will discuss how the coherence between policies and initiatives with development objectives could be enhanced, on the basis of stronger commitments on both sides.

54. In order to ensure coherence and complementarity with the work of other international actors, including emerging partners, Africa and the EU recognise the need to broaden their cooperation with third partners through enhanced tripartite dialogue. Similarly, both parties recognise the importance of triangular cooperation for the development of the two continents.[3]

Human and Social Development

55. Employment issues, notably social protection, the shortage of employment opportunities and the promotion of decent work in Africa, will be jointly addressed, with priority being given to creating productive jobs in the formal economy, improving poor living and working conditions in line with the UN decent work agenda and integrating the informal economy into the formal. Investments in private sector development will be promoted, looking in particular to youth and women. The service sector will be further developed as this is where women and youth are mostly involved. Africa and the EU will make technology work for employment, and will ensure that infrastructure works to create jobs for Africans, both skilled and unskilled. In addition, attention will be paid to the creation of jobs through micro-finance schemes. As generally disadvantaged groups often benefit substantially from such microfinance schemes they should be actively pursued.

56. Africa and the EU will promote children's rights as well as the empowerment of Europe's and Africa's youth. Special efforts will be made to assist youth and children in (post-) conflict situations. All these measures will be supported by predictable long-term financing.

57. Moreover, partners insist on the urgent need to strengthen not only basic education but entire education systems, at all levels. Africa and the EU will together work towards ensuring long-term predictable funding for national education plans to help ensure quality education for all and that all girls and boys attend and complete school, including through the Education for All Fast Track Initiative and the implementation of the Plan of Action for the Second Decade of Education for Africa. Particular attention will be given to the inclusion of hard-to-reach children and children and youth with disabilities.

58. Training and development of teachers is a priority at all levels of education. Africa and the EU will therefore support the recruitment, retention and training of teaching staff, as well as a general valorisation of the teaching profession. A further priority is to ensure that 'there are jobs behind the education' and an increased responsiveness of training to the needs of the economic sectors. Technical and Vocational Education and Training

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[3] In the context of this Joint Strategy, triangular cooperation refers to the implementation of a project for the development of an African country with the technical involvement of another African country and with financial and/or other input from the EU side, or vice versa.

(TVET) and skills development with the involvement of the productive sectors will also be promoted.

59. Furthermore, building upon the 2007 Addis Ababa Declaration on Science Technology and Scientific Research for Development, Africa and the EU shall strengthen their cooperation in these areas. In this context, attention will also be paid to space-based technology, applications and sciences.

60. In the field of health, integrated strategies, including the strengthening of national health systems at all levels, will be promoted by Africa and the EU, based on adequate financing, human resources and commodities. To reinforce health system capacity, partners will also jointly address both the migration of health workers, which is a crisis in some African countries, and the creation or reinforcement of social protection systems. Efforts will be made in line with the Africa Health Strategy, the EU Project on Human Resources for Health, the Abuja commitment (15% financing for health) and the European Programme for Action to Tackle the Shortage of Health Workers in Developing Countries. Efforts to scale up towards universal access to basic health services, HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis Malaria prevention, treatment, care and support by 2010, and cooperation on other pandemics as well as on issues relating to meningitis, will be intensified, with special focus on women, children and adolescents, older and disabled persons as well as members of vulnerable groups.

61. The involvement of the private sector in health sector development and financing, including through public-private partnerships, should be encouraged and the production and access to generic medicines should be enhanced. Africa and the EU will, in addition, promote further research, particularly for vaccines and new medicines for both major and neglected diseases, and on issues relating to water-borne diseases, as well as on the clinical effectiveness of traditional medicine. Partners will also work towards effective implementation of international health agreements and regulations. Other issues of common interest, such as the abuse of narcotic drugs and the preparedness and responses for emergencies, should be addressed. Special attention will be given to fighting malnutrition in Africa, in line with the Africa Regional Nutrition Strategy.

62. Sexual and Reproductive Health and Rights (SRHR) will be promoted with the aim of achieving universal access to reproductive health by 2015 and to reduce newborn, infant and maternal morbidity and mortality, as set out by the International Conference on Population and Development (ICPD) and the Maputo Plan of Action, in the context of the Action Plans of this Joint Strategy.

Gender Equality

63. Africa and the EU will also strengthen the inter-institutional fabric of their administrations to mainstream gender equality in all strategies, policies, programmes and actions. They will address the entire range of women's rights and strengthen their efforts to eliminate illiteracy and to ensure equal access of girls to education, to fight the feminisation of poverty, to promote women in decision-making positions and peace processes, and fight sexual and gender based violence against women and early forced marriage, and work towards the abandonment of female genital mutilation and cutting

(FGM/C) and other harmful traditional practices, as set out in the Beijing Platform for Action and the AU Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality.

Environmental Sustainability and Climate Change

64. Africa and the EU have a clear common interest to address environmental sustainability and climate change. Environmental degradation and climate change undermine sustainable development and represent threats to the achievement of the MDGs. Climate change is affecting all countries, but will be most immediately and severely felt in the poorest and most vulnerable countries, which do not have the means and resources to adapt to the changes in their natural environment. Africa will be particularly hit in terms of food security, water management and extreme weather phenomena such as drought, floods and cyclones.

65. Africa-EU cooperation in this field will link positively with economic growth, job creation, social stability, and the building of capacities for adaptation to, and mitigation of, negative effects of climate change. It will address interrelated areas such as food security, sustainable agriculture and land management and will cover a vast number of interrelated areas and issues such as land degradation, desertification, the preservation of biodiversity, bio-safety issues including GMOs, prevention of toxic waste dumping, environmentally sound waste management, sustainable use and management of natural resources including forest, fish stocks and integrated water management, weather observation and early warning systems to improve disaster risk management.

66. Africa and the EU will also work together in the global arena and international fora to effectively respond and adapt to climate change and other global environmental challenges. In this context, the compliance with UN and other international agreements is of key importance and – following the December 2007 Bali conference – Africa and the EU will work together for an ambitious post-2012 climate framework. The EU will furthermore support Africa's capacity building efforts in the sustainable management of natural resources, including on weather observation and early warning systems, as well as helping to tackle illegal logging and associated trade. In this context, Africa and the EU should strengthen existing cooperation mechanisms and programmes relating to the use of space technologies and space-based systems.

67. At the global level, the EU will promote a better geographical distribution of Clean Development Mechanism projects, helping Africa profit from the global carbon market.

Migration and Development

68. Migration and mobility are interwoven with the history of human development and should be treated as largely positive phenomena. Acknowledging this, Africa and the EU will pursue and implement policies and programmes that address all relevant dimensions of migration, including circular migration. These efforts will aim to promote and better manage legal migration and mobility with a view to supporting the socio-economic development of both countries of origin and countries of destination.

69. Africa and the EU will work to deepen their frank and constructive dialogue in taking forward the implementation of the Declaration adopted in November 2006 at the Tripoli

EU-Africa Ministerial Conference on Migration and Development, and ongoing regional processes, which provide a comprehensive agenda for common action in the area of migration and development. Partners will foster the linkages between migration and development, maximise the development impact of remittances, facilitate the involvement of diasporas/migrant communities in development processes, promote the protection of the human rights of migrants, assist and protect asylum seekers and refugees and help countries of origin, transit and destination in Africa build capacity to better manage migration.

70. Africa and the EU will also jointly address the down-sides of migration. This includes jointly combating illegal migration, where cooperation needs to be stepped up, including through cooperation on return and readmission of migrants in the context of the Tripoli Declaration and relevant international agreements, as well as on border control and trafficking in human beings. In this regard, they will work actively to ensure the implementation of the EU-Africa Plan of Action on Trafficking in Human Beings, especially Women and Children. Partners will also work to promote respect for the principles and provisions of the OAU Convention governing the specific aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the Geneva Convention on Refugees. Africa and the EU will pay particular attention to brain drain in sensitive sectors like health and education.

71. Both sides commit themselves to ensure that adequate financial resources are made available for the effective implementation of the measures outlined in the Tripoli Declaration.

Agriculture and Food Security

72. In the area of agriculture, Africa and the EU will promote policy coherence for development, food security, food safety and food quality; strengthen farmer organisations and inter-professional associations; improve policy and strategy development processes; increase domestic and foreign investment; promote diversification in rural areas; strengthen livestock disease surveillance and control systems, including through fighting against the avian flu; promote risk management approaches and the use of early-warning systems; strengthen capacity vis-à-vis regional and international trade and SPS standards, promote institutional reforms, strengthen agricultural research for development and make the best use of the opportunities opened up by advances in biotechnology.

73. A new EU-AU partnership on agricultural development will support Africa's agricultural agenda, as set out in the Comprehensive Africa Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP). This includes putting emphasis on improved governance of agriculture and supporting capacity-building on the part of African public and private organisations involved in agriculture, particularly at regional and continental levels. It also includes a strong engagement in Africa's agricultural research for development agenda as coordinated by the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa (FARA).

74. African fisheries resources, both coastal and inland, represent vital natural capital and a potential source of wealth able to contribute substantially and sustainably to economic growth and poverty reduction. As with agriculture, Africa and the EU will improve

policy coherence for development, particularly related to fisheries access arrangements, trade and controlling illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing, notably through the Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs). Africa and the EU will also collaborate in creating an institutional and governance environment to promote conservation and sustainable and optimal use of this valuable resource.

Infrastructure

75. The promotion of interconnectivity of African infrastructure at all levels in line with AU/NEPAD priorities will be further advanced. In doing so, the two sides will make use and build upon the framework offered by the 2006 EU-Africa Infrastructure Partnership and Trust Fund as well as the Pan-African Infrastructure Development Fund which set out the strategy for securing interconnectivity across the continent and its different regions and for tackling the issue of delivery of infrastructure services. In line with the priorities identified through the Infrastructure Partnership, the following goals shall be pursued:

76. As regards transport, Africa and the EU will aim at increasing interconnectivity by investing in and improving infrastructure along the Trans-African road transport corridors and associated regional road and rail networks. Partners shall also focus on enhancing port efficiency, and supporting measures for improving air and maritime safety and security. By supporting the removal of non-physical barriers to the free movement of goods, services and people through more rigorous implementation of regional protocols the Partnership shall also aim at improving transport services.

77. As regards water, Africa and the EU acknowledge that in order for water to contribute fully to national development and local livelihoods, investment in regional hydraulic infrastructure needs to be increased.

78. As regards energy, the two sides recognise that increased regional and continental interconnectivity is necessary for enhancing the reliability and efficiency of energy systems. Partners will thus aim at improving energy infrastructure, in particular for electricity interconnections, agreements on joint standards and regulation procedures, as well as removing non-physical barriers for exchange of energy across borders.

Water and Sanitation

79. Water resource management and access to safe water and basic sanitation are crucial both for economic growth and poverty reduction and the achievement of the MDGs. Africa and the EU will therefore work together to further develop the existing EU-Africa Partnership on Water Affairs and Sanitation with the overall objective to meet basic water and sanitation needs and contribute to improved water resource management at local, river basin and catchment, national and trans-boundary level.

80. In addition, Africa and the EU will reinforce their joint efforts to address the challenges of water security and climate change, sustainable access to safe affordable water supplies, hygiene education and sanitation. In this context, Africa and the EU will aim at mobilising increased investments for hydraulic infrastructure in Africa. Furthermore,

they will promote the participation of other international partners in the dialogue on the sustainable use of Africa's water resources.

Energy

81. The two sides recognise that the international energy challenges have created a need for Africa and the EU to give an even stronger focus to sustainable energy in their mutual relations. Both sides will therefore aim at strengthening cooperation and solidarity in the sustainable management of their energy resources and at continuing to promote access to energy, energy security and safety, and regional cooperation.

82. To this end, the partners have agreed to establish the Africa-EU Energy Partnership, which will address the joint challenges of energy security and diversification of supply, access to affordable, clean and efficient energy services, new and renewable energy resources and climate change. Partners will furthermore aim at building capacity, at mobilising increased investments for energy infrastructure in Africa, including through the existing EU Energy Facility and other financial instruments, and at including emerging donors in the dialogue on sustainable energy sector development in Africa.

83. Africa and the EU will also explore ways and means to launch a dialogue on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, within the framework of relevant International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) provisions and in line with international safety standards and rules.

Development of Knowledge-based Societies

84. Africa and the EU will strengthen their cooperation in building knowledge-based societies and economies. Both sides recognise that the development of S&T and innovation is one of the essential engines of socio-economic growth and sustainable development in Africa; that competitiveness in the global economy is increasingly dependent on knowledge and innovative ways of applying modern technology, especially Information and Communication Technology (ICT); and that meeting the MDGs requires a special global effort to build scientific and technological capacities in Africa. Thus partnerships and investments advancing access to ICT infrastructure, access to quality education, and the development of science and technology and innovation systems in Africa are crucial for attaining all other development goals.

85. Africa and the EU will strengthen their cooperation and support to bridge the digital divide and promote the development of an inclusive Knowledge Economy, including through the implementation of the outcome of the World Summit on Information Society and relevant AU/NEPAD programmes.

86. More specifically, in the area of ICT, Africa and the EU will aim at bridging the digital divide that limits access to modern telephony and internet services. It will address the harmonisation of policy and regulatory frameworks and investment in broadband infrastructure and support non-commercial e-services.

87. In parallel, similar efforts will be made to address the scientific divide and increase Africa’s research capacities. Inadequate technical capacity of Africa will be upgraded

through the establishment of specialised networks in regions and sub-regions, which need to focus on identified priorities so as to underpin economic growth and sustainable development of the African continent. In this respect, Africa and the EU will promote the strengthening of collaborative links between African regional and sub-regional partnerships and European partners, in order to contribute to the sustainability of established centres and networks of excellence.

Cultural Cooperation

88. A stronger political partnership between Africa and the EU should be underpinned by an equally strong partnership on cultural cooperation. All expressions of culture, including arts, multilingualism and sports, should be taken into account.

89. Africa and the EU will therefore engage in an effective dialogue and cooperation on culture, promote cultural exchanges and twinning arrangements, and support capacity building and technical assistance on the protection and preservation of, and access to, cultural goods and sites in Europe and Africa. These efforts will strengthen the safeguarding of African World Heritage sites, as well as the diversity of cultural expressions within the framework of relevant UNESCO conventions. In this context, the two sides will launch an inventory of ongoing cooperation on cultural goods issues with a view to identify potential areas of further cooperation. Furthermore, Africa and the EU will also – in the context of their development cooperation – fully take into account local culture and contribute to increase the access of people to culture and to means of cultural expression.

Communication

90. Africa and the EU recognise the need to better communicate with each other and to better promote the social and cultural values of the European and African peoples.

91. In this regard, partners will also work towards the promotion of more accurate images of each other, and fight stereotypes, xenophobia and racism, through enhanced exchanges and contacts of non-state actors, including trade unions, professional associations, the private sector, media, schools, universities, research and cultural institutions, and sport clubs and associations, including through support for twinning arrangements between civil society organisations.

V. INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE AND IMPLEMENTATION

1. Institutional Architecture and Actors

92. Africa and the EU will implement their new strategic partnership through an institutional architecture, which allows and promotes intensive exchange and dialogue on all issues of common concern.

93. The partnership will involve a large number of institutional and non-institutional actors in Africa and the EU at continental, regional, national and local levels, with a central role of the AU and the EU. Partners will therefore place greater value on the role of their continental organisations in facilitating this partnership and task them to work closely together, including through more regular dialogue between corresponding AU

and EU institutions, in the preparation and follow-up of decisions and meetings. The frequency of these meetings at political level, namely, of senior officials, Ministers and Heads of State and Government, will have to be enhanced in order to take forward the objectives of the Joint Strategy.

94. It should be noted that this strategic partnership, and the effective implementation of the policies and actions outlined in the Joint Strategy, are also the shared responsibility of all African and EU states.

Regular Africa-EU Summits

95. In the future, starting from the Lisbon Summit, meetings of the Heads of State and Government will be organised every three years, alternately in Africa and the EU. These Summits will reflect the importance which the two sides attach to their relationship, take stock of progress made in the implementation of commitments made and give political guidance for further work, including through the approval of Action Plans. These Summits should be prepared at ministerial level.

96. The political momentum and visibility of the new partnership will also require political engagement and commitment of the leaders of Africa and the EU in the period between the Summits. To this end, the Presidents of the EU Council and the AU, of the European and the Pan-African Parliament and of the European and AU Commissions, will – in the period between Summits and on a regular basis – meet their institutional counterparts, alternately in Africa and the EU, to review progress and provide political guidance to the partnership.

The AU and EU: Different Levels of Interaction

97. In this context, partners recognise a need for a more defined division of roles and responsibilities between the pan-African, sub-regional, national and local levels and between the different actors on the EU side, as well as for coherence and complementarity with other international actors.

98. The African Union has emerged as a natural interlocutor for the EU on continental issues and as the most important institutional partner for the EU. Therefore, the institutional architecture promoted by the Joint Strategy will, on the African side, be centered on the AU. This approach requires strong institutions that invest particularly in their capacity to act effectively and interact with each other. The EU will therefore allocate the necessary resources and adapt its organisational structures. The opening of an EU Delegation to the AU in Addis Ababa will be an important step in that direction. The AU will also further strengthen its representation in Brussels. Beyond that, the EU will continue to assist the AU in its ongoing institutional transformation process and also support the strengthening of the AU's institutional ability to interact with the EU and other international partners.

99. One particular challenge is to simplify the institutional framework for regional integration and its articulation with the EPA-related groupings. Regional Economic Communities (RECs) are important for the continental economic and political integration agenda and should continue to be key partners for the EU in Africa. The EU

and AU will aim at integrating the RECs and the Sub-Regional Organisations (SROs) in the present institutional architecture and at minimizing overlap between, and conflicting mandates of, the entities concerned. The issue of the configuration of the EPA-related groupings is of particular importance in this context.

Africa-EU Troikas

100. In the period between the Summits, the dialogue between Africa and the EU should be maintained through regular meetings of Senior Officials and Ministers. In order to ensure an effective and balanced representation of both Unions, these meetings will continue to be held in Troika format, whereby each side is represented by a smaller number of representatives who are mandated to speak on behalf of Africa and the EU respectively. On the EU side, the Troika consists of the current and incoming EU Presidency, the European Commission and the EU Council Secretariat, while on the African side the Troika consists of the current and outgoing Presidencies of the AU and the AU Commission, expanded to include chef de file countries at the expert and senior official levels.

101. The biannual Africa-EU Ministerial troika meeting will play a central role in the review and monitoring of the implementation of the Joint Strategy and its successive Action Plans.

102. Africa and the EU will continue to hold biannual Africa-EU troika meetings between Foreign Ministers, alternately in Africa and the EU, and will also, as necessary, strengthen their dialogue through additional sectoral Ministerial meetings.

Commission-to-Commission Dialogue and Joint EU-AU Task Force

103. The two Commissions will play a central role as the driving forces behind the partnership. They will continue and further develop their cooperation, together with the EU Council Secretariat. The existing Joint EU-AU Task Force will be strengthened to facilitate permanent working level dialogue, interaction and joint projects between the different institutions and will continue to hold regular meetings to move forward the agenda of the strategic partnership. The Colleges of Commissioners of the European and AU Commissions will meet on an annual basis to provide political leadership and impetus to the work of the Joint EU-AU Task Force.

Parliaments and other Representative Institutions

104. This institutional architecture will also strengthen the formal structure of the dialogue between the institutions that represent the people of the two continents, the European Parliament, the Pan-African Parliament (PAP) and the AU Economic, Social and Cultural Council (ECOSOCC). The PAP and the ECOSOCC – both part of the AU institutional architecture – are promising and legitimate voices for democratic governance in Africa and deserves the support of all actors in the Africa-EU partnership.

105. Cooperation between the socio-economic partners at both sides will also be enhanced, notably through the dialogue between the EU Economic and Social Committees (EESC) and the AU ECOSOCC. These dialogues will complement and/or feed into the

institutional EU-AU troika dialogue. Consideration will also be given to setting up mechanisms for exchanges between stakeholders on the EU side to achieve maximum coordination, coherence and consistency of EU policies and approaches.

Civil Society

106. Partners furthermore recognise that the Joint Strategy should be co-owned by European and African non-institutional actors and that these actors can play an important role in taking forward the objectives of the partnership.

107. With a view to a people-centred partnership, an appropriate and prominent place needs to be defined in the institutional partnership for civil society and other non-state actors. Africa and the EU will therefore further promote the development of a vibrant and independent civil society and of a systematic dialogue between it and public authorities at all levels.

108. In addition, both sides will make effective communication with non-institutional actors a priority and strengthen their capacity to disseminate information, collect and make use of ideas and proposals from civil society partners, and encourage the active involvement of non-institutional actors in the implementation and monitoring of the Joint Strategy and its Action Plans. EU and AU Member States, and sub-regional organisations and institutions, will play a key role in this work.

109. To facilitate these people-to-people contacts, Africa and the EU will promote and expand twinning arrangements in relevant sectors. To make these arrangements work, both sides will work towards facilitation of entry procedures – including visa requirements – for people participating in these schemes.

110. The Joint Strategy should remain a permanent platform for continued dialogue with stakeholders in Africa and the EU in the years ahead. Members of Parliament, civil society organisations and European and African research institutes and think tanks will participate in dialogue mechanisms and initiatives and play a key role in monitoring the implementation of African, European and joint policies and commitments outlined in the Joint Strategy.

2. Implementation and Follow-up Mechanisms

Action Plans

111. The Joint Strategy, which provides an overarching long-term policy framework for Africa-EU relations, will be implemented through successive Action Plans which will build on the operational part of this Joint Strategy and cover proposed priority actions for three years. The first Action Plan will be adopted in Lisbon, covering the period up to the next Summit. These Action Plans will identify the main political priorities, as well as the policy commitments, programmes and actions that will be needed to achieve them. The Action Plans will allow Heads of State and Government to, on a regular basis, assess the successes and failures of implementation in key areas and, if necessary, provide new political impetus.

Financial Instruments

112. The two sides will work closely together to secure appropriate funding, and to enhance the accessibility of financing sources, to give effect to this Joint Strategy and its successive Action Plans.

113. The implementation of the Joint Strategy and the initiatives to be developed in this framework will be supported by existing financial instruments in accordance with their respective scope and their relevance to the objectives and activities concerned, such as the European Development Fund (EDF), the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI), the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument (ENPI), the Instrument for Stability, as well as the Thematic Programmes and by EU financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB). Where possible these instruments will be complemented by further contributions by EU Member States. Moreover, whenever possible, African financial instruments and AU Member States shall contribute to this process and an involvement of African financial institutions such as the African Development Bank will be ensured as appropriate.

114. In order to ensure the effective use of instruments in this innovative Africa-EU cooperation framework and to ensure that they enable partners to meet the goals of the strategic partnership, the complementarity and coherence of these instruments will be properly ensured. To this end, partners will work together towards gradually adapting relevant policies and legal and financial frameworks, as well as relevant cooperation instruments and mechanisms, to the needs and objectives of the partnership. In particular, Africa and the EU will work together to build synergies between existing cooperation agreements in support of the partnership, including through the progressive establishment of a Pan-African financial support programme.

Monitoring, Evaluation and Review Mechanisms

115. The Joint Strategy is for the long term and shall be reviewed on a regular basis and as appropriate.

116. The two Commissions and the EU Council Secretariat will – on an annual basis and in cooperation with the AU and EU Presidencies – coordinate the preparation of a joint report on the progress made in the implementation of the Joint Africa-EU Strategy, focusing on the policies and actions outlined in the Action Plans and using clear indicators and concrete benchmarks and timetables to ensure that implementation is on track. These reports will be presented to the Africa-EU Ministerial Troika meetings which will monitor progress and ensure that implementation is on track: every third year, these reports will be presented to Heads of State and Government, meeting at Summit level, alternately in the EU and in Africa.

117. In parallel, the European Parliament and the Pan-African Parliament are invited to organise joint hearings and to prepare political reports on progress made.

118. Finally, and in order to ensure a wide ownership of the process and transparency in the monitoring, civil society organisations in the EU, Africa and beyond are invited to prepare general and sector-specific reports, the conclusions of which will be taken into

account in the progress reports prepared by the two Commissions and the EU Council Secretariat and inform the further implementation of the Joint Strategy.

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Analysen und Stellungnahmen 9/2017

Wie weiter mit den Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen? Gedanken zu einer vertieften EU-Afrika-Handelspartnerschaft

Zusammenfassung

In der G20, der EU und in Deutschland fordern derzeit viele Stimmen einen Quantensprung in der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zwischen Europa und Afrika. Im Gegensatz dazu wird die Diskussion zu den EU-Afrika-Handelsbeziehungen aber häufig nur auf die Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (*Economic Partnership Agreements,* EPAs) reduziert.

Die Geschichte der EPA-Verhandlungen begann im Jahr 2000 mit der Unterzeichnung des Cotonou-Partnerschaftsabkommens (CPA) zwischen der EU und den afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (der AKP-Gruppe). Die daran anschließenden Verhandlungen entwickelten sich jedoch bald äußerst kontrovers. Während des EU-Afrika-Gipfels im Jahr 2007 eskalierten die angespannten Debatten nach der Kritik afrikanischer Staats- und Regierungschefs, die EU verfolge lediglich die Absicht, Handelsabkommen zwischen zutiefst asymmetrischen Märkten abzuschließen.

Mit Blick auf den EU-Afrika-Gipfel im November 2017 ist es daher wichtig, den Dialog darüber fortzusetzen, was die EU und Afrika mithilfe der EPAs erreichen wollen. Die EPAs könnten als Teil einer breiter angelegten Afrika-Strategie, die durch adäquate politische, personelle und finanzielle Ressourcen gestützt wird, zu einer Vertiefung der Zusammenarbeit beitragen. Doch die Zukunft der EPAs ist umstritten. Viele Akteure haben stark voneinander abweichende Erwartungen an die EPAs. Ein starkes gemeinsames Interesse an einer Intensivierung der Handelskooperation zwischen Afrika und der EU ist aber trotz der anhaltenden Kontroversen um die EPAs auf beiden Seiten nach wie vor vorhanden.

Vor diesem Hintergrund werden in diesem Papier vier Szenarien für die Zukunft der EPAs untersucht – mit ihren jeweiligen Chancen und Risiken:

- Szenario A: Fortführen der bisherigen EPA-Strategie
- Szenario B: Abbrechen der EPA-Verhandlungen
- Szenario C: Wiedereröffnung der EPA-Verhandlungen auf neuer Grundlage
- Szenario D: Verfolgung einer angepassten und flexibleren EPA-Agenda

Die Diskussion dieser Szenarien zeigt, dass EPAs wichtige Vorteile für die EU-Afrika-Handelsbeziehungen beinhalten, z. B. indem sie die Rechtssicherheit für die beteiligten Parteien stärken (Szenario A). Der Abbruch der Verhandlungen (Szenario B) bietet keinerlei Lösung für die Zukunft der EU-Afrika-Beziehungen, und auch ein Neustart derselben (Szenario C) eröffnet keine guten Erfolgsaussichten. Wir plädieren daher für eine modifizierte und flexibilisierte EPA-Agenda (Szenario D), die die Bedenken der AKP-Länder gezielt anspricht, regionale afrikanische Integrationsprozesse besser stärkt und mehr begleitende Unterstützungsmaßnahmen vorsieht als Szenario A.

Es ist nicht hilfreich, die EPAs separat zu betrachten und zu erwarten, dass sie „aus sich selbst heraus" im Bereich Handel und Entwicklung substanzielle Ergebnisse leisten können. Wenn die momentane Stagnation überwunden werden soll, müssen sich alle Akteure – ob kritisch oder moderat – an explizit interessengeleiteten Gesprächen beteiligen. Szenario D bietet die Möglichkeit, dass die EPAs ein integraler Bestandteil der Debatte über Handel und Investitionen werden, während sie bis dato eher einen separaten Diskussionsstrang in den EU-Afrika-Beziehungen bilden.

Einleitung: EU-Afrika-Handelsbeziehungen

Enge Beziehungen zwischen Afrika und Europa sind heute wichtiger als jemals zuvor. Afrika hat das Potenzial dazu, bei den derzeitigen und wahrscheinlich kommenden Angriffen auf die internationale liberale Ordnung ein wichtiger Partner für Europa zu sein. Zudem erfordern Herausforderungen wie Instabilität, Terrorismus, Migration und Klimawandel eine engere Zusammenarbeit. Die Handelspolitik ist ein unverzichtbarer Bestandteil der EU-Außenbeziehungen und mit anderen Politikfeldern eng verzahnt. Die EU und die Bundesregierung erkennen dies zunehmend an. So betonen die aktuellen Initiativen Deutschlands (Marshallplan mit Afrika, Compact with Africa) die Notwendigkeit, die wirtschaftliche und handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit mit Afrika zu stärken und zu vertiefen.

Ein derart integrierter Ansatz hat bei der Verhandlung der EPAs leider größtenteils gefehlt. Die erste Phase bis Dezember 2007 war demgemäß nicht erfolgreich. Es wurden keine regionalen EPAs beschlossen, sondern nur bilaterale Interimsverträge mit Mitteleinkommensländern. Die EU setzte daraufhin neue Fristen für 2014 und 2016, um die Verhandlungen und die Ratifizierung voranzubringen. Bisher wurde jedoch nur ein EPA mit der *Southern African Development Community* (SADC) ratifiziert, während es in den anderen Regionen lediglich bei bilateralen EPAs mit einzelnen Staaten blieb. Nach derzeitigem Stand gibt es viele Herausforderungen bei der Realisierung von EPAs und der umfassenderen Agenda, die Zusammenarbeit mit Afrika zu intensivieren sowie der institutionellen Fragmentierung der EU-Afrika-Handelspolitik entgegenzuwirken.

Erstens tragen die kontroversen Debatten bezüglich der EU-Handelsabkommen mit Kanada und den USA möglicherweise dazu bei, auch in Deutschland die Diskussionen über die EPAs und ihre Effekte wieder zu verstärken. Die Auswirkungen auf die WTO bleiben abzuwarten, aber eine wahrnehmbar abnehmende US-Unterstützung für ein offenes, liberales, multilaterales Handelssystem kann dazu führen, weitere Fortschritte bei EPAs zu verhindern und den liberalen Multilateralismus weiter zu erodieren.

Zweitens stellen auf europäischer Ebene ein zunehmender Nationalismus und/oder Anti-Globalisierungsbewegungen eine Herausforderung sowohl für EPAs als auch für die Vorschläge dar, die eine engere Zusammenarbeit mit Afrika zum Ziel haben. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist die Bundesregierung gefordert, einen strukturierten Dialog über den freien und fairen Handel mit relevanten Akteuren in der Gesellschaft zu führen, um eine langfristige öffentliche Unterstützung für ihre Politik sicherzustellen.

Insgesamt gibt es eine wachsende Kluft zwischen der Notwendigkeit, die europäische und deutsche Wirtschafts- und Handelskooperation mit Afrika zu vertiefen, und dem förderlichen Umfeld, in dem dies auch realisiert werden kann. Dazu kommt der Brexit, der afrikanische Staaten möglicherweise mit weiteren Handelshürden konfrontiert – vor allem jene Staaten, die das Vereinigte Königreich als „Einstiegspunkt" für den Zugang zum Binnenmarkt nutzen.

Die derzeitige EPA-Sackgasse

Einige afrikanische Staaten – namentlich Burundi, Nigeria und Tansania – zögern, ihre jeweiligen regionalen EPAs mit der EU zu ratifizieren. Die Staaten betonen dabei, dass die EPAs ihre Industrialisierungsstrategien unterwandern. Tansania führt als weiteres Argument den Brexit an, der ein EPA mit der EU weniger attraktiv macht. In Zentral- und Ostafrika stocken daher die Verhandlungen; es gibt bisher keine Einigung auf ein regionales EPA. Das bedeutet, dass das EPA mit der SADC (das derzeit vorläufig angewendet wird) wahrscheinlich das einzige regionale EPA in Afrika ist, das in naher Zukunft in Kraft treten wird.

EPAs stehen auch im Zusammenhang mit stockenden regionalen Integrationsprozessen in Afrika vor Problemen. Die Diskussionen über eine ehrgeizige kontinentale Freihandelszone gehen weiter, doch unter den gegenwärtigen Bedingungen erscheinen die vereinbarten Fristen für die Erreichung von Etappenzielen unrealistisch, solange technische und politische Hindernisse für eine Zunahme des intraafrikanischen Handels bestehen bleiben.

Bei der Bewältigung dieser Herausforderungen müssen die afrikanischen Staaten auch mit einer stark fragmentierten EU-Handelspolitik umgehen. Für einige afrikanische Staaten gelten einseitige EU-Präferenzregeln (*Everything But Arms*, EBA; Allgemeines Präferenzsystem, auch: *Generalized System of Preferences*, GSP), während andere nur von regionalen oder bilateralen Freihandelsabkommen oder gar nicht abgedeckt werden. Zudem enthalten die verschiedenen Freihandelsabkommen (darunter verschiedene EPAs) auch unterschiedliche Verpflichtungen. Daher gibt es bereits Stimmen, die sagen, dass es schwierig sein wird, diese in einem kontinentalen Rahmen zu harmonisieren. Während einige die EPAs langfristig als Zwischenschritt hin zu einer panafrikanischen Freihandelszone sehen, vertreten kritische Gegenstimmen die Ansicht, EPAs würden regionale Integrationsprozesse durch ungewollte negative Effekte behindern.

Wie weiter?

Es gibt eine Reihe von Punkten, an die angeknüpft werden kann. Erstens muss die EU beispielsweise die Entscheidung umsetzen, ihre 2007 beschlossene *„Aid for Trade"*-Strategie zu überarbeiten, nicht zuletzt aufgrund ihrer *„Trade for All"*-Strategie von 2016. Die *„Aid for Trade"*-Strategie sollte von einem bloßen Überblick über handelsbezogene Maßnahmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in eine implementierbare Strategie überführt werden, die sicherstellt, dass die EPAs sowohl ihre Handels- als auch ihre Entwicklungsziele erreichen.

Zweitens müssen wir anerkennen, dass die Reaktion der EU auf die sogenannte Flüchtlingskrise den unbeabsichtigten Effekt hatte, dass es zu einer Priorisierung des Migrationsmanagements und der Wiederaufnahme in den Herkunftsländern über zirkuläre Migration kam, die im Rahmen der

EU-Mobilitätspartnerschaften verfolgt wurden. Ein Ausbau der Möglichkeiten legaler Migration zwischen Europa und Afrika würde ein entscheidendes Mittel zur Stärkung von Netzwerken, zur Vertiefung von Diaspora-Beziehungen und zur Erleichterung von zukünftigem Handel und Investitionen darstellen und sollte deshalb Teil einer integrierten EU-Afrika-Handelspartnerschaft sein.

Drittens: Bei der Förderung des intraregionalen Handels muss die EU sich positionieren, wie sie auf die sehr ungleiche Beschaffenheit sowie die unterschiedlichen Mandate und Leistungen der Regionalen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaften (*Regional Economic Communities*, RECs) reagieren will (siehe auch Box 1). Dafür sollte untersucht werden, wie RECs Bausteine für einen ständigen Dialog mit der Afrikanische Union (AU) über Handel werden könnten, wie die derzeitige regionale Komponente der Gemeinsamen Strategie EU-Afrika aufgewertet und engagierte Unterstützung bei der Schaffung der kontinentalen Freihandelszone geleistet werden könnte.

Viertens: Die Handelsbeziehungen müssen auch bei den Vorbereitungen auf den nächsten EU-Afrika-Gipfel, der im November 2017 in der Elfenbeinküste stattfinden wird, berücksichtigt werden. Der Austausch zwischen der EU und der neuen Führung der AU wurde bereits intensiviert. Im Fokus steht nun u. a. die Frage, welche nächsten Schritte der Gipfel für die Erreichung einer gemeinsamen Agenda zur Beschleunigung der interkontinentalen Kooperation in den Bereichen Handel und Investitionen festlegen kann.

Für jede wesentliche Veränderung im Bereich Handel und Investitionen werden umfangreiche Ressourcen benötigt. Der von der EU geplante Fonds für Nachhaltige Entwicklung wird hier neue Impulse sowie eine Grundlage für die Messbarkeit von Fortschritten liefern. Zusätzliche Ressourcen und Messinstrumente stellen dennoch nur einen Teil der Antwort dar. Zuvorderst sollte der für den EU-Afrika-Gipfel vorgeschlagene Fokus auf „Jugend" neben der Stärkung funktionierender Institutionen und einer demokratischen Regierungsführung auch die Notwendigkeit der Förderung von Handel und Investitionen miteinbeziehen.

Obgleich es begrüßenswert ist, dass die EPAs einmal mehr im Zentrum der Diskussionen über die europäische Zusammenarbeit mit Afrika stehen, ist es wichtig, ein systematisches Erwartungsmanagement zu betreiben. Dies betrifft sowohl die möglichen Resultate als auch die Frage, was im aktuellen Kontext an den EPAs verändert werden kann.

Vier Szenarien für die Zukunft der EPAs

Szenario A: Fortführen der bisherigen EPA-Strategie

Die EU drängt auf die Ratifizierung und Umsetzung der regionalen und bilateralen EPAs. Länder mittleren Einkommens fielen sonst auf weniger vorteilhafte Marktzugangsregularien zurück. In diesem Szenario werden einige Staaten – wie Nigeria und eventuell auch Tansania – wahrscheinlich nicht bereit sein, die relevanten EPAs zu unterzeichnen.

Box 1: Die EPAs und die Handelsprioritäten der Afrikanischen Union

Die Afrikanische Union (AU) identifiziert Handel als eines der Grundziele der panafrikanischen Zusammenarbeit. Eine der Prioritäten ist die Ausweitung des intraregionalen Handels in Afrika. In diesem Kontext sollten die EU und die AU sowie die afrikanischen Staaten und die RECs sicherstellen, dass die EPAs zur Verwirklichung der wirtschaftlichen Ziele der Agenda 2063 beitragen, insbesondere zu dem, den intraafrikanischen Handel bis 2050 auf 50 Prozent zu erhöhen. Diese AU-Ambition stellt einen wichtigen Ansatz zur Förderung regionaler Wertschöpfungsketten dar und unterstützt zugleich die Industrialisierungsstrategien, die von einigen afrikanischen Staaten allein nicht realisiert werden können und die der wesentliche Kritikpunkt afrikanischer Regierungen an den EPAs sind.

Eine im Mai 2017 veröffentlichte Mitteilung der EU betont, dass die EPAs einen stabilen und berechenbaren Rahmen für die EU-Afrika-Handelsbeziehungen bieten sollen. Die EU bietet darin auch Unterstützung bei den Vorbereitungen einer kontinentalen Freihandelszone an, wobei sie sich nicht zu der Frage äußert, inwieweit die EPAs deren Realisierung ermöglichen oder behindern. Eine fundierte Analyse der tatsächlich anzunehmenden, unmittelbaren Effekte der EPAs auf die jeweiligen afrikanischen Volkswirtschaften und ihre Subsektoren sowie die jeweiligen Arbeitsmärkte und auf die Förderung intraregionalen Handels in Afrika wäre hilfreich, um die Debatte zu versachlichen.

Der entstehende Flickenteppich unterschiedlicher Handelsvereinbarungen mit der EU (EPAs, EBA, GSP, *Most Favoured Nation*, auch: MFN) kann langfristig zu einer Hürde für die afrikanische wirtschaftliche Integration werden. Jedoch können die EPAs dazu beitragen, die Rechtssicherheit für die beteiligten Parteien und auch für die Investoren zu stärken. Sie würden ein Signal seitens der EU aussenden, dass weiterhin ein großes Interesse an einem offenen, multilateralen Handelssystem besteht, während gleichzeitig die strategischen Interessen der EU in Afrika gewahrt bleiben.

Szenario B: Abbrechen der EPA-Verhandlungen

Dieses Szenario umfasst die Erkundung von Möglichkeiten, wie derzeit wenig erfolgreiche EPA-Verhandlungen abgebrochen und zeitgleich ganz oder vorläufig in Kraft getretene EPAs weiterhin unterstützt werden können. Dies würde bedeuten, dass sich die EU aus Staaten oder Regionen zurückzieht, in denen die Verhandlungen nur unzureichend voranschreiten, wie etwa in Zentralafrika oder am Horn von Afrika. Es würde aber auch bedeuten, Begleitmaßnahmen der EPAs in diesen Ländern aufgeben zu müssen. Szenario B würde also die unter Szenario A dargelegte Problematik bezüglich der mangelnden Stärkung der regionalen afrikanischen Wirtschaftsintegration nicht mildern.

Szenario C: Wiedereröffnung der EPA-Verhandlungen auf neuer Grundlage

Dieses Szenario impliziert ein Zurückkehren an den Verhandlungstisch, um die Gespräche zu Zollstrukturen und Zeitplänen, nachhaltiger Entwicklung und verwandten Handelsthemen ergebnisoffen neu zu diskutieren. Sollte die EU bereit sein, weitere Zugeständnisse zur Marktöffnung anzu-

bieten, könnte eine ausführliche Neuaufnahme der Verhandlungen ein Weg sein, regionale EPAs (besonders in Westafrika) doch noch zu einem Abschluss zu bringen. Ein Festhalten an Zusagen zu nachhaltiger Entwicklung würde die europäischen Interessen wahren. Es liegt aber wahrscheinlich kaum im Interesse der AKP-Staaten, sich mit diesen Themen zu befassen und weitergehende Vorschläge zu machen oder zu akzeptieren. Es ist zu erwarten, dass dieses Szenario monate- oder gar jahrelange Verhandlungen nach sich ziehen würde, die für die europäische Seite keinen großen Mehrwert hätten und kaum Erfolg versprechend wären.

Szenario D: Verfolgung einer angepassten und flexibleren EPA-Agenda

Die EU verfolgt ihren bisherigen Ansatz zu EPAs weiter, modifiziert und flexibilisiert diesen jedoch insofern, dass Bedenken der AKP-Länder präzise aufgegriffen werden. Dabei sollte sie von Negativanreizen absehen, um die EPA-Agenda voranzutreiben, und stattdessen erlauben, weiterhin auf Regeln des GSP oder MFN zurückgreifen zu dürfen, sollten die Verhandlungen zu den EPAs nicht erfolgreich verlaufen. Szenario D kann auf technischer Ebene erfolgen sowie im Kontext von Rendezvous-Klauseln, ohne dass die Verhandlungen neu eröffnet werden müssten. Wie in Szenario A würden die EPAs in diesem Szenario die Rechtssicherheit stärken. Außerdem käme Szenario D – wie auch A – den Interessen der Europäischen Kommission entgegen. Deshalb könnte Deutschland von dieser Seite aktive Unterstützung erwarten, sollte es dieses Szenario verfolgen.

In Szenario D sollte sich die EU darauf fokussieren, GSP und EBA zu stärken, indem deren mittel- bis langfristige Perspektiven aufgezeigt und dahin gehend optimiert werden, regionale afrikanische Integrationsprozesse stärker zu unterstützen (z. B. durch geeignete Kumulationsregeln). Dies könnte auch bedeuten, weitere Flexibilität zuzulassen, wenn aufgezeigt werden kann, dass spezielle Bestimmungen der Vertiefung oder Harmonisierung der regionalen Integration entgegenstehen. Gleichzeitig könnten in Szenario D die „*Aid for Trade*"-Programme fortgeführt und die Bekenntnisse, Ressourcen zu mobilisieren, erneuert werden, sodass die EPA-Anpassungskosten für die beteiligten Länder getragen werden können. Diese Maßnahmen müssen verstärkt werden, um die gesetzten Ansprüche zu erfüllen und inklusives und nachhaltiges Wachstum zu fördern. Die Aufstockung von „*Aid for Trade*"-Programmen und die Intensivierung von kohärenten Maßnahmen in der deutschen und europäischen Politik könnten dabei helfen, die europäisch-afrikanische Integration zu unterstützen. Voraussetzungen dafür wären eine ehrliche und detaillierte Analyse nichttarifärer Handelshemmnisse im EU-Afrika-Handel sowie das Entwerfen und die Umsetzung einer Strategie, um afrikanische Staaten bei der Überwindung von angebotsseitigen Beschränkungen zu unterstützen. Zentrale politische und technische Hindernisse bei der Schaffung einer Umgebung, die sowohl dem EU-Afrika-Handel als auch dem innerafrikanischen Handel förderlich ist, sollten in darauf aufbauenden Kooperationsinitiativen klar benannt werden.

Schlussfolgerung

Die oben ausgeführten Ideen und Vorschläge sind nicht erschöpfend, stellen jedoch heraus, dass eine Agenda „Weiter wie bisher" bei den EPAs sowohl für die EU als auch für Afrika zu Enttäuschungen bei dem Vorhaben, ihre Ziele in den Bereichen Handel und Investitionen zu erreichen, führen würden.

Die Diskussion der Szenarien zeigt auch, dass es nicht hilfreich ist, die EPAs separat zu betrachten und zu erwarten, dass nur durch sie im Bereich Handel und Entwicklung substanzielle Ergebnisse erzielt werden können. Die EPAs werden nicht von allein implementiert, sondern alle Partner müssen sich dafür einsetzen, die Ziele der EPAs zu realisieren. Vier Jahrzehnte unilateraler EU-Handelspräferenzen für die AKP-Staaten haben verdeutlicht, dass diese nur vereinzelt dazu beigetragen haben, die wirtschaftliche Transformation voranzubringen, da ihre Präferenzen meist nur zu einem *Lock-in* von Handel in Rohstoffe führten. Relevant bleibt deshalb für die EU, gezielte Hilfe bei der Harmonisierung und Kooperation zwischen regionalen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaften anzubieten.

Das Verfolgen von Szenario D hätte den Vorteil, dass die EU ihr Bekenntnis zu multilateraler Kooperation bestärken, ihre eigenen Handelsinteressen sichern und gleichzeitig einige der zentralen Bedenken der AKP-Staaten – besonders in Bezug auf die regionale Integration – adressieren könnte. Die EPAs sollten zum integralen Bestandteil einer breiter angelegten interkontinentalen Strategie werden, anstatt vom Verhandlungstisch zu verschwinden.

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Analysen und Stellungnahmen 20/2017

Der Nothilfe Treuhandfonds der EU für Afrika und seine Auswirkungen auf die EU-Entwicklungspolitik

Zusammenfassung

Der „Nothilfe Treuhandfonds der EU zur Unterstützung der Stabilität und zur Bekämpfung der Ursachen irregulärer Migration und Vertreibung in Afrika" (EUTF) stellt einen wesentlichen Bestandteil der EU-Migrationspolitik dar. Er ist mit großen Hoffnungen aber auch ernsthaften Sorgen bzgl. seiner Ziele und Aktivitäten verbunden.

Erklärtes Ziel des EUTF ist es, „die Ursachen von Destabilisierung, Zwangsvertreibung und irregulärer Migration zu bekämpfen", was weithin als unrealistisch angesehen wird. Einige zentrale Akteure haben andere Ziele für den EUTF. Sie wollen Afrika Anreize zur Zusammenarbeit bei der Migrationssteuerung bieten und die Flexibilität des EUTF nutzen, um innovative Programme zu erarbeiten. In solchen innovativen Programmen könnte der größte Mehrwert des EUTF liegen.

Viele afrikanische Partner nehmen den EUTF als Teil einer von den Europäern oktroyierten Migrationspolitik wahr, die den europäischen Interessen stärker dient als den afrikanischen. Auch wenn mit den verschiedenen Ländern und Projekten unterschiedliche Erfahrungen gemacht wurden, ist die Teilhabe der Afrikaner bei der Implementierung der EUTF-Projekte geringer als bei traditionellen Instrumenten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ). Der EUTF riskiert, die afrikanischen Partner vor den Kopf zu stoßen und deren Ziele, Wissen und Fähigkeiten zu ignorieren.

Die Auswahl der EUTF-Projekte und Partner wird als intransparent kritisiert. Die Durchführungsorganisationen der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten spielen bei dessen Umsetzung die größte Rolle. Einige davon sehen den EUTF als Finanzierungsquelle für ihre regulären Entwicklungsprogramme. Dies wirft die Frage auf, welchen Mehrwert der EUTF gegenüber bestehenden Programmen bietet.

Der umstrittenste Aspekt des EUTF ist sein Potenzial, Entwicklungsgelder zugunsten der EU-Migrationspolitik umzuleiten, auch wenn dies teilweise EU-Menschenrechts- und Entwicklungsverpflichtungen zuwiderläuft. Dies scheint Teil einer umfassenderen Entwicklung hin zu einer stärkeren sicherheitspolitischen Nutzung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik zu sein. Zudem lässt der EUTF Grundsätze der Wirksamkeitsagenda außer Acht und weist Ländern Gelder aufgrund ihres Migrationsprofils zu.

Es könnten zahlreiche Maßnahmen getroffen werden, um den EUTF zu optimieren und die Chancen, die er bietet, besser zu nutzen. Dazu zählen eine transparentere und konsultativere Projektentwicklung, die stärkere Zusammenarbeit mit und Ausrichtung auf die lokale Bevölkerung und deren Bedürfnisse, ein stärkerer Fokus auf die Auswahl der passenden Stellen für die Projektumsetzung und Lehren, die aus bestehenden Ansätzen und Daten gezogen werden können. Falls der EUTF richtungsweisend ist für die künftige EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, dann lässt dies für die Priorisierung der Entwicklungsgrundsätze sowie die langfristigen Interessen und Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Afrika nichts Gutes ahnen.

Verschiedene Prozesse stehen an, die die Zukunft der EU-Afrika-Beziehungen beeinflussen werden. Anhand dieser muss untersucht werden, wie Europa und Afrika in der Migrationspolitik konstruktiver zusammenarbeiten können.

Ziele und Bestrebungen des EUTF

Der EUTF wurde im November 2015 im Rahmen des Migrationsgipfels in Valletta gegründet. Der Fonds wurde mit ca. 2,5 Mrd. EUR ausgestattet, von denen 500 Mio. EUR für die Umsetzung der „*Migration Compacts*" vorgesehen sind. Seit seiner Gründung ist der EUTF sowohl mit hohen Erwartungen als auch ernsthaften Sorgen bezüglich seiner Zielsetzungen, Implementierung und seiner Bedeutung im Zusammenhang mit allgemeinen Entwicklungen in der EU-Migrations- und Entwicklungspolitik verbunden.

Erklärtes Ziel des EUTF ist es, „die Ursachen von Destabilisierung, Zwangsvertreibung und irregulärer Migration zu bekämpfen" (EC [Europäische Kommission], 2015, S. 1). Allerdings sind sich viele am EUTF Beteiligte bewusst, dass dies ein unrealistisches Ziel ist. Gemessen an den enormen Entwicklungsherausforderungen, den hohen Zahlen der Migranten, sowie dem Umfang der Beiträge der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die afrikanische Länder bereits erhalten, sind 2,5 Mrd. EUR wenig Geld. Ferner ist ein befristeter Nothilfefonds kaum dazu geeignet, die langfristigen und komplexen Ursachen der Migration zu adressieren. Neben dieser Diskrepanz zwischen dem Ausmaß des Problems und der finanziellen Ausstattung des EUTF ist auch die dem Fonds zugrunde liegende Annahme zweifelhaft, dass sich Migration durch Entwicklung reduzieren lässt. Denn die Forschung zeigt, dass die Auswanderungsbestrebungen mit dem Wirtschaftswachstum eines Landes zunächst zunehmen. Warum also drängten führende EU-Politiker auf diesen Fonds?

Der EUTF wurde als Reaktion auf den enormen politischen Druck gegründet, unter dem die europäischen Staats- und Regierungschefs standen, auf die „Migrationskrise" zu reagieren. Die Wirksamkeit des EUTF ist angesichts der damit verbundenen politischen Botschaft eher zweitrangig. Dies zeigt auch der starke Fokus auf Rückführung und Rückübernahme in der Kommunikation mit der europäischen Öffentlichkeit. Die Anzahl der Migranten, die für eine Rückkehr überhaupt infrage kommt, ist im Vergleich dazu gering.

Verschiedene Akteure verfolgen mit dem EUTF unterschiedliche Ziele. Einige, insbesondere die für die Innen- und Sicherheitspolitik zuständige, Vertreter der EU und der Mitgliedsstaaten möchten durch den Fonds eine stärkere Mitarbeit afrikanischer Partner bei der Migrationssteuerung erreichen. Angesichts der Komplexität innen- und außen-, wirtschafts- und sicherheitspolitischer Faktoren, die die Migrationspolitiken der afrikanischen Regierungen beeinflussen, erscheint es jedoch unwahrscheinlich, dass der EUTF Anreize für ein alternatives Vorgehen schafft. Andere, darunter einige Entwicklungspolitiker, sehen den EUTF als Möglichkeit, um von den Beschränkungen der Standardprogramme befreit mit neuen Entwicklungsmodellen zu experimentieren. Sie sind sich bewusst, dass der Fonds keinen großen Einfluss auf die „Ursachen" der Probleme nehmen und die Zusammenarbeit mit den Afrikanern nicht erkaufen kann. Aber sie denken, er könne neue entwicklungspolitische Arbeitsweisen ermöglichen.

Kasten 1: Innovationspotenzial

Einige Entwicklungspolitiker sehen die Flexibilität des EUTF als Chance, um mit neuen Arbeitsweisen zu Migration und Mobilität zu experimentieren und in traditionell schwer abzudeckenden Bereichen tätig zu werden. Genau in solchen Experimenten und den daraus gezogenen Lehren besteht der größte Mehrwert des EUTF. Um dieses Potenzial zu nutzen, muss man aber dem Druck widerstehen, Standardprojekte zu finanzieren. Stattdessen müssen solide Feedback- und Lernmechanismen erarbeitet werden, die Umsetzung des Gelernten in allen Projektzyklen muss gefördert werden und es müssen in allen Phasen lokalen Akteure eng eingebunden werden. Die Errichtung regionaler Forschungsstätten zur wissenschaftlichen Untermauerung der EUTF-Aktivitäten sowie die Mandatierung von Fachleuten für die Weiterentwicklung der Indikatoren und Monitoring-Systeme des Fonds sind in dieser Hinsicht zu begrüßen.

Afrika eine europäische Politik aufdrängen?

Der Valletta-Prozess war eine europäische Initiative. Nach Meinung der Afrikaner spiegeln die dabei ergriffenen Maßnahmen, einschließlich des EUTF, primär europäische Interessen wider. Die EU konzentriere sich verstärkt darauf, die Migrationsströme einzudämmen und sicherzustellen, dass sich afrikanische Länder an ihre Rückübernahmeverpflichtungen halten. Währenddessen möchten die afrikanischen Länder die legale Migration nach Europa vereinfachen, Jobs schaffen und die von Migranten nach Afrika gesandten Rücküberweisungen für die Entwicklung der Länder nutzen. Afrikanische Diplomaten sind enttäuscht, dass die EU den afrikanischen Interessen so wenig Raum gegeben hat.

Obwohl die lokale Teilhabe einen wichtigen Grundsatz der EUTF-Maßnahmen darstellt, haben die Afrikaner bezüglich der Ausgestaltung, Verwaltung und Umsetzung des EUTF wenig zu sagen. Im Rahmen des EUTF wird den Afrikanern weniger Verantwortung zuteil als in den traditionellen EZ-Programmen, von denen die EUTF-Gelder stammen. Beispielsweise sieht der Europäische Entwicklungsfonds (EEF), der den Großteil des EUTF-Budgets bereitstellt, offiziell die Beteiligung beider Seiten in der Planung und Umsetzung der Programme vor. Der EUTF kennt diesen Grundsatz nicht. EU-Vertreter argumentieren, der Verzicht auf das Mitwirkungsprinzip sei nötig, um die für einen Nothilfefonds nötige Schnelligkeit und Flexibilität sicherzustellen. Sie unterstreichen, dass die afrikanischen Partner trotzdem stark in die Entscheidungsfindung einbezogen würden.

Die afrikanischen Partner scheinen in den verschiedenen Phasen des EUTF-Projektprozesses unterschiedlich viel Einfluss zu haben. Was die Bestimmung von Bedürfnissen und potenziellen Projekten auf Landesebene angeht, ist die Beteiligung der Afrikaner immer vom jeweiligen Ansatz der EU-Delegationen und durchführenden Stellen abhängig. Einige Länder wie Ägypten sind sehr unzufrieden damit, wie wenig sie angehört werden, während andere Länder wie Äthiopien den Einbezug als angemessen beurteilen. Auf Ebene des Exekutivausschusses, der die Projekte genehmigt, gibt es klarere

Strukturen für die Teilhabe der Afrikaner, da afrikanische Botschafter und Vertreter regionaler Wirtschaftsverbände als Beobachter in diesem Ausschuss vertreten sind.

Die Afrikaner sind außerdem nur sehr begrenzt an der Umsetzung der Maßnahmen beteiligt und die meisten EUTF-Projekte werden von europäischen Akteuren durchgeführt. Dies wirft Fragen darüber auf, ob die EUTF-Projekte das Wissen, die Fähigkeiten und Bedürfnisse der lokalen Bevölkerung ausreichend mit einbeziehen sowie die Kenntnisse zu den spezifischen Migrationsherausforderungen berücksichtigen.

Geeignete Projekte und Umsetzungspartner?

Die Auswahl der EUTF-Projekte und der umsetzenden Akteure wird stark kritisiert. Scheinbar ist der Prozess sehr intransparenten und es werden diejenigen Durchführungsorganisationen ausgewählt, die den besten Zugang zu EU-Delegationen oder -Beamten oder eine starke Lobby haben.

Die Durchführungsorganisationen der Mitgliedsstaaten sind scheinbar besonders erfolgreich darin, sich EUTF-Gelder für eigene Projekte zu sichern. Einige Mitgliedsstaaten scheinen den EUTF gar als alternative Finanzierungsquelle für ihre regulären Projekte anzusehen um, wie es ein Staatenvertreter im Interview nannte, „ihr Budget mit Geldern aus dem Fonds aufzustocken". Daraus ergibt sich die Frage, ob der Treuhandfonds wirklich Mehrwert schafft oder lediglich die reguläre Arbeit vereinfacht.

Selbst einige Mitgliedsstaaten und das Europäische Parlament (EP) haben bereits gefordert, ein strengeres, transparenteres und evidenzbasiertes System für die Projektentwicklung einzuführen, das auf einer klar geregelten Konsultation der lokalen Stakeholder basiert. Eine weitere Forderung lautet, der EUTF solle bei der Implementierung der Projekte mit einer größeren Zahl an – auch afrikanischen Akteuren – zusammenarbeiten. Vertreter der Europäischen Kommission räumen ein, dass der Projektentwicklungsprozess angepasst werden muss. Hierfür ist es wichtig, aus Fehlern der Vergangenheit zu lernen. Beispielsweise wird in einem Bericht des Europäischen Rechnungshofs (2016) festgestellt, dass es den EU-Migrationsprogrammen an Strategie mangelt, sie zu Komplexität neigen und eine wirksame Überwachung und Erfolgskontrolle fehlt – Schwächen, die auch im Zusammenhang mit dem EUTF kritisiert werden.

Der EUTF steht unter Druck, da er rasch Ergebnisse hervorbringen muss und dabei Kompromisse zwischen Schnelligkeit und einer gründlichen Projektauswahl eingegangen werden müssen. Wenn aber die falschen Projekte und Partner ausgewählt werden, werden die gewünschten Ziele verfehlt.

Widersprüche zu Werten und Interessen

Der EUTF soll bestehende EU-Strategien und -Instrumente ergänzen, diese aber weder kopieren noch schwächen. Dies scheint jedoch nicht immer zu funktionieren.

Der EUTF steht im Zentrum des Wandels hin zu einer sicherheitspolitischen Antwort auf die Migration. So soll der Flickenteppich der EU-Migrationsfinanzierung vereinheitlicht werden. Außerdem will die EU auf bestehende Prozesse wie den Rabat- und den Khartum-Prozess aufbauen und die Umsetzung der „*Migration Compacts*" fördern. Damit steht der EUTF zwar im Einklang mit dem allgemeinen EU-Ansatz zur Migrationspolitik. Widersprüche bestehen aber zu Entwicklungs- und Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen.

Der umstrittenste Aspekt des EUTF ist dessen Positionierung bezüglich der EU-Entwicklungspolitik. Den EU-Verträgen zufolge muss die EU-EZ zum Ziel haben, Armut zu bekämpfen und langfristig zu beseitigen. Afrikanische Partner, die Zivilgesellschaft und das EP sind besorgt, dass der EUTF EZ-Gelder für Migrationsziele verwendet, die dann nicht mehr für reguläre EZ-Projekte zur Verfügung stehen. Dies könnte eine grundlegendere Entwicklung im Bereich der EU-EZ darstellen. Ein Beispiel ist die Kommissions-Mitteilung zu den Migrationsverträgen: „Positive und negative Anreize sollten in die Entwicklungspolitik der EU integriert werden, damit diejenigen Länder belohnt werden können, die ihrer internationalen Verpflichtung zur Rückübernahme eigener Staatsangehöriger nachkommen, bei der Bewältigung irregulärer Migrantenströme aus Drittländern kooperieren […]. In gleicher Weise muss es für diejenigen Länder, die nicht bei der Rückübernahme und Rückführung kooperieren, Folgen geben." (EC, 2016, S. 9). Afrikanische Diplomaten betonen, diese Bedingungen bzgl. der Rückführung und Rückübernahme seien inakzeptabel und untergraben die EU-Afrika Beziehungen.

Der Großteil der EUTF-Gelder stammt aus Entwicklungsinstrumenten und muss gemäß den Kriterien der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe (ODA) ausgegeben werden. Der Treuhandfonds ist jedoch nicht ausschließlich auf Entwicklungsziele ausgerichtet, muss nicht die gleichen Vorschriften einhalten wie traditionelle EZ-Instrumente und steht unter dem politischen Druck, migrationspolitische Ergebnisse zu liefern. Angesichts dessen ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass sowohl Vertreter der EU als auch der Mitgliedsstaaten einräumen, einige Projekte würden über die Grenzen der ODA-Definition hinausgehen. Das EP sieht eine ernsthafte Gefahr, dass der EUTF EZ-Gelder missbraucht.

Zudem besteht das Risiko, dass den ärmsten Ländern EZ-Gelder entzogen werden. Während die Kriterien für die Vergabe von EU-EZ auf die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder ausgerichtet sind, geben einige Vertreter der EU und der Mitgliedsstaaten inoffiziell zu, dass der Fonds die Gelder hin zu jenen Ländern verschiebt, die für die EU migrationspolitisch am wichtigsten sind. Ferner wurden Bedenken laut, der EUTF ignoriere grundlegende Grundsätze der Wirksamkeitsagenda, wie die Nutzung von nationalen Systemen, die Bereitstellung von Budgethilfe oder die Auswahl eines programmatischen Ansatzes. Stattdessen wird der Mitbestimmungsprozess beschnitten und es werden Einzelprojekte finanziert, in denen die lokalen Partner eine untergeordnete Rolle spielen.

Eine Reihe von Akteuren ist besorgt, dass einige Maßnahmen des EUTF die EU-Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen unterlaufen. Der Fonds arbeitet beispielsweise mit Ländern mit schlechter Menschenrechtslage zusammen. Er ordnet die Förderung der

Menschenrechte Zielen der Migrationssteuerung unter. Außerdem berücksichtigt er nur unzureichend, dass staatliche Akteure im Zusammenhang mit der Migrationsproblematik wirtschaftliche Interessen verfolgen. Besonders gespalten sind die Meinungen über ein Migrationsprojekt, das die Zusammenarbeit mit dem sudanesischen Grenzschutz umfasst. Diese Bedenken sind ernst zu nehmen, sie sind aber auch nicht neu. Der Europäische Rechnungshof stellte fest, dass die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte bei den Migrationsprojekten „Theorie bleibt und nur selten in die Praxis umgesetzt wird" (Europäischer Rechnungshof, 2016, S. 3).

Hinweise, dass EUTF Maßnahmen im Widerspruch zu Entwicklungs- oder Menschenrechtsverpflichtungen stehen, werfen ernsthafte ethische Probleme auf, auch bezüglich der Rechenschaftspflicht gegenüber EU-Bürgern und afrikanischen Partnern. Zudem gibt es Hinweise darauf, dass kurzfristige politische Interessen, d. h. die Verhinderung von Migrationsströmen, höher gewichtet werden als die langfristigen Interessen der EU, Armut zu bekämpfen und gute Regierungsführung in Afrika zu fördern.

Empfehlungen

Der EUTF könnte auf verschiedenste Arten gestärkt und verbessert werden. Dazu zählen eine solidere und transparentere Projektentwicklung, an der mehr Stakeholder beteiligt sind. Außerdem wäre die stärkere Zusammenarbeit mit und Ausrichtung auf die lokale Bevölkerung und deren vor Ort eruierte Bedürfnisse wichtig. Er sollte außerdem Lehren ziehen aus bestehenden Migrations- und EZ-Programmen. Wenn der EUTF innovative neue Ansätze erarbeiten soll, muss er auf neue Erkenntnisse aus Bereichen wie der adaptiven Planung und politischen Arbeit zurückgreifen und sicherstellen, dass volkswirtschaftliche und andere Analyseinstrumente systematisch genutzt werden.

Durch seine enge Verknüpfung mit den EU-Interessen könnte der EUTF richtungsweisend für die künftige EU-EZ sein. Obgleich spezifische Prozesse verbessert werden können, ist der großen Sorge um die Umverteilung der EZ-Gelder zugunsten einer sicherheitsorientierten Migrationspolitik schwerer beizukommen. Es gibt jedoch Maßnahmen, um diese Bedenken zu entschärfen, beispielsweise eine klare Unterscheidung zwischen EUTF-Finanzierungsquellen für Aktivitäten im Bereich der Entwicklung und der Migrationssteuerung sowie Projektentwicklungsprozesse, aus denen klar die Entscheidungsgrundlagen hervorgehen, ob Entwicklungs- und/oder Sicherheitsinteressen verfolgt werden sollen. Interessanterweise schlagen einige EU-Vertreter vor, dass die Mitgliedsstaaten von ihrem Fokus auf Rückführung und Rückübernahme abrücken sollten, der den Beziehungen zu den afrikanischen Partnern schadet.

Die EU muss mit Afrika eine offenere und konstruktivere migrationspolitische Kooperation eingehen. Verschiedene Prozesse stehen an, die sich auf die EU-Afrika Beziehungen auswirken werden – beispielsweise die post-Cotonou Verhandlungen oder die Neuaufstellung der EU-Finanzinstrumente im nächsten Mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen. Diese Prozesse sollten genutzt werden, um eine Migrationspolitik zu erarbeiten, die langfristig sowohl den europäischen als auch den afrikanischen Interessen dient.

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Die Antwort der EU auf die „Flüchtlingskrise": Ein Jahr nach dem Gipfel von Valletta

Von Clare Castillejo,
Overseas Development Institute (ODI)

Die aktuelle Kolumne

vom 14.11.2014

Die Antwort der EU auf die „Flüchtlingskrise": Ein Jahr nach dem Gipfel von Valletta

Bonn, 14.11.2016. Im November 2015 trafen sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs der EU und Afrikas in Valletta, Malta, um eine gemeinsame Antwort auf die Flüchtlingskrise zu finden, durch die die europäische Politik massiv unter Druck geraten war. Ein Jahr danach zeigt der in Valletta gegründete EU Emergency Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) einige beunruhigende Tendenzen in der Antwort Europas auf den Flüchtlingsstrom und bei der zukünftigen Ausrichtung seiner Entwicklungspolitik. Dabei ergibt sich eine interessante Möglichkeit, die Dinge auf eine andere Art zu regeln.

Der EUTF geht von der Prämisse aus, dass sich die nicht planbare Migration durch Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Unterstützung der afrikanischen Staaten beim Migrationsmanagement eindämmen lässt. Es gibt jedoch keinerlei Hinweise darauf, dass ein Mangel an Entwicklungsprojekten eine Migration auslösen würde. Hingegen hat sich gezeigt, dass Auswanderungsbestrebungen mit dem Wirtschaftswachstum zunehmen. Des Weiteren scheint die Vorstellung, dass sich die komplexen politischen, sozialen und ökonomischen „Ursachen" der Migration durch einen kurzfristig angelegten Treuhandfonds mit einem begrenzten Budget beeinflussen lassen, in hohem Maße unrealistisch. Vielen der an dem EUTF direkt beteiligten Akteure ist es daher auch bewusst, dass eine Ursachenbekämpfung nicht das eigentliche Ziel des EUTF sein kann. Anstatt dessen wird diese Unterstützung als eine politische Geste verstanden, der Migrationszusammenarbeit mit Afrika einen Durchbruch zu verschaffen. Diese Schwerpunktsetzung auf Gewährung von Starthilfen für die afrikanische Zusammenarbeit nimmt innerhalb des Migrationsmanagements der EU eine zunehmend zentrale Stellung ein. Deutlich wird dies durch die in der letzten Zeit abgeschlossenen „Migrationsverträge", mit deren Hilfe über den EUTF Fördermittel bereitgestellt werden, die an eine Zusammenarbeit im Migrationsmanagement gebunden sind. Auch diese eher begrenzte Transaktionszielstellung des EUTF scheint hinsichtlich der relativ geringen zur Verfügung stehenden Geldmenge (dem EUTF stehen 1,982 Milliarden Euro zur Verfügung, die um weitere 500 Millionen für die Umsetzung der Migrationsverträge aufgestockt wurden) sowie in Anbetracht der komplexen politischen, ökonomischen und sicherheitspolitischen Faktoren, die die afrikanische Migrationspolitik maßgeblich beeinflussen, fraglich zu sein.

Der EUTF stellt dabei einige besorgniserregende Tendenzen in der EU-Entwicklungspolitik heraus. Da der größte Teil der Finanzen des EUTF aus dem europäischen Entwicklungsfonds und anderen Entwicklungsinstrumenten stammen, haben andere Entwicklungsorganisationen Bedenken dahingehend angemeldet, dass hier finanzielle Mittel zur Förderung der Migrations- und Sicherheitsinteressen der EU in einer Weise verwendet werden, dass dadurch die Definition der eigentlichen Entwicklungshilfe verwässert wird. Offensichtlich scheint der EUTF von den Effizienzgrundsätzen und den Entwicklungsverpflichtungen der EU weit entfernt zu sein. Eigentum, Partnerschaft oder Ausrichtung spielen dort eine geringe Rolle. Die Gelder werden dabei eher nach dem Umfang der Migration als nach Bedarf verteilt, denn diese Programme werden von den Europäern gestaltet, verwaltet und realisiert, sind eng mit den Interessen der EU verknüpft und auf die Wahrnehmung dieser Interessen ausgelegt. Es besteht weitgehend Einigkeit darüber, dass diese Merkmale Bestandteil der künftigen EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sein werden. Daraus lässt sich ableiten, dass der EUTF in starkem Maße von den Kernprinzipien der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit abweicht, was sich letztlich für die Interessen der EU bzw. ihrer Partner nicht förderlich auswirken wird.

Die bis dato umgesetzten EUTF-Maßnahmen haben Schwächen bei den EU-Verfahrensweisen und Spannungen unter den Mitgliedsstaaten offengelegt. Es fehlte dabei an einer konsequenten strategischen Ausrichtung und an Überblick, was angesichts der politischen Brisanz und der Geschwindigkeit der Implementierung des EUTF problematisch ist. Ein Kritikpunkt ist dabei, dass die Auswahl der Projekte und Projektverantwortlichen nicht immer nach den Kriterien erfolgte, die den Zielstellungen des Treuhandfonds bzw. den örtlichen Gegebenheiten am besten entsprochen hätten, sondern sich oftmals nach den Wünschen der Lobbys der Mitgliedsstaaten zur Finanzierung ihrer Projektagenturen richtete. Obwohl der EUTF eine ganze Reihe von Schwächen offenbart, heißt das jedoch nicht, dass er nichts zu bieten hätte. Der EUTF schafft ein Mehrwertpotential in Sachen Flexibilität und Innovation sowie die Möglichkeit, mit unterschiedlichen Arbeitsweisen zu experimentieren, ohne dabei den Beschränkungen der traditionellen Instrumente der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unterworfen zu sein. Dabei ist jedoch ein stärkeres Augenmerk auf die Analyse, den Lerneffekt und das Feedback zu legen. Sowohl die EU-Kommission als auch die Mitgliedsstaaten sollten sich aktiv bemühen, nach Projekten Ausschau zu halten, aus denen sich neue Erkenntnisse über die mit der Migration verbundenen Probleme und fliehende Bevölkerungsgruppen gewinnen lassen. Wenn es dem EUTF gelingt, stichhaltige Belege dafür vorzulegen, wie sich durch eine Analyse der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit die Probleme der Migration effizienter eindämmen lassen, könnte dies dazu beitragen, die EU-Migrationspolitik stärker auf die Entwicklungsziele auszurichten. Des Weiteren könnte es auch ein Impuls für eine Umgestaltung der Entwicklungsinstrumente und Programme der EU dahingehend sein, dass sie angemessen ausgestattet werden, um besser mit den komplexen und sich rasant ändernden Herausforderungen der Migrationsproblematik umzugehen.

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Discussion Paper 28/2017

The EU Migration Partnership Framework

Time for a Rethink?

Clare Castillejo

The EU Migration Partnership Framework

Time for a rethink?

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Abstract

The European Union's (EU) Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) was established in June 2016 and seeks to mobilise the instruments, resources and influence of both the EU and member states to establish cooperation with partner countries in order to "sustainably manage migration flows" (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2). Its strong focus on EU interests and positive and negative incentives mark a departure from previous EU migration initiatives and have generated significant controversy. This Discussion Paper examines the politics, implementation and impact of the MPF more than one year on from its establishment, asking what lessons it offers for the future direction of EU migration policy.

The paper begins by introducing the MPF and examining the different perspectives of EU actors on the framework. It finds that there is significant disagreement both among EU member states and within EU institutions over the MPF's approach and priorities. The paper explores the political and ethical controversies that the MPF has generated, including regarding its ambition to subordinate other areas of external action to migration goals; its use of incentives; and its undermining of EU development and human rights principles.

The paper assesses the implementation and impact of the MPF in its five priority countries – Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. It argues that the concrete achievements of the migration partnerships have been limited; that the MPF has largely failed to incentivise the cooperation that the EU was seeking; and that the EU's migration programming in MPF partner countries has suffered from serious flaws. The paper takes an in-depth look at the Ethiopia partnership, which has been the most challenging. It describes how the interests and goals of the EU and Ethiopia have not aligned themselves, how the issue of returns has come to entirely overshadow engagement, and how the relationship between the partners has been soured.

The paper goes on to examine how the MPF relates to African interests and how it has affected EU-Africa relations, arguing that the MPF approach is seen by many African actors as imposing EU interests and undermining African unity and continental ambitions. Finally, it explores how the EU can develop engagement with Africa on migration issues that is more realistic, constructive, and sustainable, with the aim of fostering intra-African movement and economic opportunities; ensuring protection for refugees and vulnerable migrants; and allowing both continents to benefit from large-scale, safe and orderly African labour migration to Europe. However, it warns that any such shift will require a change in mindset by European leaders and populations.

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Table 1: Key progress on migration by national authorities in MPF countries, as reported by the EU in June 2017 18

Abbreviations

AU	African Union
CAMM	Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility
CSDP	Common Security and Defence Policy
DG DEVCO	Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (EC)
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
EEAS	European External Action Service
EIP	European External Investment Plan
EU	European Union
EUR	euros
EUTF	EU Trust Fund for Africa
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
MPF	Migration Partnership Framework (EU)
NGO	non-governmental organisation
ODA	Overseas Development Assistance
UN	United Nations

Executive summary

The European Union's (EU) Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) was established in June 2016 as part of a range of initiatives aimed at curbing migration flows in response to the 2015 "migrant crisis". Its stated aim is to mobilise the instruments, resources and influence of both the EU and member states to establish cooperation with partner countries in order to "sustainably manage migration flows" (European Commission, 2017a, p. 2), and it has had substantial political backing from EU leadership. The MPF explicitly employs positive and negative incentives to encourage partner countries' cooperation and places a heavy emphasis on keeping migrants out and sending them back, characteristics that have generated significant controversy. So far, the MPF has been implemented in five priority countries – Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. It is also increasingly being used to engage on migration with a range of other countries in a more ad hoc way.

This paper explores the politics, implementation and impact of the MPF more than one year on from its establishment. It examines the motivations and high expectations of those who support the MPF, the concerns and doubts of those who oppose it, and the experiences of those involved in implementing it. The paper asks to what extent initial expectations and concerns are proving valid and what, in fact, have been the operational and political impacts of this partnership framework.

The paper begins by introducing the MPF, outlining how it was developed in response to political pressure on European leaders generated by the "migrant crisis", and how it has been implemented and financed. It examines how the MPF fits into the broader EU migration policy framework, arguing that it is the most openly interest-driven of the EU's recent migration initiatives. As such it can be seen to epitomise a broader shift in the EU's approach, which seeks to promote short-term European migration and security goals through transactional engagement with African partners.

The paper goes on to examine the different perspectives of European actors on the MPF. It identifies the tensions and disagreements among EU member states in relation to the migration partnership approach, which are shaped by their conflicting interests on migration issues and their different relationships with African partners. It also identifies differences among EU institutions, with some strongly backing the MPF approach, while others question the heavy focus on returns and borders and express concern about the undermining of diplomatic relations. It also discusses the largely negative perspectives of civil society and migration experts on the MPF, as well as summarising the tensions that have emerged around funding for the MPF.

The MPF has a number of particularly controversial aspects, and the paper examines these, asking how they are perceived by different actors and how problematic they really are. These include the ambition to subordinate other areas of external action to migration goals; the use of positive and negative incentives to ensure partner cooperation on the EU's migration agenda; and the undermining of the EU's development and human rights principles. In particular, the paper argues that in making reduced migration a central goal of development assistance; targeting such assistance based on migration rather than poverty factors; and explicitly using development aid as both a carrot and stick to ensure partner cooperation on migration, the MPF is breaking with good development practice. It also

argues that in the drive to achieve the EU's migration goals, issues of protection and the human rights of migrants are being overlooked.

The paper then turns to look at the implementation and impact of the MPF at country level. It argues that the concrete achievements of the MPF migration partnerships have been limited and that the MPF has so far not managed to incentivise the type of cooperation that the EU was seeking. This is particularly striking in the area of returns, where there has been almost no progress in the five priority countries and where European expectations that modest financial incentives would purchase cooperation appears to have been misplaced. The paper also argues that, beyond the failure of incentives, there is a deeper flaw in the MPF logic. While a substantial amount of the EU's migration-focused development assistance in MPF countries is intended to address "root causes" of migration, there is no evidence that such types of development investments actually reduce migration. Examining the projects implemented through the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF) in MPF partner countries, the paper finds that these have suffered from inadequate local ownership, weak alignment with local priorities and systems, untransparent selection procedures, slow implementation, and lack of sustainability. Moreover, many of these projects appear to be a repackaging of existing development programming in order to gain access to new EUTF funding.

Looking at implementation and impact across the priority countries, the paper recognises that the strongest results have been seen in Niger, where EU and local interests most closely converge, EU incentives have greater weight, and the sensitive issue of returns is not a factor. In Nigeria, Senegal and Mali progress has been more limited, with the EU expressing frustration that these countries are not cooperating on returns, and partner governments expressing frustration that they have so far seen little benefit from the MPF in terms of their interests, for example regarding investment in jobs or legal migration opportunities.

The paper takes an in-depth look at the Ethiopia migration partnership, which has been the most challenging for the EU. In this partnership the goals of the EU and Ethiopia have not been aligned, with the EU deeply frustrated that Ethiopia is not cooperating on the issue of returns, and Ethiopia disappointed that EU assistance through the EUTF has been slow, has failed to address key local needs and interests, and has resulted in a proliferation of unstrategic projects. The issue of returns is now entirely overshadowing the Ethiopia MPF and the EU is beginning to apply negative incentives to seek to force cooperation in this area. The paper argues that this partnership is a clear example of how the EU is losing perspective in its engagement with an important African partner that itself hosts almost one million refugees and that could be a positive partner in addressing the long-term challenge of migration.

The paper goes on to look more widely at how the MPF is perceived by African actors and what impact it is having on broader relations between the EU and Africa. It argues that the MPF approach does not acknowledge the different interests of European and African countries in relation to migration, but seeks to present EU interests as common interests. This means that dialogue with African partners is not based on a genuine recognition of each side's priorities and an attempt to seek compromise. It also finds that, in its bilateral and transactional approach and its focus on tightening borders, the MPF runs counter to African aspirations for inter-continental mobility and free movement, and to attempts to

develop a common African position in its engagement with the EU. The paper argues that the MPF – and the broader EU approach to migration that it represents – has undoubtedly soured European relations with some African countries, as can be seen in sensitivities over the issue of migration in the November EU-Africa summit.

Finally, the paper argues that the MPF demonstrates the limitations of the EU's current approach to migration and that a rethink is required. This must begin with recognition that migration cannot be halted and that, moreover, Europe will increasingly need African migration in years to come. From this starting point the EU should explore how Africa and Europe can work together to foster intra-African movement that supports Africa's economic growth; to ensure protection for refugees and vulnerable migrants; and to allow both continents to benefit from large-scale, safe and orderly African labour migration to Europe. It should also move from attempting to address "root causes" of migration with short-term development funds, to examining how the EU could really readjust its trade and investment policy in Africa to create more decent jobs and opportunities. Critically, the EU must also get its own house in order on asylum and migration, being honest about conflicting interests between member states and working towards effective common migration and asylum policies and systems. However, the paper argues that such a transformative shift in approach will require European leaders to have the courage to change the current political and public discourse around migration to a more constructive one.

1 Introduction

The European Union's (EU) Migration Partnership Framework (MPF) was established in June 2016, in response to the 2015 migration crisis, with the aim of establishing "a coherent and tailored engagement […] with third countries to better manage migration" (EC [European Commission], 2016a, p. 6). The partnership framework seeks to fully integrate migration into the EU's foreign policy by mobilising the instruments, tools, resources and influence of both EU and member states to establish cooperation with partner countries for "sustainably managing migration flows" (EC, 2017a, p. 2). It has a set of ambitious short-term and long-term goals. In the short term, it seeks to save lives in the Mediterranean; to increase returns to countries of origin and transit; and to enable migrants and refugees to stay close to home. In the longer term, it seeks to address the root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement and improve opportunities in countries of origin.

This paper examines the politics, implementation and impact of the MPF more than one year on from its establishment. Section 2 introduces the partnership framework, the way in which it was established, and how it works. Section 3 examines the different perspectives of EU actors on the MPF and finds that there is significant disagreement both among EU member states and within EU institutions over the MPF's approach and priorities. Section 4 explores the political and ethical controversies that the MPF has generated, including regarding its ambition to subordinate other areas of external action to migration goals; its use of positive and negative incentives; and its undermining of EU development and human rights principles. Section 5 examines the implementation and impact of the MPF in the pilot countries. It argues that the concrete achievements of the migration partnerships have been limited; that the MPF has largely failed to incentivise the cooperation that the EU was seeking, and that the EU's migration programming in MPF partner countries has suffered from serious flaws. Section 6 takes an in-depth look at the partnership with Ethiopia, which has been by far the most challenging. In this partnership, the interests and goals of the EU and Ethiopia have not aligned themselves, the issue of returns has come to entirely overshadow engagement, and the relationship between the partners has been significantly damaged. Section 7 examines how the MPF relates to African interests and how it has affected EU-Africa relations, arguing that the MPF approach is seen by many African actors as imposing EU interests and undermining African unity and continental ambitions. Finally, the concluding section explores how the EU can develop engagement with Africa on migration issues that is more realistic, constructive, and sustainable, with the aim of fostering intra-African movement and economic opportunities; ensuring protection for refugees and vulnerable migrants; and allowing both continents to benefit from large-scale, safe and orderly African labour migration to Europe. However, it argues that such a shift will require a change in mindset by European leaders and populations.

This report is based on desk research, in-person interviews conducted in Brussels and Addis Ababa, and telephone interviews with relevant actors in other locations. In total, 38 individuals were interviewed during the period September to October 2017. These included officials from the European Commission and European External Action Service; European Parliamentarians; diplomats and development officials from European member states; government officials and diplomats from MPF partner countries; UN officials; migration experts; and representatives of civil society organisations. Interviewees spoke on condition of anonymity and hence are not named in the paper.

2 Introducing the Migration Partnership Framework (MPF)

2.1 The MPF within the EU's migration policy framework

The MPF was developed as a response to the 2015 "migrant crisis" and the resulting public and political pressure on European politicians to take action in response to large numbers of highly visible arrivals, particularly in light of the conspicuous failure of the European refugee redistribution agreement. As such, it is part of a wider package of recent EU migration initiatives focused on Africa and prompted by the "migrant crisis". These include the 2015 European Agenda on Migration, the Valletta summit and Valletta Action Plan, the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), and the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility (CAMM) documents signed with countries such as Ethiopia and Nigeria. The MPF must be also understood in the context of pre-existing EU engagement with Africa on migration, including the EU-Africa Migration and Mobility Dialogue (MMD) and the regional Rabat and Khartoum processes.

While the MPF has similar stated objectives as the Valletta Action Plan,[1] it is very different in tone from Valletta or from previous EU initiatives and agreements on migration. These differences include the MPF's focus on a transactional relationship[2] and emphasis on using both positive and negative incentives to achieve EU interests. As Lehne points out, in the communication establishing the MPF the "The EU's interests are laid out in brutally clear terms [and] the approach focuses almost exclusively on keeping people out and sending them back" (Lehne, 2016). Meanwhile, the interests of African countries are mentioned only in the most general terms. Indeed, this communication, as well as the five quarterly progress reports on the MPF that have been issued so far, repeatedly stress the importance of returns and readmission and the need for "rewards" and "consequences" to ensure partner's compliance in this area. The European Council has reportedly played a major role in promoting this tough approach, a stance that can be seen in its 2016 conclusions on the MPF that stated "Cooperation on readmission and return will be a key test of the partnership between the EU and these partners [and] all relevant instruments and sources of funding should be mobilised in a coherent manner in support of the approach" (European Council, 2016, p. 2). According to those involved in designing the MPF, this emphasis on returns is based both on a need to deliver quick, visible results and an assumption that returns act as a deterrent to potential migrants – an assumption that migration experts say is not supported by evidence. Overall, the MPF is the most openly interest-driven of the EU's migration initiatives, and indeed the one that appears furthest removed from the principles of genuine partnership.

1 The Valletta Action plan is built around five priority domains: development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement; legal migration and mobility; protection and asylum; prevention of and fight against irregular migration, migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings; and return, readmission and reintegration.

2 In which deals are done to achieve short-term goals and interests, as opposed to building a longer-term relationship of collaboration.

2.2 How migration partnerships work

The partnerships were initially envisaged as "compacts" – documents that established clear commitments from each partner – around which all EU policy areas could be mobilised to deliver on migration goals. However, this idea of a set of established commitments was dropped as impractical and the MPF is now described as a

> political framework for continued and operational cooperation, pulling together the different work strands in order to develop a comprehensive partnership with third countries, combining the instruments, tools and leverages available to the EU and Member States to deliver clear targets and joint commitments. (EC, 2016b, p. 3)[3]

In essence, these partnerships involve a mix of political, aid and security engagement by the EU and member states, adapted to each country context, and with a focus that shifts over time in response to changes in context or in the quality of cooperation. The partnerships do not involve any dedicated political dialogue processes or programming instruments, but are more a general "scaling up" of political engagement and development investments on migration through pre-existing channels. While EU officials report that they welcome the flexibility of the partnerships in their current form, some argue that the absence of any formal commitments creates a lack of clarity on what each side should do and expect, reducing the potential to exercise leverage and achieve impact.

So far, the MPF has been implemented in five priority countries – Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal. These countries were identified at the outset because they are priorities in terms of origin or transit and – critically – because they were seen as open to such a partnership. Indeed, one EU official pointed out that it was thought these countries would demonstrate the quick results that Europe's political leaders desperately needed, but that they have not done so and that in hindsight some were a "bad choice". However, it seems the MPF is now moving away from this original model of priority countries and instead will be used to engage with a variety of countries in a more ad hoc, fluid and lower profile manner. In this way cooperation has recently been stepped up under the MPF with countries in West and North Africa. Cooperation has also begun under the MPF with some Asian countries, including engagement on the issue of returns with Bangladesh and Pakistan, cooperation with Afghanistan on a number of issues including root causes of migration, and a migration management project for silk-route countries).[4] This shift is partly a response to the limited results in the pilot countries, and the desire to avoid creating further unrealistic expectations. It is also because member states are unlikely to agree on priority countries, with each keen to prioritise the regions from which they receive most migrants.

Activities in the five priority countries have included high-level political dialogue by both the EU and member states; placement of dedicated European migration liaison officers within EU delegations; substantial funding and programming on migration by the EU and member states; increased security support through existing Common Security and Defence

3 According to EU officials, the initial compact idea was abandoned both because it was recognised as being difficult to negotiate and inflexible, but also because different elements of the EU institutions (e.g. DG DEVCO, DG Trade and others) were reluctant to put their policies at the disposal of migration goals, or to allow the EEAS to coordinate their respective policy areas.

4 However, it is important to note that the specifics of this more recent cooperation are beyond the scope of this report, which focuses primarily on MPF implementation in the five priority countries.

Policy (CSDP) missions and operations; strengthened EU agency involvement in partner countries (such as the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, EUROPOL, and so on); and the development of innovative IT (information technology) solutions for migration management.

In terms of financial assistance in support of the MPF, so far, the bulk of this has come from the EUTF. EUR 500 million were channelled through the EUTF specifically for the five MPF countries. Projects undertaken with this money are identified and implemented in the same way as other EUTF projects. Meanwhile, MPF priority countries also benefit from wider EUTF programming, as well as migration-related assistance from member states. In the future, partner countries may also receive significant investments through the recently launched European External Investment Plan (EIP), which is intended to mobilise EUR 44 billion in private investment for Africa and the European neighbourhood by 2020. Such funding is likely to come in particular through the European Fund for Sustainable Development (EFSD), which is one of the EIP's three pillars and which, as well as working towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), "should contribute towards addressing migratory pressures" (European Parliament & European Council, 2017, p. 3).

While financial investment is supposed to be the main incentive for cooperation within the MPF, in reality, the amount of new aid being offered is not hugely attractive especially for the larger MPF countries. It is also very uncertain whether the EIP will be able to mobilise the investment it seeks. Therefore, as Lehne points out, "The financial incentives suggested are hardly generous or credible enough to have the desired impact" (Lehne, 2016).

3 The differing perspectives of European actors on the MPF

3.1 Conflicting member state interests

The MPF is supposed to harness the political engagement, finances and activities of the EU and member states in a coordinated way to achieve migration goals. It does seem that enhanced coordination among European countries is taking place to some extent, as can be seen, for example, in a series of sequenced high-level visits to Niger. However, there are also tensions between member states over the MPF, the extent to which they support its implementation, and how it relates to their own bilateral relations and interests in Africa.

The presentation that there is one common EU interest in relation to migration from Africa and that the MPF is a commonly shared EU endeavour is a fiction. In fact, different member states have different – and in some cases conflicting – interests on migration from Africa, shaped in large part by their historical ties and bilateral relations with African countries and the extent to which they host diaspora populations. Some also have their own sources of influence and do not see much value in a collective EU approach to migration. As Lehne points out,

> [w]hen it comes to African partner countries, member states have sources of influence and targeted leverage not available to the EU. They can operate more rapidly, with greater flexibility and less visibility […] From the perspectives of individual European capitals, EU initiatives might easily get in the way of national efforts. (Lehne, 2016)

These conflicting member state interests and agendas shape their approach to the MPF. Some countries particularly affected by migration, such as Italy, are keen on the transactional approach and use of positive and negative incentives. Others such as Spain (which has experience of more mutual interest-based migration collaboration in West Africa) or Ireland (which is more concerned about the undermining of EU values and principles) are apparently more sceptical. Likewise, some member states' officials interviewed stressed that returns should be central to the partnership framework, while others reported that they wanted to see a greater balance in focus across the different goals framework. However, it is important to note that difference of opinion about the MPF also exists *within* individual member state governments. For example, a number of member state diplomats reported that home ministries, justice ministries, and prime ministers' offices are keen on the strong emphasis on borders, returns and conditionalities, while foreign ministry and development officials are more doubtful.

It is clear that the bilateral relationships that European countries have with MPF countries shape their approach. Some member states want to avoid pressure or negative incentives being applied to countries where they have strong bilateral relations or strategic interests. Other member states express frustration that particular European countries are not putting their privileged bilateral relationships at the service of migration partnerships. Likewise, some member states have bilateral returns arrangements with specific MPF countries that work well and may not want an EU-wide agreement to jeopardise these. Indeed, in the area of returns, member states' interests can come into direct conflict, as a working bilateral return agreement in one member state can encourage unwanted irregular migrants to move to other member states from where they cannot be returned. In addition, some member states are resistant to some elements of the MPF agenda as they have important diaspora populations that they do not want to alienate, or a greater need for informal labour from Africa.

According to both external commentators and some EU officials, this lack of common interests, coordination and solidarity on migration issues within Europe has in fact been a driver of the MPF approach. The numbers of arrivals over recent years would have been manageable if shared between EU countries, but resistance to redistribution meant that some countries were left with a large burden and resulting political pressures. Unable to establish effective internal EU systems because of the conflicting interests of member states, the EU externalised its response to migration through instruments such as the MPF. According to Dassù, this externalisation

> indicates that any EU migration policy is harder to pursue in its internal dimension – where migration has become an explosive political divide across the continent – than as a foreign policy compact. Externalizing the burden, however, will be neither easy nor sufficient […] A change of perspective is needed: the key condition to address past failures is on the internal side [so that] a working EU migration policy could then start to emerge. (Dassù, 2017)

Hence a priority for the EU must be to strengthen its own asylum and migration systems to be better equipped to manage fluctuating migration flows and integrate incoming people. EU officials are aware that Europe needs to do this, and it has also been stressed recently by the European Council. However, the rise of right-wing movements in many member states limits opportunities to do so. As Lehne points out, "As governments become more nationalistic and solidarity among member states diminishes, collective action on the EU

level – an essential component of successful migration management – has become more difficult" (Lehne, 2017).

African MPF partners are well aware of the divisions among member states, the weakness of a common EU approach, and the resulting limitations of engaging at EU level. Both Nigerian and Ethiopian officials were clear that they prefer bilateral agreements and cooperation on migration with individual member states over cooperation with EU institutions, because they see this as more rapid, efficient and tailored to their countries' specific context. This is particularly the case on returns, with some member states offering more attractive reintegration packages than others. As Collett argues,

> [s]tate-to-state diplomacy on migration has typically been more effective than the EU's multilateral approach. Individual European governments can draw on longstanding relationships and a broader range of mutual interests; they can offer more, and often more discreetly. For many partner countries, the EU remains simply a (strong) source of funding, while the real politics lie elsewhere. (Collett, 2017)

3.2 Differences among EU institutions

There are also differences among the EU institutions on the MPF. In particular, the prioritisation of returns is strongly promoted by the Council Secretariat and DG Home. This is unsurprising, as Faure et al. point out: "DG HOME's outlook on migration tends to be short-term and focused on security threats inside the EU. This means that its actions aim, primarily, to restrict human mobility and stem irregular immigration" (Faure, Gavas, & Knoll, 2015, p. 16). However, it seems that other parts of the EU machinery, including the European External Action Service (EEAS) and DG DEVCO, are somewhat frustrated by this agenda. A number of EU officials stressed that the tough approach to returns has been misplaced and threatens to undermine diplomatic engagement and the wider range of interests that Europe has with MPF countries. They stress that discussions over the return of very small numbers of people have soured relations with African partners; absorbed an excessive amount of the EU institutions' time and political capital; and distracted from a deeper exploration with African partners on how to work cooperatively on migration. A number of European parliamentarians are also vocal in their criticism of the MPF as undermining EU values.

Some within the EEAS also questioned the strong emphasis on borders within the MPF, with one official arguing that this "responds to a false public perception of illegal migrants flooding in by boat, that is based on dramatic TV images and a hypocritical presentation of the problem by European politicians". In reality the majority of irregular migrants enter Europe legally and overstay their visas. Moreover, Europe's political leaders are well aware that irregular migration is fundamental to the success of certain European industries, such as agriculture. This suggests that the focus of EU efforts should be fixing the internal European system and regularising the labour that Europe gets from Africa, and not focusing on preventing Africans from moving. However, at the moment there does not appear to be political space within Europe to have a more honest discussion of the problem. While legal migration has not figured in any significant way in the MPF so far, the latest announcements from the European Commission (EC) suggest some shift on this, with the EC proposing pilot projects for legal migration with those third countries that have "shown political engagement in finding joint

solutions to tackle irregular migration and readmission of irregular migrants" (EC, 2017e). However, EU officials caution that there is still little appetite among member states for such action.

3.3 Perspectives of external observers

Many Brussels-based observers express serious concerns about the approach of the MPF, with many seeing this as unhelpful or counterproductive. For example, Vimont suggests that

> an approach focused too much on returns and readmissions risks being unable to convince Europe's partners to initiate true collaboration for lack of mutual trust […] The difficulty with this type of approach lies in its built-in contradiction: if a genuine spirit of cooperation must inspire the two sides' mutual engagement in such partnerships, how can such commitments ever stick if one of the parties – the EU – intends to impose its conception based on an inward-looking policy of pushing back the waves of migrants? (Vimont, 2016, p. 28)

Migration experts from international civil society and the United Nations who were interviewed were also unanimously critical of the MPF focus. They recognise that an effective system for returns is important for a credible migration system and for creating public acceptance of those who do have a right to stay. However, they stress that this issue should not be mixed up with addressing the longer-term drivers of migration or tied to aid, in the way that the MPF has so explicitly done. As one senior UN official commented,

> the EU should stop mixing returns with aid to address the drivers of migration. They are not doing good migration projects and also not getting people sent back. They are not achieving anything. What we need is an honest conversation on why Africans move and what migration means for the EU and its economy.

Migration experts also argue that the MPF, as well as other recent EU migration initiatives such as the Valletta Action plan and the EUTF, have set unrealistic goals and expectations, particularly around addressing drivers of migration. They argue that complex issues such as youth unemployment or the erosion of rural livelihoods cannot be addressed over such as short timeframe and with such modest funding as these initiatives provide.

3.4 Disagreement over funding of migration partnerships

From the beginning there has been significant disagreement among European actors regarding the funding of the migration partnerships. Some member states were frustrated when the EC announced that funding for the MPF would be channelled through the EUTF without any prior discussion with the trust fund's strategic board. Likewise, some were opposed to the initial allocation of EUR 500 million from the European Development Fund (EDF) reserve for the MPF, arguing that this allocation should be deferred until there had been some analysis of the results of the EUTF and discussion on its strategic direction. However other member states – including those for whom addressing migration is a national priority and who were strong supporters of the MPF – were keen to allocate this money. After some wrangling, the EURO 500 million extra for MPF countries was agreed in December 2016.

Member states are currently in disagreement about further financing of the EUTF. The EUTF has been replenished from the EDF and now stands at approximately EUR 2.9 billion, while the EC is calling strongly for member states to also contribute more. The EC's most recent progress report on the MPF states that

> [t]he scale of funding that can be mobilised in support of EU policy objectives remains a key factor for success. It will be essential that additional resources are made available by Member States for projects under the EU Trust Fund for Africa. (EC, 2017c, p. 15)

Some member states are in agreement, arguing that the fund is working well and that more money needs to be put in now to be ready for upcoming challenges. Others are very reluctant to put any more money into the fund arguing that the EUTF has yet to demonstrate its value, that it is a purely political tool, and that there is no evidence that this type of migration funding will have the desired impact. They also suggest that the call for replenishments are an artificial exercise, as the EC is filling the pipeline with projects that have not yet been implemented and then asking for more money.

There is also controversy surrounding who receives funding from the EUTF to implement projects in the MPF countries. The majority of implementation is being undertaken by member states implementing agencies, who see this new migration money as "as an alternative source of funding for their implementing agencies and existing programmes" (Castillejo, 2016, p. 21). There are tensions among member states, with some complaining that only a few member states' implementing agencies are getting access to the migration funding. Meanwhile others complain that some member states that only made a minimum contribution to the EUTF are now seeking to get significant money from it for project implementation. Whatever the rights and wrongs of these arguments, it is disturbing that money that has come from development funds such as the EDF is now being mostly channelled to member states agencies who are competing over it in this way.

4 Controversial aspects of the MPF

4.1 Subordination of EU external interests to migration

The communication establishing the MPF was very clear that all areas of external action should be used as leverage to gain cooperation from African partners, stating that

> neighbourhood, development and trade are not the only policies that are relevant to support the compacts. No policy areas should be exempted from this approach. All EU policies including education, research, climate change, energy, environment, agriculture, should in principle be part of a package, bringing maximum leverage to the discussion. (EC, 2016a)

This has led to serious concerns, including among some EU and member state officials involved in foreign and development policy, that other external interests will be subordinated to the EU's migration agenda.

While so far it seems that such subordination is not happening to any great extent, there does appear to be some moves in this direction within the most challenging partnerships – Nigeria and Ethiopia – neither of which are cooperating on the EU's returns agenda. In

Ethiopia, both development and trade initiatives appear to be delayed because of lack of progress on returns; in Nigeria, some development initiatives appear to be on hold. Meanwhile, MPF progress reports suggest that further investments in other partners may also be contingent on improved cooperation on returns. While it seems that the use of other policy areas as leverage will be limited and intended to send a signal rather than substantially alter the substance of EU-partner country engagement, it inevitably damages relations. Given that the EU has a wide range of interests in relation to these African countries – from climate change to poverty reduction to regional security – any move to make cooperation in these areas dependent, even in the slightest way, on progress on a limited migration agenda would seem to go against the EU's long-term interests. It would also inevitably be counterproductive, as weakened trade, development or security relationships would obviously not help provide opportunities for local populations or persuade them not to migrate. Interestingly, EU officials reported that in Mali, given the precarious security situation, the migration agenda will not be given precedence over other EU interests in the country, no matter how limited Mali's cooperation may be.

4.2 The use of conditionalities

MPF is explicitly founded on a conditional approach. It promises benefits from the EU across a whole range of areas – primarily development cooperation, but also research, trade, education and other areas in return for cooperation on the EU's migration goals, as well as threatening negative incentives in response to non-cooperation. Funding from the EUTF has so far been the main bargaining chip of the MPF, with those close to the EUTF decision-making process reporting that judgements about whether a country cooperates sufficiently are important in allocating additional money and that some agreed projects have been delayed in response to weak cooperation on returns. It is reported that such delays of EUTF projects are never explicitly linked to lack of cooperation on returns, but that African partners – and indeed member state officials – are left to infer this. This lack of transparency is highly problematic as it does not allow for a frank and clear dialogue on what commitments and expectations are on each side.

While the use of negative conditionalities has been very marginal so far, there is now a strong push from some member states and some EU institutions to apply some harder negative incentives to countries that do not cooperate on returns. As one member state official stated: "It's simple: if countries don't cooperate then we just move the money to where there is more cooperation". This approach is reflected in the hardening of the tone of MPF progress reports over the last year. For example, the fourth progress report states that

> formal cooperation on readmission and return with some of the priority countries has continued to stall. This points to the need to identify and use appropriate incentives to bring to bear in the negotiations on readmission agreements, including through visa policy. (EC, 2017c, p. 2)

The negative incentives currently under consideration apparently include reducing the ease with which diplomatic visas are granted, while still operating within existing rules. EU officials suggest that a greater application of negative incentives should be expected after the November EU-African Union (AU) summit.

The issue of trade incentives is a particularly contentious one. The communication establishing the MPF explicitly states that trade policy should be used as leverage for obtaining cooperation on migration, "notably where the EU gives preferential treatment to its partners: migration cooperation should be a consideration in the forthcoming evaluation of trade preferences under GSP+" (EC, 2016a, p. 9). However, such ideas so far appear to have limited traction and DG Trade is reportedly reluctant to put trade relations at the service of migration goals. It is, however, important that the EU looks more broadly at how its trade policy impacts migration, not in terms of a self-defeating "less-for-less" approach, but by examining how fairer trade relations could generate more opportunities and decent employment in Africa. For example, some commentators suggest that the EU's external trade policies – in particular European Partnership Agreements (EPAs) – may be partly responsible for fuelling the migration that Europe is so concerned about, by damaging economic productivity and economic opportunities in Africa.

The use of both positive and negative conditions to get cooperation from African partners on migration is problematic on a number of levels. Firstly, as discussed, it ties other important policy areas to cooperation on migration in ways that may undermine the EU's other policy goals or commitments. Moreover, as the MPF does not involve any explicit agreement between partners, conditions are therefore being used in a context where there is no clarity on what commitments have been made or are being broken and no honest dialogue between the two sides about how incentives are being applied. But, more importantly, this approach is simply unlikely to work as the incentives available – whether aid or visa processes – are just not enough to incentivise some African countries, especially when compared to the huge amounts they receive from remittances and the political sensitivity of taking back returnees.

4.3 Undermining development principles?

The MPF is unequivocal in making reduced migration a central goal of development aid and in using development aid as both a carrot and stick to ensure cooperation. As the EC states,

> [i]ncreasing coherence between migration and development policy is important to ensure that development assistance helps partner countries manage migration more effectively, and also incentivises them to effectively cooperate on readmission of irregular migrants. Positive and negative incentives should be integrated in the EU's development policy, rewarding those countries that fulfil their international obligation to readmit their own nationals, and those that cooperate in managing the flows of irregular migrants from third countries, as well as those taking action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution. Equally, there must be consequences for those who do not cooperate on readmission and return. (EC, 2016a, p. 9)

This approach presents a profound break with the EU's established development principles that focus aid on lower income and least developed countries with the aim of reducing poverty. While the funds that are being used as incentives for MPF countries may have been channelled through the EUTF – a migration-focused instrument – they were originally

drawn from development funds, primarily the EDF.[5] Hence the MPF in effect involves providing or withholding Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) to countries that are not necessarily the most in need in order to ensure that they comply with a specific European political priority and home affairs agenda on returns. Moreover, the EUTF-funded projects in the MPF countries, in their design, governance and execution, appear to flout many core development principles, as discussed in detail below. Indeed, a representative of a civil society organisation working on migration in the Sahel reported that the MPF and the funding that accompanies it is seen by local African development actors as "a cynical attempt to bribe African countries with aid", which rolls back the progress that the EU has made in its development practice over the last decade. Moreover, even from the perspective of those who believe that development aid can and should be used to curb migration, reducing aid as a sanction for lack of cooperation appears self-defeating as it would, by this logic, actually increase poverty, reduce opportunities and potentially exacerbate migration.

There are profound divisions among European actors over such an explicit use of development aid to achieve migration goals, including divisions between member states. Central and Eastern member states and those facing high levels of migrant arrivals are generally supportive of a shift towards using development aid as a tool of external action in the field of migration and security. On the other hand, some of the more well-established European bilateral donors are pushing back against a trend that they see as skewing development priorities and stretching the definition of ODA. As one official from a member state that is strongly supportive of the MPF stated "there is a divide among member states between those with traditional development thinking and those of us that see development as more in line with the comprehensive approach and the global strategy". There are also divides within member state governments and EU institutions, with development officials particularly concerned about this approach. One development official from a member state that is supportive of the MPF stated that

> as a development person this has been a game changer of what you use ODA for and what you think development aid is. As a civil servant you accept and try to live with new reality, but we see it as a poisoning of our discourse and narrative.

Some EU parliamentarians expressed concern about the impact of the MPF approach on long-term aid levels, arguing that if aid is used to achieve migration goals, but is unsuccessful in this, this could become an excuse to cut aid in some member states.

4.4 Undermining human rights principles?

There are also concerns that the MPF approach to migration is undermining the EU's human rights principles in a number of ways. Indeed, the MPF was described by Oxfam as "an attempt to outsource the EU's obligation to respect human rights" (Oxfam International, 2016).

Firstly, the strong focus on tightening borders and preventing people from moving inevitably means some with genuine claims for protection cannot reach safety. As one EU

5 For a detailed discussion of the EUTF and how it represents a fundamental shift in the EU's approach to aid, see Castillejo (2016).

official closely involved with the implementation of the MPF in the Horn of Africa admitted:

> If you reach Europe you can have a hearing, if you don't then you don't get hearing. How can you ensure that the people being blocked are not refugees? How would they get a hearing if they can't get through? These are valid human rights concerns for the migration partnership framework.

There are also broader concerns regarding the EU's willingness to overlook partners' poor human rights records in their concern to achieve their migration goals, and the chance this offers for abusive governments to whitewash their record, present themselves as cooperative and strengthen their engagement with Europe. This concern was repeatedly highlighted in relation to Sudan, which sees migration cooperation as a way to come out of the cold, for example through its engagement in the Khartoum process and as one of the beneficiaries of the EUTF and the German-funded Better Migration Management (BMM) programme – a programme cited in MPF progress reports. Sudan has reportedly taken measures to limit the flow of migrants, which is presented by the EU as a success. But experts report that this has often taken the form of *refoulment* or blocking people on their way to Libya and Egypt in ways that are not compliant with basic human rights standards. Some MPF partners, such as Ethiopia and Nigeria, also have troubling human rights records, including in dealing with people on the move. This raises questions for the EU of whether these are the kind of partners it wants or this is the type of cooperation on migration it is seeking to buy. As Willermain argues, the partnership framework

> presents states plagued by corruption and with poor governance and human rights records with a powerful bargaining chip to leverage maximum political capital […][thereby risking] perpetuating a cycle of abuse and repression that causes people to flee, and fails to effectively tackle the economic logic of human traffickers, since state actors in several African states that the EU seeks to partner with have proven economic stakes in this very trade. (Willermain, 2016)

Human rights experts argue that

> the protection and promotion of migrants' rights in partner countries should have been more comprehensively integrated [in]to the MPF. This would have been more consonant with the EU commitment to the protection of human rights worldwide […] and the human-rights based approach to migration governance commended by the United Nations. (Bauloz, 2017)

Indeed, the need for a systematic human rights assessment when cooperating with third countries in the field of migration was reaffirmed by a recent decision of the European Ombudsman, which rejected the EC's argument that, due to its political nature, the EU Turkey agreement would be exempt from the need of a thorough human rights assessment (European Ombudsman, 2017).

5 Implementation and impact of the MPF

5.1 Impact on migration trends

Since the establishment of the MPF, the EC has issued quarterly reports charting its progress. The demand for such reports and their generally positive tone demonstrates the strong political pressure for the MPF to show results. The most recent reports highlight progress in terms of reduced arrivals on the central Mediterranean, although acknowledge that arrivals on the Western Mediterranean route have increased (EC, 2017c). However, experts and some EC officials comment that the work with the MPF pilot countries has played a minimal role in shaping these trends, which are due to a range of factors including European cooperation with the Libyan authorities,[6] the EU-Turkey deal, and the fact that less migrants are on the move from the Horn of Africa.

In fact, the concrete achievements of the migration partnerships so far seem modest, especially in light of their strong political backing and high levels of expectations. The activities in the MPF countries that appear to have demonstrated the most tangible results are those focused on tackling smuggling and trafficking networks, and supporting Assisted Voluntary Returns of migrants stranded along the route to Europe. While the roll out of EU migration personnel in MFP countries – European Migration Liaison Officers, and in some countries European Border and Coast Guard Agency liaison officers – is also presented as an important step forward, there is little detail on what impact this has had in terms of results. However, as some interviewees noted, some elements of the partnership may involve behind-the-scenes political dialogue and results in terms of internal policy shifts in-country that are sensitive and hence not publicised.

European actors have different perspectives on the impact of the MPF, although most appear to assess this somewhat negatively. The majority of EC and EEAS officials interviewed for this research assessed the MPF as so far having had little impact on curbing migration. One commented that the MPF had not added any specific value, that the EU engaged in similar ways in countries that are not MPF partners, and that it is “more politics than substance”. The assessment of member states appears more polarised. While officials from a couple of member states that have consistently backed the MPF were very positive about its potential to deliver results, most of those interviewed felt that it was a political exercise that would not have any concrete impact. There appears to be widespread recognition by most European actors that the positive incentives offered by the MPF are simply not attractive enough to leverage the cooperation that the EU seeks, particularly with big partner countries such as Ethiopia or Nigeria.

6 This engagement in Libya has been highly criticised from a human rights perspective.

Table 1: Key progress on migration by national authorities in MPF countries, as reported by the EU in June 2017	
Ethiopia	• First sectoral dialogue on governance and human rights under the EU-Ethiopia Strategic Engagement, April 2017 • Ethiopia chair of Khartoum process
Mali	• Adoption of National Border Strategy and related Action Plan. • Efforts to facilitate the voluntary return of Malian citizens stranded in Niger and in Libya • Reinforcement of government actions to improve monitoring of migration flows along key border areas • Development of a regional approach to address smuggling and human trafficking
Niger	• National Migration Strategy and Action Plan finalised • Joint Investigation Team operational since March 2017 • The Cadre de Concertation agreed specific recommendations and the appointment of the Permanent Secretary • Specific regional Cadre de Concertation on migration launched, involving local and central authorities • Action against smuggling and trafficking, with 18 operations by mid-2017 • Joint information platform on alternative routes launched
Nigeria	• Launch of Cooperation Platform on Migrant Smuggling, involving EU agencies and member states • Cooperation on readmission relatively positive, though negotiations for the readmission agreement with the EU is slow (at the time of writing these negotiations were effectively stalled) • Growing cooperation on criminal trafficking of women and girls • Cooperation with the International Organisation for Migration to facilitate assisted voluntary returns from Niger and Libya • Nigerian liaison officers have been deployed in Italy
Senegal	• Reorganisation of border police service and improvement of availability of migration data • Action plan of the national migration strategy • Bilateral cooperation with Italy, Belgium and Germany expanded • Extension of central fingerprints database • Embassy opened in Niger to assist migrants wishing to return to Senegal • Negotiations finalised with the European Border and Coast Guard Agency on improved working arrangements • Focal Points for identification identified in relevant ministries.
Source: Adapted from EU [European Union], 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e	

Beyond the inability of the MPF's to incentivise the particular cooperation the EU seeks, there appears to be a deeper flaw in the MPF logic (and the logic that lies behind the EU's broader response to migration through the Valletta Action Plan, EUTF, etc.), which was repeatedly highlighted in interviews with foreign affairs and development officials and migration experts. While a substantial amount of the EU's migration-focused assistance in MPF countries is intended to address "root causes" of migration, there is no evidence that these types of development investments will actually reduce migration. As one donor official in Ethiopia put it "We need to test assumptions that, if we give Eritreans better lives, they will not move on. Is this based on anything? What research is there to back this up?" Although conflict and instability may fuel migration, there is little evidence that lack of development does so, an assumption that underlies the MPF and broader EU approach.

Indeed, a recent study on migration to Europe found that in fact "emigration is likely to increase as a country's economy grows, as more people have the financial resources and the information they need to make the journey" (Cummings, Pacitto, Lauro, & Foresti, 2015, p. 3). Likewise, François Crépeau, the UN's special rapporteur on the human rights of migrants has commented that "more development means more migration. Because all those people that have for a long time been wanting to leave, but could not afford to do so, can now leave their country," (quoted in Barbière, 2016). Indeed, many of the investments made in the MPF countries are similar to the kind of investments that have long been made under traditional development instruments – with far greater finance and scale – and yet have not appeared to reduce migration.[7]

This apparently widespread recognition that the MPF is unlikely to achieve its goals is troubling for a number of reasons. Firstly, because it suggests that the EU's understanding of the politics and dynamics of migration in Africa, and how it can work with these, is flawed or at least highly skewed by political pressure. Likewise, because this means that the negative side-effects of the MPF approach – the diversion of development aid from poverty reduction goals, the cooperation with abusive regimes, the souring of political relations over contentious issues such as returns – is being undertaken for no significant gain, even within the EU's own limited and transactional conception of what those gains should be. Also, because the fact that the EU continues to implement and give high-level support to a mechanism that seems so widely regarded as unable to deliver results, raises questions about how well its decision-making processes are working.

5.2 Impact on EU internal systems

One of the main achievements singled out in a review of the first year of MPF (EC, 2017b) is the high-level of cooperation between EU and member states in the partnership countries. This includes the coordinated use of EU and member state's development instruments, increased information-sharing, and coordination of high-level and technical missions. For example, in the Sahel, there has been collaboration in dialogue and in projects that has included member states such as France, Germany, Spain, Italy and the Netherlands. Such increased coordination is positive because it reduces mixed messages, duplication, and makes engaging with donors easier for countries in which government capacity is quite limited.

However, the progress reports also recognise that only a handful of member states are actively engaged in the MPF, and that in some cases member states with privileged bilateral relations in partner countries are not using these to further the MPF agenda. This supports the impression that the MPF is an initiative that is strongly backed by a few member states, most of which receive substantial funding for programme implementation from the EUTF, but that others are somewhat sceptical of and detached from the MPF agenda.

In terms of the impact that the MPF has had within the EU's own structures, some observers say this has been positive in pushing different EU institutions to cooperate on migration, and improving policy coherence in this area. Interestingly, some EU officials, while recognising the limited impact of the MPF on the ground, suggest its greatest achievement has been to firmly embed migration in EU foreign relations, which in the long run will be

7 For more on this, see Martin-Shields, Schraven, & Angenendt (2017).

critical, as migration is an issue that cannot be dealt with effectively by individual member states. In this sense, they argue the most positive impact of the MPF – an externally focused framework – has actually been on the EU's own internal organisation.

However, in terms of the impact of the MPF on the EU's policy framework, some actors express concern that the migration partnerships are part of a recent multiplication of migration initiatives that have had the effect of increasing confusion over this framework. Indeed, a number of member states' officials and African officials interviewed stressed that they did not know how the MPF was specifically supposed to add value, nor understand exactly how it related to other initiatives such as the Valletta Action Plan and the CAMM, which also involved incentive-based bilateral engagement with African partners. One member state official working on migration in Ethiopia commented "We do not have clarity between these bilateral processes. It is not useful to have all these different names for what is essentially the same thing".

5.3 Implementation and impact of EUTF projects

The EUTF is the main vehicle through which the EU provides migration-related aid in MPF countries, and the implementation and impact of the MPF is therefore intrinsically tied up with the effectiveness of the EUTF. The EC states that "The EU Trust Fund for Africa has allowed accelerated and flexible decision-making on projects targeting migration policy and management, and on addressing the root causes of migration" (EC, 2017b, p. 15) and reports that as of 4 September 2017, 169 contracts had been signed for a total amount of over EUR 1.2 billion across the three EUTF regions – Sahel and Lake Chad; Horn of Africa; and North Africa (EC, 2017c). However, while the EUTF has been quick to commit money, implementation has been much slower. Indeed, reflecting on the first year of the MPF the EU admits that

> [w]hile the Trust Fund has demonstrated that it is able to quickly prepare actions of common interest to the EU and its Member States as well as to partner countries, such speed has not always been maintained in subsequent steps of the process. A number of implementing partners (including development agencies of EU Member States) were not ready to quickly deploy and start activities on the ground. (EC, 2017b, p. 15).

Government officials from the MPF partner countries express frustration at these delays. They also raise other concerns about EUTF-funded projects, including that these are not in line with local priorities and needs; that they are not sufficiently aligned with government plans, systems or priorities; and that the funds do not go to local implementers. While experiences vary between countries and projects, there is no doubt that African ownership within the EUTF is weaker than within traditional European cooperation instruments and hence risks alienating African partners and overlooking local priorities, knowledge and capacities. Moreover, the selection of EUTF projects and partners has been criticised as ad hoc and untransparent, with member states' implementing agencies playing the largest role in implementation, and some clearly seeing the fund as a source of finance for their regular programming.[8] One civil society organisation working on migration in the Sahel described how EUTF projects in that region were focused on communities that migrated rather than

8 For more discussion of the weaknesses of the EUTF, see Castillejo (2016).

communities most in need; aimed to provide quick fixes rather than addressing the long-term needs of the country; were designed and implemented by Europeans with minimal consultation with local actors; and skipped important procedures such as impact assessments or human rights assessments for the sake of speed.

According to international agencies working on migration, many of the EUTF projects in the MPF countries were the same type of development projects that European actors were already implementing, but relabelled as addressing migration. They stress that these projects offered nothing new or transformational, and as one UN official stated "it is delusional to think that these projects are going to address root causes of migration". International agencies describe how the political pressure from Brussels and European capitals to work on migration and the availability of comparatively large amounts of development funds for migration under the EUTF has created a "feeding frenzy" in MPF countries, with implementing agencies and non-governmental organisation (NGOs) that have no experience of migration entering the migration field. This has resulted in a proliferation of inexpert players, and typical development projects being repackaged (in some cases at the request of European donors) as addressing migration in order to align them with political priorities and access the new migration funding. They argue that this is particularly problematic because it is done in an uncoordinated, unstrategic and inefficient way. As another UN official pointed out "Now everyone has to do their own research on root causes of migration".

Preventing such an unstrategic proliferation of ineffective migration programming requires robust monitoring of EUTF-funded projects in MPF countries, with substantive benchmarks for progress against the broad range of goals the projects seek to address, rather than simply monitoring inputs/outputs as the EU has sometimes done in the past.[9]

5.4 Impact on returns and readmissions

In the area of returns and readmissions, which has such high priority within MPF, the EU has not been able to advance its goals or obtain any significant cooperation from partner countries. Indeed, it seems that in this area the EU seriously miscalculated the extent of its leverage and underestimated the political sensitivity and resistance to returns in partner countries. As recent analysis by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) finds,

> money does not always buy the expected immediate results in the area of return. As the return statistics on Senegal, Nigeria and Mali suggest, despite last year's progress in cooperation with those countries, the launched partnership did not immediately translate into an increase in returns, which was one of the main short-term goals of the compacts. (Mananashvili, 2017)

In Nigeria, negotiations on a readmission agreement were begun but at the time of writing had stalled. The search for more informal cooperation, such as standard operating procedures, with the other MPF countries has also had little traction. Meanwhile, with Ethiopia the issue of returns has reached a complete impasse and has become a source of political tension and

9 For example, Collett (2016) points out that in countries such as Serbia, EU assistance to asylum and protection systems has been assessed in terms of quantitative outputs (e.g. officials trained, etc.) rather than whether outcomes have actually improved for those seeking asylum.

barrier to continued collaboration. There is now increasing momentum to apply stronger negative incentives to force partners to cooperate on this issue, as is discussed above. Having made returns a centrepiece of the MPF and having invested significant high-level political interest and engagement in it, the EU has so far nothing to show.

5.5 MPF implementation in Niger

Niger is frequently lauded as the most successful of the migration partnerships, both in terms of what has been achieved with the Nigerien government and the way in which European actors have coordinated in the country. The EC states that

> [c]ooperation with Niger is emblematic of what can be achieved with a transit country through the Partnership Framework. From the outset, the Government of Niger has been a proactive and constructive partner. The EU and Member States have closely coordinated their action, with a clear division of labour and mutually reinforcing support to help Niger meet its objectives. (EC, 2017b, p. 3)

The partnership with Niger has involved a lot of high-level political engagement by the EU and member states. Meanwhile, cooperation initiatives have focused on strengthened border management, combatting smuggling, assistance to and voluntary return of stranded migrants, creation of alternative economic opportunities for communities on transit routes, support for the protection and reintegration of returnees, support to national migration strategies and plans, and security support, including to the G5 Sahel Joint Force (EU, 2017a).

Niger certainly appears to be the country in which the MPF has faced the least challenges and in which there has been substantial activity at political and operational level. This success is due to a number of factors. Firstly, as a country of transit Niger does not face the same political sensitivities over returns faced by countries of origin, which have proved such a sticking point with other partners. Secondly, as an extremely poor country with limited options for inward investment, the extra resources for migration projects that have been mobilised through the EUTF and by EU member states provide a stronger incentive in Niger than in some other MPF partners that have stronger economies and more investment options. Thirdly, much of the EU assistance has been security-focused and has therefore been quite well aligned to Niger's own security interests, in particular in addressing the security threats Niger faces along both its northern and southern borders. In Niger the "more-for-more" approach appears to be working, with one EU official remarking "we clearly have an interest in rewarding a country like Niger with more aid".

Nigerien officials interviewed expressed satisfaction with the partnership, its overall focus, and the activities being carried out. However, they repeatedly stressed that it is important to integrate the EU's migration-focused security support with efforts to address wider security concerns in the country, notably terrorism and arms smuggling. For example, where EU-supported activities disrupt trafficking networks, support for alternative livelihoods for communities that benefited from trafficking is urgently needed, otherwise these communities becoming more vulnerable to recruitment by terrorist groups or involvement in smuggling. Likewise, Nigerien officials stressed that short-term security actions must be complemented by accelerated and reinforced development efforts addressing root causes of migration. These concerns demonstrate the challenge for the EU in balancing different short-term and longer-term security and migration interests in its engagement with MPF

countries. As Knoll argues, in Niger the EU's efforts in cracking down on smuggling and migration routes into Libya risk upsetting a security equilibrium based on income generated from these illicit movements. While the EU seeks to provide alternative economic opportunities "whether this will help to create sufficient economic alternatives for former combatants, security forces, and jobless young people that may lose out from recent efforts to halt flows remains to be seen" (Knoll, 2017).

5.6 MPF implementation in Mali

The EU's overall engagement with Mali has a strong focus on security, with two EU Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in place to support stabilisation efforts in Mali. In this context, it is unsurprising that much of its migration cooperation has also been security-focused. This includes reinforcement of the migration dimension of the CSDP mission, projects to support the redeployment of Malian internal security forces and to reinforce border control in central Mali, and 9 EUTF projects with an emphasis on security and job creation. In June EUR 50 million from the African Peace Facility was announced for the G5 Sahel Joint Force to help increase security and boost cross-border cooperation in the region (EU, 2017b).

Mali is a significant country of origin for migration to the EU and hence returns have been an important element of the partnership. The return rate for irregular Malian migrants in the EU remains very low and the Malian government generally does not provide papers and take people back. Mali has been resistant to the EU's push for cooperation on return and reintegration and this has become a highly sensitive political issue in the country. Indeed, the Malian government backtracked from plans for a readmission agreement with the EU in response to hostile public opinion at home and among the Malian diaspora and criticism from the opposition. EU officials recognise that this situation will not change until after next year's elections as this issue is too politically sensitive. Mali provides an example of a country where the EU has tried to force the returns agenda, but this has backfired making the issue even more sensitive and difficult to address, a fact that the EU has acknowledged and responded to by reducing the pressure on returns.

EU officials report that cooperation with Mali under the MPF has become more challenging over time and some suggest that a rethink is needed on how to engage with Mali on migration. This should include a recognition of the complexity of Mali's situation, and that migration goals cannot be pursued in isolation, but must take into account the broader security situation and EU commitment to peace and security in the country. Apparently, such a change in approach is beginning to take place, with migration being increasingly treated as one element of a holistic security response. As EU officials point out, Europe's security concerns protect Mali from the imposition of significant negative incentives and provide an example of how other external interests – rather than being subordinated – can be prioritised over migration in MPF partner countries. As one official remarked "The EU is unlikely to ever sanction Mali in terms of aid as it would not want to risk counterproductive consequences on [the] security side".

5.7 MPF implementation in Senegal

The MPF with Senegal was intended to build on what was already a strong relationship of cooperation between Senegal and Europe. Senegal is a major country of origin, and therefore the EU has strongly emphasised returns in its engagement under the MPF. In terms of aid, there have been significant funds from the EUTF, with 9 projects for a total of more than EUR 181 million adopted (EU, 2017c). However, these incentives have only produced limited results in terms of the EU's core agenda of returns and readmissions, and the number of positive responses from the Senegalese authorities to requests for the consular travel documents required to return Senegalese nationals remains low. In a recent report on the Senegal migration partnership, the EU makes clear that further cooperation on border management and other areas will be "on the basis of results achieved" (EU, 2017c, p. 3), indicating the EU's frustration at the lack of progress on returns and willingness to withhold funding to achieve cooperation in this area. Some member states' officials express significant frustration with Senegal and say they want the EU to push harder. It is important to note that Senegal already had a more mutual interest-based collaboration with Spain on migration, which appears to have been a more effective approach than the MPF.

Civil society organisations working in Senegal report serious concerns with the EU migration projects in the country, which reflect some of the broader concerns about EUTF programming discussed above. They report that projects are designed in Brussels, implemented by EU implementing agencies with minimal consultation with local actors, and focused on the regions where most migrants come from rather than those regions with the greatest developmental needs. Disturbingly they also report that officials responsible for migration issues within the EU delegation, and therefore with oversight of migration projects, have law-enforcement rather than development backgrounds. Overall, they stress that the way in which migration projects are being rolled out in Senegal represents a huge step backwards in terms of development practice.

5.8 MPF implementation in Nigeria

The EU has regular high-level engagement with Nigeria and in 2015 signed a Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility with the country. The EC reports that dialogue and political engagement with Nigeria on migration was stepped up significantly since the launch of the MPF. The Nigeria partnership lays a strong focus on combatting trafficking, while the EUTF provides funding for projects to address resilience, return, reintegration and anti-radicalisation, as well as humanitarian support (EU, 2017d). However, this EU money is inevitably "small fry" for Nigeria and unlikely to provide any significant leverage in areas where Nigerian and European interests do not align themselves.

Nigeria is among the most important countries of origin for migration to Europe and the EU has a strong interest in strengthening cooperation on returns. Negotiations were launched on a readmission agreement in 2016, but quickly stalled. However, the EU continues to stress that this should form a central part of its strategic engagement with the country:

> Nigeria is a strategic partner in Africa for investment and security as well as for migration, and the conclusion of an effective readmission agreement would represent a clear sign of commitment to this broad and strategic partnership. (EC, 2017b, p. 6)

While Nigeria's official position is that they have no problem with readmission, they do appear to be delaying progress on the readmission agreement. Nigerian officials stress that there is no point sending people back when they have no opportunities and will just travel abroad again.

It seems that, in Nigeria, the EU's ambitions to obtain cooperation on returns through positive development incentives were misplaced. While the EU continues to stress return in its engagement with Nigeria, officials privately recognise that they will not get anywhere on this. Remittances are very important for Nigeria, while development aid is not. EU officials know that more effective leverage would be through trade or research cooperation but, as discussed above, it has so far been impossible to harness these policy areas for migration goals.

While some within the EU institutions are now pushing for negative incentives, for example in relation to visas, this is unlikely to happen as some powerful member states have significant strategic interests in the country and would not want to risk seriously damaging relations. This again demonstrates that EU ambitions to use the MPF as a framework to put other areas of external action at the service of migration goals is both flawed and unrealistic.

For their part, Nigerian officials' assessment of the MPF is generally negative, stressing that the country has not yet seen much benefit from it. They report that they were hoping to see innovative solutions to address irregular migration, unemployment and lack of opportunities, and to reduce the dangers that migrants face during their journey, but that they have so far been disappointed. Critically, Nigeria is keen to see more legal migration opportunities into Europe and is frustrated that this has not been part of MPF agenda.

6 The Ethiopia migration partnership

6.1 Migration and refugee challenges in Ethiopia

Ethiopia is an important destination and transit country for migrants and refugees, as well as to a lesser extent a country of origin for labour migration (although there are not major numbers migrating to the EU). Ethiopia hosts over 850,000 refugees from neighbouring countries, mainly from Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan. This population has grown rapidly in recent years due to the crisis in South Sudan and the government sees it as a potential threat to stability. Ethiopia also has an estimated one million internally displaced people. Large numbers of Ethiopians undertake irregular labour migration, the vast majority heading east to the Gulf, the next largest cohort heading south towards South Africa, and a relatively small number heading north towards Europe. While all three of these migration routes are dangerous, experts report that by far the most dangerous is the route through Yemen to the Gulf.

Ethiopia's policy framework on migration and refugee issues is currently in a state of flux. Out-migration from Ethiopia was banned in 2013 following the forced return of many Ethiopian migrants from the Gulf. While there has been some legislative progress in this

area,[10] this ban still remains in place. As a result, migrants are forced to take irregular routes, thereby increasing their vulnerability. Although this irregular flow is tolerated by the authorities because of the importance of remittances, the government is reluctant to openly acknowledge this continued out-migration. In terms of refugee policy, Ethiopia is becoming more progressive and is a pilot country for the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF).[11] The government is in the process of changing the legal framework to move away from a strict "encampment" policy to allow a small percentage of refugees to move out of camps and integrate into communities. Both migration and refugee issues remain highly sensitive for the Ethiopian government.

The population of Ethiopia is currently around 100 million and expected to double to 200 million by 2050. Ethiopian officials stress that the main challenge for the country is to create jobs for its rapidly growing youth population, many of whom currently seek to migrate in search of opportunities. The government is particularly interested in creating industrial jobs, in line with a push to industrialise its economy. It is in the context of these multiple and significant migration challenges that the EU's migration partnership with Ethiopia must be understood.

6.2 EU-Ethiopia political engagement

The MPF is one of a number of engagement frameworks between the EU and Ethiopia. On migration, there is already the 2015 CAMM.[12] In 2016, the EU and Ethiopia adopted a Strategic Engagement document that is intended to expand dialogue across six pillars, one of which is migration. Dialogue under this strategic engagement was put on hold during the country's ten-month state of emergency that ended in August, but is set to be restarted.

Ethiopia was chosen as a pilot country for the MPF in large part because it is one of the few stable and viable partners in the Horn of Africa, with which the EU can engage on migration. EU officials report that there were expectations that it would be relatively easy to achieve results with Ethiopia on the EU's migration goals. For its part, Ethiopia was apparently attracted by the idea of support for job creation, in particular through access to the EIP.

These expectations of easy results under the Ethiopia MPF have proved unfounded. Ethiopia has been a helpful partner for the EU on migration at regional level, acting as a constructive player in the Khartoum process and at the Valletta summit, including by championing certain issues and bringing other African partners on board. However, in terms of the goals of the MPF, the interests of the EU and Ethiopia have not aligned. From the Ethiopian side, officials repeatedly stress that they had expected stronger support in the areas of job creation, addressing root causes and legal migration, and that EU collaboration in these areas

10 The government's ambition is that in future out-migration should happen within the framework of Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) and bilateral relations, in order to better manage flows and protect migrants.

11 For more on this UN initiative, see http://www.unhcr.org/comprehensive-refugee-response-framework-crrf.html.

12 The CAMM commits the EU and Ethiopia to cooperate on issues of international protection and refugees' needs, legal migration and mobility, irregular migration, smuggling and trafficking in human beings and development policy. It is funded through the EUTF.

has been slow and less than expected – or in the case of legal migration, non-existent. Meanwhile there is deep frustration among EU institutions and member states that Ethiopia has not delivered on returns. Indeed, the issue of returns has come to entirely overshadow the Ethiopia MPF and is now a barrier to further collaboration.

Some observers and EU officials point out that the choice of Ethiopia to participate in a framework that explicitly uses aid as "more-for-more" leverage to achieve European goals was a miscalculation. While Ethiopia would like more investment from the EU, the money on offer is simply not a strong enough incentive. Ethiopia has other sources of finance, notably China, and also does not want to be seen to be dictated to by the EU or to risk relations with its diaspora. Moreover, migration to Europe is simply not a major concern for Ethiopia, as it is far more concerned about the large numbers of Ethiopians migrating in risky circumstances to the Gulf. The government also has far more serious national security and stability challenges than migration.

While the EC continues to whitewash the situation with overly positive progress reports, in reality it seems this partnership has reached an impasse with no obvious way forward. The EU is now moving to negative incentives (although this is not formally acknowledged), including delaying planned development and trade cooperation initiatives, and considering leveraging other policy areas, as discussed below. However, Ethiopia is strongly opposed to such conditionalities and their imposition seems only likely to harden positions and further reduce collaboration. Ethiopian officials stress that they have many important things to discuss with the EU – from counter terrorism to climate change. They do not want migration to continue to dominate political engagement with the EU, as it currently does, and say this would be better treated as a technical issue under broader development engagement. From the European perspective, it is important to note that Ethiopia is an authoritarian country with a poor human rights record, and the EU's current focus on its migration and return goals in its engagement with Ethiopia is likely to reduce the space for the EU to pressure Ethiopia on governance reforms. Overall, it is clear that the EU and Ethiopia clearly have very different visions of the priority migration should have within their relationship and the focus that migration cooperation should take.

6.3 European coordination on migration in Ethiopia

The MPF is supposed to mobilise and coordinate all the tools of the EU and its member states to achieve migration goals. There are 21 European member states present in Ethiopia, some – such as the United Kingdom – with extremely large bilateral programmes. While this large number inevitably poses coordination challenges, most EU and member states' officials in the country report that coordination on migration issues is strong.

At political level, it appears that European actors are largely delivering a common message on migration in their dialogue with the government, including through high-level missions by member states and the HR-VP (High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission). This includes common messaging on the importance of returns and readmissions. However, in terms of how to practically respond to the lack of progress on returns, member states are not in agreement, with some pushing for tough negative incentives, and others suggesting that this issue should not be allowed to dominate the agenda.

In terms of practical coordination, there is an EU+ migration coordination group, while migration is also regularly discussed in monthly HOMs meetings. The EUTF seems to have been an important catalyst for improved collaboration on migration. EU officials report that the fact that member states contributed to the EUTF with their own money, that they have access to this money, and that some of them lead on EUTF project implementation, has increased both coordination and interest in migration, including at Ambassadorial level.

6.4 Returns and readmission

The issue of return and readmission has come to dominate the Ethiopia MPF, blocking progress on cooperation and acting as a profound irritant to the broader relationship between the EU and Ethiopia. This situation seems quite surreal given the very small numbers of Ethiopian citizens eligible to be returned, as well as the wider picture that Ethiopia is not one of the main countries of origin for irregular migration to Europe, as well as the fact that Ethiopia itself is hosting almost 1 million refugees. It is arguably a sign of the EU's loss of perspective and desperation for short-term migration "wins" that this situation has developed.

It appears that in the absence of a readmission agreement the EU wanted to pilot some returns and identified 58 Ethiopians eligible for return. The Ethiopian government dragged its feet in verifying these peoples' identity, but finally the two sides agreed on 32 people who could be returned. Ethiopia was then supposed to issue travel documents, but delayed doing so; meanwhile some of the identified people absconded. According to EU sources, at the time of writing there were less than 20 of this original group who could be returned. However, Ethiopia has still not issued travel documents for them, citing legal and technical challenges and repeatedly saying that the issue will soon be resolved, while blaming the EU for having lost the people who absconded.

EU officials stress that the return of this very small group of people is important because it is a pilot project and can pave the way for more returns. They point out that, although numbers of irregular Ethiopian migrants to Europe are comparatively low, Ethiopia has one of the worst records on readmission. Ethiopia on the other hand has made promises at political level to take these people back, but says that the returns must be voluntary not forced, and specifically that Ethiopian embassies cannot issue travel documents unless the returnee is willing to sign these. It seems that Ethiopia is stalling on this issue because it does not want to alienate its diaspora, because of the importance of remittances, because of the political sensitivity of and public hostility to forced returns, and because it does not want to be dictated to by the EU. Ethiopia is also apparently seeking greater funding from the EU for the reintegration of returnees.

There is now debate within the EU institutions of the extent to which negative incentives should be applied to Ethiopia to force progress on returns. There have already been delays to one EUTF project and to a planned EU-Ethiopia trade event, in part because of lack of progress on returns. EU officials say that, while it has not been made explicit that these delays are linked to returns, Ethiopian officials are aware of the connection. The impasse over returns is also affecting cooperation in other ways. It is apparently damaging European cooperation on refugee issues with the Ethiopian Administration for Refugee & Returnee Affairs (ARRA), the entity that is responsible for returns as well as refugees. The returns

issue is also seemingly affecting the relationship between the EU and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD),[13] with Addis Ababa complaining that the EU keeps raising the returns issue at informal ministerial meetings.

Further and more explicit negative incentives are currently being considered, including on the processing of diplomatic visas. Meanwhile, those responsible for the EUTF have been asked to slow down the initiation of new programmes in Ethiopia. One EU official involved in EUTF implementation reported that while 130 million of the 500 million put into the EUTF for MPF countries was reserved for Ethiopia, much of this is not being used because of the impasse, and that the EUTF funds for Ethiopia will now remain effectively blocked until there is some progress on returns. Another official pointed out that while Ethiopia was going to be a priority for European Fund for Sustainable Development, it is now unlikely to be, both because of poor governance and because of lack of cooperation on returns.

Different positions exist among EU institutions and member states over how the impasse over returns should be handled. There is pressure on the EU institutions to get tough and apply negative incentives from a number of member states governments that themselves face public pressure on migration issues at home. These member states say that the EU has fulfilled its obligations, that Ethiopia has benefited a lot from EUTF, and that they must now reciprocate with returns. However, other member states stress that a range of strategic and security interests with Ethiopia could be damaged by the application of significant negative incentives. Likewise, within the EU institutions, there is some division, with pressure for a tougher approach to Ethiopia coming from the Council Secretariat and DG Home, which is being resisted by DG DEVCO and some parts of the EEAS. Ethiopia is well aware of this increasing pressure for negative incentives and is unlikely to be swayed by it. Ethiopian officials make the powerful counterargument that the EU is talking about tens of people due for return, while Ethiopia is already hosting so many refugees. Indeed, Ethiopia has its own implicit threats, as one Ethiopian official commented “We are hosting nearly one million refugees in the region. This is very important for the EU. If we close our refugee camps, this would pose a problem for the EU: people would come to Europe”.

Ethiopian officials express deep frustration that this issue has dominated dialogue with the EU and has taken up so much political space at highest level. As one official put it “This [the returns] has been blocking all other discussions for last two years […] We don’t want to downsize all discussions on migration to issues of return”. While Ethiopia is clearly being obstructive, they have a point. Indeed, many outside observers agree that the overwhelming emphasis on returns by the EU is unreasonable and counterproductive. Some EU officials privately agree, pointing out the amount of EU staff time, money and political capital dedicated to pursuing the returns issue is completely out of proportion with the small numbers involved, especially in light of Ethiopia’s overall positive approach to migration and its generous hosting of so many refugees. The Ethiopian case certainly suggests that the issue of returns trumps all other elements of the MPF, including commitments to supporting countries that host refugees. In this regard it is important to note that the communication establishing the MPF not only suggests that negative incentives should be used where countries do not cooperate on returns, but also that it “will reward […] those taking action to adequately host persons fleeing conflict and persecution” (EC, 2016a, p. 9). Overall this situation seems to be a striking example of how the EU – desperate to be seen to act tough

13 The IGAD is a regional grouping of eight East African countries including Ethiopia.

on migration – is losing its way in its engagement with a powerful, and largely constructive, African country that should be a positive partner in addressing the long-term challenge of migration.

6.5 Migration programming

The last couple of years have seen a huge growth in EU spending on migration in Ethiopia, primarily from the EUTF, from which Ethiopia has received more than any other country. Prior to the Valletta summit there were just a few small migration projects, while as of mid-2017 the EU and member states together were providing just over EUR 490 million in migration-funding (EU Delegation to Ethiopia, n.d.). The vast majority of this was going to just two of the five themes from the Valletta Action Plan, with 47 per cent of funds going to Theme 1: Development benefits of migration and addressing root causes of irregular migration and forced displacement, and 46 per cent going to Theme 3: Protection and asylum.[14] This hugely increased spending demonstrates the importance given to migration within European development assistance to Ethiopia. However, a number of development and migration actors in Ethiopia have raised some serious concerns about how these funds are being spent and with what impact.

As with the EUTF more broadly, in Ethiopia it appears that the increased priority and funding for migration may be skewing development agendas. Observers argue that this has resulted in a proliferation of players in the migration field, many of whom are development NGOs (non-governmental organisations) that are repackaging or refocusing their work as "prevention of migration". Indeed, one member state official admitted that their country's existing development programming is being repackaged with a migration narrative and that they are encouraging their NGOS partners to do likewise. This seems problematic, as it suggests that some development programmes that were – hopefully – initially focused on identified development needs are being refocused towards a European-driven prioritisation of migration, in effect a skewing of development priorities. This proliferation of migration activities also results in duplication and lack of coordination.

Some humanitarian experts are also concerned that the EU's current migration focus is skewing humanitarian aid and undermining humanitarian principles in Ethiopia. In particular that the large amount of money going to mixed migration[15] is coming at the cost of meeting the humanitarian needs of refugees. They also point out that South Sudanese refugees, who make up almost half of the country's refugee caseload, are chronically underfunded and that the lack of priority given to this population is because South Sudanese do not onwardly migrate. Meanwhile, the Eritrean refugee caseload has a higher and more consistent level of support from donors because Eritreans in Ethiopia are much more likely to migrate on to Europe. Humanitarian experts stress that the starting point must be to support the most vulnerable migrants and refugees, regardless of if they are onward movers.

14 It is important to note that not all of this is new money. For example, there was pre-existing support for refugees that is now counted as coming under Valletta Theme 3 of the Valletta Action Plan. There are also reports that existing development programming has been repackaged to focus on migration.

15 For instance, focusing on the mobility patterns and routes common to different types of migrants, including forced and voluntary, as well as migrants along the continuum between these two categories.

In terms of how the new migration programmes are being implemented, local and international actors in Ethiopia express a range of concerns about their timeliness, choice of implementer, and focus, which reflect broader concerns about the EUTF as an instrument. For example, despite the fact that the EUTF was established to provide a quicker response than traditional development instruments, it seems that implementation of EUTF projects in Ethiopia has been slow. One example is the Italian managed EUR 20 million SINCE programme, which is intended to create employment for vulnerable populations. This programme was adopting in December 2015 and is still in the process of contracting local implementation partners with implementation due to begin in earnest at the end of 2017. Likewise, local and intentional actors expressed concern that the EUR 46 million BMM project, implemented by GIZ, has been extremely slow to get moving. The Ethiopian government is very unhappy about these types of delays, with one official commenting "Valletta was two years ago, but so far this fund has not created a single job".

There are also concerns that the EUTF projects in Ethiopia are implemented primarily by European implementing agencies and NGOs. While EU officials stress that the choice of implementer is made based on knowledge and track record in the country, there is a strong perception among observers that the EUTF money is being carved up among European actors. As one UN official put it:

> There is a pretence that the EUTF money goes to Africa, but it does not, it goes to the European agencies. The EU agencies are fighting over who gets most; they don't really care that none of this money actually stays in Ethiopia. They have lost sight of the objective.

There is also disappointment among local and international migration experts in Ethiopia at the focus of the EU's migration programming, which does not add value or offer a genuinely transformative approach to working on migration. As one migration expert stated "It is tragic to see how the EUTF projects are unfolding. Very few are helpful; they are just about being seen to be doing something".

There are questions about the extent to which EU migration projects work with local actors or address local priorities. For example, international agencies working with IGAD suggested that some of the EUTF support to IGAD in the form of research studies was neither in line with IGAD's interests nor helpful to IGADs work, but was a priority that was promoted by Brussels. The issue of embedding programmes in local structures was also raised vocally in relation to the SINCE programme, which is intended to create employment, but will be implemented by NGOs. UN experts suggested that such an approach cannot be sustainable or scalable given that it largely bypasses existing government structures responsible for employment, notably the Ministry of Labour and the Ministry of Industry, and that it works at local level without addressing national fiscal and employment policy frameworks. While some involved with the project have apparently pushed for a more systemic approach, they report that there is resistance both from the Italian implementers and from Brussels who want quick and visible projects focused on measurable short-term outputs, rather than longer-term institutional and policy change.

Concerns were also repeatedly raised, including by a number of EU member states officials, about the fact that some EU migration programmes were disperse and lacked focus. In this regard, the BMM project was criticised as having too many partner countries and too many disparate elements. Some argued that, instead of spreading themselves so widely, such

programmes should be looking at what change they wanted to effect and consolidating their efforts in support of this. These and the other concerns discussed above raise important questions about the extent to which EU migration programming in Ethiopia is in line with development best practices.

7 The MPF and EU-Africa relations

7.1 EU-Africa engagement on migration

Given that the MPF is so clearly focused on promoting Europe's interests in its engagement with African partners, an important question is how this framework is perceived by African actors and what impact it is having on broader relations between the EU and Africa.

African governments recognise that migration is a central concern for Europe and understand the political pressures that European leaders are facing in this regard. However, African officials from a number of MPF countries stressed that the EU places too much emphasis on migration in its political engagement with them. They argued that while migration needs to be discussed, it is currently dominating dialogue with Europe in a way that threatens to eclipse other important issues. Moreover, these officials recognise that the EU's goals on migration are unrealistic, that migration cannot be stopped, and that the measures that the MPF is prescribing are unlikely to have their desired impact. Some suggest that, until the EU accepts this reality, it will be difficult to have an honest and useful discussion on migration.

Not only does Europe put more emphasis on migration in its engagement with Africa, African and European actors also have profoundly different priorities regarding migration. As Vimont points out, there is

> a fundamental difference of narratives on migration between Europe and Africa. Europeans perceive immigration essentially as a threat to their jobs, to their national integrity, and, more and more today, to their security. Africans see migration as a natural component of their societal tradition, a significant source of their economic prosperity through the financial remittances sent back home, and, in recent years, an alternative to the double threat they face at home of unemployment and political radicalization, which lead to insecurity and destabilization. (Vimont, 2016, p. 21)[16]

These differing interests can be seen in the different elements of the MPF and the Valletta agenda that each party highlights. While the EU is focused on returns and borders, African partners of the MPF are united in stressing that they want the MPF – and indeed the broader range of initiatives emerging from Valletta – to deliver jobs, economic opportunities, and legal migration routes.

Problematically, the EU does not openly acknowledge these different interests, meaning that dialogue with African partners is not based on a genuine recognition of each side's priorities and an attempt to seek compromise. Instead it is based on an agenda that prioritises

16 Although it is important to recognise that, while many African countries see out-migration as an important economic opportunity, some are also concerned that the do not want too many refugees and migrants coming into their countries from other African states.

EU interests, pretends these are also African interests, and seeks to foist this pretence on African actors through a range of so-called positive and negative "incentives". As one EU official summed it up:

> We can pretend that we have a joint interest on migration management with Africa, but actually we don't. The EU is interested in return and readmission. Africa is interested in root causes, free movement, legal routes and remittances. We don't mention that our interests are actually not aligned.

Observers and migration experts interviewed repeatedly stated that the EU did not listen to or take on board African perspectives. One staff member of a European civil society organisation described an AU delegation trip to Brussels and Berlin in 2016, where AU representatives tried to persuade Europeans that their intense focus on migration prevention was misguided: "Everyone in Brussels and Berlin listened politely but went along with their prevention programmes".

The EU's shift away from multilateral engagement with Africa on migration through the AU, and towards the kind of bilateral, transactional relations epitomised by the MPF, is causing deep frustration among some African actors. This shift began with the Valletta Summit, to which only some countries were invited. Countries in Southern Africa felt excluded, with South Africa particularly frustrated as it faces significant migration challenges but was left out of the dialogue. The EU then further singled out just a few countries from the Valletta process to be the focus of the MPF[17] and made the tone of these relationships less diplomatic and more transactional – a further move away from positive engagement with Africa. African partners have had different responses to the bilateral and transactional approach of the MPF. Some reject this as an imposition of EU interests that undermines a common African position, while others are more pragmatic and want to see what they can gain from it.

Overall there appears to be widespread recognition, not least within some EU institutions, that Valletta, the EUTF, and the MPF have soured relations between the EU and Africa, by undermining African unity and by imposing EU interests. It is important that the problematic nature of this approach is acknowledged and addressed head on by the EU, as it will not go away by simply pretending this is a genuine partnership.

7.2 African interests and priorities on migration

African countries have a range of interests in relation to migration that threaten to be undermined by the current prevention and return focus of EU migration policy in general and the MPF in particular. Fundamentally, African countries do not have a strong interest in stopping migration to the EU, which is Africa's first source of remittances (36 per cent) (EC, 2017d). African interests are more focused on addressing intra-African migration issues, reflecting the fact that the majority of migration takes place within Africa and not from Africa to Europe.

17 This limited focus on five priority countries is now expanding as more countries come to be addressed under the MPF, albeit in a more fluid and informal way.

Central among these is the African interest in intra-continental mobility and free movement. The AU is promoting the adoption of a continental-free movement protocol, which it is hoped will unleash economic growth and development. The MPF, with its discourse that presents open borders and migrants as a threat and its pressure for African countries to securitise borders in the name of "migration management" appears to run counter to these interests. Critically, it fails to take sufficient account of the fact that intra-continental migration is an important means to generate growth and to provide a safety valve when populations are under pressure, or that porous Africa borders serve many positive social and economic functions. As one UN official pointed out: "While Africa is trying to reduce barriers to free movement, the EU is giving African countries money to securitise and reinforce borders, including to repressive countries like Sudan". However, it is important to note that on the African side there is a significant gap between continental-level discourse around the desirability of free movement and the actual approach of many African governments and regional organisations which do not support free movement in practice.

Some commentators suggest that the MPF approach particularly risks undermining the progress on freedom of movement made by some Regional Economic Communities (RECs), notably the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). For example, EU engagement with Niger is focused on tightening borders, but other ECOWAS countries are concerned that this must not jeopardise the region's free movement protocols. While migration experts point out that over the last decade there has been growing interest among African governments in developing national migration strategies and effective border management, this needs to be done in a way that reflects African realities and aspirations, not EU interests. Moreover, given that some member states have been actively supporting the AU's attempts to develop a continental free-trade area, there appear to be serious contradictions between European approaches to migration and broader Africa-wide political and economic ambitions.

Another African interest is in developing a common position on migration, which would strengthen African positions when negotiating with the EU. Indeed, with the new AU Chair and Commission in place, there is now greater aspiration for a common AU position on migration. Moreover, the AU and some powerful African countries like South Africa are reportedly keen to revitalise the continental-level Migration and Mobility Dialogue with the EU to rebalance the current focus on bilateral engagement. However, there is resistance to this from some countries that benefit from the bilateral, incentive-driven approach of the EUTF.

While both the EU and African sides are responsible for the failure of the MMD to take off, such a continental-level and politically focused approach is much needed to take a broader and more long-term look at how the EU and Africa can jointly address migration. This would require the EU to move away from its current bilateral, transactional approach and engage meaningfully at multiple levels – bilateral, regional and continental – giving sufficient weight to all three.

7.3 Migration at the EU-AU summit

There has been disagreement among both EU and African actors about the extent to which migration issues should feature in the 2017 EU-Africa summit. Recent EC reports stress that not only migration, but the MPF itself, should be discussed at the summit:

> The upcoming EU-Africa Summit will constitute an opportunity to take stock of progress made within the context of the Partnership Framework with African countries and to add new dynamics to the ongoing effort to build together a well-functioning and mutually benefiting mobility and migration partnership." (EC, 2017c, p. 15)

Some member states, notably those for whom migration has become a central element of foreign and development policy and who are supportive of a tough EU approach, also pushed for migration to be a central topic at the summit.

However other member states, notably those that are more sceptical about the EU approach to migration, as well as some officials in the EU institutions, were concerned that the issue could overtake the summit, poison discussions, and prevent progress on other issues, given the hostility of the AU and some African countries to the EU's current approach, as well as the potentially unhelpful tone of some European actors on this issue. One official commented: "If we want to have a positive summit we need to be prudent and not pressure on migration demands". This group suggested migration should be discussed as and where appropriate in relation to the issues of youth and jobs, but not be given too much prominence.

On the African side, there were also disagreements. Some MPF partner country governments suggested migration should be a major issue at the summit, as it is impossible to talk about youth and jobs without talking about migration. Other MPF partners wanted migration to have some limited place, but not to be allowed to overshadow the summit. They argue that issues such as development, trade and investment, peace and security and post-Cotonou are the critical issues to be addressed, although acknowledge that these issues do have migration elements. Still others view migration as a limited and divisive agenda that should not be discussed at the summit at all.

8 The way forward

The Migration Partnership Framework – as it has been implemented in the five priority countries – is the clearest example yet of the EU's shift towards a transactional, short-term and incentives-based approach to migration in response to the "migration crisis". It has also clearly demonstrated the limits of such an approach. The MPF may have achieved some impacts in specific areas such as enhanced cooperation on trafficking, border security, or improved intra-European coordination at country level. However, overall it has not incentivised the kind of cooperation from partner countries that it was seeking; has not significantly enhanced the way that the EU works on migration at country level; and, in some cases, has even soured relations with partner countries. Despite the continued political demand for results from the MPF, and the regular positively worded progress reports, in effect the MPF experience suggests that the EU needs to rethink on migration.

Firstly, the EU needs to accept not only that migration cannot be stopped and that Africans will continue to make the journey to Europe in search of opportunities, but – crucially – that Europe needs African migrants and that this need will grow in coming decades. As Vimont makes clear:

> [E]conomic migrant inflows, notably from Africa, will inevitably rise in the future: Europe is growing older while Africa is getting younger; a natural process of transfers and substitutions will slowly emerge to satisfy labor market needs in European countries. Current demographic research leaves little doubt on this point. (Vimont, 2016, p. 14)

With this recognition as a starting point, short-term and unsustainable approaches focused on punishing countries if they do not accept back a few hundred people, or working with individual countries to tighten their borders, do not make much sense. Instead the EU needs to focus on building genuine partnerships, not just with a few cherry-picked "partner" countries, but at national, regional and continental level. It should use these partnerships to explore how Africa and Europe can work together to foster intra-African movement that supports Africa's economic growth; to ensure protection for refugees and vulnerable migrants; and to allow both continents to benefit from large-scale, safe and orderly African labour migration to Europe. This inevitably throws up huge challenges, such as matching African skills to European markets. However, an emphasis on creating different types of opportunities for Africans in Europe (such as long-term migration, circular migration, research and educational opportunities), and hence strengthening remittances and skills-transfer to Africa, would refocus engagement in a way that serves both African and European interests, and may even help unblock the issue of returns that the EU is currently so focused on. Likewise, moving from an attempt to address "root causes" of migration with short-term development funds, to instead examining how the EU could *really* readjust its trade and investment policy in Africa to create more decent jobs and opportunities, would be a more sustainable approach.

The EU-Africa summit – while it would be wise to shy away from more divisive debates on issues such as return – could perhaps be an opportunity to explore some of these broader and longer-term issues at continental level. There are also global processes underway that can help the EU to think more creatively and honestly about its future migration policy. For example, the establishment of the new Global Compacts on Migration and on Refugees "provides openings for strategic reflections that can help redirect European policies towards a longer-term vision on migration and mobility and its role for global development in order to complement the immediate short-term responses and overcome the 'crisis mode'" (Knoll, 2017).

The most recent EC communication on the delivery of the EU migration agenda (EC, 2017f) suggests that there might be some modest appetite for such a re-balancing away from the current focus on prevention to take on board African interests, although it is not clear that member states share this appetite. The communication contains some positive elements such as the resettlement of 50,000 refugees over the next five years, pressure for member states to crack down on illegal and exploitative employment of irregular migrants, and plans for piloting legal migration. However, disappointingly, legal migration is still presented through the prism of incentivising cooperation on returns. While a functioning migration system of course requires the return of those who are not eligible to stay, making this issue so central to cooperation, given the small numbers involved and the much bigger

weaknesses in Europe's internal migration systems, is out of proportion and unhelpful, as many EU officials seem to recognise.

As well as rethinking its external engagement with Africa on migration, the EU needs to get its own house in order on asylum and migration. This requires being honest about conflicting interests between member states and working towards effective common migration and asylum policies and systems, as difficult as this may be. Perhaps even more critically, European leaders must seek to shift the current political and public discourse around migration. They must make the case that Europe needs migration from Africa; must actively challenge negative and xenophobic presentations of migrants in politics, the media and wider society; and must seek to build public acceptance of migrants and migration. Given the pressure that mainstream European political parties are currently facing from the rise of right-wing political movements, this will require significant courage. However, a change in the European mindset is crucial if Europe is to build a more constructive and realistic engagement with Africa on migration in the future.

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The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: A Glimpse of the Future for EU Development Cooperation

Clare Castillejo

The European Union Trust Fund for Africa: a glimpse of the future for EU development cooperation

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Abbreviations

DAC	Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
DCI	Development Cooperation Instrument
DG DEVCO	Directorate General, International Cooperation and Development
DG ECHO	Directorate General, Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection
DG HOME	Directorate General, Migration and Home Affairs
EC	European Commission
EDF	European Development Fund
ENI	European Neighbourhood Instrument
EP	European Parliament
EU	European Union
EUTF	European Union Trust Fund
GIZ	Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit
ICMPD	International Centre for Migration Policy and Development
IcSP	Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace
NIP	National Indicative Programmes
ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
REC	Regional Economic Community
RIP	Regional Indicative Programme

Executive summary

The European Union Emergency Trust Fund (EUTF) for stability and addressing the root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in Africa was launched one year ago. It forms a central part of the EU's emerging response to the migration crisis. At the time of its launch at a high-level summit in Valletta, Malta, both high aspirations and serious concerns were expressed about the trust fund in relation to what it aimed to achieve, how it would work and how it relates to broader shifts in Europe's approach to both migration and development cooperation.

This paper examines how the trust fund has developed during its first year and the extent to which the initial expectations of the EU and member states – as well as the concerns of civil society and African partners, among others – are proving to be valid. It begins by examining the aims and organisation of the EUTF, identifying the different aspirations for the fund held by different actors and the extent to which it is likely to deliver on these. It also explores tensions around the financing of the fund and around its governance arrangements, including deep concerns among some member states about the lack of strategic direction and untransparent operational procedures. Likewise, it discusses to what extent African partners have been involved in the trust fund – from its conception to its governance and implementation – arguing that the EUTF is far removed from aid-effectiveness principles of ownership, partnership or alignment, and hence risks overlooking local priorities, knowledge and buy-in.

The paper goes on to look in more detail at the trust fund projects that have been selected and implemented to date. It finds that most projects have so far had a relatively traditional development focus, although they deviate from traditional development programming in several ways, including being speedier, with lighter procedures and less involvement of African partners. However, this focus is likely to shift as more migration management projects come through the pipeline and funding for the EU's new migration compacts is set to be channelled through the trust fund. The paper identifies serious flaws with the process for identifying and selecting projects and argues that this results in a choice of projects and implementers that is not necessarily based on the best fit for either the trust fund's goals or the local context and needs, but instead is based frequently on the effectiveness of member states in lobbying for funds.

Central to the effectiveness of the EUTF will be how it draws on knowledge and evidence at multiple levels. Within the trust fund, resources have been committed to generating new evidence; it is critical that this evidence is fed into the strategic direction and operational management of the fund, along with broader lessons from development experience. Likewise, robust monitoring and evaluation both of projects and of the impact of the overall fund is required. This paper suggests that it will be a challenge for the EU to ensure that such evidence-generation, monitoring and evaluation is able to keep pace with the trust fund's rapid disbursement, and it argues that strong learning and feedback mechanisms will be required.

The paper discusses where the trust fund could add value to the existing array of EU development instruments: in speed, flexibility and the potential for innovation. In particular, it argues that because the EUTF operates outside of the restrictions of

traditional development instruments, it could offer an opportunity for innovation and experimentation on some of the complex issues it seeks to address and contribute to the development of knowledge about "what works" in this area. However, seizing this opportunity requires facilitating ongoing learning and adaptation; ensuring greater involvement of local actors; and persuading implementers to move away from "business as usual" models.

The paper explores how the trust fund relates more broadly to existing EU commitments, strategies and instruments. It examines the central role that the EUTF plays in the EU's response to the migration crisis in the context of the overarching framework of the EU's 2011 Global Approach to Migration and Mobility, including as a mechanism for overcoming fragmentation and "incentivising" African cooperation. It also examines the extent to which the trust fund is in line with both EU development and human rights commitments and addresses concerns that some of its projects may undermine these commitments.

Finally, the paper asks what the EUTF may signal about the future direction of EU development cooperation. It suggests that it may be an indication of emerging trends, particularly in its more streamlined procedures with less emphasis on partnership, as well as its closer links to EU interests and use of aid conditionalities to promote those interests, in line with the priorities for development cooperation outlined in the July 2016 EU Global Strategy for Foreign and Security Policy.

The paper concludes by arguing that there are several steps that can be taken to improve the governance and management of the EUTF and make the most of the opportunities that it offers. However, it suggests that an examination of the EUTF raises broader concerns about the direction of EU aid that cannot be easily assuaged and do not bode well for a future European cooperation based on development principles.

The paper is based on the analysis of EU documentation and secondary sources and 20 interviews conducted in Brussels and by telephone with representatives from EU institutions, member states, the European Parliament, international organisations and the development research community.

1 Introduction

Over the last few years, European leaders have been under mounting pressure to come up with an effective response to the migration crisis. According to the European Commission (2015a), by the end of 2014, more than 3.1 million refugees originated from the African countries covered by the EUTF, while these countries also hosted some 3.4 million refugees, representing approximately one quarter of the global refugee population.

Likewise, there was growing recognition among EU institutions and member states in the last couple of years that existing EU instruments were not adequate to address the migrant crisis and that there was a need to bring together various sources of funding to address migration in a more coherent way and to act more rapidly. It was also felt that a political signal was needed to encourage African partners' cooperation on migration. As a result, the EC proposed expanding a trust fund initially planned for the Sahel region into a much larger initiative focused on migration that would include two key regions of origin of irregular migration (Sahel and Lake Chad, and the Horn of Africa), as well as the transit region of North Africa.

The idea of the EUTF was championed at the highest level of EU leadership. Many member states were initially sceptical, as they were concerned about the increasing use of trust funds, diversion of money away from core EU development instruments and loss of direction and oversight. Moreover, EU trust funds are a new instrument and had initially only been used twice for predominantly humanitarian purposes (the 2014 Bekou Trust Fund for the Central African Republic, and the 2014 Madad Trust Fund in response to the Syrian crisis), whereas the EUTF would be used for a broader and more diffuse set of goals.[1] Indeed, Collett (2016) suggests that the absence of clearly defined goals in the EUTF was a serious concern for member states. However, given the intense pressure for European action on the migration crisis – following the conspicuous failure of the European refugee redistribution agreement in particular – member states came on board with plans for a migration trust fund. The resulting EUTF was agreed at the November 2015 Valletta summit as part of a broader set of commitments and plans to address migration that were outlined in the Valletta Action Plan (European Council, 2015).

The trust fund will run from 2015 to 2020 and can be extended if needed. It finances activities in three regions (referred to as "windows"): North Africa; the Sahel region and Lake Chad area; and the Horn of Africa. The total fund currently stands at EUR 1.982 billion, although it has been agreed to channel an extra EUR 500 million allocated to the five African migration compact countries through the African EUTF (European Commission, 2016c).

This paper examines how the EUTF has developed during its first year of implementation. Chapter 2 addresses the goals, structures and management of the EUTF, including the varied expectations of different actors for the trust fund and controversies around its governance, funding and the involvement of African partners. Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the processes for identifying, selecting and implementing projects; the focus of current projects

1 The EUTF is the third and largest trust fund established since a 2013 reform of Financial Regulations enabled the EC to create and manage its own trust funds. Trust funds are intended to enable pooling of funds from the EU, member states and other actors as well as enable more rapid and flexible programming than under mainstream development instruments.

and the choice of implementers; and the extent to which projects will be based on solid evidence and learning. In Chapter 4, the paper examines how the EUTF relates to other EU cooperation instruments, both in terms of its added value and its alignment with other EU policies and commitments. Finally, the last chapter asks what the EUTF might indicate about the future direction of EU development cooperation with Africa.

2 EUTF aims, structures and management

This chapter examines the aims and organisation of the EUTF, as well as the different aspirations for the trust fund held by different actors and the extent to which it is likely to deliver on these. It also discusses tensions around the financing of the fund and around its governance arrangements – including concerns about the lack of strategic direction and untransparent operational procedures – and the extent to which African partners have been involved in shaping and managing the trust fund.

2.1 Purpose of the fund

The goal of the trust fund is to "support all aspects of stability and contribute to address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration, in particular by promoting resilience, economic and equal opportunities, security and development and better migration management" (European Commission, 2015a). Its basic premise is that migration flows within these regions are driven by poverty, insecurity and conflict; environmental and demographic pressures; and humanitarian crises – and that addressing these will reduce irregular migration (European Commission, 2015a). The EUTF has four strategic objectives: greater economic and employment opportunities, strengthening resilience, improved migration management, and improved governance and conflict prevention.[2] It aims to achieve these by strengthening the rule of law, creating economic and education opportunities, and building better governance, as well as through supporting the effective, sustainable return, readmission and reintegration of irregular migrants.

Although the EUTF's stated goal may be to "address the root causes of destabilisation, forced displacement and irregular migration", in reality there appear to be large differences of opinion among key actors within the European institutions and member states over what they want or expect the fund to achieve. Clearly EUR 1.9 billion (or even the EUR 2.4 billion, if the EUR 500 million for the migration compact is included) is a small amount of money compared to the scale of migration; the enormity of the development, security and demographic challenges in these regions; and the large amounts of development assistance that these regions have received over the years. Indeed, all EU and member state officials interviewed recognised that the prospects of this money making a significant difference to the root causes of migration or to migration flows are

2 The Horn of Africa and Sahel windows, managed by DG DEVCO, both work on all four objectives. However, the North Africa window, managed by the Directorate General of European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, only works on the third objective, given that is primarily a transit region. The Sahel and Horn of Africa windows are guided by regional strategies and operational frameworks and have also developed national strategies. The North Africa window has a regional strategy, which is used as an operational framework and will be translated into national strategies.

pretty dim. Likewise, most of them recognised the inherent contradiction of a five-year "emergency" fund that is intended to address complex and long-term root causes. As Herrero Cangas and Knoll (2016) point out, "tackling 'the root causes of irregular migration' is a lengthy, non-linear, unpredictable process, depending on many more contextual factors than support from financial and technical development partners".

Beyond the scale and complexity of the challenge, the basic theory of change that underlies the fund is also questionable. Although conflict and instability may fuel migration, there is little evidence that a lack of development does so – a core assumption on which the EUTF appears to be based. However, as Keijzer, Heraud, and Frankenhaeuser (2015) point out, despite this lack of evidence,

> the "root causes approach" still prevails in the government circles of many countries. For destination countries, in particular, the erroneous belief that migration can be stemmed through development often remains a key motivation for engaging in the [migration and development] area.

These authors stress that "in this context, concerns over the possible instrumentalization of the [migration and development] nexus for migration control are certainly not unfounded" (Keijzer et al., 2015). Not only is there little evidence for the "root causes" approach, recent research has demonstrated that, in fact, "emigration is likely to increase as a country's economy grows, as more people have the financial resources and the information they need to make the journey" (Cummings, Pacitto, Lauro, & Foresti, 2015, p. 3). As François Crépeau, the United Nation's Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants, recently commented, "more development means more migration. Because all those people that have for a long time been wanting to leave, but could not afford to do so, can now leave their country" (quoted in Barbière, 2016). In addition, there is no clear evidence that the type of development investments that the trust fund is making will actually prevent irregular migration. Indeed, many of the trust fund's projects are similar to the kinds of investments that have long been made under traditional development instruments – with far more financing and on a greater scale – and yet have not appeared to reduce migration. This lack of evidence underlying the basic premise of the EUTF was recognised by most of the EU and member state officials interviewed for this research, and it raises questions about what this fund is actually expected to achieve.

Alternative aspirations for the fund

Although there is little expectation that the fund can make a substantial impact across the very broad goals it has set itself, various actors do have other aspirations for the fund. Several member states see the fund as being primarily intended to leverage greater cooperation from African partners on migration, notably on border management, return and readmissions, which are a major preoccupation for some member states. Member states are reportedly placing significant pressure on the European Commission (EC) to ensure that the fund results in rapid progress in these areas. Indeed, EC officials report that there is a "more for more" logic within the fund, with countries that are more cooperative on border control, returns and readmission being likely to get more money. As the migration compact funds (EUR 500 million) begin to flow through the EUTF, this logic will be strengthened, as "more for more" conditionalities are explicit within these compacts.

However, EU officials appear sceptical about the ability of this fund to purchase such cooperation from African states. As one official put it, "you cannot buy political influence in a country like Ethiopia with such small money and the highest level of European leaders must know this". Moreover, some African partner countries have a broader range of "asks" for the EU – for example, in the case of Sudan, lifting sanctions or supporting debt relief – and are unlikely to be persuaded to cooperate on migration simply through additional aid and without some movement on these demands. Indeed, given the complexity of internal and external political, economic and security factors that shape African governments' decisions on how to respond to migration, it seems simplistic to assume that the EUTF will incentivise alternative responses. As Herrero Cangas and Knoll (2016) point out, although the

> narrative around the Africa Trust Fund suggests that aid can buy partner countries' cooperation . . . all available political economy studies highlight the need to understand the dominant political and institutional forces and factors that constitute the incentive environment for governments to take up reforms, and that indicate that the potential for outside actors to shape and influence this environment is usually limited.

An alternative aspiration that was expressed by almost all of the interviewed officials of the EU as well as some member states was that the fund should primarily be an opportunity to experiment with different ways of working outside of the limitations of standard development programming. They stressed that although the fund cannot make a substantial impact on the root causes of migration, it could kick-start new approaches and activities in this area, which could then be taken forward with normal development programming. This view appears to be echoed in a recent interview with Development Commissioner Neven Mimica, who admits that the EUTF may not be a "game changer", but suggests that it is a chance to "change the mindset and approach to our projects in two aspects – making them as focussed to the root causes of migration as possible, and also making them as fast, as operational, as possible" (quoted in Tempest, 2016). Given its relative flexibility, the EUTF does seem to offer some significant opportunities for experimentation. If thoughtful experimentation is encouraged by EU delegations and implementing partners, and – critically – if this learning is captured and absorbed by the EC, it could potentially provide interesting lessons for EU development assistance.

Finally, some external observers who were interviewed – including within international organisations and civil society – suggested that a central aim of the EUTF is simply to demonstrate to the European public that leaders are taking action on migration. These observers point out that European leaders are under extreme public pressure over this issue – in particular given the complete failure of plans to share refugee populations across European countries – and hence needed a new initiative to demonstrate action. In making this argument, they point to the relatively small number of migrants coming from the regions covered by the EUTF who can actually be returned, as compared to the high level of political rhetoric around returns, which they believe is primarily for public consumption.

Divisions across line ministries?

Divisions over what is expected from the fund are not only found between member states but are also reflected within member states' governments and EU institutions. A number of interviewees reported that, within some member states, positions on African migration and the EUTF are driven by the prime minister's office, the foreign ministry and the

ministry of interior, which want the fund to have a strong focus on security and conditionality. The same can be said of the EC when looking at the strong involvement of President Jean-Claude Juncker and his cabinet in the conception of the EUTF. Meanwhile, development ministries, which may be more concerned about the diversion of aid for EU security interests, are often sidelined. As Collett (2016) points out, "the language of development actors on migration differs starkly from the language of the Emergency Trust Fund and the priorities set out during the November 2015 Valletta conference". Not only do these different actors have different priorities, they also have different understandings of migration and how it relates to development, and hence different expectations of what the EUTF can achieve. As one EU official pointed out, development ministries tend to know that supporting change in these African countries is complicated and takes a long time, whereas some actors from foreign and interior ministries appear to believe that, through the EUTF, it will be possible to quickly transform the root causes of irregular migration.

Indeed, this division also apparently exists within European institutions, with the Directorate General for Migration and Home Affairs (DG HOME) being very influential and pushing hard on migration, return and readmission. On the other hand, the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO) is more concerned with ensuring balance among the goals of the EUTF and that projects fall within the official development assistance (ODA) reporting criteria of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). As Faure, Gavas, and Knoll (2015) point out,

> DG HOME transposes its concern for EU internal security to the external dimension of migration and asylum policy. As such DG HOME's outlook on migration tends to be short-term and focused on security threats inside the EU. This means that its actions aim, primarily, to restrict human mobility and stem irregular immigration.

Different parts of the EU machinery also have different expectations about what can be achieved. For example, one EC official interviewed gave the example of the introduction of biometric registration systems, pointing out that there are unrealistic expectations in some parts of the EC that such systems can be rapidly introduced and result in quick benefits for migration management in fragile African contexts.

2.2 Funding

As of September 2016, the overall contributions to the trust fund stood at EUR 1.982 billion. This includes EUR 1.8 billion from the EU budget and European Development Fund (EDF), EUR 100 million from the Sudan Special Measure (which also comes from EDF reserves),[3] and approximately EUR 81 million from the EU member states and Norway and Switzerland as non-EU members. The EU's contribution to the trust fund pools together funding from the 11th EDF reserve with resources from the Regional Indicative Programmes (RIPs) for West, Central and East Africa, and National Indicative Programmes (NIPs) for the Horn of Africa. Further funding is drawn from other financial

3 Sudan has not ratified the 2005 and 2010 revisions to the ACP-EU Partnership Agreement, and therefore does not have access to programmable resources under the EDF. Since 2010 the EU has provided de-committed EDF funds to address basic needs in Sudan. In 2016 a further EUR 100 million was allocated to Sudan in this way, with the EUTF serving as the implementing mechanism for this.

instruments, such as the Development Cooperation Instrument (DCI) and the European Neighbourhood Instrument (ENI), as well as from the Directorate General for Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) and the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP). Of these funds, EUR 965.4 million has been allocated to the Sahel/Lake Chad regional window, EUR 702.3 million to the Horn of Africa regional window and EUR 256 million to the North Africa window, with EUR 58.3 million remaining unallocated.[4] In September 2016, there were 59 programmes worth around EUR 930 million that had been approved across the three regions.[5]

There are a number of controversies around the financing of the EUTF. The most obvious are the concerns – which have been raised by the European Parliament (EP) and civil society actors, among others – that the EUTF could result in development funds being diverted for European security goals. There are safeguards against this whereby the EUTF follows a "notional approach", in which funding is provided in line with specific legal requirements of the original sources of financing. For example, EUTF funds that have been drawn from the EDF, ENI and DCI must meet the requirements for ODA eligibility. Likewise, in cases where a beneficiary country or regional organisation has agreed to the transfer of funds covered by existing programming documents (NIPs or RIPs) into the trust fund, the scope and objectives of the original programming provisions should be respected. Similarly, funds drawn from the IcSP should preserve the specific requirements of the IcSP regulation, including the flexibility and rapidity of actions under Article 3. Despite these safeguards, however, deep concerns remain about this, and a number of EU and member state officials interviewed for this research admitted that some EUTF projects are "stretching" the definition of ODA.

The contributions of member states to the EUTF are another controversial issue. The EC had originally announced that member states will match the EU's own contributions to the fund, but in fact member state contributions have not come close. Although 25 member states have contributed – plus Norway and Switzerland – most of them have given relatively small amounts, with many giving the minimum EUR 3 million required to have voting rights, and some less. Member states were annoyed by the EC's demand for matching contributions, as they are already contributing through the EDF. As one member state official interviewed remarked: "'Matching' is a red flag to member states. We are already giving the rest of the money!" Member states' reluctance to contribute larger amounts also seems to be due to widespread scepticism about the establishment and utility of the EUTF and the desire to see some results before providing more funding. In addition, as Collett points out, the migrant crisis is already placing significant strain on many EU member states' budgets in terms of "humanitarian aid, development support, newly established migration management programmes, and increased spending needs within domestic asylum systems" (Collett, 2016, p. 41), making it more difficult for them to find further funds for the EUTF. However, EU institutions are frustrated at the low contribution levels of member states. In a recent report, the European Parliament's Committee on Development "urges the Member States to honour their pledges and to

4 The North Africa window is much smaller, both because it is focused on just one objective and because its funds come from the ENI, where, unlike the EDF, there was no reserve to mobilise. However, an EC official reports that these funds are adequate, given the challenges in establishing relationships and initiating work in this region.

5 These figure are all drawn from the European Commission (2016a).

rapidly and effectively match the Union contribution, in order to allow the EUTF to develop its full potential rather than provide the minimum required to obtain voting rights on the Strategic Board" (European Parliament, 2016, p. 6).

There are also serious questions over the match between the level of funds and the level of ambition within the EUTF, as mentioned above. African leaders have complained that EUR 1.982 billion – shared between 23 countries – is very little, especially in light of the EUR 3 billion Refugee Facility for Turkey. Certainly, it is a tiny fraction of the more than EUR 20 billion that the EU and member states provide in aid annually to African countries, and the EUR 31 billion that the EC will allocate in ODA to Africa between 2014 and 2020,[6] much of which addresses similar issues as the EUTF (e.g. sustainable agriculture, employment opportunities, governance reforms, resilience, etc.). Collett (2016) argues that, in order to have impact, a response on a much bigger scale is required, one that is based on a robust assessment of needs and not just availability of funds, and with a much stronger focus on protection. Whether the amount is sufficient to achieve the aspirations for the EUTF depends, of course, on what these aspirations are. Although the amount is small if the intention is to make a real difference regarding the root causes of migration – or indeed to generate incentives for African partners' cooperation in curbing migratory flows – the funds could support innovative work and learning in migration-related areas such as trafficking, which have had limited focus under traditional development instruments.

Finally, there has been some disagreement over further funding for the EUTF. In June 2016, the EC announced the new migration partnership framework, which will take the form of tailored "compacts" with third countries that are origin, transit or host countries (European Commission, 2016c). The first compacts will include five African countries – Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Mali and Ethiopia – and funding for these compacts will be channelled through the EUTF. The EC has proposed that an extra EUR 500 million be allocated to the EUTF for this purpose from the EDF reserve, as well as suggested that the member states match this with another EUR 500 million. The EC has been pushing hard for the EDF committee to agree on the allocation of the extra EUR 500 million, pointing out that "the EDF decision for an additional EUR 500 million will not significantly affect, in the short to medium term, the payment projects and hence the timing of the credit payments by Member States" (European Commission, 2016a).

However, member states have been split in their responses to the EC's proposals to add this extra EUR 500 million to the EUTF. One group of member states – which has been consistently more sceptical about the trust fund – has argued that this is not appropriate when original funds have still not been fully spent and there is, as yet, no information available about the results. These member states wanted the allocation of the EUR 500 million to be deferred until there has been some analysis of the results of the EUTF so far and further discussions on its strategic direction. However, other member states – including those for whom addressing migration is a national priority and who have been more consistently supportive of the EUTF – were keen to push ahead with allocating the EUR 500 million from EDF reserves immediately. Although the allocation of the EUR 500 million was ultimately agreed, this process has highlighted the serious divisions over the EUTF among member states. Beyond the issue of increasing the fund, member states

6 Figures are from the European Commission (2015c).

also disagree over the pace at which the remaining money already in the EUTF should be committed, with some arguing that further allocations should be limited until some results and lessons are available.

2.3 Governance

The trust fund's global strategy is set by its Strategic Board, which is chaired by the DEVCO and composed of representatives of contributing EU member states and other contributing donors. Its Operational Committee, made up of representatives of the EC and contributing member states, has responsibility for selecting the projects to be funded. Non-contributing member states (or those with a contribution below EUR 3 million), partner countries and relevant African regional organisations can participate as observers within both the Strategic Board and the Operational Committee.

Figure 1: Governance structures of the EUTF



Source: European Commission (2015b)

There appear to be serious concerns among some member states about how well this governance structure is working. A number of member states believe that the EUTF lacks strategic direction. They argue that although the strategy papers under each regional window provide guidance on priorities for projects, there needs to be more attention given to higher-level strategic questions, such as how the trust fund relates to other instruments and programmes, how it influences relationships with African partners and what contribution it is actually making to addressing irregular migration. These member states have been vocal in their criticism that the Strategic Board is not engaging sufficiently with the fund and is not providing adequate vision or oversight, pointing out that, so far, the Strategic Board has only met once – at the launch of the EUTF in Valletta. This does seem to be very limited engagement, especially compared with the Strategic Board of the Madad Trust Fund, which has met repeatedly since the fund's establishment two years ago.

Member states are particularly frustrated that the EC's announcement that funding for the migration compacts would be channelled through the EUTF was made without any prior discussions with the trust fund's Strategic Board. They are also frustrated that the next round of Operational Committee meetings, at which new projects will be approved, will take place in November, before the second meeting of the Strategic Board, in a sequencing that clearly does not allow for strategic direction by Board members over operational decision making.

This limited engagement by the Strategic Board appears to be particularly problematic given that the EUTF is a controversial instrument working on a highly politically-sensitive issue, and an emergency mechanism that allocates a large amount of money very rapidly. Interestingly, one EC official suggested that although more strategic discussions could be valuable, in practice these are unlikely to take place within the Board, as there are too many actors at the table to make real discussions manageable.

There are also concerns about the decision-making processes within the Operational Committee. Some member states are concerned that the project identification and selection process is overly complicated, involving multiple actors at different levels in EU and member states, resulting in a heavy and unclear coordination process and a long time to agree on each project. They suggest that this process should be improved, clarified and streamlined, given that this is a rapid emergency fund. In particular, they want greater transparency and accountability in the process by which the EC identifies projects to be presented to the Operational Committee, as is discussed in detail below. However, not all member states share these concerns, with those that are more supportive of the trust fund arguing that it is well managed and transparent at all levels.

Finally, there are a range of concerns over which actors are included in decision making over the trust fund. There has been a lot of discussion over the extent to which African partners are included, issues about which are discussed in detail below. There are also concerns about the inclusion of member states and the EP. Following discussions between the EC and member states over the contribution amount that would ensure member states' voting rights in the Board, this threshold was finally set at EUR 3 million. However, the result is that EU member states that sit in the EDF committee, but that do not contribute EUR 3 million to the EUTF, in effect lose influence over the spending of the involved EDF funds. Frustrated by this, there is now a move by some member states to change the budgetary regulations so that voting rights within trust funds reflect the voting rights within the original instruments from which the funds have been drawn.

As trust funds are outside the EU budget, the EP does not have oversight of these. However, the EP has repeatedly raised concerns that it should be included in the Strategic Board. The EP argues that this is justified because a significant amount of funds for the EUTF come from the budget, whereas other funds come from the EDF, over which the EP has been granted oversight in recent years at the EC's discretion. Moreover, in its September 2016 report, the EP stressed that given the "extraordinary flexibility and rapidity proper to a Trust Fund, periodical reporting to Parliament should be undertaken at least once every six months" (European Parliament, 2016, p. 11).

2.4 Ownership and partnership

There were significant differences during the Valletta negotiations between European and African positions. For example, whereas African leaders were pushing strongly on legal and labour migration, the EU's priorities were to address irregular migration and strengthen returns and readmission. There were also different positions over the establishment of the EUTF, with several African partners being reluctant to agree to the trust fund. Some countries included within the trust fund, such as Egypt, expressed concerns about the focus of the trust fund and the level of financial resources available under it; whereas countries excluded from it, for example some in West Africa, were concerned about RIP programme funds being diverted to a smaller subset of countries within their region. Overall there has been criticism that African partners did not have sufficient voice or input in the establishment or design of the fund. For example, Faure et al. (2015) claim that "DG DEVCO . . . communicated its decision to shift funds from the EDF into the Trust Fund with little consultation with some Regional Economic Communities (RECs) through which the EDF money would have otherwise been channelled" (p. 19).

The strategic-orientation document of the EUTF states that one of the core principles of intervention is local ownership (European Commission, 2015a). Representatives of African partner countries and regional organisations sit on the EUTF's Strategic Board and its Operational Committee as observers. According to the European Commission (2015b),

> national and local authorities will be consulted, in advance, with priorities and projects submitted to the Strategic Board and the Operational Committee, in order to ensure local ownership. All partners will also be duly associated with the process of identification, formulation and implementation, and may express their views in the Board and the Operational Committee.

Although this suggests a commitment for strong African involvement in the management and ownership of the fund, in reality the extent to which the fund allows African ownership is one of its most controversial elements.

There is no question that the EUTF's governance arrangement has fewer provisions for African ownership than the development instruments from which the funds are drawn. Particularly problematic is the fact that, although the vast majority of the African EUTF's funds come from the EDF, the trust fund does not have the co-management rule that underpins the Cotonou Agreement and the EDF. As Herrero Cangas and Knoll (2016) point out, this means that "the governance arrangement of the Africa Trust Fund allows for less formal oversight and a loss of formal control by partners, potentially with a loss of ownership on how these funds are spent". A range of actors, including African governments, civil society actors and the EP, have expressed concerns about this and have argued that the EUTF should reflect the co-management requirement of the EDF. Member states recognise that there are tensions and trade-offs between the desire for a rapid response and the need to ensure African ownership, but disagree over whether the trust fund has found the right balance.

Perhaps surprisingly, most of the EU officials interviewed for this research argued that although the EUTF contains less-formal requirements for African ownership, in practice

African participation in decision making within the trust fund is as strong – or even stronger – within traditional development instruments. They pointed out that within the EDF procedures, although Country Strategy Papers are signed with national governments, when a beneficiary requests the EC to finance a particular action, this decision is taken by a committee of member states from which African partners are absent. They contrasted this with the decision making in the EUTF's Operational Committee, where African partners are present and can express their opinions. They also stressed that the simpler procedures of the EUTF make it easier for partners to understand and engage with than the EDF. As one EU official put it: "[W]ith EDF there is joint programming but no joint decision making, with the fund you have joint decision making, but no joint programming."

However, looking in more detail at the various stages of decision making within the EUTF, it appears that African partners have much less influence in some moments than in others. In terms of the identification of potential projects at the country level, certainly formal structures for partnership are far weaker in the EUTF than in traditional development cooperation. For example, under the EDF, all activities are jointly identified and agreed on with the national authorising officer, whereas under the trust fund, there is no such obligation and, instead, more ad hoc consultations take place with sector ministries or other local actors about potential projects. It appears that the extent of this consultation varies between countries and projects and is in large part dependent on the commitment of key figures within both the EU delegations and the implementing agency. Although it must be noted that trust fund managers do travel frequently to the regions and meet with local actors. There appears to be a widespread feeling among member states that African partners need to be included earlier and in a more systematic way in discussing local needs and priorities and in identifying potential projects.

Based on the possible projects identified at the country level, the EU delegation and trust fund managers propose a list of projects to the Operational Committee for approval. At this stage, there is a clearer structure for African inputs, as African ambassadors and representatives of RECs sit as observers on the Operational Committee and are reportedly proactive in giving their opinions on projects proposed for their country. Although African representatives in the Operational Committee do not have a vote, this apparently does not make a significant difference, as projects are rarely put to a vote, as is discussed below.

The level of shared vision, partnership and cooperation at the Operational Committee stage seems to vary widely between regional windows. Although it was reported that in the Sahel regional window there is a high level of African involvement and collaboration, in the North Africa regional window, partner governments are far more cautious in their engagement with the trust fund, and also less willing to automatically accept the projects proposed by the EC. This is largely due to the high sensitivities both around migration issues and when the EU is seen as imposing its agenda in the region. Given these sensitivities, there is an emphasis on EU delegations closely coordinating with these partner countries.

Box 1: The sensitivity of ownership – examples from North Africa
One example of the challenges around partnership and ownership under the fund can be seen in the first North African Operational Committee, in which Egypt blocked the full adoption of a proposed project to enhance the national response to migration challenges. Egypt complained that it had not been formally consulted, although there had been informal discussions with the Egyptian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The project was adopted in principle and the EC is now engaging in a formal consultation process with the Egyptian ministry. EC officials stress that these problems are not related to the content of the programmes, but primarily to the need for Egypt to demonstrate that they are in the lead and will not have an EU agenda imposed on them.

Finally, in terms of project implementation, African involvement appears very limited. Out of the 89 projects mentioned in the contract status overview for the Sahel and Lake Chad window (European Commission, 2016d), the contract status overview for the Horn of Africa window (European Commission, 2016e) and the three action fiches for the North Africa window, there appears to be just one that is being implemented by an African NGO and two by African regional organisations, whereas no projects are being implemented by African governments. Instead, the vast majority of projects that have been selected are being implemented by European member states, civil society or private organisations. Although African governments have reportedly presented some projects for the EC's consideration, these were not selected. EC officials admitted that some African governments are frustrated that implementation is largely being carried out by Europeans and that the trust fund money is not going through national institutions. However, these officials stressed that European implementing agencies are frequently implementing with local government or civil society partners on the ground, through mechanisms such as financing agreements or grants, and that projects generally have a Steering Committees that includes appropriate local representatives. Despite this, the undeniably strong emphasis on European decision making and implementation seems far removed from aid-effectiveness principles of ownership, partnership and alignment.

3 Implementation of trust fund projects: the first year

This chapter examines the trust fund projects that have been selected and implemented to date, including their focus and the current balance across the strategic objectives of the fund. It discusses concerns about the processes for identifying and selecting projects and implementers. This chapter also outlines the need for robust monitoring and evaluation of projects and of the overall fund, as well as mechanisms for integrating evidence and learning into decision making.

3.1 Project focus

EUTF projects must be focused around the four objectives of the trust fund. This includes: creating economic and employment opportunities; strengthening community resilience; improving migration management; supporting overall governance and preventing conflict. Hence, the potential project focus is very broad.

In terms of the balance between the objectives of the fund – as seen in Table 1 below – so far the largest share of funds has gone to the more traditional development areas of economic and employment opportunities and strengthening resilience. This balance suggests that the massive diversion of development funds for migration management purposes that some observers warned of has not happened. This emphasis on employment and resilience, as well as on governance to a lesser extent, appears to be in large part because of a need to move fast to identify the first pipeline of projects, and the fact that it was easier and quicker to develop actions in areas where implementers had been working for a long time than to identify potential projects in the newer area of migration management. However, the next phase of projects currently in the pipeline are apparently more focused on migration management, which could lead to a greater risk of development funds being used for purposes that do not easily fit within ODA definitions.

Table 1: Adopted programmes by strategic objective of the EU Trust Fund for Africa (in EUR)

EUTF strategic objectives	Sahel & Lake Chad	Horn of Africa	North of Africa	Total
Greater economic and employment opportunities	179,176,233	121,497,000	-	300,673,233
Strengthening resilience of communities	122,223,000	148,959,000	-	271,182,000
Improved migration management	18,000,000	60,500,000	27,500,000	106,000,000
Improved governance and conflict prevention	205,100,633	34,944,000	-	240,044,633
Other	5,000,000 (Technical Cooperation Facility)	4,100,000 (Research Facility)	-	9,100,000
Total	529,499,866	370,000,000	27,500,000	926,999,866

Source: European Commission (2016a)

The extent to which the individual projects that do focus on migration management fit comfortably within ODA and are in line with both the EC's development principles and objectives – and the financial instruments from which the funds were drawn – is highly debated. More detailed analysis – both of the aims and the actual implementation and impact of each project – would be required to answer this question. Certainly, there has been fierce criticism of some projects (e.g. a project implemented by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) in Sudan, discussed in more detail below). Although there is no question that some migration management activities could fit within current definitions of ODA, there does appear to be an emphasis on identifying migration management activities that the EU would like to carry out and then retroactively seeking a development rationale for these. Finally, beyond debates over whether projects are really development-focused, as mentioned above, there are concerns that insufficient consultation with local actors means that projects are less likely to focus on local priorities, rather than the agenda of implementing agencies.

3.2 Project and implementer selection

It appears that there is serious concern among several member states about the process by which projects and implementers are identified at the country level and then selected by the operational board – in particular, that this process is untransparent and lacks effective oversight, and that member states are competing for projects in a way that undermines the development of the strongest possible portfolio of projects.

The way in which projects are identified is similar between the different windows. There appears to be an emphasis on EU delegations identifying projects and partners in line with the country-level operational framework and priorities. In the North Africa window, proposals made by the partner countries themselves have also been taken into account. In all cases, the EU delegations are responsible for overseeing the design of national programmes, and EC officials in Brussels for regional and transnational programmes.

Some member states are very concerned that the ad hoc nature of these processes means that projects are not always identified based on local needs, but instead on which implementers have the most access to the EU delegations and/or officials in Brussels and can push most forcefully to get their voices and priorities heard. Unsurprisingly, it seems that member states have so far had the loudest voices and greatest access. It is widely reported that some member states see the EUTF as an alternative source of funding for their implementing agencies and existing programmes, and that they have used the EUTF as a source of funding for projects that were already planned but which had not yet been funded, or to fund ongoing programming. Indeed, one member state official interviewed commented that, "if you are already there and know the country you are in a better position to top up your activities from the fund". Meanwhile, some member states that do not have implementing agencies have expressed frustration that they are receiving fewer funds than those that do.[7] EC officials confirm that some member states are pushing hard for "a return on their investment" from the fund, but they stress that they are resisting this pressure and encouraging member states to develop projects together rather than compete for funds.

This situation raises concerns that the choice of project and implementer is not always based on the best fit for either the trust fund's goals or the local context and needs. Some member states and the EP are calling for a more systematic and transparent way of identifying projects at the national level, using the strategic frameworks to meaningfully inform project selection, having clear and formalised consultation procedures with local stakeholders, and working through a broader range of implementers – including local governments and local civil society, who are the most aware of local dynamics and needs. EC officials admit that the process for choosing projects and implementers needs some adjustment, and they are planning to revise it, but they stress that some "business as usual" projects were selected because of the need to rapidly establish projects. Although it is clear that the trust fund is under pressure to act fast and deliver quickly results – and that there are inevitable trade-offs between speed and inclusiveness in the project and partner-identification processes – it is also clear that if the wrong projects and partners are identified, those results are less likely to be achieved.

7 Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Luxembourg and Spain receive the largest amounts from the EUTF, with Germany (GIZ) receiving significantly more than any of the others.

Member states have also expressed a number of concerns about the process of project selection by the Operational Committee. Firstly, the Operational Committee only sees projects that the EU has chosen to put forward and, inevitably, is not aware of the ideas or projects that may have been rejected, meaning that committee representatives have a limited picture. Some member states have also expressed serious concerns that there is little critical discussion within or actual decision making by the Operational Committee, but instead that almost all projects proposed are just "nodded through". Votes are generally not taken about projects, and when concerns are raised, it was reported that EC officials just note these concerns and then move the committee on to agreeing the project. Critically, member states are reluctant to speak up to block the projects of other member states, as they are concerned that their own projects could be blocked in return. Therefore, it seems that the process through which projects are both identified and selected is not necessarily the optimal process to get strong, contextually relevant projects.

3.3 Learning, monitoring and evaluation

The EUTF strategic-orientation document (European Commission, 2015a) states that a core principle of intervention is strong research and analysis. Certainly, given that the trust fund is focused on a broad range of objectives across a large number of countries, it will need to undertake evidence- and knowledge-generation, monitoring and evaluation, and lesson-learning at a variety of levels in order to inform its activities and measure its impact.

Firstly, the strategic direction of the fund, the regional strategies and frameworks, and the country priorities must be based on – and respond to – evidence about the political economy context and the migration–development–security dynamics in the regions and countries where the EUTF is working. It seems that there is a real appetite to do this, with money set aside for a Technical Cooperation Facility that is directly linked to the project cycle and accessible to all regional windows. Moreover, there have been two region-specific Research Facilities established: one for the Horn of Africa and one for the Sahel and North Africa. This investment in research to inform programming within the trust fund is very welcome and – if well used – has the potential to significantly strengthen the activities of the regional windows. However, some of these research arrangements have been slow to get moving, with initial evidence only now emerging from the Horn of Africa Research Facility that the Sahel and North Africa Research Facility has only just been established. This slow progress is problematic, given that half the funds of the EUTF have already been allocated, although EC officials stress that the trust fund's work to date has in any case been informed by existing research and evidence. A critical question is the extent to which the EC will integrate learning from these research mechanisms into the EUTF's strategic direction, operational decisions and projects. The EU, like many other donors, does not have a strong track record of learning from evidence and recommendations. Moreover, it is also important that implementing member states learn from this research, and systems must be put in place for the EU and implementers to share, discuss and – critically – act on research findings. As Hauck, Knoll, and Herrero Cangas (2015) point out,

> the impact of the activities financed through the Trust Funds will largely depend on whether their identification and implementation is informed by robust country and sector diagnosis. . . . Questions should be raised as to what extent the EU will be able to factor in a well-informed programming approach to Trust Funds, given its already

> highly restrained resources and poor track record with regard to the use of political economy and other analysis in programming processes. (p. 12)

Beyond the generation of new evidence, it is important that the EUTF activities are also guided by existing lessons and experiences from development cooperation. EC officials stress that this is the case and that they are building projects based on knowledge about approaches that work. Activities must also be based on solid context-specific local knowledge and relevant thematic knowledge, although given the very dominant role of the EC and member states in identifying, designing and implementing projects, it is questionable to what extent this is happening. It is important that both local experts and specialised institutions, such as the International Organisation for Migration, should be engaged in helping integrate lessons learnt into the trust fund's programming. In this regard, it is welcome that there are plans to contract the International Centre for Migration Policy and Development to support the trust fund's work on results and indicators. Finally, pressure to act fast should not be allowed to undermine the integration of existing knowledge into trust fund projects. As Hauck et al. (2015) argue:

> Political pressures to react and show quick results within a short space of time entails the risk that valuable lessons of international cooperation are forgotten. . . . guidance is needed to ensure decisions are based on solid analysis, and are aligned with existing regional and country strategies. This safeguards ownership, ensures complementarity and balances long-term and short-term objectives. (p. 1)

It is important that EUTF projects involve ongoing and effective monitoring, evaluation and learning. There is currently a joint results framework for all the trust fund windows, while monitoring and evaluation will also take place at the regional window level, and within individual projects, including using the EC's "results-oriented monitoring". The big challenge will be to undertake this monitoring and evaluation at a pace that keeps speed with the trust fund's emphasis on rapid disbursement and action, and that allows findings to inform implementation and adaptation as projects progress. It is also important that the learning from individual project experiences is shared across the other trust fund projects and implementers. If done well, this could help to build up a useful body of knowledge about "what works" in this field from the EUTF's overall experience.

This will require robust monitoring of projects with substantive benchmarks for progress against the broad range of goals that the projects seek to address, rather than simply monitoring inputs/outputs, as the EU has sometimes done in the past. For example, Collett (2016) points out that in countries such as Serbia, EU assistance to asylum and protection systems has been assessed in terms of quantitative outputs (e.g. officials trained, etc.), rather than whether outcomes have actually improved for those seeking asylum. It will also require strong learning and feedback mechanisms in order for lessons to be taken on board, both at the project level and within the broader EUTF management mechanisms.

Critically, monitoring at the project level and the aggregation of individual project results will not be sufficient to assess the broader impact of the EUTF. There will also need to be a wider assessment of how the trust fund as a whole is contributing to its various goals, as well as how it complements or adds value to existing EU strategies and instruments, and how it affects the EU's relationship with its African partners. As Hauck et al. (2015) argue in relation to the three EU trust funds currently established, it is

> important to work with results frameworks for the respective EUTFs, which allow an assessment of their effectiveness in delivering high impact aid as a self-standing modality, rather than looking individually at the results achieved by the different projects and activities financed. (p. 13)

Assessing the overall impact of the trust fund will be a challenge because of its broad set of objectives as well as the absence of a robust theory of change regarding what drives irregular migration and how these drivers can be shifted through the engagement of external actors. The lack of reliable indicators for illegal immigration statistics in the EU will also make an evaluation of the trust fund's success in curbing irregular migration particularly difficult. Critically, given the different aspirations of different actors for the trust fund (and the widespread scepticism that a short-term emergency fund can meaningfully address root causes), it is likely that different actors will want to assess the fund against different criteria. For example, some EU officials interviewed for this research believe that success will ultimately be measured in terms of how well the EUTF has leveraged African cooperation on migration management, return and readmission, with one official saying that "if the flow of migrants stops, Valletta and the trust fund will be seen as a success, otherwise not". It appears that so far there has been no discussion of what constitutes success criteria for the overall fund.

4 How does the trust fund relate to broader EU policies and instruments?

This chapter discusses where the trust fund could add value to the existing array of EU development instruments – in speed, flexibility and the potential for innovation – and argues that making the most of this added value requires moving away from "business as usual" models. It also explores how the trust fund relates more broadly to existing EU commitments, strategies and instruments, particularly in the areas of migration, development and human rights.

4.1 Added value: speed, flexibility and innovation

There are two clear areas where the EUTF could offer something different to the existing collection of EU instruments – in its speed and flexibility, and in its potential for innovation.

According to the EUTF's strategic-orientation document, "the Trust Fund will enable the EU, its Member States and contributing donors to respond to the different dimensions of crisis situations by providing support jointly, flexibly and quickly" (European Commission, 2015a). There appears to be widespread agreement across EU institutions and member states that the trust fund has allowed a speedy response to an urgent crisis – made possible by a high degree of flexibility in procedures – in a way that would have been impossible under traditional development instruments. There also appears to be widespread agreement that the need for this trust fund shows that traditional development instruments, notably the EDF, are too slow and inflexible. As one EU official argued, "the way the EDF is working is hopeless and we need to do something different". It seems clear that the complex procedures required by the EDF make it very sluggish (sometimes taking up to two years to develop a project), and hence not fit to respond to rapidly changing contexts.

Although this speed and flexibility is welcome, it does pose some challenges and entail some trade-offs. As Faure et al. (2015) point out:

> The Trust Funds may have the potential to respond more swiftly and in a less fragmented manner than the multitude of financial instruments currently in place, yet the direct management and quick decision-making procedures that allow for this flexibility also pose some risks. (p. 19)

These risks include skewing incentives, short-cutting local consultation and responding more to EU political priorities than to the local context and needs. Critically, unlike standard development instruments, the EUTF does not involve finances being channelled through local systems, and hence avoids the long process of negotiating financing agreements. However, in bypassing such negotiations and moving directly to European-implemented projects, extra care is required so that local relationships, buy-in, knowledge and priorities are not lost. There are also trade-offs between moving quickly and basing actions on sufficient evidence. In this respect, there appears to be a divide between member states, with some keen to push ahead fast with projects that are based on existing work, and others wanting to look more carefully at what the added value can be of projects under the EUTF and how it can address areas that are usually difficult to work in.

In addition to its four main strategic objectives, the EUTF also has a cross-cutting output of improved policy and practice (European Commission, 2015a). There seems to be broad agreement among all actors that the trust fund can offer an important opportunity, both to experiment with different ways of working and to work on areas where it has previously been difficult to engage. EU officials were particularly enthusiastic about the trust fund's potential to do this. However, they recognised that realising this potential will require successfully resisting pressure from some member states to fund projects that are, in effect, "business as usual", such as standard projects to strengthen social or economic opportunities where there are limited links to migration issues.

Examples of how the trust fund could offer a chance to innovate or work in new areas include adopting not just a country or poverty lens, but a movement/migration lens, which raises different sets of challenges, different geographic and thematic priorities, and different focus populations. For example, through the trust fund, it is possible to focus geographically on areas where migrants are based. These are typically areas where national governments have little interest in donors working because they prefer aid to go to their own population and not third-country nationals in their country, for example the north-east coast of Kenya. Although this ability to sidestep government priorities can be problematic in terms of ownership, if used carefully and taking into account local political contexts, it can allow the trust fund's projects to bypass exclusionary policies and reach marginalised migrant and refugee populations. The trust fund also has the potential to do work on a range of cross-border issues that are hard to address under other funding instruments, including trafficking, assisting migrant populations in border area "no man's lands" and creating conditions for migrants stranded in countries such as Libya to return home. It is arguably in working in such specific and hard-to-reach areas that the trust fund could add the most value, not in seeking to buy compliance on return and readmission, or addressing development "root causes" with a relatively small amount of funds and tight timeframes.

A growing body of evidence suggests that flexible, adaptive and innovative development assistance is best placed to be effective in the complex, uncertain and shifting contexts of fragile states, such as many of those included in the EUTF.[8] Such innovation requires the exploration of new instruments and programming approaches (Whaites, 2016). It also requires being politically smart, focusing on specific and locally identified problems, and being adaptive and entrepreneurial, in particular allowing for cycles of doing, failing, learning, adapting and, ultimately, discovering more effective approaches and getting better results (Wild, 2015). It is possible that – outside of the restrictions of traditional development instruments – the EUTF could offer an opportunity for such innovation and experimentation, using its relatively small projects to try out new ways of working on some of the complex issues it seeks to address. Seizing this opportunity would require that flexibility within the EUTF is not just limited to project identification, funding and contracting procedures, but that there is also flexibility for ongoing learning and adaptation during the life of the projects. It also requires that implementers avoid traditional approaches to project implementation that focuses on delivering a set of outputs regarding feedback or evolving contexts. Crucially, it would require that local actors are much more deeply involved in identifying and implementing EUTF projects, given that "change is ultimately best led by those who are close to the problem and who have the greatest stake in its solutions" (Wild, 2015).

4.2 Relation to existing EU strategies, policies and instruments

A core principle of intervention for the African EUTF is "complementarity with and subsidiarity to EU instruments and tools and/or donor interventions". According to its strategic-orientation document,

> the Trust Fund will cover the gaps, both in geographic and in thematic terms, not covered by other means or by other development partners (including EU Member States). This will need to be indicated for each project approved, for example by targeting actions in areas that are not under the control of the national authorities and/or by implementing activities that might fall outside of the scope of the signed National and Regional Indicative Programs and/or by implementing a "linking relief rehabilitation and development" (LRRD) approach. (European Commission, 2015a)

It is clearly intended for the EUTF to work in complementarity with existing policies and instruments, neither duplicating or undermining them. However, the extent to which it is doing this is contested.

Role within EU migration strategies

The EU's framework for addressing migration is fast evolving and involves an increasingly securitised approach to migration, which sees migration primarily as a security threat to Europe. In May 2015, the EC proposed the European Agenda on Migration, a new strategy for addressing the immediate and the long-term challenges of managing migration, while in June 2016 it launched the New Migration Partnership Framework, which will strengthen an incentives-based approach for reinforcing cooperation with third countries on migration management – the funding for which will

8 For discussion of adaptive programming, see, for example, Valters, Cummings, and Nixon (2016).

come from development instruments and be channelled through the EUTF. Critically, a report by the European Court of Auditors found that the EU's spending on external migration policy in neighbourhood countries up until 2014 struggled to demonstrate its effectiveness and suffers from a lack of strategy, complex governance and poor monitoring and oversight (European Court of Auditors, 2016). Many of these are concerns that have been raised in the context of the EUTF, suggesting that it may not be very different to previous flawed approaches to migration.

The problems with the EU's approach to migration are not only related to its lack of effectiveness. As Willermain (2016) argues, this New Migration Partnership Framework (and the migration compacts that it will generate)

> politicizes aid as leverage for migration control, by making development aid conditional on third countries' performance on migration – narrowly understood in securitized terms as containment, border management and return and readmission. At the same time, it presents states plagued by corruption and with poor governance and human rights records with a powerful bargaining chip to leverage maximum political capital . . . [thereby risking] perpetuating a cycle of abuse and repression that causes people to flee, and fails to effectively tackle the economic logic of human traffickers, since state actors in several African states that the EU seeks to partner with have proven economic stakes in this very trade.

The EUTF appears to be a central mechanism through which the EU is implementing this new securitised approach to migration and, perhaps more worryingly, a glimpse of things to come.

The EUTF is intended to overcome the highly fragmented nature of EU migration funding, and as such plays a central role in moving towards a more coherent approach. According to Collett (2016),

> the range of relevant EU funding sources [for migration management] is dizzying, resulting in administrative inefficiency and a lack of coherence vis-à-vis priorities and goals. The fact that EU-level funding is also complemented by frequently disparate bilateral budgeting from various interested EU Member States can compound this incoherence further.

Faure et al. (2015) agree, pointing out that EU funding to address the external dimension of migration and asylum is spread across a range of diverse financial instruments, creating serious problems of fragmentation. Although the EUTF is intended to institute a more strategic response to migration and help overcome this fragmentation, Faure et al. argue that the speed with which it has been set up and its programmes have been identified has raised concerns about the lack of strategy and complementarity with existing processes and programmes.

Alignment with EU development commitments and instruments

There are serious and widespread concerns that the EUTF will divert development funds for European security interests, because although the vast majority of money for the fund has come from development instruments, the trust fund is not focused exclusively on

development objectives. These concerns have been repeatedly expressed by development actors (including from within some member states), by civil society and by the EP.

The ultimate purpose of EU development policy – as enshrined in Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2007) – must be the reduction and eradication of poverty. However, the European Parliament (2016) report on the EUTF in September 2016 states that there is a

> serious risk of misuse of EU development aid, in particular in conflict-affected countries where security, migration and development issues are closely interconnected [and] emphasises that the projects covered by the EUTF, which have been created using sources mainly devoted in principle to development purposes, must have development objectives. (p. 8)

It also stresses that projects aimed at reinforcing security capacity in particular countries must be designed in such a way that they support poverty reduction, as well as stability. The European Parliament (2016) report insists that

> development aid should not be used to stem the flows of migrants and asylum seekers, and the projects covered by the EUTF should not serve as a pretext for preventing departure or tightening borders between countries while ignoring the factors that drive people from their homes. (p. 11)

The rules are clear that funds from the EDF and other ODA sources, including ENI and DCI, must be devoted to the economic, human and social development of the host country, with a particular focus on the development challenges identified in the trust fund decision. Hence, the funding of the EUTF must be implemented and evaluated on the basis of ODA criteria, and all expenses falling outside this requirement have to be funded from different sources that are pooled in the trust fund. However, a number of member states and EU officials interviewed suggested that some projects undertaken with development money under the EUTF are definitely "stretching the definition of ODA". If true, this raises serious ethical problems, both around diverting aid from development priorities, and in terms of accountability to EU citizens and African partners on how aid money is spent.

A more transparent decision-making process about projects that demonstrates the reasons driving project decisions at every stage and their rationale in terms of development and/or security interests of the country could help address these concerns about the misuse of ODA. As Herrero Cangas and Knoll (2016) argue,

> the boundaries between stability and development are not always clear-cut. Funding border, security and irregular migration management activities can also have a positive impact on human development trends. Development effectiveness will depend on the rationale for choosing and designing interventions: is it the EU's fear of irregular migration or is it the EU's commitment to sustainable development?

Interestingly, some EU officials interviewed suggested that a greater risk than development aid being diverted for security purposes is that it may be diverted for humanitarian work. They expressed concern that under the EUTF, development funds are being used for quasi-humanitarian work, such as supporting South Sudanese refugees, and stressed that strong coordination with DG ECHO is required to avoid duplication.

Beyond the issue of the EUTF using ODA to fund migration management projects that do not have development goals, there are also broader concerns that the trust fund is diverting development funds towards countries affected by migration, and potentially away from the poorest countries or those with the greatest needs. Hauck et al. (2015) point out that

> the criteria for allocating EU aid have been specifically designed to concentrate more aid on Lower Income Countries and Least Developed Countries, but the Africa Trust Fund, because of its wide range of objectives with a strong focus on refugees and migration management, risks following different priorities that are informed by EU's internal political and securitisation agenda. (p. 11)

Likewise, in its September report, the EP warns that the use of the EDF to finance the EUTF may have an impact on the amount of aid available for African countries that are not covered by the trust fund, and in particular least-developed countries (European Parliament, 2016). The report strongly warns against the risk of shifting aid away from the poorest countries – which often have the least access to other sources of financing – to cover the cost of the migration crisis, pointing out that this would be in violation of Article 208 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. African countries not included in the fund have also raised concerns about this diversion of aid. Almost all EU and member state officials interviewed accepted that the fund is, in effect, skewing the focus of aid towards countries with relevance for the EU's migration agenda.

Finally, as discussed above, the EUTF is clearly breaking with core principles of ownership and partnership, as outlined in the Paris and Accra agendas. Despite all the emphasis within development debates and commitments over recent years on the need to align with government systems, provide budget support and take programmatic – not project – approaches, the EUTF is, in effect, shortcutting the co-management process and funding standalone projects that are being implemented by Europeans and in which local partners play a relatively minimal role.

Alignment with EU human rights commitments

A range of actors have expressed concern that the work of the EUTF has the potential to undermine human rights in African countries and is in contradiction with EU human rights commitments. For example, the EP report expressed concern about the impact that the EUTF may have on human rights if projects to contain migratory flows involve cooperating with countries that commit systematic violations of fundamental rights. It also stressed that EUTF projects using development aid must adhere to shared values and common interests, in particular as to the respect and promotion of human rights. Critically, a recent report by the European Court of Auditors on EU migration spending in the Southern and Eastern neighbourhood found that "respect for human rights, which should underpin all actions, remains theoretical and is only rarely translated into practice" (European Court of Auditors, 2016, p. 3).

Most controversially, some German media outlets have reported on an EUTF regional project on migration management that is being implemented by a GIZ-led consortium and includes Sudan. These reports referred to the provision of both non-lethal equipment and capacity-building for Sudanese border security forces, as well as the construction of detention centres for migrants (Dahlkamp & Popp, 2016). EU officials reported that the EUTF does not support the construction of detention centres in Sudan, but confirmed that

the EU will continue to engage with the Sudanese Ministry of Interior and – if necessary to achieve the objectives of this project – may provide civilian equipment to Sudanese authorities, including border agencies, on a case-by-case basis and in line with international sanctions.

The EC states that "the EU follows a peacebuilding and people-centred approach in Sudan, and has scaled up its efforts to contribute to a more inclusive socio-economic environment. The EU directly supports the people of Sudan, and vulnerable groups in particular" (European Commission, 2016b). However, given the well-documented abusive practices of the Sudanese security forces and the widespread human rights violations and impunity of the Sudanese state, it is not clear how the potential provision of equipment to the Sudanese authorities might be in line with such a "people-centred approach". It is also unclear what guarantees the EU can have that any efforts to equip and strengthen Sudanese border security forces will not potentially facilitate further human rights abuses (although EU officials stress that migration management-training in Sudan includes awareness-raising about migrants' rights). For example, Human Rights Watch reports that Sudanese police arbitrarily detain refugees from Eritrea and hand them over to traffickers, at whose hands they face extreme torture (Human Rights Watch, 2014); likewise, it is reported that the Sudanese authorities forcibly return hundreds of Eritreans seeking asylum to Eritrea without allowing them to seek protection or have access to the United National High Commissioner for Refugees (Human Rights Watch, 2016). Although this is just one project that has attracted attention, it raises questions about the extent to which the EU may be willing to overlook human rights commitments in order to achieve its migration management goals, as well as the ways in which ODA may be used to do this. It also raises questions of how EU support for capacity-building on migration management is likely to have impact in contexts in which there is no real political will – as in the case of Sudan – either to respect the rights of migrants or control migratory flows through its borders (as even EU officials recognise that Sudan could easily strengthen its border management if it chose to do so).

5 Implications for the future of EU development cooperation

One question that has emerged – given the creation of three trust funds in the space of a couple of years – is whether this will become a more common instrument for EU aid in the future. The creation of the EUTF (and the Madad Trust Fund) was possible because member states recognised the need for a flexible, swift, comprehensive and effective joint EU response to the migration and refugee crisis, and they were under pressure to act. However, overall, they appear to be sceptical about the use of trust funds and do not want to see their further proliferation. Indeed, since the EU revised its Financial Regulations in 2013 to allow for the creation of EU trust funds, only emergency trust funds have been created, with member states reportedly resisting the creation of thematic trust funds on issues such as food security. The EP's budgetary committee and development committee have also expressed concerns about the further use of trust funds, given that they are outside budgetary authority. Despite this general scepticism however, there are apparently well-advanced plans to launch an EU trust fund for Colombia, although the status of this presumably depends on the further progress of peace in Colombia. However, one member state official pointed out that trust funds can come in other guises, and that the recently

announced European External Investment Plan is effectively another big trust fund. Overall, however, the lack of enthusiasm among member states for more EUTFs suggests that the future use of these will continue to be pretty limited.

It is widely recognised that the EUTF was needed, in part, because of the cumbersome nature of traditional development instruments and their inability to respond to rapidly evolving situations and changing needs. As the EP report of 2016 describes "trust funds are part of an ad hoc response – thus laying bare the scarcity of recourses and limited flexibility characterising the EU's financial framework". A number of interviewees across EU institutions and member states stressed that experiences from the migration crisis in the last few years demonstrate that circumstances and priorities can change rapidly, and development instruments must be more flexible in responding to those changes. Overall, there seems to be general agreement across member states and EU institutions that there is a need to reform traditional development instruments in order to speed up their procedures, making them more flexible and responsive while still ensuring sufficient checks and balances; and that this is something that should be examined in the context of the next Multiannual Financial Framework, so that ad hoc solutions such as trust funds are not necessary. Indeed, in its press release on the New Migration Partnership Framework, the EC states that "[i]n addition [to extra measures such as compacts and EUTF] traditional financial programmes should be reoriented. In the longer term, the Commission is proposing to fundamentally reconsider the scale and nature of traditional development co-operation models" (European Commission, 2016). Likewise, in a recent interview, Development Commissioner Mimica argued that

> if we could bring (the EUTF's) . . . sense of urgency into the [EUR] 20 billion regular EU member states operations in Africa, then we could really have a better impact on the overall state of development affairs in the most fragile and vulnerable parts of the world. (Tempest, 2016)

It is clear that in the future, EU development assistance will be more closely linked to the EU's external and internal priorities and interests, as is indicated in 2016 EU Global Strategy on Foreign and Security Policy, which is intended to guide all EU external action and states: "Development policy … needs to become more flexible and aligned with our strategic priorities" (European Union, 2016). All member state officials interviewed for this research stressed that a move to broaden the scope of EU development assistance to include migration and security issues (while still remaining within the DAC's ODA criteria) is inevitable, and that some member states are experiencing strong pressure from the public and parliaments for this. Likewise, one EU official stated that

> development aid cannot be in [a] bubble outside the current political context. We need to move towards development aid being more political and security focused, even though this is a push back from development people and that is what we expect from the review of the EDF.

It is important to note that this trend is not restricted to Europe: the development ministers of the OECD DAC's 29 countries recently agreed to expand their definition of ODA to include more spending linked to peace and security operations. However, there are real risks associated with this securitisation of aid. As Hackenesch and Castillejo (2016) argue, the EU must

> resist pressure to focus on promoting short term stability, that is, through support for the security sector without trying to promote broader democratic reforms . . . [as]

support for inclusive political institutions, the media, civil society and the opposition is also needed in order to not further bolster authoritarian structures.

The EUTF appears to be one of the first examples of this trend of overtly linking development aid to broader EU interests. Inevitably, the controversies around the trust fund reflect some of the broader contestations about the fundamental role and priorities of development assistance, as well as its definition and limits. This shift is deeply concerning to many development actors, as it suggests a compromising of core development principles and priorities, such as support for those most in need and prioritising poverty reduction. It also has the potential to undermine normative commitments such as human rights where promoting these may not serve EU interests (as has been alleged to be the case in the EUTF's support to Sudan). There is particular concern that the EU will use the review of the European Consensus on Development to embed a securitised and instrumentalist approach to development into its core development framework. Voices in civil society are growing increasingly vocal against this shift in direction. For example, Oxfam argues that "if the EU is ready to compromise its values, by allowing the instrumentalisation of aid for policy objectives that are contrary to these values, we will outright reject the review of the Consensus and advocate for leaving it unchanged" (Alonso, 2016).

Part of this trend appears to be a growing emphasis on aid conditionalities, in line with broader ambitions to use development assistance to further broader EU external interests. This emphasis can be clearly seen within EU aid on migration issues. Most notably, the recent migration compacts contain clear conditionalities and are based on the premise that these countries are committed to improving their approaches to returns and readmissions and, hence, will receive extra funding. There appears to be a split between those member states that want to keep conditionalities positive, and those that are calling for more use of negative (less for less) conditionalities. However, as one member state official pointed out, once conditionalities are introduced, this can be a slippery slope. For example, if the countries in the migration compact do not ultimately make progress towards signing readmission agreements – as the EU hopes – will the EU move to negative conditionalities and cut these countries' aid? Interestingly, although member states want to apply conditionality to EU assistance, they are less keen to apply it to their own assistance, as they do not want to damage bilateral relationships.

There is broad agreement across EU and member states that development partnerships with Africa will look very different after 2020. Although it is still very unclear what the post-Cotonou framework will look like, it is likely that the issue of migration will continue to play an important role in the development of EU-Africa relations. Moreover, a number of EU and member state officials interviewed stressed that Africans should be involved as partners in decision making but not as partners in implementation, as that makes programming too slow and inflexible. If this is indeed the direction of travel, it could be argued that, in some ways, the EUTF may offer a glimpse of the future nature of EU-Africa aid relationships, for example in its move away from a full partnership approach, its focus on the EU's short-term migration and security interests, and its use of conditionalities. If these aspects of the EUTF do offer a glimpse of the EU's development future, it is a very troubling one for those who are committed to development principles. However, on a more positive note, if the trust fund could be used as an opportunity to innovate, learn and enrich the knowledge and approaches of the EC and member states'

development actors – whether around flexibility and adaptation, working with hard-to-reach populations and locations, responding to shifting contexts, engaging the private sector, or working effectively across borders – then some of these lessons could perhaps help inform the EU-Africa development relationship after 2020.

6 Conclusion

One year on from its establishment, the EUTF continues to be controversial, in terms of its management and activities; the goals it seeks and how it intends to achieve these; and as a part of the EU's changing approach to migration, security and development.

In terms of the management of the EUTF, there are clear areas where this could be strengthened to improve relationships and result in higher-quality and more relevant projects. These include: more structured, transparent and consultative processes for identifying and selecting projects, as well as more robust and frank discussions and decision making at the Operational Committee level; greater consultation with and engagement of local actors and focus on locally identified problems and needs; greater emphasis on working with "best fit" implementers, not just member states; communicating more effectively with those outside the trust fund process (Africa and European civil society, EP, etc.) to build confidence and seek inputs; and undertaking and sequencing research, analysis, monitoring and feedback in ways that can actually inform project design and implementation. It also requires stronger and more frequent strategic oversight and guidance by the Strategic Board and more emphasis on discussions between the EU and member states and with African partners on how the trust fund relates to broader processes, commitments and goals, including the Valletta Action Plan, and how success should be understood and measured.

Despite disagreement over many aspects of the EUTF, there appears to be widespread agreement that the trust fund offers an opportunity to experiment and innovate, away from the restrictions of traditional development instruments. Such innovations with what is a comparatively small amount of development funding could – if used wisely – be an opportunity to learn lessons about what works, which can inform the reform of traditional EU development instruments and practices. However, in order to do this, a strong emphasis is required on drawing upon new thinking in areas such as adaptive programming, or working politically, as well as on the use of strong political economy and other analytical tools. Such integration of knowledge and use of analysis has been a challenge for EU development cooperation. Critically, it requires member states to stop seeing the trust fund as a chance to finance their "business as usual" programming, and the EC to reject any such pressure from member states, and instead actively seek out projects that attempt to work in different ways and have the potential to offer interesting lessons. In this way, although this short-term trust fund is unlikely to address the root causes of migration – as it is tasked with doing – it may provide interesting lessons on how to work effectively on migration-related issues and with mobile and vulnerable populations.

Although there are some concrete steps that can be taken to strengthen the management and implementation of the EUTF and to make the most of those opportunities that it does offer, the broader concerns about the trust fund being a vehicle to divert development aid to address migration concerns are harder to address. It appears that the trust fund is one

indication of the future direction of EU development cooperation – in essence, to be more closely linked to EU interests and to use aid conditionalities to promote those interests. Although there seem to be differences as to how far different member states and EU actors are willing to go down this road – for instance, regarding the use of negative conditionalities – there does appear to be general agreement on the direction of travel. There are some concrete suggestions of what can be done in the case of the EUTF to mitigate the securitisation of development aid. For example, the EP wants a clear and transparent distinction within the EUTF between the funding envelopes for development activities on the one hand, and those for activities related to migration management, border controls and all other activities on the other. Interestingly, some EU officials have also suggested that member states should drop their politically driven focus on return and readmission, given that the number of people eligible for return to Africa is very low, and instead support a shift in focus within the EU migration agenda towards how the EU can support people to stay at home or help stranded migrants to return home – in essence, a softer and more development-friendly migration agenda.

A number of processes lie ahead that will reshape EU development cooperation with Africa, from the review of the European Consensus on Development to the negotiation of the post-Cotonou framework, in which debates over the issues described above will be at the fore. The EUTF demonstrates that in these cash-strapped times, development funds are a large and appealing pot of money for European leaders seeking to fund other pressing interests, such as migration. In this sense, the EUTF – although it may have the potential to be used to develop interesting projects and lessons – ultimately does not bode well for a future European cooperation based on core development principles.

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Working Paper 430

Why people move: understanding the drivers and trends of migration to Europe

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Abstract

An effective and durable policy response to the current 'migration crisis' in Europe requires a better understanding of the causes of migration more broadly. Much has been said about these causes, and possible solutions to the 'crisis', often leading to conflicting messages and theories. To shine a light on these, this Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) assesses the quality of the evidence available and identifies a number of clear conclusions.

Despite inconsistencies in the statistical data on irregular migration, it is clear that there has been a significant rise in the number of people attempting to enter Europe via irregular means in recent years, driven by a combination of conflict, political instability and economic insecurity. The evidence is clear that the reasons why asylum-seekers and economic migrants choose to make the dangerous journey to Europe are often similar and a person may fit both of these categories at the same time. At the centre of this is the need for secure livelihood opportunities. Measures to allow entry to asylum-seekers, while restricting the entry of economic migrants, overlook the reasons why a person migrates, and are likely to result in increased irregular migration as migrants seek alternative – and often more dangerous – entry channels. The data shows clear patterns in the routes and nationalities of people entering Europe by irregular means. However, an individual's trajectory is difficult to predict, and a person's motivations and intentions may change frequently throughout their often long and convoluted journey to Europe. The increasing professionalisation of smuggling services and the greater availability of information via online and social media also appear to facilitate migration. As a culture of migration from a particular country grows, local and international networks strengthen, encouraging further migration and providing vital sources of information and resources for the journey. This is seen in many countries, such as Senegal, Morocco, and within ethnic communities. Policies which do not recognise the complex and changing nature of irregular migration are therefore unlikely to effectively address the difficulties which both migrants and governments are experiencing in the current crisis.

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The views expressed are the authors' own and responsibility for this work lies with them.

Acronyms

DFID Department for International Development
ESRC Economic and Social Research Council
MENA Middle East and North Africa
REA Rapid Evidence Assessment
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

Executive summary

An effective and durable policy response to the current 'migration crisis' in Europe requires a better understanding of the causes of migration more broadly. Much has been said about these causes, and possible solutions to the 'crisis', often leading to conflicting messages and theories. To shine a light on these, this Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) assesses the quality of the evidence available and identifies a number of clear conclusions.

Despite inconsistencies in the statistical data on irregular migration, it is clear that there has been a significant rise in the number of people attempting to enter Europe via irregular means in recent years, driven by a combination of conflict, political instability and economic insecurity. The evidence is clear that the reasons why asylum-seekers and economic migrants choose to make the dangerous journey to Europe are often similar and a person may fit both of these categories at the same time. At the centre of this is the need for secure livelihood opportunities (e.g. Adikhari, 2013; de Haas, 2011b; Loschmann and Siegel, 2014; Zimmerman, 2011). Measures to allow entry to asylum-seekers, while restricting the entry of economic migrants, overlook the reasons why a person migrates, and are likely to result in increased irregular migration as migrants seek alternative – and often more dangerous – entry channels. The data shows clear patterns in the routes and nationalities of people entering Europe by irregular means. However, an individual's trajectory is difficult to predict, and a person's motivations and intentions may change frequently throughout their often long and convoluted journey to Europe. The increasing professionalisation of smuggling services and the greater availability of information via online and social media also appear to facilitate migration. As a culture of migration from a particular country grows, local and international networks strengthen, encouraging further migration and providing vital sources of information and resources for the journey. This is seen in many countries, such as Senegal, Morocco, and within ethnic communities (Heering et al., 2007; Mbaye, 2014; Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007). Policies which do not recognise the complex and changing nature of irregular migration are therefore unlikely to effectively address the difficulties which both migrants and governments are experiencing in the current crisis.

Methodological approach

This Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) was commissioned by DFID to examine the state and strength of knowledge on the drivers of irregular migration to Europe in the current Mediterranean crisis. Specifically, it looks at what we know about patterns of migrant flows from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa; the factors influencing migrants' decision to make the journey via irregular means; and the role of social networks in that decision.

The REA was conducted as a semi-systematic literature review, drawing on primary and secondary research studies. The evidence retrieval prioritised studies from 2010 onwards which focused on migration from Syria, Afghanistan and Eritrea (Syrians are the single largest nationality of migrants, followed by Eritreans and Afghans), or on the three main migration routes across the Mediterranean: the Central Mediterranean, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans. The studies were categorised according to their quality and relevance and the highest scoring evidence was prioritised in the analysis phase. In total, 137 documents were collected.

Understanding changing migration flows

The review found clear evidence of a substantial increase in the number of people attempting to enter Europe via the three main migration routes. From January to June 2015, 137,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, an increase of 83% over the same period in 2014. Data sets from UNHCR and Frontex differ significantly because of the different methods they use, but it is still clear that the number of people using irregular means of entry into Europe is rising, and that the routes they are using have and continue to change. Countries that were once primarily sources of migrants, such as Turkey, or 'destination countries', such as Libya, are increasingly becoming transit points on a much larger journey.

Studies on irregular migration to Europe demonstrate that migration flows must be understood as trajectories which may cover many years as migrants settle in a country but later move on to another, or return to their home country as conditions change. This makes accurately monitoring migration very difficult using categories such as 'transit migration' or 'asylum-seeker', and statistical data can only provide an indication of the nature of migration flows. Predicting future migration is also very challenging, and requires a detailed understanding of the factors driving migration flows, including conflict, social unrest and economic instability, which are themselves difficult to predict. Possible scenarios suggest a steady increase in migration, with a likely increase in circular migration. Critically, it is not only conflict and political unrest which

drive migration: as a country's economy grows, emigration is likely to increase as more people have the necessary financial resources and information to make the journey.

Motivations to migrate by irregular means

The frequently cited factors shaping people's decisions to migrate are personal and political security, and secure livelihood opportunities. However, a person's motives may change in nature and in importance over the course of their journey, suggesting that categorising individuals as 'economic migrants' or 'asylum-seekers' does not reflect the complex and fluid reality of people's migration experience. Any policy or programme intended to influence current flows of irregular migration should ideally be based on a thorough understanding of these different motivating factors, the relationship between regular and irregular migration, and the role that social networks and information sources play in determining who is migrating, where and how.

The factors influencing an individual's decision to migrate via irregular means operate at a number of levels: international and national policies, economic conditions and political situations are all important in determining why a person of a particular nationality may migrate. Other factors are related to a person's own circumstances – notably whether they have the funds for the journey, as well as the intention to undertake it – and their local and wider social network, all of which can either encourage or prevent them from migrating.

Studies on the influence of different countries welfare and asylum support systems suggests that they are not important to a person's initial decision to migrate. However, the policies and rules of different destination countries may influence later decisions on whether to continue to another country where opportunities and conditions may be better (Kuschminder et al., 2015; Triandafyllidou, 2009). There is strong evidence that while tightening border security may change migration routes, and often results in more people making more dangerous journeys, migration policies are unlikely to influence the actual number of people migrating (Czaika and Hobolth, 2014; de Haas, 2011c; Duvell, 2009).

Migration as a collective effort; the role of social networks

Although this review found little evidence on the role of social networks specific to the current European crisis, the literature generally suggests that social networks and information flows are vital components of migration systems and migrant decision-making. Studies of migration from numerous countries, such as Afghanistan, Morocco, Senegal, and Egypt, show that irregular migration is usually a collective effort in which families and social and religious networks play a crucial role. This includes the role of family members in host countries, who may encourage prospective migrants through remittances and information. During the journey, an individual's access to smuggling networks and their experiences in the different countries they cross are also important factors shaping where and how they decide to migrate.

Members of communities with a history of migration may be more inclined to migrate than people who are less accustomed to such a 'culture of migration'. Beyond the culture of their immediate community, migrants are influenced by broader social networks and are exposed to information through mass media, word of mouth and – increasingly – social media. Internet-based technology and social media are putting different groups of migrants and non-migrant populations in direct contact, and migrants often provide each other with reciprocal support for day-to-day subsistence, sharing food and accommodation, as well as information on travel routes and destinations. These local networks are often informal and concealed.

Evidence gaps

This review also found several significant gaps in the evidence base which would merit further investigation. The evidence on detailed migration routes, especially across North Africa and from Eritrea and Somalia, is limited, and little appears to be known about the factors influencing how long someone spends in different countries during their journey to Europe, or why they move on to other countries after a period spent in a European country.

Gaps in evidence on the role of networks and information flows in the current crisis also merit further inquiry. This includes the role of networks in informing initial decisions to migrate; the role of networks during the journey and in transit locations; the way that technology, communication tools and online media are shaping these networks and affecting decisions; and how individual characteristics, especially gender, relate to these networks.

Another major gap identified in this review concerns smuggling networks, including their influence on the destination of migrants and the overall feasibility of irregular migration. As a result, attempts to tackle smuggling often rely on inadequate information and analysis.

Conclusion

Despite the difficulties in gathering up-to-date rigorous information on the current crisis, there is already significant evidence available to governments on the drivers of this situation. Policymakers should be able to draw on this evidence base to develop more effective interventions which recognise the real reasons motivating migration to Europe, and which facilitate safer channels for migration. The evidence described in this review could therefore inform policies and programmes which are more effective in supporting migrants, and enabling host countries to benefit from this human mobility.

Introduction

In the last two years, and especially during the most recent months of 2015, the European media has been saturated with images and commentary relating to the so-called 'migration crisis' that Europe is currently facing. Large-scale global migration is not an unprecedented phenomenon, nor are mass movements of refugees within Europe. However, within the past two years, and particularly since the beginning of 2015, there has been a marked rise in both the number of people crossing European borders via irregular, and often risky, means, and the number of individuals claiming asylum in European states. Accurate statistics on irregular migration are notoriously difficult to obtain. However, data on border apprehensions[1] shows almost a four-fold increase in the number of people found crossing into Europe irregularly between 2012 and 2014 (Frontex, 2015a, p. 12 PS-6),[2] and the number of migrants recorded crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe increased from 22,500 in 2012 to 219,000 in 2014 (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 5 SO-2). In order to better understand and respond to this dramatic increase in irregular migration, and the associated risks for the people involved, it is necessary to consider the causes of this movement, the dynamics of these migrations and the extent to which future migration flows and patterns can be predicted.

The UK Department for International Development (DFID) commissioned this Rapid Evidence Assessment (REA) to address the following question:

> *What are the drivers of irregular migration to Europe in the current Mediterranean crisis?*

This question is answered through three sub-questions, formulated by DFID, which together examine the current state of knowledge on the drivers of migration in the context of the on-going 'crisis':

1. What do we know about the predictability/patterns of migrant flows from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in this current crisis? Can we use that information to effectively predict future migrant flows?
2. What factors influence decisions to leave Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA and migrate to Europe via irregular means in this current crisis (with a focus on key source countries: Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia)?
3. What is the evidence on the role that social networks (peer, family, others) play in decisions to migrate?

This REA was conducted as a semi-systematic literature review, drawing on primary and secondary research studies guided by experts in this field. The evidence retrieval prioritised studies from 2010 onwards which focused on migration from Syria, Afghanistan, and Eritrea, or on the three main migration routes across the Mediterranean: the Central Mediterranean route, the Eastern Mediterranean route, and the Western Balkans route. The studies were categorised according to their quality and relevance and the highest scoring evidence was prioritised in the analysis phase.

The research question specifically addresses 'irregular migration', not 'irregular migrants', and so concerns the patterns and factors driving irregular means of migration. This therefore includes those who are travelling with the purpose of applying for asylum and who are thus not 'irregular', as well as those seeking to migrate without the ability to obtain a visa or refugee status. The focus on *irregular* migration is in order to understand, not why people migrate, but why people migrate using irregular means.[3] The very simple answer is because there is an absence of legal alternatives. In any investigation of irregular migration this must be made explicit from the outset; the 'choice' to migrate by irregular means is made in the absence of legal migration routes, and that part of a journey could be regular while another part is irregular. Irregularity and irregular or 'illegal' border crossings are brought into being by a set of policy decisions and methods of border control that create categories of 'legal' and 'illegal' migrants, and so, as a person passes through

1 In a recent web article, Nando Sigona highlights the need to consider even these statistics as potentially unreliable. Frontex recently published statistics of total migrant arrivals which double-counted individuals at different border points (see Sigona, 2015).

2 The code 'PS-6' refers to the category of the study referenced and its quality rating. The system for assessing the quality of studies and coding them accordingly is explained in section 2.1.

3 It is also important to note that, in many countries, the majority of irregular migrants in fact travel using legal means (Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 15-6 SO-4).

different countries, the migration category they fall into may change (Düvell, 2009 p. 3 SO-4). As such, we must recognise the role that state policies and practices of border control have on the nature of irregular migration, and the often long and risky journeys that people take in order to migrate to Europe.

The 'migration crisis' as referred to in the research question is not only a matter of high numbers of entrants. Rather, it is the significant numbers of migrant[4] deaths at Europe's borders, scenes of boat arrivals, of camps housing migrants in cities in Europe and the European neighbourhood, and of large groups of people being confronted by border guards which evoke a sense of crisis. The language of 'crisis' may influence government policy responses, and so it is important that a clear understanding of the evidence base on the drivers of migration flows is available to policy-makers. For this reason, this REA sets out to better understand the drivers, dynamics, and decision-making processes that underlie irregular migration to Europe.

The review begins with a discussion of the main terms used in this evidence review. The review then describes the methodological approach taken in this study and the nature of the existing evidence base. The findings from the evidence are reviewed with reference to the three sub-questions, and the report concludes with a discussion of the key findings, the strength of the evidence on which they are based, and suggestions for particular areas where further research would be beneficial.

Terminological clarifications

Migrants and/or refugees?

'Migrant' is used throughout the paper as an all-encompassing term that includes the large numbers of individuals who are refugees or who will be eligible for other forms of legal protection under EU and international law. This is in keeping with the UN definition of international migration, and conforms with Jorgen Carling's assertion that 'migrant' is a valuable umbrella term that does not attempt to paint a black and white picture in what is a very complex situation (Carling, 2015 C-2). This is not to discredit the protection claims of many of those who are currently travelling to Europe, but to recognise the fact that, whilst not all migrants are refugees, all refugees are also migrants, and that rejecting the term migrant or creating a refugee/migrant binary is both theoretically and practically problematic in the context of the current crisis. The term refugee is used, however, when referencing authors who have used this label.

Transit migration

The term 'transit migration', and 'transit locations' are used here in line with their usage in many studies retrieved during this literature search. However, more recently the term 'transit migration' has come under scrutiny, and its contested nature should be kept in mind when reading this report. Commentators have highlighted the politicised nature of the labelling of certain countries as 'transit' countries, arguing that it relates to a broader securitisation discourse on migration (Icduygu and Yukseker, 2012 SO-3). Others have also questioned the legitimacy of the term, arguing that it artificially presents a linear narrative of origin-transit-destination, masking the much more complex reality of contemporary migration (Collyer and de Haas, 2012 C-4). It has also been argued that the terms reinforce the highly misleading image that all Sub-Saharan migrants present in North Africa are on their way to Europe, whereas in reality both temporary and long-term settlement are common, and certain transit countries are also destinations in their own right (Collyer and de Haas, 2012 C-4; see also Schapendonk, 2012 PS-7). However, despite these limitations, it is clear that the broad concept of 'transit' and the studies it has engendered remain useful in discussions of migration to destinations in Europe in helping us to look beyond the traditional origin-destination dichotomy and consider the dynamism of irregular migration, in which migration aspirations, intentions and decisions change over time and space throughout the migration journey.

Irregular migration

According to the Migration Observatory (Vollmer, 2011, p. 2 C-2), 'irregular migration' usually refers to 'the cross-border flow of people who enter a country without that country's legal permission to do so. In contrast, the term 'irregular migrants' typically refers to the stock of migrants in a country who are not entitled to reside there, either because they have never had a legal residence permit or because they have overstayed their time-limited permit […] In addition to – and partly because of – the complexities of definitions, data on irregular migration and migrants are very limited. Irregular migration is by definition not recorded and eludes statistical coverage. Therefore, precise measurement is unfeasible'. This evidence review concerns the patterns and factors driving irregular means of migration, rather than 'irregular migrants', in order to include those who are travelling with the purpose of applying for asylum and who are thus not 'irregular', as well as those seeking to migrate without the ability to obtain a visa or refugee status. Given that the focus of the research is on migration flows and the current crisis, it is

4 UNHCR (2015) Dead and Missing in the Mediterranean Sea 2010-2014 https://infogr.am/sea_arrivals_to_southern_europe [25/09/2015]

less important to differentiate between those who will have the right to refugee status and those who will be rejected, but rather understand the reasons why people may stay in 'source' or 'transit' countries, and which factors are most significant in motivating migration by irregular means to an EU country.

Pathways

Three major routes of irregular migration in the current crisis, as defined by Frontex, are examined by this evidence review (Figure 1). These are:

- Central Mediterranean: 'This route refers to the migratory flow coming from Northern Africa towards Italy and Malta through the Mediterranean Sea.'
- Eastern Mediterranean: 'The Eastern Mediterranean route is defined for Frontex purposes as the passage used by migrants crossing through Turkey to the European Union via Greece, southern Bulgaria or Cyprus.'
- Western Balkans: 'The Western Balkan route describes two main migratory flows: from the Western Balkan countries themselves, and the secondary movements of mainly Asian migrants who originally entered the European Union through the Bulgarian-Turkish or Greek-Turkish land or sea borders and then proceed, through the Western Balkans, into Hungary.' (Frontex, 2015b SO-2)

Figure 1: Main irregular migration routes to Europe



Source: International Centre for Migration / Reuters

Countries of focus

Based on the pathways identified, the focus countries for the REA are Syria and Eritrea, since an initial review of statistical data on migration flows suggests that particularly high numbers of migrants from these countries are using irregular migration sea routes to Europe. Other countries considered in the search strings are Afghanistan, Somalia, and Ethiopia. These countries have been chosen because their nationals also feature significantly in data on irregular migration routes to Europe, and because of the on-going conflict and insecurity in Afghanistan and Somalia, which is assumed to be an important factor driving irregular migration. Iraq, Libya, and Turkey[5] also feature prominently in data on irregular migration, but due to time constraints were not searched for specifically.

Timeframe for 'the crisis'

There are estimates to suggest that the period 2014/2015 (especially 2015) has been unprecedented in terms of both the increase in overall numbers of asylum-seekers arriving in Europe (at least since the early 1990s) and migrant deaths en route to destination countries in the EU (UNHCR, 2015b J-2). The available statistics on the numbers of people attempting to enter Europe via irregular means are not conclusive but do indicate general trends in irregular migration in this region. Therefore, for this REA, the migration crisis is studied using evidence from 2010 onwards in order to capture the impact of the Arab Spring and the breakdown of Libya and the beginning of the civil war in Syria as probable drivers of irregular migration flows. Older source materials are included where they are particularly relevant to understanding the current crisis and useful for comparing current migration flows to those of earlier periods.

5 Turkey is of particular interest due to the high number of migrants arriving there from Syria, Afghanistan and other conflict-affected states, and due to interest in understanding the extent to which Turkey may be a destination or a transit country for migrants.

Methodology

Research and analysis process

An REA was considered an appropriate research approach for this topic due to the limited available evidence on the current crisis and the importance of verifying the quality of existing information. An REA is an efficient way of reviewing the content and quality of current knowledge on a topic and identifying questions which require further research. As stipulated in DFID's definition of an REA, the research process includes a clear review question, a structured literature search with a clear protocol and rationale for how the search is conducted, appraisal of the quality of evidence, and a synthesis of the evidence base. Based on these requirements, the methodological approach taken combines elements of a systematic evidence assessment with a more reflexive form of evidence-focused literature review. This approach involves several stages, as outlined in Figure 2 below.

Figure 2: research and analysis process

1 Search	Database, library, journal, community of practice, organisation assigned **Search** conducted Downloads
2 File	**Assess** type, design and quality of study **Pre-Screen** against inclusion criteria **File** in Zotero reference database
3 Coding	**Record** type, design and quality of study in Excel spreadsheet **Assign** tags for thematic coverage and search method used in Zotero reference database
4 Review	Verify coding (sample basis) consistency across team
5 Analysis	Team workshop for key messages, writing assignments Reading and analysis of studies/data, recording strength of evidence from which conclusions are drawn
6 Review	**Review** and finalisation of report

The first stage of the research and evidence retrieval involved developing search strings for Google and Google Scholar, and searching migration databases and academic journals.[6] This process was guided by experts in this field to ensure that key literature was included which could potentially be missed if only using rigid search strings. This is based on experience of conducting rigorous literature reviews, which found that evidence retrieval that is triangulated via structured inquiries ('snowballing') with thematic experts and specialist communities of practice, and that uses specific protocols for grey literature, will produce a more appropriate evidence base for assessment than a purely systematic review.

The evidence retrieval is streamlined by a focus on literature that, in line with the research questions, has as its primary focus the current migration crisis in the Mediterranean. Sources are limited to those produced in the last ten years in English, though earlier literature informed the scope of the study. To ensure transparency of the search process, the search strings used and the databases accessed were recorded during evidence retrieval (see appendix 1). To ensure that the sources retrieved were both high-quality and relevant to the research question, sources from academic and grey literature were assessed for their quality using agreed criteria. This meant that documents which were found to be high quality could be prioritised during the analysis. The quality assessment protocol used is described in the following section. During the retrieval process sources were also coded by theme, and the key findings were extracted in order to develop an overview of the content of the evidence base from which to begin analysis. The research team[7] then met to examine the evidence retrieved and develop an outline for closer analysis of the source documents. This involved extracting information relevant to the research questions and drawing conclusions. During the analysis and writing stage, the quality rating of the sources used has been included in the in-text citation so that the reader can assess the strength of the evidence on which a conclusion has been made.

Quality assessment protocol

The evidence retrieved has been coded according to the research type (primary, secondary, or conceptual) and its quality was assessed using four key dimensions, which were adapted from previous evidence reviews undertaken by ODI:

6 Details of the databases, platforms, communities of practice, journals and search strings used are in appendix 1.

7 The team consisted of four researchers.

1. Relevance of the study to the research questions: does it refer to the current 'crisis', and/or key source countries, and/or the role of social networks in motivations for migration?
2. Methodological transparency
3. The validity of the findings
4. Conceptual framing

Primary and secondary sources were assessed using specific indicators of quality and four inclusion criteria, as detailed below. Any sources not meeting the criteria were excluded from analysis. The indicators used to assess evidence quality were discussed and agreed in the research team, and each researcher applied them to the sources they retrieved. At the end of the retrieval process the scores were compared by the researchers to check the consistency vof the way evidence had been rated. The research team also discussed the nature of the evidence body in aggregate, and this report describes their findings with respect to the size, quality, and applicability of the body of evidence.

Inclusion criteria:

- 10 years
- In English
- Must discuss current crisis or the role of social networks in migration to Europe or drivers of irregular migration to Europe
- Must be rated 'medium' or 'high' quality (see below)

Protocol for grading and coding

Table 1: study types and designs

Type	Design [Tags]
Primary	Experimental or Quasi/Natural Experiment [PE] Comparative [PC] Single Case Study or Evaluation [PS]
Secondary	Systematic [SS] Other review [SO]
Conceptual[8]	[C}
Journalistic[9]	{J]

Note: Study type is independent of study quality.

Table 2: assessing quality – primary studies

Principle	Questions	Scoring
Conceptual framing	a) Does the study have a conceptual framework and clear research question? b) Does the study appear to draw conclusions based on its results rather than theory or policy?	0 Neither 1 One 2 Both
Methodological transparency	a) Does the study explain its research design and data collection methods? b) Does the study present or link to data sources?	0 Neither 1 One 2 Both
Internal and external validity[10]	a) Is the study internally valid? Or, are alternative causes of impact or the study's limitations considered? b) Is the study externally valid? Or, can findings be generalised to other contexts and populations?	0 Neither 1 One 2 Both
Journalistic	a) How relevant is the study to the research topic?	1 Partially 2 Directly
Score (Sum)		0-8

Scoring:
0-4 Low [Excluded]
5-6 Medium
6-8 High

8 Conceptual and journalistic articles are graded for quality according to the criteria for secondary sources (while some journalistic articles may use a mixture of secondary and primary sources, they are unlikely to be written in a scientific manner, hence the use of secondary source criteria for quality assessment).

9 A journalistic article was considered to be an article published by a news publication, such as *The Economist* or *The New Statesman*.

10 Validity is considered with respect to whether a study considers the limitations of the conclusions drawn and/or whether other variables could have influenced the findings. This applies to all studies retrieved, whether they make claims of causal impact or only present correlations and links between phenomena. Assessing the validity of the evidence was challenging and relied on each researcher's own judgement. The research team decided to take an inclusive approach so as not to unnecessarily exclude useful studies. Discussion over how to apply the criteria meant that the researchers were assessing the studies in a consistent manner.

Table 3: assessing quality – secondary studies

Principle	Questions	Scoring
Relevance	Does the study directly address the research topic?	0 No 1 Yes
Methodological transparency	Does the study describe where and how studies/data were selected for inclusion?	0 No 1 Yes
Internal and external validity[10]	Does the study assess the quality of the studies/data included?	0 No 1 Yes
Journalistic	Does the study draw conclusions based on the studies/data reviewed and consider alternative conclusions and/or limitations to the conclusions?	0 No 1 Yes
Score (Sum)		0-4

Scoring:
0-4 Low [Excluded]
5-6 Medium
6-8 High

Note: Most systematic reviews should score at least 3.
Example code included in the referencing: 'PC – 6' = Primary research, comparative study, quality rating of 6
e.g. xxx (Smith: 2015 PC-6)

Detail on the quality of the study is recorded in a spreadsheet using the reference information (see appendix 2).

Nature of the evidence base

The evidence collected consists of 138 documents. Table 4 below shows that the sources collected are spread quite evenly across primary (39%) and secondary methodologies (61%), with the largest proportion of sources (47%) being 'secondary other' (non-systematic study of secondary data) or primary single studies. The 'secondary other' sources vary in quality, with many being relevant to the research question but not always providing detail on the methodology used to gather and analyse the data they reference. This is especially the case for journalistic articles which often provide the most recent data, but are not written in a scientific manner. The primary sources tend to be of a higher quality, explaining the research methods used and reflecting on the nature of the conclusions drawn. Although the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) has recently awarded grants for comparative research work on the Mediterranean migration crisis, there are currently few comparative studies or systematic reviews on this subject, and the external validity of sources is not always clear.

The evidence which has been retrieved for this study largely consists of statistical analysis of migration flows, literature reviews of the drivers of migration, and studies of single cases, rather than comparative research. As expected, the evidence available on the current crisis is limited and most data is provided by organisations, in particular UNHCR, which are working practically to respond to the crisis, rather than scientific studies of the drivers, although academic research specifically addressing the dynamics of the crisis is being carried out.[11] The most recent evidence tends to have been gathered to inform policy and programme responses. There are more rigorous studies within the older literature, which is to be expected given the time needed to undertake in-depth research. Most of these involve detailed primary research examining the experiences of people who have migrated to Europe. Some are studies of countries outside the focus countries mentioned in the research questions, but which are relevant in terms of understanding the broader context of current irregular migration across the Mediterranean.
In general terms, the focal points in the evidence base on the current crisis are:

- how the conflict in Syria is affecting migration flows;
- the impact of EU countries' migration policies and asylum systems on migration routes and the regularity of migration;
- the importance of migration networks to continuing migration flows; and
- the situation in Turkey, and the extent to which North African and Middle Eastern countries are source, transit, and/or destination countries of irregular migration.

Table 4: nature of the evidence recieved

Quality	Primary		Secondary				Total
	Primary Comparative	Primary Single Case	Secondary Systematic	Secondary Other	Conceptual	Journalistic	
High	1	10	2	33	4	1	51
Medium	7	36		33	4	8	88
Total	8	46	2	66	8	8	138

11 See for example CTPSR (2015) Coventry-led study seeks to unravel Mediterranean crisis http://www.coventry.ac.uk/research/research-directories/research-news/2015/coventry-led-study-seeks-to-unravel-mediterranean-migration-crisis/ [01/10/2015].

Research into migration from Syria features predominantly, and far fewer studies are available on other source countries in the research question (i.e. Eritrea, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Ethiopia). Likewise, evidence on the current crisis focuses mostly on sea routes across the Mediterranean rather than land routes, and tends to discuss the migration of asylum-seekers from countries in conflict more than broader factors behind the irregular means of migration of non-asylum-seekers.

With respect to evidence which is relevant to the first research question regarding migration flows, statistics on the flow of irregular migration to Europe are not available given that, by definition, 'irregular migration' concerns unrecorded migration. However, sources of data gathered from Eurostat and UNHCR can indicate changes in the number of asylum applications being made, the number of people arriving in Southern Europe by crossing the Mediterranean, and the number of deaths recorded of undocumented migrants. Evidence from Frontex indicates changes in the number of people found attempting 'illegal border crossings' into Europe, as well as data on smuggling. While this data is collected in a rigorous and reliable manner, it does not claim to be comprehensive, and while it may indicate an increase in irregular migration, increased public and political attention to migration across the Mediterranean may have prompted greater efforts to record migration flows. It is also important to emphasise that irregular crossings are not the same as irregular migration since many of those crossing irregularly are seeking asylum, which is their right. The evidence base is also generally limited in studies which predict or forecast future patterns of migration. Only one high-quality study (de Haas, 2011a SO-4) was retrieved which discusses possible future migration flows, and this study emphasises the difficulty of making reliable and specific predictions related to migration.

With regard to the second question, concerning drivers of migration, academic literature has been retrieved which attempts to unpack the complexity of migration dynamics and motivations. There is also a relevant set of literature and information around the fluid dynamics of migration motivations and intentions, and how these can change over space and time. However, in-depth research in this area is mostly 'pre-crisis', and is often not directly focused on migrants from the countries of interest. That said, there are some limited studies on the motivations of both migration from countries of interest, and onward or secondary migration from these countries that connects with the broader literature.

Regarding the research question which considers the role of social networks, the search process has identified a large amount of theoretical and conceptual literature discussing social networks and migration, including the link between social networks and migration motivations. Research directly relating to the countries of interest remains limited, especially within the timeframe of the crisis, although there are some case studies of other MENA and Sub-Saharan African countries that are of interest. There is also a burgeoning set of literature on the role of online social media networks in the facilitation of migration, which is mirrored by anecdotal evidence on the role of technology and the Internet in facilitating Syrian journeys to Europe.

Evidence review: migration flows

Key findings:

Since 2010 the number of irregular arrivals into Europe by sea or land has increased substantially. From January to June 2015, 137,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, an increase of 83% over the same period in 2014. Syrians are the single largest nationality, followed by Eritreans and Afghans. Most are likely to qualify as refugees in EU countries.

The main migration routes are through the Eastern and Central Mediterranean and the Western Balkans. The Eastern Mediterranean route is currently the most popular, substantially increasing flows through the Western Balkans as only a small minority of people apply for asylum in Greece.

Estimates of the actual number of irregular arrivals into Europe vary between agencies, in part because migrants may be counted more than once as they make multiple crossings between EU and non-EU countries in order to reach their preferred destination. This is particularly the case across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes.

The meaning of transit migration and transit migration countries is changing. Turkey, for many years considered a country of emigration, is today seen as a 'transit' country, where most asylum-seekers receive 'temporary protection' status which allows them to apply for resettlement in other countries. Libya is evolving from a country of immigration from sub-Saharan Africa to a major 'transit country' between countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, Chad, and Europe.

Future trends of migration flows and patterns are extremely difficult to predict. This is largely due to the difficulty of predicting changes in the drivers of migration, including political unrest, conflict, and patterns of economic growth.

This section addresses the first research question:

What do we know about the predictability/patterns of migrant flows from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa in this current crisis? Can we use that information to effectively predict changes in future migrant flows?

Introduction

Drawing on data published by UNHCR and Frontex and other sources, this section reviews the statistical information on the number of people migrating via irregular means to Europe since 2010. The difficulties of accurately measuring these flows are discussed, followed by an overview of changes in flows across the three main irregular migration routes. This section then presents data on changes in the number of irregular migrants using different transit countries to travel to Europe, and how these routes have evolved over recent years. While there are clear patterns in the flow of migrants from particular countries and via particular routes, this section discusses the difficulties in making reliable predictions for future irregular migration flows based on data of past and current flows.

Changes in migration numbers 2010–2015

Since 2010, the numbers of irregular arrivals into Europe have increased substantially. UNHCR figures (2015a, p. 5 SO-2) (Figure 3) show the number of migrants arriving by sea, based on government sources, and Frontex figures (2015a, p. 12 PS-6) (Figure 4) account for all detected irregular border crossings between EU states.

Figure 3: Migrants arriving by sea to Europe



Source: UNHCR (2015c SO-2) – note; data recorded until 24th August 2015

Figure 4: Total number of detected irregular border crossings



Source: Frontex (2015a, p. 12 PS-6) – note: data recorded up until October 2015

Between 2010 and 2012, the number of irregular arrivals by sea was relatively low. This has been put down to a number of factors, including Italy's controversial agreement with Libya on intercepting and returning migrants, Spain's closure of the Canary Islands route and improved surveillance systems and border control action by Frontex (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014, p. 4 SO-3; RMMS, 2014, pp. 84–5 PC-7). Irregular crossings surged in 2011, mainly caused by political instability in North Africa related to the Arab Spring (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014; Morehouse and Blomfield, 2011, p. 6 SO-3; RMMS, 2014, pp. 84–5 PC-7). There has been a large increase in irregular arrivals by sea and irregular border crossings between 2013 and 2015.

An upsurge in migration since 2013

According to Frontex (2014a, p. 30 PS-6), the increase in irregular migration in 2013 was due to a rise in the number of Syrians seeking asylum in Europe, combined with migrants crossing the Mediterranean from North Africa and irregular migration across the border between Hungary and Serbia. As shown in Figure 5, in 2013 Syrians were by far the most common nationality recorded entering Europe irregularly (25,546 detections), accounting for almost a quarter of the total. Eritrean migrants came next (11,298 detections), for whom the number detected crossing irregularly was more than four times that of the previous year (2012). Other nationalities frequently recorded in 2013 were Afghans (9,494), Kosovans (6,357), and Albanians (9,021) (Frontex, 2015a, p. 57 PS-6).

Figure 5: Number of irregular border crossings by nationality – all borders



Source: (Frontex, 2015a, p. 57 PS-6)

Sustained rise in irregular migration during 2014

In 2014, according to Frontex data, overall irregular border crossings to Europe reached a record 283,532, a 165% increase on 2013. The vast majority (78%) were detected at a sea border (2015a, p. 57 PS-6). Frontex recorded 79,169 irregular crossings by Syrian nationals in 2014, constituting more than a quarter of all detections, as well as the majority of asylum applications to European member states (Frontex, 2015a, p. 18 PS-6). Eritreans were the second most commonly detected nationality making an irregular border crossing in 2014 (more than 34,500 crossings); most were from Libya, taking the Central Mediterranean route (Frontex, 2015a, p. 18 PS-6). There was also a large increase in Afghans taking the Eastern Mediterranean and Western Balkans route into Europe, and in the number of Kosovans being detected on the border between Serbia and Hungary (Frontex, 2015a, p. 18 PS-6).

Exponential rise in irregular migration in 2015

During 2014 and 2015 there has been an exponential increase in the number of irregular migrants entering Europe. According to UNHCR (2015a, p. 6 SO-2), from January to June 2015 137,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe, an increase of 83% compared to the same period in 2014. Syrians were again the single largest nationality, accounting for 34% of all arrivals by sea, followed by Eritreans and Afghans (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 12 SO-2). Many of these migrants first moved to neighbouring states but, after spending several years in refugee camps, decided to migrate further to Europe (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 6 SO-2).

Changing migration routes

As previous research on irregular migration shows, migration routes are continuously evolving (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014, p. 3 SO-3; Schapendonk, 2012, p. 30 PS-7). For example, from 2010 to 2015 the Central Mediterranean route to Italy and Malta, the Eastern Mediterranean route from Turkey to Greece, and the Western Balkans route became the main routes of irregular migration to Europe (Figure 6). The Central Mediterranean Route was the dominant one in 2014, with most people arriving in Italy from Libya, Tunisia or Egypt. However, in the first six months of 2015 the Eastern Mediterranean route became the primary maritime route, especially for Syrians, Afghans, and Iraqis. Finally, in 2015 the Western Balkans route became increasingly established as the third main route, including migrants and refugees from Greece as well as people from Kosovo and Albania (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke, 2015, p. 2 J-2; UNHCR, 2015a, p. 3). It is however important to note that other routes are less patrolled and so less data on border crossings is recorded, and many people who become irregular migrants entered Europe legally, but no longer have the right to remain (e.g. over-staying a visa).

The Central Mediterranean route

The Central Mediterranean route is a traditional migration route for Sub-Saharan and West African immigrants, transiting through Libya and then departing from the coast near Tripoli, Zawiyah and Benghazi to Italy and Malta (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7; Frontex, 2015a PS-6). More recently, migrants have also passed through Egypt and Tunisia (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7). According to Frontex, the Central Mediterranean route was the main area of irregular border crossing to the EU in 2011, 2013 and 2014, accounting for 60% of all border detections (Frontex, 2015a, p. 18 PS-6).

Since the mid-2000s, Sicily, and particularly the islands of Lampedusa and Linosa, have become the main point of access to Italy for migrants from North Africa (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014, p. 4 SO-3). Most of the migrants using this route rely on smugglers to make their journey to Europe (RMMS, 2014, p. 78 PC-7). Italy saw a large increase in arrivals in 2011, following political instability in Tunisia. Numbers dipped in 2012, then rose again in 2013, with people from the Horn of Africa, predominantly Somalis and Eritreans, accounting for the largest proportion of detections by Frontex. Syrians constituted almost a quarter of the total number of recorded arrivals (Frontex, 2014a, p. 33 PS-6).

In 2014 Italy received a record number of migrants (170,000), mostly Eritreans and Syrians (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7; UNHCR, 2015a SO-2). The main point of departure for these migrants was Libya, and research suggests that the increase in violence and instability in Libya was a major cause of this record influx (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7). During the first six months of 2015 Italy received 67,500 people, similar to Greece, although since June the number of migrants arriving in Greece has increased dramatically, reaching 210,824 in October alone (UNHCR, 2015d PS-2). According to UNHCR, the main nationalities arriving in Italy in 2015 were Eritreans (25%), Nigerians (10%), and Somalis (10%), followed by Syrians (7%) and Gambians (7%) (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 11 SO-2, 2015e SO-2).
Malta has received far fewer arrivals than Italy in recent years (UNHCR, 2014 SO-3). Arrivals peaked at 2,100 in 2013, only to decrease again in 2014. The main nationalities were Somalis (40%) and Eritreans (16%) (UNHCR, 2014 SO-3). Despite Malta's controversial detention policy for asylum-seekers (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7), an increasing number of migrants who have been granted asylum in Italy move on to Malta in the expectation of greater opportunities for work and/or to follow other family members (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7).

The Eastern Mediterranean route

The Eastern Mediterranean route refers to migrants arriving in Greece via Turkey, Bulgaria or Cyprus (Frontex, 2015a PS-6). In 2015 it surpassed the Central Mediterranean in terms of the number of arrivals.

Disputed Frontex data

While the data collected by UNHCR and Frontex clearly shows an exponential rise in irregular migration since 2012, the actual number of irregular arrivals to Europe is disputed. By September 2015, UNHCR was estimating more than 487,000 arrivals by sea, and the International Organization for Migration (IOM) had published a similar figure of 590,000. Frontex figures were much higher, at 710,000, possibly because the agency counts all detections of 'illegal border crossings' as an indicator of the number of people arriving irregularly in Europe. This means that an individual migrant may be counted more than once, since many make more than one crossing between EU and non-EU countries in order to reach their preferred destination. This is particularly the case across the Eastern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans routes, where people are registered on their arrival in Greece, and then counted again when they leave the EU and pass through Albania, Macedonia or Serbia, only to re-enter the EU via Croatia or Hungary (Sigona, 2015 J-4).

The number of migrants arriving via the Eastern Mediterranean route rose consistently between 2008 and 2011, then decreased in 2012 and 2013, probably due to the erection of a fence in 2012 along the border between Greece and Turkey (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014, p. 5 SO-3; Frontex, 2014a PS-6). Even so, in 2014 this route still ranked second for all irregular crossings into the EU according to Frontex (Frontex, 2014a, p. 8 PS-6), and since 2012 the number of migrants arriving irregularly by sea to Greece has increased substantially each year (Figure 7). Syrians were the most numerous nationality using this route in 2013 (12,727 or 51%), followed by Afghans (6,129) (Frontex, 2014a, p. 35 PS-6).

Overall detections through the Eastern Mediterranean route doubled between 2013 and 2014, reaching over 50,800, or 18% of all irregular arrivals registered by Frontex (Figure 6) (Frontex, 2015a, p. 22 PS-6). According to Frontex, this increase was due to more migrants crossing the Aegean, departing from more points along the coast and arriving at a larger number of Greek islands, with Lesbos, Chios, and Samos the most affected (Frontex, 2015a, p. 22 PS-6).

Figure 6: Number of irregular border crossings detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route[11]



Source: (Frontex, 2015a, p. 16 PS-6)

Figure 7: Number of migrants arriving irregularly by sea to Greece



Source: (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 13 SO-2)

In the first six months of 2015, the Eastern Mediterranean route was the most popular for irregular migration (UNHCR, 2015a SO-2). The main nationalities using this route were Syrians (57%), followed by Afghans (22 %) and Iraqis (5 %) (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 11 SO-2). According to UNHCR, only a small minority of people apply for asylum in Greece (5,115 out of 68,000 in 2015). The majority of migrants continue their journeys northwards through the Balkans, often facilitated by smugglers (UNHCR, 2015a, p. 11 SO-2).

The Western Balkans route

The Western Balkans route encompasses two main groups of migrants: those from non-EU Western Balkan countries themselves, and migrants from Asia and the Middle East, who enter through Greece and proceed towards Hungary (Frontex, 2015a PS-6). From 2010 to 2013, the number of irregular border crossings remained low in comparison with the other two routes. These crossings were mainly made by nationals from Western Balkan countries, particularly Albania, Serbia, and Kosovo, using fraudulent documents or who applied for asylum to enter an EU country (Frontex, 2015a PS-6).

12 Crossings detected on the borders of Greece, Bulgaria and Cyprus.

Figure 8 shows that there was an initial increase in irregular crossings in 2013, with the main detections registered by Frontex at the Serbian–Hungarian border (Frontex, 2014a, p. 8 PS-6). A third of these migrants were from Kosovo, and there was a substantial increase in the number of Albanians (60% increase on 2012). Migrants from both countries often applied for asylum (Frontex, 2014a, p. 37 PS-6). According to Frontex, there was a sharp decrease in the number of migrants from Afghanistan, North Africa, and Somalia, while the number of migrants from West Africa increased (Frontex, 2014a PS-6).

Figure 8: Number of irregular border crossings detected on the Western Balkans route



Source: (Frontex, 2015a, p. 16 PS-6)

In 2014 Frontex recorded a sharp increase of 65% in irregular crossings (2014b, p. 5 PS-6). Again, most were registered at the Serbian–Hungarian border (Frontex, 2014b, p. 5 PS-6). Over half of irregular crossings were by Kosovans, though there was a large increase in the number of Syrians and Afghans using this route compared to 2013 (Frontex, 2015a PS-6).

The number of migrants using the Western Balkans route has continued to increase, with over 1,000 people crossing into Greece every day since June 2015 (UNHCR, 2015a SO-2). Syrians represented more than 50% of arrivals recorded thus far in 2015, followed by Eritreans, Afghans, and Kosovans. According to UNHCR, of those submitting asylum claims, Syrians and Eritreans are the most likely to be successful (Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke, 2015, p. 2 J-2).

Patterns of transit migration

This section discusses how some countries that were previously countries of emigration have become countries of transit migration and destination. As noted in section 1.2, 'transit migration' should be understood as a fluid category encompassing various types of mixed migratory statuses and experiences, including asylum-seekers and cyclical labour migrants (Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 23 SO-4). While the focus of this discussion is on non-European transit countries, it would also be worthwhile examining to what extent some European countries, such as Italy, are transit countries since migrants do not always settle in the first European country they arrive in (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014, p. 17 SO-3). The analysis below focuses primarily on Turkey and Libya as the main 'transit countries' in the current migration crisis.

Turkey

Turkey has long been considered a country of emigration, referring particularly to waves of labour migration to Western Europe since the 1960s (Icduygu and Yukseker, 2012, p. 442 SO-3). However, since the 2000s Turkey can also be considered a destination country for various groups of migrants (de Haas, 2011b SO-4; Icduygu and Yukseker, 2012, p. 442 SO-3).

More recently, Turkey has also come to be considered a 'transit' country for various migratory groups. There are at least three separate migratory patterns: transit migration, circular labour migration, mainly from poorer post-Soviet states and Iraq and Iran, and refugee movements. Turkey's geographical position between Europe and Asia, bordering low-income Central Asian states as well as politically unstable countries in the Middle East, may be one reason for its popularity as a transit and destination country (Icduygu and Yukseker, 2012, p. 442 SO-3).

As a signatory to the 1951 Refugee Convention, but not the 1967 Protocol, which lifts the geographical limitation to European countries, most asylum-seekers arriving in Turkey receive 'temporary protection' status, which allows them to apply for resettlement through the UNHCR to other countries (Icduygu and Yukseker, 2012, p. 449 SO-3). In this sense, their status can be understood as transient or temporary. 'Temporary protection' status affords asylum-seekers some security, whilst leaving them free to seek resettlement in a European country. According to Kirisci and Ferris (2015 SO-2), UNHCR data from 2014 shows that Turkey was hosting more than two million Syrian refugees, straining Turkish economic resources and eroding political will to continue to support this inflow. A lack of international cooperation on sharing the responsibility for Syrian refugees, in terms of both financial assistance and resettlement, is likely to mean that many Syrians are trying to 'self-resettle' in Europe (Kirisci and Ferris, 2015 SO-2).

Libya

Historically, patterns of emigration from North African countries can be divided into two main groups: migration from the Maghreb (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) to Europe; and migration from Egypt, mainly to the Gulf states (Kassar et al., 2014, p. 2 SS-3). By 2014 Morocco had become an important transit country for migration from North Africa to Europe, with France as the primary destination, followed by Italy and Spain (Kassar et al., 2014, p. 4 SS-3). Sub-Saharan Africans have increasingly

joined Maghreb migrants in their attempts to cross the Mediterranean irregularly (Collyer and de Haas, 2012, p. 474 C-4). This has meant that several North African countries have gradually become countries of settlement and transit, representing a structural change in this traditional pattern of migration (de Haas, 2011b, p. 562 SO-4).

In the current crisis many migrants taking the Central Mediterranean route have departed from Libya. While Libya has a history of immigration from other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa and the Horn (Fargues and Bonfanti, 2014; RMMS, 2014, p. 17 SO-3), the political instability caused by the collapse of Gaddafi's regime has seen large numbers of people from countries such as Sudan, Somalia, Eritrea, and Chad leave the country for Italy, Malta, Egypt, Tunisia, or Algeria (RMMS, 2014, pp. 42–3 PC-7). In recent years, especially since the beginning of 2013, many Syrians have also passed through Libya in an attempt to enter Europe via irregular means (RMMS, 2014, pp. 42–3 PC-7).

There are numerous reasons why people currently living as irregular migrants in Libya may choose to migrate across the Mediterranean. Firstly, conditions in Libya are in violation of international standards: Libya is not a signatory to the 1951 Convention, UNHCR has no official status, and migrants may be arrested if found to be in the country irregularly (Altai Consulting, 2015; RMMS, 2014 PC-7). In addition to arbitrary arrest and prolonged detention, migrants also face risks such as labour exploitation. Syrians and Palestinians, as well as religious minorities, are vulnerable to attacks by militia groups, while Sub-Saharan Africans in general may experience racism or exploitation (Altai Consulting, 2015 PC-7; RMMS, 2014, pp. 51–62 PC-7). Finally, migrants may be at risk of human trafficking for forced labour or sexual exploitation, in which smugglers may be working in collusion with the authorities (RMMS, 2014, pp. 51–62 PC-7).

Predicting future trends

Future trends of migration flows and patterns are extremely difficult to predict. The evidence is generally weak in terms of high-quality published sources, which tend to focus on the factors influencing migration trends and flows, rather than on actual trends themselves. This is largely due to the difficulty of predicting changes in the drivers of migration, including political unrest, conflict and economic change. The difficulty of accurately predicting trends was confirmed by the experts consulted for this study. This section is largely based on a study by de Haas (2011b SO-4) which focuses on scenarios for patterns of migration in the Mediterranean over the next 50 years. Although we recognise the limitations of this approach, we believe that this study, by one of the most prominent migration scholars, provides a unique example of a methodology and analytical framework to approach this complex question.

De Haas' study examines migration trends since the 1950s from Southern Mediterranean countries (such as Morocco, Tunisia, and Egypt) to Northern Mediterranean ones (such as Italy, Spain, and Greece), in relation to the broader geographical, social, political, and economic factors affecting past and current migration in the region. The methodology examines moments of rupture and changes in past migration patterns to identify the most important drivers of change and determinants of future migration patterns. For each of these drivers, the author assesses the relative level of certainty and uncertainty with regard to future patterns (de Haas, 2011b, p. 560 SO-4). Based on this analysis De Haas proposes two main possible scenarios for future migration patterns to Europe from Southern Mediterranean countries. These are not strict predictions or forecasts, but rather plausible deductions about what might happen following a change in the most relevant migration drivers. 'As such they are not expected to necessarily come true, but rather to present conceivable future developments in migration trends' (de Haas, 2011b, p. 560 SO-4).

Two possible scenarios discussed by de Haas are:

1. The expanding Euro-Mediterranean core'. In this scenario, Southern Mediterranean countries undergo a period of significant economic growth and political change leading to EU expansion and liberalisation, to include countries such as Turkey and Tunisia. The easing of barriers to migration between existing Northern Mediterranean EU countries and new EU Southern Mediterranean countries will lead to a brief temporary increase in emigration from Southern to Northern countries. With time, this type of migration will turn into a more circular movement. De Haas also suggests that Turkey will become a migration destination, including from Eastern Europe, Central Asia and North Africa. The successive transformation of Southern Mediterranean countries from emigration to destination countries will also lead to increased migration from Sub-Saharan Africa and Central Asia. Within this scenario, de Haas imagines European policies to be relatively liberal for both high- and increasingly low-skilled workers due to global economic competition and labour demand (de Haas, 2011b, p. 567 SO-4). De Haas also suggests that, in addition to Turkey, it is possible that countries such as Tunisia and Morocco will evolve into migration destination countries in 2020–30, if economic growth improves, along with institutional reform and political stability (de Haas, 2011b, p. 565 SO-4).
2. The second scenario is one of 'decline and nationalism'. This sees the coupling of economic stagnation in Southern Mediterranean countries and growing inequalities with Northern Mediterranean countries

with a rise in nationalism and xenophobia in Northern Mediterranean countries. In this scenario, a combination of economic crisis, human rights abuse and growing aspirations in Southern Mediterranean countries would lead to continuing migration towards Northern Mediterranean countries. However, due to nationalism and increasingly restrictive immigration policies in Northern countries, these flows would be mainly irregular. Authoritarian Southern Mediterranean regimes will continue to tolerate emigration. Emigration from Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to grow, though at a slower pace compared to the first scenario (de Haas, 2011b, p. 568 SO-4).

While it is difficult to make predictions, it is likely that potential future EU integration and expansion will be a key determinant of regional trends, as it is likely to increase overall stability and economic growth in the region (de Haas, 2011b, p. 567 SO-4). Past experience in Spain, Portugal, and Greece indicates that EU expansion does not necessarily result in a significant increase in permanent migration, but might instead lead to more circular migration. 'However, a temporary increase in emigration after EU membership is also possible, as the more recent East European example suggests, particularly from countries which offer low levels of social security' (de Haas, 2011b, p. 567 SO-4).

The future and pace of political and institutional reform in Southern Mediterranean countries such as Turkey and Egypt is an even more important factor in determining future migration patterns. These are not likely to affect the region in a uniform way. As de Haas notes: 'political trends in Turkey and Egypt since the 1970s provide contrasting examples of the diverse pathways future political trends may take. While Turkey has combined democratisation, institutional reform and economic growth, Egypt descended into a permanent state of emergency and autocratic rule by a small elite, with high levels of political discontent' (de Haas, 2011b, p. 566 SO-4).

Demographic trends appear to be more marginal determinants of migration drivers (de Haas, 2011b, p. 568 SO-4). They also appear to be more predictable, especially until 2030, given existing birth rates and comparatively stable patterns of ageing and mortality. It is likely that reductions in fertility and birth rates in all Southern Mediterranean countries in the 1960s and 1970s will lead to a reduction in population growth (de Haas, 2011b, p. 568 SO-4). (This contrasts with Sub-Saharan Africa, where birth rates are very high.) In combination with political stability, democratization, growing equality and economic growth, this may lead to increased growth and immigration to Southern Mediterranean countries, 'a phase which Turkey might already have entered' (de Haas, 2011b, p. 568 SO-4).

The overall finding from de Haas's analysis is that the future of migration to Europe is unlikely to be 'business as usual', based on 'demographic trends and the fact that demand for high- and low-skilled labour will continue to attract migrants from outside the EU and that there is significant chance that those migrant will come from increasingly geographically distant countries' (de Haas, 2011b, p. 565 SO-4). Reflecting on the two scenarios described by de Haas, it appears that the current situation is much closer to the second scenario than the first, with Turkey already a destination country for some. The attacks in Paris on 13 November, media reporting conflating terrorism with migration, and public perceptions of the migration crisis are likely to shape government responses, although it is not possible to say what form these will take.

Conclusion

There is a clear and ongoing increase in the number of people attempting to enter Europe via the three main routes in the Central Mediterranean, Western Balkans, and Eastern Mediterranean. Although data collected by UNHCR and Frontex differs due to the different indicators they use to measure irregular migration, it is evident that the number of people migrating to Europe via irregular means is rising. It is also clear from the available data that the routes used to enter Europe irregularly have and continue to change. In 2015, greater numbers of migrants have been recorded entering Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route, and migrants are using new and different crossing points across the Aegean.

It is also clear from studies on irregular migration to Europe that migration flows must be understood as trajectories which may cover many years as migrants settle in a country but later move on to another, or return to their home country as conditions change. It is thus very difficult to accurately monitor migration, especially irregular migration, using categories such as 'transit migration' or 'asylum-seeker'. As such, statistical data can only provide an indication of the nature of migration flows. Predicting future migration flows based on existing statistical data is also very challenging, and requires a detailed understanding of the factors shaping different migration flows. It appears that, in order to predict large changes in migration flows, future conflicts, revolutions, and other instances of severe political and economic instability must also be foreseen, which is of course problematic.

Although the evidence base on the nature of the current crisis clearly shows that the majority of people migrating irregularly to Europe are of Syrian, Eritrean, Afghan, or Kosovan nationality, the reasons why people from these countries are migrating to Europe are very different. Therefore, any policy or programme which aims to influence the current flow of irregular migration to Europe needs to be based on a thorough understanding of the differing motivating factors behind the current crisis, the relationship between regular and irregular migration, and the role which social networks and information sources have in shaping who is migrating, where and how. The current evidence on these issues is discussed in sections 4 and 5.

Evidence review: deciding factors

Key findings:

The reasons why people migrate are often multiple and changing, and the categories of 'economic migrant' and 'asylum-seeker' are too rigid to reflect reality. There are many shared motivations for regular and irregular migration.

Having the capability and economic means to migrate is particularly important; in conflict situations people may be very keen to migrate, but may not have sufficient resources to do so.

Lack of economic opportunities in the country of origin and the hope of greater opportunities in another country are important drivers of irregular migration, though expectations vary according to the nature and reliability of the sources of information individual migrants have.

Irregular migration is usually a collective effort in which families and social and religious networks play a crucial role. Irregular migrants are commonly supported financially by friends or family; as migration from a society becomes common, a 'culture of migration' may emerge in communities of origin which drives further migration.

Many people who migrate irregularly use the services of smugglers or agents, who influence which destination is offered, promoted, or available, and the route taken. Smugglers' networks have become increasingly professionalised, in particular as a result of the ability of Syrian migrants to pay for more sophisticated services.

While tightening border security may change migration patterns and routes, migration policies are unlikely to influence the volume of people migrating. A person's need to leave their home is likely to be far more important to them than different countries' welfare and asylum support systems.

Trade and investment in a source country is likely to increase, not reduce, migration. It is not individuals from the poorest households who migrate to Europe, but rather those who have access to sufficient resources to pay for their journey.

This section addresses the following question:

What factors influence decisions to leave Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA and migrate to Europe via irregular means in this current crisis (with a focus on key source countries: Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia, and Ethiopia)?

Introduction: key factors influencing irregular migration

The literature on drivers of migration in general is substantial, but few studies examine the factors driving irregular migration specifically (Mbaye, 2014, p. 4 PS-7). There are many common motivations for regular and irregular migration, such as conflict and insecurity or a lack of economic opportunities (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 13 SS-4). This evidence review therefore discusses the factors influencing decisions to migrate via irregular means, but also draws on wider evidence (gathered non-systematically) of factors driving migration to Europe from the regions of interest.

With respect to the current migration crisis, it is difficult to distinguish between the numerous factors influencing migration for asylum or migration for work. The reasons for migration are often multiple and changing, and the categories of 'economic migrant' as opposed to 'asylum-seeker' are too rigid to reflect reality. The focus of this evidence review is therefore on the drivers of migration without legal means, rather than the category into which a person who is migrating could be placed.

This section begins by describing the definitional difficulties of examining the factors which determine a person's decision to migrate via irregular means. The impact of political and economic insecurity on the decision to migrate is then discussed, followed by a

review of further factors, such as personal characteristics, the influence of family, the role of smugglers and the emergence of a culture of migration. Finally, this section summarises the findings on the influence of broader, long-term forces shaping flows of irregular migration to Europe.

Definitional difficulties in understanding reasons for migration

A concept which is critical to this evidence review is the categorisation of refugees as 'involuntary' migrants (Bakewell, 2007 C-2) and to consider those who fall outside of this category as 'voluntary'. However, there are strong criticisms of this binary categorisation. Theorists have argued that, ultimately, there is always some degree of choice for all migrants even in the most constraining of situations, and understanding the specific reasons why an individual has left their country of origin is important for all groups of migrants (see for example Richmond, 1994 C-2; Van Hear, 1998 C-2). Equally important is the assertion that individuals can move between the categories of refugee and economic migrant, and indeed be present in both categories at the same time (Zimmerman, 2009 PS-5; 2011 PS-5).

Timmerman et al. (2014b, p. 224 PC-6) provide a general framework for factors which influence migration, whether regular or irregular, and categorise these factors as macro, meso, or micro. At the macro-level, factors which influence all migrants, albeit not necessarily in the same way, include immigration policies, the strength of a country's economy, and a country's political situation. At the meso-level are factors linking an individual migrant to wider society, such as social networks and whether a person lives in a region where migration is common. Factors at the micro-level concern personal characteristics, such as education, gender, ethnicity, and socio-economic status (Timmerman et al., 2014b, p. 224 PC-6). This framework emphasises that regular and irregular migration are not driven by one factor alone, but by numerous social, economic, political, and environmental issues (Loschmann et al., 2014, p. 6 SO-4). Given the constantly changing international context in which migration occurs, statistical analysis or scenario modelling cannot accurately explain how interactions between drivers at different levels result in decisions to migrate (de Haas, 2011b, p. 559 SO-4).

The transient nature of migration is especially important in understanding the drivers of irregular migration. Irregular migration does not always follow 'well-considered plans' (Schapendonk, 2012, p. 34 PS-7), and a migrant may come across different information while in a transit country, forming new contacts and finding new opportunities which change their intended destination (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 68 SS-4). It is thus highly problematic to consider the aspirations and capabilities which enable irregular migration as fixed and unchanging (De Clerk, 2015, p. 278 PS-6; Reitano, 2015, p. 17 SO-3) and it must also be recognised that the migration drivers, flows, and smuggling networks described in this review are also in a constant state of change.

Political insecurity and conflict

There is broad agreement in the literature that conflict often forces people to consider fleeing their home. However, it is unclear what specific triggers result in someone taking the decision to leave (Adikhari, 2013, p. 82 PS-6). For example, looking at why Ethiopian and Somali refugees had left their home countries, it was found that people often undergo a waiting period, attempting to make-do until the political situation improves (Zimmerman, 2011, p. 47 PS-6). Often, changes in personal circumstances, such as access to income, property, or health, within the broader context of insecurity, lead to a person eventually deciding to flee (Zimmermann, 2011, p. 64 PS-6). Adhikari (2013, p. 83 PS-6) describes the decision of whether or not to flee conflict in terms of opportunity cost: 'people tend to stay in their homes and villages when the opportunity cost of fleeing, measured in terms of forgone economic opportunity at the place of origin as well as one's attachment to home, outweighs a physical threat to life'. While political insecurity and conflict may increase a person's desire to migrate, a repressive state may prevent people from leaving, as in Eritrea, or, if economic opportunities are still present, political repression may not automatically provoke mass migration, as shown by the Gulf countries (de Haas, 2011b, p. 563 SO-4). This underlines the importance of economic as well as personal security in the decision to migrate.

Having the capability to migrate is a particularly important factor in understanding migration flows. In a situation of conflict, people may not have sufficient resources to migrate even if their intention to migrate is high (IMI and RMMS, 2012, p. 10 PS-6). For example, a large decrease in the number of Somali migrants arriving in Yemen in early 2010 is thought to be due to a deterioration in the situation in Somalia, which meant fewer resources to fund the journey. Disruption to transport systems due to conflict may also constrain people's ability to migrate (IMI and RMMS, 2012, p. 10 PS-6).

With respect to current irregular migration to Europe, several situations of political instability in countries of origin are thought to be contributing to this in-flow of people, including the conflict in Syria and instability in Libya and Tunisia. Natter (2015 SO-3) reports that 'Libya's political and economic instability, civil war, and growing Islamist threat have prompted thousands of Libyans and foreigners to leave', many of whom have entered Tunisia or been repatriated to countries such as Egypt, Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria and Gambia. Likewise, political instability in Tunisia during the Arab Spring resulted in an increase

in irregular migration to Europe as border security was disrupted (Natter, 2015 SO-3).

Economic security and opportunity

Political insecurity and conflict cannot be considered in isolation from the wider impact political instability can have on economic opportunities and the labour market. As de Haas (2011b, p. 563 SO-4) explains, 'Taken together, such factors will determine the extent to which people can fulfil their life aspirations locally and, hence, their aspirations and intentions to migrate as a perceived way to achieve their life'. Zimmerman (2009, p. 93 PS-5) finds that Somali refugees chose to continue their journey beyond the closest areas of safety to countries where they believed they could attain a greater quality of life, not just immediate safety. The study argues that 'safety was not all that they [refugees] sought because it was not all that they had lost'. Thus, rigid distinctions between migration to seek asylum and migration to seek economic opportunity are unhelpful in understanding migration flows (Zimmerman, 2009, p. 93 PS-5).

It is unsurprising, therefore, that a lack of economic opportunities in the country of origin and the hope of greater opportunities for work in a European country are important drivers of irregular migration (e.g. Czaika and Hobolth, 2014, p. 17 SO-4; Wissink et al., 2013, p. 1094 PS-8). A UNHCR study (2010, p. 15 PS-7) found that many young Afghan migrants to Europe had previously been working in Iran, where work opportunities were better than in their home country. However, economic opportunities in Iran have been decreasing and hostility towards Afghan migrants has been rising, prompting them to make the more difficult and dangerous journey to seek work in Europe instead. Similarly, a study of irregular migration from Senegal to Europe found that the prospect of greater economic opportunity in Europe – in particular, the presence of large informal economies in Spain and Italy – was an important factor motivating attempts to migrate there (Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007, p. 11 PS-6).

The importance of economic opportunity in driving irregular migration is reflected in the risks which migrants take in travelling via irregular means to Europe. While a migrant's understanding of the risks they are taking is dependent on their own experience and that of other migrants (Wissink et al., 2013, p. 1099 PS-8), studies show that irregular migrants generally have a very high tolerance of risk. For example, a study by Mbaye (2014, p. 10 PS-7) found that 'half [of potential illegal migrants from Senegal] think there is a risk of death higher or equal to 25%' and that 'the vast majority of the sample of potential illegal migrants (77%) reported that they are willing to risk their life in order to emigrate', thus underlining the strength of their intention to migrate despite the current absence of conflict in Senegal.

Numerous factors may shape a migrant's expectations of the possible standard of living available in a European country, including information available via the Internet and social media, information from contacts who have already migrated, and advertisements by companies invested in international migration, such as Western Union (Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007, p. 9 PS-6). Migrants already established in Europe may feel a social pressure to report positively on their new life to their relatives, which in turn encourages others to migrate. Private sector actors, such as banks and internet sites, should also be considered agents in facilitating and motivating international migration (Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007, p. 9 PS-6). The role of the Internet, technology and communication tools in facilitating and influencing the nature of migration networks is discussed further in Section 5.

Evidence suggests that the importance of different countries' welfare and asylum support systems as a pull factor for migration is weak. One study reports that the need to leave their home country is of far more importance to migrants than their destination, and that few asylum-seekers arriving in the UK had specific knowledge of the benefits they may be eligible for (Robinson and Segrott, 2002, p. 27 PS-7). However, differences in particular countries' systems for receiving migrants may influence the decision to continue on to another destination, including within the EU (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 59 SS-4): 'onward movements are also caused by a lack of social, economic and legal opportunities in the first country of arrival. This could include unfair asylum procedures and/or lack of local integration prospects for refugees, unviable economic conditions, generally hostile environments, e.g. discrimination, racism, racial violence and police harassment' (Triandafyllidou, 2009, p. 101 SO-4). Conditions for migrants arriving in countries such as Greece and Italy are very difficult and the wait for refugee status is long, so migrants choose to move on (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 59 SS-4). Hostility towards Africans in Istanbul has also been a factor prompting them to move on (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 59 SS-4). Likewise, refugees arriving in Ukraine were motivated to continue to Western Europe because they saw the limited humanitarian support there as a sign that establishing themselves in Ukraine would be difficult (Rechitsky, 2014, p. 175 PS-6).

Personal characteristics

Factors driving irregular migration inevitably vary between individuals, and numerous personal characteristics influence whether or not a person chooses to migrate. Studies commonly report that the majority of irregular migrants are male, unmarried, in their early 20s, and have low levels of education (Heering et al., 2007, p. 334 PS-6; Loschmann et al., 2014, p. 3 PS-6; Mbaye, 2014, p. 7

PS-7). While it is not uncommon for irregular migrants to have secondary-level education, those with a higher level of education generally have more opportunities to migrate legally (Mbaye, 2014, p. 15 PS-7). With respect to gender, a study by Heering et al. (2007, p. 326 PS-6) identified three reasons for a woman to migrate: '(1) the traditional motivation as trailing spouse; (2) to work in the city or abroad to earn money for the family; and (3) a way out from a life with a traditional dependent status, and away from obedience to male kin.' The first of these motivations is likely to be by far the most common, but women who may have a low level of education but who are still able to secure domestic work may have a strong motivation to migrate (Heering et al., 2007, p. 334 PS-6). The relationship between gender and migration is discussed in greater detail in Section 5.

Migration as a family affair

Irregular migration is usually a collective effort: irregular migrants are commonly supported financially by friends or family, and are more likely to travel with acquaintances than with their family (Loschmann et al., 2014, p. 13 PS-6). This suggests that irregular migration may at times be part of a household strategy to increase income (Loschmann et al., 2014, p. 19 PS-6; Loschmann and Siegel, 2014, p. 145 SO-4). Kibreab's (2013, p. 644 PS-6) study of Eritrean migration underlines the importance of financial support at the outset of a migrant's journey to cover smugglers' fees and bribes for government officials. At the other end of the journey, the prospect of being able to send remittances back is identified as a key driver for young Eritreans to migrate, as is the potential for family reunification in the destination country (Kibreab, 2013, p. 644 PS-6). It may also inform a migrant's decision to migrate to a particular European country (Robinson and Segrott, 2002, p. 42 PS-7).

A culture of migration

A culture of migration is discussed in numerous studies as a factor driving regular and irregular migration. According to de Haas (2011c, p. 22 C-3), 'migration processes tend to become partly self-perpetuating, leading to the formation of migrant networks and migration systems'. As networks and systems get stronger, it becomes easier for migrants to overcome obstacles to migration, and thus migration is likely to become self-reinforcing (de Haas, 2011c, p. 22 C-3). As migration from a community or society becomes common, this behaviour is normalised and expected. Heering et al. (2007, p. 325 PS-6) report that 'over time foreign labour migration becomes integrated into the structure of values and expectations of families and communities. As a result, young people contemplating entry into the labour force do not consider other options'. Similarly, Schapendonk and van Moppes (2007, p. 8 PS-6) find that 'the investments of migrants in their families or local communities are a strong encouraging factor for other families and communities, who do not yet have members abroad, to start their own migration project'. Certainly, community members seem to notice the benefits other families receive from relatives who have migrated, and feel poor in comparison, which strengthens others' intentions to migrate (Mbaye, 2014, p. 5 PS-7). A culture of migration is very significant in driving male migration, but not statistically significant for women, for whom the presence of a family network in a foreign country is a stronger driver (Heering et al., 2007, p. 334 PS-6). Social pressure to migrate also comes from religious communities. In their study of Senegalese migration, Schapendonk and van Moppes (2007, p. 8 PS-6) found that religious leaders often urge individuals to migrate in order to support their religious community through remittances. The varying importance of a culture of migration on the decision to migrate is discussed in more detail in Section 5.

The influence of migrant smugglers

As noted earlier, an important difference in regular and irregular migration is the influence of migrant smugglers on the ability of a person to migrate by irregular means. A review by Kuschminder et al. (2015, p. 56 SS-4) found that smugglers influence irregular migration in three key ways: '1) the routes and destination choices that they offer (or exclude) to the migrant, 2) in making the destination decision for the migrant, and 3) in deviating from an agreement with a migrant and delivering/leaving them in a different destination than agreed'. The extent to which a smuggler determines a migrant's destination depends upon the nature of their relationship, which could simply be a financial transaction or could be more exploitative (Wissink et al., 2013, p. 1100 PS-8).

Smuggling networks are becoming increasingly important, and increasingly professionalised. One study notes that 'the number of Eritrean migrant facilitators arrested by the EU in 2014 grew by four-fold [and that] cases of document fraud committed by Eritrean nationals has grown by threefold since the previous year' (Reitano, 2015, p. 9 SO-3). One important driver in the professionalisation of smuggling is thought to be the relative wealth of Syrian migrants, which enables them to pay for more sophisticated services (Reitano, 2015, p. 7 SO-3). The importance of contact with smugglers is discussed in further detail with respect to social networks in Section 5.

Asylum policy and border control

The influence of a country's system for processing asylum applications and the strength of its border controls is important to the flow of irregular migration to Europe (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 59 SS-4). Changes to

immigration policies can influence the routes irregular migrants take; for example, when visa regimes were made more open in Turkey and in the Western Balkans, there was an increase in migrants using these countries as transit routes (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 46 SS-4). A number of studies have concluded that efforts to intensify border controls have resulted in migrants seeking other, sometimes more dangerous, routes into Europe (e.g. Czaika and Hobolth, 2014, p. 19 SO-4; Duvell, 2009, p. 2 SO-4; Reitano, 2015, p. 13 SO-3). Tightening border security in Southern Europe has resulted in a proliferation of new migration routes across the Mediterranean (de Haas, (2011b, p. 561 SO-4). As border controls between Libya and Italy increased in 2009, irregular migration into Europe moved to Greece, via Turkey. More recently, as security at the Turkish border with Greece has been increased, more migrants have been using sea routes or entering via Bulgaria (Kuschminder et al., 2015, p. 52 SS-4).

While tightening border security may change migration patterns, migration policies are unlikely to influence the volume of people migrating (de Haas, 2011c, p. 26 C-3). Czaika and Hobolth (2014, p. 19 SO-4) report that, while increasing the restrictiveness of asylum policy appears to reduce the number of asylum applications, it also appears to increase the number of people migrating irregularly to the extent that 'the deflection effect may balance out or even exceed the deterrence effect'. According to Mbaye (2014, p. 14 PS-7), 'restrictive immigration policies may be less effective in staving off illegal migration and can incite potential migrants to turn to illegal methods'. Similarly, the Clandestino Project (Duvell, 2009, p. 2 SO-4) argues that inefficient or complicated regulations and policies for managing migration contribute to migrants choosing to ignore formal systems and entering via irregular means instead.

Broader development progress

Socio-economic development in source countries will continue to enable migration to Europe. The relationship between development and migration has been described as a 'migration hump', explaining that it is not individuals from the poorest households who migrate to Europe, but rather those who have access to sufficient resources to pay for their journey (de Haas, 2011b, p. 562 SO-4; Loschmann and Siegel, 2014, p. 145 SO-4). De Haas (2011b, p. 562 SO-4) states that 'the combination of modest levels of economic development and education (which enable and inspire people to migrate) and relative poverty (or deprivation) on the one hand, and the persistence of significant opportunity gaps with geographically proximate countries on the other' drives people to migrate. Patterns showing that 'middle income countries have the highest average levels of emigration' reflect this theory, and support the understanding that trade and investment in a source country reinforces, rather than reduces, emigration (2011b, p. 562 SO-4).

The growing youth population in the Horn of Africa may also drive further migration from the region. Increasing employment and education opportunities in these countries would be unlikely to counteract this since people migrate not only to seek better education opportunities, but also to earn higher wages for their labour (IMI and RMMS, 2012, p. 19 PS-6). As de Haas (2007, p. 833 SO-3) concludes: 'as long as aspirations increase faster than the livelihood opportunities in sending regions and countries, social and economic development will tend to coincide with sustained or increased out-migration'. The significant differences in opportunities in European countries and Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa and the Middle East will not disappear quickly; if immigration into Europe from these regions continues to be restricted, it is likely that high levels of irregular migration will also persist (IMI and RMMS, 2012, p. 27 PS-6).

Conclusion

It is clear from the evidence that the factors influencing an individual's decision to migrate via irregular means operate at a number of levels. International and national policies, economic conditions, and political situations are important in determining why a person of a particular nationality may migrate. However, there are many other factors related to a person's own circumstances, the culture of their community, and their local and wider social network which can encourage or prevent them from migrating. Several factors seem to be particularly important: personal security from conflict, economic opportunity and security to rebuild and improve their and their family's life, and having the financial resources to be able to migrate. The literature is clear that, in the current crisis, the factors influencing a person's decision to migrate irregularly differ for different nationalities and for individuals, and that these factors may change en route and over time. For those who chose to migrate despite lacking the legal means, their access to smuggling networks and their experiences in the different countries they cross are also important factors which shape where and how they decide to migrate. Finally, the influence of varying types of social network is particularly important in informing migrants' decisions and capacity to migrate. The role of social networks is discussed in more detail in the following section.

Evidence review: social networks

Key findings:

Kinship, religious and other social networks play a key role in the decision to migrate, and in determining migration journeys and return. This includes the role of family members in host countries, who may encourage prospective migrants through remittances and information.

Migrants proactively seek information from broader networks and are exposed to information through mass media, word of mouth and social media.

Technology has changed the ways in which social networks operate in relation to migration. TV and mobile technology remain a main source of information for migrants, but recent evidence points to the increasing role of online and social media.

Internet-based technology and social media are putting different groups of migrants and non-migrant populations in direct contact. However, the documentation on the use of mobile social media is almost exclusively confined to Syrians.

Local social networks often involve ties with other migrants, and with smugglers. Migrants often provide each other with reciprocal support for day-to-day subsistence, sharing food and accommodation, as well as information on travel routes and destinations. These local networks are often informal and kept 'under the radar'.

This section addresses the following question:

What is the evidence on the role that social networks (peer, family, others) play in decisions to migrate?

Introduction: the role of networks in migration

Theory and research on social networks is very well established in studies of migration. As early as the late nineteenth century connections were being made between migrants' links back to their country of origin and growing numbers of migrants. In 1907, the US Commissioner General for Immigration recognised the power of positive stories transmitted back home by immigrants via letters and during visits, and said of transatlantic migration that 'almost innumerable "endless chains" are thus daily being forged link by link' (Commissioner General, 1907, p. 60 cf. Herman, 2006 p. 198 PC-6). Commentators have highlighted the vital importance of understanding how migrant networks influence migration at different stages of the migration process, and how migrant networks can affect outcomes for migrants, their families and their wider communities (Poros, 2011 C-2). This section outlines the evidence on the role of social networks in decisions to migrate, especially within the context of contemporary migrations to Europe. Firstly, an overview of network theory and how it has been studied in the context of migration from MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa is offered. Secondly, a discussion of theory and evidence to support a more nuanced understanding of migration networks is put forward. Following this is an extended discussion focused on the role of technology, communication tools and online media in migration networks. Finally, studies of migrant social networks in 'transit locations' are scrutinised, before concluding remarks are made on the state of the evidence.

Understanding migration networks

Network theory, which has developed significantly in migration studies over the past few decades, demonstrates how migrants in places of origin and destination are connected through ties of kinship, friendship, and ethnicity. According to this theory, 'an expanding network increases the likelihood of migration, as the social capital that lies embedded in these personal ties reduces the costs and risks of migration' (Herman, 2006, p. 198 PC-6). These

networks operate at different scales – from personal ties such as family and friends, to broad patterns of social links or 'migration channels' (Gold, 2005 SO-3).

A number of studies were retrieved during the literature search that shed light on some of the ways that networks at different levels can help to illuminate migration dynamics. In one of the few cross-country studies on migration networks found in this literature search, Barthel and Neumayer (2015 SO-4) find evidence of substantial 'spatial dependence' in asylum migration among geographically proximate source countries: i.e. a migrant may draw on networks of support which include migrants from other source countries which are similar to their own (Barthel and Neumayer, 2015, p. 1132 SO-4). Complementing this macro-level study, a number of researchers have drawn from case studies to illuminate the role of networks at the level of the individual. Herman's (2006 PC-6) study of migration from Morocco and Senegal to Spain, and from Egypt and Ghana to Italy, confirms the importance of family networks in the propensity and ability to migrate. In her study, the strength of a migrant's ties largely determined the amount of assistance that their network could provide. In other words, friends and acquaintances provided the least assistance, and family the most. However, for those who had migrated irregularly, help was received predominantly from friends, rather than relatives.

In their research on Senegalese migration to Europe, Schapendonk and van Moppes also confirm the importance of 'traditional migration encouraging factor[s]', including settled migrants in the host country. Settled migrants, according to the authors, send financial support (remittances) and 'pre-ordained positive information' back home, and as a result both directly and indirectly encourage the migration of other family or community members (Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007, p. 2 PS-6)

Gender, migration and social networks

A growing body of research has documented the influence of social networks in international migration and important gender differences in the migration process, though research integrating these two aspects is rare. Most research has assumed that networks affect male and female mobility in the same way (Toma and Vause, 2010, p. 1 SO-4). More recent work has attempted to correct this bias. Toma and Vause, in their longitudinal study of Congolese (Democratic Republic of Congo) and Senegalese migrant networks, identify several ways in which gender affects migrant networks in these contexts. Firstly, men's networks tend to be larger and more diffuse, whereas women's are smaller and most often composed exclusively of close family members. Women are also much less likely to move to a place where no member of their network is located. Another study using the same data set (Liu, 2013 SO-4) reaches similar conclusions: for men, non-household migrant networks have significant effects on migration, whereas household migrant networks are most significant for female migration. There is, however, significant 'spouse bias' in these findings (i.e. when women migrate to join husbands), which exaggerates these household network effects.

In an earlier study on Moroccan family networks and migration culture, Heering et al. (2007) find further differences in the factors driving men and women to migrate. Their analysis found that migration intentions are stronger for men living in regions with a migration culture, and that the presence of family networks overseas has a slightly negative effect on these intentions. Conversely, for women, living in a region with a migration culture has no effect on migration intentions, whereas family networks abroad seem to have a positive effect on intentions to move. They also reveal a difference between women in employment 'who judge their financial situation negatively' and 'more conservative Moroccan women'. The former have the highest migration intentions, whereas the latter are unlikely to have intentions of migrating independently (Heering et al., 2007, p. 323 PS-6). Combined, these studies point to important differences between female and male migration networks, and the important role that gender norms play in determining these differences.

No studies were found that investigated gender and migrant social networks in Eastern Africa or the Middle East. Since the majority of migrants currently arriving in Europe are from these regions, this constitutes a significant gap in the evidence. Only one study (Koser Akcapar, 2010 PS-6) found in the literature search discussed gender in relation to social networks in transit contexts. This is discussed in more detail later.

Dynamic and diffuse migration networks

Recent research has moved beyond traditional understandings of networks as static and unchanging entities to look at the dynamic nature of networks and the ways in which they always also involve networking i.e. the creation, maintenance and mobilisation of different networks at different times (Schapendonk, 2014 C-2; Poros, 2011 C-2). Schapendonk's research with Sub-Saharan African migrants highlights the changeability of network connections (new ties and lost ties, changing power relations and new forms of exchange), the effort required to create and maintain social networks, and the relational aspect of networks (Schapendonk 2014 C-2). Schapendonk and others consider the ways in which networks evolve during the migration journey, between origin and destination. This is exemplified by studies of migrants in 'transit' locations, and will be discussed further below.

Related to this more nuanced understanding of networks is the idea that the feedback mechanisms that influence migration patterns are not limited to direct social

networks. These are 'absent ties' (Granovetter, 1973 cf. Bakewell and Jolivet 2015, PC-6), or broadcast feedback. Broadcast feedback can be: (i) induced, i.e. information is sought out by a prospective migrant; (ii) general, i.e. information on migration is disseminated indiscriminately to a wide audience by the mass media; or (iii) embedded, i.e. when images and ideas are transmitted either through visible signs or through stories and rumours that indicate the condition of migrants lives (ibid., pp. 6–7). Feedback through direct social networks and through these broader mechanisms is especially relevant to discussions about technology and communication tools in migration, and are investigated in more detail later in this section.

When settled migrants discourage additional migration

Studies of migration networks have tended to assume that the existence of social networks perpetuates migration movements. More recently, however, studies have emerged that point to the role of networks in discouraging migration (Timmerman et al., 2014a, p. 500 PS-5; see also Engberson, 2013 PS-7). For example, there is evidence that settled migrants may deliberately seek to reduce further migration from within their social networks. In their study of declining migration rates between Morocco and the Netherlands, Snel et al. find that Moroccan-born residents in the Netherlands are willing to provide substantially less assistance to potential migrants than they received during their own migration (Snel et al., 2013, p. 3 PS-7). They argue that, in the case of the Netherlands, macro-level developments, such as declining work opportunities, more restrictive immigration policies and growing hostility in public opinion towards immigrants, have not just direct negative effects on migration rates, but also affect the willingness of settled migrants to support potential newcomers (ibid., p. 11, See also Engberson, 2013 PS-7).

Technology, social networks and migration

The role of technology and communications tools in migration has gained increasing prominence in studies of social networks and migration. Modern means of communication, especially TV and the Internet, shape perceptions towards migration and expose people to the idea of migrating (Timmerman et al., 2014 PS-5, Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007 PS-6). Schapendonk and van Moppes, in their study of migration aspirations in Senegal, find that biased images of wealth and Western luxury spread by these media contribute in the eyes of young people in particular to 'the widely acknowledged view that "Senegal is misery and Europe is paradise"' (Schapendonk and van Moppes PS-6 2007, p. 2 PS-6). However, although many Senegalese migrants arrive in Europe misinformed and ill-prepared, a large number of migrants, possibly even the majority, are aware of and ready for the difficult conditions they may face in Europe, underlining their determination to migrate.

Several scholars demonstrate the importance of mobile telephones in migration. Collyer, for example, claims that trans-Saharan migration 'would be virtually impossible without cheap mobile communications' (Collyer, 2007 cf. Schaub, 2012, p. 127 PS-6). Schaub's research with Congolese migrants in Morocco concludes that mobile phones are central to the migration process, and that 'migrants draw on the unprecedented accessibility of contacts equipped with mobile phones to tie together novel, geographically expansive networks' (Schaub, 2012, p. 126 PS-6). Chatelard's (2005 PS-5) study of Iraqi migrants in Jordan argues that the country is an important migration hub because 'Iraqi prospective migrants to the West can … obtain information on where best to leave to by calling their relatives who are already in the West, or get information on asylum procedures via the Internet'.

New media sources, particularly social media, are playing an increasing role in communication between migrants in Western Europe and non-migrants in origin countries (Dekker et al., 2015 PC-6; Dekker and Engbersen, 2012 PS-8). These new media sources provide a forum where information, stories, photographs, and videos are exchanged, and, unlike traditional media, which mainly allows for one-to-one communication, online media are often also accessible to people beyond the migrant's direct social network (Dekker et al., 2015 PC-6). Dekker et al., in their study of migrants in four Western European destination countries (the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, and the UK) and non-migrants in three origin countries (Brazil, Morocco, and Ukraine), find that online media have become important channels of communication. Using social media helps migrants to maintain strong ties with family and friends, facilitates communication that can be useful in the migration process, establishes new networks, and is also 'a rich source of unofficial insider knowledge on migration' (Dekker and Engbersen, 2012, p. 2 PS-8).

Work by Dekker and Engberson (2012, p. 2 PS-8) finds that newly-established ties are only a small part of online transnational communication, but are actively transforming migration networks and facilitating migration (Dekker and Engberson, 2012, p. 4 PS-8). However, there are to date no quantitative studies that test the relationship between international migration decision-making and the use of online media (Dekker et al. 2015 PC-6). This is a significant gap in migration research.

'Facebook refugees'

A 2014 report from the Regional Mixed Migration Secretariat (RMMS) is the only publication by a research centre found during this evidence search that discusses social media in relation to irregular migration to Europe (RMMS, 2014 PS-6). In the study, many respondents highlighted using social media (including

Facebook, YouTube and online fora) to obtain up-to-date information, for instance on irregular migration routes and weather conditions.

The role of technology and the Internet as a tool in irregular migrations to Europe has been extensively reported in the mainstream press, notably Brunwasser's 2015 New York Times article entitled 'A 21st-Century Migrant's Essentials: Food, Shelter, Smartphone' (Brunwasser, 2015 J-2; see also Byrne and Solomon, 2015 J-2; New Scientist, 2015 J-2; Price, 2015 J-2; Watson et al., 2015 J-2). Brunwasser highlights the use of tools including smartphone maps, GPS apps, social media and messaging apps like WhatsApp by migrants travelling to Europe. Reporting from Belgrade, Serbia, he claims that migrants there 'depend on them to post real-time updates about routes, arrests, border guard movements and transport, as well as places to stay and prices, all the while keeping in touch with family and friends' (Brunwasser, 2015 J-2). Watson et al. (2015 J-2) for CNN quotes UNHCR official Alessandra Morelli as saying 'There's a lot of technology … the level of organization that I see here in this context is new', and that 'Facebook indeed is playing an incredible role'. Brunwasser explains that Syrians' migration journeys are helped by Arabic-language Facebook groups such as 'Smuggling into the EU', with over 23,000 members, and 'How To Emigrate to Europe', with more than 39,000. He indicates that traffickers and smugglers may also be connected to these online networks; on the Arabic-language Facebook group 'Trafficking to Europe', one 'trafficker' gives information on the costs and services provided for the journey from Turkey to Greece, and even offers a 50% discount for children under five. Brunwasser also suggests, however, that technological tools are allowing migrants to bypass smugglers and undertake large parts of their journeys independently.

Aid organisations are responding to the Internet capabilities of 'refugees from Syria and other countries' in Europe (IRC, 2015 SO-2). The International Rescue Committee (IRC), in partnership with Google and Mercy Corps, has recently launched a smartphone-accessible website providing up-to-date, location-specific information to refugees arriving in Europe (ibid. SO-2). Business Insider UK reports that aid workers in Belgrade have developed a web-based app providing information about essential services, such as the correct cost of taxis, toilet locations and places to buy food (Price, 2015 J-2). New Scientist recently ran an article featuring an interview with Kate Coyer, director of the Civil Society and Technology Project at Central European University in Budapest, who has been working with others in Hungary to provide power outlets and Wifi hotspots for migrants because 'people were desperately trying to find ways to charge their phones' (New Scientist, 2015 J-2).

These articles indicate some of the ways in which feedback mechanisms via the Internet and online social media platforms are being used to gather information and obtain assistance from networks that go far beyond family or kinship (2015 PC-6). This can come from official news sources, but also from public online forums where co-nationals and other stakeholders in the migration journey (in this case, smugglers) can feed information back to prospective migrants.

This evidence is of course anecdotal, and there has as yet been no systematic research on the role of technology and the Internet in current migration to Europe, nor any attempt to test the relationship between migration decision-making and online media use. In particular, the role of technology and the Internet in Syrian migration requires systematic research. One survey in the Za'atari refugee camp in Jordan found that '89% of respondents own a mobile handset and 85% own at least one SIM card', and 'more than 60% reported accessing the internet via their mobile phone only' (Maitland and Xu, 2015 PS-5). This may be indicative of a generally high level of mobile technological connectivity among Syrian refugees (migrants discussed in these news articles are exclusively Syrian). Although Brunwasser and Byrne and Soloman (for the Financial Times) suggest that these technological tools are used by migrants from across Africa and the Middle East, and previous research points to the use of mobile technology and the Internet by migrants of other nationalities, the RMMS report is the only source of information referencing the use of social media by migrants of other nationalities in current irregular migrations to Europe. Given that both migrants and non-migrants 'are likely to be subject to digital inequalities' (Dekker et al., 2015 PC-6), it is important not to generalise from these findings, especially since systematic research in this area is entirely absent.

Local and transnational ties in transit

As discussed earlier, both transnational and local ties are of great importance for migrants in transit contexts. Transnational networks radiate from the transit area back to the country of origin, and forward towards contacts in Europe and other destination countries. Local contacts are forged in the transit location, often with other migrants from the same ethnic group or religion, but also with others, including smugglers. Several studies have detailed the ways in which networks are being used in these contexts to cope with the day-to-day precariousness of being an irregular migrant in a transit zone, and to facilitate migrants' onward movements. Wissink et al.'s (2013 PS-8) study in Turkey concludes that local and transnational social networks were of utmost importance in a transit context where migration intentions are in the process of being shaped (these assertions have been mirrored in other studies, e.g. Schapendonk, 2014 C-2, Koser Akcapar, 2010 PS-6, Kuschminder et al., 2015 SO-4, Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007 PS-6). Much of this research in transit zones also demonstrates 'network

failures, disconnections, social frictions, and hard network work' (Schapendonk, 2014 C-2).

Maintaining and consolidating transnational contacts with relatives and close friends both at home and abroad, as well as creating other personal contacts through ethnic and religious links, are what Koser Akcapar says are 'the outcomes of living in a transit country' (Koser Akcapar 2010, PS-6). Wissink et al. argue that the financial and emotional support of transnational networks, both in the country of origin and with relatives in Europe, is vitally important in the formation of migrant intentions. In addition to this, some migrants maintained ties with other migrants whom they had met en route, but who had since reached Europe. According to Wissink et al., networks connecting migrants with their countries of origin influence the migration pathway by 'encouraging a certain strategy', whereas the existence of ties in Europe was mainly utilised in order to facilitate onward migration or to access resources for day-to-day subsistence (Wissink et al., 2013, p. 1098 PS-8).

These transnational links are not static, however, and can be subject to failures and disconnections over time. Wissink et al. show how support from a network can be interrupted if, for example, mobile phones are confiscated upon arrest, or if families abroad decide or are compelled to stop providing financial assistance (Wissink et al., 2013, p. 1098 PS-8). In his study of Iranian migrants in Turkey, Koser Akcapar suggests that, although existing contacts in Turkey can lower the initial costs of migration, they cannot be depended on for continuing support, especially if a migrant's stay is extended in another transit country. However, his study also demonstrates how local networks that are (re)created in Turkey among Iranians 'sometimes provide better opportunities and access to information and assistance' (Koser Akcapar, 2010, p. 185-6 PS-6).

Local social networks are key to understanding migration in transit locations. Migrants often provide each other with reciprocal support for day-to-day subsistence, sharing food and accommodation with fellow migrants in transit locations (Wissink et al. 2013, p. 1099 PS-8). According to Schapendonk and van Moppes, Sub-Saharan African migrants in Morocco 'form collectives, often along ethnic lines, in which information on security matters and work possibilities is shared' (Schapendonk and van Moppes 2007, p. 2 PS-6). Migrants also access information within these social networks about travel routes and destinations, informing their subsequent migration decisions and onward movements (Kuschminder et al., 2015 p. 60 SO-4). The transient nature of migrant populations in these locations means that these local networks are highly dynamic and changeable. Wissink et al.'s study in Turkey found that local ties are generally both weak and short-lived, but nevertheless vital for the exchange of information regarding onward migration to Greece (Wissink et al. 2013, p. 1,099 PS-8).

Despite the seemingly high levels of connectivity and information-sharing between migrants in transit contexts, individual migrants may keep certain information secret. Wissink et al. (2013 PS-8) and Schapendonk and van Moppes (2007 PS-6) argue that migrants do not tend to disclose concrete plans for border crossings, for fear that these plans may be jeopardised through disclosure to other migrants. Schapendonk and van Moppes even detect a level of competition between Sub-Saharan migrants in Morocco. Nevertheless, local, as well as transnational, networks clearly provide a vital resource for many migrants travelling to Europe (Schapendonk and van Moppes, 2007 PS-6).

Gender and religion in transit migration

The only study of social networks and transit migration found in the literature search that includes an extended discussion of gender is Koser Akcapar's (2010 PS-6) study of Iranian migrants in Turkey. Like studies of men's and women's social networks in countries of origin, his work suggests that gender affects the nature of an individual's networks. He argues that, in the context of Iranians in Turkey, men are obliged to work in the informal economy, while women are in touch with other members of their social groups, creating connections and sourcing information. Whilst some of his respondents retained links with Iran, and others received assistance and financial help from relatives in 'the West', women also worked to create new networks in Turkey to provide local mutual support. These networks, predominantly made up of close friends, co-ethnics/religionists, and kin, are similar to the networks respondents had in Iran (ibid., p. 183).

Koser Akcapar's research is also one of two key studies found that discuss the role of religious networks for migrants in transit (see also Chatelard, 2005). Both of these studies concern the role of Christian (and Baha'i, for Koser Akcapar) churches and networks and their connections with migrants. Chatelard's study of Iraqi migrants in Jordan discusses how, in the absence of relief from foreign NGOs or Jordanian institutions, Jordan's thriving Christian community and church charities provide assistance to Iraqis. She notes, however, that the vast majority of Iraqis connected to these charities are Christians or Sabeans, and, 'in practice, it is true that Christian charities offer some of their services more willingly to Christian than to Muslim Iraqis' (Chatelard, 2005 PS-5). Similarly, Koser Akcapar's study finds that non-Muslim social networks (i.e. Christian and Baha'i) offer more to Iranians than Islamic institutions (Koser Akcapar, 2010, p. 17 PS-6). Beyond basic assistance, Koser Akcapar argues that religion may also provide a way for migrants to forge new social networks, stating that some respondents 'received psychological, financial and institutional support from churches and Baha'i spiritual assemblies in Turkey and abroad'; others ended up

converting to Christianity (ibid.). He also mentions cases where Iranians have gained resettlement through sponsors found by the churches as a result of their global networks (ibid., pp. 180–81). These studies, though important in highlighting the role that factors such as gender and religion can have on social networks for migrants in transit locations, are both context- and time-specific. There also appears to be a gap in research on the role of identity characteristics, such as age and ethnicity, and reasons for migrating in shaping the networks of migrants of other nationalities during their journeys to Europe.

Conclusion

Social networks and information flows are vital components of migration systems and migrant decision-making. Despite this, evidence on the role of networks in current irregular migrations to Europe remains scarce. To quote Poros, policy-makers (and indeed researchers) 'might do well to focus more on the effects social networks can have on migration flows' in this rapidly evolving context (Poros, 2011 C-2). Gaps in evidence on the role of networks and information flows in the current crisis that require further investigation include: the role of networks in informing initial decisions to migrate; the role of networks during the journey and in transit locations; the way that technology, communication tools and online media are shaping these networks and affecting decisions; and how individual characteristics, such as age, gender and religion, relate to these networks. As the research outlined above demonstrates, a better understanding of migration networks is essential to developing a clearer picture of current movements from MENA and Sub-Saharan Africa to Europe.

Conclusion

This review has assessed the available evidence on key factors affecting irregular migration in the current Mediterranean crisis, and potential future changes. By definition the evidence on irregular migrants who enter a European country with a visa and overstay is difficult to find and assess, and therefore this review focused on irregular means of migration, i.e. the illegal routes and means that migrants use when legal ones are not available to them. While the current situation of migration and refugee flows towards Europe is commonly defined as a 'crisis', the review found that it follows pre-existing dynamics, even though the number of deaths and the large number of people on the move is clearly unprecedented. The evidence review is structured around the following three questions.

> *1. What do we know about the predictability/patterns of migrant flows from Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in this current crisis? Can we use that information to effectively predict future migrant flows?*

While data on irregular migration is by definition not always accurate or reliable, analysis of current trends points to a clear increase in people migrating via irregular means, most of whom are of Syrian or Eritrean nationality. Accurately predicting future migration trends is not possible based on currently available data because too many – often unpredictable – variables are likely to influence future flows and patterns of migration. Even so, possible scenarios appear to point to a steady increase in migration, with a likely increase in circular migration, but not necessarily in the short term.

The routes that migrants take evolve according to a number of factors, including the means and information that people have and the influence of smuggling networks, as well broader factors like the border regimes in different countries and the economic opportunities available to migrants along the way. The category of countries along migration routes is also changing, with some traditional 'destination' countries turning into transit or emigration countries (e.g. Libya). This also affects the decisions migrants make, not just to move, but also where to go and how to get there.

> *2. What factors influence decisions to leave Sub-Saharan Africa and MENA and migrate to Europe via irregular means in this current crisis (with a focus on key source countries: Syria, Afghanistan, Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia)?*

Turning to causes and inhibitors of migration, it is important to recognise that people's reasons for migrating may be the same whether or not they have the legal right to enter a country. Personal security and economic security are important drivers of migration, whether regular routes are available or not and, importantly, regardless of whether a person is entitled to asylum status or not. The evidence suggests that having the capacity (financial or otherwise) as well as intention to migrate are both critical factors determining whether a person migrates or not: Syrians are wealthier than many other migrant groups affected by conflict and economic underdevelopment. Restricting entry does not appear effective in reducing migration flows, but rather tends to force more people to take irregular and potentially dangerous routes. The evidence suggests that a lack of regular means to migrate is not a strong deterrent to migration.

Drivers of migration can also be social or cultural in nature: the evidence describes a self-perpetuating culture of migration which develops over time, as smuggling networks grow, information increases and transnational networks develop. Decisions to migrate are affected by sudden changes, such as revolution, as well as more slowly changing situations, such as the employment opportunities that different countries offer.

> *3. What is the evidence on the role that social networks (peer, family, others) play in decisions to migrate?*

Social networks play an important role not just in an individual's decision to migrate, but also on the choices people make along their journeys. These networks operate at different levels and can be grounded in or determined by family relationships, religion and nationality. These can reflect existing or emerging relationships between individual migrants, largely through the use of social media, but also with smugglers and with broader diaspora networks. Social networks can also play a variety of roles in a person's ability and motivation to migrate, such as social pressure to provide for one's family, offering resources to pay for the journey and providing information on possible routes and opportunities once in the destination country.

Evidence gaps

The review revealed some significant gaps in the evidence base. The evidence on detailed migration routes and their different components, especially across North Africa and from Eritrea and Somalia, is limited. In contrast, the evidence on the various and ever-changing routes out of Syria and towards Europe is fast improving, providing much-needed insights to develop policy actions and pilot new and different ways to address the crisis. Details are also scarce on the factors influencing how long a person spends in different countries during their journey to Europe (and little is known about people who move on to other countries after a period spent in a European country). This knowledge gap extends to migrants previously settled in a different country, e.g. Iran, when they attempt to enter Europe through irregular means/routes.

A major gap in the evidence relates to smuggling networks, especially ones that are more informal or fluid in nature, including their influence on the destination of migrants and the overall feasibility of irregular migration. This poses serious constraints to the various attempts currently being discussed and increasingly funded to fight smugglers to deter migration, as they often rely on inadequate information and analysis. Across all themes, inadequate accurate and reliable data imposes significant limitations on the kind of analysis that can be done and the conclusions that can be reached, especially on future trends and patterns. In turn, this limits what can be put forward as realistic policy recommendations to address the current crisis.

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Appendix 1

Search strings and sources of evidence accessed

Databases accessed

Google and Google Scholar
http://www.knomad.org/
http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/projects/demig
https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=MIG
http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/
http://go.worldbank.org/JITC7NYTT0
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/

Communities of Practice used

- IOM
- Migration Policy Centre
- International Migration Institute
- UNHCR
- Frontex
- Migration Policy Institute

Principle journals used

- Journal of Refugee Studies
- Migration Studies
- Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies
- International Migration Review
- Refugee Survey Quarterly
- International Migration
- Population, Space and Place
- Migration and Development

Experts consulted

- Hannah Postel, Centre for Global Development
- Melissa Siegel, United Nations University at the University of Maastrict
- Jorgen Carling, Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)
- Nando Sigona, University of Birmingham

Search Strings used

Google Scholar:

- Migration "and" flows "and" Mediterranean [since 2010]
- Irregular migration "and" pattern "and" Mediterranean" [since 2010]
- Season "and" Irregular migration "and" Europe [since 2010]
- social networks "and" irregular migration [2005-2015]
- Mediterranean "and" migration "and" social "and" networks [2005-2015]
- social networks "and" forced migration [2005-2015]
- social networks "and" drivers "and" migration [2005-2015]
- illegal "and" migration "and" causes [2005-2015]
- people "and" smuggling "and" Mediterranean "and" networks [2005-2015]
- onward migration "and" motivation "and" Libya [2005-2015]
- irregular secondary movements "and" motivation [2005-2015]
- "individual choice "and" forced migration [2005-2015]
- Ethiopia "and" migration "and" causes [2005-2015]
- Syria "and" Migration "and" causes [2005-2015]
- Afghanistan "and" migration "and" causes [2005-2015]

- Eritrea “and” migration “and” causes [2005-2015]
- Migration to Europe “and” motivation [2005-2015]
- Somalia “and” secondary migration [2005-2015]
- Syria “and” secondary migration [2005-2015]
- Syria “and” onward migration [2005-2015]
- irregular “and” onward migration “and” refugees “and” causes [2005-2015]
- Forced migration “and” individual “and” choices [2005- 2015]
- Determinants “and” migration “and” Europe [2005-2015]
- Determinants “and” migration [2005-2015]
- Driver “and” irregular migration “and” Europe [2005-2015]
- Migration crisis “and” motivation [2010-2015]
- Mediterranean crisis “and” motivation “and” migration [2010-2015]
- Motivation “and” Irregular migration “and” Europe [2005-2015]
- Mediterranean “and” migration “and” social “and” networks
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” Ethiopia
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” Syria
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” Afghanistan
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” Somalia
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” Eritrea
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” decision-making
- social “and” networks “and” refugees “and” Europe [2005-2015]
- transnational “and” networks “and” migration “and” motivation [2005-2015]
- social “and” networks “and” migration “and” motivation [2005-2015]

Google:

- Drivers “and” forced migration “and” Syria
- social “and” networks “and” migration crisis
- irregular “and” secondary “and” movements

Refugee Survey Quarterly:

- social “and” networks
- motivation

Journal of Refugee Studies:

- social “and” networks
- motivation

Journal of Migration Studies:

- social “and” networks
- motivation

International Migration Review:

- social “and” networks “and” motivation

Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies:

- social “and” networks “and” motivation
- social networks

Migration Policy Institute:

- social “and” networks
- Mediterranean “and” crisis

Migration Policy Centre:

- social “and” networks
- drivers
- motivation
- Mediterranean “and” crisis

Migration Policy Group

- drivers
- social “and” networks
- motivation “and” migration

IMI.ox.ac.uk:

- social “and” networks
- drivers
- motivations

RSC.ox.ac.uk:

- social “and” networks

UNHCR.org:

- Browse by country: Somalia
- Browse by country: Ethiopia
- Browse by country: Eritrea
- Browse by country: Syria
- Browse by country: Afghanistan

IOM.int:

- Publications – Search – social networks
- Publications – Search – motivation
- Publications – Search – Mediterranean crisis

Knomad.org

- Publications

Appendix 2

Table 5: Table recording the quality of the sources retrieved

Author	Title - if necessary for differenciation	Year	Type and design (code)	Quality if primary								Quality if secondary or conceptual				
				Conceptual framing		Methodological transparency		Validity		Relevance	Score (0-8)	Quality	Methodological transparency	Validty	Relevance	Score (0-4)
				a	b	a	b	a	b							Observations
Adikhari, P.		2013``	PS	1	1	1	1	1		1	6					0
Altai Consulting		2015	PC	1	1	1	1	1		2	7					0
Altai Consulting/UNHCR		2013	PS	1	1	1	1	1		2	7					0
Arar		2015	PS	1	1	1	1			1	5					0
AsliSirin Oner, N. and Genc, D.		2015	SO								0		1	1	1	3
Baizan and Gonzalez-Ferrera		2014	SO								0	1	1	1	1	4
Bakewell and Jolivet		2015	PC	1	1	1	1	1		1	6					0
Banulescu-Bogdan and Fratzke		2015	J								0			1	1	2
Barthel an Neumayer		2015	SO								0	1	1	1	1	4
Boubarki		2013	SO								0			1	1	2
Bredeloup and Priez		2011	SO								0			1	1	2
Brunwasser		2015	J								0			1	1	2
Bryne and Soloman		2015	J								0			1	1	2
Chatelard		2005	PS	1	1	1				2	5					0
Collyer and de haas		2012	C								0	1	1	1	1	4
Collyer, M.		2005	PC	1	1	1	1			2	6					
Czaika and Holborth		2014	SO								0	1	1	1	1	4
de Clerk, H.		2015	PS	1	1	1	1	1		1	6					0
de Haas		2011a	SO								0	1	1	1	1	4
de Haas		2010	C								0					3

de Haas et al.	2014	SO								0		1	1	1	3
de Haas, H.	2011b	C								0	1		1	1	3
de Haas, H.	2007	SO								0	1		1	1	3
de Haas, H.	2015	SO								0			1	1	2
Dekker and Engerbersen	2012	PS	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	8					0
Dekker et al.	2015	PC	1	1	1	1	1		2	6					0
Delauney, G.	2015	SO								0			1	1	2
Doanvo	2015	SO								0	1	1			2
Docquier F, et al.	2014	SO									1	1	1	1	4
Doomernik	2013	SO								0			1	1	2
Doucet, L.	2015	SO								0			1	1	2
Duvel	2009	SO								0	1	1	1	1	4
Engberson	2013	PS	1	1	1	1	1		2	7					0
Epstein	2008	C								0			1	1	2
Fahim and Samaan	2015	SO								0			1	1	2
Farguez	2013	SO								0					3
Farguez and Bonfanti	2014	SO								0		1	1	1	3
Fanguez and Fandrich	2012	SO								0	1		1	1	3
Flauhaus and de Haas	2014	SO								0	1	1	1	1	4

Frontex	Western Balkans Annual Risk	2015c	PS		1	1	1	1	2	6					0
Frontex	Annual Risk Assessment	2015b	PC		1	1	1	1	2	6					0
Frontex	Migratory routes map	2015a	PS							0		1		1	2
Frontex	Western Balkans Annual	2014b	PS		1	1	1	1	2	6					0
Frontex	Annual Risk Assessment	2014a	SO		1	1	1	1	2	6					0
Frontex		2013	PS		1	1	1	1	2	6					0
Gold		2005	SO							0	1		1	1	3
Hatton and Williamson		2009	SO							0	1	1	1	1	4
Hatton, T.		2009	SO							0		1	1	1	3
Heering et al.		2007	PS	1	1	1	1	1	1	6					0
Herman		2006	PC	1	1	1	1		2	6					0
Herandez -Carretero and Carling		2012	PS	1	1	1	1		2	5					0
Horst		2006	PS	1	1	1	1		1	5					0
Human Rights Watch		2015	PS		1	1			2	4					0
Icduygu and Yukseker		2012	SO							0	1		1	1	3
IMI		2012	PS	1	1	1	1	1	1	6					0
Kaasar and Dourgnon		2014	SO							0			1	1	2
Kane		2011	SO							0			1	1	3
Kassar et al.		2014	SS							0		1	1	1	3
Kawakibi		2013	SO							0			1	1	2
Kelley, C. et al		2015	SO							0			1	1	2
Kibreab, G.		2013	PS	1	1	1		1	2	6					0
Kirisci and Ferris		2015	SO							0			1	1	2
Klvanova		2010	PS	1	1	1			1	4					0
Korfali, D.K. and Sert, D.S		2015	PS	1	1	1	1		1	5					0
Koser Akapar		2010	PS	1	1	1	1		2	6					0
Koser and Pinkerton										0		1	1	1	3

Kraler et al	2014	C							0	1		1	1	3	
Kuschminder et al	2015	SS							0	1	1	1	1	4	
Liu	2013	SO							0	1	1	1	1	4	
Long	2015	SO							0	1		1	1	3	
Loschmann, C. and Siegel, M.	2014	SO							0	1	1	1	1	4	
Loschmann, C. et al.	2014	PS	1	1	1	1		2	6					0	
Mbaye	2014	PS	1	1	1	1	1	2	7	1	1	1	1	4	
Melander and Oberg	2007	SO							0		1	1	3	3	2
Melander and Oberg	2006	SO							0		1	1	2	3	1
Migration Policy Centre	2015	SO							0				0	2	1
Mironova et al.	2015	PS	1	1	1			2	5				0	0	2
Mironova et al.	2014	PS	1	1	1				6					0	2
Monsutti	2010	PS	1	1	1				5					0	3
Monsutti		PS	1	1	1			2	5					0	2+3
Moore, H.	2015	SO							0			1	1	2	1+2
Morehouse and Blomfield	2011	SO							0	1		1	1	3	1
Moret et al.	2006	PC	1	1	1	1		1	5					0	2
Natter	2015	SO							0	1		1	1	3	1+2
Naude, W.	2010	SO							0	1	1	1	1	4	2
New Scientist	2015	J												2	3
Nyberg Sorensen	2006	SO							0					2	1
OECD	2015	SO							0	1	1	1	1	4	1
OECD	2015	SO							0			1	1	2	1
Ozden	2013	PS	1	1	1	1	1	1	6					0	1+2
Phillips	2015	SO							0			1	1	2	1+2
Piguet and Pecoud	2011	SO							0			1	1	2	1
Poros	2011	C										1	1	2	3
Price	2015	J													

Rechitsky		2014	PS	1	1	1	1		2	6					0	2+3
Reitano, T.		2015	SO							0	1		1	1	3	1+2
RMMS	Blinded by Hope	2014b	PS	1	1	1	1		1	5					0	2
RMMS	Going West	2014a	PS	1	1	1	1	1	2	7					0	1+2
Robinson and Segrott		2002	PS	1	1	1	1	1	2	7					0	2
Schapendonk		2014	C							0			1	1	2	3
Schapendonk		2012	PS	1	1	1	1	1	2	7					0	1+2+3
Schapendonk		2009	PS	1	1	1			2	5					0	3
Schapenkdonl and Van Moppes		2007	PS	1	1	1		1	2	6					0	2+3
Schaub		2012	PS	1	1	1		1	2	6					0	3
Shaw and Mangan		2014	PS		1	1	1		2	5					0	1+2
Sigona		2015	J							0	1	1	1	1	4	1
Sirkeci and Martin		2014	PS							0			1	1	2	2
Snel et al.		2013	PS	1	1	1	1	1	2	7					0	3
Staring		2004	PS	1	1	1			2	5					0	3
The Economist		2015	J							0			1	1	2	1
Thibos		2014	SO							0			1	1	2	1
Timmerman , C. et al	Imagining Europe from the Outside	2014b	PC	1	1	1	1	1	1	6					0	2
Timmerman, C. et al	The relevance of a 'culture of migration'	2014a	PS	1	1	1	1		1	5					0	2+3
Toma and Vause		2010	SO								1	1	1	1	4	3
Triandafyllidou		2009	SO							0	1	1	1	1	4	1+2
UNHCR		2015c	SO							0			1	1	2	1
UNHCR		2015b	SO							0			1	1	2	1
UNHCR		2015a	SO							0			1	1	2	1
UNHCR		2015	SO							0	1		1	1	3	1
UNHCR		2015	PS	1	1	1	1	1	1	6					0	2
UNHCR																

UNHRC	2015	PS			1	1				2	4							0	2
UNHRC	2015	SO									0					1	1	2	2
UNHRC	2015	SO									0					1	1	2	1
UNHRC	2015	J									0			1			1	2	1
UNHRC	2015	SO									0						1	1	1
UNHRC	2015	SO									0					1	1	2	
UNHRC	2015	SO									0					1	1	2	1
UNHRC	2014	SO									0					1	1	2	2
UNHRC	2014	SO									0	1				1	1	3	1
UNHRC	2010	PC	1		1	1	1		1	2	7							0	2
UNHCR in Greece	2015	SO									0					1	1	2	1
Valenta et al.	2015	PC	1		1	1				2	5							0	2
Venturini et al.	2013	SO									0							2	2
Vervlit, M. et al.	2012	PC			1	1			1	2	5							0	2+3
Volmer	2011	C									0					1	1	2	1
Watson et al.	2015	J									0					1	1	2	3
Wissink et al.	2013	PS	1		1	1	1		1	1	2	8							0	2+3
Yazgan et al.	2015	SO									0					1	1	2	1+2
Zimmerman	2011	PS	1		1	1	1				2	6							0	2
Zimmerman, S.	2011	PS	1		1	1					2	5							0	2
Zimmerman, S.	2009	PS	1		1	1					2	5							0	2

V

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Ruprecht-Karls-Universität Heidelberg
Institut für Politische Wissenschaft

Magisterarbeit

Das Verhalten der EU gegenüber den AKP-Staaten: die Politik einer Zivilmacht oder einer Handelsmacht?

Eine Bewertung der EU-AKP-Partnerschaft von Lomé IV bis zu den Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)

Vorgelegt am 24.2.2009 von:

Patrik Eisenhauer

Erstgutachter: Prof. Dr. Sebastian Harnisch
Zweitgutachter: Prof. Dr. Peter Schlotter

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Abkürzungsverzeichnis

AKP	Afrikanische, karibische, pazifische Staaten
APRM	African Peer Review Mechanism
AU	Afrikanische Union
BIP	Bruttoinlandsprodukt
BLNS	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia und Swasiland
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum of African, Caribbean and Pacific States
CEMAC	Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale (Wirtschafts- und Währungsgemeinschaft Zentralafrikanischer Staaten)
CEN-SAD	Community of Sahel-Saharan States (Gemeinschaft der Sahel-Saharanischen Staaten)
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Gemeinsamer Markt für das Östliche und Südliche Afrika)
EAC	Eastern African Community (Ostafrikanische Gemeinschaft)
EBA	Everything but arms (Alles außer Waffen)
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Office (Europäisches Amt für humanitäre Hilfe)
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States (Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Westafrikanischer Staaten)
EEF	Europäischer Entwicklungsfonds
EG	Europäische Gemeinschaft
EGV	Vertrag zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
EIB	Europäische Investitionsbank
EPA	Economic Partnership Agreement (Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen)
ESA	Eastern und Southern African Group
ESVP	Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik
EU	Europäische Union
EWG	Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
GAERC	General Affairs and External Relations Council (Rat für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen)
GAP	Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik (englisch CAP)
GASP	Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

	(Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen)
GD	Generaldirektion
GSP	Generalized System of Preferences (Allgemeines Präferenzsystem)
HDI	Human Development Index
IGAD	Intergovernmental Authority on Development
IStGH	Internationaler Strafgerichtshof
LDC	Least Developed Country (am wenigsten entwickelte Länder)
MDG	Millennium Development Goals (Millennium-Entwicklungsziele)
MFN	Most Favoured Nation (Meistbegünstigungsprinzip)
MIC	Middle Income Countries (Länder mit mittleren Einkommen)
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development
	(Neue Partnerschaft für Afrikas Entwicklung)
NGO	Non-Governmental Organisation (Nichtregierungsorganisation)
ODA	Official Development Assistance
	(Öffentliche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit)
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
	(Organisation für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung)
PIF	Pazifische AKP-Staaten
PJZS	Polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen
SACU	South African Customs Union (Südafrikanische Zollunion)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
	(Südafrikanische Entwicklungsgemeinschaft)
SCR	Service Commun Relex
	(Gemeinsamer Dienst für auswärtige Beziehungen)
SIA	Sustainability Impact Assessment (Nachhaltigkeitsprüfung)
STABEX	System der Exporterlösstabilisierung
SYSMIN	System zur Stabilisierung mineralischer Exporterlöse
UEMOA	Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine
	(Westafrikanische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion)
WAMZ	West African Monetary Zone (Westafrikanische Währungszone)
WTO	World Trade Organisation (Welthandelsorganisation)

I. Einleitung

I.1 Thematische Einführung

Die europäische Partnerschaft mit den afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (AKP) kann auf eine lange Geschichte zurückblicken: Schon mit der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge 1957 räumten die sechs Gründerstaaten der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) ihren ehemaligen Kolonien eine besondere Stellung in der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ein. Über die Jahre wurde diese besondere Stellung – im Vergleich zu anderen Entwicklungsländern – mit den Abkommen von Yaoundé, Lomé und schließlich Cotonou bestätigt und weiter gefestigt (Dialer 2007: 45-60). Die Bedeutung der Partnerschaft zeigt sich insbesondere bei den Export-Daten der AKP-Staaten: Der Handel der einzelnen Staaten ist überwiegend auf den europäischen Markt ausgerichtet. Das liegt unter anderem daran, dass die EU den AKP-Staaten das einseitige (*asymmetrische*) Recht auf weitgehend unbeschränkten Marktzugang (mit Ausnahmen bei einigen landwirtschaftlichen Produkten) gewährte. Dieses Recht bildete zusammen mit der Idee einer „kooperativen Partnerschaft" auf Augenhöhe und den Entwicklungshilfezahlungen die Säulen der EU-AKP-Beziehungen (Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 114).

Mit dem Abschluss des Cotonou-Abkommens im Jahre 2000 sah die Europäische Kommission vor, dass die AKP-Staaten langsam auf eine vollständige Integration in den Weltmarkt hinarbeiten, d.h. ihre eigenen Märkte öffnen; das bisherige Konzept des präferenziellen Zugangs zum europäischen Markt hatte nicht zu einer beschleunigten wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung beigetragen. Um die Öffnung der Märkte der AKP-Staaten voranzutreiben, war vorgesehen, *Economic Partnership Agreements* (EPAs)[1] mit einzelnen Regionen (und später Staaten) bis zum 31. Dezember 2007 abzuschließen. Da der Zeitplan letztlich nicht eingehalten werden konnte, wurden zunächst vorläufige EPAs abgeschlossen (wobei bisher nur 36 von 79[2] AKP-Staaten dies taten), die dann bis zum 31. Dezember 2008 in ein gesamtes Abkommen eingebunden werden sollten (Schieder 2008: 23f.), was bisher jedoch auch noch nicht gelang. Warum dies

1 In der Arbeit wird der englische Begriff (bzw. die Abkürzung) benutzt, da auch in der Literatur hauptsächlich dieser Name verwendet wird und dagegen nicht besonders häufig der deutsche Begriff *Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen* (WPA).

2 In der Literatur sind unterschiedliche Daten zu der Anzahl der Mitgliedsstaaten zu finden, da Südafrika und Kuba Sonderfälle des Abkommens darstellen. Südafrika gehört seit 1997 offiziell zu der AKP-Staatengruppe, hat aber einen Sonderstatus, weil für das Land nicht die Sonderprivilegien gelten und es ein weiteres eigenes Abkommen mit der EU hat. Kuba hat den Vertrag nicht unterzeichnet; aus diesem Grund ist die Zugehörigkeit nicht klar.

nicht gelang, wird am Ende der Magisterarbeit erörtert. Zuvor werden in den folgenden Abschnitten die Fragestellung und der Aufbau sowie die Relevanz und die Vorgehensweise der Arbeit vorgestellt, die die Verhandlungen der EPAs in einem zeitlichen Vergleich mit den vorherigen Abkommen seit Lomé IV beurteilen. In Lomé IV wurde erstmals die Förderung demokratischer Grundsätze und die Achtung von Menschenrechten in das Abkommen aufgenommen, weshalb es als Ausgangspunkt für die Beurteilung der Politik der EU geeignet erscheint – weitere Gründe für die Auswahl von Lomé IV finden sich in dem Kapitel zur Vorgehensweise.

Das Ziel der Arbeit ist es, mit den Konzepten der Zivilmacht und der Handelsmacht die Politik der Europäischen Union einzuordnen. Dazu werden einerseits die Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) betrachtet, andererseits in Vertragstexten festgesetzte Vereinbarungen mit deren tatsächlicher Umsetzung verglichen.

1.2 Fragestellung und Aufbau

Die bisherige Politik der Partnerschaft mit einer präferenziellen Behandlung der AKP-Staaten soll von einer schrittweisen Aufhebung der Zölle in den AKP-Staaten abgelöst werden. Zudem strebt die EU an, über weitere handelsrelevante Bereiche wie Dienstleistungen und Investitionen zu verhandeln. Die Verhandlungen der EPAs werden massiv von NGOs kritisiert, die die „neoliberale Außenhandelspolitik der EU“ (http://www.stopepa.de/statement.html) anprangern.[3] Diese Fakten betrachtend, stellt sich die Frage, ob man mit diesen Veränderungen der Partnerschaft einen Paradigmenwechsel in dem Politikstil der Europäischen Union konstatieren kann. Konkret lautet die Fragestellung in Bezug auf die Verhandlungen über die Wirtschaftsliberalisierungen in den EPAs:

Kann man in der Politik der EU mit den AKP-Staaten einen Wandel von einer Zivilmacht zu einer Handelsmacht feststellen?

Um die Frage beantworten zu können, werden zunächst vier grundlegende Schritte

3 So wurde in Deutschland die Kampagne „StopEPA“ (http://www.stopepa.de/) ins Leben gerufen, die von einigen bekannten NGOs wie FIAN, Germanwatch, Oxfam und WEED unterstützt wird. Die Kampagne lehnt die EPAs in ihrer gegenwärtigen Form ab und fordert wirtschaftlich, sozial, und ökologisch nachhaltige Alternativen. Sie folgt einer Initiative des Africa Trade Network und der internationalen „StopEPA“-Kampagne (http://www.epa2007.org/front.asp?id=1). Für einen weiteren Überblick von NGO-Meinungen siehe VENRO (2007).

getätigt, die die Basis für die Analyse bilden. Im methodischen Teil werden die Begriffe des Wandels und der Kohärenz definiert, sowie die EU als Akteur in der Entwicklungs- und Handelspolitik betrachtet. Der theoretische Teil stellt die Konzepte der Großmacht, Handelsmacht und Zivilmacht vor und grenzt sie voneinander ab.

In den ersten beiden Schritten erfolgen Definitionen von Wandel und Kohärenz. Wie der Begriff Wandel vorgibt und die Fragestellung suggestiv formuliert, wird in der Arbeit (vorläufig) angenommen, dass sich etwas in der Politik der EU zumindest verändert hat (wann von Wandel zu sprechen ist, erläutert Kap. II.1). Die Kritik an den EPAs deutet darauf hin, dass die vorherige Situation besser gewesen sein könnte. Ob dies tatsächlich zutrifft und die EU vor den Verhandlungen der EPAs als Zivilmacht handelte, soll in der Arbeit herausgefunden werden.

Da in der Beurteilung der Entwicklungspolitik der EU die beiden Politikfelder Handels- und Agrarpolitik mit einbezogen werden, sind Kohärenzbemühungen der EU ein zu untersuchender Unteraspekt, der als zweiter Abschnitt des zweiten Kapitels beleuchtet wird. Eine Unterfrage der Arbeit lautet dementsprechend: Geben erfolgte (oder nicht erfolgte) Verbesserungen der Kohärenz in der Politik der EU einen Hinweis auf den Status der EU als Zivil- oder Handelsmacht gegenüber den AKP-Staaten?

In einem dritten Schritt ist aufzuzeigen, ob die EU als *ein* Akteur in der Politik gegenüber den AKP-Staaten auftritt, was im dritten Abschnitt des zweiten Kapitels erfolgt. Die Europäische Union wird in der Politikwissenschaft häufig als Mehrebenensystem bezeichnet, das geteilte Souveränitäten zwischen supranationaler und nationaler Ebene vorzuweisen hat (Schubert 2000: 14). Daher ist es notwendig, die Kompetenzen der EU in der Entwicklungspolitik aufzuzeigen – sowie in den Bereichen, die die Entwicklungspolitik maßgeblich beeinflussen, wie beispielsweise die Handelspolitik. Entscheidend ist die Unterscheidung zwischen gemeinschaftlichen Aufgaben der EG und Handlungen der EU, die hauptsächlich von den Mitgliedsstaaten entschieden werden. Die nationalen Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten werden aus den Untersuchungen weitestgehend ausgeklammert, da sie eine andere Ebene der europäischen Politik darstellen.[4]

Als letzter Schritt werden schließlich die Unterschiede der Konzepte Zivilmacht, Handelsmacht und Großmacht herausgestellt. Dazu werden für die ersten beiden Begriffe

4 Das heißt nicht, dass es nicht interessant wäre, sie mit einzubeziehen. Denn selbst wenn es Kohärenzbemühungen auf supranationaler Ebene gibt, können die Mitgliedsstaaten durch ein eigenes nationales Eingreifen diese Bemühungen schnell wieder konterkarieren, wie Brüne (2005: 44-56) am Beispiel Frankreich zeigt. Da aber eine Einbeziehung der nationalstaatlichen Ebene ein Thema für eine weitere umfassende Studie wäre, kann sie in dieser Arbeit nicht berücksichtigt werden.

Idealtypen[5] gebildet und operationalisierbare Kriterien entwickelt. Dies erfolgt im dritten Kapitel.

Mit diesen einzelnen Bausteinen lässt sich die Politik der EU mit den AKP-Staaten analysieren, was im vierten und fünften Kapitel chronologisch geleistet wird. Bestandteile der Untersuchung sind die Texte der EU-AKP-Partnerschaft, die vertraglichen Grundlagen der Entwicklungspolitik auf europäischer Ebene, die Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der EG und weitere Aktivitäten der EU, die die Entwicklungspolitik beeinflussen. Die vertraglichen Vorgaben werden vorerst weitgehend unkommentiert aufgeführt und dann mit der tatsächlichen Umsetzung verglichen, um eine Einordnung in die Idealtypen vornehmen zu können. Da untersucht wird, ob ein Wandel stattgefunden hat und wissenschaftliche Artikel[6] die Politik der EU bei den Verhandlungen der EPAs ebenso kritisierten wie NGOs, wird das Kapitel über die Bestimmungen in Lomé IV unter dem Aspekt betrachtet, ob es sich damals um eine europäische Politik nach idealtypischen Zivilmachtkriterien handelte. Für die nächste Periode, Cotonou und die Verhandlungen der EPAs, lautet die Frage, ob sich die Politik von einer Zivilmacht zu einer Handelsmacht gewandelt hat (die Frage soll aber nicht so verstanden werden, dass von vornherein davon ausgegangen wird, die EU hätte davor wie eine Zivilmacht gehandelt).

I.3 ***Relevanz***

Die Relevanz ist sowohl empirisch als auch theoretisch gegeben. Für die empirische Behandlung des Themas sprechen zwei Gründe:

Erstens ist es wichtig, zu analysieren, welche Auswirkungen die neuen EPAs auf die Ökonomien der afrikanischen AKP-Staaten (bzw. auf ausgewählte Beispiele) und ihre Entwicklungschancen haben. Es gilt zu untersuchen, ob den AKP-Staaten mit den neuen Verträgen für sie unvorteilhafte Bedingungen vorgegeben werden, oder ob sie auch vorteilhaft sein können. Wenn von einer negativen Wirkung der Verträge auszugehen ist, dann ist das Verhalten der EU daran zu messen, inwiefern den Konsequenzen begegnet wird. So wäre es mit dem idealtypischen Verhalten einer Zivilmacht nicht zu vereinen, dass sich die AKP-Staaten nach dem Abschluss von EPAs in einer

5 Ein Idealtypus ist „«eine Utopie» (M. Weber) und ein Maßstab, anhand dessen die empirische Analyse festzustellen hat, wie nahe oder fern die Wirklichkeit dem Idealbilde steht (Schmidt 2004: 307).

6 Für klar begründete Kritik siehe Elgström/Pilegaard (2008), Goodison (2007a), Kohnert (2008), Meyn (2008), Milner (2007), Perez (2006) und Stevens (2008).

schlechteren Lage als in der Ausgangssituation befinden.

Zweitens ist die Handelspolitik der EU Spannungen ausgesetzt, da mit der Gründung der WTO (*World Trade Organisation*) 1995 die präferenzielle Behandlung der AKP-Staaten zunehmend in Kritik geriet, da sie nicht dem Meistbegünstigungsprinzip (*Most Favoured Nation*, MFN) der WTO entsprach, das Nicht-Diskriminierung der Vertragsparteien vorschreibt. Entwicklungsländer, die nicht die besondere Behandlung in Anspruch nehmen durften, beanstandeten die EU-Politik (Woolcock 2005: 380-383).[7] Doch nicht nur dieser Aspekt der Handelspolitik erzeugt Spannungen. Die Agrarpolitik[8], die Verhandlung über den Marktzugang nicht-landwirtschaftlicher Güter, Liberalisierung von Dienstleistungen und die so genannten Singapur-Themen (Investitionen, Wettbewerb und öffentliche Beschaffung) sind umstrittene Diskussionspunkte der Welthandelsrunden, für die bisher noch keine (weltweiten) Kompromisse gefunden wurden (ebd.: 391-396). Für die AKP-Staaten sind die Abstimmungen über diese Punkte, für die multilaterale Lösungen gefunden werden sollten (Jansen 2007: 444f.), von großer Bedeutung. Gleichzeitig versucht die EU jedoch, sie mit den Staaten (oder regionalen Gruppen) bilateral zu verhandeln (Stevens et al. 2008: 3). Es stellt sich die Frage, welche Vor- und Nachteile sich daraus ergeben (dazu Meunier/Nicolaïdis 2005, Peters/Wagner 2005: 219-233, Woolcock 2005: 380-391) und welche Implikationen man aus diesem Vorgehen für die Einordnung in die zwei Idealtypen ziehen kann.

Theoretische Relevanz

Die theoretische Relevanz ergibt sich aus der Tatsache, dass die Forschung zwar bisher das Thema Zivilmacht EU behandelte,[9] aber nicht im Bezug auf eine Abgrenzung zu

7 Das Meistbegünstigungsprinzip besagt, dass Handelsvorteile, die man einem Vertragspartner gewährt, auch allen anderen Vertragspartnern offen sein müssen. Die EU hatte für ihre Beziehungen mit den AKP-Staaten eine Ausnahmeregelung (*waiver*) beantragt, die bis Ende 2007 lief (Bartels 2007: 730-736). Für andere Entwicklungsländer gibt es seit 1971 das GSP (*Generalized System of Preferences*) und seit 1998 GSP+, die Zölle und Einfuhrbeschränkungen abbauen, aber nicht in dem Umfang wie in der AKP-Partnerschaft. 2001 hat die EU für die LDCs (*Least Developed Countries*), die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder der Welt, das Programm *Everything but arms* (EBA) gestartet (ebd.: 739-743). Alle Programme werden noch in Kap. V näher erläutert, da sie im Zusammenhang der EPA-Verhandlungen eine Rolle spielen.

8 Die Bedeutung der Agrarpolitik für die Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik macht Page (2006: 134) deutlich: „Policy, however, would still be 'incoherent' if it helps countries to develop their exports and subsequently refuses market access when they do so." Hoebink (2004: 187-189) betont ebenso die Bedeutung der Agrarpolitik für die Entwicklungspolitik und sieht es als wichtigen Schritt in der Forschung an, die Kohärenz zwischen diesen Politikfeldern zu untersuchen.

9 So kommt Blauberger (2005: 27-52) bei dem Vergleich zwischen Zivilmacht und Großmacht EU zu dem Ergebnis, dass die EU vor 1990 als Zivilmacht anzusehen sei, hingegen nach 1990 wegen des Aufbaus einer militärischen Komponente in der Außenpolitik nicht mehr als solche zu erfassen sei. Scheipers/Sicurelli (2008: 617-621) kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass es Belege für eine normative Selbstverpflichtung der EU im Sinne einer Zivilmacht in Afrika gebe. Aber die Untersuchung der von

dem Idealtypus Handelsmacht – mit der Ausnahme von Schrade (1997), die allerdings nur die Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland betrachtet und Hettne/Söderbaum (2005), die in ihrer Studie über die Außenpolitik der EU gegenüber regionalen Gruppierungen die Politik einer Zivilmacht und *soft imperialism* unterscheiden.[10] Sie stellen aber kein festes Analyseraster auf, das für eine Untersuchung der dynamischen Entwicklung der EU-AKP-Partnerschaft verwendet werden könnte. Das Konzept der Handelsmacht[11] wurde wiederum in Studien einer klassischen Militärmacht gegenübergestellt (so von Rosecrance 1986 und Staack 2000).

In vorangegangenen Untersuchungen wurde die Bundesrepublik Deutschland als Paradebeispiel eines Handelsstaates beschrieben, sowohl was die Außenpolitik (Staack 2000) als auch das Politikfeld Entwicklungspolitik (Schrade 1997) betrifft. Die EU ist deshalb ein relevanter Untersuchungsgegenstand, da sie als der weltweit größte Wirtschaftsblock eine bedeutende Größe in den internationalen ökonomischen Beziehungen darstellt. Die starke europäische Bedeutung in ökonomischen Belangen beruht auf der wirtschaftlichen Leistung und auf der mehr als 40 Jahre umfassenden Erfahrung bei Verhandlungen über internationale Handelsabkommen. Vor allem die Handelspolitik ist ein wichtiges Instrument der Politikausübung: „The EU's 'actorness' on the international scene relies primarily on non-military means, from aid to diplomacy, and (...) in this panoply, trade stands perhaps as the most effective mode of the action" (Meunier/Nicolaïdis 2006: 912).

Das Konzept der Handelsmacht erfährt Kritik in diversen Studien dahingehend, dass es nicht die Vorstellung eines umfassenden Rollenkonzeptes erfülle (siehe beispielsweise Kirste/Maull 1996: 304) und die Trennung von normativer und ökonomischer Macht zur Etablierung eines dritten außenpolitischen Idealtypus neben Großmacht und Zivilmacht zu eng gefasst sei (Blauberger 2005: 15). Diese Kritik an den bisherigen Konzepten wird zwar in der vorliegenden Arbeit geteilt, da tatsächlich keine exakte

der EU geforderten Unterstützung in Afrika für den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (IStGH) und das Kyoto-Protokoll zeigt, dass es zwei Seiten gibt: Auf der einen Seite ist die EU fähig, die Rolle eines Fürsprechers für das internationale Recht und eines Unterstützers der Entwicklungsländer auszufüllen. Auf der anderen Seite wurden die Grenzen des normativen Anspruchs deutlich, da erstens Druckmittel eingesetzt wurden (im Falle des Kyoto-Protokolls Konditionalitäten), um die Ziele zu erreichen und zweitens im Falle des IStGH nicht nur Erfolge bei dem Streben nach Unterstützung zu vermelden waren.

10 Ein Vergleich „Handelsstaat" und Zivilmacht wurde zwar schon einmal vorgenommen, aber als mögliche Szenarien der Fortentwicklung Europas und nicht als empirische Untersuchung (Telò 2001: 254-269).

11 Die Autoren schreiben über Staaten. Aus diesem Grund ist ihre Bezeichnung „Handelsstaat" (ebenso bei Schrade 1997). In der Arbeit wird der Begriff „Handelsmacht" verwendet.

Beschreibung des Idealtypus Handelsmacht erstellt wurde. Aber die Unterscheidung von Zivilmacht, Handelsmacht und Großmacht lässt sich unter Zuhilfenahme der klassischen Definition von Macht, die allen drei Begriffen gemeinsam ist, und der Unterscheidung zwischen *soft power* und *hard power* erklären. Macht bedeutet nach Max Weber die „Chance, innerhalb einer sozialen Beziehung den eigenen Willen auch gegenüber Widerstreben durchzusetzen, gleichviel worauf diese Chance beruht" (zitiert nach Schmidt 2004: 424). *Soft power* als Mittel einer Zivilmacht bedeutet, die Fähigkeit zu haben, Präferenzen von anderen Akteuren mitzugestalten und sie zu bekräftigen, die Ergebnisse (*outcomes*) zu wollen, die man selbst zu erreichen sucht. Macht ist bei einer Zivilmacht somit weniger präsent, während sie bei den beiden anderen Idealtypen eine wichtige Rolle spielt: *Hard power* basiert auf Zwang. Sie beruht auf Anreizen und Drohungen und ist vorwiegend ökonomischer (Handelsmacht) oder militärischer Natur (Großmacht) (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2006: 23f.). Smith (2008: 22f.) zeigt die Unterscheidung zwischen Handelsmacht und Großmacht gut auf, als sie der Frage nachgeht, ob die EU eine Zivilmacht oder ein *power block* ist.[12] Ein *power block* verfolgt eigene Interessen und schreckt nicht vor Zwangsmaßnahmen zurück (Mittel sind sowohl Zuckerbrot als auch Peitsche). Die EU nutzt, wenn sie als *power block* agiert, ökonomische und diplomatische Stärken, um die eigenen Interessen voranzutreiben und zu schützen, ohne als Großmacht zu wirken.

Die beiden Idealtypen Zivilmacht und Handelsmacht grenzen sich gemeinsam von dem Idealtypus der Großmacht insofern ab, dass man beide aus der liberalen Theorie in den Internationalen Beziehungen herleiten kann. Zivilmacht steht in der Tradition des ideellen, Handelsmacht in der Tradition des kommerziellen Liberalismus: „The treatment which liberals began prescribing in the eighteenth century had not changed: the 'disease' of war could be successfully treated with the twin medicines of *democracy* and *free trade*" (Burchill 2005: 59, Hervorhebung im Original).
Nach Moravcsik sind Staaten (oder andere politische Institutionen wie die EU) Transmissionsriemen dominanter gesellschaftlicher Präferenzen (Schieder 2006: 183). So kann sowohl die Außenhandelspolitik der EU über die Innen-Außen-Analogie erklärt werden, da zu erwarten ist, dass die Gemeinschaft nach den in ihrem Inneren in Bezug auf den Handel umgesetzten Werten und Prinzipien in ihren Außenbeziehungen

12 Eine dritte Kategorie ist der *flop*, was bedeutet, dass die EU es nicht schafft, eine gemeinsame Politik zu vollziehen und zunehmend irrelevant wird.

handelt, als auch die Politik einer Zivilmacht. Ihr Hintergrund ist mit dem hohen Stellenwert der Sozialpolitik in Westeuropa nachzuvollziehen (Peters/Wagner 2005: 230, 237).

Gerade die aktuelle Diskussion über die Verhandlungen der EPAs stellt eine gute Ausgangslage dar, um sich eingehend mit den Kriterien von Zivilmacht und Handelsmacht zu befassen.[13] Die Bemühungen um Kohärenz sind dabei ein interessanter Untersuchungsgegenstand, um sich mit dem Thema auseinander zu setzen. Man kann nicht per se davon auszugehen, dass Kohärenzbemühungen in Richtung Zivilmacht oder Handelsmacht weisen.[14] Es ist durchaus möglich, dass keine Ergebnisse zu konstatieren sind. Das institutionelle Setting der Entwicklungspolitik und der interagierenden Politikfelder zu untersuchen, kann dennoch Erkenntnisse darüber liefern, ob die Kommission stärker die Entwicklungspolitik fördert oder andere Politikfelder, die eigene Vorteile in den Vordergrund stellen.

I.4 Vorgehensweise

Eine Kritik an den bisher erschienenen Studien über die Frage nach dem Zivilmacht-Status der EU ist, dass der Begriff nicht klar definiert sei und sich zu sehr an der Rhetorik der EU orientiere:

> „[The] ideal type needs a clearer definition (...). This is not so much to define what a CPE [Civil Power Europe] 'is' (...) but rather to construct an analytically sound framework (...). Thus, by relating Europe's putative pursuit for normative objectives with its power capacity in different external policy domains, well-defined and applied to detailed cases, scholars could test the common criticism that the normative power literature merely confirms EU rhetoric" (Orbie 2006: 126).

Die Makel sollen in dieser Arbeit nicht aufgegriffen werden: Die Beurteilung, ob sich die EU wie eine Zivil- oder Handelsmacht verhält, beschränkt sich auf die Entwicklungs- und Handelspolitik (inklusive handelsrelevanter Bereiche der Agrarpolitik) der EU mit den AKP-Staaten (bzw. auf ausgewählte Fallbeispiele) und erhebt somit keinen

13 Die Diskussion darum wurde schon vor dem Abschluss der „Interim"-EPAs geführt (Storey 2006), aber noch nicht ausführlich danach, weswegen dies in der Magisterarbeit geschehen soll.

14 Jopp/Schlotter (2007b) finden einen umgekehrten Zusammenhang: „Je mehr (...) die Politik der EU (...) in langfristige Programme von „soft power" und der Projektion von „Zivilmacht" (...) eingebettet ist, desto größer ist ihre Kohärenz" (ebd.: 381). In der Magisterarbeit wird davon ausgegangen, dass, auch wenn die Kriterien einer Zivilmacht erfüllt sind, es immer noch Inkohärenzen mit anderen Politikfeldern geben kann. Deshalb werden Kohärenzbemühungen untersucht, selbst wenn das außenpolitische Verhalten der EU einer Zivilmacht entspricht.

Anspruch auf eine globale Gültigkeit der Ergebnisse. Es ist davon auszugehen, dass sich die EU unterschiedlich verhält in speziellen Politikfeldern, den verschiedenen Regionen der Welt und in den internationalen Institutionen. Aus diesem Grund ist eine detaillierte Analyse der Politik sinnvoll, die nicht zu viele Unteraspekte beleuchten will.[15]

Bei dem Vergleich der Idealtypen mit dem tatsächlichen Handeln der EU werden in der Arbeit zwei Methoden verwendet. Erstens sollen in Anlehnung an Schrade (1997) die Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der EU an die AKP-Staaten untersucht werden. Es erfolgt eine quantitative Analyse, ob es einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Höhe der Entwicklungshilfe und den aus den Idealtypen theoretisch vorgegebenen Vergabekriterien gibt.
Die zweite Methode beinhaltet, die Vertragstexte der EU-AKP-Partnerschaft und Dokumente der innereuropäischen Politik bezüglich der Entwicklungspolitik zu betrachten, um das Verhalten der EU beurteilen und einordnen zu können. Die Rollentheorie wird hierbei als Analysemethode benutzt. Sie besagt, dass Staaten außenpolitische Rollenkonzepte entwickeln,

> „die sowohl eigene Vorstellungen – Weltbilder, Werte und Normen – als auch Erwartungen der Außenwelt – Rollenerwartungen – hinsichtlich eines angemessenen Verhaltens in den internationalen Beziehungen beinhalten“ (Kirste/Maull 1996: 283).

Die Autoren sehen dabei den ego-part, d.h. die eigenen Vorstellungen, als den im Vergleich mit den systemischen Rollenerwartungen anderer Akteure stärker beeinflussenden Teil der Außenpolitik an (ebd.: 292). Es ist jedoch wichtig zu betonen, dass keine klassische rollentheoretische Analyse durchgeführt werden soll;[16] lediglich das Analyseraster zum Aufstellen der Idealtypen (vor allem für die Zivilmacht) findet Anwendung. Das Raster dient dazu, die Vertragstexte und das tatsächliche Verhalten der EU an den Idealtypen zu messen.
Als Startpunkt der Untersuchung bietet sich das Abkommen Lomé IV (von 1989) an. Zum einen weil sich in der Periode nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges die Anforderungen an die EU erhöhten, neue politische, legale und sozio-ökonomische Strukturen in

15 Das heißt nicht, dass es nicht auch hätte sinnvoll sein können, die Sicherheits-, Umwelt- und Migrationspolitik in die Analyse mit einzubeziehen, da alle drei Politikfelder relevante Auswirkungen für die AKP-Staaten haben. Die Sicherheitspolitik wird in der Arbeit zwar eine gewisse Beachtung finden, eine vollständige Analyse der drei Politikfelder findet aber nicht statt.

16 Sie würde beinhalten, Normen, Werte, Weltbild, gesellschaftlich konstruierte außenpolitische Zielsetzungen, Selbst- und Fremdperzeption, historische Erfahrungen, kulturelle Eigenheiten und außenpolitische Lernfähigkeit in Hinblick auf die Frage „was bestimmt das außenpolitische Verhalten von Staaten“ zu untersuchen. Die Methodik wäre, die Prinzipien in den Äußerungen zur Außenpolitik eines staatlichen Akteurs nachzuweisen (Kirste 1998: 15, 57).

anderen Regionen der Welt zu fördern. Dazu musste sie diverse nicht-militärische außenpolitischen Instrumente nutzen, die vornehmlich in die erste Säule fielen (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2006: 15f.). Gleichzeitig steigerte Lomé IV die Bedeutung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der Zusammenarbeit beträchtlich. Zum anderen gab es in der gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklungspolitik mit der Gründung der EU durch die Maastrichter Verträge 1992 das erste Mal eine Verankerung des entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenzgebots (Ashoff 2005: 49).[17] Mit einem Vergleich der nachfolgenden Verträge können erfolgte oder nicht erfolgte Veränderungen in der Partnerschaft als Hinweis auf einen Wandel gedeutet werden. Außerdem wurde mit der Gründung der WTO 1995 die Handelspolitik stärker institutionalisiert. Die präferenzielle Behandlung der AKP-Staaten durch die EU erfuhr immer mehr Kritik von anderen Handelspartnern der EU und durch das eingeführte effektivere Streitschlichtungsverfahren gab es ein Instrument, das die Kritik auch in wirksame Politik umsetzen konnte (Peters/Wagner 2005: 231).

Für die Betrachtung der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen ist ein Vergleich der afrikanischen AKP-Staaten vorgesehen (es können nicht die Daten aller Staaten gesammelt werden, aber mindestens 80 % der Zahlungen sollen Berücksichtigung finden). Dagegen werden bei der Untersuchung der Auswirkungen der EPAs auf die Ökonomien einerseits allgemeine Charakteristika der Vereinbarungen aufgezeigt; andererseits findet eine Auswahl von Fallbeispiele statt, die einer detaillierten Analyse unterzogen werden. In der Beurteilung, welche Auswirkungen Handelsliberalisierungen auf Teile der Ökonomien der Länder haben, werden die verhandelten Vereinbarungen betrachtet (aufgeführt in Stevens et al. 2008).[18]

17 Zudem rückte ungefähr zur selben Zeit die OECD das Thema Kohärenz zwischen Geberländern in den Fokus (Stokke 2006: 60f.).

18 Die „Interim"-EPAs sind bei den Aufzählungen der Zollliberalisierungen mit „positiven" Listen der Produkte versehen, d.h. in den Vertragstexten ist aufgezählt, was mit jedem *einzelnen* Produkt passiert (Stevens et al. 2008: 43). Deswegen haben die Vertragstexte Längen von mehreren hundert Seiten und können nicht einzeln untersucht werden, da es zeitlich nicht machbar wäre. Stevens et al. haben eine äußerst detaillierte Aufzählung der Vertragsinhalte vorgelegt, die glaubhaft erscheint und als Quelle für die Beurteilung der EPAs benutzt wird. Weitere Beurteilungen werden aus dem mehrmals im Jahr erscheinenden Heft Trade Negotiations Insights (http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/) genommen, das die aktuellen Entwicklungen in den Verhandlungen aufzeigt und kommentiert.

II. Methodik

II.1 ***Definition Wandel***

Es gibt mehrere Grundannahmen, die den verschiedenen Konzepten des Wandels gemeinsam sind: Erstens ist Wandel nicht objektives Merkmal sozialer Strukturen oder Prozesse, sondern theorieabhängig. Zweitens ist Wandel ein Konzept, das Verhältnisse über eine Zeitspanne untersucht und somit abhängig ist vom Bezug auf Stabilität, d.h. auf eine Ausgangsbasis mit der verglichen wird. Drittens wird an die Forschung die Anforderung gestellt, dass bei der Untersuchung von Wandel Einflussfaktoren auf mehreren verschiedenen Ebenen unter der Berücksichtigung einer Vielzahl von Kausalketten integriert werden müssen (da die Magisterarbeit nicht die Erklärungen für eine eventuelle Veränderung der Politik umfasst, ist dieser Punkt nicht von hoher Relevanz). Die Konzepte unterscheiden sich danach, ob sie zielgerichtetes Entscheidungshandeln untersuchen, inhaltlich definierte Außenpolitiken im Sinne von *Policies* oder das Selbstverständnis kollektiver Akteure, das durch das internationale Umfeld beeinflusst wird (Medick-Krakau 1999: 8-13). Die zweite Gruppe umschließt Rollenkonzepte, die als Analysekategorie in der Magisterarbeit dienen. Von Wandel ist dann zu sprechen, wenn die EU nach dem Konzept einer Zivilmacht zu einem gewissen Zeitpunkt handelte, sie es zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt nicht mehr tat und die Politik einer Handelsmacht feststellbar ist.[19]

II.2 ***Begriffsklärung Kohärenz***

Kohärenz kann sowohl für eine Zivilmacht-orientierte Politik als auch für eine Handelsmacht-orientierte Politik sprechen: „The same decision may be coherent from a trade perspective but incoherent from a development perspective“ (Carbone 2008a: 326). Zwar lässt sich ein gewisses Maß an Inkohärenz in einem pluralistischen System nicht umgehen, aber der Stellenwert eines Politikfeldes ist dennoch feststellbar: Wenn Kohärenzbemühungen in den Politikfeldern, die die Entwicklungsländer betreffen, dazu führen, dass die entwicklungspolitische Kompetenz gestärkt wird und es Erfolge gibt, Inkohärenzen zu beseitigen, dann spricht das für die Politik einer Zivilmacht.

19 Interessanterweise stellte Medick-Krakau (1999: 25f.) fest, dass sich die Außenhandelspolitik der USA als einziges außenpolitisches Politikfeld in den 90er Jahren grundlegend wandelte, sowohl auf der Verhaltensebene als auch bei den Ordnungsvorstellungen, Leitideen und Handlungsnormen.

Wenn dagegen Aspekte in den Vordergrund der Bemühungen um Kohärenz rücken, die das Eigeninteresse betonen – insbesondere das wirtschaftliche –, spricht es für die Politik einer Handelsmacht, wie ein Zitat verdeutlicht:

> „Die angestrebte Kohärenz zwischen interner und externer EU-Politik besteht (...) in einer Harmonisierung des Binnenmarktes nach Maßgabe der Lissabon-Strategie. Ziel ist es, auf diesem Weg EU-weite Standards zu schaffen, die im Rahmen einer stärker nach ökonomischen Kriterien – und weniger nach Gesichtspunkten von Entwicklungshilfe (...) – ausgerichteten Handelspolitik den Boden ebnen" (Altvater/Mahnkopf 2007: 186).[20]

Ob diese Meinung tatsächlich gerechtfertigt ist, ist ein zu untersuchender Aspekt dieser Arbeit. Es wird nicht davon ausgegangen, dass eine solche Handelspolitik per se mit negativen Konsequenzen für Entwicklungsländer verbunden ist, denn es gibt unterschiedliche Meinungen zu diesem Thema.[21] Vielmehr macht das Zitat deutlich, dass man Kohärenz unter verschiedenen Gesichtspunkten betrachten kann. In den folgenden Absätzen werden die Kriterien für eine Untersuchung der Kohärenz aufgezählt.

Der elementare Bestandteil von Kohärenz ist die Abwesenheit von Inkohärenzen. Positiv ausgedrückt ist eine Definition von Kohärenz die „Unterstützung der Entwicklungspolitik durch andere Politiken bzw. (...) [das] Zusammenwirken aller im jeweiligen Kontext relevanten Politiken zur Erreichung übergeordneter Entwicklungsziele" (Ashoff 2005: 42). Stokke (2006: 58f.) greift den Gedanken auf und schreibt, dass man Politiken dann als kohärent bezeichnen kann, wenn sich die Ziele, Strategien, Mechanismen und die Ergebnisse von politischen Entscheidungen zumindest nicht widersprechen.[22] Vor diesem Hintergrund sind auch die Reformen in der Agrarpolitik der EU zu

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20 Auf das problematische Verhältnis von interner und externer Politik macht auch Nuttall (2005: 110f.) aufmerksam. So kann es durchaus sein, dass die Präferenz für eine erhöhte Kohärenz im Inneren aus demokratischen Gesichtspunkten sogar eine stärkere Legitimation besitzt als eine Ausrichtung auf die Außenpolitik, wenn sie den Willen der europäischen Bevölkerung widerspiegelt.

21 Einen guten Überblick der Diskussionen um die möglichen Auswirkungen von Handelsliberalisierungen geben Tokarick (2008) und Nuscheler (2005: 308-345). Tokarick kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass Handelsliberalisierungen den Entwicklungsländern große Vorteile bringen würden. Im Gegensatz zu anderen bei ihm aufgeführten Studien fällt der Gewinn der Entwicklungsländer sogar höher aus bei der Öffnung ihrer eigenen Märkten als bei weiteren Liberalisierungen auf Seiten der westlichen Industrienationen. Nuscheler verweist auf Voraussetzungen, die gewährleistet sein müssen, damit sich eine positive Wirkung von Handel entfaltet. Einen Überblick der verschiedenen Denkschulen und deren zeitliche Einordnung liefert Auroi (2006).

22 Vor allem in englischen Texten unterscheiden die Autoren zwischen Konsistenz und Kohärenz (zu einer genauen Herleitung und Definition der Begriffe siehe Hoebink 2004: 183-187). Die Abwesenheit von Inkohärenzen würde dann mit Konsistenz umschrieben werden, die als Definition beinhaltet, dass es keine Widersprüche zwischen den verschiedenen Politikfeldern gibt. Kohärenz hat eine weitergehende Bedeutung: Eine kohärente Politik schafft eine Synergie der betreffenden Politikfelder (Gauttier 2004: 26). In der Magisterarbeit wird nur die Kohärenz untersucht und nicht noch die strikte Trennung von den beiden Definitionen berücksichtigt, da einerseits Kohärenz der Überbegriff ist und andererseits ein zu starker Fokus auf den Aspekt der Trennung der beiden Begriffe gelegt werden würde.

beleuchten, besonders im Hinblick auf die Verhandlung der EPAs.

Dialer (2007: 40-42) sieht es als das Hauptproblem auf EU-Ebene, dass sowohl *horizontale Inkohärenz* (auf der politisch-organisatorischen Ebene, d.h. innerhalb des Systems der EU) als auch *vertikale Inkohärenz* (bei Entscheidungsprozessen innerhalb des politischen Mehrebenensystems) zusammenfallen (siehe auch Carbone 2008a: 326, Jopp/Schlotter 2007a: 12f.). In der Magisterarbeit steht die „horizontale Kohärenz" der Entscheidungsebene über Entwicklungshilfe im Untersuchungsfokus.[23] Um eine eventuelle Veränderung der Kohärenz zu erfassen, bieten sich folgende Untersuchungen an, um die Vorsätze für mehr Kohärenz in Vertragsschriften der EU unter die Lupe zu nehmen: Wurden a) Prozeduren geschaffen, um Kohärenz zu erreichen? b) Komitees eingesetzt mit Repräsentanten der beteiligten Akteure? c) Systeme für eine Überwachung der Kohärenz erschaffen? d) Prozeduren geschaffen, um Konflikte zwischen gegensätzlichen Ansichten zu lösen? (Stokke 2006: 58).

II.3 ***Analyse des Akteurs EU in der Entwicklungs- und Handelspolitik***

Entwicklungspolitik ist nach Schmidt (2004: 198) „die Gesamtheit aller Institutionen, Mittel, Maßnahmen und Bestrebungen, die vorrangig mit dem Anspruch eingesetzt werden, die wirtschaftliche, soziale und politische Entwicklung von Dritte-Welt-Staaten zu fördern." Entwicklungspolitik ist in der Definition von Schmidt somit nicht gleichbedeutend mit Entwicklungshilfe und -zusammenarbeit, sondern subsumiert Aspekte diverser Politikfelder wie Sicherheits-, Handels-, Umwelt- und Migrationspolitik. In der Arbeit soll ein engeres Verständnis von Entwicklungspolitik verwendet werden, zusammengesetzt aus Entwicklungshilfe und -zusammenarbeit. Im Folgenden wird die Akteursqualität (*actorness*) der EU in den beiden oben genannten Politikfeldern[24] dargestellt und an einem theoretischen Modell gemessen, sowie die aktuelle institutionelle Aufgliederung der Kompetenzen erläutert.

Vier Komponenten bestimmen nach Jupille/Caporaso (1998: 214-220) die

23 Für eine umfassende Darstellung der verschiedenen Kohärenz-Definitionen siehe Hoebink (2004: 187-196).

24 Die Agrarpolitik, die ein weiteres zu betrachtendes Politikfeld für die Kohärenz der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik ist, wird nicht ausführlich dargestellt, da sie – im Gegensatz zur Handelspolitik – nicht in direkter institutioneller Konkurrenz zur Entwicklungspolitik steht. Zu der institutionellen Ausgestaltung sei hier kurz angemerkt, dass die Kompetenz der Kommission für politische Entscheidungen limitiert ist und die Schlüsselentscheidungen im Rat der Europäischen Union entschieden werden (Rieger 2005: 172-179). Wichtiger als das institutionelle Setting in der Agrarpolitik sind die Reformen, die getätigt wurden; diese werden später in die Analyse mit einbezogen.

Akteursqualität:[25]

- **Anerkennung** (*recognition*), d.h. andere akzeptieren den Akteur und arbeiten mit ihm zusammen. *Recognition* ist die Grundvoraussetzung für Akteursqualität. Sie ist entweder de jure oder de facto vorhanden. De jure bedeutet, dass der Akteur diplomatisch anerkannt ist oder formelles Mitglied in internationalen Organisationen ist. De facto meint, dass dritte Parteien sich entscheiden, mit dem Akteur zu interagieren und ihn somit implizit anerkennen.
- **Autorität** (*authority*), die die legale Kompetenz zum Handeln umschreibt: Sie ist dann gegeben, wenn die Nationalstaaten Kompetenzen auf die europäischen Institutionen übertragen.
- **Autonomie** (*autonomy*), verstanden als die institutionelle Bestimmtheit und Unabhängigkeit von anderen Akteuren. Sie bemisst sich im konkreten Fall der EU daran, ob sie von den Mitgliedsstaaten unabhängig handeln kann.
- **Zusammenhalt** (*cohesion*), was die Möglichkeit des Akteurs bewertet, kohärente Präferenzen für die Politikausübung zu formulieren und artikulieren. Zusammenhalt soll nicht als ein Bestandteil der Akteursqualität untersucht werden, da kein nennenswerter Unterschied zu Kohärenz festzustellen ist. *Cohesion* geht (mit der Betrachtung der Kohärenzbemühungen der EU) als eine unabhängige Variable in die Analyse der EU-Politik gegenüber der AKP-Staaten mit ein.

Allgemeiner institutioneller Aufbau

Die Europäische Union wurde offiziell am 1. November 1993 gegründet, als der Maastrichter Vertrag in Kraft trat. Er schuf die drei Säulen der EU: die Europäische Gemeinschaft (EG), die Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) und die polizeiliche und justizielle Zusammenarbeit in Strafsachen (PJZS). Die erste Säule ist supranational organisiert und beinhaltet Politikfelder wie den internen Markt, die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik, Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik. Die zweite Säule (GASP) basiert auf intergouvernementaler Zusammenarbeit, die dritte behandelt Vorgaben für Kooperation in den Feldern der Justiz und Innenpolitik (Smith 2008: 27). In der ersten Säule ist der Rat der Europäischen Union (Rat), der aus den Repräsentanten der Mitgliedsstaaten besteht, das Haupt-Entscheidungsgremium. Die Europäische Kommission schlägt Gesetze vor, verhandelt Abkommen mit Drittstaaten und verwaltet die Hilfsprogramme der

25 Für weitere Beiträge zum Thema *actoreness* siehe Bretherton/Vogler (2006: 15-35) und Jopp/Schlotter (2007a: 11f.).

Union (ebd.: 33-35).[26]

Die Europäische Union ist die am stärksten institutionalisierte internationale Organisation der Welt. Da eine Zollunion gemeinsame Regeln für Importe benötigt, bekam die Kommission schon 1957 mit den Römischen Verträgen die Kompetenz für den externen Güterhandel. So verhandelt sie seit 1961 als verantwortlicher Akteur in der Handelspolitik für die europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten, nicht ohne Komplikationen wegen Kompetenzstreitigkeiten. Nur die Gemeinschaft hat das Recht, Handels-, Kooperations- und Assoziationsabkommen Drittstaaten anzubieten. Die legale Grundlage hierfür ist Artikel 133 des Vertrags zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EGV),[27] der 2001 im Vertrag von Nizza erweitert wurde (siehe unten): Der am meisten genutzte Artikel der europäischen Gemeinschaft in den internationalen Beziehungen regelt in einheitlichen Prinzipien die gemeinsame Politik für Zolllinien, internationale Verhandlungen, Liberalisierungen, Exportbestimmungen und Protektionsmaßnahmen (Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 62-67). Bis Nizza bestand der stärkste Einfluss des institutionellen Rahmens des *aquis communautaire*[28] auf die Außenwirtschaftspolitik darin, zu bestimmen, ob die Autorität über bestimmte Themen bei der EU, bei den Mitgliedsstaaten oder in gemischter Kompetenz liegt (Meunier/Nicolaïdis 1999: 479-497, Young 2003: 57-63). Der Vertrag von Nizza aus dem Jahre 2001 (in Kraft getreten 2003) erweiterte maßgeblich die Kompetenzen der EG bei Handelsfragen. Es blieben jedoch einige besonders sensible Dienstleistungssektoren – audio-visuelle, Bildungs-, Gesundheits-, und soziale Dienstleistungen – und ausländische Direktinvestitionen in Nicht-Dienstleistungssektoren in der gemischten Kompetenz. Das bedeutet, dass die Mitgliedsstaaten immer noch Verträge einzeln ratifizieren müssen (Young 2003: 66).

Die Vorgehensweise, internationale Vereinbarungen zu verhandeln und abzuschließen, sieht wie folgt aus: Der Rat autorisiert die Kommission, Verhandlungen mit Drittstaaten oder internationalen Organisationen aufzunehmen. Die Kommission vollzieht die Verhandlungen nach den Vorgaben des Rates und in Absprache mit einem speziellen Komitee, das vom Rat eingesetzt wurde. Am Ende stimmt der Rat über das Abkommen

26 Zur genauen Aufteilung der Kompetenzen und einer präziseren Beschreibung der Entscheidungsverfahren siehe Smith (2008: 33-36).

27 Der konsolidierten Fassung; wenn im Text die Rede vom EGV ist, so ist die aktuellste Version des Vertrages gemeint, also der Vertrag von Nizza.

28 Der *aquis communautaire* ist der gemeinschaftliche Besitzstand innerhalb des EU-Rechts und umfasst alle für die Mitgliedsstaaten verbindlichen Rechtsakte.

ab. Es gibt folgende verschiedene Arten von Abkommen:

- Handelsabkommen, bei denen der Rat mit qualifizierter Mehrheit entscheidet;
- Kooperationsabkommen, bei denen der Rat ebenfalls per qualifizierter Mehrheit abstimmt, wenn nicht Felder berührt werden, die Einstimmigkeit benötigen; zudem konsultiert der Rat das Parlament;
- Assoziationsabkommen, bei denen der Rat mit Einstimmigkeit entscheidet und die Zustimmung des Parlaments benötigt wird (Smith 2008: 36f.).

In der Praxis sind die meisten Abkommen „gemischte Abkommen", weil ihnen nicht nur Art. 133 zu Grunde liegt, sondern auch die Art. 300 und 310, die die genaue Kompetenzverteilung beschreiben. Wenn nicht nur Themen betroffen sind, die in der exklusiven Kompetenz der EG liegen, und gemeinsame Rechte und Verpflichtungen geschaffen werden, muss im Rat Einstimmigkeit herrschen. Deshalb haben die Mitgliedsstaaten Lomé und Cotonou mit unterzeichnet, und müssen gleichermaßen die EPAs ratifizieren (Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2008: 204f.).

Handelspolitik

Verantwortlich für die Handelspolitik der Kommission ist der/die Kommissar/-in für Handel (derzeit Catherine Ashton) und die ihm/ihr unterstehende Generaldirektion (GD) Handel, wobei ab 1999 die GD Relex (Außenbeziehungen) dazu gekommen ist, die eine koordinierende Rolle für die gemeinschaftlichen externen Beziehungen einnimmt. Auf Ratsebene gibt es kein eigenes Handelstreffen, bestehend aus den Handelsministern der Mitgliedsstaaten. Handelsfragen werden gemeinsam mit anderen Themen in dem Rat für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen (GAERC) behandelt. Um das Vorgehen der Kommission zu beobachten, gib es das so genannte „Artikel 133 Komitee"[29], das ein bedeutendes Gremium in der Handelspolitik der Gemeinschaft ist, da es die Meinungen der Regierungen der Mitgliedsstaaten an die Kommission weiter gibt (Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 67-69).

Die Akteursqualität lässt sich in der Handelspolitik somit folgendermaßen beurteilen: Es sind de facto-Anerkennung und Autorität gegeben, da die Kommission als Vertragspartner agiert und als solcher akzeptiert ist. Autonomie ist schwächer ausgeprägt, da die Mitgliedsstaaten über den Rat Einfluss auf die Kommission, die als

29 Es gibt zwei Formationen des Komitees. Eine mit hohen nationalen Vertretern, die die Kompetenzen für Handelsfragen in ihren Heimatländern besitzen; sie treffen sich einmal im Monat. Daneben gibt es regelmäßige Treffen von Delegierten, die technische Details bearbeiten (Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 68f.).

Verhandlungsführerin agiert, ausüben können und die Abkommen teilweise selbst ratifizieren müssen.

Entwicklungspolitik

Die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist nach Art. 3 des EGV eines der Handlungsfelder der EG. Sie ist laut Art. 177-181 eine „Ergänzung der entsprechenden Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten“ (Amtsblatt 2002: 77), wodurch deutlich wird, dass die primäre Zuständigkeit für die Entwicklungspolitik bei den Mitgliedsstaaten liegt. Auf gemeinschaftlicher Ebene sind für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwei Kommissare und ihre Generaldirektionen zuständig: Dem/der Kommissar/-in für Entwicklung und humanitäre Hilfe (derzeit Louis Michel) untersteht die GD Entwicklung, das die Verhältnisse der EU mit den AKP-Staaten regelt und die GD ECHO (Europäisches Amt für humanitäre Hilfe), das Soforthilfen in Notfällen gewährt. Dem/der Kommisar/-in für Außenbeziehungen und Nachbarschaftspolitik (derzeit Benita Ferrero-Waldner) untersteht die GD Relex, die für die übrigen Entwicklungsländer zuständig ist und EuropeAid, das Projekte in der Entwicklungspolitik verwaltet (Knapp 2008: 120f., 133f., Bretherton/Vogler 2006: 130-132).

Eine wichtige Gemeinschaftsaufgabe ist die Vergabe finanzieller Hilfe an Drittstaaten. Die Kommission verwaltet alle gemeinschaftlichen Hilfsprogramme. Für die AKP-Staaten gibt es einen separaten Fonds, den *Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds* (EEF), der sich aus den Beitragszahlungen der Mitgliedsstaaten und Eigenmitteln der *Europäischen Investitionsbank* (EIB) zusammensetzt (zu den Zahlen siehe Tab.1 auf der folgenden Seite). Zusätzlich zu den Mitteln aus dem EEF gibt es das Nahrungsmittelhilfsprogramm, das eines der ältesten EG-Hilfsprogramme ist. Dieses ist Teil des EG-Haushalts (Reisen 1999: 17). Im Jahr 2005 lag der Anteil der EG-Mittel an der kollektiven europäischen Entwicklungshilfezahlungen bei 20 % (Europäische Kommission 2006: 5).

Tab.1 Mittel des EEF (Mill. Euro)[30]

Lomé I EEF 4	Lomé II EEF 5	Lomé III EEF 6	Lomé IV EEF 7	Lomé IVb EEF 8	Cotonou EEF 9 (bis 2007)	EEF 10 (2008-2013)
3.072	4.724	7.400	10.800	12.967	13.500	22.682

Quellen: Keßler 2007: 35, http://europa.eu/scadplus (abgerufen am 22.12.08), eigene Darstellung.

Die Mitgliedsstaaten betreiben weiterhin Entwicklungspolitik und humanitäre Hilfe parallel zur supranationalen Ebene. Da die in den Verträgen theoretisch verankerte Komplementarität der Hilfsprogramme zwischen supranationaler und nationaler Ebene kaum gegeben ist, ist es nicht gerechtfertigt, die Ausgaben zusammen zu zählen und zu behaupten, die EU sei der größte Hilfsgeber der Welt (Smith 2008: 37f.) – auch wenn die GD Entwicklung es auf jeder Seite ihrer Homepage schreibt (siehe http://ec.europa.eu/development/index)[31]. Die EG hat ein eigenes Hilfsbudget und ist seit 1986 durchgehend mindestens der sechstgrößte Hilfsgeber der Welt gewesen. Innerhalb der GASP kann die EU zudem ökonomische und finanzielle Sanktionen gegen Drittstaaten verhängen (in Einstimmigkeit). Allerdings haben die Mitgliedsstaaten wiederum auch selbst die Möglichkeit, sich solcher Mittel zu bedienen (ebd.: 61f.).
Bretherton/Vogler (2006: 135) sind zwar der Meinung, dass allein die Gründung der AKP-Partnerschaft und die wachsende Anzahl der AKP-Mitgliedsstaaten ein Zeichen der Akteursqualität der EU sei. Nach Ansicht des Autors ist Anerkennung zwar für die supranationale Ebene gegeben, aber die parallel laufenden Programme der Mitgliedsstaaten untergraben die Stellung der EU. Autorität und Autonomie sind nur für die eigenen Mittel der EG gewährleistet, für die gesamten Mittel der EU gibt es keine Einheitlichkeit der Verwendung. Deswegen können nur die eigenen Mittel der EG in die Beurteilung der Politik gegenüber den AKP-Staaten einfließen.

30 In absoluten Zahlen wurde der EEF stark aufgestockt. Wenn man allerdings die Ausweitung der AKP-Staatengruppe über den Zeitraum der Partnerschaft (Lomé I bis Cotonou) betrachtet, relativieren sich die Zahlen (Keßler 2007: 34). Zudem sind sie niedriger als die Mittel der Hilfsprogramme für die direkte europäische Nachbarschaft (Peters/Wagner 2005: 234, Reisen 2007: 51). So erhielten die AKP-Staaten z.B. 1991 nur 44 % der Mittel, die die zehn ost-europäischen Länder im Hilfsprogramm PHARE bekamen (Hurt 2003: 165). Eine weitere Relativierung erfahren die Zahlungen, wenn man die realen, inflationsbereinigten, Werte betrachtet. Dann steht statt einem nominalen Wachstum von 439 % (EEF 4 bis EEF 9) nur ein reales Wachstum von 16 % zu Buche, und die Werte vom siebten zum neunten EEF verringern sich sogar um 11,4 % (Clarke 2007: 210).
Auf die beträchtliche Kritik, die der EEF im Laufe der Zeit hinnehmen musste, sei hier nur kurz hingewiesen (siehe Hoebink 2005: 136-147, Reisen 1999: 26-36), denn die schwierigen Aushandlungsmodalitäten zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten und der Kommission betreffen die Magisterarbeit nur am Rande. Was allerdings noch später betrachtet wird, ist die Praxis der Mittelvergabe.

31 Manche im Text angegebenen Links werden im Text nicht ausgeschrieben, um eine gute Lesbarkeit zu gewährleisten. Der vollständige Link ist im Literaturverzeichnis angegeben.

III. Theoretische Grundlagen

III.1 Abgrenzung Großmacht

Großmacht, bzw. Machtstaat, sind Schlüsselbegriffe der (neo-)realistischen Theorie im Bereich der Internationalen Beziehungen. Die beiden Begriffe sind in der Politikwissenschaft genau definiert, werden hier aber synonym verwendet (unter der Definition von einem Machtstaat).[32] Da die Bezeichnung „Staat" auf die EU nicht zutrifft, wird in der Arbeit der Begriff „Großmacht" benutzt. Die grundlegende Eigenschaft eines Machtstaates ist nach Schmidt (2004: 426), dass er „eine an Machtpolitik orientierte Außen- und Innenpolitik" betreibt, d.h. „allgemeine Bestrebungen [aufweist], die auf Gewinn, Erhalt und Ausweitung von Machtpotentialen (...) und effektiver Macht gerichtet sind" (ebd.: 425).

Da neorealistische Ansätze unter der Annahme einheitlicher Staaten und mit der systemischen Voraussetzung der internationalen Anarchie das Handeln von Akteuren deuten wollen, sind sie nicht gut geeignet, das Verhalten der EU zu erklären (Hyde-Price 2004: 100-102).[33] Denn die EU ist kein einheitlicher Staat (und steht auch nicht kurz davor einer zu werden), überwindet die Anarchie im Inneren und versucht, das internationale Umfeld mit nicht-militärischen Mitteln zu gestalten (Hill/Smith 2005: 389). Die selben Autoren fassen zusammen: „Neorealism, given its highly systemic perspective and stress on the balance of power, seems to have relatively little to tell us about the EU's place in the world" (ebd.: 390). Die Charakteristika einer Großmacht sind nach Schrade (1997: 257-59) – sie benutzt den Begriff Machtsstaat –, dass sie unkooperativ, unilateral und gegebenenfalls konfrontativ vorgeht, wobei Macht- und Sicherheitsinteressen im Vordergrund stehen. Blauberger (2005: 16) fügt diesen Eigenschaften hinzu, dass das klassische Mittel einer Großmacht aus einer Androhung und Anwendung von militärischer Gewalt besteht. Wenn man sich vergegenwärtigt, dass die EU militärische Mittel bisher nur nutzte, um Konflikte zu lösen und Menschenrechte und demokratische Prinzipien zu fördern (Jopp/Schlotter 2007b: 390f., Stavridis 2001: 13-17, Toje 2008: 210), dann sieht man die Grenzen der Aussagekraft dieses Idealtypus für die Politik der EU. Toje (2008: 212) fasst den Standpunkt gut zusammen: „Seen collectively, Europe has the tools – the capabilities, the technology, the finance and the population –

32 Der Begriff Großmacht besitzt eine eher geschichtliche Komponente (siehe Schmidt 2004: 286), weshalb die Definition von Machtstaat besser geeignet scheint, die idealtypischen Aspekte zu beleuchten.

33 Für eine detailliertere Beschreibung der hier nur simplifizierten Darstellung siehe zum Beispiel Schörnig 2006.

of a great power, but lacks the will."

Zusätzlich zu den genannten Aspekten gibt es zwei weitere Gründe, warum neorealistische Ansätze nicht besonders gut geeignet sind für die Analyse des Verhaltens der EU: Erstens können sie nicht das Vorgehen in der Entwicklungspolitik erklären; da die AKP-Staaten keine existenzielle Bedrohung für die Sicherheit der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und ebenso keinen möglichen Sicherheitsgewinn darstellen, gäbe es diesem Ansatz nach keine Gründe für eine präferenzielle Partnerschaft. Zudem hat sich die Entwicklungspolitik in den 1990er Jahren nicht grundlegend geändert, was man hätte erwarten müssen, da die AKP-Staaten an geostrategischer Relevanz verloren hatten (Folz et al. 2007: 11f.). Zweitens wäre zu erwarten, dass die EU hinsichtlich der chinesischen Politik in Afrika nicht versuchen würde, eine allzu strikte Politik gegenüber den afrikanischen Staaten zu betreiben, damit auch die europäischen Staaten Zugang zu den dort vorhandenen Rohstoffen haben. China zeigt die Absicht, Hilfe zu geben und Handel zu treiben, ohne beschränkende Konditionalitäten, Menschenrechte und Anstrengungen für eine Demokratisierung zu beachten (Böhm 2007, Keukeleire/MacNaughtan 2006: 209).[34]

III.2 ***Zivilmacht***

Über die Definition einer Zivilmacht und die Frage, ob die EU als solche einzuordnen ist, wurde seit der ersten Vorstellung des Konzepts durch François Duchêne 1972/73 ausgiebig diskutiert,[35] ohne dass sich die Autoren auf eine allgemeine Formulierung der zugrunde liegenden Bestimmungsfaktoren einigen konnten. Erschwerend für eine Konzeptualisierung ist, dass ein Teil der Literatur Zivilmacht als normatives Ideal darstellt, ohne konkrete Fälle zu testen. Ein anderer Teil bewertet die europäische Außenpolitik (bzw. bestimmte Teilgebiete) anhand selbst gewählter Indikatoren, die von der eigenen Überzeugung einer gewählten Theorie beeinflusst sind. Besonders die Diskussionen darum, ob durch den Aufbau der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) die Politik der EU noch die einer Zivilmacht sein kann, sind von dieser

34 Zu der chinesischen Politik in Afrika schreibt Zafar (2007: 126), dass sie die westliche Entwicklungshilfe verändern wird und beide Seiten sich zusammensetzen sollten, um gemeinsame Entwicklungsziele voranzutreiben. Inwieweit dies gelingen kann und wie sich die chinesische Präsenz auf die afrikanischen Staaten auswirkt, ist ein Thema für weitere Forschung.

35 Überblicksdarstellungen geben Orbie (2006) und Stavridis (2001).

Dichotomie geprägt.[36] Im englischsprachigen Raum bildete sich als Abgrenzung zu dem, nach Ansicht der Autoren, mit einer Militarisierung nicht zu vereinbarenden Konzept der Zivilmacht die Bezeichnung „normative Macht" (*normative power*) heraus (Manners 2002). Der Ansatz betont vor allem die innere Struktur der EU als normatives Vorbild:

> „Simply by existing as different in a world of states and the relations between them, the European Union changes the normality of 'international relations'. In this respect the EU is a normative power: it changes the norms, standards and prescriptions of world politics away from the bounded expectations of state-centricity" (Manners 2008: 45).

Da normative Macht demnach den Fokus auf die inneren Werte und Normen der EU legt und nicht so sehr auf das außenpolitische Verhalten,[37] werden hier die Kriterien für eine Zivilmacht herausgearbeitet aus dem ursprünglichen Konzept von Duchêne und den in den 90er Jahren aufkommenden Ansätzen in der Rollentheorie.

Nach Duchêne (1973: 34f.) betreibt eine Zivilmacht eine Politik, die versuchen muss, „das Gefühl für gemeinsame Verantwortung und für vertragliches Vorgehen, das sich bisher ausschließlich auf die «heimischen» und nicht auf die «fremden» Angelegenheiten (...) bezog, auch in den internationalen Beziehungen einzuführen." Das Vorgehen ist dabei „durch den zivilen Charakter von Mitteln und Zwecken und einen für sie konstitutiven Sinn für gemeinsames Vorgehen charakterisiert, worin wiederum, wenn auch noch so unvollkommen, soziale Werte wie Gleichheit, Gerechtigkeit und Achtung des anderen zum Ausdruck kommen." Die innereuropäisch verbreiteten Werte und Normen sollten somit in der Außenpolitik ebenso zum Tragen kommen.

In den 90er Jahren wurde Zivilmacht als ein weit verbreiteter Idealtypus in rollentheoretischen Analysen, die ein neues Erklärungsmodell für außenpolitisches Handeln neben den „etablierten" Theorien entwickelten, herausgebildet (Harnisch 2003: 335). Die

36 So bezweifeln Bono (2006), Hyde-Price (2006), Manners (2006) und Schroedter (2003), dass man die EU mit dem Aufbau der ESVP weiterhin als Zivilmacht ansehen kann. Sjursen (2006: 243-249) hinterfragt sogar im Allgemeinen, ob die EU eine normative Macht ist. Für sie kann die EU nur dann einen Anspruch auf das Selbstverständnis von normativem Handeln erheben, wenn sie (in Anlehnung an Habermas) erstens in den Außenbeziehungen so handelt, dass die Gründe des Handelns in einer freien und offenen Debatte Zustimmung finden von allen betroffenen Parteien, und zweitens sie sich an kosmopolitische Regeln bindet und nicht so stark auf externe Souveränität beharrt.
Dagegen betonen Maull (2005, 2006) und Stavridis (2001), dass die EU auch mit dem Aufbau der ESVP weiterhin als Zivilmacht handelt, wenn sie nur unter bestimmten Voraussetzungen (d.h. nur kollektiv und mit internationaler Legitimation) militärische Mittel einsetzt. Sie würde somit dazu übergehen, eine Zivilmacht aus Überzeugung zu sein und nicht wegen fehlender Macht (Stavridis 2001: 20). Ohne eine starke GASP sind die Möglichkeiten der EU, eine effektive Rolle in der Vorbeugung von Konflikten und in friedensschaffenden Einsätzen zu spielen, sehr begrenzt (Petiteville 2003: 137).

37 Ein weitere, oft zitierte Aussage von Manners (2002: 252) verdeutlicht dies: „The most important factor shaping the international role of the EU is not what it does or what it says, but what it is."

Rollentheorie ergänzt die Erklärungsansätze des Neo-Realismus (mit den bestimmenden Faktoren Macht und Sicherheit) und des Neo-Institutionalismus (Wohlfahrt und Nutzen) um die Analysevariablen Normen, Werte und Moral (Kirste/Maull 1996: 308). Dadurch wird der Kritik an den aufgezählten Ansätzen Ausdruck verliehen, dass die Politik eines Akteurs nicht nur durch zweckrationales Handeln und feste Interessen- und Präferenzstrukturen bestimmt wird (Schrade 1997: 260).

Das generelle Konzept der Zivilmacht beinhaltet drei Aspekte: Erstens wird das Verhalten des Akteurs klassifiziert, der das Ziel hat, die internationalen Beziehungen in bewusster Abgrenzung zur Großmacht unter zivilen Aspekten mitzugestalten (Zivilmacht als Macht). Zweitens zeichnet den Akteur ein spezifisches Rollenkonzept aus, das auf den Prozess der Zivilisierung internationaler Politik ausgerichtet ist (Zivilmacht als Rolle). Drittens beinhaltet das Konzept die Wahl der Mittel nach einer außenpolitischen Strategie, die auf besonderen Instrumenten beruht (Zivilmacht als Medium) (Frenkler et al. 1997: 20f.). In Anlehnung an die Studien von Frenkler et al. (1997: 21-26) und Kirste/Maull (1996: 299-303) wird Zivilmacht verstanden als ein mögliches außenpolitisches Rollenkonzept, das man als Idealtypus mit dem tatsächlichen Handeln des untersuchten Akteurs vergleichen kann. In dem Vergleich mit der Realität kommen die beiden anderen Aspekte des Konzepts zum Tragen. Die idealtypischen Wertorientierungen und Zielsetzungen sowie die außenpolitischen Verhaltensweisen und Instrumente führen zu Analysekategorien, die der Untersuchung des Handelns eines Akteurs dienen:

1) **Gestaltungswille**: Zivilmächte beanspruchen eine kollektive oder partnerschaftliche Gestaltung der internationalen Ordnung mit eigener Beispielfunktion.
2) **Nationale Zielsetzunge**n: Eine Zivilmacht versucht, den innerstaatlich erreichten Grad der Zivilisierung auf die internationalen Beziehungen zu übertragen.
3) **Internationale organisatorische Zielsetzungen**: Auf internationaler Ebene ist das Ziel, die Zivilisierung der internationalen Politik voran zu treiben und die Interdependenz-Risiken beherrschbar zu machen. Mittel dazu sind partieller Souveränitätstransfer, Verrechtlichung, verbesserte Effizienz und eine erhöhte Legitimierung internationaler Institutionen, insbesondere die Unterstützung für eine Erweiterung und Vertiefung der Vereinten Nationen.
4) **Internationale inhaltliche Zielsetzungen**: Die Anerkennung von verflochtenen Interessen und universellen Werten führen zu einer wertorientierten Außenpolitik. Dazu zählt die Unterstützung von nachhaltiger Entwicklung und *Good*

Governance (verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung), also die Förderung von Demokratisierungsprozessen, rechtsstaatlichen und demokratische-pluralistischen, partizipatorischen und ökonomisch effizienten Strukturen.[38] Um die Wertvorstellungen durchzusetzen, dienen einerseits Auflagen bei der Gewährung von Vergünstigungen, andererseits auch im Notfall kollektiv abgestimmte Sanktionen.

5) **Spezifische außenpolitische Handlungsmuster**: Ziel ist es, erwünschte Ergebnisse in internationaler Kooperation zu erreichen. Diese Kooperation ist nur dann chancenreich und effektiv, wenn eine Übertragung von Souveränität institutionalisiert wird. Wenn Probleme entstehen, werden diese durch Verhandlungen, Kompromisse, Vermittlung und Streitschlichtungsverfahren gelöst.
6) **Außenpolitische Instrumente der Zivilmacht**: Bevorzugung politischer Instrumente (Verhandlungen), Konditionalitäten und Sanktionen.

Militärische Einsätze werden nicht grundsätzlich abgelehnt, aber nur dann befürwortet, wenn sie nicht alleine, sondern kollektiv durchgeführt werden, international legitimiert sind und „zivilisierende" Maßnahmen verfolgen (Maull 2005: 781, Maull 2006: 167-169).[39] Im Politikfeld Entwicklungspolitik müssten als zentrale Kriterien einer Zivilmacht bei der Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe die menschliche Bedürftigkeit und weitestgehend demokratische innenpolitische Rahmenbedingungen stehen (Schrade 1997: 261f.).

Kurz zusammengefasst ist das Hauptmerkmal einer Zivilmacht, dass sie versucht, partnerschaftlich (in Kooperation) Werte und Normen – wie demokratische Grundsätze und Menschenrechte –, die sie in ihrem Inneren verwirklicht hat, auf andere Akteure zu übertragen. Bei der Lösung von Problemen handelt sie nicht selbstbezogen, sondern beachtet die Argumente der beteiligten Parteien.

38 Die Demokratie- und *Good Governance*-Förderung ist nicht frei von Kritik. Einerseits kann es nur ein Deckmantel für eine Politik sein, die eigene Interessen verfolgt: „There is a subtle difference between norms themselves being in the EU's interest, and their merely providing a normative cloak increasing the effectiveness and legitimacy of external policies" (Young 2004: 421). Andererseits wird die Art und Weise kritisiert, wie die EU eine Umsetzung vorsieht, da sie zu hohe Erwartungen hat und zu sehr eigene Vorstellungen umsetzen will, die nicht zwangsläufig im politischen und wirtschaftlichen Interesse der Entwicklungsländer sind (Mold 2007: 241-247, 254f.). Zu einer positiven Sicht der Förderung von guter Regierungsführung kommen Sidiropoulos/Chevallier (2007) und Beck/Conzelmann (2004); für eine theoretische Analyse der Verbindung von Menschenrechten mit ökonomischen Theorien siehe Seymour/Pincus (2008).

39 Allerdings lautet eine Kritik, dass die These, die GASP sei ein Friedensprojekt, das Ausmaß der Militarisierung in den Internationalen Beziehungen unterschätze (Bono 2006: 162).

III.3 ***Handelsmacht***

Unter Einbeziehung der Untersuchungen von Rosecrance (1986), Schrade (1997) und Staack (2000) ist es möglich, Merkmale einer Handelsmacht in Abgrenzung zu einer Zivilmacht aufzustellen. Ganz allgemein ist das Hauptmerkmal einer Handelsmacht, dass sie die Ziele verfolgt, den nationalen Wohlstand und Ressourcenverteilung durch interne Entwicklung und Handel zu verbessern (Rosecrance 1986: 40). Letztgenannter Autor sah die Welt der Handelsstaaten vor allem als positive Abgrenzung zu machtstaatlichen Ambitionen: „In einer offenen Wirtschaft ist steigende Produktions- und Handelstätigkeit der einen Nation kein Hindernis für eine andere, das gleiche Ziel zu erreichen“ (ebd.: 55). Handelsstaaten sind auf ein möglichst offenes internationales Handelssystem angewiesen, das hohe Zölle, exzessive Handelskontrollen und Quoten stetig verringert. Ihre Entfaltungskraft ziehen sie aus dem Zusammenschluss mit anderen gleich gesinnten Staaten (Rosecrance 1993: 128f.). Interdependenz sollte somit für alle beteiligten Parteien mit Gewinnen verbunden sein. Auf ein Problem in dieser Ansicht weist Staack (2000: 31) hin: Die potentiellen negativen Aspekte von Handelsstaatlichkeit erwähnt Rosecrance nicht. So werden weltweite Herausforderungen wie Umweltschutz und Energieknappheit genauso vernachlässigt wie die Interessen der Entwicklungsländer. Deren Kooperation muss eben nicht darauf beruhen, dass sie gleich gesinnt sind, sondern dass die Verweigerung der Kooperation mit hohen Kosten verbunden wäre.

Das Handelsstaatsmodell entspricht den Verhaltenserwartungen des Liberalismus mit der Annahme, dass die Realität durch eine komplexe Interdependenz gekennzeichnet ist. Die Handelsmacht ist in dem Modell ein amoralischer und zweckrationaler Nutzenmaximierer. Die Verwirklichung ethischer Werte ist der Verfolgung egoistischer Interessen untergeordnet (Schrade 1997: 256; 259).[40]

Zwei weitere Merkmale, die Staack (2000: 19) aus Rosecrance ableitet, nämlich erstens die Bereitschaft zu einem Autonomieverzicht durch Multilateralismus, Integration und Kooperation und zweitens eine Präferenz für zivile Strategien bei der Verfolgung ihrer Interessen in den internationalen Beziehungen, finden sich ebenso im Konzept der Zivilmacht. Sie können somit nicht als Kriterien angewandt werden. Eine Abgrenzung

40 Zu weiteren Aspekten des Liberalismus siehe Schieder (2006), der die verschiedenen Untertypen der Theorie und das allgemeine Konzept, insbesondere das von Andrew Moravcsik, erläutert.

findet man in der Entwicklungspolitik: In diesem Politikfeld sieht die Handelsmacht keine moralische Verpflichtung zur Hilfeleistung und Umverteilung über rein humanitäre Hilfe hinaus vor und verfolgt eigene wohlfahrtssteigernde Ziele, d.h. Eingliederung der Entwicklungsländer in ein liberales Weltwirtschaftssystem und den Wegfall von Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (Schrade 1997: 259f.). Bei diesem Vorgehen wäre es essentiell, zu prüfen, ob die institutionellen Voraussetzungen in den Entwicklungsländern gegeben sind, um von Handelsliberalisierungen zu profitieren: „Je mehr ein Staat vom Außenhandel abhängig wird, desto mehr müssen seine Institutionen den Erfordernissen des Wandels angepasst werden“ (Rosecrance 1986: 52). Ein Mindestmaß an Qualität des institutionellen Settings ist die Vorbedingung für einen wohlfahrtssteigernden Einfluss von Handel. Besonders wichtige institutionelle Voraussetzungen sind Marktzugangskonditionen, die Effizienz des Steuersystems und Arbeitsmarktregulierung (Borrmann/Busse 2007: 405-408). Für eine Handelsmacht haben diese Aspekte eine zweitrangige Bedeutung, im Vordergrund steht der eigene Vorteil.
Für die Untersuchung dienlich sind weitere Kriterien, die Meunier/Nicolaïdis (2006: 910) aufgeführt haben. Sie unterscheiden zwischen *Power in trade*, d.h. die Benutzung der eigenen ökonomischen Stärke für eine Durchsetzung von eigenen Interessen und *Power through trade*, d.h. die Weiterverbreitung der eigenen Werte und Normen. Während letztere Machtausübung in eine Richtung der Zivilmacht weist, kann die erstere einen Aspekt zu Kriterien einer Handelsmacht hinzufügen: das bewusste Ausnutzen von asymmetrischer Verhandlungsmacht über Marktzugangskonditionen. Staack (2000: 52) fügt dem hinzu, dass eine Handelsmacht gegenüber den Ländern der „Dritten Welt“ ihre ökonomischen Machtvorteile ausspielt.

In einer Synthese der aufgeführten Kriterien lassen sich folgende Merkmale einer Handelsmacht bestimmen: Sie handelt egoistisch und individuell auf Basis von ad-hoc- Kooperationen, um eigene Interessen durchzusetzen. Ein offenes Handelssystem ist das Mittel, um die Wohlfahrt zu steigern; deshalb werden Liberalisierungen von fremden Volkswirtschaften angestrebt und mit Druckmitteln eingefordert, ohne dass die Anpassungsschwierigkeiten der betroffenen Staaten Beachtung finden.

III.4 ***Operationalisierung und Hypothesen***

Wie oben dargestellt, erfolgt die Untersuchung des Handelns der EU nicht in einer Auswertung deklaratorischer Politik, denn die tatsächliche Ausführung der Politik steht im Mittelpunkt:

> „The central question is the implementation of the commitments. (...) although it is not an easy task, achieving better policy coherence for development is no longer a 'mission impossible'. However, it is not simply a matter of designing mechanisms. It is also, if not mainly, a matter of commitment at the highest political level" (Carbone 2008a: 340).

Für die Analyse werden die Unterkategorien verwendet, die Frenkler et al. (1997: 26-29) aufzählen, um beurteilen zu können, ob das Handeln der EU im Einklang mit einem der beiden Idealtypen ist. Es erfolgt dabei eine Gegenüberstellung mit dem idealtypischen Handeln einer Handelsmacht, die noch nicht in der Untersuchung von Frenkler et al. inbegriffen waren (aufgeführt in Tab. 2).[41] Danach wird die Operationalisierung von Schrade (1997) dargestellt, bevor zum Schluss die Vorstellung der Hypothesen erfolgt.

Tab.2 Übersicht des Handelns der Idealtypen

Kriterium/Idealtyp	**Zivilmacht**	**Handelsmacht**
Gestaltungswille	Bereitschaft zur Übernahme internationaler Verantwortung mit kollektiven und partnerschaftlichen Bemühungen, aber kein Führungsanspruch	Übernahme internationaler Verantwortung aus Eigeninteresse
Nationale Zielsetzungen	Wohlfahrtsmaximierung: Außenpolitik steht aber unter dem Primat demokratisch-sozialstaatlicher Innenpolitik	Wohlfahrtsmaximierung: Außenpolitik steht unter dem Primat der wirtschaftlichen Interessen
Internationale organisatorische Zielsetzungen	- Für eine verbesserte Effizienz und Erweiterung von institutionalisierter Kooperation - für eine wachsende Verrechtlichung und Durchsetzung des Völkerrechts	Präferenz für ad-hoc-Kooperation
Internationale inhaltliche Zielsetzungen	- Kooperative Lösungen für globale Probleme - wertgebundene Außenpolitik: Förderung von *Good*	Eigener Vorteil steht im Mittelpunkt

41 Die Unterpunkte, die nicht von Relevanz für die Analyse sind, werden herausgelassen, die beiden Punkte spezifische außenpolitische Handlungsmuster und außenpolitische Instrumente zusammengeführt.

	Governance, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratisierung und Menschenrechte	
Außenpolitische Instrumente	- Lösung politischer Probleme durch Verhandlung, Kompromiss, Vermittlungsverfahren und Schlichtung - Solidarität und Wertegemeinschaft als grundlegende Elemente der Partnerschaft	Einsetzen von Druckmitteln, um eigene Lösungen von Problemen durchzusetzen

Neben den genannten idealtypischen Eigenschaften gibt es Spannungsfelder in der Außenpolitik der EU, die den Unterschied zwischen den beiden Polen Zivil- und Handelsmacht verdeutlichen (in Meunier/Nicolaïdis 2006: 915-922):

- Regionalisierung vs. Multilateralismus: Können regionale Handelsabkommen als Baustein für Multilateralismus angesehen werden? Die bilateralen Verhandlungen der EPAs laufen gleichzeitig mit den multilateralen Verhandlungen auf WTO-Ebene und sind den Vorwürfen ausgesetzt, dass sie Themen mit einbeziehen, für die man multilateral keine Lösung findet, da sie zu kontrovers sind. In den vergangenen fünf Jahrzehnten schloss die EU eine Vielzahl von bilateralen Handelsverträgen mit Entwicklungsländern ab, die europäische Import- und Exportinteressen befriedigten (Orbie 2008: 45).[42]
- Öffnung der Märkte mit Konditionen vs. Partnerschaft auf Augenhöhe: Gibt es nicht einen Widerspruch zwischen dem Anspruch des Weiterverbreitens von innereuropäischen Werten und Normen, die auf einer freiwilligen Kooperation von europäischen Staaten beruhen und dem Aufzwingen dieser Werte und Normen durch Handel? Bei Einschätzung der betriebenen Politik in der Handelskooperation geht es darum, ob man Entscheidungen gemeinsam trifft oder ob den Partnerländern Reformen aufgezwungen werden.
- Bilaterale Vorzugsbehandlung vs. Nicht-Diskriminierung: Wie legt man die Spannung zwischen internationalem Recht und besonderen Beziehungen bei? Dieser Punkt betrifft die Handelspolitik im Allgemeinen und die Vor- und Nachteile der

42 Allerdings kommt Orbie (2008: 50) in der Beurteilung der bilateralen Handelsverträge, die die EU im letzten Jahrzehnt mit Ländern abschloss, zu dem Schluss, dass sie eher Bausteine für eine multilaterale internationale Freihandelsagenda sind und sie ihr nicht im Weg stehen, da sie mit den WTO-Regeln kompatibel sind.

WTO-Konformität von Handelsabkommen. So bevorzugten die Lomé-Verträge die AKP-Staaten gegenüber anderen Entwicklungsländern. Aspekte einer Handelsmacht würden dann vorliegen, wenn die bilaterale Vorzugsbehandlung dem eigenen Vorteil dient.

- Freihandel vs. innenpolitische Präferenzen: Wie kann man ein Freihandels-Credo mit der Sorge um die sozialen Effekte von Marktintegration verbinden? Die Frage spielt auf den Widerspruch zwischen den nationalen Zielsetzungen an.
- Interne vs. externe Ziele: Ist freier Markt wie im Inneren der EU einfach übertragbar auf die Außenbeziehungen? In seinem Artikel „Europe's market liberalization is a bad model for a global trade agenda“ geht Jones (2006) genau auf diesen Aspekt ein und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass der Erfolg des europäischen Binnenmarktes von europäischen Faktoren abhänge: „The problem is that the single market has succeeded primarily insofar as it is European and not global in scope“ (ebd.: 943).
- Westliche Hegemonie vs. vermittelnder Akteur: Ist es möglich, dass die EU gleichzeitig der reiche liberale Norden, z.B. bei Dienstleistungen, der nervöse protektionistische Norden, z.B. in der Landwirtschaft und ein Vermittler von Norden und Süden sein kann? Die Frage setzt genau an den Spannungen zwischen den einzelnen Politikfeldern an, die für die Entwicklungspolitik relevant sind und die in der Magisterarbeit betrachtet werden.

Die letzten drei Fragen der Gegensatzpaare können nicht im Sinne einer Bestätigung oder Verneinung, bzw. bei Freihandel vs. innenpolitischen Präferenzen im Sinne einer optimalen Lösung, beantwortet werden, da eine Antwort von normativen Einstellungen geprägt ist und von Nebenbedingungen abhängt. Die sechs Spannungsfelder zeigen die Widersprüche bzw. die Schwierigkeiten für eine Einheitlichkeit in der Politik der EU auf. Die ersten drei Gegensatzpaare finden Aufnahme in die Beurteilung, die in den nächsten Kapiteln vorgenommen wird. Regionalisierung vs. Multilateralismus veranschaulicht die Probleme der Förderung von regionaler Integration in den AKP-Staaten, und betrifft die Frage, ob für manche in den EPAs behandelten Themen nicht besser multilaterale Lösungen gefunden werden sollten. Der zweite Aufzählungspunkt verdeutlicht die ungleiche Verhandlungsmacht zwischen EU und AKP-Staaten und gibt ebenso wie der dritte Punkt für die Einordnung in die Idealtypen an, dass das Verhalten einer Handelsmacht dann vorliegt, wenn die EU eigenmächtig nur für sie vorteilhafte Bedingungen in den Verhandlungen vorgibt.

Nach Schrade (1997: 265-268, 272-276) müssten, wenn die Idealtypen erfüllt werden, die Entwicklungshilfezahlungen[43] der EG an die Empfängerländer korrelieren mit dem Grad, in dem diese Länder „empfangswürdig“ sind (gemessen an den theoretisch vorgegebenen Vergabekriterien).[44] Wenn die EG ihre Mittel wie eine Zivilmacht verteilt, so wären zwei Kriterien zentral, die gleich gewichtet sind: Erstens die Bedürftigkeit des Empfängerlandes und zweitens demokratische und rechtsstaatliche Standards. Die Bedürftigkeit eines Empfängerlandes bemisst sich anhand des Bruttoinlandsprodukts pro Kopf.[45] Die demokratischen und rechtsstaatlichen Standards können mit dem Index von Freedom House[46] ausgewertet werden. Die Werte werden dabei normiert, um auf Werte zwischen Null und Eins zu kommen.[47] Bei den Entwicklungshilfezahlungen werden nicht die absoluten Zahlen, sondern die Zahlungen pro Einwohner betrachtet, um nicht bevölkerungsreiche Länder in der Berechnung mehr zu berücksichtigen als bevölkerungsarme.

Wenn die Verteilung der Zahlungen aus Erwägungen einer Handelsmacht erfolgen, so müsste das zentrale Kriterium die wirtschaftliche Relevanz für den Geberstaat sein. Zwei Indikatoren wären ausschlaggebend: Erstens das Volumen des Außenhandels der

43 Die Daten liefert die OECD, die Entwicklungshilfe (ODA, *Official Development Assistance*) folgendermaßen definiert: ODA umfasst Beihilfen oder Darlehen an bedürftige Länder oder Gebiete, die a) der offizielle Sektor vergibt, b) die Förderung von ökonomischer Entwicklung und Wohlstand als Hauptziel haben, c) unter die Bedingung fallen, dass Darlehen einen Beihilfeanteil von mindestens 25% haben. Zusätzlich ist die technische Kooperation mit einberechnet. Nicht berücksichtigt sind Ausgaben für militärische Zwecke und Zahlungen an private Personen (http://www.oecd.org/glossary).

44 In ihrer Studie verwendet sie noch zwei weitere Kriterien, nämlich die Zusammensetzung der Mittel und die bevorzugten Kanäle der Mittelvergabe (Schrade 1997: 266). Da letzteres Kriterium schon auf Grund des Ansatzes mit der EG als multilateralem Geber herausfällt und das erstere als zusätzliche Forschungsaufgabe das Ausmaß der Arbeit zu sehr strecken würde, fallen beide aus der Analyse heraus.

45 Eigentlich war der Human Development Index (HDI) für die Analyse vorgesehen, da er weitere Aspekte neben den rein wirtschaftlichen Kenngrößen verwendet, wie Lebenserwartung und Alphabetisierungsquote. Da sich aber die Zusammensetzung und die Berechnung des Index im Untersuchungszeitraum verändert hat und somit keine Vergleichbarkeit der Daten gewährleistet ist, wird die „klassische“ Maßeinheit für Entwicklung benutzt, das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen. Die Größe erfuhr zwar viel Kritik, ermöglicht aber einen Vergleich über die Zeit (zur Debatte dazu siehe Nuscheler 2005: 186-191).

46 Freedom House analysiert jährlich den Grad der demokratischer Freiheiten in jedem Land dieser Welt. Der Index basiert auf 10 Einzelindikatoren für die Messung der politischen Rechte in den Gebieten des Wahlprozesses, des politischen Pluralismus und der demokratischen Beteiligung; sowie auf 15 Einzelindikatoren für die Messung der bürgerlichen Freiheiten in den Gebieten Meinungs- und Glaubensfreiheit, Versammlungsfreiheit, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und der individuellen Rechte (Stand 2008). In den beiden übergeordneten Themen vergibt Freedom House jeweils Werte von 1 („frei“) bis 7 („unfrei“). Bei einem Durchschnitt von 1 bis 2,5 wird ein Land als „frei“ angesehen, von 3 bis 5 als „teilweise frei“ und von 5,5 bis 7 als „unfrei“ (siehe www.freedomhouse.org).

47 Bei der Normierung wird das Pro-Kopf-Einkommen im Verhältnis zu dem Wert gesetzt, ab dem die OECD „Länder mit mittleren Einkommen“ (MIC) definiert, was aktuell 3705 Dollar ist (www.oecd.org/dataoecd). Der Freedom House Index wird auf eine Skala von 0 bis 1 normiert, wobei 0 der schlechteste, 1 der beste Wert ist. Beide Indikatoren gehen in gleichen Maße in die Berechnung mit ein.

EU mit den betreffenden Empfängerstaaten und zweitens die potentielle Marktgröße des Landes, gemessen an der Bevölkerungsgröße und der Größe des Bruttoinlandsprodukts (alle drei jeweils gemessen in Relation zur Summe der Größen im Untersuchungsset).[48] Beide Kriterien fließen im gleichen Maße in die Beurteilung ein. Da ein Vergleich der tatsächlichen Daten stattfindet und die Höhe der unabhängigen Variable eine Rolle spielt, wird der Korrelationskoeffizient r von Pearson verwendet, um den Zusammenhang darzustellen – „die am häufigsten verwendete Maßzahl zur Messung des Zusammenhangs zwischen zwei Variablen" (Wagschal 1999: 193).[49]

Für ein idealtypisches Verhalten ergeben sich – neben den oben in der Tabelle genannten Kriterien – Hypothesen, die sich bewahrheiten müssen, damit ein Idealtyp erfüllt wird. Handelt die EU wie eine Zivilmacht, müssten folgende Kriterien erfüllt sein:

1) Bei der Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe stehen besonders die Bedürftigkeit und demokratische Standards im Vordergrund: Im Verhältnis zu ihrer Einwohnerzahl bekommen die Staaten am meisten Entwicklungshilfe, die eine sehr bedürftige Bevölkerung haben und demokratische Standards befolgen.
2) Eine Zivilmacht setzt sich für entwicklungspolitische Kohärenz auf der eigenen Entscheidungsebene ein.
3) Wenn es zu Friktionen durch Handelsliberalisierungen kommt, werden entsprechende Mittel bereit gestellt, um diesen Einhalt zu gewähren.[50]

Die Hypothesen zum Vorgehen einer Handelsmacht sehen dagegen wie folgt aus:

1) Bei der Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe steht der wirtschaftliche Nutzen des Empfängerlandes im Vordergrund.
2) Das Ziel von Kohärenzbemühungen ist die Erweiterung des eigenen Spielraums in der Handelspolitik.

48 Formal ausgedrückt sieht die Berechnung so aus: Empfangswürdigkeit = Export EU * 0,5 + Bevölkerungsgröße * 0,25 + BIP * 0,25.

49 Bei Werten zwischen 0 und 0,2 (im Betrag) ist kein bzw. ein sehr schwacher Zusammenhang vorhanden, zwischen 0,2 und 0,4 ein schwacher, zwischen 0,4 und 0,6 ein mittelstarker, zwischen 0,6 und 0,8 ein starker, zwischen 0,8 und 1 ein sehr starker und bei 1 ein perfekter Zusammenhang (Wagschal 1999: 197).

50 Solch ein Vorgehen kann einerseits zwar gleichzeitig zu Vorwürfen führen, dass die EU sich damit die Unterstützung für Abkommen „kaufen" möchte – Stevens et al. (2008: 99) geben dies als eine Befürchtung an und raten AKP-Staaten, die keine Vorteile durch EPAs für sich erwarten, keine Abkommen abzuschließen. Andererseits sind aber unterstützende Maßnahmen zwingend notwendig, um die institutionellen Voraussetzungen zu setzen, damit die EPAs positive Auswirkungen entfalten können (siehe Borrmann/Busse 2007 sowie Krause/Drachenfels 2009 in einem aktuellen ZEIT-Artikel). Insgesamt überwiegt der Eindruck, dass Zahlungen erforderlich sind und geleistet werden müssen, um Zivilmachtkriterien zu erfüllen.

IV. Lomé IV: Politik einer Zivilmacht?

IV.1 ***Übersicht der EU-AKP-Politik vor Lomé IV und der grundlegenden Bestandteile der Kooperation***

Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EWG[51] und den ehemaligen Kolonien wurde schon 1957 in dem Vertrag von Rom verankert. In diesem Vertrag führte man unter anderem den *Europäische Entwicklungsfonds* (EEF) ein, der Projekte oder Programme finanziert, die die Entwicklung der Empfängerländer vorantreiben soll. Die Staaten der EWG waren sich einig, dass die wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung der afrikanischen Kolonien in ihrem Interesse liegt. Deswegen beschlossen sie, in einem Durchführungsabkommen, das von 1958 bis 1962 galt, mit der Öffnung des westeuropäischen Marktes sowie finanziellen und technischen Hilfsleistungen dieses Ziel voranzutreiben. Unter den EWG-Staaten bestand weitgehend Einigkeit darüber, dass die Assoziierungspolitik unter neuen vertraglichen Grundlagen fortgesetzt werden sollte.[52] So begannen Verhandlungen 1961, die 1963 in Yaoundé (Kamerun) endeten und zu einem Vertrag zwischen der EWG und 18 afrikanischen Staaten führten, der 1964 in Kraft trat. Das Abkommen sah erstmals vor, den EEF zu nutzen, um Entwicklungsmaßnahmen zu finanzieren.[53] Zahlungen erfolgten vor allem für Maßnahmen zur Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit. Fünf Jahre später wurde der Folgevertrag Yaoundé II abgeschlossen (Inkrafttreten 1971), der die Schwerpunkte Entwicklung und Industrie hatte, und der folgende Ziele aufzählte:

- Stärkung der Eigenverantwortlichkeit der Entwicklung,
- Förderung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit in Afrika,
- Einleitung von Maßnahmen zur Förderung des Handels,
- die Verbesserung und Stabilisierung der Regelungen zur Einfuhr von Agrarerzeugnissen der afrikanischen Staaten in die Länder der EWG.

Trotz dieser Bemühungen fiel die Bilanz der Vorläufer der Lomé-Abkommen enttäuschend aus: Es hatten sich weder die Exporte in die europäischen Staaten erhöht, noch

51 Erst mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht ist der offizielle Vertragspartner die Europäische Gemeinschaft (EG), davor war es die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG).

52 Mit den für die europäischen Staaten unerwartet schnellen Unabhängigkeitserklärungen unterlagen die ehemaligen Kolonien und dann neuen Staaten nicht mehr offiziell den Römischen Verträgen. Da man nicht wollte, dass die afrikanischen Staaten sich der Sowjetunion zuwendeten, musste schnell gehandelt werden (Dialer 2007: 47).

53 Ein weiterer wesentlicher Unterschied war die Schaffung von gemeinsam besetzten Institutionen, die allerdings nicht viele Entscheidungen zu treffen hatten, weswegen sie während den Laufzeiten der Abkommen kaum eine Bedeutung hatten (Bartels 2007: 722).

hatte sich die Handelsstruktur geändert (Dialer 2007: 46-49, Ferdowsi 1999: 4-8).
Nicht nur allein aus diesen Gründen wurde eine Neuordnung der Assoziierungspolitik thematisiert: Der Abschluss der Beitrittsverhandlungen mit Großbritannien (zusätzlich Dänemark und Irland) 1972 führte zu einer grundlegenden Neuorientierung der EG-Entwicklungspolitik, da die ehemaligen britischen Kolonien miteinbezogen werden sollten. Im Februar 1975 unterzeichneten nach eineinhalb Jahren der Verhandlungen die neun EWG-Staaten und 46 AKP-Staaten (die sich nun formal konstituierten aus den afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten) das erste Lomé-Abkommen. Er knüpfte zwar an die Yaoundé-Konventionen an, setzte aber auch wesentliche Forderungen der AKP-Staaten um. So ist seit dem Lomé-Abkommen nicht mehr von „Assoziation" die Rede, sondern von „Partnerschaft", da die EG die Beziehungen nicht als „postkoloniale Großzügigkeit" verstanden haben wollte. Es entwickelte sich eine europäische Partner-Identität, die aus mehreren verknüpften Ansichten bestand: dass besondere Verbindungen mit den ehemaligen Kolonien existieren; dass eine europäische Verantwortung für diese Länder besteht; dass es die Möglichkeit gibt, gegenseitig von ökonomischer Kooperation zu profitieren und dass es eine Interdependenz zwischen Arm und Reich gibt. Die Bezeichnung „EurAfrica" wurde benutzt, um das besondere Verhältnis auszudrücken. Der Effekt des Partnerschaftsprinzips war, dass die Verhandlungsposition der AKP-Staaten gestärkt wurde. Sie konnten weitere Forderungen durchsetzen, die die bisherige Unterstützung erhöhten, da es für die EG sehr schwierig war, Verminderungen durchzusetzen. Dieses Prinzip war für alle Verhandlungen vor den 90er Jahren (inklusive Lomé IV) gültig (Elgström 2000: 182f.).

Die Kooperation konnte allerdings die Erwartungen nicht erfüllen, da viele Entwicklungsländer in den 80er Jahren keine Fortschritte erzielten oder sogar Rückschritte verkraften mussten. Trotzdem wurde die Lomé-Konvention im Fünf-Jahres-Rhythmus drei Mal erneuert mit einer ansteigenden Teilnehmerzahl (siehe Tab. 3, S. 39). Die grundlegenden Instrumente der Zusammenarbeit – Handelskooperation, finanzielle und technische Kooperation und Unterstützung für den Rohstoffmarkt – und die institutionellen Strukturen mit paritätisch besetzen Organen waren schon in Lomé I festgeschrieben. Sie werden hier als die zwei Schwerpunkte handelspolitische und industrielle Zusammenarbeit vorgestellt:

- **Handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit**: Gemäß der Vorstellung, dass „Wandel durch Handel" erfolgen kann, standen drei Maßnahmen im Vordergrund: Erstens

gewährte die europäische Seite den Produkten aus den AKP-Staaten zollfreien Zugang zu dem gemeinsamen Markt (mit Ausnahme von Zucker, Bananen, Rum, Rindfleisch und Reis), ohne den Anspruch für die eigenen Exporte zu haben.[54] Zweitens wurde das noch nicht im Yaoundé-Abkommen festgelegte kumulative Ursprungsprinzip eingeführt. Es bedeutet, dass unterschiedliche Bearbeitungsstufen eines Produktes in verschiedenen Staaten der AKP möglich ist, ohne dass der präferenzielle Handelszugang verloren geht. Dadurch sollte ferner ein Beitrag zu einer verstärkten Süd-Süd-Kooperation geleistet werden. Der dritte Schwerpunkt im Handelsbereich war das System der Exporterlösstabilisierung (STABEX), eine Versicherung für Exporterlöse. Fiel der Preis auf dem Weltmarkt für die vereinbarten 29 Agrarerzeugnisse (in Lomé IV waren es 51 Produkte), so erfolgte aus dem STABEX-Fond eine Ausgleichszahlung. In Lomé II wurde ein weiteres Instrument eingeführt, SYSMIN, das die Sicherung der Exporterlöse von sieben Bergbauprodukten zum Ziel hatte.[55]

- **Industrielle Zusammenarbeit**: Ziel war, dass die AKP-Staaten ihren Anteil an der Weltindustrieproduktion massiv steigern. Dazu sollte es Investitionen geben sowohl in produzierende Bereiche wie Landwirtschaft, Industrie und Energiewirtschaft, für übergreifende Programme wie Schutz und Bewahrung der Umwelt, als auch für Katastrophenschutz (Babarinde 1995: 470-474, Ferdowsi 1999: 15f., Keßler 2007: 35f., 42).

Während mit Lomé II (1981 in Kraft getreten) vor allem eine Konsolidierung des ersten Abkommens im Vordergrund stand, erweiterte Lomé III (ab 1986) den Grundvertrag: Zum einen um das Prinzip einer autonomen und sich selbst tragenden Entwicklung und zum anderen etablierte man ländliche und landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung als neues Kooperationsfeld (ebd.: 29-32). Da sich die wirtschaftliche Situation der AKP-Staaten, vor allem in Afrika, weiter verschlechtert hatte, war eine Veränderung nötig. Das Abkommen konzentrierte sich stärker auf die sektorale Entwicklung von Landwirtschaft und Fischerei.

Im Zuge von Lomé III gab die EWG die bisher betriebene Politik der Neutralität

54 Dies stellte eine Umkehr von der bisherigen Politik nach den Yaoundé-Verträgen dar, da in ihnen in der Theorie eine verstärkte Liberalisierung vorgesehen war, die die europäische Seite aber nicht mit Nachdruck einforderte (Bartels 2007: 723).

55 Zu den genauen Vorgaben zur Mittelvergabe siehe Kappel (1999: 33-36).

gegenüber den AKP-Staaten auf und einigte sich mit diesen auf den Verweis auf Menschenrechte in der Präambel. Im Vertragstext selbst gibt es allerdings keine konkreten Hinweise auf Maßnahmen bei Nichtbeachtung der Vereinbarung. Erst zu Beginn der 90er Jahre konnten wirkliche Fortschritte erzielt werden, da man nicht mehr despotische und korrupte Regime aus strategischen Erwägungen (damit sie nicht mit der Sowjetunion kooperieren) unterstützen musste (Dialer 2007: 55f., Ferdowsi 1999: 17f.).

Eine Übersicht der beteiligten Staaten, der Zeiträume der Abkommen und der wichtigsten Inhalte mit einem Ausblick auf die weiteren Vertragsabschlüsse bietet Tab.3.

Tab.3 Übersicht der Abkommen und der beteiligten Staaten

Abkommen (Unterzeichnung, Inkrafttreten)	**Partizipierende Staaten** (zusätzliche)	**Inhalte**
Yaoundé I (1963, 1964)	**18 Staaten**[56] Burundi, Dahomey (Benin), Elfenbeinküste, Gabun, Kamerun, Kongo-Brazzaville (Republik Kongo), Kongo-Kinshasa (Demokratische Republik Kongo), Madagaskar, Mali, Mauretanien, Niger, Obervolta (Burkina Faso), Ruanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Tschad, Zentralafrikanische Republik	- Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit - Finanzierung durch EEF - „Assoziation“
Yaoundé II (1969, 1971)	**22 Staaten** Kenia, Tansania, Uganda Hinzu kam: 1972: Mauritius	- Schwerpunkte Entwicklung und Industrie
Lomé I (1975, 1976)	**58 Staaten** Afrika: Botswana, Äquatorialguinea, Äthiopien, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swasiland, Sambia Karibik: Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaika, Trinidad und Tobago Pazifik: Fiji, Samoa, Tonga	- „Partnerschaft“ - Präferenzieller Marktzugang - STABEX - Kumulatives Ursprungsprinzip

56 Die fettgedruckten Zahlen fassen alle teilnehmenden Staaten zusammen und nicht nur diejenigen, die den Vertrag am Anfang unterschrieben. Deswegen kann es zu unterschiedlichen Zahlen im Text und in der Tabelle kommen.

	Hinzu kamen: 1976: Komoren, Seychellen, Surinam 1977: São Tomé und Principe, Kap Verde, Papua-Neuguinea 1978: Djibuti, Solomonen 1979: Tuvalu, Dominica, Santa Lucia, Kiribati	
Lomé II (1979, 1980)	**59 Staaten** Simbabwe	- SYSMIN
Lomé III (1984, 1985)	**66 Staaten** Afrika: Angola, Mosambik Karibik: Antigua und Barbuda, Belize, St. Christopher und Nevis, St. Vincent und die Grenadinen Pazifik: Vanuatu	- Autonome und sich selbst tragende Entwicklung - Ländliche und landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung
Lomé IV (1989, 1990)	**70 Staaten** Karibik: Dominikanische Republik, Haiti Hinzu kamen: 1990: Eritrea, Namibia	- Erstmals Menschenrechte stärker im Mittelpunkt
Lomé IVb (1995)	**71 Staaten** Hinzu kam: 1997: Südafrika	- Aufwertung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit
Cotonou (2000, 2002)	**79 Staaten** Karibik: Kuba Pazifik: Cookinseln, Marshallinseln, Föderierte Staaten von Mikronesien, Nauru, Niue, Palau Hinzu kam: 2003: Ost-Timor	- Schrittweise Aufhebung der präferenziellen Behandlung -Politische Dimension

Quellen: Brüne 2000: 206f., http://ec.europa.eu/development/ (abgerufen am 22.12.08), Keßler 2007: 28-32, eigene Darstellung.

*IV.2 **Analyse des Zeitraums von Lomé IV***

IV.2.1 Beurteilung der Vertragsinhalte

Lomé IV wurde am 15. Dezember 1989 nach 14-monatigen Verhandlungen abgeschlossen (erstmals mit einer Laufzeit von zehn Jahren, wobei eine Überprüfung nach fünf Jahren vorgesehen war). Das Abkommen wertete die Bedeutung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit deutlich auf, wobei die Begriffe selbst im Vertragstext nicht festgehalten sind; die Verbesserung der beiden Prinzipien und die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte entwickelten sich zu den zentralen Zielen der EG. Weitere Neuerungen

waren Bestimmungen zur Verringerung der Auslandsverschuldung, die Kooperation im Bereich Umweltschutz, ein Strukturanpassungsunterstützungprogramm und die Möglichkeit, mit dezentralen Akteuren sowie NGOs zu kooperieren (Dialer 2007: 57, Keßler 2007: 32). Die Gemeinschaft stellte mehr Bedingungen als zuvor, was auch an einer Veränderung der ideologischen Prioritäten lag, die auf internationaler Ebene entstanden waren (siehe Elgström 2000: 184, Conzelmann 2004: 292-294).

Wenn man das Abkommen unter den Gesichtspunkten der oben aufgestellten idealtypischen Kriterien untersucht, werden die Kriterien einer Zivilmacht erfüllt. So wird gleich in Art. 1 der Wille ausgedrückt, gemeinsam die Bemühungen zu verstärken, ein Modell zu schaffen

> „für die Beziehungen zwischen entwickelten Staaten und Entwicklungsländern im Hinblick auf eine gerechtere und ausgewogenere Weltwirtschaftsordnung“ (Abkommen Lomé IV 1989, auch die folgenden Zitate).

Gestaltungswille und **internationale organisatorische Zielsetzungen** – nach Art. 7 sollte die regionale Integration der AKP-Staaten gestärkt werden – unter Zivilmacht-Aspekten sind gut zu erkennen. Bei den **nationalen Zielsetzungen** stehen die demokratisch-sozialstaatlichen Aspekte deutlich vor den wirtschaftlichen Interessen. Nach Art. 23 wenden die Vertragsparteien Instrumente der Zusammenarbeit an,

> „die den Grundsätzen der Solidarität und des beiderseitigen Interesses entsprechen und der wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und sozialen Lage der AKP-Staaten und der Gemeinschaft (...) angepasst sind.“

Nach Art. 25 dürfen die AKP-Staaten weiterhin freien Zugang zu den europäischen Märkten haben, ohne auf Gegenseitigkeit der Öffnung verpflichtet zu sein. Die an Zivilmacht orientierte **internationale inhaltliche Zielsetzung** zeigt sich bei der Forderung nach Einhaltung der Menschenrechte: Menschenrechtsklauseln wurden seit Beginn der 90er Jahre in Abkommen mit Drittländern aufgenommen. In Lomé IV steht die Forderung nach einer Einhaltung der Menschenrechte in Art. 5 im ersten Teil über die Grundlagen der Zusammenarbeit:

> „Ziel der Zusammenarbeit ist eine auf den Menschen als ihren hauptsächlichen Betreiber und Nutznießer ausgerichtete Entwicklung, die somit die Achtung und die Förderung der Menschenrechte insgesamt voraussetzt“, die Rechte sind dabei „das Recht auf nichtdiskriminierende Behandlung, die Grundrechte der Person, die bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte, die wirtschaftlichen, die sozialen und die kulturellen Rechte.“

Als Unterstützung für die Förderung der Menschenrechte nahm man im Vertrag Positivmaßnahmen mit Art. 5 Abs. 3 auf. Den Maßnahmen wurde eine gute Bilanz

zugesprochen, wobei es an systematischen Analysen über ihre Effektivität mangelt und sie nur mit geringen Mitteln ausgestattet waren. Negative Sanktionen waren nicht ausdrücklich festgelegt (Keßler 2007: 50f.). Die spezifischen **außenpolitischen Instrumente** sind nach Art. 11 auf Verhandlungen und Vermittlung ausgelegt und erfüllen damit die Zivilmacht-Kriterien.

IV.2.2 Untersuchung der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der EG

In die Berechnungen der Korrelationen werden die Daten der 30 afrikanischen Länder mit einbezogen, die am meisten Entwicklungshilfe in dem Untersuchungszeitraum erhielten. Wenn man die regionalen Zahlungen und die Zahlen von Somalia, für das keine Daten vorliegen (auch in den folgenden Perioden nicht), nicht einbezieht, so lassen sich 88 % der gesamten Entwicklungshilfe an die afrikanischen AKP-Staaten erklären. In der folgenden Tab. 4 sind alle relevanten Daten für die Berechnungen[57] aufgeführt.

Tab. 4 Empfängerländer 1990-1994 (Daten in heutigen Preisen)

Daten/ Empfänger	Entwicklungshilfe in Mill. Dollar (Gesamt)	Hilfe pro Kopf in Dollar (Gesamt)	Freedom House Index (Durchschnitt)	BIP pro Kopf in Dollar (Durchschnitt)	Handel in Mill. Dollar (Durchschnitt)	BIP in Mrd. Dollar (Durchschnitt)	Einwohner in Mill. (Durchschnitt)
Äthiopien	864,51	17,10	5,7	224,07	419,24	11,22	50,54
Elfenbeinküste	560,28	44,14	5,2	821,43	1004,56	10,36	12,69
Kamerun	468,44	38,25	5,7	1019,67	670,94	12,42	12,25
Mosambik	458,16	31,09	5,1	159,32	252,3	2,34	14,74
Sudan	377,62	13,81	7	492,84	363,16	13,08	27,34
Tansania	350,82	12,94	5,6	187,41	414,56	5,07	27,12
Sambia	341,41	41,30	3,5	413,14	224,12	3,40	8,27
Uganda	319,33	16,80	5,5	170,01	149,64	3,22	19,01
Südliche Sahara unspezifisch	280,73						
Angola	273,54	25,86	6,4	720,12	1061,42	7,51	10,58
Mali	269,28	30,00	3,7	300,60	217,06	2,69	8,98
Nigeria	249,6	2,61	5,3	251,58	3128,22	23,84	95,77
Burkina Faso	245,84	26,40	5	317,58	191,76	2,94	9,31
Niger	231,12	27,94	4,6	266,61	164,24	2,19	8,27
Guinea	227,8	37,84	5,5	518,65	308,68	3,13	6,02

57 Die Berechnungen selbst werden hier nicht aufgeführt; sie wurden mit SPSS vollzogen. Für die theoretischen Hintergründe und die genaue Berechnung des Pearson-Korrelationskoeffizients siehe Wagschal (1999: 193-202).

Kenia	225,45	9,03	5,6	421,81	745,58	10,46	24,96
Malawi	224,84	23,08	5,5	185,08	114,52	1,80	9,74
Ruanda	221,46	32,00	6	268,78	75,82	1,87	6,92
Burundi	218,68	38,36	6,4	184,57	77,8	1,05	5,70
Ghana	212,51	14,11	5,1	428,25	667,28	6,42	15,06
Senegal	206,71	24,52	3,9	641,20	652,42	5,38	8,43
Mauretanien	201,13	97,66	6,6	644,78	295,78	1,33	2,06
Somalia	193,98						
Simbabwe	193,85	18,56	4,8	715,85	399,1	7,43	10,45
Namibia	192,71	128,82	2,4	1986,93	350,44	2,97	1,50
Madagaskar	166,77	13,06	3,6	236,76	245,82	3,02	12,77
Benin	147,91	29,40	3	381,78	255,82	1,92	5,03
Zentralafrikanische Rep.	105,41	33,24	4,7	476,19	78,98	1,50	3,17
Togo	102,74	24,64	5,7	382,38	252,16	1,58	4,17
Sierra Leone	100,17	23,87	5,9	180,32	93,92	0,76	4,20
Tschad	99,08	16,72	5,9	254,73	85,72	1,50	5,93
DR Kongo	97,34	2,38	6	212,47	343,42	8,63	40,85

Quellen: http://webnet.oecd.org, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWAllScores.xls, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index.aspx (alle aufgerufen am 15.12.08), eigene Darstellung.

Zivilmacht-Hypothese

Die Zahlungen der EG an die 30 afrikanischen AKP-Staaten (Daten siehe Tab. 4), die die größten Anteile an der Entwicklungshilfe haben, weisen nur eine sehr geringe positive Korrelation mit der „Empfangswürdigkeit" (Schrade 1997: 266) nach Zivilmacht-Kriterien auf. Mit $r = -0{,}107$ und einem Signifikanzniveau von $\alpha = 0{,}573$[58] kann man die Zivilmacht-Hypothese für den Zeitraum des Lomé IV-Abkommens nicht bestätigen. Selbst wenn man die starken Ausreißer Namibia und Mauretanien mit überdurchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-Hilfezahlungen aus den Berechnungen herausnimmt, ändert sich das Bild nicht. Die Korrelation ist zwar leicht positiv mit $r = 0{,}61$, aber das Signifikanzniveau verschlechtert sich auf $\alpha = 0{,}756$. Die Korrelation jeweils nur mit den Freedom House-Daten und den BIP pro Kopf-Daten ergeben ein uneinheitliches Bild. Während für erstere ein schwach positiver linearen Zusammenhang von $r = 0{,}208$ mit $\alpha = 0{,}287$ vorlag, lieferte letztere einen etwas stärkeren negativen Zusammenhang von $r = -0{,}381$ auf dem 0,05-Signifikanzniveau. Wenn man wiederum Namibia und Mauretanien aus der Berechnung ausschließt, so verstärken sich die Trends sogar noch weiter. Nach diesen Zahlen kann man auf der einen Seite sagen, dass die EG auf den Grad der Demokratisierung achtet, aber auf der anderen Seite Unterentwicklung sogar

58 Da sich in den Sozialwissenschaften der Wert $\alpha = 0{,}05$ als Mindestmaß für die Annahme einer Hypothese etabliert hat (Wagschal 1999: 308), ist eine Aussage bei einem so hohen Signifikanzniveau wie bei der obigen Korrelation wertlos.

mit weniger Zahlungen verbunden ist. Ob der Befund die Handelsmacht-Hypothese bestätigt, wird im nächsten Absatz untersucht.

Handelsmacht-Hypothese

Die Handelsmacht-Hypothese findet eine gewisse Bestätigung. Mit einer Korrelation von r = 0,261 und dem Signifikanzniveau von α = 0,164 ist zwar keine besonders starke Bindung der EG an die aufgestellten Handelsmacht-Bedingungen festzustellen. Aber wenn man Nigeria aus den Berechnungen herausnimmt, das aufgrund seiner Bevölkerungsgröße und des Handelsvolumens eine sehr große Beeinflussung der Daten darstellt, so erhält man eine mittelstarke Korrelation von r = 0,571 auf einem 0,01-Signifikanzniveau. Allerdings darf man dem Befund nicht zu viel Bedeutung zumessen, da nach der Handelsmacht-Hypothese Nigeria mit den Ölvorkommen und der Größe der Wirtschaft eine bedeutende Rolle in den Zahlungen der EG einnehmen müsste.

IV.3 ***Umsetzung des Kohärenzgebots in den Maastrichter Verträgen***

Ein entwicklungspolitisches Kohärenzgebot wurde im Vertrag von Maastricht im Jahr 1992, der am 1. November 1993 in Kraft trat, erstmals juristisch in Art. 130v verankert:

> „Die Gemeinschaft berücksichtigt die Ziele des Artikels 130u[59] [im Gebiet der Entwicklungspolitik] bei den von ihr verfolgten Politiken, welche die Entwicklungsländer berühren können“ (Amtsblatt 1992: 55).

Der Artikel gilt für die Kohärenz der Politikfelder der Gemeinschaft und nicht für die Mitgliedsländer; diese müssen sich allerdings nach Art. 5 des Vertrags gemeinschaftsfreundlich verhalten. Er ist nicht ganz eindeutig, da es noch ein allgemeines außenpolitisches Kohärenzgebot nach Art. 3 des EU-Vertrags gibt,[60] das die Entwicklungspolitik

59 Nach Art. 130u des EG-Vertrags hat die EU ein rechtlich verankertes entwicklungspolitisches Mandat, das allerdings als „Ergänzung der Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten“ definiert ist. Somit sollte die Kommission für nationale Hilfsprogramme lediglich eine koordinierende Rolle einnehmen, weswegen es zu Mängeln der organisatorischen Absprachen zwischen Kommission und Mitgliedsstaaten kam (Brüne 2000: 211f.). Die drei Prinzipien (Kohärenz, Komplementarität und Koordination) werden häufig als die drei „Ks“ der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik bezeichnet (Fröhlich 2008: 57). Die Ziele des Art. 130u waren die Förderung sozialer und nachhaltiger Entwicklung, Bekämpfung der Armut und die schrittweise Integration der Entwicklungsländer in die Weltwirtschaft (Amtsblatt 1992). Zu der Entstehungsgeschichte und den beteiligten Akteuren siehe Hoebink (2004: 197-201).

60 Zu der Bedeutung und der Ausgestaltung des Kohärenzgebots in dem Vertrag zu Gründung der Europäischen Union siehe Smith (2001). Er untersucht vor allem die GASP und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass es zwar schwierig sei, eine kohärente gemeinsame Politik zu betreiben, aber ein Rückschritt zu

mit einschließt; ferner definiert Art. 5 nicht den spezifischen Aufgabenbereich der EG gegenüber den Mitgliedsstaaten (Reisen 1999: 13). Dennoch ist Art. 130v des EG-Vertrags eine wichtige Berufungsgrundlage, da mehrere Politikfelder, die Inkohärenzen aufweisen – wie die Handels-, Agrar- und Fischereipolitik –, in die Zuständigkeit der Gemeinschaft fallen (Ashoff 2005: 49). Die beiden erstgenannten Politikfelder werden anhand ihrer institutionellen Ausgestaltung und der politischen Entscheidungen auf ihre Auswirkungen auf die Entwicklungspolitik in den kommenden Absätzen analysiert.

Institutionelles Setting

In der Kommission befassten sich seit Maastricht zwei Generaldirektionen mit Entwicklungspolitik (GD I und GD VIII), wobei die GD VIII für die AKP-Staaten zuständig war (Kappel 1996: 7f.). Es bestand eine funktionale Trennung zwischen Außenwirtschafts-, Entwicklungs- und Außenpolitik. Die übersichtliche Anordnung der Kompetenzen wurde jedoch 1995 wegen der Beitritte von Dänemark, Österreich und Schweden geändert, da neue Kommissionsposten zu schaffen waren. Für das Entwicklungsprogramm waren nun vier Generaldirektionen (GD I, GD IA, GD IB und GD VIII) und das Amt für humanitäre Hilfe (ECHO), das 1992 gegründet worden war, zuständig. Die Aufgaben zwischen den GDs waren regional verteilt und mit der Verantwortung für einen bestimmten Politikbereich gekoppelt: GD VIII war weiterhin für die AKP-Staaten zuständig sowie für die Entwicklungspolitik.[61] Es lag somit nicht in der Verantwortung der GDs, Maßnahmen für alle Regionen unter entwicklungspolitischen Aspekten durchzuführen (Reisen 1999: 21f.). Die Verteilung der Verantwortung in der Entwicklungspolitik zwischen den verschiedenen Generaldirektionen machte es schwierig, eine effektive Kontrolle über die bestehenden Programme auszuüben und eine kohärente Politik zu betreiben (Holland 2002: 85-89, Schukraft 2005: 130f., Weiland 1998: 10). Dabei ist die Fragmentierung der Verwaltung einerseits auf das Anwachsen der Hilfsprogramme zurückzuführen, andererseits schlicht auf die Erweiterung der EU, die auch in Zukunft eine vereinfachte Struktur der Kommission erschweren sollte: „Coordination problems inherent to the institutions remain and may even be worsened by upcoming enlargement: the Member States' attachment to the 'one State, one

ausschließlich national bestimmter Politik undenkbar sei (ebd.: 193).

61 GD IA befasste sich mit den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern sowie der gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik; GD IB war für die Beziehungen zu den Ländern in der Mittelmeerregion, im Nahen und Fernen Osten, in Lateinamerika und Asien zuständig; GD I oblagen die Beziehungen zu USA, Japan, Südkorea, Taiwan und China sowie die Handelspolitik (ODI 1995: 8, Reisen 1999: 21), weswegen es nicht unbedingt gerechtfertigt ist, sie zu den zuständigen GDs dazu zu zählen.

Commissioner' rule lead to fear a greater dispersion of competence over external relations" (Gauttier 2004: 33).

Handelspolitik

In der zweiten Hälfte der 90er Jahre versuchte die EU immer stärker, die internationalen Handelsverhandlungen im Rahmen der WTO zu gestalten und wurde zu einem der größten Fürsprecher von Multilateralismus bei globalen Themen (Woolcock 2005: 381f.). Die Grundlinie der EU-Außenhandelspolitik war auf eine Liberalisierung des internationalen Handels ausgerichtet, wobei es einige bedeutsame Ausnahmen gibt, wie z.B. die Agrarpolitik (Peters/Wagner 2005: 228-230). Die institutionelle Ausgestaltung der Handelspolitik war vielen Veränderungen in den 90er Jahren ausgesetzt (siehe oben). Wegen der Vermischung von regionalen und politischen Schwerpunkten in den einzelnen GDs kann man keine verstärkte Konzentration auf die Handelspolitik konstatieren.

Agrarpolitik

In der Agrarpolitik änderten die MacSharry-Reformen 1992 die Methode, dass Landwirte hohe garantierte Abnahmepreise bekamen, gegen negative Folgen der Überproduktion (fallende Preise) abgesichert waren und Preiswettbewerb durch Importe wegen Exportsubventionen erschwert wurden.[62] Die Landwirte erhielten nun direkte Zahlungen, die potentielle Einkommensausfälle kompensierten, wenn sie weniger produzierten. Der Zusammenhang zwischen der Größe der Hilfszahlung und der Produktionsleistung wurde somit stark geschwächt. Die Reformen reduzierten die Handelsverzerrungen, hoben sie aber nicht gänzlich auf (Colman 2007: 90-95, Rieger 2005: 170-172). Inkohärenzen gab es weiterhin: So exportierte die EU zum Beispiel Fleisch nach Westafrika und arbeitete damit gegen ihre eigene Anstrengung, dort die lokalen Märkte aufzubauen (Carbone 2008a: 331).

Zusammenfassung

Die Kohärenzbemühungen der EU geben keine Hinweise auf eine verstärkte Konzentration auf die Politik einer Zivil- oder Handelsmacht. Den Feldern der Agrar-, und

62 Vier Gründe waren für den Druck ausschlaggebend, eine Reform zu veranlassen: zu hohe Kosten für das Budget, Druck von Konsumentenseite, externer Druck aus den Verhandlungen der Uruguay Runde zur Liberalisierung des Agrarsektors und Umweltaspekte (Colman 2007: 81-87).

Handelspolitik sowie der strukturellen Unterstützung für rückständige Regionen wurde stets eine höhere Priorität eingeräumt als der Entwicklungspolitik:

> „If the implementation of crucial goals of internal or monetary policies clash with those of development policy, the latter have always been sacrificed in the interests of some compromise of greater political importance“ (Weiland 1998: 10).

Das liegt aber vor allem an den Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten. Wenn man auf die vier Kriterien zur Untersuchung der Kohärenz aus Kap. II.3 zurückgreift, so wird deutlich, dass keines der Kriterien erfüllt wird. In der Entwicklungspolitik gab es zwar durchaus Bemühungen, sie effizienter zu gestalten, aber es fand keine Neugestaltung unter Kohärenzaspekten statt.[63] Dass Inkohärenzen zwischen den drei Politikfelder existierten, gab die Kommission sogar 1994 zu, als sie auf Druck von NGOs einen Bericht zu dieser Thematik publizierte (Carbone 2008a: 331). Wie sich das auf die institutionelle Ausgestaltung auswirkte, ist der Untersuchungsgegenstand im Kapitel IV.5.

IV.4 ***Revision von Lomé IV***

IV.4.1 Neuerungen

Die Revision von Lomé IV (in der Literatur Lomé IVb genannt) wurde am 4. November 1995 auf Mauritius abgeschlossen. Lomé IVb umfasste als geänderte Fassung von Lomé IV wesentlich weniger Bestimmungen als das ursprüngliche Abkommen. Diese sind allerdings von großer Bedeutung. So wurde in Art. 5 Abs. 1 die Achtung der Menschenrechte noch stärker betont, sowie demokratische Grundsätze und rechtsstaatliche Bedingungen als essentielle Elemente der EU-AKP-Beziehungen erklärt:

> „Die Achtung der Menschenrechte, der demokratischen Grundsätze und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, die den Beziehungen zwischen den AKP-Staaten und der Gemeinschaft sowie allen Bestimmungen dieses Abkommens zugrunde liegt (...) bildet einen wesentlichen Bestandteil dieses Abkommens“ (Abkommen Lomé IVb 1995, auch folgende Zitate).

Zudem war die Suspendierung der Zusammenarbeit nach Art. 366a Abs. 3 möglich, falls der politische Dialog bei Missachtung der Grundsätze zu keinem Ergebnis führt:

> „Die Vertragspartei, die einen Verstoß gegen eine Verpflichtung geltend gemacht hat, kann (...) geeignete Maßnahmen ergreifen, die erforderlichenfalls auch die teilweise oder vollständige Aussetzung der Anwendung dieses Abkommens auf die betreffende Vertragspartei umfassen können.“

63 Zu den Gründen für Inkohärenzen siehe Ashoff (2005: 51-54).

Gleichzeitig mit diesem Ausbau der politischen Konditionalität[64] (Ferdowsi 1999: 18, Keßler 2007: 53) wurde die Bedeutung der Handelspolitik als Entwicklungsvoraussetzung gezielt angesprochen: Nach Art. 6a erkennen die Vertragsparteien an, „dass dem Handel bei der Förderung des Entwicklungsprozesses grundlegende Bedeutung“ zukomme, dass „der Entwicklung des Handels eine hohe Priorität“ einzuräumen sei und die AKP-Staaten „in einer harmonischen Weise allmählich in die Weltwirtschaft“ einzugliedern seien. An dem Artikel ist deutlich zu erkennen, dass die präferenzielle Behandlung der AKP-Staaten in den Handelsbeziehungen von der EU nicht mehr als wesentliches Element der AKP-Partnerschaft angesehen wurde.

IV.4.2 Untersuchung der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der EG

Mit den Daten der 30 Staaten, die am meisten Entwicklungshilfe empfangen, lassen sich 80 % der Zahlungen erklären. Die regionalen Programme machen einen großen Anteil aus, ohne dass sie Berücksichtigung erfahren können. Südafrika ist in der Tabelle mit aufgeführt, ist aber nicht Bestandteil der Berechnungen, da das Land einerseits erst 1997 Mitglied der AKP-Staatengruppe wurde und es andererseits eine so dominante Stellung in den Wirtschaftsbeziehungen darstellt, dass eine Miteinbeziehung das Ergebnis sehr stark prägen würde.

Tab. 5 Empfängerländer 1995-1999 (Daten in heutigen Preisen)

Daten/ Empfänger	Entwick-lungshilfe in Mill. Dollar (Gesamt)	Hilfe pro Kopf in Dollar (Gesamt)	Freedom House Index (Durch-schnitt)	BIP pro Kopf in Dollar (Durch-schnitt)	Handel in Mill. Dollar (Durch-schnitt)	BIP in Mrd. Dollar (Durch-schnitt)	Einwoh-ner in Mill. (Durch-schnitt)
Südliche Sahara unspezifisch	1071						
Mauretanien	392,72	168,53	5,8	574,93	311,79	1,33	2,33
Mosambik	384,9	23,20	3,5	218,53	200,71	3,65	16,59
Südafrika	382,04	8,98	1,5	3349,68	10897,72	142,22	42,53
Äthiopien	370,56	6,37	4,5	139,59	532,68	8,09	58,14
Angola	354,31	28,96	6	521,80	1040,07	6,39	12,23
Uganda	340,6	15,34	4,3	271,74	209,46	6,03	22,20

64 Zusätzlich wurde eine wesentliche Änderung bei der Auszahlung von Mitteln für vereinbarten Projekten eingeführt: Sie wurden nicht komplett ausgezahlt, sondern unterlagen einer Überprüfung der Verwendung nach spätestens drei Jahren. Ein Land erhielt erst nur 70% der Geldmittel; wenn es alle Voraussetzungen erfüllte, bekam es den Rest (Dialer 2007: 58).

Senegal	314,94	32,80	4,1	517,50	1019,45	4,97	9,60
Malawi	312,54	29,67	2,6	187,55	79,14	1,97	10,54
Burkina Faso	305,32	29,13	4,4	252,12	242,50	2,65	10,48
Tansania	286,16	9,16	4,7	262,86	379,95	8,24	31,23
Madagaskar	261,5	17,64	3	245,22	353,62	3,63	14,82
Guinea	256,09	35,16	5,5	506,67	351,40	3,68	7,28
Mali	251,97	24,31	2,7	277,71	339,76	2,88	10,37
Elfenbeinküste	251,29	16,24	5,2	780,98	1520,75	12,08	15,47
Sambia	244,1	25,09	4,3	350,89	156,06	3,40	9,73
Ghana	210,27	12,31	3,3	414,73	1161,96	7,09	17,08
Kenia	198,2	7,04	6	453,92	1018,98	12,78	28,16
Ruanda	185,19	29,65	6,5	259,19	73,59	1,62	6,25
Niger	185,08	18,88	5,4	189,06	158,10	1,85	9,80
Namibia	179,34	102,26	2,5	1990,22	176,30	3,48	1,75
Simbabwe	163,97	13,96	5,1	631,68	449,56	7,42	11,74
Kamerun	163,5	11,58	6,1	708,63	832,03	10,00	14,12
Tschad	148,45	21,40	5,4	227,22	255,79	1,58	6,94
Botswana	136,56	90,63	2	3399,80	289,22	5,13	1,51
Benin	129,57	22,35	2,1	405,20	437,03	2,35	5,80
Zentralafrikanische Rep.	124,97	35,37	3,7	446,09	70,16	1,58	3,53
Sierra Leone	106,11	23,61	5,1	178,90	107,97	0,80	4,50
Sudan	102,75	3,52	7	377,30	444,44	11,03	29,19
Mauritius	102,23	88,91	1,5	3612,30	741,50	4,15	1,15
Somalia	97,98						
DR Kongo	78,4	1,67	6,5	121,57	351,80	5,69	47,03
Lesotho	77,68	38,57	4	483,70	32,60	0,97	2,01

Quellen: http://webnet.oecd.org, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWAllScores.xls, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index.aspx (alle aufgerufen am 15.12.08), eigene Darstellung.

Zivilmachthypothese

Wenn man die beiden Staaten, die gemessen an der Hilfe pro Einwohner die mit Abstand am größten Werte haben – Mauretanien mit 168,53 und Namibia mit 102,26 Dollar pro Einwohner –, in der Berechnung lässt, ergibt sich eine negative Korrelation von $r = -0{,}255$ bei einem Signifikanzniveau von $\alpha = 0{,}174$. Wenn man sie nicht miteinbezieht, weil sie extreme Ausreißerwerte sind, kommt man zu einem ähnlichen Ergebnis mit $r = -0{,}208$ mit dem Signifikanzniveau von $\alpha = 0{,}288$. Es sind somit wiederum keine Aussagen zulässig, außer dass sich die Hypothese der Mittelvergabe nach Zivilmacht-Kriterien nicht bestätigen lässt. Wenn man die beiden einzelnen Indikatoren mit der Hilfe pro Kopf korreliert, so wiederholt sich das Ergebnis der vorherigen Periode: Während ein schwach positiver Zusammenhang mit den Freedom House-Daten vorliegt, existiert ein mittelstarker negativer Zusammenhang mit dem Einkommen pro Kopf. Wenn Mauretanien und Namibia nicht berücksichtigt werden, so verstärkt sich

das Ergebnis und ist signifikant auf dem 0,01-Signifikanzniveau.

Handelsmacht-Hypothese

Die Korrelation der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen mit den Kriterien der Handelsmacht liefert ein niedrigeres Ergebnis als bei der Untersuchung der vorangegangenen Periode. Mit $r = 0{,}17$ und einem Signifikanzniveau von $\alpha = 0{,}369$ ist die Handelsmacht-Hypothese nicht eindeutig zu verwerfen, aber auch nicht zu bekräftigen. Allerdings gibt es einen positiven Zusammenhang, der mit der Einbeziehung Südafrikas stärker wird.

IV.5 ***Umsetzung des Kohärenzgebots im Vertrag von Amsterdam***

Im Vertrag von Amsterdam, der 1997 unterzeichnet wurde und am 1. Mai 1999 in Kraft trat, gab es keine Änderung des Kohärenzgebots von Maastricht.[65] Da der Vertrag eine Neu-Nummerierung der Artikel einführte, war das Gebot nun im Art. 178 zu finden (Ashoff 2005: 49).

Institutionelles Setting

Da im vorangegangenen Zeitraum die erwünschte Kohärenz nicht erreicht wurde, gab es weitere Umstrukturierungen in der Kommission. So führte sie 1998 eine tiefgreifende Reorganisation durch, um das Entwicklungshilfemanagement zu verbessern. Sie gründete den Gemeinsamen Dienst für auswärtige Beziehungen (SCR), der die Verwaltung der Entwicklungshilfe vereinfachen und mehr Kohärenz schaffen sollte. Er setzte sich aus Beschäftigten zusammen, die aus den für die auswärtigen Beziehungen zuständigen GDs abgeordnet wurden und war hauptsächlich für die Durchführung und Überwachung der Programme in den verschiedenen Regionen der Zusammenarbeit zuständig. Im Rahmen der Gründung des SCR wurde auch die GD VIII reorganisiert. Sie sollte zwei Hauptaufgaben wahrnehmen: die Beziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten pflegen und die Formulierung und Umsetzung der gesamten EU-Entwicklungspolitik gestalten.

65 Der Entwicklungsministerrat verabschiedete im Juni 1997, fast zeitgleich mit der Unterzeichnung des Amsterdamer Vertrages, eine Resolution über Kohärenz. Obwohl nach dem Vertrag von Maastricht alle Politikfelder, die Entwicklungsländer betreffen, beachtet werden müssten, wurden nur vier Gebiete gezielt angesprochen: Friedensschaffende Maßnahmen, Konfliktprävention und Konfliktlösung, Ernährungssicherheit, Fischerei und Migration. Über die Fortschritte der Umsetzung gab es allerdings kein offizielles Berichtverfahren (Reisen 1999: 14).

Die Schaffung eines weiteren Amtes konnte allerdings nicht dazu beitragen, einen einheitlicheren Ansatz für die Hilfsprogramme zu schaffen, auch weil die Reform nicht von einer umfassenden Personalaufstockung oder Verbesserung der Prozeduren zur Projekt-Implementierung begleitet wurde (Reisen 1999: 24).

Im Rahmen der Neuordnung der Kommission 1999 kehrte der neue Kommissionspräsident, Romano Prodi, zu einer funktionalen Trennung der Aufgabenbereiche in den Außenbeziehungen zurück. Der Außenkommissar koordinierte als Primus inter pares im sog. „Komitee der Vier" die Außenbeziehungen mit den Kommissaren für Entwicklung, Handel und Erweiterung. Er war für die Koordinierung aller Außenaktivitäten der Kommission verantwortlich. Das Komitee sollte die übergeordnete Konzeptionalisierung der gemeinsamen außenpolitischen Aktivitäten sicherstellen, was vor allem beim Thema Konfliktprävention gelang (Holland 2002: 89-100, Schukraft 2005: 131f.).

Zusammenfassung

Insgesamt lassen sich sehr geringe Fortschritte in der Bemühung um Kohärenz verzeichnen. Die Gründung des SCR war ein erster Schritt in die richtige Richtung, vermochte es aber auf Grund konzeptioneller Mängel nicht, für mehr Kohärenz in der Entwicklungspolitik zu sorgen. 1999 veröffentlichte die Kommission eine Kategorisierung von verschiedenen Typen der Kohärenz, gab jedoch keine innovativen Vorschläge zu ihrer Verbesserung an. Als die GD Entwicklung im Februar 2000 eine sehr kritische Analyse der bisherigen Politik vorlegte und insbesondere die Inkohärenzen mit der Handels-, Agrar- und Fischereipolitik betonte, verweigerte man auf den höheren Ebenen eine stärkere Berücksichtigung der Kohärenz. Erst die Annahme der Millennium Development Goals (MDGs)[66] im Jahr 2000 beförderte die Entwicklungspolitik wieder stärker in den Fokus sowohl auf internationaler als auch europäischer Ebene (Carbone 2008a: 330-332).

66 Die Ziele der MDGs sind im Einzelnen: 1) Extreme Armut und Hunger beseitigen (die Anzahl der Menschen, die weniger als einem Dollar pro Tag haben und die unter Hunger leiden, soll halbiert werden), 2) Grundschulausbildung für alle Kinder gewährleisten, 3) Gleichstellung und größere Einfluss der Frauen fördern, 4) Die Kindersterblichkeit senken, 5) Die Gesundheit der Mütter verbessern, 6) HIV/AIDS, Malaria und andere Krankheiten bekämpfen, 7) Eine nachhaltige Umwelt gewährleisten und 8) Eine globale Partnerschaft im Dienst der Entwicklung schaffen (http://www.unric.org/html/german/mdg/index.html).

IV.6 ***Ausgestaltung der vertraglichen Vorgaben von Lomé IV***

Die Ausgestaltung der vertraglichen Grundlagen erfuhr viel Kritik, da die meisten der AKP-Staaten es nicht schafften, eine wirtschaftliche Besserstellung zu erreichen (Dialer 2007: 58-60).[67] Die vermeintlichen Gründe dafür werden im Folgenden aufgeführt.

Finanzielle Zusammenarbeit

In der finanziellen Zusammenarbeit berücksichtigte die Kommission bei der Mittelvergabe des EEF weder Kriterien wie Eigenanstrengungen, Entwicklungsorientierung und Reformbereitschaft der AKP-Regierungen, noch analysierte sie ausreichend den Bedarf der Empfängerländer. Somit kam das Vorgehen eher den Eliten der AKP-Staaten entgegen als der hilfsbedürftigen Bevölkerung. Das Konzept der partnerschaftlichen Kooperation hatte keine große Bedeutung, den AKP-Staaten wurden kaum Mitspracherechte gewährt. Überkomplexe Strukturen und schwerfällige Verfahren auf europäischer Seite – so lag die durchschnittliche Dauer von Bewilligung der Gelder bis zur Auszahlung 1999 bei viereinhalb Jahren[68] (Dearden 2007: 11) – erschwerten die Verteilung der Gelder; zudem wurden in der Bewilligungspraxis für Projekte europäische Unternehmen bei dem Aufbau von einheimischen Kapazitäten in den AKP-Staaten bevorzugt (Keßler 2007: 35-37).

STABEX und SYSMIN

Die Kooperation im Bereich Grundstoffe (STABEX und SYSMIN) mit dem Ziel der Stabilisierung von Exporterlösen war zwar aus Sicht der AKP-Länder ein wesentlicher Verhandlungserfolg, erfuhr aber starke Kritik. Erstens reichten in Jahren mit starken Preisverfällen die ausgemachten Mittel nicht aus. Zweitens gab es eine produkt- und länderspezifische Konzentration bei der Mittelvergabe, die eher einen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Situation von Ländern mit mittleren Einkommen leistete und ärmere Länder somit benachteiligte. Dazu kamen Ausnahmen für eine Unterstützung bei landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen, die ausgeschlossen waren von Ausgleichszahlungen.

67 So hatte in Afrika das durchschnittliche Pro Kopf Einkommen in den 90er Jahren fast die gleiche Höhe wie in den 60er Jahren. Ein großer Teil der Bevölkerung lebte immer noch von weniger als einem Dollar pro Tag, die Mehrzahl der Subsahara-Staaten war weiterhin stark verschuldet (Forwood 2001: 425).
Positive Ausnahmen stellen z.B. Mauritius, die Seychellen und Botswana dar, die im Vergleich zu den anderen AKP-Staaten ein überdurchschnittliches und stabiles Wachstum vorweisen können (Keßler 2007: 47).

68 Das führte dazu, dass aus den ersten acht EEFs (bis 2000) 9,9 Milliarden Euro nicht verbraucht wurden, die aber den AKP-Staaten weiterhin zur Verfügung stehen (Tchitchi 2005: 100f.).

Drittens förderte das System die Beibehaltung monokultureller und unproduktiver Strukturen, während zugleich Maßnahmen zur Verringerung der Abhängigkeit von einzelnen Produkten faktisch bestraft wurden (Kappel 1999: 33-36, Keßler 2007: 42f.). Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen: „An ihren wirtschaftlichen Ergebnissen gemessen nehmen sich die Yaoundé- und Lomé Vereinbarungen im Kern als wenig erfolgreicher Versuch eines produktbezogenen Einkommenstransfers durch Exportstabilisierung wichtiger agrarischer und bergbaulicher Güter aus“ (Brüne 2000: 208).

Für die Beurteilung nach den idealtypischen Kriterien bedeutet die umgesetzte Politik folgendes: Das Vorgehen in der finanziellen Zusammenarbeit und bei der Mittelvergabe in den Programmen STABEX und SYSMIN schränkt die positive Einschätzung des **Gestaltungswillens,** der **außenpolitischen Instrumente** und der **internationalen organisatorischen Zielsetzungen** ein, die bei der Beurteilung der Vertragsvorgaben getroffen wurde. Denn der Gedanke des partnerschaftlichen Vorgehens wurde nicht ausreichend in die Praxis umgesetzt. **Nationale Zielsetzungen** sind von den Einschränkungen nicht betroffen.

Handelspräferenzen

Ein dritter wesentlicher Punkt der Kritik war der sinkende Nutzen von Handelspräferenzen, da erhebliche Einschränkungen in aus AKP-Sicht wichtigen Bereichen bestanden. So erhob die EU weiterhin Zölle bzw. Abschöpfungen auf landwirtschaftliche Erzeugnisse, für die gemeinsame Marktordnungen existierten (z.B. Getreide, Rindfleisch, Zucker, Tabak, Obst und Gemüse). Die AKP-Staaten erhielten somit sich stetig verringernde Vergünstigungen im Handel im Vergleich zu anderen Staaten, die gegenüber Wechselkursschwankungen und anderen Einflüssen auf die Preisgestaltung kaum noch eine nennenswerte positive Auswirkung hatten.

Die Ursprungsregeln stellten eine weitere Einschränkung für AKP-Exporte in die EU dar. Zwar etablierte Lomé das Prinzip des kumulativen Ursprungs, nach dem die AKP-Gruppe als einheitliches Zollgebiet behandelt wird. Aber für wichtige Exportartikel wie Textilien, Bekleidung, Fischerei- und Agrarprodukte blieben die Regelungen restriktiv, so dass vor allem europäische Interessen bedient wurden.

Der Handel zwischen den AKP-Staaten und Europa ließ im Laufe der Lomé-Abkommen stark nach. Die AKP-Staaten verloren als Absatzmarkt für europäische Waren zunehmend an Bedeutung; im Gegensatz dazu blieb die EU der wichtigste Absatzmarkt

für AKP-Produkte, wobei starke Einbußen zu verzeichnen waren. Das lag nicht nur an fehlender Diversifizierung der Exportartikel, sondern auch an politisch instabilen Verhältnissen in manchen AKP-Staaten. Aus diesen Gründen ist eine Schuldzuweisung allein an die EU nicht gerechtfertigt, um ausbleibende Entwicklung zu beklagen (Kappel 1999: 31f., Keßler 2005: 44-48).

Menschenrechte und Armutsbekämpfung

Im Bereich der Menschenrechte ist festzustellen, dass die Zusammenarbeit mit Staaten, die massive Menschenrechtsverstöße zuließen, suspendiert wurde – so z.B. mit Äquatorialguinea, Burundi, Kenia, Ruanda, Somalia, Sudan und Togo. Die Praxis war allerdings nicht frei von Kritik, weil eine Selektivität je nach wirtschaftlichen und strategischen Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten zu erkennen gewesen sei[69] (Holland 2002: 132-139). Da in Lomé IVb die politische Konditionalisierung erstmals eine explizite Rechtsgrundlage bekommen hatte, wurden in der zweiten Hälfte der 90er Jahre u.a. die Elfenbeinküste, Niger, Sierra Leone, und Simbabwe sanktioniert (Keßler 2005: 52f.). Die Beurteilung der **internationalen inhaltlichen Zielsetzung** ändert sich nicht grundlegend, da sowohl positive Erfahrungen als auch einschränkende Kritik zu verzeichnen waren.

Armutsbekämpfung wurde erst mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht als zentrale Maßnahme zur Förderung der Entwicklung anerkannt. In den Verhandlungen zu einem neuen Abkommen nach Lomé IV hielt die EU fest, dass Armutsbekämpfung zum Meilenstein der neuen Partnerschaft werden müsse. Da Frieden die Voraussetzung für eine erfolgreiche Armutsbekämpfung sei, sollte zudem der Konfliktprävention eine größere Bedeutung zukommen (Kappel 1999: 38-41, Manners 2006: 187f.).

69 So wurde insbesondere der Umgang mit Nigeria als Beispiel dafür aufgeführt, dass die EU keine eindeutigen Signale setzte, wenn sie ein bedeutendes Wirtschaftspotential sah. Nigeria zeichnete sich durch erhebliche Menschenrechtsverletzungen aus, dennoch kam es nicht zu einem Einfrieren von Geldern oder einem Wirtschaftsboykott (Kappel 1996: 51). Gauttier (2004: 29-32) sah zumindest die Ausführung der Sanktionierung positiver und bescheinigte der EU eine juristische Kohärenz bei der Durchführung der vorgesehenen Mechanismen, bestätigte aber ebenso die fehlende Einheitlichkeit der Bewertung von Verstößen.

IV.7 ***Zwischenfazit***

Die Analyse der Vertragstexte brachte das Ergebnis, dass die Politik der EU dem Idealtyp der Zivilmacht nahe kommt. Von den fünf Analysekategorien erfüllte die EU eine, **nationale Zielsetzungen**, ohne Einwände und die vier anderen – **Gestaltungswille, internationale organisatorische und inhaltliche Zielsetzungen sowie außenpolitische Instrumente** – mit leichten Einschränkungen. Die Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung und die weitestgehende Stagnation bei den afrikanischen Ländern können nicht darauf zurück geführt werden, dass die EU ihre eigenen Vorteile in den Vordergrund stellte,[70] auch wenn es Anzeichen für eine uneinheitliche Behandlung der AKP-Staaten gab. Die Lomé-Abkommen waren einzigartig, weil sie die Politikfelder Entwicklungshilfe und Handel gemeinsam behandelten und nicht voneinander trennten (Reisen 1999: 18).

Die Untersuchung der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen lieferte die Ergebnisse, dass die Zivilmacht-Hypothese zu verwerfen ist und die Handelsmacht-Hypothese eine leichte Bestätigung findet, ohne einen starken Zusammenhang vorzuweisen. Eine Dynamik im Sinne eines Wandels ist nicht vorzufinden, wie an Tab. 6 deutlich wird.

Tab. 6 Pearson-Korrelationen zu den Hypothesen

Zeitraum/Hypothese	Zivilmacht	Handelsmacht
1990-1994	r = -0,107 (0,061)[a]	r = 0,261 (0,571**)[b]
1995-1999	r = -0,255 (-0, 208)[a]	r = 0,170

** Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.
a: Ergebnisse ohne Namibia und Mauretanien.
b: Ergebnis ohne Nigeria.

Die wenig erfolgten Kohärenzbemühungen ließen keine Stärkung der Entwicklungs- oder Handelspolitik erkennen. Die fehlende Kohärenz der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik führte dazu, dass die EU nicht als der Akteur wahrgenommen wurde, der sie hätte sein können:

> „Der permanente Kompromisscharakter europäischer Südpolitik trug (...) dazu bei, dass die Gemeinschaftspolitik in den Empfängerländern nicht das politische Gewicht hatte, das sie auf Grund des Leistungsumfanges hätte beanspruchen können“ (Brüne 2005: 47).

Zusammenfassend ist die Frage des Kapitels, ob die EU während Lomé IV als

70 Carbone (2008a: 332) sieht die Politik der EU wesentlich kritischer: „Throughout the decade, the issues of the implications of trade, agriculture and fisheries policy for developing countries were neglected, not only because the EU placed its interests before those of developing countries, but also because of the assumption that the needs of developing countries were taken care of through development assistance.“ Die Kritik zeigt auf, dass die These, die EU verhalte sich wie eine Zivilmacht, gewissen Einschränkungen unterliegt, die aber nicht ausreichen, um sie zu verwerfen.

Zivilmacht anzusehen sei, damit zu beantworten, dass die EU den Idealtyp einer Zivilmacht nur mit Einschränkungen erfüllt. So sind die Zahlungen der EG nicht an die Bedürftigkeit der Empfängerländer gekoppelt, die negative Korrelation deutet in die Richtung einer Handelsmacht, ohne dass dieser Idealtyp bestätigt werden kann; vor allem die Vertragstexte und die Anstrengungen der EG für eine bessere Entwicklung in Afrika sind mit dem Idealtyp Handelsmacht schwer zu vereinigen. In dem Zeitraum nach dem Abschluss des Cotonou-Abkommens wird sich zeigen, ob sich etwas an dem Verhalten der EU gegenüber den afrikanischen Staaten verändert hat.

V. Abkommen von Cotonou und EPAs: von Zivilmacht zu Handelsmacht?

Wie im Zwischenfazit deutlich wurde, erfüllt das Verhalten der EU die idealtypischen Kriterien einer Zivilmacht nur mit Einschränkungen. Die Leitfrage des Kapitels bleibt dennoch bestehen, um die Veränderungen der Politik der EU im Laufe der EPA-Verhandlungen herauszuarbeiten und zu beurteilen, ob das Handeln der EU im weiteren Verlauf den idealtypischen Kriterien einer Handelsmacht entspricht.

V.1 Analyse des Abkommens

In einem Grünbuch zur Zukunft der AKP-Partnerschaft machte die Kommission schon 1996 deutlich,[71] welche Schwerpunkte sie für den Nachfolgevertrag von Lomé setzte:

> „The geographical coverage of the cooperation agreement might be changed to take on broad factors such as the diversity within the ACP group, the need for differentiation of cooperative objectives and priorities and, possibly, trade regimes, plus the prospect of reduced aid requirements for certain countries and graduation. Changing the non-reciprocal preference arrangements which are different from those of other developing countries could become unavoidable and involve different trade arrangements tailored to the type of economy concerned“ (Europäische Kommission 1996: viii).

In dem Grünbuch wurde der Überzeugung Ausdruck verliehen, dass aus Sicht der EU die Lomé-Politik einer grundlegenden politischen und institutionellen Reform bedürfe. Besonders zwei Aspekte der Veränderung hebt der Auszug hervor: Erstens wird der geographische Umfang der Kooperation in Frage gestellt und zweitens der nicht-reziproke Handel. Das Dokument stellte die Weichen für eine Neubestimmung der europäischen Position in der Entwicklungspolitik mit einem verstärkten Fokus auf den politischen Dialog in einer neuen Partnerschaft. Da die Kommission sich der sensiblen Punkte der geplanten Neuerungen bewusst war, veranstaltete sie Treffen sowohl in den Mitgliedsstaaten als auch in den AKP-Staaten, um über die strittigen Ideen zu diskutieren. Nach den Gesprächen im Rat konnte die britische Präsidentschaft im Juni 1998 ein gemeinsames Verhandlungsmandat erzielen.[72] Da die AKP-Staaten sich ungefähr zur selben Zeit auf einen gemeinsamen Standpunkt einigten, begannen die offiziellen

71 Zu weiteren Dokumenten, die in dieser Zeit beschlossen wurden und die einen Schwerpunkt auf Handelsliberalisierungen setzten, siehe Goodison (2007a: 249f.).

72 Die Bedenken des Vereinigten Königreich (zusammen mit Dänemark, Schweden und Holland) über die Auswirkungen der neuen Handelsbestimmungen wurden in den Verhandlungen innerhalb der europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten nicht aufgegriffen, da man einen Abschluss finden wollte. Mit Überlegungen aus dem Zwei-Ebenen-Spiel zeigt Forwood (2001: 427-432), wie schwierig es war, einen innereuropäischen Kompromiss zu finden. Da es aber allen europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten wichtig war, einen gemeinsamen Standpunkt zu finden – und das Vereinigte Königreich innerhalb seiner Präsidentschaft das Ergebnis erreichen wollte –, wurde die am Ende getroffene Entscheidung vehement verteidigt.

Verhandlungen im September desselben Jahres (Elgström 2000: 185f.).

Das Cotonou-Abkommen schlossen die Vertragsparteien schließlich im Juni 2000 in Benin ab. Als erstes der Partnerschaftsabkommen hat es eine Laufzeit von zwanzig Jahren. Als wichtigste Pfeiler blieben Handel und Entwicklungshilfe erhalten (Babarinde/Faber 2004: 27), aber es gab auch substantielle Veränderungen[73] – neben der Tatsache, dass der Text verschlankt wurde:

1) **Ziele und Prinzipien**: Kurz zusammengefasst sind die vier Grundprinzipien des Abkommens, die Art. 2 auflistet: Gleichheit der Partner und Eigenverantwortung für Entwicklungsstrategien, Partizipation von nicht-staatlichen Akteuren, zentrale Rolle des Dialogs und der beiderseitigen Verpflichtungen, Differenzierung und Regionalisierung (Tchitchi 2005: 57).

   Neu gegenüber den Lomé-Abkommen ist die Anerkennung der essentiellen Verknüpfung von Entwicklung, Frieden und Sicherheit. Art. 1 listet als grundsätzliches Ziel auf,

   > „im Sinne eines Beitrags zu Frieden und Sicherheit und zur Förderung eines stabilen und demokratischen politischen Umfeldes die wirtschaftliche, kulturelle und soziale Entwicklung der AKP-Staaten zu fördern und zu beschleunigen" (Abkommen Cotonou 2000, auch alle weiteren Zitate).

   Die zweite Änderung ist die Aufnahme der Armutsbekämpfung als explizite Aufgabe:

   > „Die Partnerschaft ist auf das Ziel ausgerichtet, in Einklang mit den Zielen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung und der schrittweisen Integration der AKP-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft die Armut einzudämmen und schließlich zu besiegen."

   Gerade zwischen den beiden Punkten Integration in den Weltmarkt – ein Aspekt, der noch weiter unten behandelt wird – und der Beseitigung der Armut können allerdings Spannungen auftreten. Dem Aspekt der Gleichheit der Partner fügten die Vertragsparteien noch die Eigenverantwortung (*ownership*) der AKP-Staaten für ihre Entwicklungsstrategien bei (Martenczuk 2000: 466f.).

2) **Politische Dimension**, die in Titel II des ersten Teils behandelt wird und drei Schwerpunkte setzt: Erstens wurde der Politische Dialog als neues Element im

73 Als Gründe für Veränderungen in dem Abkommen verglichen mit Lomé lassen sich sowohl exogene Einflüsse – Handelsliberalisierungen auf internationaler Ebene, der kontinuierliche Aufstieg der EU als ökonomischer Akteur und das Ende des Kalten Krieges – als auch endogene Einflüsse ausmachen – Erweiterung der EU, Kommissionsreformen und eine vertiefte Integration auf europäischer Ebene (Babarinde/Faber 2004: 28-33, Forwood 2001: 424).

Art. 8 eingeführt. Er ist sehr breit definiert und betrifft alle im Abkommen behandelten Ziele. Friedensschaffende Maßnahmen, Konfliktprävention und Sicherheit werden, analog zu Art. 1, in Art. 11 besonders hervorgehoben. Zweitens gibt es mit Art. 13 erstmals Bestimmungen zu Migration, die in weiteren Dialogen im Rahmen der AKP-Partnerschaft behandelt werden sollten. Drittens betonte man wie schon zuvor die Bedeutung von Menschenrechten, Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Als zusätzliches Element wurde *Good Governance* aufgenommen. Die Verletzung der vier aufgezählte Prinzipien kann wie in den Lomé-Abkommen zu Einschränkungen der Kooperation nach Art. 96 (bei Verstößen gegen Menschenrechte, demokratische Grundsätze und Rechtsstaatlichkeit) und Art. 97 (bei Fällen von Korruption) führen (ebd.: 467-474).

3) **Partizipation nicht-staatlicher Akteure**: Zum ersten Mal wurden nicht nur staatliche sondern auch nicht-staatliche Akteure als Partner anerkannt; dazu zählen nach Art. 6 (1) die Privatwirtschaft, Wirtschafts- und Sozialpartner sowie die Zivilgesellschaft. Die nicht-staatlichen Akteure sollen mit der Zentralregierung zusammenarbeiten und können finanzielle Mittel nach Art. 58 (2e) erhalten (Tchitchi 2005: 60-62).

4) **Handelsbestimmungen**: Die größte Veränderung zu der Lomé-Periode ist die schrittweise Aufhebung der präferenziellen Handelsbestimmungen mit den AKP-Staaten, die im dritten Teil des Cotonou-Vertrags geregelt ist. Um die Bestimmungen WTO-konform zu gestalten, sollten bis Ende 2007 neue Handelsverträge (die EPAs) abgeschlossen werden.[74] Die EU teilte die AKP-Staaten in sechs regionale Gruppierungen ein, mit denen Übereinkommen getroffen werden sollten, denn die EU sah regionale Integration als einen elementaren Schritt an, Entwicklung zu fördern:

> „In dem Bewusstsein, dass die regionale Integration eines der wichtigsten Instrumente für die AKP-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft ist, baut die wirtschaftliche und handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit auf den Initiativen der AKP-Staaten zur regionalen Integration auf“ (Art. 35 (2)).

74 33 der 48 afrikanischen AKP-Staaten waren – im Zeitraum der Verhandlungen – als LDCs klassifiziert, während nur fünf der 23 karibischen und pazifischen Staaten als solche eingeordnet wurden. Dieser Unterschied zwischen den AKP-Staaten ist einer der Gründe für die Inkompatibilität mit den WTO-Statuten, da andere bedürftige Staaten dadurch benachteiligt werden (Forwood 2001: 427).

Dieser Passus steht allerdings in einem Spannungsverhältnis zu Art. 37 (5), nach dem Verhandlungen mit einzelnen Ländern möglich sind:

> „Die Verhandlungen (...) werden unter Berücksichtigung des Prozesses der regionalen Integration der AKP-Staaten mit denjenigen AKP-Staaten geführt, die sich dazu in der Lage sehen."

Es ist vorgesehen, dass die AKP-Staaten ihren Handel mit einer Übergangsfrist von zehn bis zwölf Jahren liberalisieren. Nach Art. 35 (3) treten die Vertragsparteien für „eine besondere und differenzierte Behandlung aller AKP-Staaten" ein, was bedeutet, dass LDCs und Nicht-LDCs unterschiedliche Möglichkeiten haben, ihre Handelsbeziehungen mit der EU aufrecht zu erhalten, wenn sie keine EPAs abschließen. Für die LDCs bleibt *Everything but arms* (EBA),[75] für Nicht-LDCs GSP als Alternative[76] (Babarinde/Faber 2004: 37f., Martenczuk 2000: 474-478). Die EU begründet die Liberalisierungsstrategie damit, dass dadurch Wohlfahrtsgewinne durch mehr Wettbewerb auf den Märkten entstehen und sich dynamische Vorteile für die Wirtschaft der AKP-Staaten ergeben, weil mehr Investitionen getätigt und politische Reformen ausgeführt werden (Matambalya/Wolf 2001: 125).

Zusammenfassend beruhen die neuen Handelsbestimmungen auf drei Schwerpunkten: Reziprozität (Gegenseitigkeit der Marktöffnung), Regionale Abkommen und Sonderbehandlung für LDCs.

5) **Finanzielle Unterstützung**: Bei der finanziellen Unterstützung entschloss man sich, das Nebeneinander von verschiedenen Prozeduren und Vergabemodalitäten aufzulösen und einfachere Kriterien für das Beantragen von Mitteln einzuführen. Die Instrumente der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen wurden auf zwei reduziert. Seitdem gibt es eine Finanzierungsmöglichkeit für Budget-[77], Sektoren- und Projektunterstützung und eine andere für Notfall-Unterstützung und Kompensationszahlungen bei Exportverlusten, die STABEX und SYSMIN ersetzen.

75 Bei der Einordnung der LDCs weist Hurt (2003: 166-168) auf Unregelmäßigkeiten der europäischen Praxis hin, da einige Länder trotz niedrigen HDIs nicht als LDCs eingeordnet werden.

76 GSP, eingeführt 1971, stellt Vergünstigungen in den Handelsbeziehungen bereit, aber in geringerem Umfang als das Cotonou-Abkommen. 1998 erfuhr das System eine Erweiterung durch GSP+, bei dem Länder Handelspräferenzen zugesprochen wurden, wenn sie bestimmte Bedingungen wie Drogenbekämpfung erfüllen. Da es von der WTO als nicht konform mit den Handelsregeln beurteilt wurde, änderte die EU GSP+ 2005, so dass es den Regeln entsprach (Bartels 2007: 739-743). Eine kritische Beurteilung der Handelsprogramme als Alternativen zu den EPAs erfolgt in Kap. V.2.5.

77 Um Budgethilfe zu bekommen muss ein Land nach Art. 61 (2) bestimmte Voraussetzungen erfüllen wie Offenheit und Transparenz der Verwaltung der öffentlichen Ausgaben und des öffentlichen Beschaffungswesens.

> Zudem sind die Auszahlungen nicht mehr nur nach dem Bedarf der Länder bemessen, sondern es wird auch die Ausführung der unterstützten Programme kontrolliert. Länderspezifische Förderstrategien, die nach Kriterien der Leistung der Empfängerländer gestaltet werden, definieren anhand von politischen und sozioökonomischen Rahmenbedingungen eine mittelfristige Entwicklungsstrategie und schätzen damit den entsprechenden Finanzbedarf ein (Carbone 2008b: 220, Keßler 2007: 62f., Martenczuk 2000: 478-481).

Da die AKP-Staaten wesentlich geringere personelle Kapazitäten besitzen als die EU, konnten sie die Verhandlungen nicht prägen: „The ACP's role during the negotiations was to react against the EU mandate, rather than to play a proactive part in the negotiations“ (Forwood 2001: 436). Zwar konnten die AKP-Staaten manche umstrittenen Vorschläge zu Migration und *Good Governance* beeinflussen; sie schafften es aber nicht, eigene Interessen in anderen Bereichen adäquat zu vertreten, was hauptsächlich daran liegt, dass sie nur eine informelle Gruppe ohne eine starke supranationale Organisation darstellen. Teilweise griff das AKP-Sekretariat sogar auf Personal der Kommission zurück, da die eigenen institutionellen Kapazitäten stark eingeschränkt waren. Die strittigen Punkte betrafen vor allem den Handelsbereich und die Beibehaltung von STABEX und SYSMIN, die von den AKP-Staaten gefordert wurde, obwohl die beiden Kompensationssysteme nicht besonders erfolgreich waren (ebd.: 434-436, Holland 2002: 189-195). Durch die Bestimmungen zum Veränderung der Handelsbeziehungen ändern sich die Beziehungen der beiden Vertragsparteien grundlegend: „Hence, the Partnership Agreement can no longer be regarded as a purely development-oriented agreement, which grants benefits only to the ACP side“ (Martenczuk 2000: 487). Ob dieses Faktum positiv oder negativ zu beurteilen ist, wird in den nächsten Abschnitten beurteilt. Man muss bei allen Überlegungen aber auch im Hinterkopf behalten, dass es keine Selbstverständlichkeit ist, dass die EU sich weiterhin für die Entwicklungsländer einsetzt, wie Keßler (2007: 65) betont: „Grundsätzlich ist positiv zu werten, dass die EU trotz veränderter außenpolitischer Interessen, trotz des Kraftaktes Osterweiterung und ungeachtet budgetärer Zwänge an ihrem Engagement in der Region festhält.“

V.2 Entwicklungspolitisches Handeln der EU

V.2.1 Untersuchung der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der EG

Mit den Daten der empfangenen Entwicklungshilfe von den 30 afrikanischen AKP-Staaten, die die meiste Unterstützung in den Jahren 2000-2006 erhalten haben, lassen sich 86 % der Zahlungen erklären – die regionalen Zahlungen und Somalia nicht mit einbezogen. Südafrika ist, wie oben schon beschrieben, ein Sonderfall, da nicht alle vertraglichen Bestimmungen für das Land gelten. Deshalb werden Berechnungen sowohl mit als auch ohne Südafrika durchgeführt.

Tab. 7 Empfängerländer 2000-2006 (Daten in heutigen Preisen)

Daten/ Empfänger	Entwick-lungshilfe in Mill. Dollar (Gesamt)	Hilfe pro Kopf in Dollar (Gesamt)	Freedom House Index (Durch-schnitt)	BIP pro Kopf in Dollar (Durch-schnitt)	Handel in Mill. Dollar (Durch-schnitt)	BIP in Mrd. Dollar (Durch-schnitt)	Einwoh-ner in Mill. (Durch-schnitt)
Südafrika	922,39	20,06	1,57	3847,54	16856,70	177,88	45,98
DR Kongo	914,53	16,80	6,00	112,59	443,57	6,18	54,42
Äthiopien	905,17	13,08	5,00	140,53	515,90	9,82	69,19
Tansania	890,75	24,78	3,64	334,18	492,39	12,06	35,94
Sudan	880,36	26,19	7,00	602,01	994,02	20,57	33,61
Mosambik	868,61	46,18	3,50	276,25	242,93	5,23	18,81
Südliche Sahara unspezifisch	836,39						
Madagaskar	637,94	36,14	3,14	275,64	409,36	4,88	17,65
Sambia	614,41	55,50	4,07	489,32	161,40	5,51	11,07
Uganda	573,64	21,27	4,86	269,41	247,68	7,32	26,96
Mali	572,01	47,92	2,29	355,55	417,38	4,29	11,94
Burkina Faso	548,14	44,30	4,07	333,52	323,37	4,18	12,37
Malawi	461,69	37,58	3,64	198,52	77,15	2,46	12,29
Mauretanien	436,98	162,08	5,29	559,32	462,18	1,53	2,70
Angola	422,87	29,02	5,64	1322,52	2017,69	19,86	14,57
Ruanda	411,27	47,27	5,86	229,42	85,54	2,01	8,70
Niger	402,66	34,01	3,57	214,76	225,36	2,57	11,84
Nigeria	393,71	3,05	4,14	608,21	5889,81	80,17	129,24
Kenia	374,65	11,66	3,86	490,19	1041,90	15,85	32,14
Burundi	357,19	50,16	5,14	99,75	62,46	0,71	7,12
Ghana	351,04	17,65	2,07	400,58	1259,36	8,08	19,89
Tschad	336,84	40,16	5,57	402,19	176,77	3,49	8,39
Sierra Leone	312,27	60,23	3,86	193,28	230,23	1,01	5,18
Kamerun	309,67	18,38	6,07	792,44	1083,64	13,49	16,85
Somalia	293,33						
Senegal	287,1	25,80	2,79	607,90	1398,56	6,83	11,13
Benin	286,7	41,07	2,14	495,22	552,54	3,50	6,98

Elfenbeinküste	206,15	11,71	5,71	771,29	1327,63	13,65	17,61
Guinea	192,21	21,88	5,50	363,13	413,28	3,18	8,79
Liberia	173,28	52,37	5,00	155,31	928,35	0,51	3,31
Namibia	158,97	81,06	2,36	2400,50	195,35	4,72	1,96
Simbabwe	148,07	12,65	6,14	451,84	186,21	5,29	11,71

Quellen: http://webnet.oecd.org, http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/FIWAllScores.xls, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2007/02/weodata/index.aspx (alle aufgerufen am 15.12.08), eigene Darstellung.

Zivilmacht-Hypothese

Für die Periode von 2000-2006 ist die Zivilmacht-Hypothese zu verwerfen, da sowohl unter Einbeziehung als auch unter Vernachlässigung der Daten Südafrikas keine Korrelation zu verzeichnen ist (r = 0,041, ohne Südafrika r = 0,007). Die einzelnen Berechnungen der Freedom House-Daten und des BIP pro Kopf weisen in dieselbe Richtung: erstere Berechnung ergab einen sehr geringen positiven Zusammenhang mit r = 0,059 (ohne Südafrika r = 0,106), zweitere einen ganz leichten negativen Zusammenhang von r = -0,019 (-0,184), ohne ausreichende Signifikanzniveaus vorzuweisen.

Handelsmacht-Hypothese

Die Handelsmacht-Hypothese kann dagegen leicht bestätigt werden. Mit Südafrika gibt es eine schwach positive Korrelation von r = 0,335 bei einem Signifikanzniveau von α = 0,070. Wenn man Südafrika allerdings heraus nimmt, ist der Zusammenhang nicht mehr eindeutig. Wenn zusätzlich Nigeria aus den Berechnungen ausgeschlossen wird – mit den oben für die Lomé-Periode beschriebenen Bedenken –, so ergibt sich eine etwas geringere Korrelation von r = 0,230 bei einem gleichzeitig etwas geringeren Signifikanzniveau. Dass Südafrika an erster Stelle der Zuwendungen steht, obwohl es auf Grund seines BIP pro Kopf kein Entwicklungsland mehr ist, kann als Zeichen verstanden werden, dass die Zahlungen damit verbunden sind, dass man auf europäischer Ebene positive Rückkopplungseffekte erhofft und somit die eigenen Interesse bedient werden.

V.2.2 Beurteilung der Vertragsinhalte von Cotonou und deren Umsetzung

Bei der Analyse der aufgeführten Vertragsinhalten überwiegen die idealtypischen Kriterien einer Zivilmacht:

Der **Gestaltungswille** ist weiterhin von dem Gedanken der Partnerschaft geprägt, eine

Bevorzugung der eigenen europäischen Interessen ist nicht festzustellen. Im Gegenteil sollte die Eigenverantwortung der AKP-Staaten gestärkt werden. Diese ist allerdings bei den länderspezifischen Förderstrategien stark eingeschränkt, da die Kommission darüber entscheidet, ob Mittel zugewiesen werden und die Empfängerländer somit einem Machtungleichgewicht bei der Formulierung ausgesetzt sind (Dialer 2007: 181f.). Zudem werden die Strategiepapiere für die einzelnen Länder zum selben Zeitpunkt entwickelt und können so nicht ökonomische Zyklen der betroffenen Länder berücksichtigen (Carbone 2008b: 227). Dialer (2007: 242) fasst die (teilweise unbewussten) Widersprüche und Grenzen in der intendierten Stärkung der Eigenverantwortung in den AKP-Staaten im Zusammenhang mit den normativen Ansprüchen der EU klar zusammen:

> „Im Rahmen der EU-AKP-Partnerschaft wird eine Normenübertragung auf die AKP-Staaten angestrebt, die in umgekehrter Weise nicht denkbar wäre. Spinnt man dieses Denkmuster weiter, so ist das Cotonou-Partnerschaftsabkommen als primär europäischer Normenkatalog zu werten, da die spezifisch afrikanischen, pazifischen und karibischen «Orientierung und Ideen» (un)bewusst vernachlässigt werden."

Die Stärkung der politischen Dimension spricht bei den **nationalen Interessen** für einen Vorrang der demokratisch-sozialstaatlichen Innenpolitik; für eine abschließende Beurteilung müssen noch die Ergebnisse aus den EPA-Verhandlungen mit einbezogen werden, die in die Richtung einer Betonung der europäischen wirtschaftlichen Interessen weisen könnten.

Die **internationale organisatorische Zielsetzung** ist zwiespältig zu sehen. Einerseits tritt die EU für eine WTO-Konformität ein und somit für eine verbesserte Effizienz institutionalisierter Kooperation auf der internationalen Ebene der Handelsbeziehungen. Andererseits ist eindeutig eine Präferenz für ad-hoc-Kooperationen in den Bestimmungen zu belegen, die die Möglichkeit der Einzelbehandlung der AKP-Staaten für die EPAs vorsehen. Hier ist somit keine eindeutige idealtypische Verortung möglich.

Die **internationalen inhaltlichen Zielsetzungen** bekräftigen im Vertragstext eindeutig die idealtypischen Zivilmacht-Kriterien, da eine wertgebundene Außenpolitik mit der Förderung von *Good Governance*, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratisierung und der Menschenrechte zu erkennen ist. Das übergeordnete Ziel der Armutsbekämpfung kann ebenso zum Bereich der wertgebundenen Außenpolitik gezählt werden. Es liegt ein mehrdimensionaler Ansatz vor, der politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Aspekte umfasst (Tchitchi 2005: 102). Doch der Ansatz ist nicht frei von Kritik: Bei der Umsetzung in die Vergabepraxis der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen ist das übergeordnete Ziel der Armutsbekämpfung nicht erkennbar (siehe vorheriges Kapitel), da Länder mit

niedrigen BIP pro Kopf nicht bevorzugt werden (Schmitz 2005: 59-63). Ein weiterer Kritikpunkte ist die Vielzahl der Ziele und Maßnahmen, die durch das Fehlen einer Fokussierung der Gefahr ausgesetzt sind, dass sie nicht verwirklicht werden können. Der modernisierungstheoretische Ansatz ist vorherrschend,[78] dass Handel automatisch zu Wachstum und Armutsreduzierung führt, ohne dass die Gruppe der „Armen" näher definiert ist; so werden z.B. keine geschlechterspezifischen Ansätze aufgeführt (Dialer 2007: 180).

Zu der Förderung von Demokratisierung und *Good Governance* gibt es unterschiedliche Stimmen. Einerseits wird die Umsetzung der *Good Governance*-Normen als positiv angesehen: „Mit dem Cotonou-Abkommen [wurde] eine positiv einzuschätzende Form der Organisation von Regeldurchsetzung gefunden (...), welche eine Antwort auf eine Reihe von Effektivitäts- und Legitimitätsproblemen der Regeldurchsetzung geben kann" (Beck/Conzelmann 2004: 322f., siehe auch 338). Bei der Förderung von Demokratie können zwei Kritikpunkte angeführt werden: einerseits die Ergebnisse der Berechnungen in dieser Magisterarbeit, die keinen nennenswerten Zusammenhang zwischen Demokratisierung und Höhe der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen feststellen konnte; andererseits eine Studie von Crawford (2007), der am Beispiel Ghanas zeigt, dass die gewährten Zahlungen nicht für eine Förderung von demokratischen Strukturen vorgesehen waren: „From the evidence in the Ghana case, the assessment of the EU in meeting its stated policy goals of promoting democratisation can only be one of weak implementation and poor performance" (ebd.: 189). Der Autor räumt zwar ein, dass man von einem Fall keine Generalisierungen vornehmen kann, glaubt aber, dass der ghanaische Fall kein Einzelfall ist.[79]

Die Beurteilung der **außenpolitischen Instrumente** gibt auch kein eindeutiges Bild ab. Zwar sollen Probleme gemeinschaftlich gelöst werden. Aber Solidarität als grundlegendes Instrument der Partnerschaft wird durch die Druckmittel, die die EU bei der Umsetzung der EPAs einsetzen kann – denn sie kann bestimmen, welche Alternativen zur Verfügung stehen – abgeschwächt.

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78 Für knappe Übersichten der „großen" Entwicklungstheorien, den Modernisierungs- und Dependenztheorien, und den neueren Ansätzen sowie den angewandten Entwicklungsstrategien siehe Nuscheler (2005: 76-90) und Tchitchi (2005: 30-36).

79 Mit den Ergebnissen muss man insofern vorsichtig sein, da Ghana mit Namibia und Südafrika das Land ist, das die höchsten Freedom House-Werte im Sub-Sahara-Raum hat (siehe Tab. 7) und man urteilen könnte, das dort Unterstützungen für einen Demokratisierungsprozess möglicherweise nicht benötigt werden (wobei Crawford (2007: 176-178) Bereiche des politischen Systems aufzählt, die Unterstützung benötigen). Aber selbst mit den erstgenannten Argumenten bleibt es unverständlich, warum gar kein Geld der EG für Demokratisierungsprozesse vorgesehen ist.

Weitere Mängel, die nicht idealtypisch eingeordnet werden können, sind bei der Beteiligung der nicht-staatlichen Akteure zu finden. Schon im Text selbst ist die angestrebte Partizipation nicht präzise formuliert. Zwar wurden in allen Ländern nicht-staatliche Akteure in Konsultationen miteinbezogen, aber nur Ghana wird als besonders gutes Beispiel angesehen (Dialer 2007: 143, Tchitchi 2005: 79-81). Die aufgeführten Schwierigkeiten bei der Umsetzung können nicht alle den idealtypischen Kriterien zugeordnet werden; sie machen vielmehr deutlich, dass es schwierig ist, bei so unterschiedlichen Vertragsparteien einen für alle befriedigenden und die Entwicklung voran bringenden Abschluss zu finden:

> „Die Analyse der politischen Reformbestrebungen der AKP-EU-Partnerschaft macht deutlich, dass viele Neuerungen durch den Widerspruch zwischen Anspruch und Wirklichkeit gekennzeichnet sind. Dabei handelt es sich in der Umsetzung der einzelnen Bereiche nicht um «Anfangsschwierigkeiten», sondern sowohl um konzeptionelle Mängel als auch um den mangelnden Willen der Vertragspartner“ (Dialer 2007: 143).

Ein strittiges Thema ist die stärkere Einbeziehung von sicherheitspolitischen Aspekten. Nach Hadfield (2005: 58) wurde durch die Revision von Cotonou im Jahr 2005 hauptsächlich die Sicherheitspolitik gestärkt: „Security appeared to define development, and securitized development obtained as EU foreign policy.“ In einer Pressemitteilung äußerte sich der EU-Entwicklungskommissar Louis Michel zu den Verhandlungen. Er unterstreicht die wichtige Stellung der Sicherheitspolitik, die in keinem Widerspruch zu den bisherigen Vereinbarungen stünden, und zählt sie als einen Bestandteil der neuen Aspekte auf:

> „Es sichert die Kontinuität unserer Zusammenarbeit mit den AKP-Staaten, da es eine nachhaltige finanzielle Unterstützung vorsieht und wichtige Aspekte der Bereiche Sicherheit, Nichtverbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen und Zusammenarbeit mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof abdeckt” (europa.eu/rapid).

Die neuen Bestandteile der Partnerschaft im Bereich der Sicherheit, die insgesamt zu einer zusätzlichen Stärkung der politischen Dimension führen sollten, können noch um Terrorismusbekämpfung ergänzt werden.

Drei weitere Verhandlungsergebnisse waren erstens die Ausdifferenzierung der Entwicklungsstrategien mit einem stärkeren Bezug zu den MDGs; zweitens die Einrichtung einer Investitionsfazilität, das langfristige Mittel in Form von verschiedenen Risikoteilungsinstrumenten vergibt und als revolvierender Fonds eingerichtet ist, d.h. die

zukünftig verfügbaren Mittel hängen von den Mittelrückflüssen ab, was zu einer verbesserten Erfolgskontrolle führt; drittens verbesserte man das Finanzmanagement und die Durchführungsverfahren bei Projekten (Dialer 2007: 185-205, Hadfield 2007: 57-63). In dem Zitat betont Michel auch die Kontinuität der Partnerschaft, die mit der Revision noch effizienter fortgeführt werden sollte.

V.2.3 Spektrum der Aktivitäten neben der AKP-Partnerschaft

Um eines der zentralen Ziele der AKP-Partnerschaft, die Beseitigung der Armut, zu erreichen, gab es nach dem Abschluss des Abkommens sowohl auf internationaler als auch auf europäischer Ebene zahlreiche Aktivitäten (siehe Tchitchi 2005: 90-97). Von den Aktivitäten auf europäischer Ebene werden im Folgenden die *Everything but arms*-Initiative, die Zusagen für die Erhöhung der Entwicklungshilfe, der *European Consensus on Development* und die Afrikastrategie beleuchtet.[80]

Everything but arms (EBA)

EBA ist ein Programm, das von der EU 2001 eingeführt wurde und allen LDCs, die ungefähr die Hälfte der AKP-Staaten ausmachen, zur Verfügung steht. Es bietet einen zollfreien Zugang in die europäische Wirtschaftsregion für alle Produkte außer Waffen; für Bananen (bis 2006), Reis und Zucker (2009) bestanden bzw. bestehen noch Übergangsfristen.

Der damalige Handelskommissars Pascal Lamy stellte im Jahr 2000 seinen Vorschlag vor, den LDCs einen zollfreien Zugang zum europäischen Markt zu gewähren. Der Einspruch der südlichen europäischen Länder verhinderte jedoch das ambitionierte Vorhaben des Handelskommissars, da sie zu große Einbußen für ihre landwirtschaftlichen Produkte befürchteten. Infolgedessen führte man die Übergangsfristen für Reis, Zucker und Bananen ein und setzte als Absicherung der europäischen Landwirtschaft Handelsbeschränkungen ein, falls sich die Exporte der LDCs in die EU zu sehr steigerten. Kritik erfuhr der Beschluss, weil die AKP-Staaten nicht konsultiert wurden in der Verhandlungsphase und die GD Entwicklung ebenso nicht beteiligt war, was die verminderte Bedeutung, die man ihr zumaß, deutlich macht. Einschränkend muss man

80 Für eine Aufzählung von weiteren Maßnahmen siehe Dearden (2007: 28-33). Sie fügen den untersuchten Programmen und Initiativen nichts grundlegend Neues hinzu, weshalb sie nicht im Detail hier aufgenommen wurden.

jedoch hinzufügen, dass der Entwicklungskommissar und ein Großteil seiner Mitarbeiter für den Beschluss waren (Carbone: 44-55).

Die besondere Behandlung der AKP-Staaten als die Gruppe an der Spitze der bevorzugt behandelten Staaten wurde mit der Einführung von EBA aufgehoben und eine stärker entwicklungsorientierte Hierarchie entwickelt. Der Prozess der differenzierten Behandlung und damit Fragmentierung der AKP-Staaten, den die Vertragspartner im Cotonou-Abkommen angekündigten, wurde somit mit EBA eingeführt (Page 2006: 126).

Zusammenfassend halten sich Kritik und positive Beurteilung von EBA ungefähr die Waage: Einerseits war die Initiative nicht sonderlich effizient, da keine Exportsteigerung bei den afrikanischen LDCs verbucht werden konnte.[81] Andere Faktoren waren dafür ausschlaggebend, wie institutionelle Qualität, wobei einschränkend zu sagen ist, dass mit Daten aus dem Jahr 2002 gerechnet wurde und positive Effekte heute eventuell eher erkennbar sind. Die Länder, die weiterhin Cotonou-Präferenzen benutzten, konnten dagegen ihre wirtschaftliche Situation verbessern (Babarinde/Faber 2007: 110-113). Da EBA hohe administrative Anforderungen besitzt, nutzten viele LDCs der AKP-Staaten weiterhin das Cotonou-System, obwohl es nicht dieselben Vergünstigungen bietet (Bartels 2007: 739-743). Ein weiterer negativer Aspekt ist, dass eine Liberalisierung des europäischen Marktes auch negative Folgen für Zuckerexporteure haben kann, wenn diese als Exporteure unter den fallenden Preisen zu leiden haben (Orbie/Faber 2007: 224). Positiv zu bewerten ist andererseits, dass EBA als „Multiplikator" für Verbesserungen in anderen Bereiche der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit diente (ebd.: 221, 237). Ein anderer positiver Effekt für die EU war, dass EBA eine Möglichkeit darstellte, die eigene Politik im Sinne einer Zivilmacht[82] in ein positives Licht zu rücken: „At the beginning of this millennium, the EU experienced a legitimacy crisis in its external trade and development nexus. EBA constituted an attractive response in this difficult context" (ebd.: 229). Ob ein positives Bild von der EU gerechtfertigt ist, ist das Thema der kommenden Abschnitte und Kapitel.

81 Bei den nicht-afrikanischen LDCs, die in EBA aufgenommen wurden, wie Afghanistan, Bangladesch, Bhutan, Jemen, Kambodscha, Laos, die Malediven, Nepal gehen Orbie/Faber (2007: 222f.) von einer positiven Wirkung der Initiative aus.

82 Page (2006: 131) weist darauf hin, dass sich die EU mit EBA eine Unterstützung der LDCs bei den WTO-Verhandlungen erhofft haben könnte, weswegen eine rein altruistische Begründung von EBA eingeschränkt werden muss.

Entwicklungshilfe

Auf der Konferenz zur Finanzierung der Entwicklungshilfe in Monterrey im Jahr 2002 gaben die Mitgliedsstaaten die Zusage, mehr Entwicklungshilfe zu geben (im EU-Durchschnitt 0,39 % des BIP). Die Kommission sollte den Prozess beobachten und Bericht darüber abgeben. Bei dem Treffen zum fünfjährigen Jubiläum des Millennium Gipfels im Jahr 2005 stellte die EU ein noch ehrgeizigeres Ziel für die europäische Entwicklungshilfe vor, die nun bis 2010 0,56 % des BIP und schließlich 2015 0,7 % umfassen sollte. Im Mai 2005 entschieden zudem die europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten, dass sie die Entwicklungshilfe an die afrikanischen AKP-Staaten verdoppeln (Carbone 2008b: 218).[83] Nach einer Evaluation der Kommission 2007 wurde das Ziel für 2006 sogar schon 2005 erreicht (Orbie/Versluys 2008: 76f.); die massiven Aufstockungen des zehnten EEF zeigen die europäischen Bemühungen.[84] Eine andere positive Entscheidung für die Entwicklungsländer betraf 2006 die Praxis der Bindung von Hilfsmitteln, d.h. die Verpflichtung, Materialien und Dienstleistungen im Geberland zu beziehen. Diese viel kritisierte Praxis änderte die EU mit zwei Regulierungen im Jahr 2006, so dass nur noch ungebundene Hilfe an Empfängerländer verteilt werden durfte (Nixson 2007: 334f.).

Neben den positiven Aspekten müssen jedoch ebenso einschränkende Aspekte aufgezählt werden: Die meisten Zahlungen gingen an Staaten mit mittleren Einkommen (MICs) und nicht an LDCs. So bekamen im Jahr 2000 MICs 61 % der europäischen Hilfszahlungen und Länder mit niedrigen Einkommen 39 %. Die Zahlen verbesserten sich zwar – im Jahr 2004 erhielten LDCs 42 % der gemeinschaftlichen Zahlungen und MICs 45 % –, aber LDCs waren immer noch nicht die Hauptempfänger der Zahlungen. Weitere Einschränkungen sind die Verrechnung von Schuldenerlassen und die Einbeziehung von Geldern für Austauschstudenten und Flüchtlinge (Orbie/Versluys 2008: 80-83). Auf einen weiteren problematischen Aspekt weist Carbone (2008b: 219) hin, der die mangelnde Abstimmung der europäischen Seite mit den Empfängerländern kritisiert: „The excessive preoccupation of the European Commission with improving the quality of EU aid has fatally resulted in reduced ownership of development by African

83 Im selben Jahr einigte man sich in der *Paris-Deklaration*, die Anstrengungen für eine wirksamere Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu intensivieren. Die Bereiche, die verbessert werden sollten, waren Eigenverantwortung, Harmonisierung der Geberpolitiken, Partnerausrichtung, ergebnisorientiertes Management und gegenseitige Rechenschaftspflicht (OECD 2006).

84 Wenn man allerdings die vereinbarten Zahlen des Gleneagles-Treffens der G8 im Jahr 2005 betrachtet, so liegen die Zahlen des zehnten EEF etwas darunter. Es müssen somit noch weitere Verbesserungen vorgenommen werden, da sich der zehnte EEF fast verdoppeln müsste, um in elften EEF für die Jahre 2014-2018 die Anforderungen zu erfüllen (Clarke 2007: 217).

countries." Bei der Analyse der Länderstrategiepapiere kommt Dearden (2007: 17-23) zu dem Schluss, dass noch einige Verbesserungen notwendig sind, um sie zu einem effizienten Instrument der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu machen.

Das Gewicht der gemeinschaftlichen Hilfe im Paket der gesamten europäischen Hilfe wird – wenn die Politik so fortgeführt wird wie geplant – in den kommenden Jahren von heute 20 % auf 13 % im Jahr 2013 abnehmen (Europäische Kommission 2006: 5). Folglich sollte sich die EU stärker der Rolle als regulativer Akteur widmen und kohärente Entwicklungsstrategien entwerfen (Orbie/Versluys 2008: 88).

European Consensus on Development

Der *European Consensus on Development*, den die Kommission, der Rat und das Europäische Parlament 2005 gemeinsam beschlossen, führte eine Vision für die zukünftige europäische Entwicklungspolitik ein. Im ersten Teil bestätigt die gemeinsame Erklärung die im Cotonou-Abkommen verankerten Ziele der Armutsreduzierung, der Entwicklung mit demokratischen Fortschritten und der verstärkten Eigenverantwortung der Entwicklungsländer. Zudem wird, wie im Absatz vorher dargelegt, die Erhöhung der Entwicklungshilfe beschlossen:

> „It reaffirms EU commitment to poverty eradication, ownership, partnership, delivering more and better aid" (Rat der Europäischen Union et al. 2005: 4).

Eine Neuerung des Konsenses ist, dass er sowohl für die gemeinschaftliche Ebene als auch für die Mitgliedsstaaten eine konsistente Politik vorgibt:

> „It will guide Community and Member State development cooperation activities in all developing countries, in a spirit of complementarity" (ebd.: 4).

Der zweite Teil zählt die Aufgaben der Gemeinschaft auf, die sich besonders dort einsetzen soll, wo sie einen komparativen Vorteil gegenüber den Mitgliedsstaaten durch ihre Expertise und Erfahrung habe.[85] Die Verknüpfung von Sicherheitsaspekten mit Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten wird im Konsens weiter bekräftigt. Das Dokument demonstriert insgesamt, dass Entwicklungspolitik eine wichtige Stellung in der EU besitzt (Reisen 2007: 60).

85 Die Bereiche sind: Handel und regionale Integration, Umwelt und nachhaltige Bewirtschaftung natürlicher Ressourcen, Infrastruktur, Kommunikation und Verkehr, Wasser und Energie, ländliche Entwicklung, Raumplanung, Landwirtschaft und Ernährungssicherheit, gute Regierungsführung, Demokratie, Menschenrechte und Unterstützung wirtschaftlicher und institutioneller Reformen, Konfliktverhütung und Unterstützung fragiler Staaten, menschliche Entwicklung, sozialer Zusammenhalt und Beschäftigung. Besondere Berücksichtigung in allen Aktivitäten sollen Menschenrechte, Gleichstellung der Geschlechter, Demokratie, Kinderrechte und Rechte von Ureinwohnern, Umwelt und Kampf gegen AIDS finden (Rat der Europäischen Union et al. 2005: 21-30).

Afrikastrategie

Im selben Jahr nahm die EU die Afrika-Strategie an (Europäische Kommission 2005b), die erste seit Aufnahme der Beziehungen zwischen der damaligen EWG und den afrikanischen Staaten Ende der 50er Jahre. In dieser bekräftigt die EU, Afrika in den Bereichen Frieden und Sicherheit zu unterstützen, sowie die schon in den anderen Dokumenten beschlossenen Ziele weiter voran zu treiben. Der Strategie ging die EU-Sicherheitsstrategie *A secure Europe in a better world* (Rat der Europäischen Union 2003) voraus, die mit der expliziten Betonung der Sicherheitspolitik als Vorbedingung der Entwicklung eine Neuausrichtung der EU-Afrikapolitik nach sich zog (Schmidt 2007: 109f.).

Neue Elemente der EU-Afrika-Beziehungen gibt es im ökonomischen Bereich (wie z.B. der Aufbau eines europäisch-afrikanischen Wirtschaftsforums und einen Aufruf zur Produktdiversifizierung), im politischen Bereich (wie die Governance-Initiative zur Unterstützung des *African Peer Review Mechanism* (APRM)[86] und das EU-Afrika Menschenrechtsforum), im sozialen und im finanziellen Bereich, wo bei ersterem vor allem Investitionen in Bildung angekündigt wurden und man bei letzterem eine Ausweitung der Mittel festschrieb (Kingah 2007: 527-550).

Insgesamt bestätigt die Strategie den Paradigmenwechsel in der europäischen Afrika-Politik von der Entwicklungspolitik zu einem umfassenden, vor allem politischen Ansatz. In allen folgenden offiziellen Dokumenten zur Konfliktprävention in Afrika verweist die EU darauf, dass die Kohärenz ihrer Politik eine unerlässliche Voraussetzung für eine erfolgreiche Afrikastrategie darstellt (Schukraft 2007: 127). Inhaltlich greift sie dagegen hauptsächlich auf bereits beschlossene Prinzipien zurück, weswegen sie keine neuen Akzente setzen konnte. Bei einer abschließenden Beurteilung muss man aber auch die positiven Seiten der Afrika-Strategie erwähnen: Sie bestärkt das schon tiefe Afrika-Engagement der EU und kündigt eine Erhöhung der Unterstützungen und eine Ausweitung der Aktivitäten an (Schmidt 2007: 117f.).

86 Der APRM ist ein freiwilliges Verfahren, das eine qualitative Beurteilung der Regierungsführung afrikanischer Staaten durchführt. Es ist Bestandteil des sozio-ökonomischen Programms *Neue Partnerschaft für Afrikas Entwicklung* (NEPAD) der *Afrikanischen Union* (AU) (Kingah 2006: 553f., Lister 2007: 78).

V.2.4 Kohärenzbemühungen seit Abschluss des Abkommens

Im Vertrag von Nizza (2000) gab es keine Veränderungen in den Artikeln zur europäischen Entwicklungspolitik[87] (Ashoff 2005: 49); internationale Entwicklungen waren dafür verantwortlich, dass Kohärenz in der Entwicklungspolitik verstärkt in den Blickpunkt der Europäischen Kommission rückte: „The era of "passivism" ended with the beginning of the new century, when the European Commission, taking advantage of a number of favourable conditions and using an astute strategy, managed to set an ambitious agenda for the EU" (Carbone 2008a: 339).

Auf der internationalen Handelsebene setzte sich die EU besonders für die „Entwicklungsrunde" der WTO ein. Zudem gestaltete sie die globale Agenda der Entwicklungspolitik dadurch, dass sie als einheitlicher Akteur bei der Konferenz zur Finanzierung der Entwicklungshilfe in Monterrey im Jahr 2002 auftrat und im Anschluss daran im Kollektiv für eine Verbesserung der Entwicklungspolitik eintrat. Für das Treffen zum fünfjährigen Jubiläum des Millennium Gipfels im Jahr 2005 bereitete die EU drei neue Vorschläge für eine verbesserte Entwicklungspolitik vor: Erstens gab man ein ambitioniertes Ziel für die europäische Entwicklungshilfe aus (siehe oben), zweitens wurde eine Erhöhung der Zahlungen an Afrika in Aussicht gestellt und drittens eine neue Initiative für eine verstärkte Kohärenz der Politik ins Leben gerufen. Im dritten Kapitel der Vorschläge für „eine beschleunigte Verwirklichung der entwicklungspolitischen Millenniumsziele" (so der Titel des Dokuments), das den Titel „Kohärenz im Dienste der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit" trägt, heißt es:

> „Die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist als solche zwar von wesentlicher Bedeutung, reicht aber nicht aus (...). Es bedarf einer weiter gespannten und tiefgreifenderen Anstrengung (...). Das Ziel besteht darin, die Möglichkeit für zusätzliche Beiträge zur Entwicklung zu sondieren. Dazu wird vorgeschlagen, das Konzept der Kohärenz im Dienste der Entwicklung unter diesem Gesichtspunkt auszuloten" (Europäische Kommission 2005a: 10).

Die Kommission bestätigte in diesem Papier, dass die europäischen Politikfelder Handel, Landwirtschaft, Fischereiwesen, Verkehr und Energie direkte Auswirkungen auf die Wirtschaftsentwicklung der Entwicklungsländer haben. Um die Inkohärenzen zu beseitigen, gab sie für die betroffenen Politikfelder Maßnahmen an, die für mehr Kohärenz in den Verpflichtungen der Entwicklungspolitik sorgen sollten. Um den Prozess zu überwachen, soll alle zwei Jahre ein Bericht erscheinen. Der erste Bericht von 2007

87 Und es konnten auch sonst keine weiter greifenden Reformen durchgeführt werden: „Both in the Treaty of Amsterdam and in the Treaty of Nice, member states failed to introduce a reform of the adminstrative and institutional structures that might match the political ambitions expressed in the treaties" (Reisen 2007: 49).

über die Fortschritte für mehr Kohärenz war kritisch mit den Ergebnissen Carbone 2008a: 332-335). Es wurde zwar positiv erwähnt, dass Kohärenz mehr Beachtung fand sowohl auf europäischer Ebene als auch in den Mitgliedsstaaten; aber die Ziele, die man sich zwei Jahre vorher steckte, wurden nicht erreicht:

> „Allgemein gesehen hat die EU eine Reihe konkreter Schritte unternommen, um für eine verstärkte Politikkohärenz im Interesse der Entwicklung zu sorgen. Die konkreten Ergebnisse bleiben allerdings hinter den im Europäischen Entwicklungskonsens zum Ausdruck gebrachten Erwartungen zurück. Es mangelt weiterhin an Bewusstsein für und Wissen über diese Problematik" (Europäische Kommission 2007: 11).

Im angesprochenen European Consensus on Development von 2005 wird die Kohärenz in der Entwicklungspolitik ebenso erwähnt:

> „The EU is fully committed to taking action to advance Policy Coherence for Development in a number of areas. It is important that non-development policies assist developing countries' efforts in achieving the MDGs. The EU shall take account of the objectives of development cooperation in all policies that it implements which are likely to affect developing countries. To make this commitment a reality, the EU will strengthen policy coherence for development procedures, instruments and mechanisms at all levels, and secure adequate resources and share best practice to further these aims" (Rat der Europäischen Union et al. 2005: 11).

Inwieweit die Konzentration auf eine erhöhte Kohärenz „in allen Politiken"[88], wie im Dokument geschrieben steht, tatsächlich in der Praxis Niederschlag fand, wird in den kommenden Abschnitten thematisiert.

Institutionelles Setting

Die Kommission unternahm von 1999 bis 2004 Anstrengungen auf der institutionellen Ebene, um die Effizienz der gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklungshilfezahlungen zu verbessern. Drei Reformen brachte die Reformagenda 2000 mit sich: Die erste Reform bestand aus der Gründung von EuropeAid, das die Ausführung der Hilfsprogramme für alle Drittstaaten überwacht und der GD Relex untersteht. Damit wurde zwar die Kohärenz der Entwicklungspolitik gestärkt, aber es besteht die Gefahr, dass sie außenpolitischen Zielen untergeordnet wird und somit entwicklungspolitische Themen in den Hintergrund treten. EuropeAid wurde gegründet, um die Missstände im Bereich der Verwaltungsverfahren zu beseitigen, die zu lange dauerten und unübersichtlich waren. Durch die Gründung konnte man die Verfahren deutlich beschleunigen. 2007 verbesserte man zudem die Verfahren bei der Krisenhilfe, indem ECHO, das Amt für

88 Eine Einschränkung erfährt die Kohärenz allerdings: Die gemeinschaftliche Politik ist weiterhin als komplementär zur Entwicklungspolitik der Mitgliedsstaaten anzusehen, was einer gemeinsamen Politik im Wege steht.

humanitäre Hilfe, das *Food Aid and Food Security* Programm von EuropeAid übernahm und dadurch Inkohärenzen zwischen den beiden Ämtern verringert wurden (Holland 2002: 100-111, Schukraft 2007: 137-143). Die beiden weiteren Reformen waren kleinerer Natur: Man führte Länderstrategiepapiere ein (siehe Kap. V.1) und übergab den EG-Delegationen in den Drittländern mehr Verantwortung für das Projektmanagement (Orbie/Versluys 2008: 69-72).
Eine Neuerung gab es auch im Bereich der Konfliktprävention: Nachdem die von der Kommission 1995 neu gegründete und in die GD Entwicklung eingegliederte Krisenmanagement-Einheit 1999 auf Grund der radikalen Verkleinerung der GD Entwicklung von 800 auf 200 Mitarbeiter wieder aufgelöst wurde, schuf man sie 2001 neu. Die *Einheit für Konfliktvermeidung, Krisenmanagement und politische Fragen mit den AKP-Staaten* (englisch kurz CPCMU) wurde allerdings an die GD Relex angegliedert. Um entwicklungspolitische Aspekte bei außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Themen nicht zu vernachlässigen, gründete der damalige Entwicklungskommissar Poul Nielson 2003 dafür die *Panafrikanische Einheit*. Sie unterstützt die Afrikanische Union (AU) und subregionale Organisationen beim Aufbau einer afrikanischen Sicherheits- und Friedensarchitektur (Schukraft 2005: 134-136).

José Manuel Barroso beanspruchte mit seinem Amtsantritt 2004 die Leitungsfunktion der Relex-Gruppe für sich, um seinen politischen Führungsanspruch in der Kommission deutlich zu machen. Ansonsten änderte sich an der Struktur der Kompetenzen nichts. Es gab zwar Pläne, die GD Entwicklung ganz der GD Relex anzugliedern, sie wurden aber verworfen, da die Kommission mit der Aufnahme der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten vergrößert werden musste (ebd.: 132f.). Die Neuerungen ergeben insgesamt das Bild, dass die GD Relex auf Kosten der GD Entwicklung gestärkt wurde (Reisen 2007: 52-56). Die Schwächung der Entwicklungspolitik kann an zwei weiteren Entscheidungen gezeigt werden: Zum einen hat die GD Entwicklung kaum ein Mitspracherecht in den Verhandlungen der EPAs, die allein von der GD Handel geführt wird (Elgström/Pilegaard 2008: 370-372). Zum anderen löste man 2002 den eigenen Rat für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auf, dessen Themen von da an im außenpolitischen Rat mitbestimmt wurden (Knapp 2008: 133). Dies führte zu Kritik an der Kommission, da man eine Marginalisierung der Entwicklungspolitik befürchtete (Arts 2003: 112).

Handelspolitik

Die EU ist der größte Fürsprecher einer vertieften internationalen Handelsagenda. Und das nicht nur, weil sie Kritikern zufolge von der industriellen Lobby beeinflusst ist, sondern auch weil sie besonders gute Erfahrung mit der eigenen Marktintegration gemacht hat (Orbie 2008: 37). In den Doha-Verhandlungen der WTO mit dem Ziel einer Besserstellung der Entwicklungsländer (deswegen „Entwicklungsrunde") setzte sich die EU für deren Interessen ein.[89] Da aber die Handelsrunde immer noch nicht abgeschlossen werden konnte, ist es schwierig, die Politik der EU in diesem Bereich zu bewerten. Eine Einschränkung erfährt die Förderung der Entwicklungsländer bei den Verhandlungen über die EPAs, in denen die GD Entwicklung nicht beteiligt ist und so eine kohärente Entwicklungspolitik für begleitende Maßnahmen zu den Handelsbestimmungen eingeschränkt wird (Orbie 2008: 56-58).

Agrarpolitik

Nach den MacSharry-Reformen 1992 gab es zwei weitere Reformen 1999 mit der Agenda 2000 – deren Ausmaße begrenzt waren – und 2003 nach Überlegungen des damaligen Agrarkommissars Franz Fischler. Über viele Jahre hinweg hatte die Kommission vor der Reform im Jahr 2003 auf Verbesserungen in der gemeinsamen Agrarpolitik (GAP, englisch CAP) gedrängt, doch konnten bis 2003 keine bedeutenden Veränderungen vorgenommen werden (Daugbjerg/Swinbank 2006: 1-4).

Der Berlin-Gipfel im März 1999 setzte nur den Rahmen für neue Reformen und beschloss lediglich kleinere technische Veränderungen. Die Anfänge der Doha-Entwicklungsrunde und die Vorschläge von Fischler, die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik nachhaltiger unter ökonomischen, ökologischen und sozialen Aspekten zu gestalten, übten Druck aus, Reformen durchzuführen.[90] Nicht alle Reformen, die Fischler vorgeschlagen hatte, konnten sich schließlich bei der Annahme des Reformpakets 2003 durchsetzen, da einige Mitgliedsstaaten gegen eine zu umfassende Veränderung waren. Die Ergebnisse waren im Einzelnen: Erstens wurden direkte Zahlungen an Landwirte von der Produktion

89 Zu den verschiedenen strittigen Punkten bei den WTO-Verhandlungen, die im Interesse der Entwicklungsländer liegen, siehe Page et al. (2008).

90 Daugbjerg/Swinbank (2006: 17f.) kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass nicht nur Druck aus den internationale Handelsverhandlungen zu der Reform führten, sondern auch das europäische institutionelle Setting bei den Vorbereitungen zu den Reformen eine besondere Rolle einnahm. Eine interessante Folgerung ihrer Studie ist, dass vor allem die Landwirtschaftsminister die Reformen vorantrieben und nicht der Europäische Rat, was den Annahmen in anderen Studien widerspricht: „In political science, it is often assumed that shifting the reform process from an institutional location friendly to special interests to one in which other interests dominate would facilitate policy change" (ebd.: 19).

abgekoppelt, d.h. man muss theoretisch nichts mehr produzieren, um Prämien zu bekommen. Der am Ende beschlossene Kompromiss sah allerdings im Gegensatz zu Fischlers Vorschlägen noch Ausnahmen vor. Zweitens müssen die Landwirte seit der Reform bestimmte Standards beim Wohlergehen der Tiere, bei der Futterqualität und im Umweltschutz respektieren. Das hat den Vorteil, dass die GAP damit die Kriterien der WTO für eine Einordnung als nicht-handelsverzerrend erfüllt.[91] Ein dritter Vorschlag von Fischler, die Preise für Milch und Getreide zu senken, wurde abgelehnt. Dieser Punkt sowie die Tatsachen, dass das Budget für die GAP nicht insgesamt gesenkt wurde – ein Posten von insgesamt 53,8 Milliarden Euro im Jahr 2007 (OECD 2007: 106) – und dass die Handelsbedingungen weiterhin zu Ungunsten der Entwicklungsländer ausfallen würden, erfuhren Kritik von NGOs (Nedergaard 2006: 212-219, Matthews 2008: 387f.). Kritisiert wird ebenso die europäische Fischereipolitik, die in den vergangenen Jahren oft zu negativen Auswirkungen in AKP-Staaten führte. Die EU hat Abkommen abgeschlossen, die zwar für das Fischen in den Hoheitsgewässern der Vertragspartner finanziell entschädigen, aber dort zu einer Überfischung führten (Orbie/Versluys 2008: 84).

Die bisherigen Reformen minderten den negativen Einfluss der GAP für die Entwicklungsländer; gleichwohl sind Benachteiligungen für diese bei einigen Handelswaren immer noch vorhanden: „Successive CAP reforms now mean that the distortions it generates on world markets are smaller than before, although they remain significant for individual commidities“ (Matthews 2008: 381). Positive Veränderungen für die Entwicklungsländer zeigen sich auch bei den Zahlen zu der Unterstützung der europäischen Landwirtschaft. Von der OECD vorgenommene Schätzungen zu den Unterstützungen der Landwirtschaft belegen einen abnehmenden Trend: Während Mitte der 80er Jahre noch 41 % der Einkommen der europäischen Landwirte aus Maßnahmen der Politik resultierten, waren es 2004-2006 nur noch 34 %. Zudem sanken Exportunterstützungen von über 10 Milliarden Euro in den frühen 90er Jahren auf 2,4 Milliarden in

91 Bei der WTO gibt es drei Kriterien von landwirtschaftlichen Unterstützungen: In der so genannten „gelben Box“ (*amber box*) sind handelsverzerrende Unterstützungen aufgezählt, die abgebaut werden müssen. Die *green box* beinhaltete Fördermaßnahmen, die den Handel nicht oder nur sehr marginal beeinflussen. Grundvoraussetzung ist hierbei die Entkopplung der Zuschüsse. Die *blue box* listet nicht vollkommen entkoppelte Zahlungen auf, und ist damit eine Zwischenkategorie der beiden ersten Kategorien. Maßnahmen in der *blue box* werden als Instrumente für Reformen angesehen. Mit den Reformen von 2003 konnte die EU einige Maßnahmen von der *blue box* in die *green box*-Kategorie verlagern, was aber in der Doha-Entwicklungsrunde als nicht ausreichende Reformen angesehen wurde, um eine Einigung zu erzielen (Daugbjerg/Swinbank 2006: 10f.). Zu den Verhandlungen in der WTO über die Agrarpolitik der EU und die Auswirkungen von Regulierungen auf dem heimischen Markt für den Handel mit anderen Ländern siehe Gössl (2008) und Colman (2007: 98-101).

2006 (OECD 2007: 100, 113).

Zum Schluss sei noch angemerkt, dass die Reformen der GAP nicht für alle Entwicklungsländer vorteilhaft sind, es gibt zwei Seiten der Medaille: Einerseits können Länder bei einer verringerten Subventionierung der europäischen Güter wettbewerbsfähiger werden und neue Märkte erschließen. Andererseits haben von den bisherigen Regelungen der GAP Länder profitiert, die Netto-Importeure von Produkten waren – Nachteil der gesenkten Preise ist, dass heimische Produzenten in den betreffenden Sektoren aus dem Markt gedrängt werden. Weitere Profiteure des Systems waren die Länder mit präferenziellem Zugang zum europäischen Markt, da sie hohe garantierte EU-Preise bekamen. Genau dies waren auch die Vor- und Nachteile bei der Reform des Zuckerhandels im Jahr 2005. Um die Länder zu unterstützen, die Nachteile durch die Reform erfahren, hat die EU Unterstützungen in Höhe von 1,2 Milliarden Euro für die Periode 2006-2013 zugesagt (Matthews 2008: 388-392). Inwieweit solche Zahlungen auch bei den EPAs vorgesehen sind, wird im folgenden Kapitel untersucht.

Zusammenfassung

Das Thema der entwicklungspolitischen Kohärenz nimmt einen hohen Stellenwert seit Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends ein. Es wurden Prozeduren geschaffen, um die Kohärenz zu überwachen (seit 2005) und damit wird eines der Kriterien von Stokke (siehe Kap. II.3) für das Feststellen von Kohärenzbemühungen erfüllt. Die tatsächliche Ausgestaltung bietet jedoch ein widersprüchlicheres Bild: Einerseits startete die EU viele Initiativen, um die Entwicklungspolitik zu verbessern. Auch in der Handels- und Agrarpolitik gab es Anstrengungen, die Belange der Entwicklungsländer zu berücksichtigen, wobei die WTO trotz der Agrarreform von 2003 weiterhin Senkungen der Exportunterstützungen und Zölle fordert (Orbie 2008: 48).

Andererseits wurde die eigene Generaldirektion massiv verkleinert und die Kompetenzen auf andere GDs übertragen. Zudem steht die Entwicklungspolitik zunehmend unter dem Einfluss von Sicherheitsaspekten, was unter entwicklungspolitischen Aspekten zu bedenklichen Konsequenzen führen könnte: „A fundamental question for the coming years is whether Europe's so-called comprehensive policy is becoming unbalanced, *de facto* prioritising security over development objectives“ (Orbie/Versluys 2008: 83). Dialer (2007: 246) überträgt diese Meinung auf die übergeordneten Strukturen der Weltwirtschaft und die globalen politischen Rahmenbedingungen. Sie fragt, ob es Sinn mache die Konfliktprävention weiter zu perfektionieren, wenn keine gerechten

Lösungen zu den beiden anderen Themen gefunden werden. Hadfield (2007: 66) fügt dem allerdings hinzu, dass die Tendenz zu einer stärkeren Einbeziehung von Sicherheitsaspekten nicht zwangsläufig zu verurteilen ist: „The addition of security provisions has had a damaging effect on the EC's development objectives but arguably adds to the robustness (if not coherence) of overall EU foreign policy, toughening it up in an increasingly challenging world.“ Gerade wenn man sich auf die Konflikthäufigkeit in Afrika[92] und die negativen Konsequenzen von Konflikten für Entwicklungschancen besinnt, wird klar, dass keine eindeutige Beurteilung der zunehmenden Bedeutung von Sicherheitsaspekten in der Entwicklungspolitik möglich ist.

V.2.5 Verhandlung der EPAs

Die formalen Verhandlungen für die EPAs begannen im September 2002 mit dem Ziel, sie bis Ende 2007 zum Abschluss zu bringen. Dazu wurden die AKP-Staaten in sechs Ländergruppen – vier afrikanische, eine pazifische und eine karibische – eingeteilt, mit denen Verhandlungen geführt werden sollten. Die grundlegende Forderung der EU ist, ungefähr 90 % des gemeinsamen Handels innerhalb einer Zeitspanne von 10 bis 15 Jahren zu liberalisieren, wobei die EU vollständig ihre Märkte öffnen würde, die AKP-Staaten nur 80 % ihrer Produkte von Zöllen befreien müsste (Borrmann et al. 2007: 244). Vier „Säulen“ bestimmen nach der GD Handel die neuen Abkommen: Partnerschaft, regionale Integration, Entwicklung und WTO-Konformität (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ (b)). Diese vier Themen der EPAs werden in diesem Unterkapitel genauer betrachtet, zuvor wird ein kurzer Überblick über die Verhandlungen gegeben.

Die Kommission erhielt 2002 vom Rat die Kriterien für die Verhandlungen der EPAs (Europäische Kommission 2002)[93], wobei es Kritik von Dänemark, Schweden und dem Vereinigten Königreich gab, welche offenen Marktzugang unter EBA für alle AKP-Staaten forderten. Sie schlossen sich jedoch am Ende den anderen Mitgliedsstaaten an, die sich auf ein Mandat einigten, das vor allem das Ziel des freien Handel in den Mittelpunkt der Verhandlungen stellte (Elgström/Pilegaard 2008: 370-374). Vom 27.

92 Nach Schätzungen der Europäischen Kommission befinden sich stets rund 20 % der AKP-Staaten in einer Krisen- oder Krisenfolgesituation (siehe Dialer 2007: 245).

93 Der hier angeführte Text ist der, den die Kommission vorschlug und der vom Rat fast unverändert angenommen wurde (Elgström/Pilegaard 2008: 372). Nur dieser Text ist auf der Homepage der GD Handel aufgeführt.

September 2002 bis zum 2. Oktober 2003 fand die erste Phase der gemeinsamen Verhandlungen mit allen AKP-Staaten statt; in dieser einigte man sich auf die grundlegenden Kriterien der Verhandlungen (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ (a)).

Die Verhandlungen mit den einzelnen Regionen (die einzelnen Mitglieder der afrikanischen Gruppierungen sind im Anhang in Tab. 12 aufgezählt) nahm die EU ab dem Jahr 2003 auf: Am 4. Oktober mit der Wirtschafts- und Währungsgemeinschaft Zentralafrikanischer Staaten (CEMAC), am 6. Oktober mit der Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Westafrikanischer Staaten (ECOWAS), am 7. Februar 2004 mit 16 Ost- und Südafrikanischen Staaten (COMESA), am 16. April 2004 mit den 15 karibischen Staaten (CARIFORUM), am 8. Juli 2004 mit 7 Staaten der Entwicklungsgemeinschaft des südlichen Afrikas (SADC) und am 10. September 2004 mit den 15 pazifischen AKP-Staaten (PIF).[94] Die COMESA-Gruppe spaltete sich im Laufe der Verhandlungen in zwei Gruppierungen: ESA (*Eastern und Southern African Group*) und EAC (*Eastern African Community*)[95] (http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ (c)).

Da die Verhandlungen von NGOs und sogar wiederum von einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten wie dem Vereinigten Königreich und Dänemark für die reine Betonung der wirtschaftlichen Aspekte stark kritisiert wurden, versuchte die Kommission, die entwicklungspolitische Dimension mehr zu beachten. So lud sie von 2006 an die GD Entwicklung ein, bei den Verhandlungen teilzunehmen (Elgström/Pilegaard 2008: 374-376). Zudem gab sie eine „Nachhaltigkeitsprüfung" (*Sustainability Impact Assessment*, SIA) der EPAs in Auftrag, die die ökonomischen, sozialen und Umweltauswirkungen analysieren sollte; diese erschien 2007 (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007) und gab für die Verhandlungen zwölf Handlungsanweisungen.[96]

Trotz der Abschlüsse von gemeinsamen Roadmaps zu den Bestandteilen der EPAs konnten keine vollständigen EPAs bis Ende 2007 verabschiedet werden. Die Gründe hierfür waren hauptsächlich, dass die Verhandlungspartner keine optimale Lösung für

94 Die Namen der EPA-Gruppierungen dürfen nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass sie nicht mit den tatsächlichen regionalen Organisationen übereinstimmen (Stevens et al. 2008: 4-7). Die ESA-Gruppierung vereint Mitglieder von der SADC und von COMESA. Die regionalen Organisationen selbst sind von unterschiedlicher Intensität der Integration geprägt. Die Stufe einer Zollunion haben nur CEMAC, EAC, SACU und die Westafrikanische Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion UEMOA, die sogar eine eigene Währung besitzt (siehe dazu Tchitchi 2005: 65f., Borrmann et al. 2008: 236-238).

95 Die EAC entschied sich zwar schon 2002 dazu, als Block zu verhandeln, war aber bis 2007 Bestandteil der COMESA-Konfiguration. Erst Ende 2007 konkretisierte sich das Vorhaben und endete in der Verabschiedung eines eigenen Abkommens (Stevens et al. 2008: 73).

96 Diese argumentieren im Großen und Ganzen für die Forderungen der EU in den Verhandlungen. So zählt der Bericht die Vorzüge von Liberalisierungen im umstrittenen Dienstleistungsbereich auf. Andererseits fordert er auch verbesserte Ursprungsregeln und technische Unterstützung, um die Informationsbeschaffung zu erleichtern (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007:64-82).

die Verknüpfung der Handelsliberalisierungen mit einer bestmöglichen Berücksichtigung der entwicklungspolitischen Dimension fanden (Meyn 2008: 522, Steiner 2008: 351).[97] Einzige Ausnahme waren die karibischen Staaten, die am 16.12.2007 ein vollständiges Abkommen unterzeichneten. Da die AKP-Staaten, die nicht als LDCs unter EBA exportieren durften, damit ihren präferenziellen Zugang zum europäischen Markt verloren hätten, wurden einige „Interim"-Abkommen kurz vor Ende der Frist abgeschlossen (siehe Tab. 8) – diese beinhalten jedoch nicht alle Punkte, über die Vereinbarung getroffen werden sollen. Das Ziel ist, Übereinkunft über vollständige EPAs zu finden, die 2008 weiter verhandelt werden; bis dahin gelten die Vereinbarungen der vorläufigen Abkommen. Was die Staaten betrifft, die keine EPAs ausgehandelt haben, so ist festzustellen, dass es sich abgesehen von Gabun, der Republik Kongo und Nigeria um LDCs handelt (Stevens et al. 2008: xi). Da diese drei Staaten keine hohen Exporte in die EU zu verzeichnen hatten und reich an Erdöl sind, war für sie eine Umstellung auf GSP kein großes Problem (ebd.: 86f.).[98]

Tab. 8 Unterzeichnete „Interim"-EPAs[99]

Unterzeichner	Datum
Botswana, Lesotho, Swasiland und Mosambik (SADC)	23.11.2007
EAC[100]	23.11.2007
Seychellen und Simbabwe (ESA)	28.11.2007
Fiji und Papua-Neuguinea	29.11.2007
Mauritius (ESA)	4.12.2007
Elfenbeinküste	7.12.2007
Komoren und Madagaskar	11.12.2007
Namibia (SADC)	11.12.2007
Ghana	13.12.2007

97 Die weiteren strittigen Punkte waren die „Singapur"-Themen (Investitionen, Wettbewerb, Transparenz des öffentlichen Beschaffungswesens und Handelserleichterungen), Unterstützung durch den EEF und die Klauseln über die Konsultationsprozesse bei Nichtbeachtung der Vertragsinhalte (Schmitz 2005: 72-76).

98 Nigeria stellte einen Antrag für die Aufnahme in GSP+, das bessere Bedingungen vorweist als GSP. Der Antrag wurde abgewiesen, da Nigeria nicht die Bedingungen von GSP+ in den Bereichen Arbeitsbedingungen, Menschenrechten und Umweltstandards erfüllte (Meyn 2008: 522).

99 Bei den genannten Terminen handelt es sich um die Paraphierung des Vertrages, sie müssen für die vollständige Rechtsgültigkeit noch ratifiziert werden. Bisher haben dies die karibischen Staaten am 15.10.2008, die Elfenbeinküste am 26.11.2008 und schließlich Kamerun am 15.1.2009 getan. Die restlichen Abkommen wurden noch nicht ratifiziert (ECDPM 2009).

100 Zu der EAC gehören Burundi, Kenia, Ruanda, Tansania und Uganda.

CARIFORUM (vollständiges EPA)	16.12.2007
Kamerun	17.12.2007
Sambia (ESA)	30.9.2008

Quellen: http://www.acp-eu-trade.org/, http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ (b) (beide aufgerufen am 30.1.09), Fessehaie (2008: 8), eigene Darstellung.

Wie man an der Tabelle ablesen kann, sind alle Abkommen in den letzten beiden Monaten des Jahres 2007 fertig gestellt worden. 2008 kamen bis auf Sambia – das noch die Marktzugangsdaten mit der EU vereinbaren musste, sonst aber Teil der ESA-Gruppierung ist – keine weiteren „Interim"-EPAs dazu, noch wurden vollständige EPAs vereinbart. Im Januar 2009 unterschrieb Kamerun das „Interim"-EPA, das ab diesem Zeitpunkt an in Kraft trat. 2009 sollen weitere Verhandlungen mit den einzelnen Regionen geführt werden. Dabei ist nicht vollständig geklärt, ob die Verhandlungsergebnisse der „Interim"-EPAs in vollständige Abkommen übernommen werden oder noch einmal Gegenstand der Verhandlungen sind (Bilal/Hanson 2008: 1f.)

WTO-Konformität

Das oberste Ziel der EPAs ist es, mit einer schrittweisen Integration der AKP-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft die EU-AKP-Partnerschaft WTO-konform zu gestalten. Zwei Artikel stellen die Kernelemente eines WTO-konformen regionalen Handelsabkommens zwischen zwei Parteien dar: Artikel XXIV des GATT (*General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade*) und die Ermächtigungsklausel (*enabling clause*), die erlaubt, dass Entwicklungsländer Sonder- und Vorzugsbehandlung (*special and differential treatment*) im Vergleich zu anderen Länder erhalten dürfen. Beide Artikel sind Ausnahmeregelungen des Art. 1 des Meistbegünstigungsprinzips (MFN), das besagt, dass Handelsvorteile, die einem Vertragspartner innerhalb der WTO gewährt werden, allen anderen Vertragspartnern ebenso offen stehen müssen.

Art. XXIV ist aufgrund seiner Unbestimmtheit bei der Frage, wie ein regionales Abkommen regelkonform gestaltet werden muss, in der Kritik. So besagt der Artikel, dass „annähernd der gesamte Handel" (*substantially all trade*) liberalisiert werden muss, ohne eine genaue Zahl zu nennen, ab der die Schwelle überschritten ist. In einigen bisher abgeschlossenen Freihandelsabkommen vereinbarte man 86 % bis 90 %. Er gibt darüberhinaus an, dass der Übergang zum freien Handel innerhalb eines „angemessenen Zeitrahmens" (*reasonable length of time*) geschehen muss, der „nur in Ausnahmefällen" zehn Jahre überschreiten darf, ohne die Ausnahmefälle zu spezifizieren

(Matambalya/Wolf 2001: 131-135, Ochieng 2007: 367-369). Da es keinen Konsens über die Auslegung der Bestimmungen gibt, muss sich die Position der EU daran messen lassen, wie strikt sie die Vorgaben der WTO umsetzt.[101]

Die abgeschlossenen vorläufigen EPAs weisen sehr unterschiedliche Vorgehensweisen bei den beiden Ausnahmeregelungen auf (siehe Tab. 9, in der noch weitere Charakteristika aufgeführt werden, die für die Einzelfallbetrachtungen im nächsten Kapitel relevant sind).

Tab. 9 Daten zu den bisher unterzeichneten afrikanischen „Interim"-EPAs

Land[a]	Beginn Liberalisierung	Laufzeit	Prozent sensible Produkte	Theoretischer Verlust in Mill. Dollar (am Ende)	BIP pro Kopf in Dollar (2006)	HDI (2005)	Importe aus EU in Mill. Dollar (2006)
Komoren	2013	2022	19,3 %	3,5	642	0,561	51
Madagaskar	2013	2022	19,3 %	32,6	287	0,533	437
Mauritius	2008	2022	4,4 %	18,1	5026	0,804	1143
Seychellen	2013	2022	2,5 %	142,9	9368	0,843	256
Zimbabwe	2013	2022	20,1 %	14,5	472	0,513	184
Burundi	2010	2033	23 %	4,8	119	0,413	104
Kenia	2010	2033	19,4 %	39,5	670	0,521	1515
Ruanda	2010	2033	25,4 %	3	271	0,452	132
Tansania	2010	2033	20,2 %	16,7	335	0,467	779
Uganda	2010	2033	17,3 %	8,7	316	0,505	388
Botswana	2008	2018	2,8 %	k.A.	6756	0,654	113
Lesotho	2008	2018	2,8 %	k.A.	621	0,549	24
Mosambik	2008	2023	19 %[102]	10	386	0,384	320
Namibia	2008	2018	2,8 %	k.A.	3085	0,650	198

101 Zu der Umsetzung der WTO-Vorgaben müssen zwei Anmerkungen gemacht werden. Eine verteidigt eine harte Linie der EU, denn Ausnahmen der Regeln müssen gut begründet sein, so dass keine nichtbeteiligten Länder die Vereinbarungen beanstanden können (Thallinger 2007: 510). Die zweite erinnert daran, dass die EU auch versuchen könnte, die Regeln der WTO zusammen mit den Entwicklungsländern zu verändern, wenn die Regeln der Entwicklung der AKP-Staaten bei einem Abschluss der EPAs im Wege stünden (ebd.: 514-516). Es wäre eine gute Möglichkeit gewesen, zu versuchen, die Regeln der WTO generell entwicklungspolitischer zu gestalten. Denn bei der Ausgestaltung des GATT waren Entwicklungsländer nicht beteiligt, weswegen ihre Belange in dem Regelwerk der WTO insgesamt nicht sehr präsent sind. Zu diesem Punkt und zu den getätigten Reformen siehe Steiner (2008: 336-349).

102 Für Mosambik gibt es unterschiedliche Zahlen. Stevens et al. geben 37,7 % an Ausnahmen an, die EU (Europäische Kommission 2009) jedoch nur 19 %. Dies erscheint realistischer, wenn man die anderen Prozentsätze der Ausnahmen betrachtet, die höchstens knapp über 20 % liegen.

Swasiland	2008	2018	2,8 %	k.A.	2312	0,547	33
Kamerun	2010	2023	21 %	80	999	0,532	1200
Elfenbeinküste	2008	2022	20 %	139	951	0,432	1447
Ghana	2009	2022	20,3 %	97	602	0,553	1834
Sambia	2013	2022	20 %	k.A.	921	0,434	334

a: Kursive Länder sind LDCs.
Quellen: http://hdrstats.undp.org/buildtables/rc_report.cfm, http://webnet.oecd.org/wbos/index.aspx, http://www.imf.org/external(alle abgerufen am 10.2.09), Stevens et al. (2008: 11-53), eigene Darstellung.

Auf der einen Seite müssen die Länder der EAC die ersten sechs Jahre keine Zölle aufgeben und erst nach 26 Jahren die vertraglichen Inhalte komplett umgesetzt haben. Auf der anderen Seite stehen die Länder der SADC, die Elfenbeinküste, Ghana und Mauritius, die schon im zweiten Jahr der Laufzeit des Abkommens Zölle senken und innerhalb von 15 Jahren die Vorgaben in den Abkommen erfüllt haben müssen. Bei der Ausnahme von Zollbefreiungen der sensiblen Güter sind die SADC-Staaten mit unter 15 % der Ausnahmen am unteren Ende, fünf Staaten dürfen 15-20 % der Produkte schützen, weitere acht sogar mehr als 20 %. Die SADC-Staaten gleichen ihre Zölle den südafrikanischen Bestimmungen an, weswegen die Bestimmungen nicht als Beispiel einer strengen Verhandlungspraxis der EU angesehen werden kann (Stevens et al. 2008: 55f.).[103] An den Daten sieht man, dass die EU nicht auf den Übergangsfristen von 10-12 Jahren beharrte und sensible Produkte von Liberalisierungen ausgenommen sind. Eine positive Beurteilung der EU wird allerdings dadurch eingeschränkt, dass die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Vertragspartner in den Ausnahmeregelungen keine Rolle spielte: „No clear pattern can be identified that the poorer countries have longer to adjust than the richer ones“ (ebd.: 56). Dennoch kann bei der Gestaltung der WTO-Konformität keine idealtypische Vorgehensweise einer Handelsmacht erkannt werden, da es im wirtschaftlichen Interesse der EU gewesen wäre, eine möglichst schnelle Öffnung der Märkte zu erreichen.[104]

Regionale Integration

Im Abkommen von Cotonou hielten die beiden Vertragspartner fest, dass regionale Integration ein elementarer Bestandteil sei, um Entwicklung zu fördern, was in dem

103 Für die genauen Daten jedes einzelnen Landes siehe die detaillierte Darstellung von Stevens et al. (2008: 11-53).

104 Denn bei manchen Exportgruppen wie landwirtschaftlichen Produkten sind die afrikanischen Märkte trotz niedriger europäischer Gesamt-Exportzahlen in die AKP-Staaten von wachsender Bedeutung (Goodison 2007b: 280f., 288).

Mandat der Kommission für die EPA-Verhandlungen aufgegriffen wurde: „EPA negotiations should therefore build on the acquis of regional integration in order to maximise the benefits of EPAs“ (Europäische Kommission 2002: 7).

Die regionalen Gruppierungen, für die sich die afrikanischen Länder entschieden,[105] stimmten nicht mit den vorhandenen regionalen Zusammenschlüssen (für einen Überblick siehe Tab. 12 im Anhang) überein – mit der Ausnahme der EAC. Einige Länder sind Mitglieder von mehreren regionalen Abkommen und wechselten innerhalb der Verhandlungen noch die Mitgliedschaft (Stevens et al. 2008: 73f.). Da die überlappenden Mitgliedschaften und die geringe Effizienz der regionalen Organisationen eine erhofften Verbesserung der Handelsbeziehungen behinderten, werden die Verhandlungen der EPAs von manchen Autoren als Möglichkeit angesehen, eine verbesserte regionale Integration zu erreichen (De la Rocha 2003, Mwebeiha 2004). Andere Autoren weisen auf die Probleme der LDCs hin, die durch einen vollständigen Marktzugang auf den europäischen Markt keine Wohlfahrtsgewinne zu verzeichnen hätten, da sie mit EBA diesen ohnehin schon erhalten. Wenn sie allerdings weiterhin einer Zollunion innerhalb der AKP-Staaten angehören wollen, die ihrerseits ein EPA abgeschlossen hat, müssten sie ebenso wie diese ihre Zölle nach den Vereinbarungen senken (Bilal 2007: 217f., Morrisey et al. 2007: 217). Die angeführten Probleme existieren nicht nur für die LDCs, sondern auch für regionale Gruppierungen, wenn einzelne Mitglieder unterschiedliche sensible Produkte als Ausnahmen für die Senkung der Zölle vereinbaren (PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2007: 53f.).

Stevens et al. (2008: 74f.) kommen zu dem Schluss, dass die Vorschläge der Kommission für Zoll-Harmonisierung und -liberalisierung bestehende regionale Gruppierungen belasteten. Die Verhandlungen ließen zu wenig Zeit für autonome Anstrengungen auf der AKP-Seite. Andererseits setzten die EPA-Verhandlungen das Thema regionale Integration wieder verstärkt auf die Agenden der bestehenden regionalen Organisationen. Zusammenfassend kommen die Autoren zu dem Schluss, dass die regionale Integration nicht voranschreiten konnte im Zuge der EPA-Verhandlungen: „A common perception is that there is little coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration processes in Africa“ (ebd.: 74).

105 Der hier geschriebene Satz ist ein gutes Beispiel dafür, wie man den Sinn einer Aussage durch Passivkonstruktionen verfälschen kann. Viele Kritiken an der europäischen Verhandlungspolitik betreffen die Vorgehensweise bei den Fragen der regionalen Integration. Die afrikanischen Staaten wählten allerdings *selbst* die Zusammensetzung und bekamen sie nicht aufgezwängt (was eine passive Satzkonstruktion suggerieren würde). Das soll nicht die Vorgehensweise der EU entschuldigen, aber zeigt, dass nicht alle Kritik berechtigt ist und nur auf der europäischen Seite zu suchen ist.

Entwicklung

Handelszusammenschlüsse können den Handel in zweierlei Hinsicht beeinflussen. Erstens ist es möglich, dass bisherige Handelsbeziehungen ausgeweitet werden und neue Handelsbeziehungen zwischen den Vertragsparteien entstehen. Dieser Effekt wird *trade creation* genannt (handelsschaffend), da neue Märkte erschlossen werden, Produzenten so von Kostensenkungen profitieren und diese auf die Konsumenten umgeleitet werden könnten. Der zweite Effekt ist ein negativer, genannt *trade diversion* (handelsumleitend): Es ist ebenfalls möglich, dass das bisher wirtschaftlichere Angebot eines Anbieters, der kein Mitglied des neuen Handelszusammenschlusses ist, verdrängt wird von einem weniger effizienten Produzenten eines Mitgliedsstaates innerhalb des Zusammenschlusses. Das hätte zur Folge, dass die Wohlfahrt der Inländer wegen zunehmender Importpreise abnimmt (Tchitchi 2005: 104f.). Während beide erstgenannten Effekte erst mit der Laufzeit der EPAs tatsächlich zu bestimmen sind, gibt es einen dritten Effekt, der unmittelbar mit Beginn der Liberalisierungen in Erscheinung tritt: Er betrifft den Abbau von Zöllen, die in den AKP-Staaten eine wichtige Einnahmequelle darstellen. Die AKP-Staaten müssen mit Einnahmeausfällen rechnen, die kompensiert werden müssen (siehe Tab. 9, S. 82). Im Folgenden werden Berechnungen zu den ökonomischen Folgen der EPAs vorgestellt und analysiert, wie die EU auf die zu erwartenden Anpassungsschwierigkeiten reagiert. Zudem werden weitere Komponenten aufgezählt, die die EPAs neben den oben genannten noch beinhalten.

Mittlerweile gibt es einige Studien, die sich mit den Auswirkungen der EPAs auf die afrikanischen Ökonomien beschäftigen, ein eindeutiges Ergebnis gibt es aber nicht. Manche Studien haben zum Ergebnis, dass die EPAs Kosten für die AKP-Staaten verursachen:

- Perez (2006) testet verschiedene Szenarien der EPAs und kommt zu dem Schluss, dass die AKP-Staaten umso mehr profitieren, je stärker sie ihre Märkte schützen dürfen und je besser ihre eigene regionale Integration voranschreitet. Die beste Alternative zu den EPAs wäre jedoch eine Anwendung von GSP und EBA: „If ACP countries had to use the GSP and the EBA initiative, their welfare and output losses would be less important than the losses induced by the "standard" EPAs proposal" (ebd.: 1015).
- Milner (2007) führt eine sehr umfassende Evaluation der Anpassungskosten von EPAs durch. Er berechnet für jedes Mitglied der AKP-Staaten die Kosten für finanzielle Anpassung, Handelserleichterungen und notwendige

Exportdiversifizierungen, Anpassung des Arbeitsmarkts, Steigerung der Produktivität, Verhandlungsführung und legislative Anpassung. Er kommt zu dem Schluss, dass insgesamt 9 Milliarden Euro als Kosten für die AKP-Länder bei einem Abschluss von EPAs entstehen (ebd.: 258).

Drei weitere Studien sehen ein ungefähr ausgeglichenes Ergebnis:

- Milner et al. (2005)[106] betrachten drei Länder der EAC – Kenia, Uganda und Tansania – mit der Annahme, sie liberalisierten ihre Märkte vollständig, was in den EPAs jedoch nicht passiert. Sie kommen zu dem Ergebnis, dass die drei Länder nur marginale Wohlfahrtseffekte zu verzeichnen hätten. Für Kenia – und verallgemeinert für große Ökonomien, die nicht als LDC klassifiziert sind – würden potentielle Kosten durch den präferenziellen Zugang auf den europäischen Markt ausgeglichen. Uganda hätte einen Wohlfahrtsgewinn von 0,05 %, während das BIP Tansanias um 0,5 % zurückgehen würde, da ein handelsumleitender Effekt überwiegen würde.
- Karingi et al. (2005) kommen bei Berechnungen mit einem allgemeinen Gleichgewichtsmodell zu dem Urteil, dass die EPAs zu einem geringen positiven Effekt führten, wenn die AKP-Staaten vollständigen Zugang zu den europäischen Märkten bekämen. Allerdings sehen sie regionale Integration als einen wichtigen Baustein für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung (ebd.: 62). In einem zweiten Partialmodell berechnen sie die Kosten für die Senkung der Zölle und bestätigen beträchtliche Einnahmeausfälle – für einen knappen Überblick siehe UNECA (2005: 5). Ein weiteres Ergebnis ist, dass die EU sehr von den Liberalisierungen der AKP-Märkte profitierten, was einerseits zu Profiten innerhalb der AKP-Staaten durch einen handelsschaffenden Effekt führte, aber auch zu Ausfällen wegen signifikanter handelsumleitender Effekte (Karingi et al. 2005: 81f.).
- Borrmann et al. (2007) untersuchen die Auswirkungen der EPAs auf das östliche und südliche Afrika. In ihrer Analyse nehmen sie an, dass 100 % aller Produkte liberalisiert werden und lassen somit die Stufen der Liberalisierung außer Acht. Sie kommen zu dem Schluss, dass handelsschaffende Effekte handelsumleitende übertreffen, was sie aber nicht zu dem Urteil kommen lässt, dass EPAs generell entwicklungsförderlich seien: „The negative impact from subsequent terms-of-trade

106Zwei Jahre später haben die Autoren ihre Ergebnisse noch einmal bestätigen können (siehe Morrissey et al. 2007).

effects or losses in tariff revenue resulting from trade liberalisation might outweigh the increase in consumer surplus“ (ebd.: 247). Der Verlust der Zolleinnahmen könnte zwar durch eine Steuer- oder Finanzreform ausgeglichen werden, die Autoren weisen aber darauf hin, dass Steuerreformen in ESA-Ländern in den 90er Jahren nicht zu den gewünschten Ergebnissen geführt haben (ebd.: 248). Als Fazit ziehen Borrmann et al., dass, auf Grund der großen Anzahl von LDCs in Afrika, die Vergabe von EBA-ähnlichen Präferenzen das beste Ergebnis für die EPA-Verhandlungen wären (ebd.: 251).[107]

- Jansen (2007) betrachtet den kritisch diskutierten Bereich der Dienstleistungen für die Staaten im afrikanischen Süden und Osten. Sie urteilt, dass es für sie vorteilhaft sei, den finanziellen Sektor, Tourismus und *Mode 4*-Dienstleistungen (Leistungen von natürliche Personen im Ausland) in den EPAs zu verhandeln und dafür technische Unterstützung zu verlangen. Dagegen seien für andere Bereiche – wie Telekommunikation, Transport und Geschäfts-Dienstleistungen – multilaterale Verhandlungen vorzuziehen (ebd.: 445).

Bei all den negativen Einschätzungen sollen nicht die Studien vergessen werden, die ökonomische Vorteile für die AKP-Staaten durch die EPAs sehen. In ihnen findet sich Kritik an den Modellen in einigen der vorher aufgeführten Artikeln, die mit zu vereinfachten Annahmen zu ihren Beurteilungen gekommen seien (siehe auch Curran et al. 2008: 535-537, 542-546):

- Keck/Piermartini (2007) schätzen die Auswirkungen für die Staaten der SADC positiv ein und sehen eine Steigerung des BIPs der beteiligten Staaten voraus, da z.B. nach ihren Berechnungen neue Arbeitsplätze im Agrarsektor entstehen. Sie betonen, wie die anderen Autoren, die positiven Effekte einer vertieften wirtschaftlichen Integration innerhalb der Gruppierung: „For some SADC countries, it is crucial to seek further integration within SADC (...) in order to reap the full benefits“ (ebd.: 122).
- Fontagné et al. (2008) vergleichen die Auswirkungen von EPAs mit verschiedenen Szenarien. Sie kommen zu dem Schluss, dass EPAs weitaus besser die Entwicklung fördern können als das GSP-System und dass mit den EPAs die handelsschaffenden

107 Viele Autoren sehen andere bestehende Alternativen zu den EPAs wie GSP, GSP+ und EBA als bessere Optionen an (siehe auch Stevens 2008: 213-215). Curran et al. (2008: 540-542) weisen allerdings darauf hin, dass nach Kalkulationen der Europäischen Kommission die Kosten von GSP+ für Nicht-LDCs bei 750 Millionen Euro liegen würden. Somit ist die Alternative nicht von vornherein als bessere Lösung anzusehen.

Effekte mehr als doppelt so hoch sein werden als die handelsumleitenden.

Eine Beurteilung der Studien führt zu dem Schluss, dass die EPAs für die AKP-Staaten positive Auswirkungen haben können, wenn bestimmte Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind, die unterstützende Maßnahmen benötigen. Nach Zivilmachtkriterien kann die EU diese wahrscheinlichen Anpassungsschwierigkeiten nicht ignorieren.

Wie an dem vorherigen Abschnitt über regionale Integration zu erkennen ist, wurde dieser Aspekt, der von vielen Studien als relevanter Faktor für eine positive wirtschaftliche Entwicklung genannt wurde, von der EU nicht maßgeblich gefördert. Der sofortige zollfreie Zugang (mit den Ausnahmen für Zucker und Reis) auf den europäischen Markt bringt vor allem den Nicht-LDCs Vorteile, die insgesamt Waren im Wett von 1,4 Milliarden Euro auf den europäischen Markt ohne zusätzliche Gebühren liefern können, was zu einer direkten Ersparnis von 12,7 Millionen Euro führt (Stevens et al. 2008: 64-67). Damit die Präferenzen für die AKP-Staaten einen hohen Nutzen erzielen, gibt es Pflichten sowohl für sie als auch für die EU und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten:

> „ACP (...) countries (...) must engage without delay in necessary reforms and adjustments for their economies. And there is now an onus on the EU and its member states to provide positive assistance to help countries make the most of it“ (ebd.: 68).

Nur die vier Staaten Kamerun, Komoren, Ghana und Mauritius werden weniger als ein Drittel ihrer Zolleinnahmen verlieren, alle anderen mehr[108] (ebd.: 55); insgesamt werden die Einnahmeausfälle ungefähr 610 Millionen Dollar (488 Millionen Euro)[109] betragen (siehe Tab. 9, S. 82), wobei einschränkend zu erwähnen ist, dass allein ein Viertel von den Seychellen, dem Land der Gruppe mit dem höchsten BIP pro Kopf, zu tragen ist. Die Summe ist aber auch ohne die Seychellen beträchtlich, weshalb sich die Frage nach unterstützenden Maßnahmen von europäischer Seite stellt. Die europäischen Staaten weigerten sich, verpflichtende Zahlungen in die EPAs mit aufzunehmen, da man die eigenen Pflichten schon durch den EEF abgedeckt sah. 2007 gab die EU diese Politik auf und kündigte an, dass mit einer neuen Strategie, die Gelder für Handelsmaßnahmen vorsieht (*EU Aid for Trade Strategy*), die AKP-Staaten ab 2010 jährlich 300-400 Millionen Euro mehr bekommen sollen. Wie diese Strategie umgesetzt wird und aus welchem Budget die Gelder genommen werden sind zwei Kriterien, die für einen

108 Die Staaten der SADC sind eine Ausnahme, da ihre Zölle von der eigenen Zollunion SACU verteilt werden und sie innerhalb der Zollunion die Zölle stark absenken.

109 Bei diesen Zahlen ist zu beachten, dass davon ausgegangen wird, dass 100 % der Zölle eingesammelt werden, was unrealistisch ist. Die Summe ist demnach eine Obergrenze der tatsächlichen Einnahmeausfälle.

Erfolg ausschlaggebend sind und erst in Zukunft beurteilt werden können (ebd.: 101-108, Frederiksen/Rampa 2007: 16f.). Wenn die Gelder in der angekündigten Höhe zur Verfügung stünden, könnten sie die Einnahmeausfälle durch verringerte Zolleinnahmen ausgleichen.

Bei den Komponenten der EPAs, die bisher keine Erwähnung fanden, fallen folgende Bestimmungen auf: zu Schutzmaßnahmen für Produkte, MFN-Klauseln, Einschränkungen bei der Einhaltung der Verträge und „Rendezvous"-Klauseln (Stevens et al. 2008: 56-63):

- Bei den **Schutzmaßnahmen für Produkte** haben die EPAs unterschiedliche Inhalte. Während die EAC, ESA und SADC keine Bestimmungen vorsehen, um Importe beschränken zu dürfen, wenn die Nahrungsmittelsicherheit bedroht wird, ist es bei den anderen EPAs Bestandteil der Abkommen.
- **MFN-Klauseln** sind in allen Verträgen zu finden. Sie sehen vor, dass Zoll-Präferenzen, die anderen „großen" Mitgliedern (mit mehr als 1 % Anteil am Welthandel) gewährt werden, auch allen Vertragspartnern offen stehen müssen. Dieser Passus ist einmalig in europäischen Handelsverträgen und schränkt den Handlungsspielraum der AKP-Staaten für Freihandelsverträgen mit anderen Parteien ein.
- Mit den **Einschränkungen bei der Einhaltung der Verträge** ist gemeint, inwiefern bei Problemen mit der Umsetzung den Vertragsparteien Verzögerungen erlaubt sind. Insgesamt fällt auf, dass die EPAs restriktiver sind als andere Abkommen der EU, z.B. mit Südafrika oder Mexiko.
- Von den **„Rendezvous"-Klauseln** sind Bereiche der Verhandlungen betroffen, die kontrovers verhandelt wurden. So sollen bei allen Gruppen (außer der pazifischen) noch die „Singapur"-Themen weiter verhandelt werden, geistige Eigentumsrechte aber nur mit CEMAC, Ghana und der Elfenbeinküste.

Wie deutlich wird, setzte die EU ein Großteil der Bestimmungen strikt durch. Da einige Bestandteile aber noch verhandelt werden, ist eine vollständige Beurteilung nicht möglich. Eine weitere für die AKP-Staaten wichtige Kategorie, die Ursprungsregeln, ist ebenso noch nicht abschließend geklärt. Die Ursprungsregeln wurden allerdings bei der Reform des GSP-Systems 2005 für regionale Zusammenschlüsse verbessert (Borrmann et al. 2007: 249). Daran werden sich zukünftige Verhandlungsergebnisse messen müssen.

Partnerschaft

Das Thema Partnerschaft soll dahingehend untersucht werden, inwieweit die AKP-Staaten in den Prozess der Verhandlungen eingebunden wurden und wie die Reaktionen der beteiligten Länder waren.

Gerade der Abschluss der Abkommen Ende 2007 war von Spannungen in den EU-AKP-Beziehungen geprägt.[110] Einige Gruppen und Länder beschwerten sich über den Verhandlungsstil der Kommission: So wurde den CEMAC-Verhandlungspartnern gedroht, EEF-Zahlungen zu verzögern und Zölle auf GSP-Niveau anzuheben und der Vorschlag unterbreitet, nur mit einem kleinen Team von Experten zu verhandeln. Die karibischen Staaten erhielten ebenso die Drohung für eine Zollerhöhung auf GSP-Niveau, falls sie ihr Angebot für Marktöffnungen nicht verbesserten. Bei den pazifischen Staaten entschlossen sich acht Staaten nicht zu unterschreiben, obwohl sie davor dazu bereit gewesen waren, da sie sich dann einem zu starken Druck ausgesetzt sahen. In anderen Fällen versuchte die Kommission Länder gegenseitig auszuspielen, indem sie vorgab, Kompromisse in strittigen Punkten erreicht zu haben, um sie in anderen Verhandlungen auch festzuschreiben. Als der festgesetzte Termin Ende 2007 näher rückte, ging die EU dazu über, sowohl regional als auch bilateral zu verhandeln, was einzelne Länder zum Dilemma führte, ob sie die regionale Integration weiter vorantreiben oder bessere Ergebnisse für sich selbst wollten. Die Aufsplittung der Verhandlungen führte dazu, dass die ausgehandelten EPAs für die Elfenbeinküste, Ghana und Kamerun in letzter Minute beschlossen wurden und auf Entwürfen der Kommission beruhten, was die Eigenverantwortung für die Verhandlungen und die Ergebnisse schwer beeinträchtigte. Angesichts dieser Tatsachen ist es nicht verwunderlich, dass die EPAs und ihre Verhandlungen schwerer Kritik von AKP-Staaten ausgesetzt waren und der Großteil der AKP-Staaten sich weigerte, EPAs abzuschließen (Reuters 2007). Doch es gibt nicht nur negative Stimmen. Vor allem aus Staaten, die sich in den Verhandlungen engagierten, gab es positive Resonanz – so aus den karibischen Staaten oder von der Regierungsseite der Elfenbeinküste (Stevens et al. 2008: 77-85).

110 Schon die Gespräche über die Ergebnisse der bisherigen EPA-Verhandlungen im Jahr 2006 nach dem Review-Artikel des Cotonou-Abkommens waren nicht zufriedenstellend, obwohl sie strittige Punkte hätten angehen können. Der Abschluss-Bericht wurde mit nur wenigen AKP-Verhandlungspartnern in Brüssel verhandelt und von beiden Seiten nicht als besonders wichtig wahrgenommen (ECDPM 2007: 7-10).

V.3 Fallbeispiele aus den EPA-Verhandlungen

Für die Falluntersuchungen werden drei Beispiele herangezogen: Erstens das SADC-EPA, das ein gutes Beispiel ist, weil vier der Mitglieder – Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia und Swasiland (BLNS) – zusammen mit Südafrika in der South African Customs Union (SACU) die am besten funktionierende Zollunion in Afrika bilden (Tchitchi 2005: 83). An diesem Beispiel kann verdeutlicht werden, welche Herausforderungen durch die EPAs für regionale Organisationen entstehen. Der zweite zu untersuchende Fall ist Tansania. Tansania ist ein weiteres Beispiel für ein Mitglied einer Zollunion, der EAC. Anhand dieses Landes wird untersucht, was sich für Vor- und Nachteile ergeben, als LDC mit einem beträchtlichen Anteil an Importen aus der EU ein EPA abzuschließen. Das dritte Beispiel ist Ghana. Es ist insofern interessant und relevant, weil es das Land innerhalb der Gruppe der EPA-Unterzeichner mit den höchsten Importen aus Europa ist, und weil es den Vertragstext von der EU vorgegeben bekam (siehe vorheriges Unterkapitel). Wie die Vereinbarungen in dem Abkommen aussehen ist somit ein guter Indikator dafür, ob die EU eigene Vorteile bei den Verhandlungen besonders bedachte.

V.3.1 SADC

Von den 15 offiziellen Mitgliedern der SADC verhandeln nur sieben in der SADC-Gruppe der EPA-Verhandlungen, davon haben fünf ein „Interim"-EPA abgeschlossen (siehe oben) – Südafrika und Angola traten dem Abkommen nicht bei (Europäische Kommission 2009a). Obwohl BLNS die Länder sind, die am Schnellsten die Liberalisierung anfangen und abschließen müssen, sowie die wenigsten Ausnahmen an sensiblen Gütern haben, waren dies nicht die strittigen Diskussionspunkte. Sie nahmen durch die Zollunion de facto an der Liberalisierung der südafrikanischen Zölle teil – Südafrika hatte dies in dem Freihandelsvertrag von 1999 beschlossen. Die Themen, die die beteiligten Staaten daran hinderten, ein vollständiges Abkommen abzuschließen waren u.a. Dienstleistungen, Investitionen, Öffentliche Beschaffung und Wettbewerbspolitik sowie technische Bestimmungen wie die oben angesprochene MFN-Klausel (Davies 2008: 2). Während Botswana, Lesotho, Mosambik und Swasiland für eine Fortführung der Verhandlungen offen waren, weigerten sich Südafrika und Namibia weiter zu verhandeln. Wenn sich die Weigerung von Südafrika fortsetzt[111] und keine

111Im SACU Abkommen von 2004 steht, dass kein Mitglied einen neuen Handelsvertrag abschließen

Einigung trotz weiterer Verhandlungen, die für 2009 vorgesehen sind (Europäische Kommission 2009a), erzielt werden kann, so könnte das die Existenz von SACU vor Schwierigkeiten stellen, weil die Mitglieder der Zollunion dann unterschiedliche Liberalisierungsperioden hätten (Stevens et al. 2008: 99-101). Die Politik der EU wird sich daran messen lassen müssen, ob sie es zu einem solchen Zusammenbruch kommen lassen will, um umstrittene Themen durchzusetzen. Denn die übergeordnete Organisation SADC hat schon an Einfluss verloren, da die Mitglieder in unterschiedlichen regionalen Gruppierungen die EPAs verhandelten: „The current situation will likely imply the end of SADC as a meaningful trading arrangement, and the consolidation of SACU as the real trade hub in Southern Africa“ (Borrmann et al. 2008: 251). Wenn beide Organisationen nach einem EPA-Abschluss keine Bedeutung mehr haben, würde das ein sehr schlechtes Licht auf die europäische Verhandlungsführung werfen, da sie dafür mitverantwortlich wäre und die regionale Integration de facto untergraben hätte. Eine abschließende Einordnung in die Idealtypen lässt sich erst mit den weiteren Verhandlungsergebnissen vornehmen. Wenn ein Übereinkommen innerhalb der SACU dann daran scheitert, dass die EU die umstrittenen Themen durchsetzen wollte, überwiegen die Kriterien einer Handelsmacht. Wenn dagegen eine für alle akzeptable Lösung gefunden und die regionale Integration vorangetrieben wird, sind idealtypische Merkmale einer Zivilmacht vorherrschend.

V.3.2 Tansania

Tansania entschloss sich, die EPA-Verhandlungen in der EAC-Gruppierung zu führen und nicht innerhalb der SADC, deren Mitglied es gleichsam ist. Die EAC-Länder vereinbarten 2005 eine Zollunion (die bis 2010 zollfrei sein soll), weswegen sich eine gemeinsame Verhandlung anbot (Kiguta 2008: 6). EAC ist die einzige Gruppierung, deren Liberalisierungsplan einheitlich für die ganze Region ist, was die regionale Integration unterstützt. Gleichzeitig ist es die Region, die am spätesten beginnt und aufhört zu liberalisieren, was den Ländern genügend Zeit gibt, sich an die neuen Gegebenheiten anzupassen. In ihrer Studie über die Auswirkungen der EPAs auf die EAC kamen Morrissey et al. (2007: 214) zu dem Schluss, dass Tansania Getränke, Tabakwaren,

kann, wenn nicht alle zustimmen. Südafrika hat somit die Möglichkeit, den EPA-Prozess zu blockieren oder ihn zu akzeptieren und mit zu gestalten (Stevens et al. 2008: 5).

Chemikalien, Metallprodukte und Transportgeräte als sensible Produkte kennzeichnen sollte. Alle diese Produkte finden sich zumindest als Unterabschnitte in der Liste der sensiblen Produkte (denn die genannten Begriffe sind als Oberbegriffe zu undifferenziert, um in der detaillierten Fassung der Ausnahmen zu erscheinen). Tansania ist zudem von wahrscheinlichen Einnahmeausfällen von 0,5 % des BIP betroffen. Es ist noch nicht abzusehen, wie darauf reagiert werden wird. Die Themen, die in den nächsten Runden angesprochen werden sollen, sind Nachhaltige Entwicklung, Dienstleistungen, Landwirtschaft, Wettbewerbspolitik, geistige Eigentumsrechte und Öffentliche Beschaffung (Europäische Kommission 2009b).
Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, dass man in Tansania die Vorteile der wirtschaftlichen Integration innerhalb der EAC und die positiven Effekte für die Konsumenten höher einschätzte als die negativen Effekte der verringerten Zolleinnahmen. Wenn eine Lösung dafür gefunden wird (und mit den Geldern der EU für Handelsmaßnahmen ab 2010 ist Unterstützung vorgesehen), dann kann man dieses Abkommen positiv für Tansania und die EAC-Gruppierung beurteilen; damit wären ebenso idealtypische Kriterien einer Zivilmacht für die Politik der EU erfüllt. Allerdings ist noch nicht klar, welche Auswirkungen ein EAC-EPA haben wird auf die beiden anderen regionalen Organisationen, SADC und COMESA, in denen die fünf Staaten der EAC Mitglieder[112] sind (Stevens et al. 2008: 98f.).

V.3.3 Ghana

Ghana ist neben der Elfenbeinküste das einzige Land aus dem westlichen Afrika, das ein „Interim"-EPA abgeschlossen hat. Alle anderen Länder dort sind LDCs – mit der Ausnahme der Kapverden und Nigeria – und können weiterhin unter EBA exportieren. Der Zeitplan und die von der Zollliberalisierung ausgenommenen Güter weisen keine extremen Veränderungen zu den anderen Abkommen auf. Güter, die als potentiell gefährdend für die eigene landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung angesehen werden wie Tomaten und Geflügelfleisch (Bertow/Schultheis 2007: 42-45) wurden als sensible Produkte von der Liberalisierung ausgenommen (Europäische Kommission 2009c). Die westafrikanische Staatengruppe hat sich nach dem Abschluss der Abkommen von Ghana und der Elfenbeinküste für ein gemeinsames EPA ausgesprochen, das bis Juni 2009

112Burundi, Kenia, Ruanda und Uganda sind Mitglieder von COMESA, Tansania der SADC.

abgeschlossen werden soll. Es existieren jedoch weiterhin Schwierigkeiten bei der Festlegung der externen Zölle, der Übergangsfristen und der Ursprungsregeln (Stevens et al. 2008: 94-96): „In spite of the optimistic and positive rhetoric in the region on the prospect of concluding a full regional EPA, given the current situation, the road ahead remains unclear“ (ebd.: 95). Zusammenfassend lässt sich sagen, beim Abkommen mit Ghana ist nicht eine idealtypische europäische Politik einer Handelsmacht festzustellen, da zu erwarten gewesen wäre, dass die EU auf strengere Regeln hätte beharren müssen.

V.4 ***Zwischenfazit***

Um zu einem Zwischenfazit zu kommen, müssen die idealtypischen Kriterien noch einmal herangezogen und auf die Verhandlungen der EPAs angewendet werden. Der **Gestaltungswille** (und gleichzeitig die **außenpolitischen Instrumente**) können nicht vollständig dem Zivilmacht-Idealtyp zugerechnet werden. Das Prinzip der Partnerschaft und der Eigenverantwortung verlor an Bedeutung, als im letzten Moment die vorläufigen Abkommen abgeschlossen wurden. Die Kritik einschränkend muss allerdings erwähnt werden, dass die AKP-Staaten auch daran Schuld tragen, da sie es selbst nicht schafften, sich untereinander abzustimmen und zu einigen, obwohl der Termin für den Abschluss der Abkommen schon sehr lange feststand: „The ACP countries have their share of responsibility as well in this frantic process: many left contentious or difficult issues until the end of the negotiations“ (Stevens et al. 2008: 83). Es ergibt sich insgesamt keine eindeutige Einschätzung für die Zuordnung in die Idealtypen; die Politik der EU in diesem Feld stimmt eher mit einer Handelsmacht als mit einer Zivilmacht überein.

Die Bewertung der **nationalen Interessen** liefert ein einigermaßen ausgeglichenes Bild: Während die Bestimmungen des Cotonou-Abkommens in Richtung einer Zivilmacht weisen, sieht es bei den Handelsbestimmungen der EPAs danach aus, dass die EU die europäischen binnenwirtschaftlichen Ideale auf die außenpolitischen Handlungen übertrug. Die Fallbeispiele ließen allerdings nicht die Beurteilung zu, dass die Vereinbarungen in den vorläufigen EPAs nur die eigenen Interessen der EU widerspiegeln. Bei den Kohärenzbemühungen ist ein zwiespältiges Ergebnis zu konstatieren: Einerseits wurden die Kompetenzen der GD Entwicklung stark eingeschränkt; andererseits gewann das Thema Entwicklungspolitik insgesamt an Bedeutung und es gab

Anstrengungen für eine stärkere Einbeziehung von entwicklungspolitischen Aspekten in der Agrar- und Handelspolitik. Da die Bestimmungen in den EPAs die Vorgaben der WTO nicht voll ausreizten und nicht allzu restriktiv erscheinen, überwiegen bei der Einschätzung der nationalen Interessen leicht die Kriterien einer Zivilmacht.

Bei der **internationalen organisatorischen Zielsetzung** überwiegt eindeutig der Idealtyp der Handelsmacht, da die EU ad-hoc-Kooperationen einsetzte, um gewünschte Ergebnisse zu erreichen und weiterhin versucht, für umstrittene Themen in den multilateralen Handelsverhandlungen bilaterale Lösungen zu finden, obwohl diese nicht als vorteilhaft für die Entwicklungsländer eingestuft werden können.

Die **internationalen inhaltlichen Zielsetzungen** nach einer idealtypischen Zivilmacht sind in der Praxis nicht in dem Ausmaße bestätigt worden, wie sie im Cotonou-Vertrag ambitioniert aufgeführt sind. Mit den EPAs ist die inhaltliche Zielsetzung hinzugefügt und bekräftigt worden, Freihandel als Wachstumsmotor zu fördern, die anderen inhaltlichen Prinzipien wurden nicht tangiert. Ein Förderung der eigenen europäischen Interessen ist darin nicht zwangsläufig zu sehen; die Politik der EU wird sich daran messen lassen müssen, wie sehr sie die AKP-Staaten bei der Transition zum Freihandel unterstützen will, damit nicht der Eindruck entsteht, es ginge hauptsächlich um die Erschließung neuer Märkte. Erst wenn diese Frage in der Zukunft geklärt wird, ist eine vollständige Beurteilung der europäischen Politik möglich; vorerst überwiegen die Kriterien einer Zivilmacht.

Zusammenfassend lässt sich die Frage der Kapitelüberschrift nicht abschließend klären. Eines ist sicher: Die EU handelt nicht vollkommen wie eine Zivilmacht (was sich auch an den Berechnungen zu den Entwicklungshilfezahlungen zeigt), besonders seit den Verhandlungen der EPAs, bei denen Kriterien einer Handelsmacht häufiger zu erkennen sind. Die Kritik wiegt schwer, dass nicht die optimale Lösung für die Entwicklung der AKP-Staaten gesucht wurde, sondern die Abkommen (teilweise mit Druckausübung) kurz vor Ende der Frist durchgesetzt wurden (Meyn 2008: 522-525). Zur Verteidigung der Politik der EU müssen drei Argumente aufgeführt werden: Erstens führen Kritiker häufig unrealistische Alternativlösungen an, die die Interessen der EU gar nicht berücksichtigen. Es stellt sich die Frage, warum die EU Abkommen beschließen sollte, die sie insgesamt schlechter stellt. Zweitens ist die Kritik nicht glaubwürdig, wenn sie das vorherige System preist, das zu keinen Fortschritten in der Entwicklung der Volkswirtschaften führte:

„Much criticism (...) has focused on assumptions that the status quo is acceptable in development terms (...) – often with the further assumption that the value of these preferences will be unaffected by preference erosion or direct competition with other developing regions“ (Curran et al. 2008: 549).

Drittens handelt die EU – in der Tradition der ökonomischen Wachstumstheorien – mit der Annahme, dass die EPAs den Wohlstand der AKP-Staaten voranbringen (Meyn 2008: 517f.). Es geht somit weniger um Eigensinn als um die konsequente Umsetzung einer ökonomischen Theorie, die von einigen als das falsche, von anderen wiederum als das richtige Instrument angesehen wird[113] (die aufgeführten Studien zu den Auswirkungen spiegeln die Gegensätze gut wider).

113So schreibt Walker (2008: 15) in den *Trade Negotiations Insights*, die sonst meist negative Einschätzungen der EPAs beinhalten: „By implementing the legal and economic reforms resulting from the EPA, actively pursuing the regional integration agendas, and successfully concluding the impending FTA [Free trade areas] negotiations with appropriate development assistance, countries will have a better chance of economic survival.“ Walker betont damit wiederum, dass die EPAs für die AKP-Staaten auch positive Auswirkungen haben können, wenn auf europäischer Seite unterstützende Leistungen erfolgen.

VI. Fazit

Die Fragestellung, ob sich die Politik der EU von einer Zivilmacht zu einer Handelsmacht gewandelt hat, ist insofern zu verneinen, dass keiner der beiden Idealtypen vollständig erfüllt wurde im Beobachtungszeitraum – besonders wenn man die Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der EG in die Beurteilung miteinbezieht. Das heißt aber nicht, dass sich nichts verändert hat. Während im Zeitraum von Lomé IV die Kriterien einer Zivilmacht überwogen, die mit den Cotonou-Vereinbarungen und vor allem der praktischen Umsetzung schon abgeschwächt wurden, so liegen in der Beurteilung der EPAs und deren (vorläufig) ausgehandelten Bestimmungen mehr Kriterien einer Handelsmacht vor – zusammenfassend sind die Ergebnisse in Tab. 10 aufgeführt. In den Bereichen **Gestaltungswille**, **internationale organisatorische Zielsetzungen** und **außenpolitische Instrumente** ist eine Veränderung der Politik von Zivil- zu Handelsmacht zu konstatieren, ohne dass die Kriterien eines Wandels erfüllt werden; die beiden verbliebenen Bereiche – **nationale Interessen** und **internationale inhaltliche Zielsetzungen** (unter Vorbehalt der weiteren Verhandlungen) – erfüllen durchgehend die Zivilmachtkriterien.

Tab.10 Erfüllung der idealtypischen Kriterien im Untersuchungszeitraum

Idealtypische Kriterien/ Zeitraum	Gestaltungswille		Nationale Interessen		Internationale organisatorische Zielsetzungen		Internationale inhaltliche Zielsetzungen		Außenpolitische Instrumente	
	ZM	HM	ZM	HM	ZM	HM	ZM	HM	ZM	HM
Lomé IV	+		++		+		+		+	
Cotonou	+		++		o	o	+		o	o
EPAs		+	+			++	+			+

ZM = Zivilmacht, HM = Handelsmacht
O = nicht eindeutig.
+ = leicht überwiegende Kriterien.
++ = Eindeutigkeit.

Bedeutung Handelspolitik

Die Bedeutung von Handel (auch auf reziproker Basis) für die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung wuchs im Untersuchungszeitraum stetig an; im Cotonou-Abkommen wurde schließlich Handelspolitik bewusst von den Komponenten der entwicklungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit getrennt. Einerseits wegen des Drucks von anderen (bedürftigen) Ländern, andererseits aus eigenen Überlegungen zu ökonomischer Entwicklung durch Frei-

handel. Die europäische Handelspolitik ist wesentlich von einem Freihandelsdogma geprägt und weniger von normativen Zielen, was nach Orbie (2008: 62) vor allem an der institutionellen Natur der EU liegt:

> „The limited capacity of the EU to engage in a normative external trade agenda basically relates to its raison d'être: the Union is institutionally designed to promote negative integration and market-enhancing policies (...) rather than positive integration and redistribution."

Diese Einstellung ist nicht von vornherein zu verurteilen; wenn die EU Kriterien einer Zivilmacht in den weiteren Verhandlungen der EPAs erfüllen will, muss erkennbar sein, dass die Argumente der Verhandlungspartner Berücksichtigung finden und nicht die eigenen Vorstellungen Vorrang haben.

Analyse der Entwicklungshilfezahlungen

Eine starke Einschränkung erhalten die Zivilmacht-Idealtypen in den Zeiträumen von Lomé IV bis Cotonou trotz der vielen Bekenntnisse zu demokratischen Grundsätzen und Armutsbekämpfung durch die empirischen Daten, die in dieser Arbeit analysiert wurden. Sie zeigen keinen Zusammenhang zwischen den Entwicklungshilfezahlungen und der idealtypischen „Empfangswürdigkeit" nach Zivilmachtkriterien auf, weshalb die erste Hypothese zum Handeln einer Zivilmacht verworfen werden muss (siehe Tab. 11). Die Hypothese besagt, dass bei der Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe besonders die Bedürftigkeit und demokratische Standards im Vordergrund stehen.

Tab. 11 Pearson-Korrelationen zu den Hypothesen im gesamten Zeitraum

Zeitraum/Hypothese	Zivilmacht	Handelsmacht
1990-1994	r = -0,107 (0,061)[a]	r = 0,261 (0,571**)[b]
1995-1999	r = -0,255 (-0, 208)[a]	r = 0,170
2000-2006	r = 0,041 (0,007)	r = 0,335 (0,230)[b,c]

** Die Korrelation ist auf dem Niveau von 0,01 (2-seitig) signifikant.
a: Ergebnisse ohne Namibia und Mauretanien.
b: Ergebniss ohne Nigeria.
c: Ergebnisse ohne Südafrika.

Während bei den Berechnungen zu einer Verknüpfung der Zahlungen mit demokratischen Standards positive Korrelationen (aber ohne das erforderliche Signifikanzniveau) zu verzeichnen sind, hat die Verknüpfung mit der Bedürftigkeit sogar negative Korrelationen als Ergebnis. Insgesamt bestätigen die Zahlungen die oftmals vertretene Kritik,

dass Entwicklungshilfe nicht aus altruistischen Beweggründen gewährt wird: „Humanitarian motives may dominate, but more usually there are economic, political, and strategic factors that determine the amounts given and the countries selected by donors for assistance“ (Nixson 2007:327). Dies findet mit den Korrelationen zu der Politik einer Handelsmacht eine leichte Bestätigung, ohne vollkommen zu überzeugen. Aus diesem Grund ist ebenso die erste Hypothese zum Vorgehen einer Handelsmacht, dass bei der Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe der wirtschaftliche Nutzen des Empfängerlandes im Vordergrund steht, nicht eindeutig zu bestätigen. Da die Berechnungen mit nur wenigen Variablen ausgeführt wurden, wäre eine weitere detailliertere Betrachtung eine interessante Forschungsaufgabe, um zu erfahren, welche Faktoren ausschlaggebend sind für die Mittelvergabe.

Partnerschaft und Eigenverantwortung

Weitere Aspekte wie Partnerschaft und Eigenverantwortung konnten nicht in dem Maße umgesetzt werden, dass sie den Zivilmachtkriterien entsprachen. Besonders der Aspekt der Partnerschaft litt stark in den Verhandlungen der EPAs, während er zuvor bei den Cotonou-Verhandlungen nicht so negativ beurteilt wurde. Es bleibt abzuwarten, ob das Konzept der Partnerschaft doch wieder mehr in den Vordergrund rücken kann im Laufe der weiteren Verhandlungen. Das Prinzip der Eigenverantwortung, das einen wichtigen Platz in den neueren Entwicklungstheorien einnimmt (Tchitchi 2005: 35f, 109), wurde im Verhandlungsprozess ebenso nicht gestärkt. Es gibt allerdings einige Ansätze der EU, wie z.B. der verstärkte Einsatz vor Ort, die der Eigenverantwortung in der Zukunft zu mehr Bedeutung verhelfen könnten. Dies wäre essentiell, um einerseits dem Argument entgegenzuwirken, dass eigene europäische Interessen im Vordergrund stünden und um andererseits zu gewährleisten, dass Reformen in den Ländern selbst eine breitere Unterstützung genießen.

Kohärenzbemühungen

Zu der Unterfrage, ob Kohärenzbemühungen in die Richtung einer Zivilmacht oder einer Handelsmacht weisen, wurde zunächst die Akteursqualität der EU in den beiden Politikfeldern Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik erörtert. In beiden Politikfeldern kann man der EU Akteursqualität zusprechen; bei den Entwicklungshilfezahlungen aber nur, wenn man ausschließlich die gemeinschaftlichen Ausgaben betrachtet.

Bei der Analyse der Kohärenzbemühungen waren weniger die Kriterien von Stokke (2006) – ob institutionelle Voraussetzungen geschaffen wurden, um dem Thema der Inkohärenzen zu begegnen – hilfreich, als die Analysen der Kompetenzen und der getätigten Reformen. Die Beobachtungen in den Kohärenzbemühungen ergeben ein widersprüchliches Bild – wobei sie überhaupt erst ab dem Zeitpunkt des Cotonou-Abkommens zu beurteilen sind, da davor nichts Grundlegendes geändert wurde. Einerseits kann die zweite Hypothese zu den Zivilmachtkriterien, dass sich eine Zivilmacht für entwicklungspolitische Kohärenz auf der eigenen Entscheidungsebene einsetzt, eindeutig verworfen werden: Die Kompetenzen der GD Entwicklung wurden im Laufe des Untersuchungszeitraums immer stärker eingeschränkt. Damit stärkte man aber nicht nur die Stellung der GD Handel, sondern noch mehr die der GD Relex. Andererseits gab es insbesondere seit der Vereinbarung der Millennium-Entwicklungsziele große Bemühungen, die Entwicklungspolitik als gesamtes Politikfeld zu stärken, sei es durch eine Erhöhung der Gelder oder durch Dokumente wie dem *European Consensus on Development*. In der Agrarpolitik gab es deutliche Anzeichen für eine stärkere Berücksichtigung der Beschwerden über ungerechte Subventionen; dennoch sind noch nicht alle handelsverzerrenden Maßnahmen abgebaut. Die zweite Handelsmacht-Hypothese, dass das Ziel von Kohärenzbemühungen die Erweiterung des eigenen Spielraums in der Handelspolitik ist, ist nicht vollkommen zu entkräften, da vor allem die GD Handel für die Verhandlung der EPAs zuständig war und gegenüber der GD Entwicklung einen Zuwachs an Kompetenzen verzeichnen konnte. Einschränkend muss allerdings gesagt werden, dass die GD Handel sich zu Beginn der EPA-Verhandlungen dafür einsetzte, EBA-ähnliche Präferenzen für alle AKP-Staaten zu gewähren, was am Widerstand der europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten scheiterte. Alles in allem zeigen die Kohärenzbemühungen der EU, dass die Bereiche Handel und Sicherheit von der Kommission im Laufe der Zeit eine höhere Wertschätzung erhielten als die Entwicklungspolitik. Die Kohärenz der Politik ist ein Thema, das noch weiter erforscht werden kann, insbesondere die hier nicht erfolgte Einbeziehung der Politik der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten.

Unterstützende Maßnahmen

Die letzte Zivilmacht-Hypothese besagt, dass die EU die Entwicklungsländer unterstützt, wenn es zu Friktionen durch Handelsliberalisierungen kommt. Diese Hypothese ist noch nicht vollständig zu klären. Die EU weigerte sich, verpflichtende Zahlungen in

die „Interim“-EPAs aufzunehmen (auch um der Kritik aus dem Weg zu gehen, dass sie nur Anreize setzen sollten, um die AKP-Staaten zum Abschluss der Abkommen zu bewegen). Die Umsetzung der Aid for Trade-Strategie wird zeigen, ob die Hypothese zu bestätigen oder zu verwerfen ist. Reformen in den Ländern für Verbesserungen in der Infrastruktur und effizientere Administrationen müssten nach Zivilmachtkriterien Unterstützung bekommen.

Beurteilung der Analysekonzepte

Die beiden Idealtypen der Zivilmacht und der Handelsmacht wurden im Untersuchungszeitraum nicht vollständig erfüllt. Das liegt auch daran, dass Idealtypen per Definition „Utopien“ sind, mit deren Hilfe ein Vergleich mit der Realität stattfindet und von denen in den seltensten Fällen alle Kriterien erfüllt werden. Die Kriterien von Zivil- und Handelsmacht halfen, die Politik der EU in der Partnerschaft mit den AKP-Staaten zu beurteilen. Die Analyse der Vertragsinhalte machte deutlich, dass eine alleinige Betrachtung der Texte keine gültigen Aussagen zulässt, wenn man nicht die Umsetzung in die Praxis mit einbezieht.

Schlussbetrachtung der EPA-Verhandlungen und Ausblick

Insgesamt lässt sich sagen, dass die EU mit dem Verhalten während des Aushandelns der EPAs eher dem Handelsmacht- denn dem Zivilmacht-Idealtypus entspricht – die Frage, *warum* die EU sich auf die beobachtete Art und Weise verhielt, ist eine mögliche weitere Forschungsfrage.

Wenn man die EU als Handelsmacht bezeichnet, so muss man dennoch eingestehen, dass sie in manchen Bereichen außerhalb der Handelspolitik weiterhin ein normatives Antlitz besitzt, da die politische Dimension des Cotonou-Abkommens bestehen bleibt. Zudem kann die EU in den fortgeführten Verhandlungen der EPAs versuchen, die Belange der Entwicklungsländer besser zu berücksichtigen. Ein endgültiges Urteil ist jetzt noch nicht möglich, da die Verhandlungen die Beurteilung stetig verändern können: „Given that implementation is deferred for some years, EPAs are likely to be a continuing source of material for analysis well into the medium term“ (Stevens 2008: 223). Der EU steht folglich die Möglichkeit offen, den negativen Einschätzungen zu den EPAs durch ein konziliantes Auftreten, das sich um Ausgleich bemüht, entgegenzutreten.

VII. Anhang

Nach Tchitchi (2005: 65f.) kann man regionale Zusammenschlüsse anhand von vier verschiedenen Stufen und Intensitäten einordnen: Freihandelszone (niedrigste Intensität), Zollunion, Binnenmarkt und als höchste Stufe Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Wenn man die regionalen Zusammenschlüsse in Tab. 12 betrachtet, so fällt auf, dass immerhin zwei die höchste Stufe einer Währungsgemeinschaft erreichen (und eine weitere dies plant). Zudem ist auffällig, dass viele Staaten in zwei Zusammenschlüssen vertreten sind, manche sogar in drei oder vier. Problematisch sind die überlappenden Mitgliedschaften, wenn zwei Zusammenschlüsse die selben Ziele verfolgen – wie z.B. COMESA und SADC.

Tab. 12 Übersicht der regionalen Zusammenschlüsse in Subsahara-Afrika

Name	**Art des Zusammenschlusses**	**Mitglieder**[a]
CEMAC (Communauté économique et monétaire de l'Afrique centrale)	Währungsgemeinschaft	Äquatorialguinea, Kamerun, Republik Kongo, Gabun, **Tschad**, **Zentralafrikanische Republik**
CEN-SAD (Community of Sahel-Saharan States)	Geplante Freihandelszone	**Ägypten**, **Benin**, **Burkina Faso**, ***Dschibuti***, **Elfenbeinküste**, ***Eritrea***, **Gambia**, **Ghana**, **Guinea**, **Guinea-Bissau**, ***Kenia***, ***Komoren***, **Liberia**, Libyen, **Mali**, Marokko, Mauretanien, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, São Tomé und Príncipe, **Senegal**, **Sierra Leone**, **Somalia**, ***Sudan***, **Togo**, Tunesien, **Tschad**, **Zentralafrikanische Republik**
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa)	Freihandelszone	**Ägypten**, ***Äthiopien***, **Burundi**, ***Dschibuti***, ***Eritrea***, ***Kenia***, ***Komoren***, **Demokratische Republik Kongo**, Libyen, ***Madagaskar***, ***Malawi***, ***Mauritius***, **Ruanda**, **Sambia**, ***Seychellen***, ***Simbabwe***, ***Sudan***, **Swasiland**, **Uganda**
EAC (Eastern African Community)	Zollunion und „Interim"-EPA	**Burundi, *Kenia*, Ruanda, Tansania, *Uganda***
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States)	Regionale Wirtschaftsvereinigung	**Benin**, **Burkina Faso**, **Elfenbeinküste**, **Gambia**, **Ghana**, **Guinea**, **Guinea-Bissau**,

		Kap Verde, **Liberia**, **Mali**, **Niger**, **Nigeria**, **Senegal**, **Sierra Leone**, **Togo**
- Untergruppe: **UEMOA** (Union économique et monétaire ouest-africaine)	Währungsgemeinschaft	Benin, Burkina Faso, Elfenbeinküste, Guniea-Bissau Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo
- Untergruppe: **WAMZ** (West African Monetary Zone)	Geplante Währungsunion	Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Sierra Leone
ESA (Eastern and Southern Africa)	Verhandlungsgruppe EPAs	***Äthiopien***, ***Dschibuti***, **Eritrea**, **Komoren,** ***Madagaskar***, ***Malawi***, ***Mauritius***, ***Seychellen***, ***Sudan***, **Sambia**, ***Simbabwe***
- Untergruppe: **Abgeschlossenes „Interim"-EPA**		Komoren, Madagaskar, Mauritius, Seychellen, Simbabwe
IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)	Politische regionale Organisation (Unterstützung Entwicklung)	***Äthiopien***, ***Dschibuti***, ***Kenia***, **Somalia**, ***Sudan***, ***Uganda***
SADC (Southern African Development Community)	Freihandelszone	Angola, Botswana, **Demokratische Republik Kongo**, Lesotho, ***Madagaskar***, ***Malawi***, ***Mauritius***, Mosambik, Namibia, **Sambia**, ***Seychellen***, ***Simbabwe***, Südafrika, **Swasiland**, **Tansania**
- Untergruppe: **SACU** (South African Customs Union)	Zollunion	Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, Swasiland, Südafrika

Quellen: http://www.cemac.cf/, http://www.cen-sad.org, lang=french http://www.comesa.int/, http://www.eac.int/, http://www.ecowas.int/, http://www.igad.org, http://www.sacu.int/, http://www.sadc.int/, http://www.uemoa.int/index.htm, http://www.wama-amao.org/ (alle abgerufen am 19.2.09), Stevens et al. (2008: 6), eigene Darstellung.

a: Fettgedruckte Länder sind Mitglied von zwei regionalen Abkommen, zusätzlich kursive Länder von mindestens drei (Dschibuti und Kenia sind Mitglied von vier, nicht mitgezählt werden die Mitgliedschaften in den Unterorganisationen).

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Verpflichtende Erklärung

Ich erkläre, dass ich die Arbeit selbständig und nur mit den angegebenen Hilfsmitteln angefertigt habe und dass alle Stellen, die dem Wortlaut oder dem Sinne nach anderen Werken entnommen sind, durch Angabe der Quellen als Entlehnungen kenntlich gemacht worden sind.

SPECIAL REPORT | Vom 11. Bis 15. April 2016

FUNKTIONIERT DIE ENTWICKLUNGSHILFE DER EU?

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Mit Unterstützung von

BILL & MELINDA GATES foundation

http://www.euractiv.de/section/entwicklungspolitik/special_report/funktioniert-die-entwicklungshilfe-der-eu/

Die EU startete Hilfsprogramme, um Flüchtlinge des Sudan-Konflikts wieder in ihr Land zurückzuführen. [European Commission DG ECHO/Flickr]

EU-Entwicklungshilfe gegen Fluchtursachen: Die Zweifel bleiben

Die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten greifen im Kampf gegen Fluchtursachen zunehmend auf ihre Entwicklungshilfebudgets zurück. Ob die Migration dadurch tatsächlich eingedämmt werden kann, ist umstritten.

Seit Beginn der Flüchtlingskrise hat die EU zahlreiche Maßnahmen verkündet, um die Situation in den Griff zu bekommen. Europas Entwicklungshilfebudget, das größte weltweit, deckt inzwischen einen Großteil der Finanzierungslücke in der Flüchtlingskrise.

Auf dem Valetta-Flüchtlingsgipfel brachte die EU vergangenen November ihren Nothilfe-Treuhandfonds für Afrika auf den Weg. Mit ihm will sie gegen die Ursachen illegaler Migration und Vertreibung kämpfen. Der Fonds gilt als schnelle und flexible Alternative zur konventionellen Entwicklungshilfe. Er soll Programme für mehr Beschäftigung, Ernährungssicherheit und Gesundheit fördern. Oberste Priorität jedoch haben Projekte für ein verbessertes Migrationsmanagement in den Ländern der Sahelzone und dem Horn von Afrika. In der Vergangenheit jedoch wurden vergleichbare Schritte den Erwartungen nicht immer gerecht.

Bisher wurden insgesamt zehn Projekte genehmigt, die bald an den Start gehen werden: darunter laut Kommission ein 67 Millionen Euro schweres Paket, dass die Selbstversorgung in den besonders stark von der Migration betroffenen Regionen Äthiopiens verbessern soll. Ein anderes Vorhaben zielt darauf ab, vertriebene Somalier in stabile Gebiete des Landes zurückzuführen. Diesem Projekt stellt der Fonds 50 Millionen Euro zur Verfügung. Mithilfe des Treuhandfonds will die EU also die Entwicklung in Herkunfts- und Transitländern unterstützen und so gegen Fluchtursachen beseitigen. Dabei könnte der Fonds jedoch auf dieselben Probleme wie die europäischen Entwicklungshilfegelder stoßen.

Rechnungshof kritisch

Der EU falle es schwer, eine klare Grenze zwischen Migrationsursachen und -folgen zu ziehen, heißt es in einem sehr kritischen Bericht des EU-Rechnungshofs über die Nutzung von Entwicklungshilfegeldern in der Flüchtlingskrise. Zwei Programme wurden im Rahmen des Mitte März veröffentlichten Dokuments überprüft. Beide fielen unter die

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externen Migrationsausgaben für den südlichen Mittelmeerraum und die östlichen Nachbarländer bis 2014, minderten die Migrationsströme letztendlich jedoch kaum.

Die Auswertung solcher Programme ist sehr schwierig, da es den Statistiken zur illegalen EU-Einwanderung an verlässlichen Indikatoren mangelt. Entwicklungshilfegelder auf viele kleine Projekte aufzuteilen, macht es außerdem nicht einfacher, die Gesamtergebnisse zu evaluieren. Trotz der zahlreichen Initiativen vor Ort konnte man bisher nicht genug Menschen erreichen, um massiven Migrationsbewegungen entgegen zu wirken.

Der Nothilfe-Treuhandfonds für Afrika und die vom Rechnungshof überprüften Programme funktionieren auf ganz ähnliche Weise, erklärt Elizabeth Collett, Direktorin des Migration Policy Institute (MPI). Daher könne der Fonds auf die gleichen Problemen treffen wie konventionelle Entwicklungshilfeprogramme.

Sicherheitsausgaben als Entwicklungshilfe

Ein großer Anteil der europäischen Hilfsgelder fließt in die Koordinierung von Flüchtlingsströmen – manchmal direkt auf Kosten von regulären Entwicklungshilfeprojekten. Sicherheit und Grenzschutz seien bei den europäischen Migrationsausgaben besonders präsent, so der Bericht des EU-Rechnungshofes.

„Es bereitet uns großes Kopfzerbrechen, dass die Sicherheitsinteressen der EU zunehmend Einfluss auf die europäische Entwicklungshilfe haben. Die Grenzsicherheit zu stärken, um Einwanderungsströme einzudämmen, hilft hungerleidenden Menschen in Entwicklungsländern nicht im Geringsten. Es beseitigt auch nicht die extremen Ungleichheiten in der Welt", kritisiert Sara Tesorieri, Expertin für EU-Migrationspolitik bei Oxfam.

Diese Tendenz in Richtung Sicherheit scheint immer mehr Teil der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe zu werden. Im Februar dieses Jahres trafen sich die Entwicklungsminister der 29 Länder des OECD-Entwicklungshilfeausschusses. Sie einigten auf eine breitere Definition der Entwicklungshilfe, sodass diese nun auch Friedens- und Sicherheitsausgaben umfasst.

Zusammenhang: Entwicklung und Migration

Die konventionelle Logik besagt, dass die Migrationsbereitschaft abnimmt, wenn die Armut sinkt und Arbeitsplätze geschaffen werden. Selbst dieser Grundgedanke steht nun jedoch zur Debatte. „Wie Studien der Oxford University zeigen, führt mehr menschliche Entwicklung wahrscheinlich zu mehr Mobilität – und nicht andersherum", so Tesorieri. Die UN sieht das genauso. „Mehr Entwicklung heißt mehr Migration„, betont François Crépeau, UN-Sonderberichterstatter für Menschenrechte von Migranten, bei einem Besuch in Brüssel. „Denn viele Menschen, die lange auswandern wollten – es finanziell jedoch nicht konnten – bekommen so die Möglichkeit dazu."

INTERVIEW

Lässt sich der Erfolg von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit messen?

Die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit steht immer wieder in der Kritik, weil sich ihr Erfolg so schlecht messen und gegenüber der Öffentlichkeit darstellen lässt. EurActiv sprach mit Sarah Holzapfel vom Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) über ihre aktuelle Studie „Boosting or hindering aid effectiveness? An assessment of systems for measuring donor agency results„.

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sollte transparent und koordiniert sein. [DFID/Flickr]

Darin hat Sarah Holzapfel verwendete Standard-Indikatoren von elf internationalen Geber-Organisationen daraufhin untersucht, ob diese helfen, den Erfolg von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (EZ) zu messen.

EurActiv: Sie haben im Auftrag des Bundesministeriums für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ) untersucht, welche festen Parameter etwas über den Erfolg von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aussagen. Sind solche Parameter wirklich sinnvoll?

Sarah Holzapfel: Eine messbare Berichterstattung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist in der Tat schwierig. In der Regel verwenden Geberorganisationen für ihre Berichterstattung zwischen 15 und 30 Standardindikatoren, wie z .B. „die Anzahl ausgebildeter Lehrer" oder „die

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Anzahl zusätzlicher Wasseranschlüsse". Die verwendeten Standard-Indikatoren sind jedoch sehr oberflächlich und haben nur eine begrenzte Aussagekraft. Das bedeutet ja noch nicht, dass dadurch auch die Schüler mehr gelernt haben. Darüber kann man mit diesen Indikatoren keine wirklich sinnvollen Aussagen treffen. Ich habe das in meinen Analysen eher kritisch betrachtet.

Angesichts der öffentlichen Kritik über nicht ausreichende Ergebnisnachweise in der EZ stellt das die Geberorganisationen vor eine schwierige Aufgabe. Wie haben die von Ihnen untersuchten elf Organisationen abgeschnitten?

Das ist schwierig zu beantworten. Die aggregierte Berichterstattung gibt es noch nicht so lange. Erst Anfang 2000 wurden die ersten Versuche unternommen. Alle Geber sind noch dabei zu lernen, ihre Systeme anzupassen und stellen sich ähnliche Fragen wie das BMZ.

Einige Geber wie DFID und die IDB verwenden Ziele für Standardindikatoren, wie z.B. „wir verpflichten uns, bis 2018 fünf Millionen Haushalten den Zugang zu sauberem Wasser zu ermöglichen." Solche Ziele sehe ich kritisch, da diese zu einer geringeren Ausrichtung der EZ an den Entwicklungsprioritäten der Partnerländer führen können. Zudem bilden Standardindikatoren nur einen sehr kleinen, messbaren Teil des Projektportfolios ab und

messen eher kurzfristige als langfristige Ergebnisse.

Dennoch eignen sich Standard-Indikatoren sehr gut, um öffentlichkeitswirksam den Nutzen der EZ zu kommunizieren und dadurch gesellschaftlichen Rückhalt in der Bevölkerung für die EZ zu stärken. Um jedoch die Wirksamkeit der EZ im Sinne der Sustainable Development Goals bewerten zu können, muss man sich eigentlich die Maßnahmen im einzelnen und auf Länderebene ansehen.

Was bedeutet das genau?

Es ist wichtig, dass die Geber nicht nur Aktivitäten und Outputs messen und darstellen. Also – wie viele Kilometer Straße haben wir gebaut oder wie viele Wasseranschlüsse gelegt-, sondern sie müssen auch die Auswirkungen ihrer Aktivitäten erfassen. Wie hat sich das Leben unserer Zielgruppe wirklich verändert? Wie sind die Einkommen gestiegen? Gibt es mehr Ernährungssicherheit? Das geht nur durch Evaluierung.

Das klingt wie eine Selbstverständlichkeit, die sich auch aus den Verpflichtungen der Geber–Organisationen zu den Sustainable Development Goals und den International Aid Transparency Initiative Standard (IATI) nach mehr Transparenz ergibt. Was müsste jetzt passieren?

Rechenschaft über die Ergebnisse abzugeben ist ein Bestandteil der generellen Verpflichtungen für mehr Transparenz. Meiner Meinung nach sollten die Geber alle Projekte und deren Ergebnisse in einer zentralen Datenbank erfassen, zu der jeder weltweit Zugang hat. Das wäre für die Bevölkerung und die Regierungen in den Entwicklungsländern selbst auch sehr hilfreich und gibt ihnen einen Überblick, wer was und mit welchem Erfolg finanziert. Auch den Gebern könnte das helfen, sich besser auszutauschen und sich mit den Regierungen der Entwicklungsländer besser zu koordinieren. Der IATI-Standard bietet hierfür einen geeigneten Rahmen.

Und auch in Deutschland könnte dann jeder genau sehen, welche Projekte im Rahmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Steuergeldern finanziert werden.

Die Transparenz in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist auch in Deutschland ein Problem, wenn auch nicht ausschließlich. Bei uns findet man relativ wenige Informationen darüber, wie zum Beispiel auch bei den Franzosen. Das ist bei den multilateralen Entwicklungsbanken wie der Weltbank (IDA/IBRD), der Asian Development Bank (ADB) oder der Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) ganz anders. Da bekommt man schon einen besseren Einblick über Projektdokumente, Vorschläge, Monitoring-Berichte – da können sich die bilateralen Geber noch einiges abgucken.

Der IATI-Standard ist tatsächlich gut für mehr Transparenz. Allerdings ist die Darstellung der Ergebnisse noch sehr gering. Die meisten Geber veröffentlichen nur die Ausgaben der Projekte und wo sie diese finanzieren – nicht aber die Ergebnisse, die damit erreicht wurden.

Das liegt vielleicht auch an der öffentlichen Kritik, dass Steuergelder in der EZ mitunter nicht sinnvoll eingesetzt werden? Niemand berichtet ja gern über Fehlleistungen.

Das ist einer der Gründe, der mir immer wieder genannt wird und den ich auch nachvollziehen kann: Nicht alles sollte öffentlich sein, da man eben auch Fehler machen und auf Projektebene auch flexibel reagieren muss. Manche Dinge kann man intern besser lösen. Natürlich macht man sich die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit angreifbar, wenn die Ergebnisse nicht immer positiv sind. Es ist aber auch ganz klar, dass nicht jedes Projekt erfolgreich sein kann. Nichtsdestotrotz denke ich, gerade eben weil auch Steuergelder in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit verwendet werden, ist es wichtig, dass die Öffentlichkeit mehr Informationen darüber erhält, was genau mit diesen Geldern geschieht.

Mit sinnvollen Standard-Indikatoren über Quantität und Evaluierungen über Qualität der einzelnen Projekte auf

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Länderebene würden die Geber nicht nur mehr Transparenz herstellen, sondern ihre Leistungen auch miteinander vergleichbar machen.

Die Messsysteme sind heute immer noch nicht vergleichbar und somit ein Vergleich der Organisationen hinsichtlich ihrer Effizienz und Effektivität nicht möglich. Jeder misst irgendwie anders und inwieweit eine ordentliche Evaluierung dahintersteckt, kann man aus den bisher angewendeten Standard-Indikatoren nicht ablesen. Deshalb ist es schwierig unterschiedliche Geber untereinander zu vergleichen. Man kann eigentlich nur auf Maßnahme-Ebene schauen, welche Projekte erfolgreich und sinnvoll sind und welche eben nicht. Für eine bessere Vergleichbarkeit sollten Geber daran arbeiten, Indikatoren und Systeme der Berichterstattung zu harmonisieren. Organisationen anhand standardisierter Indikatoren zu vergleichen wird allerdings auch dann in Zukunft schwierig bleiben.

Was würde laut Ihrer Studie für eine zukünftige Messung der Wirksamkeit von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sinnvoll sein?

Neben einer zentralen Erfassung und einer Kombination aus mehr Transparenz und Evaluierung ist meiner Meinung nach eine verbesserte, koordinierte und durch das Partnerland gesteuerte Wirkungsmessung auf Länderebene entscheidend, die entsprechenden Partnerländer bei der Auswertung mit einzubeziehen. Bei Entwicklungszusammenarbeit geht es immerhin um so wichtige Fragen wie Ownership, Alignement und eine entsprechende Koordination. Die müssen auch vom Partnerland geleistet werden. Zurzeit richtet die Mehrzahl der EZ-Projekte eigene Monitoring-Systeme ein, die parallel zu den Systemen der jeweiligen Partner-Regierungen laufen. Hier sollten mehr harmonisierende Anstrengungen seitens der einzelnen Geber stattfinden. Das würde der Koordinierung und der Transparenz zukünftig sehr helfen.

Dr. Sarah Holzapfel ist Agrarökonomin und Wissenschaftliche Mitarbeiterin am Deutschen Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE) in der Abteilung Bi- und multilaterale Entwicklungspolitik.

EU-Hilfe am Horn von Afrika

Hochrangige EU-Vertreter für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Entwicklung und Notfallhilfe sind letzte Woche nach Addis Abeba gereist, wo sie weitere 122 Millionen Euro an europäischen Hilfsgeldern zusagten. So soll verhindert werden, dass sich die humanitäre Krise in Äthiopien in eine Hungersnot verwandelt. EurActiv Brüssel berichtet.

Ostafrika steckt in einer der schlimmsten humanitären Krisen. Der Klimawandel verschärft durch das Wetterphänomen El Niño den Temperaturanstieg der Meeresoberfläche. Es kommt zu Überflutungen und zu Dürreperioden, vor allem im Osten des afrikanischen Kontinents und am Horn von Afrika. Äthiopien, ein Land mit etwa 100 Millionen Einwohnern, ist am schwersten von den Auswirkungen des Klimawandels betroffen. Das Land durchlebt die schlimmste Dürrekatastrophe der letzten 50 Jahre und damit ist dir Hungersnot ernster als 1984/85, als damals das erste „Live Aid"-Wohltätigkeitskonzert stattfand. Mittlerweile sind zehn Prozent der dortigen Bevölkerung von Nahrungsmittellieferungen abhängig. Äthiopien wurde zum Symbol für Mangelernährung und Hungersterben (sehr zum Leidwesen der derzeitigen Regierung, die kostspielige Sofortmaßnahmen einführte, um auf Dürrewarnungen reagieren zu können).

Christos Stylianides, EU-Kommissar für humanitäre Hilfe, und Entwicklungskommissar Neven Mimica versprachen, weitere 122,5 Millionen Euro bereitzustellen. Mit diesen Geldern will man den dringendsten Bedürfnissen der mehr als zehn Millionen Menschen gerecht werden. Die EU spricht hierbei von „Hilfe für eine rasche Erholung [und] Initiativen zur Bewältigung der Ursachen von Fragilität und Verwundbarkeit."

Vier Monate zwischen Spenden und Nahrungsmitteln vor Ort

Es wird etwa vier Monate dauern, bis nach den versprochenen Geldern auch Nahrungsmittellieferungen vor Ort ankommen werden. Bis zur Regenzeit im Sommer soll so zunächst der Druck auf die Bevölkerung des Landes gemindert werden. „Mit mehr als zehn Millionen Hungerleidern [in Äthiopien] ist die humanitäre Situation wirklich besorgniserregend. Die EU handelt: Die neue Unterstützung wird es uns ermöglichen, unsere Hilfsbemühungen für die Ärmsten im Land zu intensivieren", betont Stylianides. Mimica lobt darüber hinaus die bisherige Arbeit der Regierung in Addis Abeba: „Wir können auf den bisherigen Erfolgen Äthiopiens bauen." Die Hauptstadt verspricht derzeit, die Eröffnung einer neuen elektrifizierten Bahnstrecke bis zum Hafenstaat Dschibuti zu beschleunigen. So will man Hilfslieferungen den Zugang zum Land erleichtern.

Ein 122 Millionen Euro schweres EU-Hilfspaket allein werde jedoch nicht ausreichen, unterstreichen NGOs und auch die äthiopische Regierung.

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Immerhin sei Äthiopien nicht das einzige krisengebeutelte Land im Horn von Afrika (die Region umfasst außerdem Eritrea, Somalia und Dschibuti). Tatsächlich kommen diese Zusagen jedoch zum ursprünglichen El-Niño-Nothilfepaket hinzu, welches die EU im Dezember 2015 verkündete. Es umfasst 79 Millionen Euro für die Großregion des Horns von Afrika, von denen 43 Milliarden an Äthiopien gehen.

Das Land ist bereits jetzt der größte Empfänger von EU-Entwicklungshilfegeldern. Seit 2011 erhielt es 200 Millionen Euro an humanitärer Hilfe und profitiert derzeit von einem landesspezifischen Entwicklungshilfeprogramm in Höhe von 745 Millionen Euro für den Zeitraum von 2014 bis 2020.

Dennoch brauche Äthiopien laut Regierung weitere 650 Millionen Dollar, um auf die ursprünglich benötigten 1,4 Milliarden Dollar an Spendengeldern zu kommen. In unterschiedlichen Sektoren gebe es noch lebensbedrohliche Finanzierungslücken. Vor vier Wochen startete die Regierung eine insgesamt 90-tägige Aufklärungskampagne über den weiteren Bedarf an Unterstützung.

„Sehr wenig... sehr spät“

„Die dargebotene Hilfe ist nur sehr wenig und ist häufig sehr spät gekommen“, warnte Premierminister Hailemariam Desalegn am 17. März – noch vor dem jüngsten EU-Hilfspaket. Man habe der momentanen Dürrekatastrophe in Ostafrika, die auch Länder wie Malawi und Simbabwe betrifft, nicht genug mediale Aufmerksamkeit entgegengebracht – vor allem aufgrund der Flüchtlingskrise im Mittelmeerraum und in Nordafrika. „Äthiopien sollte auf keinen Fall vernachlässigt werden, auch wenn es in der Welt zur Zeit viele Krisen gibt“, meint Desalegn. „Mein Land verdient mehr Unterstützung. Immerhin beherbergen wir etwa 750.000 Flüchtlinge aus Nachbarländern, die auf

Bei letzten schweren Dürreperiode 2009 kamen viele Nutztiere ums Leben. [Oxfam/Flickr]

Nahrungsmittellieferungen angewiesen sind.“ Damit verweist er auf die weiteren Probleme, vor denen die EU-Kommission bei der Bereitstellung von Hilfe im Horn von Afrika steht. Während Äthiopien ein relativ stabiler und sicherer – wenn auch autoritärer – Staat ist, gelten die Nachbarländer (Somalia, Eritrea, der Sudan und der Südsudan) als gescheiterte Staaten, gezeichnet von islamistischem Terror und Bürgerkrieg.

Bei seiner Reise in die Region besuchte Mimica auch den Nachbarstaat Sudan. Diesem versprach er 100 Millionen Euro im Rahmen des 2015 eingerichteten EU-Notfalltreuhandfonds für Afrika. Mit diesen Geldern wolle man gegen die Instabilität sowie die Ursachen illegaler Migration und Vertreibung im Sudan kämpfen. Seit dem Darfur-Konflikt vor zehn Jahren leben etwa drei Millionen Binnenflüchtlinge innerhalb der Landesgrenzen.

Die meisten NGOs loben die zusätzliche Unterstützung in der El-Niño-Dürreperiode. Dennoch gibt es Vorbehalte und – zumindest seitens Oxfams – harsche Kritik.

Landwirtinnen und Kleinbauern

Oxfam verweist darauf, wie wichtig lokale Kleinbauern für zukünftige Entwicklungsinitiativen sein werden, sobald die unmittelbare Krise vorbei sei. „Ernährungssicherheit hat für die EU oberste Priorität. Die Frage ist nur, wie man das Ganze in Maßnahmen umsetzt“, erklärt Hannah Saarinen, EU-Politikberaterin für Landwirtschaftsinvestitionen, in einem Gespräch mit EurActiv. „Das umfassende Bild von Entwicklung sollte vor allem herausstellen, wie wichtig weibliche Landwirte sind. Ihre Situation hat einen vervielfachenden Einfluss auf das Horn von Afrika. Denn dort dient die Landwirtschaft als Hauptmöglichkeit zur Selbstversorgung und Produktion. Auf politischer Ebene erkennt man die Bedeutung von Kleinbauern und Landwirtinnen an. Es geht aber nicht nur um Entwicklung, sondern auch um Investitionen, handelspolitische Maßnahmen und um die Frage, inwiefern diese mit nachhaltiger Landwirtschaft vereinbar sind. Private Investitionen in die Landwirtschaft nehmen zu. Zu häufig werden sie jedoch weitestgehend nach ihren Bedingungen [denen der westlichen Konzerne] getätigt“, meint Saarinen.

Die Kampagne ONE, die 2007 unter anderem von Bono mit ins Leben gerufen wurde, begrüßt die „positiven Schritte“ der EU. Gleichzeitig unterstreicht sie jedoch, dass man sich stärker auf die Ernährung konzentrieren müsse. „Während der Dürreperiode 20011, hat die EU-Kommission als erste einen Ansatz verfolgt, der humanitäre Hilfe mit langfristigen Entwicklungsprogrammen

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kombiniert hat. So konnte man die Empfänger zukünftigen Schocks gegenüber widerstandsfähiger machen", erklärt Tamira Gunzburg, ONE-Direktorin in Brüssel. „Wenn externe Schocks wie El Niño diesen Prozess jedoch bedrohen, sollte die Kommission den betroffenen Ländern weiterhin beistehen. Sie sollte auch in Zukunft in Programme investieren, die die Mangelernährung im Horn von Afrika und darüber hinaus behandeln beziehungsweise verhindern. So könnte man die jährliche Sterberate von Kindern unter fünf Jahren halbieren."

War on Want ist eine Wohltätigkeitsorganisation mit Sitz in Großbritannien, die nach eigenen Angaben „einzigartige" Hilfe während der Hungersnot von 1985 leistete. Sie habe nämlich nicht nur mit dem marxistischen Derg-Regime zusammengearbeitet, sondern auch mit den Befreiungsfronten im Tigre und in Eritrea. Von dieser Organisation hagelt es nun scharfe Kritik an dem EU-Paket. „Der Sinn von Hilfe ist es nicht, nur kurzfristige Symptome zu behandeln. Man muss die langfristigen strukturellen Probleme der Länder in Ostafrika angehen", betont der Direktor von War on Want EurActiv gegenüber. „Die EU sollte nachhaltig Kapazitäten in Afrika schaffen, damit der Kontinent in Zukunft nicht mehr auf Hilfe angewiesen ist. Alles andere macht das Problem nur noch schlimmer."

Eritrea – Hilfe für autoritäre Regierungen?

Jetzt steht die EU-Kommission jedoch weiterer Kritik aus den eigenen Reihen gegenüber. Denn Brüssel selbst bemängelt die Hilfsmaßnahmen am Horn von Afrika. Man dürfe den autoritären Regierungen dort nicht noch mehr EU-Gelder geben, fordert letzten Monat die größte Fraktion im EU-Parlament, die konservative EVP (Europäische Volkspartei). Davo Ivo Stier, Sprecher des Entwicklungsausschusses verweist auf die 200 Millionen Euro, die die EU in den nächsten fünf Jahren Eritrea überlassen will. „Die Menschen fliehen aus Eritrea, weil sie von der Regierung unterdrückt werden. Wir müssen sicherstellen, dass wir mit den EU-Hilfen aus Steuergeldern keine autoritären Regime fördern. [Wir] haben wiederholt klargestellt, dass eine zukünftige Unterstützung Eritreas nur mit demokratischer Regierungsführung, dem Aufbau transparenter und inklusiver Organisationen sowie dem Schutz der Menschenrechte möglich ist", so Stier. „Die Entwicklungsprogramme sollten transparenter werden. Außerdem müssen die EU-Institutionen besser zusammenarbeiten."

Entwicklungshilfe als Druckmittel für Menschenrechte

Die EU nutzt ihre Entwicklungshilfe seit mehr als 20 Jahren als Druckmittel für mehr Menschenrechte in den Ländern des Südens – ein Schachzug, den afrikanische, karibische und pazifische Länder nicht immer gutheißen. EurActiv Frankreich berichtet.

In einer öffentlichen Befragung über die Zukunft des Cotonou-Abkommens wurde die europäische Entwicklungshilfe als Einflussfaktor in Sachen Menschenrechte auf den Prüfstand gestellt. Das Ergebnis ist eindeutig: Die Achtung der Menschenrechte durch den Staat ist eine unumgängliche Voraussetzung für Entwicklungshilfe.

2000 schlossen die EU und die AKP-Staaten (die Länder Afrikas, der Karibik und des Pazifiks) das Cotonou-Abkommen ab. Seitdem bestimmt es ihre politischen, wirtschaftlichen und entwicklungspolitischen Beziehungen. Beide Vertragsparteien verschrieben sich bei der Unterzeichnung den Menschenrechten, demokratischen Grundsätzen und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Diese bilden bis heute einen der Grundpfeiler des Abkommens.

Überarbeitung von Cotonou

Das Cotonou-Abkommen, das noch bis 2020 seine Gültigkeit behält, muss sich weiterentwickeln. Zu diskutieren ist dabei auch die Frage, inwiefern die Entwicklungshilfe an die Achtung der oben genannten Prinzipien gebunden sein sollte.

Bei einer öffentlichen Befragung zur Zukunft des Cotonou-Abkommens nach 2020 legten die Teilnehmer eine gewisse Skepsis an den Tag (NGOs, nationale Parlamente, Unternehmen, Think-Tanks usw.). „Die Befragten zeigten sich im Allgemeinen kritisch, was den Einfluss des im Cotonou-Abkommen festgelegten Mechanismus anbelangt, der zur Verbesserung der Menschenrechtslage, der Demokratie und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit beitragen sollte", betont die Kommission.

Einer der Kritikpunkte: Der politische Dialog zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten sei zu formal, zu technisch und zu sehr auf die Union bezogen. Dennoch muss dieser Dialog intensiviert werden. „Er hat es ermöglicht, gewisse Grundrechte und kontroverse Aspekte von Entwicklungsprogrammen in den Fokus zu rücken", so die EU-Kommission.

Auch andere Beteiligte begrüßen den durch das Cotonou-Abkommen angestoßenen politischen Dialog über Menschenrechts- und Demokratiethemen – darunter das Generalsekretariat für europäische Angelegenheiten. „Sehr interessiert zeigen sich vor allem die Länder,

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deren bilateraler Austausch mit den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten eingeschränkt ist und die nur selten die Möglichkeit zu einen europäischen Dialog haben (wie Surinam)", heißt es von französischer Seite.

Dialog mit Burundi

In der Praxis griff man bereits mehrfach auf den im Cotonou-Abkommen festgelegten politischen Dialog zurück. Sollte dieser scheitern, tritt Artikel 96 in Kraft. Ihm zufolge dürfen in einem solchen Fall Sanktionen verhängt werden. Diese können bis hin zur Aussetzung der Zusammenarbeit mit einem gewissen Land reichen. Die EU machte bereits mehrfach Gebrauch von diesem Artikel, um auf Staatsstreiche und Menschenrechtsverletzungen zu reagieren: auf den Fidschis (2000 und 2007), in Simbabwe (2002), in der Zentralafrikanischen Republik (2003), in Guinea-Bissao (2004 und 2011), in Togo (2004) und in Madagaskar (2010).

Mitte März verkündete die EU, sie würde die offizielle Entwicklungshilfe für Burundi auf Eis legen. Dort kam es zu einer schweren Krise, nachdem der Präsident Pierre Nkurunziza der Verfassung zum Trotz 2015 seine dritte Amtszeit angetreten hatte. „Wir arbeiten derzeit an EU-finanzierten Projekten, die der Bevölkerung in Burundi einen Zugang zu grundlegenden Dienstleistungen ermöglichen, ohne die dafür notwendigen Mittel über die Konten der burundischen Regierung laufen zu lassen", erklärt EU-Entwicklungskommissar Neven Mimica. Mit Hilfsgeldern in Gesamthöhe von etwa 430 Millionen Euro für den Zeitraum von 2015 bis 2020 ist die EU Burundis größter Geldgeber.

Achtung der Menschenrechte

Die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte ist heutzutage eine unumstößliches Kriterium für die Beziehungen zwischen der EU und Entwicklungsländern. Das war jedoch nicht immer der Fall. Erst als man 1995 die Überarbeitung des Lomé-Abkommens unterzeichnete, trat eine Klausel zur Achtung der Menschenrechte, der demokratischen Grundsätze und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Kraft. Anfangs hatte es diesbezüglich viel Gegenwind aus den AKP-Staaten gegeben. Sie beriefen sich auf das Prinzip des Nichteingreifens und der Neutralität, welches bis dahin die internationale Zusammenarbeit bestimmt hatte, so ein Bericht des Europäischen Zentrums für die Verwaltung der Entwicklungspolitik (ECDPM).

Die EU nutzt als einzige in der Praxis die politische Dimension der Partnerschaft. Die AKP-Staaten ihrerseits „haben sich nur sehr selten auf die Klausel des politischen Dialogs im Cotonou-Abkommen berufen", betont das Deutsche Institut für Entwicklungspolitik (DIE).

Die Ankündigung des burundischen Präsidenten Pierre Nkurunziza, er werde für eine dritte Amtszeit kandidieren, hat das Land ins Chaos gestürzt. [Goran Tomasevic / Reuters]

Debatte um LGBT-Rechte

Manche Themen sorgen jedoch noch immer für tiefe Kluften zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten – vor allem mit Blick auf die afrikanischen Länder. Über die Rechte sexueller Minderheiten (LGBT: Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender) wird im aktuellen Rahmen des Cotonou-Abkommens Stillschweigen gewahrt. Während einige Länder in Afrika immer mehr Gesetze gegen sexuelle Minderheiten erlassen, positioniert sich die EU deutlich für die Achtung der LGBT-Rechte. Das könnte für weitere Spannungen in der Verhandlungen über den Zeitraum nach Cotonou sorgen. „Manche Mitgliedsstaaten sehen diese Frage als möglichen Grund, mit dem Abkommen zu brechen, oder aber als wichtigen Risikofaktor in der Post-Cotonou-Debatte", so das DIE.

INFOGRAPHIC

Europäische Flüchtlingspolitik erhöht Ausgaben der nationalen Entwicklungshilfe-Budgets

Auch 2015 ist die EU immer noch der weltweit größte Geber von Entwicklungsgeldern. Zur Bewältigung der Migration als Auswirkung der Flüchtlingskrise nutzen die europäischen Länder immer häufiger ihre Entwicklungshilfe-Budgets.

Europäische Länder und Institutionen stellten 2015 mehr als die Hälfte der weltweiten Entwicklungshilfe bereit.

2015 stieg die europäische Entwicklungshilfe um fast 16%, also doppelt so schnell wie der weltweite Durchschnitt.



Viele europäische Länder haben 2015 auf einen bedeutenden Teil ihres Entwicklungshilfe-Budgets zurückgegriffen, um die Kosten der Flüchtlingsaufnahme zu decken.



Auch im weltweiten Vergleich verwenden die EU-Länder für die Flüchtlingsaufnahme einen bedeutend höheren Anteil ihrer Entwicklungsgelder.



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African migration: trends, patterns, drivers

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The first Rinus Penninx Best Paper Award was awarded to Marie-Laurence Flahaux and Hein De Haas for this paper in 2014 (https://www.imiscoe.org/news/network-news/259-first-rinus-penninx-best-paper-award).
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Abstract

Africa is often seen as a continent of mass migration and displacement caused by poverty, violent conflict and environmental stress. Yet such perceptions are based on stereotypes rather than theoretically informed empirical research. Drawing on the migration and visa databases from the Determinants of International Migration (DEMIG project) and the Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD), this paper explores the evolution and drivers of migration within, towards and from Africa in the post-colonial period. Contradicting common ideas of Africa as a 'continent on the move', the analysis shows that intra-African migration intensities have gone down. This may be related to state formation and the related imposition of barriers towards free movement in the wake of decolonisation as well as the concomitant rise of nationalism and inter-state tensions. While African migration remains overwhelmingly intra-continental, since the late 1980s there has been an acceleration and spatial diversification (beyond colonial patterns) of emigration out of Africa to Europe, North America, the Gulf and Asia. This diversification of African emigration seems partly driven by the introduction of visa and other immigration restrictions by European states. Contradicting conventional interpretations of African migration being essentially driven by poverty, violence and underdevelopment, increasing migration out of Africa seems rather to be driven by processes of development and social transformation which have increased Africans' capabilities and aspirations to migrate, a trend which is likely to continue in the future.

Keywords: International migration, Development, Post-colonialism, State formation, Migration determinants, Africa

Introduction

Africa is often seen as a continent of mass displacement and migration caused by poverty and violent conflict. Influenced by media images of massive refugee flows and 'boat migration', and alarmist rhetoric of politicians suggesting an impending immigrant invasion, the portrayal of Africa as a 'continent on the move' is linked to stereotypical ideas of Africa as a continent of poverty and conflict. In recent years, irregular migration from Africa to Europe has received extensive attention. Sensationalist media reportage and popular discourses give rise to an image of an 'exodus' of desperate Africans fleeing poverty at home in search of the European 'El Dorado'. Millions of Africans are believed to be waiting to cross to Europe at the first opportunity.

The three assumptions underlying such argumentations are that African migration is: high and increasing; mainly directed towards Europe; and driven by poverty and violence. Representations of extreme poverty, starvation, warfare and environmental degradation amalgamate into an image of African misery. Irregular migration occurring from Sub-Saharan Africa and the Maghreb to Europe has also increasingly been defined as a

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security problem associated with international crime, trafficking and terrorism (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014; Cuttitta, 2007; Goldschmidt, 2006; Lutterbeck, 2006). As the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) stated, 'The system of migrant smuggling (…) has become nothing more than a mechanism for robbing and murdering some of the poorest people of the world' (UNODC, 2006, p. 20).

Not only media and politicians, but also scholars fuel the image of a rising tide of poverty-driven African emigration. For instance, Myers argued that the current flow of 'environmental refugees'[1] from Africa to Europe 'will surely come to be regarded as a trickle when compared with the floods that will ensue in decades ahead' (Myers, 2005, p.4). This feeds into more general ideas conveyed by scholars such as (Collier, 2013) that we are facing a veritable South–north 'exodus' driven by poverty and income gaps, which threatens to spin out of control unless rights of immigrants are curtailed. This reflects a broader tendency in the research literature to cast 'South-North' migration as a symptom of development failure (Bakewell, 2008). Based on the common perception that poverty and income gaps between poor and rich countries are the 'root causes' of migration, and faced with the ineffectiveness and perverse effects of increased border controls, the frequently proposed long-term 'solution' to this phenomenon is to stimulate development in origin countries through aid, trade, or remittances (De Haas, 2007).

The problem is, that such ideas are based on assumption, selective observation or journalistic impressions rather than on sound empirical evidence. The focus of media, policy and research on irregular migration, smuggling, trafficking and the high death toll amongst trans-Mediterranean 'boat migrants' reinforce the impression that African migration is essentially directed towards Europe and driven by despair. Since 2000, however, there has been a recent surge in survey- or interview-based studies on contemporary African migrations (Bakewell & Jónsson, 2011; Berriane & De Haas, 2012; Bilger & Kraler, 2005; Bredeloup & Pliez, 2005; De Bruijn, Van Dijk & Foeken, 2001; Lessault & Beauchemin, 2009; Lessault & Flahaux, 2013; Pian, 2009; Schielke & Graw, 2012; Schoorl et al., 2000; Whitehouse, 2012). These studies have shed light on the diversity of African migration. Several studies have shown that most African migrations are not directed towards Europe, but towards other African countries (Schoumaker et al., 2015; Sander & Maimbo, 2003) and that those moving out of Africa do not only move to Europe but also to the Gulf countries and the Americas (Bakewell & De Haas, 2007).

Contradicting common idea that African emigration is essentially about irregular movement, previous research has suggested that most Africans migrate out of the continent in possession of valid passports, visas and other travel documentation (cf. Schoorl et al. 2000, Heering, Esveldt, Groenewold, van der Erf, Bosch, de Valk, and de Bruijn, 2000). More generally, recent scholarship has started to question the implicit assumption that African migration is 'exceptional' and essentially different from migration elsewhere. More and more micro-evidence emerges indicating that most Africans migrate for family, work or study (Schoumaker et al., 2015) (Bakewell & Jónsson, 2011), as is the case in other world regions. In a recent study on the Great Lakes region, (Bakewell & Bonfiglio, 2013) argued that although it would be impossible to deny the importance of conflict as a cause of (forced) migration in the region, that it would 'equally wrong to neglect the ongoing, perhaps mundane social processes that drive mobility, such as the search for an education, a spouse or a better life in the city' (Bakewell & Bonfiglio, 2013, p. 4). According

to official data, refugees and 'people in refugee-like situations' represented 2.4 million or 14 per cent of international migrants in Africa (UNHCR, 2011). Although this is a higher proportion than in other regions, this implies that about 86 per cent of international migration within Africa is *not* primarily related to conflict.

Notwithstanding the increasing availability of survey- and interview-based micro-level data on African migration, data availability remains extremely patchy and is generally focused on migration to Europe from a limited number of better-researched African countries, such as Morocco, Senegal, Ghana and South Africa. What has been particularly lacking so far, is macro-data that allows to map the overall evolution of the migration patterns from, to and within Africa over the past decades. This is not only important to gain a more fundamental insight into the factual evolution of African migration and to verify the validity of common perception of massive and increasing African migration, but it would also allow to contribute to the scholarly debate on the determinants of migration. On the one hand, this pertains to the debate on how development affect human mobility in which scholars have challenged conventional push-pull models by arguing that, particularly in poor societies, development increases rather than decreases levels of migration (Clemens, 2014; De Haas, 2010; Skeldon, 1997). On the other hand, conventional accounts of African migration tend to ignore the role of African states in shaping migration. This reflects the more general Eurocentric (destination-country) focus of migration research.

In order to fill these research gaps and gain a better understanding of the nature and causes of African migration, this paper analyses the evolution of migrations within, towards and from Africa in the post-colonial era, and explores the main factors explaining changes in the volume and the direction of these migrations. It will do so by drawing on new longitudinal databases containing data on migration stocks and flows, which have significantly extended the capacity to perform such analyses. Before embarking upon the empirical analysis, however, we will further explore the theoretical arguments that compel us to critically rethink role of development and states in migration processes.

Theoretical background: the drivers of migration

Conceptualising the role of development

The idea that much African migration is essentially driven by poverty ignores evidence that demographic and economic transitions and 'development' in poor countries are generally associated to *increasing* rather than decreasing levels of mobility and migration and that the relation between development and migration is fundamentally non-linear. This argument was originally put forward by (Zelinsky, 1971) in his *Hypothesis of the Mobility Transition.* Zelinsky argued that processes of modernisation and economic development have historically coincided with increasing rural-to-urban migration followed by a subsequent *increase* in emigration. When societies become wealthy emigration decreases and immigration increases, leading to a mobility or migration transition, in which countries gradually transform from countries of net emigration into countries of net immigration. These ideas about a 'migration transition theory' have been further developed (De Haas, 2010; Martin & Taylor, 1996; Skeldon, 1997) and empirically tested using historical (Hatton & Williamson, 1998) and contemporary (Clemens, 2014; Czaika & De Haas, 2012; De Haas, 2010) data sources.

Such insights turn the predictions of conventional 'push-pull' models or neoclassical theories that predict that migration decreases as societies develop and income and

other geographical opportunity gaps decrease upside down. In reality most migrants do not move from the poorest to the wealthiest countries, and the poorest countries tend to have lower levels of emigration than middle-income and wealthier countries. To understand why development is generally associated to more migration, it is important to move beyond views of (African) migrants as objects which are passively pushed around by external 'push' factors such as poverty, demographic pressure, violent conflict or environmental degradation, analogous to the way physical objects are attracted or repelled by gravitational or electromagnetic forces.

Such 'push-pull' views, however, ignore that people will only migrate if they have the ambitions and resources to make this happen. We can see migration as a function of people's *aspirations* and *capabilities* to migrate (De Haas, 2011; 2014). This idea helps us to understand why development is often associated to increased levels of migratory as well as non-migratory mobility (such as commuting, tourism and business travel). Development processes typically expand people's access to material resources, social networks, education, media and knowledge. At the same time, improvements in infrastructure and transportation, which usually accompany development, make travel less costly and risky, enabling migration over increasing distances.

Yet increased migration capabilities do not automatically lead to migration if people do not aspire to do so. Migration aspirations depend on people's more general life aspirations and their perceptions of the extent to which these aspirations can be fulfilled 'here' and 'there'. Both these aspirations and perceptions about geographical opportunities are highly subjective and likely to change under the influence of social and cultural change. Improved access to information and exposure to other (wealthy and/or 'Western') lifestyles conveyed through education, media and advertising tend to change people's perceptions of the 'good life' alongside increasing material aspirations and a growing appetite for consumer goods. The crux is that when 'development' occurs in poor and marginal countries and areas, aspirations and capabilities to migrate tend to increase simultaneously, explaining the paradoxical phenomenon of development driven emigration booms.

Although poor people do also migrate, they tend to do so less often, and if they migrate, they tend to do so overall smaller distances. This also seems to explain why the skilled and relatively wealth are overrepresented among long-distance international migrants. This particularly holds when border controls and immigration restrictions increase the costs and risks of migrating to wealthy countries. We can therefore also expect emigration to become less selective if societies as a whole become wealthier and more developed, as this will also lift relatively poor people above the material threshold needed to migrate internationally, initially to neighbouring countries but increasingly also overseas.

If societies get wealthier, more people can imagine a future within their own country and emigration is likely to decrease. Wealthy societies, however, remain highly mobile and migratory. This is partly related to the high levels of educational and occupational specialisation, and overall organisational complexity of modern societies, which requires people to move within and across borders to fulfil the desire to match qualifications and personal preferences with labour market and social opportunities. The higher skilled therefore tend to migrate more and over larger distances. This shows that it is illusionary to think that large-scale migration is somehow a temporary phenomenon that will disappear once – an equally illusionary – equilibrium is achieved, as conventional push-pull

models would predict. We therefore need to refute popular 'push-pull' models, as they lead to misleading analyses on the nature, causes and future of migration.

Conceptualising the role of states in migration processes

Common accounts of African migration are also characterised by either an ignorance or a weak theorisation of the role of African states in migration processes, which reflects a broader 'receiving country bias' in migration research, which obscures the role of origin states (Vezzoli, Villares-Varela, & De Haas, 2014). This also ignores the fact that poor countries are *also* destination countries. While the increasing immigration restrictions and border controls put in place by European destination states have received ample attention, the role of colonial and post-colonial African states in shaping migration processes is poorly understood. This is a major research gap. First, colonial occupation and concomitant practices of the slave trade and the systematic use of forced labour and recruitment have in many ways shaped contemporary migration patterns within and from the continent (Cohen, 1987). During the period of colonial liberation, millions of people fled conflicts with colonial powers reluctant to relinquish control (Algeria, Kenya, etc.) or with white settler groups determined to cling to their privileges (eg Zimbabwe, South Africa) (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). Yet, the defeat of old-style colonialism and the establishment of independent states often did not necessarily mean a return to peaceful conditions (Castles et al. 2014, De Haas, & Miller, 2014). During the Cold War, East and West fought proxy wars in Africa while backing undemocratic regimes and supporting the toppling of democratic governments. Political and economic pressures, arms supplies, mercenaries and even direct military intervention were factors contributing to new conflicts or the continuation of old ones (Zolberg, Suhrke, and Aguayo, 1989). For instance, struggles for domination in Angola, Mozambique and Ethiopia involved massive external involvement, with great human costs for local populations (Bakewell, 2000; Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014).

Decolonisation also heralded a phase of state formation, in which newly established African states have endeavoured to instil a sense of national unity in ethnically diverse societies, which often created considerable internal tensions and has regularly erupted in violent conflicts (cf. Davidson, 1992). State formation processes and concomitant conflicts have theoretically uncertain effects on population mobility, which are as yet poorly understood. On the one hand, instability, uncertainty and conflict may provide incentives for people to leave. On the other hand, it may also provide incentives for people to stay in order to provide protection for their families. In the same vein, people living under authoritarian regime may more often wish to migrate, but authoritarian states may also have a higher willingness and capacity to control and restrict emigration. This may explain why a recent analysis of global migrant stock data found a robustly *positive* relationship between the level of political freedom and emigration (De Haas, 2010).

Although the formation of nation states can go along with increasing migration (cf. Skeldon, 1997) either through conflict, infrastructure, or policies that encourage emigration as a means to decrease unemployment, generate remittances, and decrease dissatisfaction, increased nationalism, anti-colonial sentiment, xenophobia and protectionism associated to the same state formation processes has also compelled several African governments (such as Algeria, Egypt, and Côte d'Ivoire) to discourage the emigration of their own populations to control emigration or out of the fear of a 'brain drain' and to restrict the immigration of foreigners (Natter, 2014; Samers, 1997; Zohry & Harrell-Bond,

2003). Particularly socialist and/or nationalist governments have traditionally been anti-emigration. Processes of state formation may also have increased the urge among leaders of newly established states to assert national sovereignty by introducing immigration restrictions and border controls and to portray immigrants as a threat to sovereignty, security and ethnic homogeneity or stability in a bid to rally political support. In this context, African governments have frequently resorted to deportations. For instance, (Adepoju, 2001) counted 23 mass expulsions of migrants conducted by 16 different African states between 1958 and 1996.

Political tensions and military conflict pushed many countries to attempt to seal off their mutual borders, such as between the Frontline States in Southern Africa with South Africa as part of the anti-Apartheid struggle and between Morocco and Algeria as part of the conflict around the Western Sahara. Particularly, socialist states such as Algeria and Egypt (under Nasser) saw large-scale emigration as a source of brain drain and a threat to sovereignty, and therefore tried to curb emigration (Collyer, 2003; Fargues, 2004, p. 1360; Natter, 2014; Sell, 1988). This shows that states can both facilitate and constrain migration in various direct and indirect – and therefore complex – ways, and that this relation needs in-depth empirical inquiry to be better understood.

This paper uses new data to explore the *volume* and the *direction* of migration from, within and to Africa in order to contribute to broader debates on the role of development and states in migration processes. Table 1 summarises the theory-derived ideas about how broader processes of development and (post-colonial) state formation affect migration. Although the migrant population ('stock') data this paper draws from enables us to map the evolution of migration patterns, more comprehensive flow data is necessary to formally test hypotheses on migration determinants. Rather than providing formal tests for these ideas, this paper assesses the extent to which these ideas seem to hold in the light of African migration realities and to formulate hypotheses which can be further evaluated by future research.

Data

African migration research is haunted by the lack of reliable official data and the absence of appropriate sampling frameworks in the form of census or survey data. Although these problems are far from resolved, recently, the availability of new migration databases has significantly expanded the scope to conduct analyses on migration from, to and within Africa[2].

The Global Bilateral Migration Database (GBMD), which was released by the World Bank, contains bilateral migration population ('stock') data for 226 countries, major territories and dependencies for each decade from 1960 to 2000 (Özden, Parsons, Schiff & Walmsley, 2011). This database is based on census data and population register records

Table 1 Dimensions of analysis and theory-derived ideas on migration determinants

	Role of development	Role of states
Volume	Emigration initially increases with development, to decrease at higher development levels.	Autocratic and nationalist governments are better able and willing to reduce levels of emigration and immigration.
Direction	Development leads to an increasing proportion of populations to migrate to other continents.	Post-colonial relations stimulate migration to former colonisers, although this 'colonial echo' decreases over time.

(when census data were not available). While the release of this database has drastically increased the potential to assess long-term migration trends, it has some limitations. For instance, immigration is likely to be underestimated for countries defining migration on the basis of 'citizenship' rather than 'birth' because of naturalisation. Moreover, irregular migration is generally not taken into account and if data was missing some values have been estimated. Because the 1970 data turned out to be inconsistent, we decided only use 20 year intervals (ie, 1960, 1980 and 2000) to study the evolution of African migration.

The recently completed DEMIG C2C ('country-to-country') migration flow database (which has been part of the Determinants of International Migration project) has drastically expanded our ability to perform detailed analysis of recent patterns and trends of African migration to and from Europe, North America and Oceania. DEMIG C2C database covers bilateral migration flows for 34 reporting countries from and to a broad range of origin countries over the 1946–2011 period (see Vezzoli, Villares-Varela, & De Haas, 2014). This database also has its limitations. In general, migration flow data is generally less reliable than stock data and its coverage is patchier. For instance, flow data are not available for some important destination countries such as the United Kingdom. When flow data are based on population registers they are not always comparable because the registration criteria (such as duration of stay) can vary considerably across countries.

This paper will use these new data sources to analyses the evolution of migration patterns within, towards and from Africa in the 1960–2010 period. The analysis of the GBMD stock data will give a global and long-term perspective of the evolution of these migrations. The analysis of the DEMIG C2C flow data will give better insights into the recent evolution of African migration to Europe, North America and Oceania, as well as patterns of diversification in terms of destination and origin countries. To assess the level of development of African countries, world development indicators available on the World Bank website will be used (GDP, mortality rate of children under five years old, fertility rate and proportion of rural population). To estimate the restrictiveness of immigration policies of African and non-African states, the paper will draw on the DEMIG VISA database, which is a global panel of bilateral travel visa requirements covering the 1973–2013 period (De Haas & Villares-Varela, 2014 forthcoming).

Volume and direction of African migration

The evolution of the migration intensity from, to and within Africa since 1960

The volume of migration from, to and within Africa may be measured in absolute or relative numbers. As Table 2 shows, total stocks of migration from Africa to the rest of the world and within Africa have increased between 1960, 1980 and 2000, while migration from the rest of the world to Africa has decreased in absolute numbers.

Table 2 Estimated total stocks of migration from, to, and within Africa

	From Africa to the rest of the world	From the rest of the world to Africa	Within Africa
1960	1 830 776	2 811 930	6 176 385
1980	5 418 096	1 872 502	7 966 359
2000	8 734 478	1 532 746	10 500 000

Yet, to measure the intensity of emigration it is more appropriate to calculate the volume of migration in relation to the size of the population born in origin countries or destination countries. To measure *emigration intensity* we divided the numbers of emigrants from each country by the population born in the same country. In order to measure the relative importance of immigration from particular African or non-African countries in destination countries, we calculated *immigration intensity* by dividing the number of migrants from particular origin countries (African and non-African) in each destination country by the population born in each of these countries. It is important to emphasise that these measures for emigration and immigration intensities are based on migrant stock data, and should therefore not be confused with migration rates which are usually based on annual flow data. Migration intensities give a general estimate of the intensity of migration to and from particular countries in the recent past.

African emigration intensity

Our analysis confirms that the majority of African migrants move within the continent. Figure 1 shows trends in the average emigration intensity. All results have been weighed for population size of each country. This reveals two striking trends. While intra-African emigration has shown a clearly *declining* trend between 1960 and 2000, extra-continental emigration, albeit much lower, shows an *increasing* trend, particularly between 1960 and 1980. In 2000, African countries had on average 2.3 % of their citizens officially living abroad, down from 2.8 % in 1960. While average extra-continental emigrant intensity went up from 0.6 % in 1960 to 1.1 % in 2000, intra-continental emigrant intensities went down from 2.1 to 1.3 %. The robustly declining trend of intra-continental migration may seem puzzling at first sight, as it contradicts popular accounts of Africa as a continent 'on the move'.

Figure 2 shows that the increase in extra-continental migration between 1960 and 1980 from Africa mainly reflects the high emigration intensity from Maghreb countries, but not from other regions[3], where the emigration intensity to non-African destinations stays below one percent. The decrease in intra-continental mobility has been particularly stark in East Africa and to a lesser extent in Southern and Central and North Africa, while emigration from West Africa within the continent has remained on a consistently high level (see Fig. 2).



Fig. 1 Evolution of emigration intensity from African countries (per 1000; weighted by population size). Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database



Fig. 2 Evolution of emigration intensity by African region (per 1000; weighted by population size). Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database

Figure 3 depicts the emigration intensity from the different African countries. The maps corroborate that African emigration is first and foremost about migration within the continent. Intra-continental emigration intensities tend to be highest in inland West-African countries (such as Mali and Burkina Faso), some Southern African countries and small states such as Lesotho and Eritrea, and tend to be low in the Maghreb (where most people migrate to Europe) and populous countries such as Nigeria, Egypt, and South Africa.

The paradox of declining intra-African migration might partly be explained by the fact that decolonisation and the concomitant antagonism between newly created states may have indeed increased intra-continental barriers to movement. The comparatively high migration levels in West-Africa seem linked to the fact that this region contains many smaller countries both in population and in land surface. In countries with small populations, more migration is likely to spill over national borders, explaining why small



Fig. 3 Evolution of emigration intensity from African countries (emigrants per 1000 people born in each country). Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database

countries have on average higher emigration intensities (De Haas, 2010). Other factors may include that many ethnic groups are spread in several West-African countries which provide strong network connections across borders, as well as the fact that under colonial rule strong (generally coast-bound) migration patterns were already established. A final factor may be that there is visa-free movement between ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) countries (cf. OECD, 2006).

Figure 3 also shows that extra-continental emigration intensities are highest in North African countries. Our analysis, however, suggests that emigration from the Maghreb region are declining to a certain extent, which *may* indicate that they are over the peak of their 'migration transition', which confirms more detailed studies of Maghreb emigration (Natter, 2014).

Figure 4 depicts the level of extra-continental migration (out of Africa) as a proportion of total emigration. It shows some clear patterns. First, in 1960 North Africa was the only region where extra-continental migration was higher than intra-continental migration, with the exception of Ethiopia and South Africa[4]. The Maghreb is Africa's emigration region *par excellence*. This is related to its geographical proximity to Europe, their strong colonial and post-colonial links to France and the labour recruitment agreements these countries signed with European countries since the 1960s (De Haas, 2008; Natter, 2014). Egypt has weaker ties to Europe, but since Sadat's *infitah* (open door) policies of the 1970s massive emigration has occurred oil-producing Libya and the Gulf States (Sell, 1988; Zohry & Harrell-Bond, 2003).

Second, some other countries, such as Angola and Ethiopia (and to some extent Somalia, Sudan, Kenya and Uganda) stand out as countries with strong extra-continental connections but weak regional migratory connections. This is possibly related to conflict and long-distance networks created as a consequence of refugee resettlement and (in the case of Angola) colonial ties. Third, South Africa has relatively low emigration intensity, but as far as people emigrate it is overwhelmingly out-of-the-continent. Fourth, the urban coastal zones of a number of relatively prosperous West-African countries (Ghana, Nigeria, Senegal) form an emergent zone of increasing extra-continental emigration (with the notable exception of Côte d'Ivoire). More generally, it seems that countries with a high proportion of extra-continental emigration intensity are those with comparatively higher levels of economic development.



Fig. 4 Extra-continental emigration intensity as a proportion of total emigration intensity (percentage). Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database



Fig. 5 Evolution of immigration intensity from African countries (immigrants per 1000 inhabitants). Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database

Immigration intensity within Africa

Figure 5 shows the evolution of immigration intensity in African countries for 'neighbouring African countries', 'non-neighbouring African countries' and 'non-African countries'. The results mirror the findings on emigration intensity confirming that the bulk of African migration is contained within the continent and, more specifically, occurs between neighbouring countries.

The maps indicate that there has been an increasing concentration of African migrant populations in particular countries or clusters of countries. The overall pattern has been coast-bound migration from more marginal inland countries and areas. Post-independence migration has been increasingly about urbanisation and the concomitant transfer of population from inland, marginal rural areas to fertile agricultural areas, towns and cities which are often located in coastal areas. These patterns do not only exist between countries (such as between Burkina Faso and Côte d'Ivoire) but also within countries (such as north–south migration within West African countries or south–north migration in Egypt). While Coastal West Africa and Southern Africa are larger, historically well-established immigration zones, the migration hubs in Djibouti and the oil economies of Gabon (from West and Central Africa) and Libya (from

neighbouring countries) have more recently risen as major African migration destinations. The number of countries, however, with high immigration intensity has decreased over time, which reflects a general trend of decreasing intra-African migration.

While declining intra-African migration is not a uniform process, it fundamentally questions popular accounts of African migration as high and rapidly increasing. More research into the causes of declining intra-African migration intensity is required, hopefully with improved data. One possible explanation is that independence, the attempts to create nation-states (cf. Davidson, 1992) and the concomitant drive to assert restrictive border regimes may have curbed migration to a certain extent. Between 1950 and 1975, the large majority of African countries gained independence. Under colonial rule, mobility between countries, particularly when they were under the same colonial authority, may have been easier than after decolonisation, when states may have been keen to assert their newly acquired sovereignty by demarcating borders. Particularly when states embarked upon a more protectionist political and economic track, this may have coincided with increasing immigration restrictions and nationalism.

For instance, in the 1950s and 1960s many West African migrants moved to Ghana. After the 1966 coup in Ghana and the concomitant economic decline, the immigrant community became a scapegoat. In 1969 the Ghanaian government enacted the Aliens Compliance Order, which led to a mass expulsion of about 200,000 migrants, mainly from Nigeria, Togo, Burkina Faso and Niger (Van Hear, 1998, p. 73–74). With Nigeria's new oil wealth after 1973, millions of Ghanaians and other West Africans sought work there. But corruption and misguided economic policies precipitated a crisis, and in 1983–1985 an estimated two million low-skilled West Africans were deported from Nigeria, including over one million Ghanaians (Van Hear, 1998, p. 73–74).

Although African states are often said to have very porous borders, there has definitely been a drive to make them less porous as part of a larger quest to assert the sovereignty of African over their territory and the populations inhabiting that territory. Although regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the South African Development Community (SADC), the East African Community (EAC) and the Common Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA) have introduced rules for free movement of nationals between their member states, these agreements have generally been poorly implemented or contradicted by the restrictive policies and practices of member states (Adepoju, 2001; Ricca, 1990). Migrant rights are not always protected, and as elsewhere in the world, migrants are often scapegoated and mass deportations have regularly occurred, particularly in times of economic crisis (Castles, De Haas, & Miller, 2014).

Figure 5 also highlights that there has also been a stark decrease in immigrant population originating from non-African countries in Africa. This sharp decrease in the presence of non-African immigrants in Africa, particularly in North and Central Africa seems to partly reflect the departure of colonial administrators and settlers after independence, such as the massive departure of French colons from Algeria. But it also reflects a sharp decrease in immigration from Europe, the Indian subcontinent (to East and Southern Africa) and Lebanon (mainly to West Africa). In some cases it reflects policies of ethnic cleansing, such as the deportation of Ugandan residents of Indian by the Idi Amin regime. In 2000, oil-rich Libya and Gabon remain among the rare countries that attract significant shares of non-African immigrants.



Fig. 6 Destinations of African migrants in 1960, 1980 and 2000. Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database

The geographical diversification of African emigration

General migration trends

Figure 6 shows that although African migrants are still overwhelmingly located in African countries, the proportion of Africans living in (North) America and, particularly, Europe has increased. As we will see, because these are *stock* data, this underestimates the actual rate of increase of migration *flows*. The figures in Additional file 2 break these data down on the regional level and show that this increase in extra-continental has been general, although with strong regional variations. After Africa, Europe is the second continent of destination for migrants from West, East, Southern and Central Africa. Migrants from Southern Africa, however, also migrate to America and Oceania in significant numbers. Finally, the main destinations of North African migrants are Europe and Asia (Gulf countries), followed by Africa. This confirms that, with the exception of North Africa, migration out of Africa has been historically low.

In order to obtain an overview of the spread of African emigration in terms of destination countries, Fig. 7 depicts the total numbers of African migrants in the world in 1960, 1980 and 2000. Besides corroborating that the bulk of African migrants move within the continent, it also shows that the number of African living in Europe, North America, and other countries such as Australia and India has been increasing. In 1960 most extra-continental migrants lived in France and the United Kingdom, which is not surprising given their position as the dominant colonisers of the African continent. Since then there has been a clear patterns of diversifications of European destinations, with countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal and Spain becoming important destinations. We also see a clear increase and diversification of African emigration to non-European destinations, and particularly towards Saudi Arabia, Australia, USA and Canada. This overall pattern of diversification seems to indicate of a declining 'colonial echoe' in African emigration.

Recent African migration to Europe, North America and Oceania

While the GBMD is useful to identify long-term migration trends ad patterns, there are less useful for analysing more recent trends in African migration. First, stock data that are very much a 'legacy of the past' that approximate net migration over several



Fig. 7 Absolute numbers of African migrants in destination countries in 1960, 1980 and 2000. Source: Global Bilateral Migration Database

decades, which means that recent changes in migration patterns only show up after a long period. Second, the last census round included in the GBMD dates back to 2000. In order to substantiate and complement the preceding analysis, we analyse recent flow data from the DEMIG C2C database, which is particularly useful to uncover recent trends of extra-continental African migration.

Figure 8 shows that there has been a recent acceleration and diversification of extra-continental migration from sub-Saharan Africa, particularly to the United States and Canada. Figure 9 gives further detail on the evolution of non-African



Fig. 8 African migration flows to selected OECD countries by continent of destination[5]. Source: DEMIG C2C database

migration destination by region of origin. While North Africa is still overrepresented in extra-continental emigration, the share of other regions, particularly West and East Africa is increasing. Figure 10 reveals that North- and West- Africans are predominant in African migration to Europe, which seems related to the relative proximity to Europe and the historical role of labour recruitment in Francophone countries in the Maghreb but also in Senegal and Mali.

African migration to the Americas (US and Canada) is much more diverse, although Southern and Central Africa are relatively underrepresented in this migration. This may be partly explained by the absence of colonial ties, the effect of the US visa lottery and the comparative openness of the US and particularly Canada, for high-skilled high immigration, which may have enabled more diffuse immigration patterns in terms of origin countries. The United States is becoming an increasingly important destination among extra-continental migration, in particular from West Africa. African migration to Oceania (mainly Australia and to some extent New Zealand) is small but increasing, and dominated by Southern Africans, which seems to largely follow British colonial.



Fig. 9 Evolution of extra-continental African emigration by region of origin[6]. Source: DEMIG C2C database



Fig. 10 Evolution of the regions of origin of African migrants by continent of destination. Source: DEMIG C2C database

The graphs presented in Additional file 3 show that Europe in the main destination outside Africa for migration flows from North, Central and West Africa, while the extra-continental migration flows from East Africa are increasingly directed toward America, and those from Southern Africa toward Oceania and America.

Exploring developmental and policy drivers of African migration

The role of development processes

There seems to be a rather clear relation between levels of socio-economic development and the volume and geographical orientation of African emigration. More marginal, poorer or landlocked countries tend to have lower absolute and relative levels of extra-continental migration, and their migration is primarily directed towards other

African countries. This seems to confirm migration transition theory, according to which materially poor populations of the least developed countries have less capabilities to move, and when they move, they tend to move over shorter distances, either internally, or to other African countries. Figure 4 shows that the countries with relatively high extra-continental migration are also the countries that are located on the coast, that are more urbanised, have a higher GDP per capita, and are more advanced in the demographic transition as indicated by lower mortality and lower fertility (see Fig. 11). This seems to confirm the hypothesis of transition theories pioneered by (Zelinsky, 1971).

There are some notable exception to these overall patterns. While Ethiopia has a very low estimated emigrant intensity (0.4 % in 2000), emigration used to be mainly directed at North America and Europe, at least until the onset of larger-scale migration to the Gulf in the 2000s. This may be related to the predominance of refugee flows from Ethiopia and the fact that many refugees have been resettled in North America and Europe. Another, albeit very different, exception to this general pattern is Côte d'Ivoire, which is a major intra-African destination, but sees few of its own citizens leaving, either within or outside Africa. This is very different from patterns in South Africa, which attracts migrants from elsewhere in Africa but is also an important source of emigration out of the continent, highlighting its major role as a hub linking intra- and extra-African migration.

This seems linked to the fact that South Africa (and, to a certain extent, other countries in Southern Africa and Kenya and Uganda) has witnessed large-scale settlement from the UK, Netherlands and other European countries and has also witnessed the large-scale arrival of populations from the Indian subcontinent and China over the colonial period. As a consequence of this history of settlement, descendants of European and Asian immigrants have retained strong transnational ties with origin and other settlement countries,



Fig. 11 Economic and demographic situation of African countries in 2000.
Source: World Development Indicators, World Bank

such as the UK, US, Australia, India, Pakistan and China. The concomitant intensity of transnational social, economic and political ties now facilitate migration out of the continent. Côte d'Ivoire, by contrast, lacks a history of large-scale European settlement and is therefore less connected to inter-continental migration systems.

The role of states and policies

While levels of development seem to clearly affect immigration and emigration volumes and the distance of migration, state policies also play an important role. We argue that, in order to explain the comparatively low and declining intra-African migration intensity and low immigration towards Africa, xenophobia and immigration restrictions imposed by African states may play a role. In addition, we hypothesise that the diversification of African migration beyond Europe is partly be driven by increasingly immigration restrictions by former colonising countries (mainly France and the UK) and other European destinations. This may have prompted increasing numbers of Africans, particularly those possessing the education and skills allowing them to obtain visas, to explore new destinations in North America, Oceania and elsewhere. There is indeed some evidence of increasing migration of Africans in search of work, education and business opportunities to fast growing economies such as China (Ghosh, 2010), India, Russia, Turkey, Japan, Brazil and Argentina (Henao, 2009).

The role of policies in shaping migration flows in general and in Africa in particular has been understudied, partly due to the lack of appropriate policy data. This section uses new panel data from the DEMIG VISA database (De Haas and Villares-Varela, 2014 forthcoming) to construct measures of relative immigration restrictiveness of African and non-African destinations (broken down by major regional blocks) between 1973 and 2014. This *visa restrictiveness index* has been calculated by computing the percentage of origin countries that need a travel visa to enter destination country for every year. For the graphs, we subsequently calculated the average value for all destination or origin countries within the regional aggregated of interest for every year.

Figure 12 shows the *visa restrictiveness indices* of African countries specified for African and non-African nationals. The figure shows that the level of border restrictions of African countries is rather high and has in fact shown an increasing trend,



Fig. 12 Visa restrictiveness of African countries (1973–2013). Source: DEMIG VISA database

particularly since the late 1980s. In 2013, on average, about 90 % of nationals from non-African countries needed a visa to enter African countries, while on average 78 % of Africans needed a visa to enter another African country[7]. This is substantially higher than the global average of bilateral visa requirements of 65 % reported in (Czaika & De Haas, 2014), which seems to confirm that African states are rather closed towards the free movement of people.

Figure 13 suggests that West Africa has become the most open to African migration on average, which seems to be linked to – at least nominally – free travel and migration between ECOWAS countries. Southern Africa has also become more open, which seems to be linked to the end of the *apartheid* regime which put a high priority in containing mobility from other African states. Over time, North Africa has shown a remarkable increase in visa restrictiveness for other African nationals from a comparatively low level of 69 % in 1973 to 89 % in 2013, which may partly reflect the political process of 'externalisation' of European border controls (cf. Betts & Milner, 2006; Paoletti, 2011). East Africa has staggering scores on the visa restrictiveness index for African nationals of between 80 and 90 %. Also Central Africa visa policies have also become more restrictive after an initial opening in the 1970s.

Figure 14 specifies visa restrictiveness toward nationals from OECD countries[8] for the different African regions. It shows that Southern Africa is the only African region that has become more open to OECD nationals over time, particularly after the end of the Cold War and the demise of the *apartheid* regime in the early 1990s, with an average of only 24 % of OECD countries needing a travel visa to enter Southern African countries in 2013, down from 80 % in 1973. This also seems to be in line with the idea that Southern Africa has the strongest global migration ties to its history of large-scale settlement of Europeans. In contrast, all other regions show an *increasing* visa restrictiveness for OECD nationals. While North Africa was relatively open in 1973 with a visa restrictiveness index score for OECD countries of 45 %, this had gone up to 70 % in 2013. Also East Africa is closing. Central Africa's visa restrictiveness index for OECD citizens has been 99 % since the early 2000s. Interestingly, while West Africa has



Fig. 13 Visa restrictiveness of African countries for nationals from African countries, by region of destination (1973–2013). Source: DEMIG VISA database



Fig. 14 Visa restrictiveness of African countries for nationals from OECD countries, by region of destination (1973–2013). Source: DEMIG VISA database

opened up to Africans citizens, it has become more closed to free travel of OECD nationals.

It is not entirely clear which political processes explain the increasing visa restrictiveness of African countries towards OECD countries (with the exception of Southern Africa). One hypothesis is this partly mirrors the increasing visa restrictiveness of OECD countries for African citizens, suggesting that a certain degree of visa retaliation may have taken place. Figure 15 indeed confirms that there has been a massive trend of OECD countries closing their doors to free travel of African citizens, although there are clear regional differences. In 1973 OECD countries used to be relatively open towards nationals from Southern Africa and, to a lesser extent, from North Africa with restrictiveness indices of 61 and 73 % respectively. OECD visa restrictiveness for North Africans shot up since 1990 to reach 98 % in 1993, which seems to reflect the Schengen visa imposed for such countries in Europe. By 1995 all African regions had reached



Fig. 15 Visa restrictiveness of OECD countries for nationals from African countries, by region of origin of migrants (1973–2013). Source: DEMIG VISA database

OECD visa restrictiveness scores of more than 90 %. For Southern Africans the increase was more gradual, reaching a value of 93 % in 2013.

Figures 13 and 14 show that, in overall, African countries have been more restrictive towards nationals from OECD and other non-African countries than towards African nationals. Yet the most striking finding is the extraordinary high visa constraints imposed on movement to and from African countries, whether within or outside of the continent, suggesting a high level of reciprocity in visa imposition. This particularly applies for Central, West and East Africa. It is not clear whether this reflects 'retaliation' or other processes. North and Southern Africa show different patterns. Although North African visa restrictiveness towards OECD citizens has increased, this does not match the almost near-universal closing of OECD countries towards North Africans. For Southern Africa, we even see a negative correlation as the region has become more open to travel from OECD citizens while reverse travel restrictions from Southern Africa to OECD countries have gone up.

The general increase in visa restrictiveness towards African citizens can be a partial driver towards an increasing spatial diversification of migration patterns away from colonial patterns. This reflects the broader argument that immigration restrictions change the character of migration rather than decreasing overall volumes of migration as such. Based on this, (De Haas, 2011) hypothesised four 'substitution effects' that can limited the effectiveness of immigration restrictions: (1) *spatial substitution* through the diversion of migration to other countries; (2) *categorical substitution* through a re-orientation towards other legal or illegal channels; (3) *inter-temporal substitution* affecting the timing of migration such as 'now or never migration' in the expectation of future tightening of policies; and (4) *reverse flow substitution* if immigration restrictions also reduce return migration, reduce circulation and thus push migrants into permanent settlement (see also Flahaux forthcoming). While all four effects may apply to African migration, the DEMIG VISA data seems to confirm the role of policies in encouraging spatial substitution in the form of diversion away from colonial pattern. Figure 16 shows that until the late 1980s former colonisers were much less restrictive towards migration of the nationals from previous colonial states. By 1988



Fig. 16 Visa restrictiveness of OECD countries for nationals from African countries, by type of link between countries (previous colonial link or not) (1973–2013). Source: DEMIG VISA database

this gap was largely closed, however, and in 2010 it was completely closed. This can partly explain the diversification of African emigration over the past few decades. So while increasing African emigration has been rooted in structural development trends, destinations seem to have been diversifying not because of a general fading of colonial links, but also partly as a result of closeness of former colonisers parallel to the more favourable immigration opportunities offered (particularly for the skilled) offered by new destinations such as the Canada, the US and Australia.

Conclusion

Drawing on new data sources, this paper analyses the evolution of African migrations between 1960 and 2010. It particularly explores the role of development processes, state formation and policies in explaining trends and patterns of migration. Our analysis confirms that the majority of African migrants continue to move *within* the continent. Second, common perceptions of Africa as a 'continent on the move' are contradicted by the available data, which strongly suggests that the overall intensity of intra-African migration has decreased in recent decades, with the exception of West Africa. This decrease or – in the case of West Africa – stagnation of migration intensities may be related to state formation and the related imposition of barriers towards free movement in the wake of decolonisation as well as the concomitant rise of nationalism and related inter-state and intra-state tensions and violence. In this process, new independent states have tried to assert their newly acquired sovereignty by demarcating borders. Apart from the likely role of inter-state tensions in reducing unrestricted migration (such as in southern Africa in the apartheid era and considerably hostility between North African states), this also frequently coincided with considerable xenophobia and anti-immigrant sentiment in African societies. This is reflected in a high level of visa restrictiveness of African states for African nationals.

While the intensity of intra-African migration has decreased, there has been a recent acceleration and geographical diversification (beyond colonial patterns) of extra-continental migration from Africa to Europe, but increasingly also to North America, the Gulf and Asia. While most extra-continental migration once originated from North Africa, in recent decades there has been a rapid increased in migration from West Africa and, to a lesser extent, East Africa to wealthy countries outside Africa. This geographical diversification of African emigration seems partly connected to visa and other immigration restrictions put in place by traditional European destination countries (often former colonisers), and to a declining influence of the old colonisers and economic growth, labour demand and more liberal immigration regimes in the new destination countries. However, it is important to emphasise that the levels of extra-continental migration are still below those of migration within Africa and remain low for international standards. In the same vein as (Lessault & Beauchemin, 2009) argued, it would therefore be highly misleading to characterise migration from Africa as an exodus from Africa or an invasion of Europe and other destination countries.

Our analysis also contradicts conventional interpretations of African emigration as essentially driven by poverty. In general, African countries with comparatively higher levels of development (such as in the Maghreb or coastal West Africa) also tend to have the highest intensity of extra-continental migration, while the poorest countries (such as many landlocked Sub-Saharan countries) have lower levels of overall emigration and most

emigration is dominated by short-distance migration to nearby countries. This seems to confirm the 'migration transition theory' (De Haas, 2010; Skeldon, 2012; Zelinsky, 1971), which argues that economic development and concomitant social transformation initially coincide with *increasing* levels and a larger geographical reach of emigration. Increasing income, education and access to information and networks generally increases people's capabilities and aspirations to migrate. In sum, contradicting conventional interpretations of African migration being essentially driven by poverty, violence and underdevelopment, this paper shows that recent increases in African emigration should rather be explained from processes of development and social transformation which have increased young Africans' capabilities and aspirations to migrate, a trend which is likely to continue in the future.

Endnotes

[1]This term 'environmental refugee' (or 'environmental migration') is problematic in itself, as the impact of environmental factors on migration is highly dependent on many other political, economic and social factors. See also Gemenne (2011).

[2]'Africa' refers to the countries of the African continent and Madagascar. We took the decision to exclude the islands because of data inconsistencies.

[3]The regions named in this paper are those used in the classification of the United Nations (see map in Additional file 1).

[4]In 1960, 53 and 48 % of emigrants from Ethiopia and South Africa were estimated to live out of the continent, respectively.

[5]To Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, USA and Canada.

[6]To Europe, North America and Oceania (Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Australia, New Zealand, USA and Canada)

[7]Because the values on this index were not weighed by the population size of origin countries, we can, strictly speaking, not state that a particular percentage of, for instance, 'all non-African citizens' need a visa to enter a particular country. The index therefore represent the number of countries for which a travel visa is imposed.

[8]We calculated this index for OECD countries separately, assuming that this group of relatively wealthy countries figure prominently among aspired migration destinations of inter-continental migrants, which is also confirmed by the analyses of stock in previous sections. The Gulf is the only major destination region excluded from this figures. The indices may be slightly misleading as African countries seem to be more open to free travel for European citizens than for OECD citizens in general.

Additional files

Additional file 1: Regions in Africa (UN classification). (DOCX 24 kb)

Additional file 2: Destinations of African migrants, by region of origin and continent of destination. (DOCX 66 kb)

Additional file 3: Evolution of continents of destination (for selected destination countries) by regions of origin of African migrants. (DOCX 134 kb)

Competing interests
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.

Authors' contributions

MLF carried out the analyses, and HdH drafted the manuscript. Both authors participated in the conceptualisation and writing of the article. All authors read and approved the final manuscript.

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Die Afrika-Strategie der EU: Abschottung statt Fluchtursachenbekämpfung

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Als Reaktion auf den Anstieg der Flüchtlingszahlen seit dem Jahr 2015 verabschiedete die EU eine Vielzahl an Maßnahmen. Ziel ist, das Migrationsmanagement in Afrika zu stärken, den Menschenschmuggel zu bekämpfen und die Lebensbedingungen vor Ort zu verbessern. De facto liegt der Schwerpunkt auf der Blockade von Fluchtrouten, u.a. durch den Aufbau einer Küstenwache in Libyen und den Einsatz von Milizen gegen Flüchtlinge im Sudan.

- Die eingeleiteten Maßnahmen zur Fluchtursachenbekämpfung lassen eine schlüssige Strategie vermissen: In Äthiopien wird nach dem Gießkannenprinzip der Arbeitsmarkt gefördert, aber wenig für die Flüchtlingslager getan. In Eritrea, wo es keinerlei Rechtsstaat gibt, sollen Staatsanwälte zur Unterbindung des Menschenschmuggels ausgebildet werden; im Sudan kommen berüchtigte Milizen zur Grenzsicherung zum Einsatz, und in Libyen werden trotz fehlender staatlicher Strukturen Grenzschützer ausgebildet.

- Insgesamt wertet der derzeitige Ansatz der EU autoritäre Regierungen auf, die als Partner bei der Migrationsbekämpfung gesehen werden. Dies macht politische Reformen unwahrscheinlich. Die Motive der Flüchtenden werden undifferenziert als rein ökonomisch bewertet.

- In Libyen verstößt die EU gegen ihren eigenen Menschenrechtskodex, wenn sie trotz Warnungen von UN-Organisationen Flüchtlinge nach Libyen zurückschicken lässt, die dort unter extrem unmenschlichen Verhältnissen in Lagern gehalten werden.

Fazit

Um Fluchtursachen nachhaltig zu bekämpfen, müssen die politische Situation im Herkunftsland sowie die spezifischen Fluchtursachen stärker berücksichtigt werden. Maßgeschneiderte Lösungsansätze könnten die Ermöglichung legaler temporärer Migration aus Westafrika sein, wo ökonomische Fluchtmotive vorherrschen. Die Schaffung legaler Reisemöglichkeiten für Flüchtlingsgruppen mit hoher Anerkennungsquote wäre ein wirksames Mittel, um Menschenhandel und -schmuggel einzudämmen. In Flüchtlingsaufnahmeländern wie Äthiopien oder auch dem Sudan sollten Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten im Umfeld von Flüchtlingslagern gefördert werden, wovon auch die umliegenden lokalen Gemeinden profitieren sollten.

Reaktionen der EU auf die „Flüchtlingskrise“ 2015:

Nach dem sprunghaften Anstieg der Flüchtlingszahlen aus Afrika in den Jahren 2014 und 2015 verabschiedete die EU ein ganzes Bündel an Maßnahmen zur Eindämmung der Flucht. Neben dem schon seit dem Jahr 2006 bestehenden Rabat-Prozess wurde im Jahr 2014 der Khartum-Prozess mit dem Ziel etabliert, durch einen Dialog mit den Ländern Ägypten, Eritrea, Äthiopien, Süd-Sudan und Sudan gegen Menschenhandel und -schmuggel vorzugehen und zu diesem Zweck konkrete Projekte zu implementieren.

Ein Jahr später trafen sich europäische und afrikanische Staatschefs auf Malta, um den Valletta Action Plan zu verabschieden, zu dessen Zielen wiederum der Kampf gegen den Menschenschmuggel, aber auch verbesserter Schutz für Migranten sowie verstärkte Kooperation mit den Herkunftsländern bei der Rücknahme und Reintegration von Flüchtlingen zählen. Im Zentrum des Interesses stand somit das „Migrationsmanagement“ unter Wahrung der Menschenrechte, aber auch der Souveränität der teilnehmenden Staaten. Eine Stellungnahme der EU-Kommission im Vorfeld des Valletta-Gipfels machte allerdings deutlich, dass ein Schwerpunkt des Aktionsplanes auf der Begrenzung der Flüchtlingsströme aus Libyen liegen sollte: zu diesem Zweck sollen die libyschen Behörden beim Aufbau einer Küstenwache und beim Training von Grenzschützern an der Südgrenze des Landes unterstützt werden (European Council 2017). Zur Umsetzung der Maßnahmen stellte die EU einen 2,85 Mrd. EUR umfassenden Emergency Trust Fund zur Verfügung. Das Geld soll zum einen für die Verbesserung des Grenzschutzes, zum anderen zur Bildungs- und Beschäftigungsförderung eingesetzt werden. Spezielle Migrationspartnerschaften mit Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Äthiopien und Senegal haben darüber hinaus zum Ziel, gegen Menschenschmuggelringe vorzugehen und die freiwillige Rückkehr in die Heimatländer zu forcieren (European Commission 2017).

Im Juni 2016 verkündete die EU dann ihr neues Migration Partnership Framework, das zum Ziel hat, Migrationsströme besser zu steuern, den Menschenschmuggel zu bekämpfen und die Zahl der Todesfälle im Mittelmeer zu minimieren (European Commission 2016). Die EU unterscheidet zwischen kurzfristigen und langfristigen Maßnahmen, wobei erstere in etwa inhaltsgleich mit den auf dem Valletta-Gipfel beschlossenen Punkten sind. Langfristig sollen Fluchtursachen bekämpft werden, indem die afrikanischen Partnerländer in ihrer „politischen, sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung“ unterstützt werden. Zu diesem Zweck wurden mit vier westafrikanischen Ländern (Senegal, Mali, Niger, Nigeria) und dem ostafrikanischen Äthiopien Verträge abgeschlossen, die maßgeschneiderte Lösungen anbieten sollen. Geplant ist nach EU-Angaben der Einsatz von 8 Mrd. EUR in den Jahren 2016 bis 2020 zur Unterstützung dieser Schlüsselländer (European Commission 2016).

Defizite bei der Fluchtursachenbekämpfung

Angesichts der innenpolitischen Debatten in Europa im Zuge der „Flüchtlingskrise“ des Jahres 2015 und dem Erstarken des Rechtspopulismus ist es verständlich, dass die europäische Politik einen gewissen Aktionismus entwickelt hat, um die Lage in den Griff zu bekommen. Kurzfristig setzt die EU zunächst auf verstärkte Repression

durch Stärkung des Grenzschutzes sowie vermehrte Rückführung von Migranten. Längerfristig soll ein Mix aus unterschiedlichen entwicklungsfördernden Maßnahmen potenzielle Flüchtlinge dazu bewegen, ihre Heimat gar nicht erst zu verlassen.

Doch wie sehen solche Projekte aus? Hier soll ein kurzer Blick auf die Länder der Fluchtroute im Osten Afrikas, die sich von Eritrea über Äthiopien und den Sudan nach Libyen erstreckt, geworfen werden.

Äthiopien ist nicht nur eines der wichtigsten regionalen Partnerländer Europas am strategisch wichtigen Horn von Afrika, sondern gleichzeitig Aufnahmeland von etwa einer halben Million Flüchtlingen aus Somalia, dem Süd-Sudan und Eritrea. Regiert wird das Land im autoritären Stil von einer Partei, die bei den letzten Wahlen im Jahr 2015 hundert Prozent der Parlamentssitze erhielt. Seit letztem Herbst herrscht der Ausnahmezustand, der nach monatelangen Protesten verschiedener Volksgruppen gegen Unterdrückung und politische Marginalisierung verhängt wurde. Die Hauptgruppe der aus Äthiopien nach Europa gelangenden Flüchtlinge sind Eritreer, von denen sich derzeit ca. 160.000 im Nachbarland aufhalten, die meisten von ihnen in Camps mit nur geringen Zukunftsperspektiven. Die Mehrzahl der Geflüchteten träumt von einer Weiterreise über den Sudan und Libyen nach Europa (ODI 2017). Wegen der guten Chancen der Eritreer, in Europa Asyl zu erhalten, hat sich auch eine nicht bekannte Zahl von Äthiopiern diesem Treck angeschlossen. Wie versucht nun die EU, die neue Migrationspartnerschaft mit Äthiopien konkret umzusetzen?

Bislang gibt es ein EU-Projekt namens SINCE (Stemming Irregular Migration in Northern and Central Ethiopia), das Teil des Khartum-Prozesses ist und vom EU Trust Fund finanziert wird. Das Ziel liest sich wie aus einem Handbuch für klassische Entwicklungshilfe: so sollen die Lebensbedingungen der Not leidenden äthiopischen Bevölkerung, einschließlich potenzieller Migranten mit speziellem Fokus auf Jugendliche und Frauen verbessert werden. Geografische Schwerpunkte sind die Hauptstadt Addis Abeba und alle bevölkerungsreichen Regionen des 100-Millionen-Einwohner-Staates, nämlich Amhara, Tigray, Oromia und die Südregion (EU und ICMPD 2016). Nun gibt es zwar in Äthiopien massive Arbeitsmigrationsströme in die Golfstaaten, von armutsbedingter Massenmigration von Frauen und jungen Menschen nach Europa ist eher wenig bekannt. Daher erweckt das Projekt den Anschein, als werde nach dem Gießkannenprinzip Geld an die jeweiligen Regionalregierungen vergeben. Sinnvoller erscheint dagegen das Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDDP) für Äthiopien mit dem Ziel, die Lebensbedingungen in den Flüchtlingslagern und die ökonomischen Perspektiven der dort lebenden Eritreer und Somalier zu verbessern. Zudem gibt es ein von einem europäischen Geberkonsortium finanziertes Projekt, das die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen für Flüchtlinge und Einheimische in sogenannten Industriezonen zum Ziel hat (*BBC News* 2017).

In Eritrea, das Mitglied des Khartum-Prozesses und unter den afrikanischen Ländern ist, die die größten Flüchtlingsströme hervorbringen, gibt es keine einschlägigen EU-Projekte. Unter dem Stichwort „Better Migration Management", einem 46-Mio.-EUR-Programm, das der Bildung von Kapazitäten in Regierungsinstitutionen sowie dem rechtlichen Vorgehen gegen organisierten Menschenschmuggel dienen soll, findet sich jedoch ein erstaunliches Projekt in Eritrea, das unter der

Leitung der GIZ von einem EU-Länderkonsortium implementiert werden soll. Die GIZ sagt über das Projekt Folgendes:

„In ausgewählten Ländern sollen Trainings für Grenzbeamte zu den Rechten von Migranten und Flüchtlingen angeboten werden, um die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte sicherzustellen. Außerdem sollen die Beamten befähigt werden, schutzbedürftige Migranten und Flüchtlinge besser zu identifizieren und an passende Hilfsangebote weiterzuleiten. Im Sudan und in Eritrea ist geplant, die nationale Migrationspolitik zu beraten, sodass Menschenrechte und internationales Recht in der Gesetzgebung verankert werden. In Eritrea sollen zudem Justizbeamte wie beispielsweise Staatsanwälte geschult werden, um effektiver gegen Menschenschmuggel vorgehen zu können" (GIZ o.D.).

Das Eritrea-Projekt ist in jeder Hinsicht ohne klaren Fokus und an Absurdität kaum zu überbieten. Das Land erlaubt den Grenzübertritt nur mit einem Ausreisevisum, in dessen Genuss nur ein Bruchteil der Bevölkerung kommt. Eritreer, die vor dem zeitlich nicht begrenzten Nationaldienst fliehen, überqueren daher mithilfe von lokalen Helfern und Militärs, die systematisch in den Schmuggel ihrer eigenen Rekruten eingebunden sind, die Grenzen nach Äthiopien und Sudan, an denen Schießbefehl herrscht. Drakonische Strafen für aufgegriffene Deserteure sind an der Tagesordnung, auch wenn die Massenflucht nicht systematisch unterbunden wird, da die Geflüchteten von Europa aus Geld an ihre Familien schicken und somit auch eine neue Einkommensquelle für das Regime darstellen. Zusätzlich erhebt die Regierung eine Diasporasteuer in Höhe von zwei Prozent auf alle Einnahmen, auch auf Sozialleistungen, die die Geflüchteten in Europa erhalten (Hirt und Mohammad 2017).

Die GIZ will mithilfe ihres Programms diese Probleme durch geschulte Staatsanwälte angehen, die gegen den Menschenschmuggel einschreiten sollen. Problem hierbei ist, dass es in Eritrea an den rudimentärsten rechtsstaatlichen Grundlagen mangelt. Das Land hat weder eine Verfassung noch ist der Oberste Gerichtshof besetzt. Die Institution des Staatsanwaltes gibt es schlicht nicht, da der Staat, bzw. die Führungsclique um den Präsidenten, eine kleine Gruppe von Kadern der Regierungspartei und hochrangigen Militärs, sich nicht lange mit formaler Rechtsprechung abgibt. Menschen in Eritrea werden meist ohne Gerichtsverhandlung verhaftet und nach Monaten oder Jahren im Glücksfall wieder freigelassen. Die formale Ausbildung von Juristen wurde nach der Schließung der Universität in Asmara im Jahr 2006 eingestellt. Konflikte in der Bevölkerung werden nach traditionellem Gewohnheitsrecht gelöst. Dieses Beispiel von Fluchtursachenbekämpfung durch die EU/GIZ demonstriert, dass die europäischen Akteure die politisch-institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen für die Implementierung von Projekten ignorieren und damit sogar regimestabilisierend wirken.

Im Sudan ist geplant, schutzbedürftige Flüchtlinge besser zu unterstützen, sie gut zu versorgen und eine psychosoziale Betreuung für unbegleitete Jugendliche aufzubauen. Der UNHCR unterhält im Ost-Sudan seit den 1970er-Jahren Flüchtlingslager, die heute eher den Charakter permanenter Siedlungen haben. Die Verbesserung der dortigen Lebensbedingungen erscheint also durchaus sinnvoll. Allerdings verlässt das Gros der Flüchtlinge diese grenznahen Lager nicht nur aufgrund mangelnder ökonomischer Möglichkeiten so schnell wie möglich, sondern weil dort die Gefahr besteht, von Menschenhändlern aufgegriffen zu werden, die Lösegelder von Angehörigen erpressen, oder aber den miteinander kooperierenden sudanesi-

schen und eritreischen Behörden in die Hände zu fallen und deportiert zu werden. Insbesondere nach der Etablierung des Khartum-Prozesses wurden im Sudan im Auftrag der Regierung vermehrt eritreische Flüchtlinge von den sogenannten Rapid Support Forces aufgegriffen. Diese militärischen Einsatzkräfte waren zuvor unter dem Namen Djandjaweed-Milizen für die Verübung von Massakern in Darfur bekannt (Shah 2017).

In Nordafrika plant die EU ein Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP), welches u.a. die Einrichtung von „migrantenfreundlichen Inklusivleistungen" vorsieht, die den sozialen Zusammenhang stärken und Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten auf kommunaler Ebene schaffen sollen. Hierzu soll es mehr Kleinkredite sowie Crowdfunding-Plattformen in Nordafrika geben. In Libyen setzt die EU 20 Mio. EUR mit der Absicht ein, angesichts der weitverbreiteten Ausbeutung und der systematischen Misshandlung von Flüchtlingen ein Minimum an menschenwürdigen Lebensbedingungen für Migranten zu garantieren. Hierzu soll es Interventionen in Aufnahmezentren und Haftanstalten für Migranten geben, die derzeit personell unzureichend ausgestattet seien (European Commission 2017: 3). Hier wird ignoriert, dass es sich bei Libyen um einen gescheiterten Staat handelt, in dem weite Gebiete von Warlords oder Ablegern des IS kontrolliert werden. Hier werden Migranten von organisierten Menschenhändlern und -schmugglern, aber auch von Sicherheitskräften festgehalten, um Lösegeld zu erpressen. Sie werden gezwungen, Verwandte anzurufen, die meist mehrere tausend Euro bezahlen müssen, bevor sie aus der Gefangenschaft entlassen werden (van Reisen und Mawere 2017; SAHAN und IGAD 2016: 14).

Insgesamt läuft die derzeit von der EU verfolgte Strategie zur Bekämpfung der Fluchtursachen auf eine Aufwertung autoritärer Regierungen hinaus, die von europäischen Politikern als Partner bei der Migrationsbekämpfung gesehen werden. Konsequenz ist, dass politische Reformen unwahrscheinlicher werden: der eritreische Präsident Isaias Afewerki sieht sich von der EU keineswegs unter Druck gesetzt, den zeitlich unbefristeten Nationaldienst als Hauptfluchtursache zu beenden. Äthiopiens Premier Hailemariam Desalegn diskutiert zwar mit Oppositionsgruppen, ohne aber das Machtmonopol seiner Regierungskoalition infrage stellen zu lassen, und Sudans Omar al-Beshir sieht sich gar legitimiert, die berüchtigten Djandjaweed-Milizen unter anderem Namen gegen Flüchtlinge einzusetzen. Erfolgreiche Fluchtursachenbekämpfung sieht anders aus. Noch immer scheinen viele europäische Entscheidungsträger die Motive der Flüchtenden als rein ökonomisch motiviert zu betrachten, allerdings sind es oft gerade die politischen Rahmenbedingungen, die es ihnen unmöglich machen, in der Heimat für ihren Lebensunterhalt zu sorgen (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2017).

Schwerpunkt „Grenzmanagement": das Beispiel Libyen

Trotz verschiedenster Versuche, Fluchtrouten durch den afrikanischen Kontinent undurchlässiger zu machen, sind die Zahlen der in Italien ankommenden Flüchtlinge nur vorübergehend zurückgegangen. Anfang Juli 2017 drohte die italienische Regierung gar, in Zukunft keine Flüchtlingsboote mehr aufzunehmen, wenn andere europäische Länder sich weiterhin weigern würden, die Last zu teilen. Nach Angaben der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) kamen im Jahr 2015 gut

150.000 Flüchtlinge und Migranten über das Mittelmeer nach Italien, im Jahr 2016 waren es über 180.000 und bis Ende Juni 2017 bereits mehr als 95.000. Die von der EU kurzfristig favorisierte Antwort auf diesen Anstieg ist die Ausbildung libyscher Küstenwächter, die im Idealfall die maritime Grenze schließen sollen. Das Problem, dass es sich bei Libyen um einen gescheiterten Staat mit drei konkurrierenden Regierungen und vielen unter Lokalverwaltung bzw. unter der Herrschaft von IS- und Al-Qaida-Ablegern stehenden Gebieten handelt, in denen keinerlei rechtsstaatliche Strukturen bestehen, wird ignoriert, indem man sich auf die Regierung der Nationalen Einheit stützt, die faktisch kaum Kontrolle über das Land ausübt. Dabei sind die Zustände durchaus bekannt: in einer aktuellen Lageeinschätzung des Auswärtigen Amtes heißt es, „dass in Libyen derzeit kein funktionierendes Justizwesen existiert" und dass kein staatliches Gewaltmonopol vorhanden ist (*Sea Watch News* 2017).

Ein UN-Report vom Juni 2017 fasst die zahlreichen gegen die libyschen Küstenwächter erhobenen Vorwürfe zusammen: demnach sind Mitglieder der Küstenwache eng mit diversen konkurrierenden Menschenhändlerringen verbunden und aktiv am Menschenschmuggel beteiligt. Sie gehen regelmäßig gewaltsam gegen Flüchtlinge vor und behinderten Schiffe von Nichtregierungsorganisationen wie Sea Watch und Ärzte ohne Grenzen bei der Seenotrettung. Beim Versuch, das Schmuggelgeschäft von Konkurrenten zu untergraben, beschossen Mitglieder der Küstenwache Migrantenboote auf dem Meer und führten so den Tod zahlreicher Menschen herbei. Zudem nahmen Küstenwächter Migranten fest, um sie zum Zwecke der Zwangsarbeit und sexuellen Ausbeutung zu internieren (UN Security Council 2017: 41, 103 und 133).

Unabhängig von der zweifelhaften Reputation der Küstenwache bedeutet eine Zurückweisung von Flüchtlingen nach Libyen einen eklatanten Bruch mit den ethischen Werten der EU. In einer aktuellen Fernsehreportage beschreibt der Journalist Michael Obert die Zustände in den Haftlagern vor Ort, wo Menschen wie Vieh zusammengepfercht werden und unter unsäglichen hygienischen Bedingungen dahinvegetieren müssen, mit den Worten: „für mich ist das die Hölle" (TTT 2017). Auch UNICEF berichtete im Februar 2017, dass tausende Frauen und Kinder monatelang in „Höllenlöchern" festgehalten und regelmäßig vergewaltigt und missbraucht würden (UNICEF 2017). Dennoch machen sich unvermindert weitere Flüchtlinge und Migranten nach Libyen auf, in der Hoffnung, die Festung Europa zu erreichen. In einer aktuellen Analyse kommt der UNHCR zu dem Schluss, dass die Wirtschaftskrise sowie systematischer Missbrauch und Ausbeutung von Flüchtlingen und Migranten in Libyen den Migrationsdruck nach Europa erhöhen (UNHCR und Altai Consulting 2017). Auf Dauer kann eine Abschottungspolitik, die sich lediglich auf die Verbesserung des „Grenzmanagements" in Staaten ohne rechtsstaatliche Mechanismen konzentriert, nicht wirken. Sie läuft eher Gefahr, menschenverachtende Regime zu stabilisieren, die blühende Schmuggelindustrie in Libyen zu fördern und somit den Flüchtlingsstrom aufrechtzuerhalten.

Kann man Fluchtursachen erfolgreich bekämpfen?

Der derzeitige Aktionismus der EU und die Vergabe von Mitteln zur Fluchtursachenbekämpfung nach dem Gießkannenprinzip, die sich wie im Beispiel Äthiopi-

en teilweise wenig von herkömmlicher Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unterscheidet, wird in dieser Form wenig bewirken. Vor allem müssen maßgeschneiderte Lösungsstrategien erarbeitet werden, die die jeweilige politische Situation in den Herkunftsländern berücksichtigt. Ein Land wie Äthiopien, das sehr viele Flüchtlinge aufnimmt und sich gleichzeitig um wirtschaftliche Entwicklung bemüht, muss anders behandelt werden als ein Regime, das wissentlich einen Massenexodus hervorruft und durch Reformunwilligkeit perpetuiert, wie die politische Führung Eritreas. Im Sudan ist hingegen professioneller Menschenschmuggel und -handel seit Jahren fest etabliert. Im Kontrast dazu gibt es Länder in Westafrika, in denen traditionell temporäre Arbeitsmigration ausgeübt wird, die durch Rücküberweisungen der Migranten auch der Entwicklung zugutekommt, und die über eine wesentlich stärker ausgebildete und freier agierende Zivilgesellschaft verfügen (Rühl 2017). Doch auch zivilgesellschaftliche Gruppen im Exil, wie z.B. die zahlreichen eritreischen Menschenrechtsgruppen in Europa, werden selten als Ratgeber herangezogen, wenn es um die Gestaltung bilateraler Zusammenarbeit und die Verbesserung der Situation im Heimatland geht.

Solche maßgeschneiderten Lösungsansätze könnten wie folgt aussehen:

- Temporäre legale Migration kann für viele Länder Westafrikas eine mögliche Lösung sein, die es ermöglicht, zum Arbeiten legal nach Europa einzureisen und danach wieder zurückzukehren (Follmar-Otto 2007). Hierbei ist darauf zu achten, dass eine solche Migration zum Anstieg prekärer Beschäftigungsverhältnisse führen kann, wie sie bereits heute in der saisonalen Landwirtschaft weitverbreitet sind. Zudem verhindern kurzfristige Arbeitsverhältnisse die Qualifikation von Arbeitsmigranten, die bei ihrer Rückkehr einen Beitrag zur Entwicklung leisten könnten.
- Immer wieder werden vom UNHCR und von Menschenrechtsorganisationen vergeblich Asylverfahren auf afrikanischem Boden für Flüchtlinge mit hohem Anerkennungspotenzial gefordert, wie z.B. im Falle Eritreas. Eine solche Möglichkeit würde ein wirksames Mittel gegen Menschenhandel und -schmuggel darstellen. Für anerkannte Asylberechtigte sollten demnach legale Reisemöglichkeiten geschaffen werden, oder es sollten zumindest vermehrt Resettlement-Programme nach dem Vorbild der USA und Kanadas eingerichtet werden. Diese Länder nehmen eine kleine Zahl von Flüchtlingen aus Drittstaaten auf und gewähren ihnen einen dauerhaften Aufenthaltsstatus.
- Regierungen, die sich als reformunwillig gezeigt haben und schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen begangen haben und begehen wie in den Fällen Eritrea und Sudan, sollten nicht durch Entwicklungshilfeleistungen belohnt werden, die nicht an Reformbedingungen geknüpft sind. Das eritreische Regime profitiert derzeit dreifach vom Status quo: die Geflüchteten überweisen Geld an die Zurückgebliebenen und helfen so, das Regime zu stabilisieren, ohne dass hierbei wie in Westafrika Synergieeffekte auftreten, da marktwirtschaftliche Strukturen in Eritrea zerstört und durch eine Kommandowirtschaft ersetzt wurden. Günstlinge der Regierung profitieren (auch im Sudan) vom Menschenschmuggel und können so kooptiert werden, und schließlich fließt noch europäisches Geld in die Staatskassen der Länder, die für ihre fehlende Transparenz berüchtigt sind.
- In Ländern, die hunderttausende Flüchtlinge beherbergen wie Äthiopien, sollte viel stärker in die Schaffung von Arbeits- und Beschäftigungsmöglichkeiten vor

Ort investiert werden, wovon auch die umliegenden lokalen Gemeinden profitieren sollten. Migrationsrouten werden weniger durch Restriktion beeinflusst als durch die Wahrnehmung, in einem Land willkommen zu sein: Geflüchtete sind eher gewillt, in der Nähe ihres Herkunftslandes zu bleiben, wenn sie Arbeit und ein Auskommen haben und ihre Kinder zur Schule schicken können. Die Förderung von Kleinstunternehmen und Schaffung von Perspektiven außerhalb der Camps kann hierbei hilfreich sein. Auch im Sudan geht es nicht um die Ausbildung von Grenzschützern, sondern es sollte in Kleinkredite und Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen vor Ort investiert werden, um Flüchtlingen eine Bleibeperspektive zu bieten.

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GIGA-Forschung zum Thema

Das Forschungsteam 2 „Autoritäre Politik“ im Forschungsschwerpunkt 1 „Politische Verantwortlichkeit und Partizipation“ untersucht die Funktionslogik autoritärer Politik. Dabei werden Gemeinsamkeiten und Unterschiede im Hinblick auf

die Merkmale der Regime, ihrer Strategien und Praktiken sowie hinsichtlich ihrer Interaktion mit den Bürgern, sozialen Gruppen und der politischen Opposition analysiert. Das Dossier zum Thema „Flucht und Migration" informiert über die Forschung des GIGA: www.giga-hamburg.de/de/flucht-und-migration.

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Economic Partnership Agreements: Implications for Regional Governance and EU-ACP Development Cooperation

Summary

The controversial Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs) are currently back on the agenda, as several African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states are again faced with a loss of market access if they do not ratify their EPAs by 1 October 2016. To complicate matters, Brexit has introduced an element of uncertainty and is causing some ACP states to reconsider their decision to sign EPAs.

EPAs were introduced under the trade pillar of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA), which governs relations between the European Union (EU) and the ACP. EPAs represent a sea change in trade relations between the EU and the ACP: not only do they introduce reciprocity into trade preferences, they are organized on a regional basis, with the aim of promoting regional integration within the ACP. This Briefing Paper presents an update of the various EPA processes, and investigates the extent to which they have actually met the EU's stated aim of promoting regionalism in the ACP, as well as the EPAs alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the debate on the future of EU-ACP cooperation.

EPAs have been only partially effective in facilitating regional integration in the ACP. EPA negotiations have resulted in the conclusion of region-wide deals that align with existing integration initiatives in only three regions: the Caribbean, the East African Community (EAC), and West Africa. EPAs have acted as a 'mid-wife' to deeper integration in these regions, however it is a possibility that the EAC and West African EPAs will not be signed by the October deadline.

In the remaining regions – the Pacific, Central Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA), and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) – EPAs have made future prospects for regional integration more difficult, and in some cases may have contributed to a 'lock-in' of fragmented regionalism.

Part of the reason for this mixed record is tension between the CPA's principles of 'regionalization', which recognizes the importance of regional integration for development; and 'differentiation', which advocates treating states differently based on their level of development. EPAs aimed to encourage groups of states to sign the agreements as regional blocs, but the EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) regime undermines regional EPAs by offering Least Developed Countries (LDCs) non-reciprocal trade preferences. This splits ACP regions into LDCs versus non-LDCs, making it difficult to conclude regional EPAs.

Given the ongoing struggle to conclude regional EPAs, and the uncertainty of Brexit, the EU should consider extending the 1 October deadline, to allow ACP states more time to consider their positions and work on further harmonising regional relations.

As regional integration is key for the economic development of ACP states, future cooperation should be aware of the need for alignment of EPAs, the SDGs, and the goal of regional integration.

EPAs: Where do we stand?

As of August 2016, only one EPA region, the Caribbean, has a full regional EPA in force, as it was the only region to conclude a comprehensive deal by the initial deadline of December 2007. Three other regions – SADC, West Africa, and the EAC – have concluded regional EPAs, but the likelihood of signature is in doubt in West Africa and the EAC. Finally, there is little hope of regional EPAs materializing in the remaining regions of Central Africa, ESA, and the Pacific. LDCs in these configurations have opted to trade under EBA, while the non-LDCs have signed and ratified individual bilateral EPAs. Regional EPAs seem an unlikely outcome for these three configurations.

Of those regions which have concluded regional EPAs and are in the signing and ratification phase, the SADC Group is making the most progress. The seven members of the SADC configuration signed their EPA in June 2016. Although their EPA is not as extensive as the Caribbean EPA, nor does it included all 15 member states of SADC (see Figure 1), the ratification process is well underway.

The five members of the EAC configuration concluded a regional EPA in 2014. A signing ceremony was scheduled for 18 July 2016, but in the wake of Brexit, Tanzania announced that it would not sign the agreement, throwing the future of the EAC EPA into doubt and jeopardizing Kenya's continued market access.

As in the EAC, uncertainty prevails within the West African configuration. Despite having negotiated a regional EPA with the lowest market opening of any ACP region and a substantial development package, the regional EPA may still be scuppered by Nigerian opposition. Nigeria endorsed the EPA for signature in July 2014, however a change of government in May 2015 rekindled its reluctance to sign, based on domestic opposition from manufacturing and trade associations, and perceived incompatibility with its national Industrial Revolution Plan.

Regional consultations are under way to convince Nigeria and its lone supporter, Gambia, to sign. Yet it remains a possibility that Nigeria will not sign, putting the other non-LDCs in the region in a difficult position. Ghana and Ivory Coast still have their bilateral EPAs on the backburner, and will be sorely tempted to dust them off to maintain EU market access should regional consultations fail. This would undermine the Economic Community of West African States' (ECOWAS) existing level of integration, especially the recently implemented Common External Tariff (CET). The EU insists it will not be returning to the negotiating table to address Nigeria's concerns, so the following months represent a real test of regional solidarity.

Implications for regional governance

As the trade pillar of the CPA, EPAs intended to enhance regional integration in the ACP by 1) encouraging states that belong to multiple regional organizations to make difficult but decisive choices about their multiple memberships (see Fig. 1), contributing to more coherent integration; 2) putting external pressure on regions to formulate common positions on issues central to common trade policy; and 3) developing a shared culture of cooperation and balanced compromise within ACP regions through the negotiation process.

Figure 1: EPA configurations and associated regional organizations



Source: Author

However, outcomes have not necessarily met expectations. First, EPAs did not solve the overlap problem in southern, eastern and central Africa, and may have worsened the problem by 'locking-in' fragmented regionalism. The 15 member states of SADC have made commitments to the EU across three different EPA configurations, and although there are plans to harmonize overlap through the SADC-EAC-COMESA (Common Market of Southern and Eastern Africa) Tripartite and the African Union's (AU) planned Continental Free Trade Area, it is not clear how the differing and possibly conflicting commitments made under different EPAs could be reconciled with planned customs unions. A potential solution might be for the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), a sub-set of five SADC members, to form a southern African integration hub, and the EAC (a customs union since 2005) to form an East African hub, with each hub expanding outwards as states decide which union to join. Indeed, Mozambique is currently in negotiations to join SACU, and other SADC countries may follow suit. The EU might consider delaying the October deadline to allow regions time to further harmonise these overlapping regimes, and in the long term may have to allow for some flexibility and/or renegotiation on certain EPA provisions in order to promote further harmonization.

Second, neither the CPA, nor the consultative phase of the EPAs, gave any prescription on the degree of integration required for ACP regions to enter into negotiations, nor what level of integration should be obtained by the end of the EPA process. A CET is commonly regarded as a prerequisite for regions to enter into trade negotiations with external parties, and in some cases, EPA negotiations *have* facilitated the emergence of a CET. Negotiations with West Africa were put on hold for almost two years while the region finalized its CET, shortly afterwards concluding a region-wide EPA. EPA negotiations also accelerated regional integration in the EAC. It signed a customs union agreement in 2005, became an official EPA configuration in 2007, signed a common market protocol in 2010 and one on monetary integration in 2013, making it one of the most ambitious and fast-moving integration initiatives in the ACP. In such regions, where the membership of EPA configurations cohered with the borders of existing regional organizations, negotiations have served as a 'mid-wife' to deeper integration. In other regions, the sharpening of the regional agenda has been less acute, as states struggled to formulate regional responses to issues thrown up by the EPAs due to overlapping memberships and disparate trade preferences.

As far as stimulating a culture of cooperation, the negotiations again represent a mixed bag and seem to have been most successful in those regions where EPAs cohered with existing integration initiatives. In West Africa, the ECOWAS Commission's role in negotiations has strengthened its authority and autonomy vis-à-vis member states, and solidified a culture of supranational cooperation within the region. One could hardly say the same of SADC, where the EPA inflamed intra-regional tensions to the extent that SACU was threatened with disintegration. This impasse was only resolved by South Africa asserting its dominance within the group at the expense of the interests of smaller states (Murray-Evans, 2015); hardly a 'win' for establishing cultures of balanced compromise.

EPAs and the future of EU-ACP development co-operation

The EPAs were conceptualized as the trade pillar of the CPA, but they are likely to long outlive it. The CPA will expire in 2020, and both the ACP and the EU are currently contemplating the framework for post-2020 cooperation. The ACP Secretariat was not particularly visible nor influential during the negotiations, while the regionalized nature of the EPAs has led to regional organizations gaining visibility and influence at the expense of the ACP as a whole. As a result, the future of the ACP as an organization is in question. Currently its mandate overlaps with that of other organizations, and it is becoming less relevant on the international stage, as signalled by the low attendance of Heads of State at ACP summits. The shared interests of a group that were a consequence of the 'colonial hangover' no longer seems sufficient to generate collective action amongst a diverse group of 79 states. Evaluations show that the gains of political and trade cooperation within the EU-ACP framework have been limited, and the framework is ill-equipped to deal with implementing the Sustainable Development Agenda, due to its focus on traditional North-South development cooperation, and its poor record on civil society engagement, (Bossuyt, Keijzer, Medinilla, & De Tollenaere, 2016). One suggested reform is to integrate the increasingly regionalized dynamics and keep the ACP as an 'umbrella' organization, tasked with facilitating exchange of information between regions. However, the Secretariat's failure to perform even this perfunctory task during EPA negotiations makes this an unconvincing suggestion. Although there are vested interests and path dependencies advocating the continuation of EU-ACP cooperation along the lines of the CPA, the time is ripe to consider reforming cooperation along regional lines. Regional institutions are already in place throughout the ACP, and a more regionalized approach to EU-ACP cooperation would allow ACP regions to shape cooperation with the EU in a manner better suited to their regional specificities, instead of a catch-all framework intended to cover 79 states.

EPAs and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

Trade is a key instrument for the delivery of the SDGs, but 'done wrong' trade liberalization can exacerbate, rather than relieve poverty. EPAs relate most strongly to Goal 17: global partnership for sustainable development (see Box 1) but, as they currently stand, there are several tensions and trade-offs between the suggested targets and the EPAs themselves.

Target 17.10 does not recognise the reality of regulatory standards being set outside of the World Trade Organization (WTO), in interregional forums such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). Most developing countries do not have a voice in the setting of trade rules and standards in

Box 1: EPAs and Sustainable Development Goals

EPAs are most relevant for **Goal 17: Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize global partnership for sustainable development.**

Relevant targets:
17.10: Promote a universal, rules-based, open, non-discriminatory and equitable multilateral trading system under the WTO.
17.11: Increase the exports of developing countries. In particular, double LDCs' share of global exports by 2020.
17.12: Grant duty free quota free market access to all LDCs, and ensure that preferential rules of origin are transparent and simple.
17.15: Respect each country's policy space to implement policies for poverty eradication and sustainable development
The EPAs are also relevant for other targets:
2.b: Correct trade distortions in world agricultural markets, through the elimination of agricultural export subsidies.
8.a: Increase Aid for Trade support for developing countries, in particular LDCs.

Source: United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2016)

these negotiations that will have a knock-on effect on them. Nevertheless, trade agreements outside the multilateral system can make positive contributions to SDGs. EPAs make a positive contribution to targets 17.12, 2.b, and 8.a, by granting ACP states duty-free quota-free access to EU markets, improving rules of origin, eliminating subsidies on produce exported to ACP states, and offering Aid for Trade packages to assist in implementation of the EPAs. However, a tension arises in relation to target 17.15, as EPAs have the effect of eroding policy space in signatory countries. The EU's push to include clauses restricting the use of export taxes, safeguard mechanisms, and infant industry protection were a major factor in some states' scepticism of EPAs, particularly for middle-income countries seeking to move up the industrialization ladder. EPAs *do* allow mechanisms to protect some economic sectors under certain conditions, but the fact remains that restricted policy space is the price non-LDCs must pay to maintain access to EU markets.

Conclusions and recommendations

EPA negotiations have a mixed record in encouraging regional integration in the ACP. They have only achieved the stated objective of encouraging deeper integration in regions in which the EPA configuration coheres with the boundaries of pre-existing regional organizations. Even in these regions it is uncertain whether signing and ratification will proceed as planned. Tension between the CPA's principles of regional integration and differentiation when it comes to trade policy is one of the reasons for this mixed record. A post-Cotonou framework for cooperation between the EU and ACP states should try to reduce this inconsistency in order to promote greater harmonization of regional initiatives in Africa.

In the medium- to long-term, policymakers on both sides should consider reformulating post-2020 relations along more regionalised lines. The ACP Secretariat proved to be an ineffectual actor in EPA negotiations and there is little material interest to bind together countries as diverse as Swaziland, Chad and Tuvalu. Regional organizations such as the Caribbean Community (CARICOM), ECOWAS and EAC, even continental organizations such as the AU, are better placed to serve their member states' interests and solve collective action problems than an organization as unwieldy as the ACP.

In the short term, given African states' ongoing efforts to harmonize various overlapping initiatives, and the uncertainty caused by Brexit, the EU should consider extending the October 2016 deadline. Enforcing the deadline risks pushing non-LDCs in West Africa and the EAC into breaking away from their regional EPAs in favour of bilateral EPAs, which will only serve to introduce an extra layer of complexity to the 'spaghetti bowl' of African regionalism.

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

Afrika – Länder und Regionen

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Editorial

Afrikas Vielfalt sprengt alle Dimensionen: Auf einem Kontinent von über 30 Millionen Quadratkilometern mit unterschiedlichsten Klima- und Vegetationszonen lebten 2008 circa 967 Millionen Menschen, gegliedert in mehrere tausend Ethnien sowie etwa zweitausend eigenständige Sprachgruppen, territorial verteilt auf 53 Staaten.

Diese Staaten wiederum präsentieren sich in Flächenausdehnung, Bevölkerungszahl, naturräumlicher Gestaltung, Ressourcenausstattung und Regierungssystem äußerst heterogen: Dem Flächenstaat Sudan (2,5 Millionen Quadratkilometer) stehen kleinräumige Länder wie Gambia (11 300 Quadratkilometer) gegenüber. Das dicht besiedelte Nigeria ist mit rund 148 Millionen Einwohnern der bevölkerungsreichste Staat Afrikas, während in Mauretanien auf größerer Fläche nur 3,3 Millionen leben. Auch die natürlichen Ressourcen sind unterschiedlich verteilt: Senegal muss seine Einkünfte vornehmlich aus Fischerei und Phosphatvorkommen erzielen, während die Demokratische Republik Kongo reich an Gold, Kupfer, Erzen und Diamanten ist. Selbst innerhalb eines Landes treffen Gegensätze aufeinander. So ist Kenias Nordosten immer wieder von Dürre bedroht, während der grüne Südwesten unter anderem den Teeanbau ermöglicht. Das Spektrum der Regierungssysteme variiert von Monarchien (Marokko, Swasiland) über autokratische Systeme (Äquatorial-Guinea, Sudan) zu Demokratien (etwa Südafrika, Ghana und Mali). Daneben gibt es Länder, in denen der Staat jegliche Macht verloren hat, wie Somalia, die Zentralafrikanische Republik und die DR Kongo.

Schon aus dieser Gegenüberstellung wird deutlich, dass pauschale Aussagen der differenzierten Realität Afrikas nicht gerecht werden, speziell dann, wenn sie Ursachen und Hintergründe für bestimmte Erscheinungen wie schwache Staatlichkeit, Bürgerkriege, Entwicklungsdefizite und Armut ausblenden.

Angesichts dieser Ausgangssituation wirkt es geradezu vermessen, den Kontinent auf dem knappen Raum von Heftausgaben zu behandeln. Als Kompromiss hat die Redaktion sich entschlossen, Afrika wie bereits 1999 und 2001 erneut zwei Hefte zu widmen. Damals waren sie geographisch geteilt in Afrika südlich (Heft Nr. 264) und nördlich der Sahara (Heft Nr. 272). Jetzt stellen zwei aufeinander folgende Heftausgaben zunächst Regionen und ausgewählte Länder Afrikas vor, um den Kontinent dann im zweiten Ansatz nach Schwerpunktthemen zu betrachten.

Das vorliegende Heft gliedert Afrika in fünf geographische Großräume, die jeweils in einem einführenden Kapitel in ihren wesentlichen Entwicklungen und Besonderheiten überblicksartig vorgestellt werden. Die Einteilung in Nord-, West- und Zentralafrika, das Horn von Afrika plus Ostafrika sowie das südliche Afrika entspricht der Zuordnung, welche die Afrikanische Union – der Zusammenschluss der unabhängigen afrikanischen Staaten – selbst vorgenommen hat. Jedem dieser Überblickskapitel folgen Analysen zu Ländern, die innerhalb der jeweiligen Region einen Sonderstatus einnehmen oder deren Charakteristika in beispielhafter Weise konkretisieren.

Aus der individuellen Herangehensweise der hier versammelten Expertinnen und Experten ergibt sich ein facettenreiches Bild, das den Schwerpunkt auf die historische Entwicklung und auf die aktuelle politische und wirtschaftliche Situation der jeweils behandelten Staaten legt.

Dem entspricht der Kartenteil, der neben einer physischen Darstellung und einer doppelseitigen Wirtschaftskarte die territoriale und politische Entwicklung Afrikas seit der Kolonialzeit aufgreift.

In der Gesamtheit ergibt sich ein Überblick, der Kenntnisse über die Regionen und einzelne Länder Afrikas vermittelt, ihre Entwicklungswege und ihren Entwicklungsstand aus ihrer Geschichte und ihren spezifischen Gegebenheiten erklärt und ihre Zukunftsperspektiven beleuchtet. Es ist ein Ausgangspunkt, der nach dem Wunsch der Redaktion die Neugier auf die Vielfalt Afrikas wecken soll.

Christine Hesse

Isabelle Werenfels

Nordafrika: Scharnier zwischen Afrika und Europa

Seine islamisch-arabische Prägung und seine Nähe zu Europa verleihen Nordafrika eine Sonderstellung auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent. Auch politisch und sozioökonomisch haben die Staaten der Region Gemeinsamkeiten.

Bildagentur-online

Landschaft bei Ouarzazate im Süden Marokkos, im Hintergrund der Hohe Atlas

Geographisch ist Nordafrika leicht zu umreißen. Es reicht vom Nil und Suezkanal im Osten bis zum Atlantik im Westen, vom Mittelmeer im Norden bis in die Sahara im Süden, und es umfasst die Länder Ägypten, Libyen, Tunesien, Algerien und Marokko. Gelegentlich – so auch in diesem Heft – wird Mauretanien ebenfalls dazu gezählt, weil es sich selbst als Teil des so genannten großen Maghreb *(al-maghrib*: arabisch für Westen) sieht. Dies führt zur wesentlich komplizierteren Frage der Selbstdefinition der Staaten in der Region sowie zur Frage ihrer politischen Zugehörigkeiten.

Ägypten beispielsweise liegt geographisch zwischen dem Maghreb und dem Mashrek, dem arabischen Osten. Es versteht sich selbst als zentraler Akteur in der arabischen Welt, spielt in der Arabischen Liga eine dominante Rolle und wird von westlichen Staaten als wichtiger Vermittler im Nahostkonflikt betrachtet. Folglich kann es politisch eher zum Nahen Osten gezählt werden – umso mehr, als sich die anderen Staaten Nordafrikas 1989 in der maghrebinisch-arabischen Union (UMA) zusammengeschlossen haben. Diese auf regionale Integration angelegte Organisation existiert im Grunde nur auf dem Papier (letztes Gipfeltreffen 1994). Doch ändert dies wenig an der vor allem in den maghrebinischen Kernstaaten Algerien, Marokko und Tunesien existierenden Wahrnehmung des Maghrebs als einer Region für sich. Diese gründet in ähnlichen historischen Erfahrungen sowie einander verwandten gesellschaftlichen, ethnischen und kulturellen Strukturen. Für Nordafrika insgesamt gilt, dass es innerhalb des afrikanischen Kontinents aufgrund seiner eindeutigen islamisch-arabischen Prägung sowie seiner historischen und geographischen Nähe zu Europa eine Sonderstellung einnimmt.

Langzeitfolgen des Kolonialismus

Während Ägypten bereits 1922 unabhängig wurde, erreichten die Staaten Nordafrikas ihre Unabhängigkeit von 1951 bis 1962 (Libyen Ende 1951; Marokko und Tunesien 1956; Mauretanien 1960; Algerien 1962). Zuvor hatte die ursprünglich aus Berberstämmen bestehende Bevölkerung des Maghreb Jahrhunderte der Fremdherrschaft erlebt. Diese begann mit den Phöniziern (15. bis 8. Jh. v. Chr.) und führte über die Römer (146 v. bis 5. Jh. n. Chr.), die Invasion der Araber (ab 670), mit der die Islamisierung der Region einherging, bis hin zum Osmanischen Reich, das vor Marokko allerdings haltmachte, und endete in der Moderne im europäischen Kolonialismus. In Libyen kostete der italienische Kolonialismus (1911 bis 1943) mehr als der Hälfte der ländlichen Bevölkerung das Leben, in Algerien forderte der Befreiungskampf gegen Frankreich (1954 bis 1962) Hunderttausende von Opfern.

Land Hauptstadt		*Fläche* in km²	*Bevölkerung* 2007	*Bevölk.-wachstum* 2007, in Prozent	*Religion* in Prozent	*BIP/Kopf* PPP US-Dollar/ Rang 2006	*HDI Rang* 2006
Ägypten Kairo		1.001.500	75,47 Mio.	1,7	Muslime: ca. 90 Christen: ca. 10	4.953 / 99	116
Algerien Algier		2.381.700	33,85 Mio.	1,5	Islam (Staatsreligion) Christen: < 3	7.426 / 81	100
Libyen Tripolis		1.759.500	6,16 Mio.	1,9	Islam	13.362 / 54	52
Marokko Rabat		446.600	30,86 Mio.	1,2	Islam	3.915 / 114	127
Mauretanien Nouakchott		1.030.700	3,12 Mio.	2,5	Islam (Staatsreligion)	1.890 / 137	140
Tunesien Tunis		163.600	10,25 Mio.	1,2	Islam sehr kleine jüdische und christliche Gemeinden	6.958 / 87	95

Spalten 2-4: Weltbank; Spalte 5: Auswärtiges Amt (Zeitpunkt der Abfrage: April 2009); Spalten 6 und 7: UNDP

Die kolonialen Spuren sind bis in die Gegenwart deutlich sichtbar: an den engen wirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen der maghrebinischen Staaten mit den ehemaligen Kolonial- oder Protektoratsmächten Frankreich (Algerien, Marokko, Mauretanien), Spanien (Teile Marokkos) und Italien (Libyen) genauso wie an den komplexen kulturellen Verbindungen und dornigen politischen Beziehungen zu diesen Staaten. In den maghrebinischen Kernländern hat der Kolonialismus zu einer bis heute währenden Spaltung in Französisch sprechende Eliten einerseits und Arabisch sprechende Bevölkerungsmehrheiten andererseits geführt. Insbesondere in Algerien, wo es überdies wie in Marokko eine starke Berberbewegung gibt, hat dies massive soziale Spannungen und bis heute ungelöste Identitätskonflikte mit sich gebracht. Eine indirekte Folge der Dekolonisierung ist der Konflikt um die Westsahara.

Ägypten stellt auch in Bezug auf seine Kolonialgeschichte eine Ausnahme dar. Es wurde von den Briten kolonisiert – die im Gegensatz zu den Franzosen und Italienern wesentlich zurückhaltender vorgingen – und früh in die Unabhängigkeit entlassen. Auch mit Blick auf die Bevölkerungsstruktur unterscheidet sich das Land am Nil von seinen Nachbarn im Westen: Es ist der einzige Staat Nordafrikas mit einer nennenswerten christlichen Minderheit, den so genannten Kopten (rund zehn Prozent der Bevölkerung). Die dominante Religion in Nordafrika insgesamt ist der sunnitische Islam.

Autoritäre Regime

Gemeinsamkeiten weisen die nordafrikanischen Staaten nicht zuletzt in Bezug auf ihre politischen Regime auf. In all diesen Staaten haben die postkolonialen Eliten ihr Versprechen der Demokratisierung nicht eingelöst. Ende 2008 existierten in Nordafrika ausschließlich autoritäre Regime, wenn auch in unterschiedlicher Ausprägung. Im regionalen Vergleich schon fast ein Leuchtturm an politischen Freiheiten ist die marokkanische Monarchie. Allerdings hängt der beachtliche Grad an Pluralismus eng an der Person des Königs, Mohammed VI., da die Verfassung dem Monarchen nach wie vor nahezu absolute Macht garantiert.

Am anderen Ende des Spektrums stehen die äußerst autoritären Republiken Tunesien und Libyen. Tunesien verwandelte Präsident Ben Ali nach seiner Machtübernahme 1987 schrittweise in einen Polizeistaat. In Libyen richtete der selbsternannte Revolutionsführer Muammar al-Gaddafi ein so genanntes basis-demokratisches System ein, das de facto von ihm manipuliert und von geheimpolizeilichen Organen kontrolliert wird.

Einen gewissen Grad an Pluralismus weisen Algerien, Ägypten und Mauretanien auf, doch geht er in Algerien und Ägypten nicht sehr tief. Vielmehr sind es Versuche der Regime, kontrollierbare Ventile für den Unmut der Bevölkerung zu

schaffen. Mauretanien dagegen galt nach einem Coup durch demokratisch orientierte Militärs 2005 vorübergehend als der demokratische Hoffnungsträger der arabischen Welt. Diese Hoffnungen wurden durch einen erneuten Militärputsch im Sommer 2008 zunichte gemacht.

Unterschiedlich erfolgreiche Strukturreformen

Während politische Reformprozesse in der Region kaum voranschreiten, haben die meisten nordafrikanischen Regime ab den 1990er Jahren wirtschaftliche Strukturreformen eingeleitet. Auffallend dabei ist, dass die marktwirtschaftlichen Reformen in den erdöl- und erdgasreichen Staaten Algerien und Libyen am langsamsten vorankamen. Mit dem seit der Jahrtausendwende kontinuierlich steigenden Erdölpreis bestand für die beiden Länder kein unmittelbarer Anreiz, ihre Volkswirtschaften, in denen rund 98 Prozent (2007) der Exporteinnahmen aus dem Erdöl- und Erdgassektor kamen, zu diversifizieren.

Ganz im Gegensatz dazu sahen sich Ägypten, das über weit weniger fossile Ressourcen verfügt, sowie Tunesien und Marokko, die kein Erdöl exportieren, schon in den 1980er Jahren gezwungen, ihre wirtschaftlichen Strukturen auf Wettbewerbsfähigkeit in internationalen Märkten auszurichten. Insbesondere in Tunesien waren diese Reformen im regionalen Vergleich sehr erfolgreich. Der damit verbundene Anstieg des Lebensstandards erklärt nicht zuletzt, warum sich hier die Opposition gegen das repressive System in Grenzen hält.

In Marokko und Ägypten dagegen ist es nicht gelungen, die bestehende enorme Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich sowie zwischen verschiedenen Regionen zu überwinden. Mauretanien, das vor wenigen Jahren noch zu den 20 ärmsten Ländern der Welt gehörte, konnte durch Reformen sowie dank (bescheidener) Erdölfunde den Lebensstandard der Bevölkerung anheben. Doch rangiert es, genauso wie Marokko, im *Human Development Index* der Vereinten Nationen noch immer auf einem der hinteren Plätze (2006: 140 von 179 Staaten).

Letztlich weisen alle Staaten Nordafrikas, mit der eingeschränkten Ausnahme Tunesiens, ähnliche strukturelle Defizite auf: ungenügende Regierungsführung, hohe Korruption und wenig Rechtssicherheit sowie fließende Grenzen zwischen formellem und informellem Sektor und zwischen privaten und öffentlichen Interessen von Staatsangestellten. All dies hat negative Folgen für ausländische Investitionen außerhalb der Erdölsektoren.

die bildstelle / REX FEATURES LTD.

Nordafrika ist islamisch-arabisch geprägt. Junges Paar in Kairo 2008

Maurice Weiss / OSTKREUZ

Die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit ist hoch. „Hittistes" (Mauersteher) in Algier

Massive sozioökonomische Herausforderungen

Der ungleiche Zugang zu staatlichen Ressourcen, steigende Lebenshaltungskosten bei niedrigen Löhnen, strukturell hohe Arbeitslosigkeit und nicht zuletzt politische Repression sind Probleme, die in Nordafrika seit Jahrzehnten immer wieder zu Unruhen und Aufständen führen. Diese Faktoren trugen ab den 1960er Jahren maßgeblich zum Erstarken der islamistischen Bewegungen bei. Auch hinter den vordergründig ethnischen oder religiösen Konflikten verbergen sich meist sozioökonomische und politische Verteilungskämpfe. Dies gilt für Spannungen zwischen Berbern und Arabern in Algerien genauso wie für diejenigen zwischen Schwarzafrikanern und Mauren in Mauretanien oder zwischen Muslimen und Kopten in Ägypten.

Eine Reihe politischer und gesellschaftlicher Probleme hat sich im Zuge der demographischen Entwicklungen sowie der medialen Globalisierung weiter verschärft. Insbesondere die Situation von Jugendlichen ist in der ganzen Region von Perspektivlosigkeit geprägt. Die Bildungssysteme sind veraltet, überlastet und orientieren sich nicht an den Bedürfnissen des Arbeitsmarktes. Die Jugendarbeitslosigkeit liegt in den meisten nordafrikanischen Staaten weit über 30 Prozent, und die mit der hohen Urbanisierung einhergehende anhaltende Wohnungsnot erschwert die Familiengründung. Gleichzeitig sind die Ansprüche der Jugendlichen an ihre Lebensumstände gestiegen – nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Verbreitung des Satellitenfernsehens, über das westliche Lebensmodelle genauso wie golfarabischer Reichtum in die Armutsviertel von Kairo, Casablanca und Algier getragen werden. Die Wege, die sich nordafrikanische Jugendliche aus der Trostlosigkeit suchen, sind vielfältig und zuweilen problematisch: Sie können von illegalen Migrationsversuchen nach Europa, Flucht in Kriminalität und Drogen bis hin zur Zuwendung zu radikalen islamistischen Gruppen reichen.

Der so genannte *Youth Bulge* (Jugendüberschuss) mit seinen direkten Folgen ist indes nur ein Aspekt der demographisch bedingten Herausforderungen. Da in Teilen Nordafrikas die Geburtenraten sinken, wird in wenigen Jahrzehnten auch hier die Überalterung der Gesellschaft zum Problem werden. An-

gesichts der nur ungenügend ausgebauten staatlichen Altersvorsorge dürften die Folgen noch gravierender als in Europa sein. Überdies führen Bevölkerungswachstum und Klimawandel dazu, dass natürliche Ressourcen wie Land und Wasser zunehmend knapper werden.

Wechselseitige und auswärtige Beziehungen

Letztlich können die nordafrikanischen Staaten die Folgen des Klimawandels, den Migrationsdruck aus Afrika oder den Kampf gegen die sich zunehmend regional vernetzenden bewaffneten islamistischen Gruppen nur durch eine enge regionale Kooperation erfolgreich angehen. Allerdings stehen die Chancen dafür nicht sonderlich gut. Ägypten versteht sich nur bedingt als Teil der Region, und der Maghreb war 2007 nach Erkenntnissen der Weltbank die am wenigsten integrierte Region weltweit. Dies lag maßgeblich am anhaltenden Konflikt um die Westsahara, der zu geschlossenen Grenzen zwischen den bevölkerungsreichsten Staaten der Region, Algerien und Marokko, führte. Aber auch die regionalen Vormachtansprüche Algeriens, Libyens und Marokkos erschwerten die Kooperation. Insbesondere die erdölreichen Länder der Region zeigten eine starke Präferenz für bilaterale Zusammenarbeit mit einzelnen Staaten der Europäischen Union sowie den USA und – zunehmend – China und Russland. Europa blieb für alle Maghrebstaaten der wichtigste politische, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Bezugspunkt. Gleichzeitig engagierten sich vor allem Algerien, Libyen und Marokko wirtschaftlich in Afrika und zeigten dort auch Gestaltungsambitionen. Eine gewisse Ausnahme bildete einmal mehr Ägypten, dessen wichtigste außenpolitische Bezugspunkte die USA und die Akteure des Nahostkonflikts blieben.

Islamismus in Nordafrika

Isabelle Werenfels

Das massive Erstarken islamistischer Bewegungen in Nordafrika begann in Ägypten in den 1960er Jahren, in den maghrebinischen Kernstaaten in den späten 1970er Jahren. Lediglich in Mauretanien ist der Islamismus ein relativ neues Phänomen. Ausschlaggebend waren Krisen der jeweiligen postkolonialen Entwicklungsmodelle, die mit spezifischen internationalen Entwicklungen zusammen fielen. Zwar unterschieden sich die verschiedenen autoritären Systeme Nordafrikas beträchtlich, gemeinsam waren ihnen jedoch:

- *mangelnde politische Partizipation sowie Unterdrückung von Oppositionellen;*
- *soziale Ungerechtigkeit;*
- *ökonomische Strukturprobleme, die in Kombination mit einem wachsenden demographischen Ungleichgewicht eine hohe Jugendarbeitslosigkeit bewirkten;*
- *sowie – vor allem in den Maghrebstaaten – Wertekonflikte zwischen westlich orientierten Eliten und einer Mehrheit der Bevölkerung.*

Internationale Entwicklungen und Einflüsse führten maßgeblich dazu, dass diese Gemengelage den Islamisten stärker in die Hände spielte als linken Akteuren. Dazu gehören die arabischen Niederlagen in den israelisch-arabischen Kriegen, die islamische Revolution im Iran 1979 und der Krieg in Afghanistan, der den Grundstein für eine gewaltbereite islamistische Internationale legte, ebenso wie das Friedensabkommen zwischen Israel und Ägypten 1979 und das Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts. Letztere machten auch die arabisch-nationalistische bzw. die sozialistische Utopie zunichte. Die dadurch aufkommende ideelle Orientierungslosigkeit – kombiniert mit länderspezifischen gesellschaftlichen Wertekrisen und ökonomischen Schocks – bereitete nationalen islamistischen Massenbewegungen einen fruchtbaren Boden. Schließlich haben auch die beiden Kriege der jeweils US-geführten internationalen Koalitionen gegen den Irak 1991 und 2003 islamistische Bewegungen gestärkt. Der letzte Irakkrieg ist, genauso wie die anhaltende israelische Besatzungspolitik, nach wie vor ein zentraler Faktor, der islamistischen Bewegungen – oder zumindest deren Propaganda – weltweit Auftrieb gibt.

Auch wenn die nordafrikanischen Regime zeitweise eine gewisse Toleranz gegenüber dem Aufbau islamistischer sozialer Netzwerke zeigten, reagierten sie überwiegend mit Repression auf deren politische Aktivitäten – unabhängig davon, ob islamistische Akteure mit Waffen das Regime stürzen wollten oder durch Wahlen an die Macht strebten. In Ägypten wurde der Vordenker des militanten Flügels der Muslimbrüder, Sayyid Qutb, schon 1966 hingerichtet. In Algerien und Tunesien konnten sich islamistische Akteure Ende der 1980er und Anfang der 1990er Jahre zwar an Wahlen beteiligen, doch reagierten die Regime auf deren Wahlerfolge mit dem Ausschluss der Islamisten vom politischen Prozess und ihrer brutalen Verfolgung. In Algerien folgte darauf ein mehrere Jahre währender Bürgerkrieg in den 1990er Jahren. Auch in Libyen kam es in den 1990er Jahren zu blutigen Konfrontationen zwischen Sicherheitskräften und Islamisten. Lediglich Marokko erlebte keine größeren bewaffneten Auseinandersetzungen. Hier gab es schon früh Versuche der Monarchie, Islamisten ins System einzubinden; wer nicht mitmachte, war allerdings Schikanen ausgesetzt.

Nicht zuletzt aufgrund der genannten Konfrontationen durchliefen die islamistischen Bewegungen Nordafrikas ab den 1990er Jahren Spaltungsprozesse. Ein kleine Minderheit der islamistischen Akteure wandte sich dem bewaffneten internationalen Dschihadismus zu. Dabei kam es bei den maghrebinischen Gruppen ab 2006 zu einem zumindest rhetorischen Schulterschluss mit dem Al-Qaida Netzwerk sowie einer Panmaghrebisierung militanter Aktivitäten. Die überwältigende Mehrheit der Islamisten dagegen strebte die Veränderung nationaler gesellschaftlicher, politischer und wirtschaftlicher Strukturen durch Beteiligung am politischen Prozess an. Dabei unterschieden sie sich oft nur geringfügig von anderen wertkonservativen politischen Kräften in der Region. Seit 1997 sitzt in Marokko eine islamistische Partei im Parlament und ist in Algerien eine solche Partei Teil der Regierungskoalition. In Ägypten und Mauretanien sind in den Wahlen nach der Jahrtausendwende zahlreiche Islamisten als Unabhängige ins Parlament eingezogen. Einzig in Tunesien und Libyen bleiben Islamisten vom politischen Prozess ausgeschlossen.

Ägypten

Stephan Roll / Thomas Demmelhuber

Systemkrise

Bereits in den späten 1950er Jahren, unter der Präsidentschaft Gamal Abdel Nassers (1954 bis 1970), hatte sich in Ägypten eine staatszentrierte Herrschaftsordnung herausgebildet: Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft wurden weitgehender staatlicher Kontrolle unterworfen. Mitglieder der militärisch-bürokratischen Herrschaftselite, die in einem Loyalitätsverhältnis zum Staatspräsidenten standen, besetzten alle herrschaftspolitisch relevanten Ämter. Politische Gegner befriedete die Staatsführung durch Ämterpatronage und materielle Privilegien oder bekämpfte sie mit repressiven Mitteln. Ein umfangreiches System sozialer Sicherungen (vor allem in Form von Subventionen) und ein dominanter Polizei- und Sicherheitsapparat stellten die politische Abstinenz der Massen sicher.

Wirtschaftlich getragen wurde dieses Herrschaftssystem zu einem beträchtlichen Teil durch den Zufluss von ökonomischen und politischen Renten, Einnahmen also, denen kein entsprechender Arbeits- oder Investitionsaufwand vorausgegangen war. Hierzu gehören Erträge aus der Nutzung des Suezkanals, Rücküberweisungen von ägyptischen Gastarbeitern im Ausland, Gewinne aus dem Export von Erdgas und Erdöl und, zu einem großen Teil, politisch motivierte Transferzahlungen wie Entwicklungs- und Militärhilfe. Diese Abhängigkeit von externen Mittelzuflüssen blieb auch unter der Präsidentschaft von Nassers Nachfolger, Anwar as-Sadat (1970 bis 1981), bestehen. Zwar kam es unter Sadat zu vorsichtigen Reformen des staatszentrierten Wirtschaftssystems, diese reichten jedoch keineswegs aus, um die Wirtschaftsleistung des Landes tatsächlich zu erhöhen und hierdurch die expandierenden Staatsausgaben zu finanzieren. Schätzungen zu Folge betrug der Anteil der Rentenzuflüsse an den Staatseinnahmen in den 1980er Jahren bis zu einem Drittel. Hinzu kamen Entwicklungskredite, die Ägypten dank seiner politischen Bedeutung für den Nahost-Friedensprozess und seiner geostrategischen Lage als Transitland am Suezkanal zu vergleichsweise günstigen Konditionen aufnehmen konnte. Gemessen am Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) zählte Ägypten in den 1980er Jahren zu einem der höchstverschuldeten Länder weltweit.

Gegen Ende der 1980er Jahre geriet das Land aufgrund von Einnahmeausfällen durch den sinkenden Weltmarktpreis für Rohöl, eines drastischen Rückgangs der Rücküberweisungen ägyptischer Gastarbeiter in den Golfstaaten und der immensen Schuldenlast in Zahlungsschwierigkeiten. Nach mehrjährigen Verhandlungen mit dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF), der Weltbank und den Gläubigerländern erklärte sich die ägyptische Staatsführung unter Husni Mubarak 1991 schließlich bereit, ein wirtschaftliches Strukturanpassungsprogramm aufzulegen: Als Gegenleistung für weitere internationale Finanzhilfen und einen umfangreichen Schuldenerlass sollte das staatlich dominierte Wirtschaftssystem schrittweise in eine international wettbewerbsfähige Marktwirtschaft überführt werden.

Der Nil ist eine wichtige Lebensader Ägyptens.

hemis / laif

Einseitige Reformen

Die Umsetzung der vereinbarten wirtschaftlichen Reformmaßnahmen blieb jedoch weit hinter den Ankündigungen zurück. Dies betraf besonders die Privatisierung staatlicher Unternehmen. Das „Reformtheater“ reichte somit zwar aus, um sich internationale Finanzhilfen zu sichern, nicht jedoch, um einen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung zu erreichen, geschweige denn die soziale Situation der breiten Bevölkerung zu verbessern. Während in den 1990er Jahren Wirtschaftsreformen hinausgezögert oder nur mangelhaft ausgeführt wurden, unterblieb die Reform des politischen Systems gänzlich. Zu groß war die Angst des Regimes vor einem Machtverlust vor allem zugunsten gewaltbereiter Islamisten, denen es immer wieder gelang, Stadtteile und sogar ganze Städte unter ihre Kontrolle zu bringen. Im Rahmen des seit 1981 bestehenden Ausnahmezustands, der nach der Ermordung von Staatspräsident Anwar as-Sadat durch islamistische Extremisten ausgerufen worden war, ging der Staat mit aller Macht gegen jede Form politischer Opposition vor. Besonders hart fiel die Repression gegenüber Gruppierungen des Politischen Islam aus. Die Staatsführung unterschied dabei nicht zwischen moderaten Kräften wie der Muslimbruderschaft und extremistischen Gruppen wie der *Gama'a al-Islamiya* und dem islamischen Dschihad, die in den 1990er Jahren mit Anschlägen auf westliche Touristen auf sich aufmerksam machten. Neben dem Einsatz polizeistaatlicher Methoden versuchte die Regierung auch, sich selbst als Verteidigerin islamischer Werte zu positionieren (Propagierung eines Staatsislam), was jedoch der Popularität der Muslimbruderschaft kaum abträglich war. Die extremistischen Gruppierungen konnten letztlich mit allen Mitteln eines Militär- und Sicherheitsapparats zurückgedrängt werden; einige von ihnen erklärten sich seit 1997 zum Gewaltverzicht bereit.

Durch die zögerliche Reformpolitik der ägyptischen Regierung blieb das Land weiterhin anfällig für wirtschaftliche Krisen. Ende der 1990er Jahre führten die Asienkrise, der sinkende Weltmarktpreis für Rohöl und ein Einbruch im Tourismusgeschäft aufgrund neuer Anschläge auf Touristen abermals zu fiskalischen Schwierigkeiten. Doch nicht nur in Bezug auf die Wirtschaftsreformen war die ägyptische Staatsführung einem großen Handlungsdruck ausgesetzt. In Folge der Terroranschläge des 11. Septembers 2001 auf New York und Washington D.C. betrachteten die USA und Europa das Demokratiedefizit in der

arabischen Welt zunehmend als Entwicklungshemmnis und Nährboden für Terrorismus. Die Forderung zahlreicher internationaler Initiativen nach einer Öffnung der repressiven politischen Systeme in den arabischen Ländern inspirierte auch zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure in Ägypten, die immer offensiver ihr Recht auf politische Teilhabe einforderten.

2004 reagierte Husni Mubarak auf die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Herausforderungen mit der Wiederaufnahme der Wirtschaftsreformen und insbesondere des zum Erliegen gekommenen Privatisierungsprozesses: Zwischen 2004 und 2008 wurde mehr als das Doppelte an Privatisierungserlösen erzielt wie in den zwölf Jahren zuvor. Durch eine teilweise Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen konnten umfangreiche ausländische Investitionen ins Land geholt und die wirtschaftlichen Wachstumsraten beträchtlich gesteigert werden. Die Lebenssituation der meisten Ägypter verbesserte sich hierdurch jedoch nicht – im Gegenteil: Laut Angaben der Weltbank mussten 2004 weit über 40 Prozent der Bevölkerung mit weniger als zwei US-Dollar pro Tag auskommen. Aufgrund starker Preissteigerungen vor allem für Grundnahrungsmittel reichte das Haushaltseinkommen vieler Familien auch in den Folgejahren kaum zum Leben aus, was Anfang 2008 zu schweren sozialen Unruhen sowie Streik- und Protestbewegungen führte. Zudem mehrten sich gewaltsame Auseinandersetzungen zwischen Muslimen und koptischen Christen, zu denen rund zehn Prozent der Bevölkerung zählen. Es gab jedoch auch Gewinner der wirtschaftlichen Liberalisierung: Bereits in den 1990er Jahren hatten politisch gut vernetzte Unternehmerfamilien riesige Unternehmenskonglomerate errichtet, die zum Teil marktbeherrschende Stellungen erreichten.

Der neue Anlauf bei den Wirtschaftsreformen wurde nicht von einer politischen Liberalisierung begleitet. Zwar gab die Staatsführung dem innenpolitischen und internationalen Reformdruck anfänglich nach, und es kam 2005 erstmals zu Präsidentschaftswahlen mit mehreren Bewerbern (zuvor wurden lediglich Referenden abgehalten, bei denen nur über den Kandidaten der Regierungspartei abgestimmt werden konnte), zahlreiche Unregelmäßigkeiten vor und während der Wahlgänge ließen jedoch daran zweifeln, dass der Wahlerfolg von Amtsinhaber Husni Mubarak ein Abbild des ägyptischen Wählerwillens darstellte. Dies gilt auch für die Ergebnisse der ebenfalls 2005 abgehaltenen Parlamentswahlen, bei denen die mit unabhängigen Kandidaten angetretenen Muslimbrüder trotz massiver Behinderung einen Achtungserfolg erzielen konnten.

Nasser Nuri / REUTERS

Husni Mubarak (h.) hat seinem Sohn Gamal wichtige Funktionen in der Regierungspartei übertragen.

Im Anschluss an das Wahljahr 2005 spitzte sich die Auseinandersetzung zwischen dem Mubarak-Regime und der Muslimbruderschaft zu, und es kam wieder zu Verhaftungen und Gerichtsprozessen gegen Mitglieder der Gruppierung. Im Ausland erlangte indes vor allem eine andere Oppositionsbewegung große Aufmerksamkeit: die außerparlamentarische Oppositionsbewegung *Kifaya* (arabisch: „Genug!“), in der sich Vertreter nahezu aller politischen Richtungen und Ideologien zusammenschlossen. Nach öffentlichkeitswirksamen Protestaktionen im Jahr 2005 nahm jedoch die öffentliche Präsenz von *Kifaya* in Folge innerer Richtungsstreitigkeiten ab.

„Dynastische Republik“?

Sowohl die Ausgestaltung der Wirtschaftsreformen als auch die innenpolitische Entwicklung Ägyptens seit der Jahrtausendwende waren eng verbunden mit dem politischen Aufstieg des zweitältesten Sohnes Husni Mubaraks, Gamal Mubarak. Dieser hatte seit der Jahrtausendwende seinen Einfluss innerhalb der regierenden Nationaldemokratischen Partei (NDP) massiv ausgebaut. Nach einem schlechten Ergebnis der Partei bei den Parlamentswahlen im Jahr 2000 wurde Gamal Mubarak von seinem

Die Muslimbruderschaft

Stephan Roll / Thomas Demmelhuber

Im Jahre 1928 von Hassan al-Banna gegründet, 1954 nach einer losen Allianz mit den „freien Offizieren“ verboten, gelang es der Muslimbruderschaft trotzdem, sich als religiös-politische Massenbewegung in Ägypten zu etablieren. Die Bruderschaft entwickelte sich so zur am besten organisierten und in der Bevölkerung überaus populären Oppositionskraft. Offiziell weiterhin verboten, wird die Muslimbruderschaft in einem vom Regime definierten Rahmen geduldet. Sie hat seit vielen Jahrzehnten der Gewalt abgeschworen und lehnt es im Gegensatz zu extremistischen Gruppierungen ab, ihre politischen Ziele durch bewaffneten Kampf zu erreichen. Von großer Bedeutung war der politstrategische Wandel der Bruderschaft zu Beginn der 1980er Jahre: Sie erkannte die vom Regime festgesetzten Spielregeln politischer Partizipation weitgehend an und versuchte seitdem, ihre Forderungen nach demokratischer Öffnung dadurch durchzusetzen, dass sie am politischen Prozess teilnahm. Bei den Parlamentswahlen von 2005 zogen die Muslimbrüder mit über 88 formell unabhängigen Mandatsträgern als stärkste Opposition (knapp 20 Prozent der Sitze) ins Parlament ein. Insbesondere in Bezug auf religiöse und moralische Fragen versuchte die Bruderschaft daraufhin, der staatlich kontrollierten al-Azhar-Universität, der wichtigsten theologischen Bildungsstätte des sunnitischen Islam, die Deutungshoheit abzunehmen und sich als Kontrollinstanz der Regierung zu profilieren.

Vater zum Vorsitzenden des neu geschaffenen „Politischen Sekretariats“ der Partei ernannt, das er zu seinem Machtzentrum ausbaute. Mit Hilfe dieses Gremiums steuerte er die personelle und programmatische Erneuerung der Partei und nahm Einfluss auf die Ausgestaltung der Regierungspolitik. Anders als sein Vater und dessen Vorgänger im Präsidentenamt gründete sich die politische Karriere Gamal Mubaraks nicht auf Verbindungen zum Militär. Vielmehr zählten mit Großunternehmern und Wirtschaftstechnokraten die Gewinner des wirtschaftlichen Reformprozesses zu seinen Unterstützern. Vertreter der Wirtschaftselite konnten so immer direkter Einfluss auf politische Entscheidungen nehmen, sei es als Minister, Parlamentsabgeordnete oder hohe Funktionäre der Regierungspartei, und wurden zum bestimmenden Element der Herrschaftselite. Der wirtschaftliche Reformprozess diente somit in erster Linie der Herrschaftssicherung und nicht der nachhaltigen sozioökonomischen Entwicklung oder politischen Öffnung.

Regionaler Bedeutungsverlust

Neben die innenpolitische Umbruchsituation, in der sich Ägypten in den 1990er Jahren befand, trat ein regionaler Bedeutungsverlust. Seit der Neuorientierung des internationalen Staatensystems im 20. Jahrhundert hatte sich Ägypten als bevölkerungsreichstes Land in der arabischen Welt (2008 knapp 80 Millionen Einwohner) immer als kultureller Leitakteur der Region wahrgenommen. Dieser Führungsanspruch wurde jedoch durch den zunehmenden Einfluss Saudi-Arabiens eingeschränkt. Das betraf insbesondere die Vermittlerrolle im Nahostkonflikt zwischen Israel und den Palästinensern, aber auch Ägyptens Stellung in der Arabischen Liga. Geoökonomische und geostrategische Verschiebungen seit dem Sturz des Regimes von Saddam Hussein im Irak (2003) und der damit einhergehende Aufstieg des Iran verstärkten die Bedeutung der Länder auf der arabischen Halbinsel im Kontext der internationalen Politik.

Algerien

Jakob Horst / Isabelle Werenfels

Die Weichen für das algerische Regierungssystem wurden schon bei der Staatsgründung 1962 gestellt. Nach dem Krieg gegen die Kolonialmacht Frankreich (1954 bis 1962) setzte sich bei den Machtkämpfen zwischen den verschiedenen Clans innerhalb der Nationalen Befreiungsbewegung (FLN) der militärische Flügel durch. Damit konnte eine kleine Clique von Generälen hinter den Kulissen Macht ausüben, das Militär wurde lange Zeit zur einzig relevanten politischen Kraft.

Politische und soziale Spannungen

Dass sich das algerische Regime Ende der 1980er Jahre zu einer politischen und wirtschaftlichen Öffnung gezwungen sah, lag an massiven Jugendrevolten, die im Oktober 1988 das ganze Land erfassten. Die tieferen Gründe dieser Unruhen lagen in einer weitgehend gescheiterten Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturpolitik, die in den Augen der rebellierenden Bevölkerung vor allem der Bereicherung einer korrupten militärisch-bürokratischen Elite gedient hatte. Die algerische Wirtschaft war Ende der 1980er Jahre in einem desolaten Zustand. Ein ehrgeiziges nationales Industrialisierungsprojekt hatte in den 1970er Jahren kurzfristig einen wirtschaftlichen Boom und einen bemerkenswerten Modernisierungsschub, nicht aber produktive Industrien und langfristige Wachstumsperspektiven bewirkt.

Mit dem Kollaps des Ölpreises 1986 verschärfte sich die soziale und ökonomische Situation dramatisch. Neben der Teuerung und der Jugendarbeitslosigkeit (1988 über 30 Prozent) entwickelte sich die Wohnungsnot in den Städten zu einem der dringlichsten Probleme. Nicht zuletzt die wirtschaftliche Not trieb der in den 1980er Jahren erstarkenden islamistischen Bewegung eine wachsende Zahl von Algeriern in die Arme. Islamistische Vereinigungen bauten ein Netz sozialer Dienste auf und füllten damit Lücken, die aufgrund leerer Kassen und Misswirtschaft des Staates entstanden waren.

Die FIS gewann ab Ende der 1980er Jahre viele Anhänger. Versammlung in Bab el-Oued, einem Stadtteil Algiers 1992

Abdelhak Senna / AFP / Getty Images

Nach der politischen Öffnung 1989, bei der eine neue Verfassung verabschiedet wurde, die auch die Gründung unabhängiger politischer Parteien zuließ, entwickelte sich die *Front Islamique du Salut* (Islamische Heilsfront, FIS) zur einflussreichsten gesellschaftlichen Kraft und stärksten Stimme der Opposition. Die FIS muss als klassische Protestpartei verstanden werden. Zu ihren Anhängern zählten nicht nur stark religiöse Algerier, sondern auch Kleinunternehmer und wenig religiöse jugendliche Arbeitslose, die sich in erster Linie einen radikalen Bruch mit der Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik des Regimes wünschten. Die FIS propagierte eine freie Marktwirtschaft und eine islamische Gesetzgebung.

Nachdem sie 1990 die ersten demokratischen Kommunalwahlen gewonnen hatte, setzte sich der Siegeszug der FIS im Dezember 1991 im ersten Wahlgang der Parlamentswahlen fort. Zum zweiten Wahlgang kam es nicht. Am 11. Januar 1992 endete das demokratische Experiment in Algerien abrupt, als Präsident Chadli Bendjedid auf Druck der Armee das Parlament auflöste und zurücktrat. Mit der Begründung, ein FIS-Wahlsieg hätte von der Demokratie zur Theokratie geführt, verübte eine Junta der einflussreichsten Generäle einen unblutigen Staatsstreich und etablierte einen in der Verfassung nicht vorgesehenen „Hohen Staatsrat", den sie selbst besetzten. An die Spitze des Rates beriefen sie als Legitimationsfigur Mohamed Boudiaf, einen im Exil lebenden historischen Führer des FLN-Unabhängigkeitskampfs.

Dekade des Bürgerkriegs

Spätestens mit der Ermordung Boudiafs im Juni 1992 begannen die Jahre der blutigen Konflikte, welche zunehmend die Dimension eines Bürgerkriegs annahmen und nach Schätzungen von Menschenrechtsorganisationen mindestens 150 000 Opfer forderten. Nach dem Abbruch der Wahlen und dem Verbot der FIS im März 1992 hatten sich viele der enttäuschten jugendlichen FIS-Anhänger radikalisiert und bewaffneten islamistischen Untergrundbewegungen angeschlossen, etwa der *Armée Islamique du Salut* (Islamische Heilsarmee, AIS), dem militärischen Flügel der FIS, oder der *Groupe Islamique Armé* (Bewaffnete Islamische Gruppe, GIA).

Die Politik des algerischen Regimes nach dem Putsch war von einer politischen und einer militärischen Strategie geprägt. Letztere widerspiegelte sich in der Parole „die Terroristen zu terrorisieren", was bedeutete, sie physisch auszulöschen. Gleichzeitig begannen die Generäle, gemäßigte islamistische Parteien in den politischen Prozess einzubinden. Mit den Wahlen zum Parlament 1997 und zum Präsidentschaftsamt 1995 und 1999 versuchte das Regime zumindest formell zu einer konstitutionellen Rechtmäßigkeit zurückzukehren. Manipulationen blieben allerdings an der Tagesordnung. Bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen 1999 zogen die sechs Mitbewerber um das Präsidentenamt am Vorabend der Abstimmung ihre Kandidatur unter Protest zurück und warfen dem Militär massive Wahlfälschung zugunsten des Kandidaten Abdelaziz Bouteflika vor.

Fortdauerndes Machtmonopol

Kurz nach seinem Wahlsieg im Sommer 1999 brachte Bouteflika einen Gesetzesvorschlag zur nationalen Versöhnung auf den Weg. Der so genannte *Concorde Civile* sah Straffreiheit für bewaffnete Islamisten vor, die ihre Waffen abgaben. Diese Amnestiepolitik wurde mit der „Charta für den Frieden und die nationale Versöhnung" im Herbst 2005 fortgesetzt. Zwar wurde die Charta offiziell mit über 90 Prozent der Stimmen angenommen, doch im Zuge der gesetzlichen Umsetzung kam es zu Protesten. Umstritten war nicht nur die begrenzte Straffreiheit für die Mitglieder der bewaffneten islamistischen Gruppen, sondern auch der Schutz vor Strafverfolgung für Angehörige der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte. Dies führte zu dem Vorwurf, die Charta sei lediglich ein Instrument, um die in den 1990er Jahren in die Konfrontation mit den Islamisten involvierten Generäle juristisch zu schützen. Eine wirkliche Aufarbeitung der Ereignisse in den 1990er Jahren steht weiter aus. Allerdings ist es Bouteflika nicht zuletzt mit diesen Initiativen gelungen, Algerien aus der internationalen Isolation herauszuführen und das Regime wieder salonfähig zu machen.

Auch wenn die Gewalt in Algerien seit Anfang des neuen Jahrtausends zurückgegangen ist und die noch aktiven Kämpfer inzwischen auf weniger als 1000 geschätzt werden (in der Hochphase des Konfliktes 1994 ging man von 27 000 Bewaffneten aus), so bleiben die gesellschaftlichen Spannungen und die strukturellen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Probleme weiter bestehen. Diese gehen weit über die Frage des Umgangs mit den Islamisten hinaus.

Das zentrale Problem der Konzentration politischer Macht in den Händen weniger bleibt weiterhin ungelöst. Zwar ist seit

Abdelaziz Bouteflika hat wichtige Positionen im Militär mit Vertrauten besetzt.

Fayez Nureldine / AFP / Getty Images

Immer wieder entlädt sich der Unmut über mangelnde politische und wirtschaftliche Beteiligung in gewalttätigen Protesten – Oran 2008

STR New / REUTERS

1999 eine Machtverschiebung vom Militär hin zum Präsidenten zu beobachten – vor allem, weil Präsident Bouteflika seit seiner Wiederwahl 2004 Schlüsselpositionen innerhalb der Armee mit ihm gegenüber loyalen Personen besetzen konnte. Doch am autoritären Charakter des Regierungsstils ändert dies wenig. Der 1992 ausgerufene Notstand ist nach wie vor in Kraft. Der Geheimdienst bleibt politisch einflussreich, und ehemalige Revolutionäre haben noch immer die wichtigsten Positionen im System inne – der Generationenwechsel im Machtzentrum lässt auch in der Ära Bouteflika auf sich warten. 2008 ließ der Präsident sogar die Verfassung ändern, um sich im April 2009 zum dritten Mal ins Amt wählen lassen zu können.

Zwar existiert ein im arabischen Vergleich beachtliches Maß an Meinungsfreiheit, doch unterliegen Medien und oppositionelle Akteure permanenten Manipulationsbestrebungen und Repressalien durch das Regime. Die Fragmentierung der algerischen Gesellschaft (ethnisch, sprachlich, regional) bietet der Spaltungspolitik des Regimes überdies einen fruchtbaren Boden, so dass sich seit dem Verbot der FIS-Partei keine lagerübergreifende Oppositionsbewegung mehr formieren konnte. Die meisten Parteien sind ohnehin schwach und leiden an internen Demokratiedefiziten. Die mangelnde Legitimation der politischen Institutionen äußert sich nicht zuletzt in einer kontinuierlich sinkenden Beteiligung an Parlamentswahlen (2007 lag sie bei knapp 35 Prozent).

Ökonomisch-soziale Dauerkrise

Auch die zentralen sozialen und ökonomischen Probleme Algeriens bleiben trotz veränderter Rahmenbedingungen weiter bestehen. Die Zahl der Arbeitslosen ist seit 2000 zwar offiziell auf unter 15 Prozent gefallen; inoffizielle Schätzungen gehen indes von einer Jugendarbeitslosigkeit von über 30 Prozent aus. Die daraus resultierende Perspektivlosigkeit weiter Teile der jungen Bevölkerung führt zu sozialen Spannungen, die sich immer wieder in gewalttätigen Ausschreitungen entladen, und verstärkt den Wunsch junger Algerier, nach Europa zu emigrieren.

Das algerische Regime ist bisher nicht in der Lage, die durch die steigenden Energiepreise gewonnene finanzielle Autonomie für eine Restrukturierung und Diversifizierung der Binnenwirtschaft zu nutzen. 2006 stammten noch immer 77 Prozent der gesamten Staatseinnahmen aus dem Erdöl- und Erdgassektor. Die Regierung tätigt zwar massive Investitionen im Infrastrukturbereich, doch strukturelle Reformen wie etwa die Privatisierung des Bankensektors kommen nur schleppend voran. Der staatliche Ressourcenreichtum verleitetet dazu, gemäß dem Gießkannenprinzip lediglich die Symptome der strukturellen Defizite zu bekämpfen. Darüber hinaus befördern die Renten aus dem Energiesektor eine Verteilungslogik, bei der die politischen Machthaber Unterstützung mit finanziellen Geschenken erkaufen.

Neben den wirtschaftlichen Problemen bleibt auch die Identitätsfrage ungelöst. Nach der Unabhängigkeit reduzierte die

Raï: Symbol für ein „anderes“ Algerien

Thomas Burkhalter

Raï (arabisch: „Meinung“) hatte es in Algerien von Anfang an schwer. In Algerien und (Ost-)Marokko entstanden, verbindet diese Musikrichtung traditionellen arabischen Gesang mit westlichen Instrumenten sowie arabische und afrikanische Rhythmen mit Reggae, Flamenco, Pop, Disco und Hip-Hop. Bereits ihr Vorgängerstil Wahrani galt in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren als vom Kolonialismus pervertierte Folklore und wurde mit Sittenzerfall und Verwestlichung gleichgesetzt. Mit den Sängerinnen („Sheikhas“), die an zwielichtigen Orten in Oran, einem Zentrum des Raï, auch für Angehörige der französischen und spanischen Armee „Folklore Oranaise“ sangen, wollte das offizielle Algerien gerade während des Kolonialkriegs nichts zu tun haben. Sie galten als Objekte geheimer Freuden, die tanzten, tranken und sexuellen Affären nicht abgeneigt waren.

Nach der Unabhängigkeit 1962 war es vor allem Präsident Houari Boumedienne, der sich prägend in die Musikszene einschaltete. Er machte sich für eine „anständige“ Musik stark, die die nationale Einheit und Einigkeit betonen sollte, und fand sie in der andalusischen Kunstmusik. Die Raï-Musiker dagegen, die Sittenkodexe missachteten und in oranischem Akzent Liebesaffären besangen, missfielen Boumedienne und den marxistischen Theoretikern seines Regimes. Raï wurde mit Auftrittsverboten belegt und durfte in Fernsehen, Radio und in den Printmedien nicht in Erscheinung treten. Die Erfolge des Raï bei der Jugend und die Doppeldeutigkeiten der Raï-Texte bereiteten den Machthabern Sorgen.

Diese Situation änderte sich unter Chadli Bendjedid (1979 bis 1991), dem Nachfolger Boumediennes. Bendjedid vermochte den wirtschaftlichen Niedergang des Landes nicht aufzuhalten, wandte sich allmählich vom Sozialismus ab und öffnete Algerien wieder gegenüber den Industriestaaten. Im Westen hatte der Raï bereits Interesse geweckt, und so sah Bendjedid darin eine Chance, für das eigene Land zu werben. 1985 fand in Oran das erste offizielle Raï-Festival statt.

Raï blieb indes eine Musik, die sich politisch nicht einbinden liess; die politische Führung blieb ihm gegenüber misstrauisch. 1988 wurden Raï-Musiker daher auch beschuldigt, mit ihren Liedern zur grossen Jugendrevolte angestachelt zu haben. Die meisten Sänger wiesen dies von sich; Cheb Sahraoui betonte, dass es keinen Zusammenhang zwischen Raï und der Oktoberrebellion gab, auch wenn Khaleds „Harba Ouine“ (Flucht, aber wohin) zur Hymne der aufgebrachten Jugend geworden war. Ab den 1990er Jahren standen sämtliche Sängerinnen und Sänger des Raï auf der „schwarzen Liste“ der islamistischen FIS-Partei. Cheb Hasni (1994), der Produzent Rachid Baba-Ahmed (1995) und der Berber-Sänger Matoub Lounès (1998) wurden ermordet, wobei unklar blieb, von wem. Viele Sänger zogen ins Ausland, der Raï wurde zur Weltmusik.

In seinem Heimatort Taourirt Moussa erinnert ein Wandgemälde an den ermordeten Berber-Sänger Matoub Lounès.

The NewYorkTimes / Redux / laif

nationalistische Rhetorik die algerische Identität auf Arabertum und Islam und ignorierte die ethnische, kulturelle und sprachliche Eigenheit der Berber, die etwa 30 Prozent einer Gesamtbevölkerung von knapp 35 Millionen (Stand: 2008), ausmachen. Zwar wurde die Berbersprache Tamazight 2005 offiziell als nationale Sprache neben Arabisch anerkannt, doch der eigentliche Ursprung der Proteste, die Verwehrung von Pluralismus und politischer Partizipation, besteht weiter.

Viele junge Algerier sind zudem hin und her gerissen zwischen den Reizen der westlich-liberalen Konsumgesellschaften und islamisch-konservativen Vorstellungen, die oft als einzig möglicher Gegenentwurf zur erlebten Realität von Korruption und Klientelismus erscheinen. Frustriert durch ihren Ausschluss aus dem wirtschaftlichen und politischen Leben steigt nicht zuletzt ihre Bereitschaft, sich bewaffneten islamistischen Gruppen anzuschließen. Seit Anfang 2007 hat die Zahl der Anschläge – vor allem durch die „Islamistische Gruppe für Predigt und Kampf" (GSPC), die sich 2007 in „Al-Qaida im Islamischen Maghreb" umbenannte – in Algerien abermals zugenommen, und die Zahl der zivilen und militärischen Opfer terroristischer Gewalt ist erstmals wieder angestiegen. Durch diese Entwicklung ist die sich seit der Jahrtausendwende abzeichnende Befriedung des Landes erneut in Frage gestellt.

Libyen

Almut Besold

Als das Königreich Libyen 1951 unabhängig wurde, war es weltweit eines der ärmsten Länder. Bereits 1959 begann unter dem ersten und einzigen König Idrîs as-Sanûssi die Erdölförderung im großen Maßstab und ließ das Staatseinkommen rasch ansteigen. Bis heute macht der Verkauf von Erdöl und -gas nahezu den gesamten Exporterlös (2006: 96 Prozent) aus.

Bekannt ist Libyen jedoch nicht nur für sein Erdöl, sondern auch für sein einzigartiges politisches System, das sich seit 1969 schrittweise herausbildete. Obwohl die Erdöleinnahmen Libyens in den 1960er Jahren sehr rasch wuchsen, war es dem König nicht gelungen, die ärmlichen Lebensumstände der breiten Bevölkerung zu verbessern. Inspiriert von den sozialistischen Schlagwörtern des ägyptischen Präsidenten Nasser kam es infolgedessen am 1. September 1969 zu einem Putsch durch eine Gruppe libyscher Offiziere. Ihr Anführer Muammar (al-)Gaddafi lenkt seitdem die Geschicke des Landes in Einklang mit der von ihm entwickelten so genannten „Dritten Universaltheorie", die sich als Alternative zu Kapitalismus und Kommunismus versteht. Als praktische Handlungsanweisung dazu gilt das „Grüne Buch", in dem Gaddafis Vorstellungen zu Staat, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft formuliert sind. Sie sind bis heute relevant und spiegeln sich im offiziellen Staatsnamen „Große Sozialistische Libysch-Arabische Volks-Dschamahirija" („Volksherrschaft") wider.

„Basisdemokratisches" System

Die libysche „Volksherrschaft" ist basisdemokratisch organisiert. Etwa 2700 mit einem imperativen Mandat versehene Vertreter von 15 000 örtlichen Volkskonferenzen, Volkskomitees und Berufsorganisationen treten im nationalen Gremium des Allgemeinen Volkskongresses (entspricht einem Parlament) jährlich in der Verwaltungshauptstadt Surt zusammen. Sie führen die lokalen Beschlüsse in Gesetze über und bestellen das nationale Volkskomitee (Regierung), dessen Mitglieder Ministerfunktionen haben und deren Generalsekretär einem Regierungschef vergleichbar ist. Die Aufgaben des Staatspräsidenten nimmt der Generalsekretär des Allgemeinen Volkskongresses wahr.

Parallel zu diesem Herrschaftsbereich mit seinem gesetzlich geregelten Verwaltungs- und Verfahrensgang entstand zwischen 1977 und 1980 ein Revolutionssektor bestehend aus Revolutionsführung und -komitees. Diese keiner Institution politisch verantwortlichen Revolutionskomitees üben seitdem eine Kontrollfunktion im Sinne der Revolutionsführung aus. In der Praxis steht der Revolutionsführer über dem Staatspräsidenten und trifft die grundlegenden strategischen und politischen Entscheidungen. Nach westlichem Verständnis ist Libyen damit ein Staat, dessen Bürger der Willkür der politischen Führung ausgeliefert sind.

Funktion der Stämme

Von großer informeller Bedeutung im politischen System Libyens sind die Stämme. Obwohl die Stammesstruktur kaum mit staatsrechtlichen Vorstellungen zu vereinbaren ist, beherrschen die Rivalitäten zwischen einflussreichen Stämmen bis heute den Alltag. Der Bedeutungszuwachs der Stämme ergab sich insbesondere in den 1970er Jahren auf zweierlei Weise. 1973 begann der Staat, systematisch Bürokraten, religiöse Würdenträger, Händler und Unternehmer vom politischen Prozess auszuschließen. Diese dadurch stigmatisierten Gruppen besannen sich ihres Stammes, um über gesellschaftlichen Rückhalt verfügen zu können. 1977 wurde der von Gaddafi geleitete, nicht an politische Strukturen gebundene Revolutionssektor eingerichtet. Der fehlende demokratische Rückhalt veranlasste ihn, sich auf die Mitglieder seines Gadadfa-Stammes, auf den südlibyschen Magarha-Stamm und die mit ihm verbündeten Stämme der Warfalla und Aulad Ali zu stützen. Das sinkende Staatseinkommen in den 1980er und beginnenden 1990er Jahren zeigte, dass die Unterstützung der Stämme maßgeblich auf den staatlichen Finanzzuwendungen beruhte. Ihr Rückgang ließ Stammesunruhen befürchten. Eine gescheiterte Stammesrevolte im Oktober 1993 führte später zur Einführung von Kollektivstrafen für Großfamilien und Stämme.

Innenpolitische Konfliktfelder

Innenpolitisch dominieren drei Problemfelder: die Perspektivlosigkeit der Jugend, das Konfliktpotenzial durch ausländische Arbeitskräfte und Migranten sowie die islamistische Opposition. In Libyen sind 30 Prozent der Bevölkerung jünger als 15 Jahre und nur vier Prozent älter als 65 Jahre (2006). Da die Bevölkerung jährlich um zwei Prozent wächst, nimmt auch die hohe Arbeitslosenquote von geschätzten 30 Prozent kontinuierlich zu. Ziel der

picture-alliance / dpa

Libyens Exporte bestehen zu über 90 Prozent aus Erdöl und Erdgas. Verteilerkreuz im Ölfeld As Sarah

Nasser Nasser / AP

Vorsichtige Annäherung: Die damalige US-Außenministerin Condoleezza Rice zu Besuch in Tripolis im September 2008

Staatsführung ist es, insbesondere der Jugend eine Perspektive zu geben, aber auch das aufgrund traditionell hoher Hochzeitskosten gestiegene Heiratsalter zu senken. Trotz der hohen Arbeitslosenrate sind viele Libyer nicht bereit, in den Bereichen Bau, Landwirtschaft und Abfallbeseitigung zu arbeiten. Stattdessen werden diese Arbeiten von den bis zu zwei Millionen vornehmlich aus Schwarzafrika oder den arabischen Nachbarländern – oft illegal – eingeströmten Migranten ausgeführt. Viele von ihnen sehen Libyen als Sprungbrett nach Europa an und nehmen dafür ein menschenunwürdiges Dasein in Kauf. Sie führen meist ein Leben zwischen Legalität und Illegalität, sind stark den Launen der libyschen Staatsführung unterworfen und bei der Bevölkerung nicht angesehen. Diese missgönnt ihnen nicht nur ihre Beschäftigung, sondern macht sie für das Ansteigen von Kriminalität und Prostitution verantwortlich. Im Jahr 2000 kam es zu Ausschreitungen gegen Migranten, die 130 Opfer gefordert haben sollen.

Eine weitere Herausforderung ist die islamistische Opposition, auch wenn diese sich nicht legal organisieren darf. Sie bildete sich bald nach der Machtübernahme Gaddafis, da die meisten Islamgelehrten an seiner eigenwilligen Koraninterpretation Anstoß nahmen. In den 1980er Jahren begannen Islamisten mit dem bewaffneten Kampf gegen staatliche Einrichtungen, der sich in den 1990er Jahren verstärkte und von Seiten des staatlichen Sicherheitsapparates entschieden und erfolgreich eingedämmt wurde. 2006 wurden mindestens 50 Muslimbrüder aus langjähriger Haft entlassen, da sie (erzwungen?) zugesichert hatten, zukünftig auf Gewalt zu verzichten. Statt die Islamisten vornehmlich zu unterdrücken, wie zuvor, sucht das Regime sie nun eher in die Randständigkeit abzudrängen.

Die genannten Probleme bewirkten in den letzten Jahrzehnten immer wieder innenpolitische Veränderungen. So öffnet sich Libyen seit 2003 bewusst – wenngleich auch zaghaft – den kapitalistischen Marktregeln. Ende März 2007 wurde in Bengasi die erste Börse Libyens eröffnet. Im selben Jahr kam es zur Privatisierung einer staatlichen Bank, und 65 Prozent staatlicher Anteile an dem libyschen Erdölkonzern Tamoil wurden für 2,6 Milliarden US-Dollar an einen US-amerikanischen Investmentfonds verkauft. Bis zu 360 Staatsunternehmen sollen privatisiert werden. Da auf offizielle Ankündigungen häufig keine entsprechenden konkreten Schritte folgen, bleibt die Umsetzung allerdings abzuwarten.

Außenpolitische Kehrtwende

Auch Gaddafis außenpolitische Schritte seit Ende der 1990er Jahre lassen sich maßgeblich mit dem Bestreben der Machtsicherung erklären. 1978 verhängten die USA erste Sanktionen gegen Libyen, da sie die libysche Unterstützung internationaler Freiheitsbewegungen verschiedenster Zielrichtungen als Unterstützung von Terrorismus werteten. Darüber hinaus beschuldigten die USA Libyen wiederholt, chemische Waffen zu produzieren (Errichtung einer Giftgasfabrik im libyschen Rabta 1989) und einen Anschlag auf US-amerikanische Soldaten (in der Berliner Diskothek „La Belle“ 1986) verursacht zu haben. Auch die Vereinten Nationen verhängten 1992/93 Sanktionen mit dem Ziel, die bei Libyen vermutete Urheberschaft mehrerer Attentate (1988 Bombenanschlag auf ein US-Verkehrsflugzeug über der schottischen Ortschaft Lockerbie, 1989 auf ein Flugzeug der französischen Gesellschaft UTA über Niger) zu ermitteln. Von Libyen wurde verlangt, die mutmaßlichen Attentäter auszuliefern. 1999 lenkte Tripolis ein. Die Sanktionen wurden ausgesetzt und schließlich 2003 aufgehoben, nachdem Libyen Entschädigung geleistet hatte.

Das Verhältnis zu den USA verbesserte sich insbesondere durch die libysche Verzichtserklärung auf Massenvernichtungswaffen und den Beitritt Libyens zum Chemiewaffenübereinkommen (2003/2004). Die USA strichen das Land 2006 von ihrer Liste der den Terrorismus unterstützenden Staaten und nahmen die diplomatischen Beziehungen wieder auf. Letztlich begegnete Gaddafi zum Zweck der langfristigen Machtsicherung mit der außenpolitischen Öffnung internen Risikofaktoren wie dem gewachsenen Einfluss von Teilen der Armee, divergierenden Stammesinteressen, dem Problem mit den militanten Islamisten sowie zeitweilig stark gesunkenen Erdöleinnahmen. Im Erdöl- und Erdgassektor sind umfangreiche ausländische Investitionen unumgänglich, um die Förderungsanlagen zu modernisieren und die mit 41 Milliarden Barrel größten Erdölreserven Afrikas weiterhin ausbeuten zu können. Geplant ist eine Produktionserhöhung von 1,7 Millionen Barrel pro Tag auf drei Millionen Barrel pro Tag bis 2012. Im Einklang damit stehen Pläne, mit Hilfe der USA und Frankreichs ein ziviles Atomprogramm zu entwickeln, um dem steigenden eigenen Energiebedarf gerecht werden und sich auf den Export von Erdöl und -gas konzentrieren zu können.

Libyen ist stark bemüht, sich – bis zu einem gewissen Maße – in die Weltgemeinschaft zu integrieren. Der Westen begrüßt diese Annäherung an die internationale Gemeinschaft. Allerdings bleibt dabei unberücksichtigt, dass sich das politische System Libyens nicht grundlegend geändert hat. Das wird auch daran deutlich, dass zwei, mitunter drei seiner sieben Söhne als potenzielle Nachfolger Gaddafis in Betracht gezogen werden: Unabhängig davon, welcher der Söhne – wenn überhaupt – den Vater politisch beerben wird, bleibt die Regimestabilität oberstes Ziel.

Marokko

Sonja Hegasy

Das marokkanische Königshaus ist die letzte muslimische Dynastie, die ihren weltlichen Herrschaftsanspruch auch auf die Funktion des „Führers der Gläubigen" stützt. Zwar gibt es vereinzelt wieder Bewegungen, die ihre Führungsfiguren durch diesen Titel zu legitimieren versuchen (wie die Taliban), aber eine traditions- und gleichzeitig gegenwartsverbundene Anwendung dieses Prinzips kann nur noch die marokkanische Monarchie für sich in Anspruch nehmen. Auch die Abstammung des Königs vom Propheten Mohammed ist in diesem Zusammenhang wichtig. Jedes Jahr wird seine Genealogie anlässlich der *baiᶜa* (Treueeid) in den Zeitungen publiziert. Für die Mehrheit der Marokkaner gilt seine Person als heilig.

Unter der Bedingung, eine konstitutionelle Monarchie zu errichten, wurde Marokko 1956 von der französischen Protektoratsmacht in die Unabhängigkeit entlassen. Begeistert feierten die Massen die Rückkehr des Sultans auf den Thron: In ihren Augen war er zum Gründer der nationalen Souveränität und zur Leitfigur des antikolonialen Widerstandes geworden. Diese Tatsache sichert der Monarchie als Institution bis heute einen Großteil ihrer Legitimität. Ebenso wichtig für den Machterhalt ist der Versuch, Marokko als konstitutionelle Monarchie und parlamentarische Demokratie zu behaupten. „Demokrat von Gottes Gnaden" bedeutet jedoch, dass der König über der Verfassung steht – von einer konstitutionellen Monarchie kann also in der Praxis nicht gesprochen werden.

1998 beauftragte der damalige König Hassan II. nach jahrelanger Unterdrückung politischer Gegner erstmals ein Mitte-Links-Bündnis mit der Regierungsbildung. Damit wurden zum einen Akteure eingebunden, die wichtige Interessensgruppen vertraten (Kooptation), und zum anderen verlieh sich das Königshaus neue Legitimität nach innen und außen in einer Zeit zunehmender Demokratisierungsforderungen. Dies gehört zu den klassischen Legitimationsstrategien neopatrimonialer Systeme: Auf der einen Seite versuchen sie die Herausbildung autonomer Interessensgruppen zu verhindern, auf der anderen Seite benutzen sie diese – wo vorhanden – aber auch, um die Zivilgesellschaft zu steuern. Zugleich bedienen sie sich einer überbesetzten Staatsbürokratie und ausgiebiger wohlfahrtsstaatlicher Leistungen, um die Bürgerinnen und Bürger einzubinden. Marokko ist ein Agrarland, dessen wirtschaftliche Entwicklung aufgrund langer Dürreperioden starken Schwankungen unterliegt. Das Land verfügt über reiche Phosphatlagerstätten. Darüber hinaus werden vor allem Fisch, Zitrusfrüchte und Getreide exportiert. Als wichtigster wirtschaftlicher Akteur und größter Privatbesitzer des Landes verfügt der König über umfangreiche Ressourcen.

Mohammed VI., der seinem Vater 1999 auf den Thron folgte, kann diese Legitimationsinstrumente aufgrund starken wirtschaftlichen Drucks aber nicht mehr alle gleichermaßen bedienen wie sein Vater. Repression und Kooptation reichen nicht aus. So ist seine *Initiative Nationale pour le Développement* ein wichtiges Mittel, um den durchschnittlichen Lebensstandard der Bevölkerung zu erhöhen. Um die Legitimität seiner Herrschaft zu sichern, präsentiert sich der junge König außerdem als Identifikationsfigur in Gestalt eines modernen, aufgeklärten, sportlichen und volksnahen Souveräns. „Der König der Reform" untertitelte die oppositionelle Wochenzeitung *Le Journal* einmal vielsagend ein Foto, das Mohammed VI. beim Jet-Ski zeigte.

Abdelhak Senna / AFP / Getty Images

Mohammed VI. versteht sich sowohl als traditioneller wie als moderner Herrscher. Feiern zum 8. Jahrestag der Thronbesteigung am 31. Juli 2007

Der junge König regiert ein junges Volk: Fast 35 Prozent der Bürgerinnen und Bürger sind jünger als 15 Jahre. Trotz hoher Investitionen in den Bildungssektor waren 2002 immer noch 37 Prozent aller Männer und 62 Prozent aller Frauen Analphabeten. Vor diesem Hintergrund ist es wichtig zu verstehen, welche Vorstellungen junge marokkanische Erwachsene von politischer Legitimität haben. Ist der König und Führer der Gläubigen für sie noch eine heilige Autorität? Wie vereinbaren sie die dreifache Identität als Untertanen, Gläubige und moderne Staatsbürgerinnen und -bürger? Das Kommunikationsproblem zwischen der alten Generation der Unabhängigkeitskämpfer und der nachdrängenden jungen Elite ist deutlich. Auch die Anhänger des politischen Islam stellen das Auslegungsmonopol der Monarchie und ihrer palasttreuen Religionsgelehrten in Frage. Aber bis heute gibt es ein relativ erfolgreiches System des Austarierens und der Einbindung von Dissidenten, das sowohl die islamistische als auch die linksradikale Opposition in Marokko entkräftet.

Marokkos Streitkräfte bestehen aus rund 200 000 aktiven Soldaten, die zur Hälfte Wehrpflichtige (18 Monate) sind, sowie aus 150 000 Reservisten. Die Militärausgaben betrugen von 1998 bis 2008 jährlich stabil vier bis fünf Prozent des Bruttoinlandsprodukts.

Anfang 2004 wurde ein Teil des Familienrechts reformiert, das bislang als unantastbar galt und insbesondere von der Anhängerschaft der Islamisten lange erfolgreich verteidigt worden war. Doch nach den Anschlägen im Mai 2003 hielten sich die legalen wie halblegalen Organisationen der Islamisten – in erster Linie die „Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung" (PJD) und die Bewegung „Gerechtigkeit und Wohlfahrt" *(al-ᶜadl wal ihsan)* – zurück, um nicht mit dem islamistischen Terror identifiziert zu werden. In diesem Klima konnte Mohammed VI. seine Reform

des Familienrechts durchsetzen. Nun sind die Kinder der Töchter einer Familie beispielsweise ebenso erbberechtigt wie die Kinder der Söhne.

2004 gab Mohammed VI. auch eine Reorganisation des Parteiensystems bekannt. Die Parteien sollen staatliche Subventionen und Wahlkampfgelder erhalten. Die gemäßigt islamistische Partei für Gerechtigkeit und Entwicklung (PJD), die 2002 mit 42 Sitzen (darunter vier Frauen) zur größten Oppositionskraft wurde, schien die neuen Voraussetzungen am besten zu erfüllen. Gerne stellt sich die PJD als marokkanische Variante der in der Türkei regierenden Namensschwester AKP dar. Insbesondere im Wahlkampf 2007 hat sie versucht, diese Ähnlichkeit gewinnbringend für sich einzusetzen. Aber gerade das mag kontraproduktiv gewirkt haben. Wer schon vorab verlautbaren lässt, dass er bereit ist, sich mit den herrschenden politischen Strukturen zu arrangieren, der ist für Wähler, die eine starke Opposition wünschen, wenig attraktiv. Das Wahlergebnis der Parlamentswahlen 2007 machte eines deutlich: Alle politischen Eliten haben massiv an Glaubwürdigkeit verloren. Die Wahlbeteiligung lag nach offiziellen Angaben bei 37 Prozent, 2002 waren es noch 52 Prozent. Von „Politikverdrossenheit" zu sprechen, wäre ein Euphemismus: Arabische Medien berichteten, dass viele ungültige Stimmen (ihr Anteil soll 19 Prozent betragen haben) mit kritischen bis feindseligen Kommentaren versehen waren. Die Programme der insgesamt 33 zur Wahl angetretenen Parteien sowie Dutzender unabhängiger Kandidaten unterschieden sich kaum voneinander. Wenn Spitzenpolitiker der PJD Marokko inzwischen als günstigen Ort für internationale Investoren anpreisen, so klingt ihr Werben kaum anders als die Broschüren des marokkanischen Wirtschaftsministeriums.

Das Ende der Vergangenheit? Marokkos Wahrheitskommission

Sonja Hegasy

Mit Beginn der Amtszeit von Mohammed VI. 1999 wurden in Marokko eine Vielzahl gesellschaftspolitischer Reformen initiiert: Nur eine Woche nach dem Tod Hassans II. (Regierungszeit: 1961 bis 1999) kündigte sein Sohn eine verbesserte Einhaltung von Menschenrechten an und entließ rund 8 000 Gefangene aus der Haft. In seiner ersten Thronrede stellte Mohammed VI. die Schwerpunkte seiner Regentschaft vor: Reform des Bildungswesens, Armutsbekämpfung und Sicherung des Rechtsstaates. Die marokkanische Gerechtigkeits- und Versöhnungskommission (Instance Equité et Réconciliation, IER, www.ier.ma) muss im Kontext dieser Reformpolitik gesehen werden. Marokko ist das erste und bisher einzige arabische Land, in dem ehemalige politische Häftlinge zunächst (1999) eine nichtstaatliche Wahrheitskommission – das Forum Marocain Vérité et Justice (FVJ) – gründen konnten und erreichten, dass auf ihren Druck hin Anfang 2004 auch eine staatliche Kommission eingesetzt wurde. Vorsitzender der IER war der inzwischen verstorbene Menschenrechtsaktivist und ehemalige politische Häftling Driss Benzekri.

Die IER hatte das Mandat, Menschenrechtsverletzungen aus den Jahren 1956 bis 1999 (von der staatlichen Unabhängigkeit bis zum Tod Hassans II.) aufzuklären, Entschädigungs- bzw. Wiedergutmachungsansprüche der Opfer festzustellen, Politikempfehlungen zu erarbeiten und einen gesellschaftlichen Versöhnungsprozess anzustoßen. Sie ist ein international anerkanntes Organ und pflegt eine enge institutionelle Zusammenarbeit mit dem International Center for Transitional Justice (ICTJ). Insgesamt fanden landesweit sieben öffentliche Anhörungen der IER statt, von denen zwei direkt im staatlichen Fernsehkanal RTM übertragen wurden; die anderen fünf wurden stark gekürzt und zeitversetzt ausgestrahlt. Der wichtigste Unterschied zur südafrikanischen Truth and Reconciliation Commission liegt darin, dass in den Anhörungen der IER die Namen der Täter nicht genannt werden durften und nur zehn Täter aussagten. Eine juristische Verfolgung der Täter wurde bewusst ausgeklammert. So konnte es passieren, dass Opfer in den Anhörungen der IER auf ihre Peiniger trafen, die dort als „Sicherheitskräfte" tätig waren. Dagegen veranstalteten unabhängige NGOs eigene Anhörungen im Land und forderten eine Strafverfolgung der Täter.

Insgesamt wurden 20 046 Gesuche bei der IER eingereicht, von denen 16 861 als vollständig anerkannt und 9680 positiv beschieden wurden. Bis 2007 zahlte die IER 85 Millionen US-Dollar als Entschädigung.

Über die 23 Monate ihres Mandats (vom 7. Januar 2004 bis zum 30. November 2005) beschäftigte die IER zeitweilig bis zu 350 Personen zur Dokumentation sowie zur Bearbeitung der Anträge. Für die Zukunft ist ein Archiv geplant, das die Dokumente der Öffentlichkeit zugänglich machen soll. Der marokkanische Historiker Jamaa Baida fordert die Gründung eines Instituts für die Zeitgeschichte Marokkos. Auch die Idee, Museen über die „bleierne Zeit" zu konzipieren, wurde in die Öffentlichkeit getragen. Eine öffentliche Entschuldigung des Premierministers, wie sie der Abschlussbericht der IER fordert, hat es bisher nicht gegeben.

Unabhängige NGOs kritisieren die zeitliche Begrenzung der IER bis 1999, da Menschenrechtsverletzungen unter Mohammed VI. so nicht untersucht werden. Die kritische, nicht heroisierende Auseinandersetzung mit Marokkos postkolonialer Geschichte ist jedoch eine beachtliche Leistung der IER.

Abdelhak Senna / AFP / Getty Images

Öffentliche Anhörung der IER in Rabat am 22. Dezember 2004

Abdelhak Senna / AFP / Getty Images

In den Archiven der IER wird vergangenes Unrecht dokumentiert.

Die offiziell verbotene Bewegung Gerechtigkeit und Wohlfahrt des greisen Scheich Yassine gilt dagegen als eigentliche Opposition. Mitgliederzahlen sind nicht bekannt, aber sie verfügt im ganzen Land über ein Netzwerk von Unterstützern. Die Bewegung ruft entschieden zum Gewaltverzicht auf, fordert aber gleichzeitig die Abschaffung der Monarchie und trifft so den Nerv der Zeit. Abdessalam Yassine verbindet seine Politik mit der eigentlich unpolitischen muslimischen Mystik und gewinnt auf diese Weise viele Anhänger. Nadia Yassine, inoffizielle Sprecherin der Bewegung und Tochter des Gründers, spricht betont positiv von der rivalisierenden PJD. Gerechtigkeit und Wohlfahrt kann sich bequem zurücklehnen und gelassen dem Schauspiel zusehen: Die Politik- und Politikermüdigkeit treibt ihr ohne große Mühen jene Bürgerinnen und Bürger in die Arme, die sich eine echte Opposition wünschen.

picture-alliance / dpa

Familienvorbild: die marokkanische Königsfamilie 2004

Spreckels / Schapowalow

Mauretaniens Bevölkerung setzt sich aus Arabisch sprechenden Mauren ...

Giacomo Pirozzi / Panos Pictures / VISUM

... und französischsprachigen Schwarzafrikanern zusammen.

Mark Edwards / Still Pictures

Fischfang ist die Haupterwerbsquelle. Rückkehr der Boote in Nouakchott

Rafael Marchante / REUTERS

Soldaten bei den Wahlen zur Nationalversammlung im November 2006

Mauretanien

Eva Meyer

Der bevölkerungsarme Wüstenstaat Mauretanien (3,3 Millionen Einwohner – 2008) hat eine turbulente Geschichte hinter sich. Eigentlich handelt es sich bei Mauretanien um ein künstliches Gebilde der französischen Kolonialmacht, die nach ihrem Abzug aus Westafrika einen Pufferstaat zwischen dem expandierenden Marokko und ihrem ehemaligen Hoheitsgebiet Senegal schaffen wollte. In ihm wurden mit der Unabhängigkeit 1960 zwei sehr unterschiedliche und traditionell gegnerische Volksgruppen auf einem großen, äußerst unwirtlichen Gebiet zusammengefasst. Die mauretanische Bevölkerung setzt sich aus arabischsprachigen Mauren und französischsprachigen Schwarzafrikanern zusammen, weswegen Mauretanien oft als Brücke zwischen Nord- und Subsahara-Afrika (das heißt Afrika südlich der Sahara) gehandelt und gelegentlich auch Westafrika zugeschlagen wird.

Die ethnischen und kulturellen Differenzen wurden von wechselnden Militärregierungen instrumentalisiert, insbesondere von Präsident Maaouya Ould Sid'Ahmed Taya, der 1984 durch einen Putsch an die Macht kam. Die Arabisierungspolitik der Mauren führte in den 1980er Jahren zu Unruhen und gipfelte schließlich in den „Ereignissen von 1989": systematisch durchgeführten Vertreibungen von Schwarzafrikanern. Diese wurden rigoros aus der Verwaltung des Landes entfernt. Heute noch sind mehrere Tausend von ihnen in senegalesischen Flüchtlingslagern untergebracht. Ihre Rückkehr stellt gegenwärtig eines der wichtigsten Anliegen der schwarzen Bevölkerung dar. Nach wie vor praktizierte Sklaverei zählt ebenfalls zu Mauretaniens großen gesellschaftlichen Problemen.

Unter Taya wurden Oppositionelle systematisch verhaftet und Oppositionsparteien verboten. Die Presse hatte unter drakonischen Pressegesetzen zu leiden. Zu Beginn des neuen Jahrtausends zählte Mauretanien zu den ärmsten, unterentwickeltsten und politisch instabilsten Ländern weltweit.

Im August 2005 endete Tayas 21-jährige autoritäre Herrschaft durch einen Putsch. Dessen Hauptinitiator, Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, ein Mann aus Tayas engstem Beraterkreis, leitete in einer eineinhalbjährigen Übergangsphase Demokratisierungsmaßnahmen ein. Senat und Nationalversammlung wurden neu besetzt, Wahlgesetze reformiert und die Pressegesetze erheblich überarbeitet. Im März 2007 wurde Sidi Ould Cheikh Abdallahi

Mauretaniens erster demokratisch gewählter Präsident. In der Folge galt Mauretanien als Hoffnungsträger und demokratisches Vorbild für Afrika und die arabische Welt.

Das Land erlebte nicht nur eine erhebliche politische Öffnung, sondern es schien Abdallahi auch daran gelegen zu sein, eine Versöhnung zwischen Mauren und Schwarzafrikanern zu erreichen. Ölfunde vor der mauretanischen Küste ließen außerdem auf einen wirtschaftlichen Aufschwung hoffen.

Strukturelle Probleme wie alte Clanverbindungen sowie ein kompliziertes Kastensystem und eine damit verbundene Vetternwirtschaft blieben indes bestehen. Mit einem weiteren erfolgreichen Militärputsch unter General Abdul Aziz am 6. August 2008 wurden die demokratischen Hoffnungen vorerst zerstört. Präsident und Premierminister kamen unter Hausarrest, und ein Militärrat übernahm die exekutiven Befugnisse. Dies zeigt, dass friedliche Regierungswechsel für Mauretanien vorerst eine Ausnahme sind. Eine Konsolidierung der Demokratie wird nur möglich sein, wenn eine langfristige Versöhnung der verschiedenen Bevölkerungsgruppen gelingt sowie wirtschaftliche Stabilität und die Kontrolle des Militärs erreicht werden.

Westsahara – der „vergessene Konflikt“

Jakob Horst

Der Konflikt um die Westsahara wird oft als der letzte Entkolonialisierungskonflikt Afrikas bezeichnet. Nach dem Ende der spanischen Kolonialherrschaft 1975 beanspruchte Marokko das zwischen seiner südlichen Grenze, Algerien und Mauretanien gelegene Gebiet als historischen Teil des alawitischen Königreichs. Die indigene Bevölkerung der Westsahara, die Sahraouis, forderten dagegen ihr Recht auf einen unabhängigen Staat ein.

Der Internationale Gerichtshof entschied zwar schon 1975, dass die Bevölkerung der Westsahara gemäß dem in der Charta der Vereinten Nationen (UN) festgelegten Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker in einem Referendum, einer Volksabstimmung, über den zukünftigen Status ihres Landes bestimmen sollte, dennoch annektierte Marokko 1976 zunächst die nördlichen zwei Drittel des Landes und 1979 das gesamte Gebiet.

Es folgten jahrelange Kämpfe zwischen dem marokkanischen Militär und der 1973 gegründeten und von Algerien unterstützten Frente Polisario (Volksfront für die Befreiung von Seguia al Hamra und Rio de Oro), die 1976 die „Demokratische Arabische Republik Sahara“ ausgerufen hatte. Im Verlauf der Kämpfe flüchteten mehr als 100 000 Sahraouis in Lager nahe der algerischen Stadt Tindouf.

Ein 1991 durch UN-Vermittlung erreichter Waffenstillstand, der seither durch die „Mission der Vereinten Nationen für das Referendum in der Westsahara“ (MINURSO) überwacht wird, sah im Rahmen eines Friedensplans die Durchführung des Referendums vor. Uneinigkeit über die Frage der Stimmberechtigten verhinderte allerdings, dass die Volksabstimmung umgesetzt wurde. Während die sahraouische Seite das Stimmrecht auf diejenigen beschränken wollte, die schon vor 1975 auf dem Territorium der Westsahara gelebt hatten, war Marokko bestrebt, die marokkanischen Siedler, die seit 1975 hinzugekommen waren, einzubeziehen, um so ein für sich günstiges Abstimmungsergebnis sicherzustellen.

Zwischen 2000 und 2003 unterbreitete der UN-Sondergesandte und ehemalige US-Außenminister James Baker verschiedene Kompromissvorschläge, darunter den einer Autonomie sowie einer fünfjährigen regionalen Selbstverwaltung mit anschließendem Referendum der gesamten Bevölkerung der Westsahara über die Unabhängigkeit. Diese Optionen wurden aber jeweils von der einen oder anderen Seite abgelehnt.

Im April 2007 legte Marokko schließlich einen Autonomie-Plan vor, der eine „autonome Region Westsahara innerhalb der Grenzen des souveränen Königreichs“ vorsieht. Da der Plan die Möglichkeit einer Unabhängigkeit der Westsahara ausschließt, wird er von der Polisario abgelehnt, die nach wie vor auf das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Sahraouis pocht.

Der marokkanische Autonomieplan wird von wichtigen internationalen Akteuren wie Frankreich und den USA unterstützt, was eine Durchsetzung der völkerrechtlich legitimen Forderungen der sahraouischen Seite unwahrscheinlich macht.

Die „Frente Polisario“ kämpft für die Unabhängigkeit der Westsahara. Parade im Mai 2008 anlässlich des 35. Jahrestages ihrer Gründung

Daniel Ochoa de Olza / AP

Daniel Lambach

Westafrika: Ressourcenreichtum und Verteilungskonflikte

Die Spaltungen in Nord und Süd sowie in englisch- und französischsprachige Länder sind Charakteristika Westafrikas. Bis ins 19. Jahrhundert war es Zentrum des Sklavenhandels, heute sorgt sein Ressourcenreichtum für innerstaatliche Verteilungskonflikte.

André Held / akg-images

In Westafrika existierten mehrere vorkoloniale Königreiche. Oba (König) von Benin mit knieendem Gefolge, Bronzeskulptur aus dem 16. Jh.

Westafrika besteht aus 16 Staaten: Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire (Elfenbeinküste), Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kapverdische Inseln, Liberia, Mali, Mauretanien (siehe 17 f.), Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone und Togo. Die Region wird im Norden durch die islamisch geprägten Maghreb-Staaten begrenzt, im Westen und Süden durch den Atlantischen Ozean und im Osten durch die zentralafrikanischen Staaten Tschad und Kamerun. In Westafrika leben über 260 Millionen Menschen auf einer Fläche von rund 6,1 Millionen Quadratkilometern. (Zum Vergleich: In der EU leben über 490 Millionen Menschen auf rund 4,3 Millionen Quadratkilometern.) Westafrika weist eine bemerkenswerte ethnische und kulturelle Vielfalt auf: Nach manchen Schätzungen beherbergt es über 500 ethnische Gruppen, die eine große Zahl von Sprachen sprechen und die verschiedensten Religionen praktizieren.

Diese Diversität ist das Produkt des einzigartigen Zusammenspiels von Geographie und Geschichte in Westafrika. Die Geographie der Region ist durch einen Nord-Süd-Gegensatz gekennzeichnet: Im Norden liegt die Sahara, die sich im Westen fast bis zur Atlantikküste erstreckt. Daran grenzt zunächst die trockene Halbwüste der Sahelzone an, danach folgt das Grasland der Savanne. Schließlich wachsen entlang der Küste des Golfs von Guinea zunehmend feuchter werdende Tropenwälder. In der Savannenregion entspringen viele Flüsse, die alle relativ direkt in Richtung des Meeres fließen. Die einzige Ausnahme bildet der Niger, der drittlängste Fluss Afrikas, der in Guinea entspringt und zunächst lange ostwärts fließt, ehe er in Nigeria in den Atlantik mündet.

Die geographischen Zonen bestimmten lange Zeit die Lebensweise der dortigen Völker. Die dünn besiedelte Sahara wurde lediglich von kleinen Nomadenstämmen der Berber und der Tuareg bewohnt, während sich in der Sahelzone verschiedene, oft halbnomadische Völker entwickelten, die ihr Überleben durch Viehwirtschaft sicherten. In der fruchtbareren Savanne siedelten sich Ackerbauern an, während sich in den Wäldern zumeist segmentäre Gesellschaften herausbildeten, das heißt Dorfgemeinschaften, die weitgehend autonom über ihr eigenes Schicksal bestimmten.

Im 8. Jahrhundert kam Westafrika erstmals durch die von Berbern betriebenen transsaharischen Handelsverbindungen in Kontakt mit dem Islam, der unter den Hausa und Mande bald erste lokale Anhänger fand. Bis zum 14. Jahrhundert waren auch viele der weiter südlich gelegenen Reiche von zum Islam konvertierten Königen beherrscht; unter den Waldvölkern konnte sich diese Religion jedoch nicht etablieren. Daher weisen viele westafrikanische Gesellschaften bis heute eine charakteristische Nord-Süd-Spaltung auf: Während im trockenen Norden die Nachkommen islamischer Viehhirten leben, stammen die Bewohner des feuchteren Südens von animistischen (Animismus = Glaube an seelische Mächte, an Geister in menschlicher Gestalt) und christianisierten Ackerbauern und Waldbewohnern ab.

Die unterschiedlichen klimatischen Bedingungen und die daraus resultierenden Sozialstrukturen bestimmten auch die Möglichkeiten zur Herausbildung politischer Herrschaftsformen. Daher ist es kein Zufall, dass unter den sesshaften Bauern der Savanne eine Reihe von lokalen Königreichen entstanden. Immer wieder gelang es einzelnen Herrschern, ihre Nachbarn unter ihre Kontrolle zu bringen. Das erste große Reich dieser Art war Ghana, das vom 8. bis 12. Jahrhundert im heutigen Mali bestand und das nach Auskunft arabischer Geschichtsschreiber über einen gewaltigen Goldreichtum verfügt haben soll. Seine Macht schwand, als es nach einem Konflikt mit den islamischen Almoraviden (einem berberischen Fürstengeschlecht, das im 11. und 12. Jahrhundert Nordwestafrika und Teile von Spanien beherrschte) seinen Zugang zu den Handelsrouten nach Nordafrika verlor.

Auf Ghana folgte das Imperium von Mali, das vom 13. bis 14. Jahrhundert die Vormachtstellung in Westafrika innehatte. Mali war deutlich größer als Ghana und beherrschte den gesamten Oberlauf des Nigerflusses sowie die Küstenregion des heutigen Senegal. Mali wurde durch eine islamische Dynastie regiert, das Imperium zerbrach jedoch schließlich an internen

Machtkämpfen. Sein Nachfolger wurde das Reich von Songhay, das um die Stadt Gao am Ostrand Malis entstand. Songhay erlebte eine Blütezeit in der Mitte des 15. Jahrhunderts, wurde aber 1591 durch marokkanische Armeen erobert.

Die Geschichte Westafrikas ist geprägt durch den Sklavenhandel, der jedoch nicht erst mit dem Eintreffen der Europäer begann. Vielmehr war bereits der Reichtum der Königtümer von Ghana, Mali und Songhay ebenso wie vieler kleinerer Reiche auf der Arbeit von Sklaven begründet, die in den Minen und auf den Feldern eingesetzt wurden. Gleichzeitig stellten Sklaven – neben Gold – das einzige Gut dar, dessen Wert groß genug war, um die aufwändigen Karawanen nach Nordafrika zu rechtfertigen. Mit dem Eintreffen der Europäer nahm der Umfang des Sklavenhandels massiv zu. Erwarben europäische Händler zwischen 1450 und 1500 rund 600 Menschen pro Jahr, war diese Zahl bis 1650 bereits auf jährlich rund 4000 Personen angestiegen. Der hohe Arbeitskräftebedarf in den amerikanischen Kolonien ließ die Nachfrage in der Folgezeit explodieren; um 1780 wurden jedes Jahr rund 50 000 Sklaven über den Atlantik verschifft. Ein Ende fand diese Entwicklung erst Anfang bis Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts, nachdem zunächst Großbritannien und die USA, später auch Frankreich den Überseehandel mit Sklaven (nicht aber deren Besitz) verboten. In dieser Zeit entstanden auch erste Siedlungen befreiter Sklaven an den westafrikanischen Küsten wie zum Beispiel Freetown und Monrovia, die heutigen Hauptstädte von Sierra Leone und Liberia.

In der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts veränderte sich auch die Natur der europäischen Präsenz in Afrika. Seit dem 15. Jahrhun-

Land *Hauptstadt*	*Fläche* *in km²*	*Bevölkerung* *2007*	*Bevölk.-wachstum* *2007, in Prozent*	*Religion* *in Prozent*	*BIP/Kopf* *PPP US-Dollar/ Rang 2006*	*HDI Rang* *2006*
Benin *Porto-Novo*	*112.600*	*9,03 Mio.*	*3,0*	*Christen: ca. 35* *Muslime: ca. 25; Voodoo offiziell: ca. 17 (vermutlich aber zwischen 60 und 70)*	*1.259 / 151*	*161*
Burkina Faso *Ouagadougou*	*274.000*	*14,78 Mio.*	*2,9*	*Muslime: ca. 50* *Animisten: ca. 35* *Christen: ca. 15*	*1.084 / 159*	*173*
Côte d'Ivoire *Yamoussoukro*	*322.500*	*19,27 Mio.*	*1,9*	*Muslime: ca. 40* *Christen: ca. 30* *Animisten: ca. 30*	*1.632 / 141*	*166*
Gambia *Banjul*	*11.300*	*1,71 Mio.*	*2,6*	*Muslime: über 90* *Christen: ca. 8* *Animisten: ca. 2*	*1.152 / 155*	*160*
Ghana *Accra*	*238.500*	*23,46 Mio.*	*2,0*	*Naturreligionen: 40* *Muslime: 30* *Christen: ca. 30*	*1.247 / 152*	*142*
Guinea *Conakry*	*245.900*	*9,38 Mio.*	*2,1*	*Muslime: über 90* *Christen: 6; weit verbreiteter Animismus*	*1.118 / 157*	*167*
Guinea-Bissau *Bissau*	*36.100*	*1,69 Mio.*	*2,9*	*Muslime: ca. 50* *Naturreligionen: ca. 40* *Christen: ca. 10*	*467 / 175*	*171*
Kapverd. Inseln *Praia*	*4.000*	*530.000*	*2,2*	*Christen: über 90* *wenige Muslime*	*2.833 / 124*	*118*
Liberia *Monrovia*	*111.400*	*3,75 Mio.*	*4,8*	*Christen: ca. 40* *Animisten: ca. 40* *Muslime: ca. 20*	*335 / 176*	*176*
Mali *Bamako*	*1.240.200*	*12,33 Mio.*	*3,0*	*Muslime: über 75* *Christen: ca. 5, viele – auch zugleich – Animisten*	*1.058 / 160*	*168*
Niger *Niamey*	*1.267.000*	*14,2 Mio.*	*3,3*	*Muslime: 95* *Animisten: 4,5* *Christen: 0,35*	*612 / 173*	*174*
Nigeria *Abuja*	*923.800*	*147,98 Mio.*	*ca. 2,2*	*Muslime: ca. 50* *Christen, viele – auch zugleich – Animisten: ca. 50*	*1.852 / 139*	*154*
Senegal *Dakar*	*196.700*	*12,41 Mio.*	*2,8*	*Muslime: ca. 94* *Christen: 4* *Animisten: ca. 2*	*1.592 / 144*	*153*
Sierra Leone *Freetown*	*71.700*	*5,85 Mio.*	*1,8*	*Muslime: ca. 70* *Christen: 20* *Animisten: 10*	*630 / 172*	*179*
Togo *Lomé*	*56.800*	*6,58 Mio.*	*2,6*	*Animisten: 40* *Christen: 30; Muslime: 30*	*792 / 166*	*159*

Spalten 2-4: Weltbank; Spalte 5: Auswärtiges Amt (Zeitpunkt der Abfrage: April 2009); Spalten 6 und 7: UNDP

dert hatten sich die europäischen Seefahrernationen zumeist auf den Bau von Handelsposten an der Küste beschränkt, eine über diese Siedlungen hinausgehende Herrschaft erschien den Regierungen dagegen unwirtschaftlich. Technologische Fortschritte (die Erfindung der Telegraphie, der Eisenbahn, des Repetiergewehrs sowie die Entdeckung des Malariamittels Chinin) und eine Verschiebung der europäischen Mächtebalance in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts machten es für europäische Mächte sowohl möglich als auch attraktiv, ihre Territorialherrschaft in Afrika auszudehnen. Sie einigten sich auf der Berliner Konferenz (1884/1885) auf die Aufteilung des afrikanischen Kontinents.

Die Herrschaft in den dadurch begründeten Kolonialstaaten war gleichzeitig oberflächlich und brutal. Die Kolonien dienten den expandierenden Industrien Europas als Rohstofflieferanten, wobei die entsprechenden Primärgüter in Minen und Plantagen in einer an Sklaverei grenzenden Arbeitsweise gewonnen wurden. Die Kolonialherren errichteten nur ein Mindestmaß an staatlichen Institutionen und verließen sich stattdessen oft auf einheimische Mittelsmänner, wie es das britische Motto der *indirect rule* verdeutlicht.

In Westafrika gab es zwei größere Kolonialmächte: Frankreich und Großbritannien. Portugal verfügte mit Guinea-Bissau und den Kapverdischen Inseln lediglich über sehr kleine Besitzungen, und die deutsche Kolonie Togo war nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg vom Völkerbund unter französische Kontrolle gegeben worden. Als in London und Paris Ende der 1950er Jahre die Erkenntnis reifte, dass man sich die Kolonialimperien weder wirtschaftlich noch politisch länger würde leisten können, wurde dies von den

Schwieriges Erbe

[...] Rückblickend ist die Dekolonisation Afrikas geradezu rasant verlaufen. Nach 1945 resignierten die Kolonialmächte in Asien angesichts der massiven nationalen Bewegungen zwar recht schnell. Doch in London und Paris dachte zunächst niemand an eine Aufgabe der afrikanischen Kolonien – im Gegenteil! Dort fand so etwas wie eine „zweite koloniale Besetzung" statt. Frankreich wie Großbritannien favorisierten südlich der Sahara einen mit größeren Investitionen verbundenen „Entwicklungskolonialismus", der den Metropolen direkten Nutzen und den Afrikanern die für die Unabhängigkeit vermeintlich nötige „Reife" bescheren sollte. Wellen von Experten wurden nach Afrika entsandt, um den Bauern neue Wege des Anbaus zu weisen und den Arbeitern neue Formen der Arbeit nahezulegen. Ein bisschen Demokratie einzuüben war Teil des Programms.

Die neuen afrikanischen Politiker, die sich in der Regel aus der kleinen Schar gut ausgebildeter Stadtbewohner zusammensetzten, verstanden sich indes als Bürger und wollten nicht länger Eingeborene sein. Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, Sekou Toure und andere nationalistische Politiker verlangten nun politische Mitsprache. [...]

Die neue Generation afrikanischer Politiker hatte [...] rasch gelernt, das Spiel der parlamentarischen Demokratie zu spielen und die neuen Strukturen zu einer stetigen Ausdehnung der eigenen Machtbasis zu nutzen. Es gelang ihnen, die politische Initiative zu ergreifen und den Gang der Ereignisse zu bestimmen. Beschleunigt wurde der Prozess dadurch, dass sich die USA und die Sowjetunion auf internationalem Parkett als antikoloniale Kräfte gerierten.

Parallel verlor die koloniale Entwicklungsinitiative rasch ihren Reformeifer. Die Verwaltungs- und Wirtschaftskreise in Paris und London waren Mitte der fünfziger Jahre überzeugt: Afrika würde für die Ökonomien in Europa und der Welt nur mehr eine marginale Rolle spielen. Die hohen Kosten, die etwa mit der Schaffung von Wohlfahrtsstaaten nach europäischem Muster verbunden waren und noch sein würden, erschienen den Europäern immer mehr als Fehlinvestition. [...] Infrastrukturmaßnahmen und Sozialprogramme in Afrika wurden zurückgenommen oder verschleppt. Am Ende übernahmen die Afrikaner das Projekt „Entwicklung" zusammen mit dem von den Kolonialherren aufgebauten Staatsapparat. [...]

Zum Zeitpunkt der Unabhängigkeit glaubten die Führer dieser Jahre in der Position zu sein, das jeweils beste von Europa und Afrika auswählen zu können. Doch sie wurden Opfer ihres schnellen Erfolges. Sie konzipierten, Gefangene des zeittypischen Machbarkeitswahns, ihre jungen Staaten als Sozialstaat mit Interventionskompetenz, sahen sich aber zugleich mit dem Erbe eines schwachen und autoritären Staates konfrontiert. Angesichts der großen Lücke zwischen Wollen und Können und aus Schwäche heraus suchten sie ihr Heil in autoritären Lösungen. [...]

Die jungen Staaten mussten neben der Regierungsverantwortung das Scheitern kolonialer Entwicklungsprogramme mit übernehmen. Sie erbten eine enge, exportorientierte Infrastruktur und begrenzte Märkte für Produzenten von Rohstoffen. Aber sie mussten nun den Preis für eine immer schwerfälligere Verwaltungsstruktur zahlen, die im Zuge des spätkolonialen Entwicklungsenthusiasmus etabliert worden war. Vor allem mussten die Regierenden mit den wachsenden Erwartungen der Bevölkerung umgehen, die nun hoffte, dass der Staat endlich ihnen gehöre.

[...] Die afrikanischen Eliten hatten aufgrund ihrer Erfahrungen mit der Mobilisierung gegen den kolonialen Staat meist ein untrügliches Gespür dafür bekommen, wie prekär die Macht war, die sie geerbt hatten. Der bestenfalls gemischte Erfolg kolonialer und nachkolonialer Entwicklungsanstrengungen erweckte in ihnen wenig Hoffnungen, dass die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung ausreichend Wohlstand generieren würde, um ihnen politischen Kredit zu verschaffen, und auch zu wenig einheimisches Wachstum, um genügend Steuern abzuwerfen. So besannen sie sich auf die Strategie, die bereits die Regierenden der Kolonialstaaten praktiziert hatten: Begrenzte, von den Herrschenden kontrollierte Aufstiegsmöglichkeiten und die Einengung von Spielräumen schienen das beste Mittel gegen eine potentielle Opposition. [...]

Andreas Eckert, „Der Dominoeffekt", in: Süddeutsche Zeitung vom 6. März 2007

1957 wird Ghana unabhängig. Premier Kwame Nkrumah (r.) beim Festakt in Accra mit dem Ex-Gouverneur und der Herzogin von Kent.

Central Press / Getty Images

nach Unabhängigkeit strebenden afrikanischen Eliten begrüßt. Zu diesen gehörten Ärzte, Lehrer und Intellektuelle, die oft zuvor in Frankreich und England studiert hatten und nun an der Spitze afrikanischer Bewegungen wie zum Beispiel dem in vielen französischen Kolonien aktiven, panafrikanistisch orientierten *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (RDA) standen.

Jenseits der Forderungen nach Unabhängigkeit gingen die politischen Programme dieser Eliten jedoch weit auseinander. Auf der einen Seite gab es charismatische Revolutionäre wie Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana und Sékou Touré in Guinea, die den radikalen Bruch mit der kolonialen Vergangenheit anstrebten, die Einheit der Afrikaner betonten und eine konsequente Blockfreiheit forderten. Ihnen gegenüber standen konservative Staatschefs wie Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Elfenbeinküste), die angesichts der hohen wirtschaftlichen Abhängigkeit der postkolonialen Staaten von ihren früheren Kolonialmächten für eine kooperative und vorsichtige Politik eintraten. Viele der Revolutionäre entwickelten an den Sozialismus angelehnte Herrschaftsmodelle, der radikale Panafrikanismus war jedoch nach Nkrumahs Sturz durch einen

Landwirtschaft in Burkina Faso

Klaus Sieg, agenda

Achtzig Prozent der Bevölkerung des westafrikanischen Staates lebt auf dem Land. Die meisten dieser Menschen betreiben Subsistenz-Landwirtschaft. Sie bauen Hirse, Mais und etwas Gemüse an, halten einige Hühner oder Ziegen. Fast alles ihrer Produktion verbrauchen sie selbst – in trockenen Jahren reicht die eigene Ernte aber häufig nicht aus. Mehr als drei Hektar kann eine Familie in Burkina Faso nicht bebauen, und so viel auch nur, wenn die Kinder mithelfen. Hauptwerkzeug auf dem Feld ist die traditionelle Hacke „Daba". Immer wieder werden so genannte Cash Crops als Heilsbringer angepriesen. Die Feldfrüchte für den Export sollen den Bauern Geld bringen. Damit können sie Nahrungsmittel zukaufen, das Schulgeld für die Kinder bezahlen oder ihre Landwirtschaft modernisieren. So weit die Theorie. Burkina Faso hat in den vergangenen Jahren intensiv den Anbau von Baumwolle für den Export gefördert. Zwei Drittel der Exporterlöse erzielt das Land mit Baumwolle. Doch die Konkurrenz der subventionierten Baumwolle aus den USA, aber auch der von riesigen Feldern in Zentralasien und China ist übermächtig. [...]

Die Schwierigkeiten sind vielfältig. Nur ein Viertel der Bevölkerung kann lesen und schreiben. Die Infrastruktur auf dem Land ist völlig unzureichend. Burkina Faso verfügt als Binnenland über keinen Meerhafen. Exportgüter müssen über die einzige vorhandene Bahnlinie oder per LKW über schlechte und unsichere Straßen nach Ghana oder an die Elfenbeinküste transportiert werden.

Neben Baumwolle bieten auch Cashewnüsse, Sesam und Karitébutter den Bauern in Burkina Faso Einkommensmöglichkeiten. [...] Die Produktion von Karitébutter in den Dörfern von Burkina Faso geht über Stunden und Tage. Schon immer war das Sache der Frauen. Im Juni und Juli gehen sie mit Kalebassen und Plastikschüsseln zwischen den wild wachsenden Karité-Bäumen umher und sammeln die grünen, weichen Früchte vom Boden. Zunächst befreien sie die Früchte von ihrem weißen Fleisch. [...] Dann erhitzen die Frauen die ölhaltigen Kerne, um sie anschließend zu stampfen und zu mahlen. Mit Wasser rühren sie dieses Pulver zu einer braunen Paste, die aufgekocht wird. Nach dem Erkalten kneten die Frauen die Paste so lange, bis sie flockig und weiß ist. Farbpigmente und Bitterstoffe werden so heraus gewaschen. Über dem Holzfeuer kochen die Frauen dann daraus gelbes Öl. Nach dem Filtern erkaltet das Öl zu Butter.

Diese leicht körnige, weiße Butter, auch Sheabutter genannt, nutzen sie als Creme. Auch Seife lässt sich aus der Karitébutter herstellen. In den letzten Jahren wird Karité deshalb zunehmend auch von der internationalen Kosmetikindustrie nachgefragt. Eine Chance für die Frauen in Burkina Faso. So können sie ihre Produkte aus der ölhaltigen Nuss nicht nur auf den lokalen Märkten verkaufen und zum Teil den doppelten Preis erzielen.

Ein Zusatzeinkommen können die Frauen und ihre Familien dringend brauchen. Burkina Faso ist eines der ärmsten Länder der Welt. [...] Der Norden des Landes liegt im Bereich der Sahelzone. Immer wieder leidet es unter Trocken- und Dürreperioden. Die sich ausbreitende Sahara treibt die Bevölkerung dieser Region in die Städte und in den Süden von Burkina Faso. Dort wächst der Druck auf die Ressourcen. Im relativ fruchtbaren Süden fällt zwar mit 1000 Millimetern pro Jahr fast genauso viel Regen wie in Mitteleuropa. Doch der kommt innerhalb von nur zwei bis drei Monaten an wenigen Tagen übers Land, prasselt aus bedrohlichen Wolkentürmen nieder und wäscht nicht selten die dünne Humussicht von den kargen Böden. Wenn er denn kommt.

„Bleibt der Regen aus, klopft schnell der Hunger an die Tür." Mariam Idogo [...] baut gemeinsam mit ihrem Mann in ihrem Heimatdorf Guiaro Mais, Hirse und etwas Gemüse an. Das Meiste davon verbrauchen die beiden und ihre vier Kinder selbst. Doch in den Sommermonaten leert sich der Vorratsspeicher. Die neue Ernte ist noch nicht eingebracht, und Mariam Idogo muss Lebensmittel auf dem Markt in Po kaufen. Das Geld dafür verdient sie durch die Herstellung von etwa einhundert Kilogramm Karitébutter. Auf dem Markt bekommt sie dafür umgerechnet knapp achtzig Euro. Das ist der Gegenwert von gerade einmal zwei 20-Kilogramm-Säcken Reis. „Im letzten Jahr haben sich die Preise für Lebensmittel auf dem Markt verdoppelt." Mariam Idogo hat fast alles für Lebensmittel ausgeben müssen. Wenn sie und die anderen Frauen für ihre Karitébutter auf dem internationalen Markt bessere Preise erzielen, bleibt der Hunger dauerhaft vor der Tür. Und vielleicht reicht der Verdienst dann auch für die Schulbildung der Kinder.

Doch Abnehmer in Kanada, den USA und Europa kaufen am liebsten die ganzen Nüsse. So können sie die Preise unter Kontrolle halten und ihre Qualitätsstandards bei der Herstellung der Butter realisieren. In Burkina Faso versuchen deshalb Hilfsorganisationen, die Frauen bei der Herstellung und Vermarktung ihrer Karitébutter zu unterstützen. So soll ein möglichst großer Teil der Wertschöpfung aus der Karitébutter bei den Frauen gehalten werden. [...]

Verarbeitung von Kariténüssen zu Sheabutter

Jörg Boethling / agenda

Militärputsch des prowestlichen *National Liberation Council* 1966 weitgehend passé.

Außerdem trat eine zweite Konfliktlinie hervor: die Spaltung Westafrikas in anglophone und frankophone Länder. Insbesondere Frankreich unterhielt auch nach der Dekolonisierung weiterhin sehr enge politische und wirtschaftliche Verbindungen zu seinen ehemaligen Kolonien. In den 1960er Jahren intervenierten französische Truppen achtmal in West- und Zentralafrika, um freundlich gesonnene Regierungen zu stützen. Doch auch Großbritannien spielte seine Verbindungen aus, um sich in der bipolaren Weltordnung des Kalten Krieges eine eigene Einflusssphäre zu erhalten.

In Westafrika entbrannte aus diesen gegenläufigen Interessen ein Konflikt um die regionale Vormachtstellung, wobei Nigeria und die Elfenbeinküste die wichtigsten Protagonisten waren. Während des Sezessionskonflikts um die nigerianische Provinz Biafra (1967 bis 1970) sah Frankreich eine Chance, die dominante Macht Nigeria zu schwächen und unterstützte die Separatisten über die Elfenbeinküste und Gabun mit Waffen, Söldnern und Geld. Nachdem jedoch die anderen Staaten Biafra die Anerkennung verweigerten, konnte sich die nigerianische Regierung erst intern und später, getragen von der weltweiten Nachfrage nach Öl, auch in der Region durchsetzen.

Um seine dominante Position abzusichern, betrieb Nigeria ein Projekt regionaler Wirtschaftsintegration, das 1975 in der Gründung der *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS) mündete. Da sich schnell herausstellte, dass die auf den Rohstoff-Export ausgerichteten Mitgliedsländer wirtschaftlich nur wenig von einer Integration profitierten, verwandelte sich ECOWAS bald von einer wirtschaftlichen Organisation in ein politisches Forum, in dem aktuelle diplomatische Fragen besprochen werden konnten. In den 1980er Jahren erhielt ECOWAS überdies durch ein Sicherheitsabkommen eine weitere Dimension, die durch den ersten liberianischen Bürgerkrieg (1989 bis 1996) eine besondere Relevanz erlangte.

Im Umfeld dieses Bürgerkrieges traten die beiden regionalen Konfliktlinien wieder deutlicher hervor. In den 1980er Jahren wurde Liberia durch eine Militärjunta unter der Führung von Samuel Doe regiert, der gute Beziehungen zu den USA und zu Nigeria unterhielt; deshalb wurde er sowohl von Revolutionären wie Blaise Compaoré (Burkina Faso) und Muammar al Gaddafi (Libyen) als auch von dem selbst ernannten Anführer der westafrikanischen Frankophonie, Félix Houphouët-Boigny (Elfenbeinküste), abgelehnt. Diese drei Staatschefs unterstützten stattdessen die Rebellen der *National Patriotic Front of Liberia* (NPFL) unter der Führung von Charles Taylor, die ab 1989 für den Sturz Does kämpften. Bereits Mitte 1990 schien die Machtübernahme der NPFL unmittelbar bevorzustehen, ehe die ECOWAS unter dem Druck Nigerias eine Interventionstruppe nach Liberia entsandte, die Taylors Vormarsch auf die Hauptstadt in letzter Minute stoppen konnte. Daraus entwickelte sich ein Stellungskrieg, der einige Jahre andauerte und auf mehrere angrenzende Länder übergriff.

Mit der Zeit wurde jedoch deutlich, dass die internationalen Allianzen weniger durch strukturelle Faktoren als vielmehr durch die darin verbundenen Personen bestimmt wurden. Beispielsweise beendete der heutige Präsident der Elfenbeinküste, Laurent Gbagbo – ein langjähriger Konkurrent des Houphouët-Boigny-Lagers – die Unterstützung für Taylor, der 1997 das Präsidentenamt Liberias übernommen hatte. In der Folge breitete sich der im Jahr 2000 neu entbrannte liberianische Bürgerkrieg auch in die Elfenbeinküste aus, wo es ab 2002 zu unter anderem von Compaoré und Taylor unterstützten Rebellionen kam.

Die Vertreibung Taylors aus seinem Amt im Jahr 2003 beendete vorerst die Bürgerkriege in der Region – mit Ausnahme des Konflikts in der Elfenbeinküste, der bis heute nicht vollständig gelöst ist, sowie verschiedener lokaler Konflikte in Nigeria. Seither haben viele Regierungen angesichts eines guten weltwirtschaftlichen Klimas eine deutliche Friedensdividende einfahren können. Dennoch bleibt die gesamte Region latent instabil: Nigeria und die Elfenbeinküste, die beiden größten Staaten der Region, leiden unter internen Spaltungen und schlechter Regierungsführung. In Guinea herrscht nach dem Tod des langjährigen, autokratisch regierenden Präsidenten Lansana Conté und einem Putsch seit dem 25. Dezember 2008 eine Militärjunta, die für 2010 reguläre Wahlen ankündigte. Obwohl Militärputsche heute wesentlich seltener sind als noch während ihrer Hochphase in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren, stellen sie weiterhin eine ständige Bedrohung dar, wie auch der Putsch in Mauretanien im Sommer 2008 gezeigt hat. Nicht zuletzt leidet die gesamte Region unter massiven Entwicklungsproblemen, die noch für Jahrzehnte eine nachhaltige Stabilisierung der politischen Lage erschweren werden.

Das 1471 erbaute Fort Elmina in Ghana war ein Zentrum des Sklavenhandels.

Friedrich Stark

Baumwolle ist ein wichtiges Exportgut Westafrikas. Ernte in Mali 2007

Jörg Boethling/agenda

1967 bis 1970 kämpften Rebellen für die Unabhängigkeit Biafras.

AFP/Getty Images

Nigeria

Heinrich Bergstresser

Der westafrikanische Staat Nigeria hebt sich strukturell in vielerlei Hinsicht von allen anderen afrikanischen Staaten ab. Denn in dem nur mittelgroßen Land (923 800 Quadratkilometer) lebten nach dem letzten Zensus von 2006 mehr als 140 Millionen Menschen, das heißt, jeder fünfte oder sechste Afrikaner ist Nigerianer, und Nigerianer bilden mit Abstand die größte afrikanische Diaspora in Übersee. Doch es ist nicht nur das bevölkerungsreichste Land des Kontinents, sondern bietet auf geographisch überschaubarem Raum mit annähernd 400 Sprachen und Ethnien gleichzeitig die größte kulturelle Heterogenität, wobei allein die drei Mehrheitsvölker, die Hausa-Fulani, Igbo und Yoruba, etwa die Hälfte der Gesamtbevölkerung stellen. Drei der vier Sprachstämme und ein Viertel aller Sprachen Afrikas sind in Nigeria vertreten, hier leben zugleich weltweit die größte Anzahl von Christen und Muslimen in einem Staatsgebiet zusammen, und praktizierte Religiosität ist bei mindestens 90 Prozent der Gesellschaft fester Bestandteil des Alltags.

Ein seit Jahrzehnten rasant anhaltendes Bevölkerungswachstum von bis zu drei Prozent ließ die Bevölkerungszahl allein seit 1991 um mehr als 50 Millionen ansteigen, und trotz einer leichten Abflachung der demographischen Wachstumskurve wird bereits in wenigen Jahren die Zahl von 170 Millionen Menschen überschritten sein. Diese enormen Steigerungsraten spiegeln sich im aktuellen Urbanisierungsgrad von 50 Prozent – Tendenz steigend – und einem 44-prozentigen Anteil Jugendlicher unter 15 Jahren an der Gesamtbevölkerung wider. Allein in den beiden bevölkerungsreichsten Bundesstaaten Lagos im Süden und Kano im hohen Norden leben jeweils neun Millionen Menschen und in jedem weiteren Bundesstaat, einschließlich des Bundesterritoriums Abuja, zwischen 1,4 und sechs Millionen. Und in allen 36 Bundesstaaten gibt es eine Vielzahl von Klein- und Mittelstädten, wobei die Hauptstädte in der Regel Populationen von hunderttausend Einwohnern und mehr aufweisen.

Nigeria gehört als OPEC-Mitglied zu den weltweit wichtigsten Erdöl- und Erdgasproduzenten, ohne jedoch den Reichtum an natürlichen Ressourcen bisher zur wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung genutzt zu haben. Vielmehr erzeugten jahrzehntelange politische Auseinandersetzungen um den lukrativen Zugang zu diesen Ressourcen eine lange Kette blutiger und kostspieliger Konflikte.

Der britische Imperialismus begann Mitte des 19. Jahrhunderts von der Küste des Golfs von Guinea aus das Territorium des heutigen Nigeria in sein Kolonialreich einzugliedern. Lagos wurde 1861 Kolonie, doch dauerte es mehr als 40 Jahre bis auch im islamischen Nordosten der Widerstand gebrochen war. Nach der erfolgreichen „Befriedung" der Protektorate Nord- und Südnigeria fasste Frederick Lugard, britischer Offizier und Kolonialverwalter, 1914 die beiden Gebiete unter der Bezeichnung *„The Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria"* zusammen. Er begründete die Politik der „indirekten Herrschaft", um die bestehenden Herrschaftsstrukturen konsolidieren und die Kolonie kostengünstig verwalten und ausbeuten zu können. Indirekte Herrschaft bedeutete, dass die einheimischen Eliten ihre traditionellen Funktionen behielten, aber als Sachwalter britischer Interessen dem Kolonialverwalter unterstanden. Diese Rolle übernahmen im Südwesten die Yoruba-Könige, im Südosten stützten die Missionsschulen die Fremdherrschaft über die segmentäre Igbo-Gesellschaft, und den Emiraten im Norden des Landes blieben die innere Selbstverwaltung und die Kontrolle über die Minoritätenvölker des *Middle Belt*. Darüber hinaus verboten die Briten jegliche Missionierung im islamischen Hausa-Fulani-Kernland des hohen Nordens und schrieben damit für mehrere Jahrzehnte die politische und soziale Stagnation in diesem Gebiet fest. Der unter diesen Bedingungen erzwungene Zusammenschluss zweier Kolonialgebiete mit völlig unterschiedlichen Wertesystemen, Normen sowie politischen und soziokulturellen Vorstellungen zu Macht und Fremdherrschaft begründete den noch heute erheblichen Entwicklungsunterschied zwischen Nord und Süd. Zwischen den beiden Weltkriegen entstanden die ersten antikolonialen Bewegungen in Lagos, getragen von gebildeten Yoruba und Igbo. Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg versuchten sie, ihre nationalen, antiimperialistischen Ideen auch in den Norden zu tragen, stießen jedoch auf massiven Widerstand der feudalen Herrschaftselite der Hausa-Fulani, die schließlich eine eigene Partei gründete, um sich gegen die expandierende Intelligenz des Südens zu behaupten. Somit zerschlug sich schon Jahre vor der Unabhängigkeit die Hoffnung auf eine nationale Bewegung, was den drei Mehrheitsvölkern aber Macht und Reproduktionsbasis in ihrer jeweiligen Region sicherte. Zugleich verweigerte die britische Kolonialmacht den benachteiligten Minoritätenvölkern eigene politische Einflusszonen. Am Tag der Unabhängigkeit des dreigliedrigen föderativen Systems mit dem Bundesterritorium Lagos 1960 begann der Kampf zwischen den Eliten der drei Mehrheitsvölker um die politische Vorherrschaft.

Xinhua / Das Fotoarchiv

Nigeria ist das bevölkerungsreichste Land Afrikas. Oshodi-Markt in Lagos

Der von den Igbo inspirierte erste Militärputsch 1966 und der blutige Gegenputsch von Hausa-Fulani und Minoritäten der Nordregion wenige Monate später mündete schon bald in einem opferreichen Bürgerkrieg (1967 bis 1970) um die abtrünnige Igbo-dominierte Ostregion, der als Biafra-Krieg in die Geschichte einging. Als am Vorabend dieses gewaltsamen Konfliktes die territoriale Einheit des Landes zu zerbrechen drohte,

entpuppten sich letztlich die Minoritätenvölker aus dem Norden und Süden, personifiziert durch den jungen General und Juntachef Yakubu Gowon aus dem *Middle Belt*, als Zünglein an der Waage. Er schmiedete neue Allianzen zwischen den Minoritätenvölkern, Yoruba und Hausa-Fulani, erweiterte die Föderation auf zwölf Bundesstaaten, beendete gewaltsam die Sezession und etablierte zugleich das Militär als zentralen politischen Akteur im komplizierten Kräftespiel des Vielvölkerstaates.

Die großen internationalen Ölkonzerne und die staatliche Ölgesellschaft läuteten nun im Niger-Delta das Zeitalter des leicht verdienten Geldes ein, und der Ölboom veränderte binnen weniger Jahre Denk- und Verhaltensmuster der noch sehr jungen Nation. Doch schufen die Petrodollar zunächst einmal die materielle Grundlage, die Wunden des Bürgerkrieges zu heilen und die tiefen Gräben zwischen den Igbo und den übrigen Volksgruppen zumindest teilweise zu überbrücken. Zugleich entwickelte sich ein fragiler Konsens der Eliten über die Verteilung der wertvollen Ressource Öl, der aber die zahlreichen Staatsstreiche und Putschversuche und die beiden gescheiterten Demokratisierungsprojekte (II. Republik 1979 bis 1983 unter Staatspräsident Shehu Shagari und der von Juntachef General Ibrahim Babangida 1993 abrupt beendete mehrjährige Übergangsprozess zur III. Republik) nicht unterbinden konnte. Erst der plötzliche Tod von General Sani Abacha 1998 und die Wahl des ehemaligen Juntachefs General a. D. Olusegun Obasanjo zum demokratisch legitimierten Staatspräsidenten 1999 beendeten die lange Phase militärischer, repressiver Herrschaft. Zugleich ermöglichte der erneute Demokratisierungsversuch die Einführung des islamischen Rechts, der Scharia, als bindendes Recht in zwölf islamisch geprägten Bundesstaaten Nordnigerias, womit ein alter Traum von Teilen des islamischen Klerus und des Establishments Wirklichkeit wurde. Trotz erheblicher verfassungs- und strafrechtlicher Probleme hat sich die große Mehrheit der Eliten und politischen Entscheidungsträger schließlich mit der Existenz zweier Rechtssysteme arrangiert und den Status quo eines gelebten Rechtspluralismus akzeptiert. Eine Verfassungskrise blieb aus, und nach zwei Legislaturperioden, ein Novum in der nigerianischen Geschichte, ging mit der Wahl von Umaru Musa Yar'Adua 2007 sogar erstmals die Macht von einer direkt gewählten Staatsführung auf eine andere über.

Die Ölkrise Anfang der 1970er Jahre und die sukzessive steigenden Erdölpreise hatten binnen weniger Jahre das agrarisch

Filmland Nigeria

In dem kleinen Krankenhaus außerhalb der Stadt Asaba im Niger Delta wälzen vier Frauen dicke Bücher. „Finanzabgleich", sagt eine korpulente Dame in giftgrünem Kleid. „Wir machen unsere Monatsabrechung und wie immer fehlt Geld." Und man wäre wenig überrascht, würde nicht gerade in einer anderen Ecke eine Szene mit der nigerianischen Variante von Julia Roberts gedreht. Kate Henshaw, eine schöne, grazile Frau mit starker dunkler Stimme und schallendem Lachen. „Und? Haben Sie gute oder schlechte Nachrichten?", fragt sie mit großen Augen eine schneeweiß gekleidete Krankenschwester. Eine kleine Digitalkamera läuft. Der Kameramann dreht ohne Stativ. [...] Tchidi Chikere, der Regisseur, redet nun auf die Krankenschwester ein. „Will er ihr Grammatik beibringen?", brummelt die Krankenhauschefin im giftgrünen Kleid. „Hoffentlich sind die bald fertig." Spricht's und widmet sich wieder ihren Finanzen, ganz nach dem Motto: Sollen die doch hier Hollywood proben, ich habe wirklich Wichtigeres zu tun.

Es ist diese gesunde Koexistenz zwischen Stars und normalem Leben, die Nigerias Filmindustrie auszeichnet. 2000 Filme werden hier jedes Jahr gedreht, 200 Millionen Euro umgesetzt, mit Geschichten ganz nah am Menschen. So hat sich die drittgrößte Filmindustrie der Welt nach Hollywood und Bollywood in Indien den Namen Nollywood verdient. Kino allerdings ist in Nigeria kein Thema. DVDs für den Heimgebrauch gelten als Kult. Die Budgets sind winzig, im Schnitt 10 000 Euro pro Film. Digitale Technik macht es möglich. 500 000 Kopien eines Films landen auf dem Markt. Jede Woche gibt es etwa zehn Neuerscheinungen. Die moderne Technik ist einfach und kostengünstig. „Drei bis vier Monate brauchen wir, um einen Film abzudrehen. Vom Drehbuch bis zum Verkaufsstart", erklärt Regisseur Tchidi. Er wisse selbst nicht, wie viele Filme er in den vergangenen zehn Jahren produziert hat. „Zwischen 150 und 200 vielleicht?"

Star Kate Henshaw hat aufgehört, zu zählen. Die Schauspielerin ist mit einem Engländer verheiratet und verbringt viel Zeit in London. Doch ihre Einsätze in Nollywood will sie nicht aufgeben. „Wir haben viel Spaß am Set. Nigeria hat so viele talentierte Schauspieler." Die Schauspielerin ist in Nigeria ein Star, der nicht ohne Sonnenbrille durch die Straßen von Lagos, Abuja oder Kano laufen kann. [...] „Afrikaner sind wunderbare Geschichtenerzähler", sagt Henshaw. „Wir fühlen uns in den Geschichten zu Hause. Deshalb können wir sie so schnell abdrehen, bis zu 20 Szenen am Tag."

Keiner der Schauspieler hat ein Double. Die Maske macht man zwischendurch. Dem Hollywood-verwöhnten Auge kommen die Filme seltsam vor.

„Man kann ein Kunstwerk nicht kritisieren, indem man es am Maßstab anderer Kulturen misst. Das wäre beinahe Kolonialismus", sagt Tchidi. Zurzeit versucht er, afrikanische Schauspieler für neue Projekte zu engagieren. Bisher sind Nollywood-Filme nur in Nigeria erfolgreich. Nun will Tchidi mit „frischem Fleisch" ganz Afrika erobern.

Dabei lässt sich jetzt schon viel Geld in Nollywood verdienen. Ein bis zwei Euro kostet eine DVD im Supermarkt, beim Friseur oder auch in eigens dafür gebauten Bretterverschlägen. „Filme sind unsere Lebensbegleiter", sagt Sandra Banjano, die Videos verkauft. „Nachmittags, wenn die Kinder nach Hause kommen, dann können wir uns bei einem Film entspannen. Und abends, wenn wir mit der Hausarbeit fertig sind, schauen wir noch einen Film." In Sandras Bretterladen steht ein kleiner Fernseher, aus dem Nollywood den ganzen Tag dröhnt. Oft ist Kate Henshaw zu sehen. „Die ist eine von uns", sagt Sandra. „Die kennt das Leben in den Dörfern." Kate Henshaw lacht über solche Sätze. „Ich identifiziere mich nicht mehr mit den Leuten in den Dörfern. Ich bin weitergezogen. Mein Geist hat sich verändert. Meine Augen sind weit offen." Die Krankenhausleiterin hört zu. Und dann spricht sie die Schauspielerin an. „Unsere Augen sind auch offen, das solltest du nie unterschätzen. Denn wie sollten wir deine Filme mit geschlossenen Augen anschauen?", sagt sie und lacht, laut und von Herzen.

Nicole Macheroux-Denault, Traumfabrik Nollywood, in: Welt am Sonntag vom 8. März 2009

EyeUbiquitous / Hutchison

Der Erdölreichtum Nigerias kommt nur einer kleinen Schicht zugute. Bohranlage in Bonny im Bundesstaat Rivers

George Osodi / AP

In zwölf Bundesstaaten Nordnigerias gilt das islamische Recht, die Scharia. Wegweiser in Bauchi 2006

strukturierte Land in einen anerkannten politischen Akteur des Kontinents verwandelt. Nigeria glaubte nun, auf Grund seines Ölreichtums, seines demographischen Gewichts und seiner damals 250 000 Mann starken Armee prädestiniert zu sein, eine Führungsrolle in Afrika zu spielen und Afrikas Stimme in der Welt zu sein. Darüber hinaus hatte der Glaube, allein mit Devisen Unter- und Nichtentwicklung überwinden zu können, die gesamten Eliten des Landes erfasst und sie zu Großkonsumenten umfunktioniert, die der Weltmarkt mit Konsum- und Investitionsgütern, Fernstraßen, Industrieanlagen, Luxusgütern, Autos, Bildungseinrichtungen und hoch qualifizierten Fachkräften belieferte. Als der Ölpreis in den 1980er Jahren einbrach, brach auch der Traum einer schnellen Industrialisierung und Modernisierung in sich zusammen. Was blieb, ist eine bis heute weithin gültige Grundstruktur des politischen und sozioökonomischen Systems, das sich im Wesentlichen auf die Erdöl- und Erdgaseinnahmen stützt: Korruption in allen Institutionen und auf allen Gesellschaftsebenen, organisierte Schwerkriminalität in allen Landesteilen, Gewaltkonflikte um Grund und Boden sowie um Macht und Einfluss auf kommunaler und bundesstaatlicher Ebene, weit verbreitete absolute Armut, marode Infrastruktur, eklatanter Mangel an Elektrizität, Trinkwasser und Benzin. Positive Entwicklungen gab es lediglich im Bereich der Kommunikationstechnologie, denn dank der Digitalisierung gehört Nigeria quantitativ mittlerweile zu den führenden Handy-Nationen der Welt.

So dient die am US-amerikanischen Föderalismus orientierte föderative Struktur Nigerias mit seinen mittlerweile 36 Bundesstaaten, dem Bundesterritorium Abuja mit seinen sechs Stadtbezirken *(Area Councils)* und den 786 Bezirken *(Local Governments)* den Eliten und Mandatsträgern als wichtigste Plattform, den Ressourcenreichtum nach einem festgelegten Schlüssel zu ihren Gunsten umzuverteilen. Die starke Stellung der Gouverneure, untermauert durch die Rechtsprechung des obersten Gerichtshofes, hat zahlreiche Machtzentren geschaffen, die, alimentiert durch die verfassungsrechtlich abgesicherten üppigen Anteile aus den Erdöl- und Erdgaseinnahmen, weitgehend ein politisches Eigenleben führen. Die Versuche der beiden gewählten Staatspräsidenten Obasanjo und Umaru Musa Yar'Adua, die ausufernde Korruption mit rechtstaatlichen Mitteln zu bekämpfen, sind bislang weitgehend gescheitert.

Nach vorsichtigen Schätzungen haben sich die nigerianischen Eliten im Laufe der letzten drei bis vier Jahrzehnte mindestens 400 Milliarden Dollar aus dem Ölsektor problemlos widerrechtlich angeeignet und auf in- und ausländische Konten transferiert. Die große nigerianische Diaspora in Afrika und in Übersee war und ist Teil dieses Netzwerkes, um Transaktionen dieser Größenordnung überhaupt durchführen zu können. Die internationale Gemeinschaft hat diesem Treiben, bislang jedenfalls, nichts Substanzielles entgegengesetzt, sondern es aus Opportunitätsgründen in der Regel sogar geduldet. Denn die USA als wichtigster Importeur nigerianischen Erdöls und Erdgases und die EU haben ein grundsätzliches Interesse an einem zumindest halbwegs stabilisierten Nigeria. Jenseits der riesigen Energiereserven betrachten die westlichen Staaten Nigeria auch als Ordnungsfaktor in der westafrikanischen Region, der einen wichtigen Beitrag zu UN-Blauhelmmissionen innerhalb und außerhalb Afrikas liefert.

Côte d'Ivoire (Elfenbeinküste)

Daniel Lambach

Die Elfenbeinküste liegt am Golf von Guinea und grenzt an Liberia, Guinea, Mali, Burkina Faso und Ghana. Das Land ist in zwei geographische Zonen unterteilt: eine trockene Savanne im Norden und einen tropischen Regenwald im Süden. 19,27 Millionen Menschen bewohnten 2007 dieses Land, das mit 322 500 Quadratkilometern etwa ähnlich groß wie die Bundesrepublik Deutschland ist. Der Süden ist wesentlich dichter besiedelt als der Norden; dort konzentrieren sich auch die Anbaugebiete für Kaffee und Kakao, die beiden wichtigsten Exportgüter der Elfenbeinküste. Zwar ist Yamoussoukro seit 1983 die offizielle Hauptstadt der Elfenbeinküste, der wahre politische Mittelpunkt des Landes befindet sich aber weiterhin in der vorigen Hauptstadt Abidjan, die mit ihren etwa vier Millionen Einwohnern das größte Bevölkerungszentrum der Elfenbeinküste ist.

Die geographische Spaltung des Landes spiegelt sich in der Sozialstruktur: Während die Bewohner des Nordens zumeist Muslime sind und mit etwa 40 bis 50 Prozent der Gesamtbevölkerung die größte religiöse Gruppe darstellen, leben im Süden vorwiegend Christen und Anhänger traditioneller Religionen. Jenseits der religiösen Zugehörigkeiten ist die ivo-

rische Gesellschaft in eine Vielzahl von ethnischen Gruppen unterteilt. Nach sprachlichen Kriterien lassen sich grob Akan, Kru, Mande und Senufo unterscheiden, wobei die Senufo und Mande den Norden, die Kru den Südwesten und die Akan den Südosten bewohnen. Die Akan machen etwa 27 Prozent der einheimischen Bevölkerung aus, die Kru rund 18 Prozent. Weitere 24 Prozent gehören zu mandesprachigen Ethnien, hinzu kommen die Senufo mit zwölf Prozent und sonstige Ethnien mit 13 Prozent.

In vorkolonialer Zeit gab es bei manchen Akan-Völkern, zum Beispiel den Baoulé und den Agni, lokale Königreiche mit differenzierter politischer Organisation. Die Kru und Senufo lebten vorwiegend in kleinen Gemeinschaften, während die Mande von den verschiedenen Großreichen Westafrikas (Mali, Songhay, Kong) regiert wurden. Die Kolonisierung der Elfenbeinküste vollzog sich nach dem für Westafrika üblichen Muster: Ab dem 16. Jahrhundert errichteten Handelsreisende erste Posten an der Küste. Ab 1840 schlossen die Franzosen Verträge mit einzelnen Königen der Akan und etablierten über die nächsten Jahrzehnte schrittweise ein Protektorat. Die meisten einheimischen Völker wehrten sich zwar gegen das französische Vordringen, wurden jedoch gewaltsam unterworfen und ihre Anführer durch kooperative *chefs* ersetzt. 1893 wurde *Côte d'Ivoire* offiziell als Kolonie in *Afrique Occidentale Française* (Französisch-Westafrika, 1895 bis 1958) aufgenommen. Die französische Kolonialherrschaft war hart: Einheimische Institutionen wurden zerschlagen, wenn sie nicht mit der Struktur des neuen Kolonialstaates harmonierten. Die christianisierten Eliten des Südens wurden von den Franzosen als Mittelspersonen in den Herrschaftsapparat einbezogen.

Nach der Auflösung des französischen Kolonialreiches wurde die Elfenbeinküste 1960 unabhängig. In Abidjan etablierte sich der Arzt Félix Houphouët-Boigny mit seiner *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (PDCI) schnell als dominante Kraft. Nach seinem unangefochtenen Sieg in der ersten Präsidentenwahl des Landes errichtete er schrittweise ein Einparteiensystem, in dem seine PDCI die Macht monopolisierte. Konkurrenten ließ Houphouët-Boigny aus dem Verkehr ziehen oder band sie in ein Patronagesystem ein, das für Ruhe und Stabilität im Land sorgte. Um dieses System mit den nötigen Ressourcen zu versorgen, förderte der Präsident die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Elfenbeinküste. Dazu ging er eine enge Partnerschaft mit Frankreich ein, das seine politische Treue mit konstant hohen Entwicklungshilfezahlungen und umfangreichen Investitionen in die Plantagenwirtschaft und den für westafrikanische Verhältnisse starken Industriesektor belohnte. In den 1960er und 1970er Jahren wuchs die Wirtschaft um durchschnittlich sechs bis acht Prozent pro Jahr. Die PDCI verteilte die Gewinne, was Bürgern und Politikern half, über die ethnischen, regionalen und religiösen Spaltungen des Landes hinwegzusehen. Der Boom dieser zwei Jahrzehnte machte Côte d'Ivoire zu einem gefragten Arbeitsmarkt: Millionen von Westafrikanern kamen als Migranten ins Land, um auf den Plantagen zu arbeiten und beim Aufbau der Industrie und des Dienstleistungssektors zu helfen.

Als jedoch 1978 die Weltmarktpreise für Kaffee und Kakao zu fallen begannen, geriet die ivorische Wirtschaft in eine Krise, die das Land erstmals mit einer verbreiteten Arbeitslosigkeit konfrontierte. Die Regierung, die die sozialen Folgen der Krise zunächst abzufedern versuchte, geriet in eine Spirale der Verschuldung, die Ende der 1980er Jahre praktisch zur Insolvenz des Staates führte. Aus der Unzufriedenheit der Bürger entstand ein Klima der Fremdenfeindlichkeit, da die Einwanderer nun als Konkurrenz um knapper werdende Arbeitsplätze galten.

Issouf Sanogo / AFP / Getty Images

Neben Kaffee ist Kakao das wichtigste Exportgut der Elfenbeinküste. Kakaobauern bei der Ernte 2007 in Godilehiri.

Unter dem Druck öffentlicher Proteste stimmte Houphouët-Boigny 1990 schließlich der Einführung eines Mehrparteiensystems zu, nahm jedoch der Opposition durch die sehr kurzfristige Ansetzung des Wahltermins jegliche Siegchancen, weshalb die PDCI ihre Machtposition erhalten konnte. Um der zunehmenden ethnischen Spaltung der Gesellschaft entgegenzuwirken, ernannte der Präsident Alassane Ouattara, einen Moslem aus dem Norden, zum Premierminister. Dies konnte die zunehmend unzufriedener werdende Bevölkerung nicht besänftigen, so dass es auch in den Folgejahren zu weiteren Unruhen kam.

Nach dem Tod des greisen Houphouët-Boigny im Jahr 1993 konnte sich Henri Bédié, der den Akan-Flügel der PDCI anführte, im Machtkampf um dessen Nachfolge durchsetzen. Anhänger Ouattaras verließen daraufhin die PDCI und gründeten mit dem *Rassemblement des Républicains* (RDR) eine neue Partei, die insbesondere im Norden Unterstützung fand. Das Parteiensystem wurde komplettiert durch die *Front Populaire Ivorien* (FPI) unter Laurent Gbagbo, die ihre Hochburg unter den Kru hatte. Um Ouattara auszuschalten, erließ Bédié ein neues Wahlgesetz, das nur denjenigen Personen das aktive und passive Wahlrecht zusprach, die nie eine andere Staatsbürgerschaft besessen und die letzten fünf Jahre ununterbrochen in der Elfenbeinküste gelebt hatten und deren beide Elternteile Ivorer waren. Es wurde behauptet, der Vater Ouattaras stamme aus Burkina Faso, der populäre Oppositionelle sei burkinischer Staatsbürger und habe aufgrund seiner früheren Tätigkeit für den IWF ohnehin zu lange im Ausland gelebt. Damit wurde jedoch nicht nur Ouattara von den Wahlen 1995 ausgeschlossen, sondern auch mehrere Millionen Nachkommen von Migranten. Diese waren lange Zeit Anhänger der PDCI gewesen, unterstützten aber inzwischen den RDR. Dieses Dekret hatte außerdem eine Signalwirkung: Bald kam es zu fremdenfeindlichen Übergriffen und zu Vertreibungen von burkinischen und malischen Einwanderern.

Bédié gewann zwar die von der Opposition boykottierte Präsidentenwahl, seine nächsten Regierungsjahre waren aber durch eine weitere Verschlechterung der Wirtschaftslage, anhaltende Proteste der Opposition und einen Anstieg der Kriminalität gekennzeichnet. An Heiligabend 1999 wurde Bédié von der Armee aus dem Amt geputscht und der ehemalige Generalstabschef Robert Gueï an seiner Stelle zum Interimspräsidenten ernannt.

Gueï formierte zunächst eine Allparteienregierung, setzte jedoch mit der Zustimmung der PDCI und der FPI Bédiés Politik der *Ivoirité* (Bestreben, nur „wahre Ivorer" politisch zu beteiligen, s.o.) fort, um Ouattara und den RDR weiterhin aus der nationalen Politik auszuschließen. Bei den Wahlen im Oktober 2000 stellte sich die Armee hinter Laurent Gbagbo, der die Parlamentswahlen mit seiner Partei FPI knapp vor der PDCI gewann. Da die gesellschaft-

liche Spaltung sich unter Gbagbos Regierung weiter fortsetzte, kam es im September 2002 zum Aufstand einer Rebellenbewegung aus dem Umfeld der RDR und mit ihr sympathisierender Teile der Armee. Nachdem die Regierung die Aufständischen aus Abidjan vertreiben konnte, zogen sich diese in den Norden zurück, wo sie auf breite Unterstützung von RDR-Sympathisanten trafen. Nach kurzen Kämpfen war das Land effektiv in eine Nord- und eine Südhälfte geteilt, es kam zu Massenvertreibungen von Muslimen aus dem Süden ebenso wie von Christen aus dem Norden.

Auf der Grundlage eines Waffenstillstandsabkommens wurden französische Truppen zur Überwachung einer neutralen Zone zwischen der Regierung und den sich als *Forces Nouvelles* (FN) bezeichnenden Rebellen stationiert, die beide Seiten jedoch regelmäßig verletzten. 2003 wurde das Friedensabkommen von Linas-Marcoussis (Frankreich) vereinbart, das die Bildung einer Regierung der nationalen Einheit, eine Abschaffung des diskriminierenden Wahlgesetzes und eine Demobilisierung der Konfliktparteien vorsah. Auch die Umsetzung dieses Abkommens wurde von Regierung und Rebellen ständig hintertrieben. Als bei einem Luftangriff der ivorischen Luftwaffe auf Rebellenstellungen neun französische Soldaten umkamen, die die Einhaltung des Friedensabkommens sicherstellen sollten, zerstörte die französische Interventionstruppe umgehend alle Flugzeuge der ivorischen Armee durch ein gezieltes Bombardement. Gewaltsame, von der Regierung angestachelte anti-französische Proteste waren die Folge, sodass ein Großteil der noch in Abidjan verbliebenen Europäer das Land verlassen musste.

Seither haben zwar die gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen ein vorläufiges Ende gefunden, die politische Krise ist jedoch noch nicht überwunden. Auf Linas-Marcoussis folgten weitere unter internationaler Vermittlung ausgehandelte Friedensverträge, die jedoch weitgehend wirkungslos blieben. Erst 2007 konnte mit dem Abkommen von Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, eine neue Basis für den Friedensprozess gefunden werden. Der FN-Anführer Guillaume Soro wurde dadurch zum Premierminister unter Präsident Gbagbo ernannt. Diese Machtteilung zwischen FN und FPI bedeutete auch eine gleichzeitige Marginalisierung der PDCI und der RPR. Sollte es zu Präsidentenwahlen kommen, wären jedoch deren Anführer Bédié und Ouattara die wichtigsten Konkurrenten Gbagbos, da der frühere Studentenführer Soro das Mindestalter für die Präsidentschaft (40 Jahre) noch nicht erreicht.

So verwundert es nicht, dass die im Ouagadougou-Abkommen vereinbarten Wahlen mehrfach verschoben wurden. Auch zeigt die Regierung wenig Elan bei der Umsetzung verschiedener anderer Maßnahmen wie zum Beispiel der Integration der Rebellen in die Armee, der Entwaffnung von Milizen, der Wiederherstellung der staatlichen Autorität im Norden des Landes, der Ausgabe von Ausweisen und dem Aufbau eines neuen Wählerregisters. Sowohl der Zeitpunkt als auch der Ausgang der Wahl sind zur Zeit nicht vorherzusagen.

Pascal Guyot / AFP / Getty Images

Frankreich verfügt über Einfluss in seinen ehemaligen Kolonien. Französische Truppen sichern 2004 in der Nähe von Abidjan, Elfenbeinküste, die Straße zum Flughafen.

Senegal

Sven Grimm

Senegal ist eine afrikanische Demokratie mit schwieriger wirtschaftlicher Ausgangsbasis. Das Land ist als *Least Developed Country* (am wenigsten entwickeltes Land) klassifiziert und hat ein sehr hohes Armutsniveau. Die Regierung will die Armut senken; sie muss die Bevölkerung in Wahlen von ihrem Programm immer wieder überzeugen und tendiert daher oftmals zu schnellen Versprechungen.

Senegal gilt seit seiner Unabhängigkeit 1960 als Stabilitätsanker in der Region. Als ununterbrochen zivil regiertes Land ist es in Afrika eine positive Ausnahme. Die politische Macht liegt, hoch zentralisiert, beim Präsidenten. Er „bestimmt die Politik der Nation“, sitzt der Regierung vor, ernennt den Premierminister und ist Oberbefehlshaber der Streitkräfte, die bisher politisch neutral blieben. Trotz der präsidialen Machtfülle ist die politi-

Dakar, Hauptstadt des Senegal, ist bedeutendster Wirtschaftsstandort und wichtigste Hafenstadt des Landes.

Andreas Buck

sche Gewaltenteilung weitgehend garantiert. Seit den späten 1990er Jahren sind die Wahlen internatonal anerkannt frei und fair, wenngleich teilweise logistisch schlecht vorbereitet.

Die Menschenrechte werden generell geachtet. Senegal hat eine freie und kritische Presse, auch wenn deren journalistische Qualität variiert. Eine Reihe von Medien – darunter auch unabhängige Radiostationen mit großem Verbreitungsgrad – pflegen eine regierungskritische Berichterstattung. Allerdings funktioniert die Justiz nur mangelhaft, und es bestehen Einschränkungen aufgrund von Stigmata für bestimmte soziale Gruppen wie beispielsweise Homosexuelle oder der Hexerei verdächtigte Personen.

Die Wolof stellen in Senegal die größte Volksgruppe mit einem Anteil von rund 40 Prozent. Andere Ethnien sind die Peul (rund 20 Prozent) sowie die Serer, Toucouleur, Diola, Malinke und Soninke. Es gibt auch Libanesen, Mauren und Europäer. Die Mehrheit der Senegalesen bekennt sich zum Islam, eine Minderheit (geschätzt auf ca. vier Prozent) zum Christentum, wobei die katholische Konfession überwiegt. Die Trennung von Religion und Staat wird in Senegal – in französischer Tradition – strikt beachtet. Religiöse und ethnische Konflikte spielen keine Rolle.

Muslimische Bruderschaften üben Einfluss aus, wirken aber – wie die katholische Kirche – ausgleichend. Die Bruderschaften werden von spirituellen Religionsführern *(marabouts)* geleitet und stellen aufgrund ihres Rückhalts in der Bevölkerung einen wichtigen politischen Faktor dar. Die größten und einflussreichsten Bruderschaften sind die Tidijane und die Mouriden. Zur Letzteren gehört auch Senegals gegenwärtiger Präsident Abdoulaye Wade, der jedoch streng auf die Laizität der Republik achtet.

Die senegalesische Gesellschaft folgt in der Regel patriarchalischen Mustern. Frauenrechte sind verfassungsrechtlich verankert, doch das Diskriminierungsverbot wird nicht konsequent umgesetzt. Traditionen wie die Polygamie, die Vielehe, werden allerdings kritisch diskutiert; die weibliche Genitalverstümmelung ist gesetzlich verboten. Auch wenn zu Beginn der Amtszeit Präsident Wades eine Frau als Premierministerin fungierte, sind Frauen in Führungspositionen stark unterrepräsentiert.

Soziale Sprengkraft liegt in der Arbeitslosigkeit. Das Wirtschaftswachstum schafft zwar langsam Arbeitsplätze, erfüllt aber bei weitem nicht die Erwartungen der Jugend. Enttäuschte Hoffnungen und Perspektivlosigkeit motivieren Migranten, von Senegal auf die Kanarischen Inseln zu gelangen.

In Senegals Politik sind persönliche Netzwerke entscheidend. Sie wiegen in der Regel schwerer als die Parteizugehörigkeit. Die Regierungspartei PDS *(Parti Democratique Sénégalais)* gründete der gegenwärtige Präsident Wade, als Mitte der 1970er Jahre neben der damals einzig zugelassenen Regierungspartei PS *(Parti Socialiste)* vier weitere Parteien zugelassen wurden. Wade, der sich damals in der Opposition befand, ließ die PDS als liberale Partei registrieren, steht aber keineswegs für einen wirtschaftsliberalen Kurs. Privatisierungen wurden zudem bereits unter seinem Amtsvorgänger, dem Sozialisten Abdou Diouf, durchgeführt.

Die Opposition besteht aus mehr als 20 Parteien, von denen die meisten sich als ideologisch „links“ verstehen. Führende Kraft ist die ehemalige Regierungspartei PS. Sie unterlag am Ende ihrer Regierungszeit in den späten 1990er Jahren starken Spaltungstendenzen, welche unter anderem den Regierungswechsel 2000 zu Präsident Wade ermöglichten. Die Regierungs- und Oppositionskonstellationen haben sich seither mehrfach gewandelt.

Internationale Entwicklungshilfegeber ermahnen Afrikas Politiker häufig zu *ownership* (Verantwortungsübernahme). Ihre Vorstellungen lassen sich vor Ort jedoch keineswegs immer einfach umsetzen. Den Forderungen nach Senkung der Subventionen für Lebensmittel oder Öl werden die senegalesischen Politiker wahrscheinlich kaum nachgeben, weil sie von der Wahlbevölkerung abgelehnt werden.

Senegal verfügt über wenig eigene Ressourcen; nennenswert vorhanden sind nur Fischgründe und Phosphat. Mehr als die Hälfte der senegalesischen Bevölkerung lebt von weniger als zwei US-Dollar am Tag, ein knappes Fünftel von weniger als einem US-Dollar täglich. Die größten Armutsanteile finden sich unter der ländlichen Bevölkerung, vor allem im trockenen Norden und Osten des Landes. Landflucht erhöht aber auch den Anteil der Armen in den küstennahen Städten. Senegals Urbanisierungsgrad zählt zu den höchsten Subsahara-Afrikas: Etwa die Hälfte der Bevölkerung lebt in Städten.

Die personellen und finanziellen Kapazitäten des Landes sind chronisch knapp, sie reichen nicht, um eine auch nur annähernd flächendeckende Versorgung der Bevölkerung im Bildungs- und Gesundheitsbereich zu gewährleisten. Rund drei Viertel des medizinischen Personals finden sich in den beiden größten Städten, Dakar und Thiès, die ländlichen Gebiete sind dagegen sehr schlecht versorgt. Positiv hervorzuheben ist demgegenüber, dass Senegal mit offiziell 0,9 Prozent die niedrigste erfasste HIV/Aids-Infektionsrate aller Länder Subsahara-Afrikas aufweist; eine frühe Aufklärungspolitik hat hier segensreich gewirkt.

Senegals Wirtschaftspolitik setzt auf private Dienstleistungen und Investitionen, während staatliche Maßnahmen vorwiegend die Rahmenbedingungen dafür gewährleisten sollen. Ein Großteil der Wirtschaft ist informell, wird also nicht in offiziellen Statistiken erfasst und beschränkt sich auf die Produktion für den Verkauf auf lokalen Märkten. Dies erschwert eine Besteuerung und wirtschaftspolitische Steuerung. Einer der dynamischsten formellen Wirtschaftssektoren Senegals ist die Telekommunikation. Mangelhaft ist die (unsichere) Energieversorgung. Die Stromkosten decken nicht die Erzeugerpreise; Senegal ist in großem Maß auf teurer werdende Erdölimporte angewiesen.

Fischmarkt in Dakar im Juni 2002

Holland. Hoogte / laif

Aufbruch in ein neues Leben?

[...] Thiaroye-sur-Mer – kein anderer Ort im Senegal hat so viele Menschen auf dem Weg nach Europa verloren [...].

Einer der Verschollenen ist der Sohn von Aram Laye. Wenn sie an die Kanaren denkt, muss sie weinen. Die Inseln im Atlantik waren das Traumziel ihres Kindes. An diesen Stränden wollte er ankommen und aufbrechen in ein neues Leben. [...] Im Morgengrauen stieg er in eine der bunt bemalten Pirogen und fuhr los. Seitdem gilt das Holzboot mit rund achtzig jungen Männern an Bord als verschollen.

Anfangs ging Aram Laye jeden Morgen ans Meer. Starrte dorthin, wo das Wasser ihren Sohn genommen hatte. [...] Jetzt widersteht sie diesem inneren Zwang und trifft sich mit anderen Frauen im „Collectif des Femmes contre l'immigration clandestine", einem Verband gegen die heimliche Migration. Dort haben alle die gleichen Nöte. Sie alle haben einen Sohn oder den Ehemann verloren.

Der Verlust bedeutet für die Familien auch ökonomisch eine Katastrophe. Um die Reise zu finanzieren, hatten sie ihr Land, ihr Werkzeug und ihren Schmuck verkauft. Plötzlich stehen sie vor dem Nichts. Doch das Leben muss weiter gehen, und deshalb gibt es das Kollektiv. Die Kehrtwende verdanken die Frauen der Gründerin des Verbands, Yaye Bayam Diouf. Die energische Frau hat beinahe jede von ihnen persönlich aus dem Zustand ohnmächtiger Trauer herausgeholt.

Alle vertrauen Diouf, denn auch sie hat einen Sohn, ihren einzigen, bei einer der Überfahrten verloren. Zunächst ging die 48-Jährige ganz pragmatisch an die Sache heran. Die Frauen brauchten Geld für ihren Lebensunterhalt. [...] Deshalb verkaufen sie jetzt Couscous und Saft aus Hibiskusblüten in den Straßen. Die Zutaten wie Hirse und Früchte kaufen sie gemeinsam, jede von ihnen legt monatlich 1250 cFA, das sind knapp zwei Euro, in den gemeinsamen Topf. Abends wird der Lohn ausgezahlt: 1000 cFA bar auf die Hand. Der Rest des Gewinns wird angespart für Notfälle und Kleinkredite. [...]

Wenn die Frauen ihre Körbe voller Essen auf dem Kopf durch die Straßen tragen, nutzen sie viele kleine Gelegenheiten, über ihr politisches Anliegen zu sprechen. Sie wollen andere Männer von der Reise mit den kleinen Pirogen abhalten. „Wir haben ja selbst unseren Söhnen die Tickets nach Europa gekauft", sagt Aby Samb traurig: „Einige sind ja auch dort angekommen, aber die meisten sind auf der Reise gestorben. Als wir das begriffen, haben wir versucht, den anderen Frauen zu sagen, wir müssen diese Situation ändern, wir können unsere Söhne nicht weiter auf dem Meer sterben lassen."

Innerhalb eines Jahres hat sich die Mitgliederzahl des Frauenkollektivs auf 550 verdreifacht. [...]

Was aber tun, um ihre Söhne zu behalten? Aby Samb, Generalsekretärin des Verbands, lacht: „Es ist bei uns ja wie überall auf der Welt, Kinder gehen ihre eigenen Wege und hören irgendwann nicht mehr auf die Alten. Also versuchen wir, die Menschen auf unsere Seite zu ziehen, auf die sie hören." Während des Ramadan organisierte das Kollektiv ein Treffen zwischen Imamen und Jugendlichen, denn fast alle haben einen Marabout, einen islamischen Heiler, dem sie Vertrauen schenken. Bevor sich einer auf die Reise macht, fragt er ihn um Rat. Nach Ansicht der Frauen, kann der Rat nur lauten: Steig nicht in das Boot. [...]

Aber die meisten jungen Männer, die am Strand für einen Job anstehen, warten weiter auf einen Platz in einem der Boote. Die Mütter können zwar moralischen Druck aufbauen, aber die finanzielle Situation ihrer erwachsenen Söhne und Töchter können sie kaum verändern. Denn die bekommen keine regelmäßige Arbeit, und sie wollen ihren Familien nicht auf der Tasche liegen. Die Arbeitslosenquote liegt bei 48 Prozent. In Thiaroye-sur-Mer haben viele Fabriken geschlossen, der Küstenboden gibt für Landwirte kaum etwas her, und das Meer, jahrhundertealte Haupteinnahmequelle, ist von europäischen und japanischen Fangflotten leer gefischt.

Um Arbeit zu finden, wollen die jungen Männer bis nach Europa. Wie Mamadou Tall. Der 22-jährige Fischer hatte die Chance ergriffen, als ihm ein freier Platz als Fahrer auf einem Boot angeboten wurde. Noch vor Marokko entdeckte sie ein Hubschrauber des Grenzschutzes. Kurz darauf wurden sie von der bewaffneten Küstenwache aufgegriffen und zurückgeschickt. Mit einem Boot würde er nicht noch mal fahren, auch weil seine Mutter ihm ins Gewissen geredet hat. Jetzt hofft Mamadou Tall auf ein Flugticket nach Europa. „Warum dürfen unsere Jungs nicht legal einreisen? Warum können sie nicht dort Geld verdienen, wo sie wollen? Ihr kommt doch auch hierher und fischt unsere Meere leer", ruft eine Händlerin, die am Strand Fische verkauft.

Es ist der Strand, den Aram Laye meidet. Könnte ihr zweiter Sohn sicher nach Europa fliegen, wie die Urlauber zu den Kanaren, wäre sie beruhigt. Stattdessen versucht sie ihn von seiner geplanten Reise abzuhalten: „Geh nicht", habe ich ihm gesagt. „Ich überlebe das nicht, wenn du auch stirbst."

Haidy Damm, „Wo das Meer die Söhne verschlingt", in: Frankfurter Rundschau vom 22. September 2007

Afrikanische Bootsflüchtlinge vor der Küste Teneriffas im März 2006

REUTERS

Der Staat betreibt eine im afrikanischen Vergleich sehr gute Umweltpolitik, bei allerdings geringen Managementkapazitäten, mageren finanziellen und knappen natürlichen Ressourcen, die zudem einem hohen Bevölkerungsdruck ausgesetzt sind. Dürren und starke Regenfälle mit Überschwemmungen haben in den letzten Jahren zugenommen. Der Klimawandel wird das Sahel-Land nach internationalen Prognosen zu starken Anpassungsleistungen zwingen.

Die Südprovinz Casamance wurde lange Jahre politisch vernachlässigt – auch, weil sie durch Gambia geografisch weitgehend vom Rest des Landes abgeschnitten war. Als Folge entstand eine separatistische Gruppierung, der MFDC *(Mouvement des Forces Democratiques Casamançais)*. Die Gruppe ist intern stark fragmentiert: Teile fordern Autonomie, eine kleine, radikale Minderheit die Unabhängigkeit. Der MFDC finanziert sich hauptsächlich durch bewaffnete Überfälle und Drogenanbau, genießt aber kaum noch Rückhalt bei der deutlich konfliktmüden Bevölkerung. Um den Konflikt zu entschärfen wird es künftig vor allem darum gehen, mehr in die Region zu investieren und deren wirtschaftliches Potenzial zu nutzen.

Senegal spielt traditionell eine konstruktive Rolle in Afrika, auch wenn die Beziehungen zu den unmittelbaren Nachbarn oftmals politisch kompliziert sind. Auf kontinentaler Ebene zählt Senegals Präsident Abdoulaye Wade zu den Initiatoren der Neuen Partnerschaft für Afrikas Entwicklung (NEPAD). Senegal ist zudem ein aktives Mitglied der Afrikanischen Union (AU) und arbeitet beispielsweise am Aufbau einer Brigade der AU-*Stand-by forces* zur Friedenssicherung in Afrika. Das Land gehört zudem zu den traditionellen Partnern der UN und stellt zahlreiche Blauhelmsoldaten. Es übernimmt damit als relativ kleiner Staat eine wichtige Rolle auch in den europäisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen.

Das gute Verhältnis zur ehemaligen Kolonialmacht Frankreich und zur EU ist nicht frei von politischen Interessengegensätzen. Ein wichtiges Thema in den Beziehungen zur EU (insbesondere zu Spanien) bleibt die illegale Migration nach Europa, für die Senegal aufgrund seiner Nähe zu den Kanarischen Inseln eine wichtige Durchgangsstation darstellt. Die Regierung Wade akzeptierte die „Repatriierung" von illegalen Migranten – und wurde dafür intern heftig kritisiert. Senegal setzt auch auf die Partnerschaft mit aufstrebenden Mächten, vor allem Indien und China.

Unwägbarkeiten für Senegals Zukunft liegen in der Weltwirtschaft, von der Senegal stark abhängt, insbesondere im Ölpreis und bei weltweiten Nahrungsmittelpreisen. Ein zentraler Faktor ist auch die interne Stabilität der Regierungspartei PDS, in der sich der über 80jährige Präsident Wade bisher erfolgreich gegen aufkommende Rivalen durchsetzen konnte. Auch ökologische, soziale oder internationale Krisen könnten drastische Folgen haben. Senegal hat es jedoch bisher geschickt verstanden, die inneren sozialen Konflikte nicht eskalieren zu lassen.

Ghana und Mali

Gero Erdmann

Ghana und Mali gelten als zwei der wenigen Fälle erfolgreicher Demokratisierung in Afrika seit 1989. Repräsentativen Umfragen zufolge wird die Demokratie als Herrschaftsform von mehr als zwei Dritteln der Bevölkerung unterstützt und die Zustimmung zum Mehrparteiensystem wächst weiter.

Beide Länder waren vor der Demokratisierung von Militärs beherrscht. Mali wurde 23 Jahre lang (1968 bis 1991) von einem Präsidenten (Moussa Traore) regiert. Ghana war hingegen von einem Wechsel instabiler Regime gekennzeichnet; Zivilregierungen (1957-1966; 1970-1972; 1979-1981) wurden mehrfach von Militärs (1966-1969; 1972-1979; 1981-1992) gewaltsam abgelöst.

Ghana

Ghana wurde 1957 aus dem britischen Kolonialreich entlassen und zunächst von Kwame Nkrumah regiert, der sich als Befreiungskämpfer verdient gemacht hatte. Fehlgeschlagene Versuche, ein sozialistisches Staatssystem zu etablieren, führten zu einer finanziellen Krise und politischer Instabilität durch häufige Putschversuche. 1981 griff auf diese Weise der Fliegerhauptmann Jerry Rawlings ein zweites Mal zur Macht.

Anders als in Mali kontrollierten er und seine Militärregierung den politische Wandel in Ghana von oben. Mit dem im Zuge der Demokratisierung gegründeten *National Democratic Congress* (NDC) konnte er 1992 die ersten Mehrparteienwahlen gewinnen, die allerdings von der wichtigsten Oppositionspartei, der *New Patriotic Party* (NPP), nach Unregelmäßigkeiten bei der Präsidentschaftswahl boykottiert worden waren. Bei den zweiten Wahlen 1996 trat die NPP zwar an, konnte sich aber gegen Rawlings und seinen NDC nicht durchsetzen.

Im Gegensatz zu anderen Staatschefs trat Rawlings verfassungskonform nach zwei Amtszeiten 2000 von Präsidentenamt zurück. Der an seiner Stelle für den NDC angetretene Atta Mills musste sich diesmal dem NPP-Kandiaten John Agyekum Kufuor geschlagen geben. Erst mit dieser zweiten Wahl ist der erste demokratische Regierungswechsel in Ghana vollzogen worden.

John Evans Atta Mills bei der Stimmabgabe in Accra am 28. Dezember 2008: Er gewann die Wahl und trat sein Amt im Januar 2009 an.

Rebecca Blackwell/ AP

Kufuor wurde 2004 im Amt zusammen mit einer (erneuten) NPP-Mehrheit im Parlament bestätigt. Im Dezember 2008 wurde John Evans Atta Mills von der NPP mit knapper Mehrheit im zweiten Wahlgang zum Präsidenten gewählt; er trat sein Amt am 7. Januar 2009 an.

Mali

Im Süden Malis siedeln vorwiegend schwarzafrikanische Völker, während der Norden von Berbern bewohnt wird. Von 1898 bis 1960 stand das Land unter französischem Einfluss, und ab der Unabhängigkeit war es ein sozialistischer Einparteienstaat.

1991 führten Massenproteste zum Sturz des Einparteienregimes. Gestützt auf eine Nationalkonferenz gelang der Übergangsregierung, die aus Zivilisten und Vertretern des Militärs unter der Führung von General Amadou Toumani Touré bestand, ein geordneter Übergang zur Demokratie. Aus den ersten demokratischen Präsidentschaftswahlen 1992 gingen Alpha Oumar Konaré und die *Alliance pour La Démocratie Malienne* (ADEMA) als Sieger hervor. Der Wechsel zur Demokratie war damit zugleich mit einem Regierungswechsel verbunden.

Basisdemokratie in Mali

[...] Die Gemeinde Dioro ist ungefähr fünf Autostunden von der Hauptstadt Bamako entfernt, [...] eine von 703 ländlichen Kommunen, die in Mali Mitte der 1990er-Jahre geschaffen wurden. Die Macht soll zurückkehren aufs Land – das war eine Vision derer, die in Mali gegen die Diktatur gekämpft hatten.

In Dioro erlebt Mali eine Premiere: Der Bürgermeister legt vor den Fernsehkameras Rechenschaft ab, er rechtfertigt öffentlich, was er mit dem Geld der Bürger gemacht hat. Issa Doumbia sitzt leicht gekrümmt vor dem Mikrofon, ein baumlanger Mensch, der Schweiß läuft in Strömen von seinem glatt rasierten Schädel, als er sich durch den Haushalt der Gemeinde kämpft. Vor ihm auf dem Marktplatz ein paar hundert Bürger auf Stühlen und Matten, manche greifen ihn an, mit dem wachen Misstrauen der Malier gegenüber allem, was Staat ist.

[...] „Zu viele hohe Funktionäre in Mali sind Diebe", sagt der Bürgermeister. „Deshalb glauben die Leute nur, was sie mit eigenen Augen sehen." Dezentralisierung, sagt er, sei die einzige Chance für Mali, sich zu entwickeln. „Auf nationaler Ebene ist der Staat einfach verdorben." [...]

Die Erfahrungen von Dioro gelten inzwischen als Modell: Bürger, die Vertrauen haben, zahlen mehr kommunale Steuern – und sie betrachten die Privatisierung des Staates durch gierige Politiker nicht mehr als Naturgewalt. Mali und Burkina Faso, zwei arme Baumwollstaaten, sind Afrikas Vorreiter bei der Dezentralisierung. „Halte dich aufrecht aus eigener Kraft!", so wird der Begriff im lokalen Bambara umschrieben. Aber woher die Kraft nehmen? Malis Regierung hat großzügig Aufgaben nach unten delegiert; um Schulen, Straßen, Wasser, Abfall dürfen sich nun die Kommunen kümmern; nur das Geld, das soll noch möglichst lange in der Hauptstadt bleiben.

Dioros wichtigste Ressource ist der Markt; 4 000 Händler nutzen ihn, viele kommen von weit her. Früher war der Markt schmutzig und brachte der Kommune nichts ein. Beides hat sich nun geändert, dank einer demokratischen Struktur. Einfach war das nicht: Die Debatte mit den einzelnen Branchengruppen der Händler dauerte ein Jahr, nun wählt die Vollversammlung jeder Branche einen Delegierten, und die Delegierten wählen für ein Jahr ein Komitee, das den Markt leitet.

Am Markttag drängeln sich Gebühreneintreiber mit winzigen Quittungen durch das Gewühl: Umgerechnet 8 Cent sind für einen Eselskarren zu entrichten, 17 Cent für einen regulären Stand. Die Quittungen bloß nicht wegwerfen!, hat es im Radio geheißen – damit es keinen Missbrauch gibt. Die 8 Cent könnten ja sonst zweimal kassiert werden!

Drei Viertel der Einnahmen wandern in den Gemeindehaushalt, mit dem Rest wird der Markt instand gehalten. Der Sekretär des Marktkomitees notiert akribisch in einem Schulheft, was der Gebührenchef des Komitees ihm seinerseits aus einem Schulheft vorliest. Das Schulheft ist in Mali das Erkennungszeichen der Basisdemokratie: In seinen Zeilen werden die kleinen Münzen der Partizipation verzeichnet, mit Akkuratesse und Hingabe.

In einem makellos gebügelten Hemd, der „Seriösität des Amtes wegen", fährt Dioros Buchhalter auf einem Moped durch Matsch und Staub, um in den 30 Dörfern der Gemeinde die jährlichen Steuern einzutreiben. Winzige Summen aus unserer Sicht, aber niemand kann sie auf einen Schlag bezahlen. 8 Cent pro Schaf, 16 Cent pro Esel, 40 für eine Kuh, 3 Euro pro Mensch. Hinten auf dem Moped des Buchhalters sitzt ein Polizist, um den Geldtransport zu bewachen.

Neuerdings verleiht die Gemeinde Preise an die Dörfer mit der besten Steuermoral: Radiogeräte und Säcke mit Reis. Der letztjährige Sieger ist ein Fischerdorf des Bozo-Volks, 1 600 Menschen, drei Familiennamen, 100 Prozent Steuerzahler. [...]

Charlotte Wiedemann, „Die kleinen Münzen der Partizipation", in: Le Monde diplomatique vom 13. Februar 2009

Dorfälteste im Dogonland, Mali, beraten über Probleme der Dorfgemeinschaft.

Melters / missio / Das Fotoarchiv

Nach seiner Wiederwahl 1997 trat Konaré verfassungskonform nicht erneut zur Wahl 2002 an. Die dritten demokratischen Präsidentschafts- und Parlamentswahlen brachten dann Amadou Toumani Touré an die Macht und bedeuteten einen neuen Regierungswechsel. 2007 wurde Touré, gestützt auf ein breites Parteienbündnis, erneut gewählt.

Anders als das ghanaische Parteiensystem ist das Regierungs- und Oppositionslager in Mali stark fragmentiert. Aus den ersten beiden Wahlen war die ADEMA noch dominant mit einer absoluten Mehrheit der Parlamentssitze hervorgegangen und sah sich einer Opposition von neun Parteien gegenüber. Doch schon die folgenden beiden Wahlen ergaben keine eindeutigen Mehrheiten mehr. 2002 verlor die ADEMA ihre Mehrheit an ein neu geschaffenes Parteienbündnis. Bei den Wahlen 2007 siegte ein neu formiertes Bündnis von zwölf Parteien unter Einschluss der ADEMA, das Präsident Touré unterstützte. Die Zersplitterung des Parteiensystems hatte jedoch bislang keine Polarisierung und Unregierbarkeit zur Folge.

Der Vergleich der beiden Länder macht deutlich, dass unterschiedliche historische Regimeentwicklungen, verschiedene Wege des Übergangs von der Diktatur zur Demokratie und unterschiedliche Parteiensysteme gleichermaßen eine erfolgreiche Demokratisierung möglich machen.

Karin Desmarowitz / agenda

Diamantenmine nahe Koidu in Sierra Leone: Oftmals finanzieren die Erträge der Minen die blutigen Bürgerkriege.

Die Mano River Staaten – Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea

Dunja Speiser

Der gemeinsame Grenzfluss Mano ist Namensgeber der zwischenstaatlichen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die die Länder Sierra Leone, Liberia und Guinea seit 1973 verbindet. Sie werden zusammenfassend auch als Mano-River-Staaten bezeichnet.

Seit 1990 sind die drei Länder von Krieg überzogen. Die Region gehört zu den instabilsten der Welt. Für die Konflikte charakteristisch war ein sehr hohes Maß an Gewalt, unter dem vor allem die Zivilbevölkerung zu leiden hatte. Hunderttausende von Menschen fanden den Tod, ebenso viele mussten flüchten. Während der Kriege gab es eine unüberschaubare Anzahl von Rebellengruppen, die von den jeweiligen Nachbarstaaten unterstützt wurden. Trotz Entwaffnungsprogrammen, die im Laufe der letzten Jahre von der internationalen Gemeinschaft durchgeführt wurden, ist die Region von Kleinwaffen überschwemmt. Geschätzte 20 000 Kinder haben als Soldaten gekämpft und zum Teil grausame Verbrechen begangen. Diese Menschen in ein normales Leben zu integrieren, gehört heute zu den schwierigsten Aufgaben, um die seit Anfang des Jahrtausends laufenden Friedensprozesse zu stabilisieren.

Die Ursachen der Konflikte sind vielschichtig und tief in der Geschichte der betroffenen Länder verankert. Hauptverantwortlich sind schlechte Regierungsführung, Korruption, wirtschaftliches Missmanagement und Missachtung der Menschenrechte auf Seiten sämtlicher Parteien. So haben die jeweiligen Machthaber über Jahrzehnte die staatlichen Institutionen, soziale Dienstleistungen wie Gesundheit, Bildung und Infrastruktur sowie die Wirtschaft zugrunde gerichtet, bis Liberia und Sierra Leone schließlich zu den ersten so genannten Zerfallenen Staaten gehörten. Die in der Region lebenden Menschen zählen zu den ärmsten der Welt, obwohl ihre Länder sehr reich an natürlichen Ressourcen wie Diamanten,

Chris Hondros / Getty Images

Szene in der liberianischen Hauptstadt Monrovia 2003: Mehr als 20 000 Kinder haben als Soldaten in den Kriegen der Region gekämpft.

George Osodi / AP

Die seit 2006 amtierende liberianische Präsidentin Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf (M.) gilt als Hoffnungsträgerin für einen dauerhaften Frieden in ihrem Land.

Edelhölzern und Gold sind. Diese Bodenschätze, allen voran die durch Sierra Leone bekannt gewordenen „Blutdiamanten“, haben die Konflikte zwar nicht verursacht, sie jedoch angeheizt und verlängert, indem die verschiedenen Gruppen mit der Ausbeutung der Rohstoffvorkommen ihre Kämpfe finanzierten.

Der Beginn des regionalen Konflikts liegt in Liberia, wo an Weihnachten 1989 von der Elfenbeinküste aus die Rebellengruppe *National Patriotic Front of Liberia* (NPFL) einfiel, um das diktatorische Regime von Samuel Doe (1980 bis 1990) zu bekämpfen. Die NPFL wurde von Charles Taylor angeführt, der von Libyen unterstützt und in dortigen Militärlagern ausgebildet worden war. Neben dem Kampf um die Macht in Liberia unterstützte Taylor die Rebellion des ebenfalls von Libyen protegierten Foday Sankoh und seiner *Revolutionary United Front* (RUF) in Sierra Leone, wo diese vor allem die an Diamanten reichen Regionen in ihre Gewalt brachten. Taylor wurde als erfolgreichster Kriegsherr der Region 1997 zum Präsidenten Liberias gewählt, aber 2003 gezwungen, ins Exil zu gehen. Für ihm vorgeworfene Kriegsverbrechen in Sierra Leone muss sich Taylor seit 2007 vor dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof verantworten. Die bewaffneten Aufstände zogen auch die angrenzenden rohstoffreichen Gebiete in Guinea in Mitleidenschaft. Das Land hat über die Jahre zwar selbst direkt keinen Krieg erlebt, trug jedoch stark an den Lasten der großen Flüchtlingsströme und wurde wiederholt bezichtigt, Rebellen gegen Liberia zu unterstützen. Auch die Elfenbeinküste, die erst seit 2008 offizielles Mitglied der MRU ist, war durch die Unterstützung bewaffneter Gruppen in den Konflikt involviert. Zahlreiche Friedensabkommen und nationale wie internationale Versuche während der ersten Kriegsjahre, die Gewalt zu beenden, scheiterten. Die Friedenstruppen der westafrikanischen Staaten (ECOMOG) wurden gar selbst Teil der Auseinandersetzungen, für deren massive Gewalt nicht nur die diversen Rebellen, sondern auch die Armeen und Milizen der jeweiligen Regierungen verantwortlich waren. In der zweiten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre konnten die Konflikte in Liberia wie Sierra Leone zwar für kurze Phasen beruhigt werden, zu keiner Zeit wurden sie jedoch wirklich gelöst und durch die regionalen Verstrickungen der beteiligten Akteure stets erneut zum Ausbruch gebracht. Erst der Entschluss der internationalen Gemeinschaft, mit einem „robusten Mandat“ (Kapitel VII) der Vereinten Nationen militärisch einzugreifen und die Länder mit umfassendem Engagement zu befrieden und wieder aufzubauen, konnte die Kriege in Sierra Leone (2002) und Liberia (2003) beenden. Die Chance für dauerhaften Frieden in der Region besteht, die Risiken für einen erneuten Kriegsausbruch sind jedoch hoch. Die Ursachen der Konflikte sind bislang weder in Liberia noch in Sierra Leone gelöst worden, die politische Situation in Guinea ist fragil und der Friedensprozess in der Elfenbeinküste steht auf tönernen Füßen.

Suche nach Gerechtigkeit

[...] In einem silbergrauen Hochhaus am Haager Stadtrand arbeiten Menschen wie Gloria Atiba-Davies, denen über hundert Staaten vor gut zehn Jahren den Auftrag erteilten, Völkermord und andere schwere Verbrechen zu ahnden und die Ära der Straflosigkeit zu beenden. [...] Sie kommt aus Sierra Leone. [...]

Gloria Atiba-Davies leitet bei der Anklagebehörde die Gender and Children Unit: eine Abteilung, die sich mit Verbrechen gegen Frauen und Kinder befasst. Es geht zum Beispiel um Mütter, die vor den Augen ihrer Familien vergewaltigt wurden. Oder um 14-jährige Soldaten, die weder lesen noch schreiben, aber mit Macheten ein Dorf niedermetzeln können. Seit vier Jahren bearbeitet die Ermittlerin solche Fälle. [...]

Karrierejuristin, Asylbewerberin, Emigrantin, Ermittlerin. Das sind ihre Stationen der vergangenen zwölf Jahre. Gloria Atiba-Davies war die ranghöchste Staatsanwältin in Sierra Leone, 1997, als sie nach einem Militärputsch über Nacht zum Flüchtling wurde. Ihr Name stand auf der „Wanted“-Liste der Putschisten ganz oben, ihr Haus wurde niedergebrannt. Ihre beiden Söhne, damals zwölf und neun Jahre alt, wurden von Freunden in Sicherheit gebracht. Ein Jahr später, 1998, kam sie als Asylbewerberin in London an, zu einer Zeit, als in Rom über hundert Nationen auf einer Konferenz den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof gründeten. Vier Jahre später – in Den Haag stöpselten Juristen des Gerichtshofs gerade die ersten Computer ein – schlug sie sich in New York als Kanzleigehilfin bei amerikanischen Anwaltsfirmen durch, hungrig nach Informationen über den Bürgerkrieg in ihrem Heimatland Sierra Leone, hungrig nach Meldungen über Charles Taylor, damals noch Präsident des Nachbarstaates Liberia, Unterstützer der Rebellen in Sierra Leone, die mit „Blutdiamanten“ handelten und den Präsidenten am Geschäft beteiligten.

Als Atiba-Davies ihren Posten in Den Haag antrat, lag ihre Heimat in Trümmern, vom Krieg geschwächt. Charles Taylor dirigierte aus einer Luxusvilla im nigerianischen Exil weiterhin Putschisten durch Westafrika. Dass sie diesen Mann eines Tages in Den Haag auf der Anklagebank sehen würde, hier im Gerichtssaal 2, ein paar Stockwerke unter ihrem Büro, hätte sich Gloria Atiba-Davies damals nicht träumen lassen. [...]

Charles Taylor [...] müsste eigentlich jetzt in Freetown, Sierra Leone, sein, wo der Sondergerichtshof für Sierra Leone, bewacht von mongolischen Blauhelmen, die Verbrechen des Bürgerkriegs in diesem westafrikanischen Land verhandelt.

Aber weil Taylor sogar nach seiner Verhaftung im März 2006 als zu einflussreich und gefährlich für die Region galt, bat das Sondergericht die niederländische Regierung, den Prozess gegen Taylor in Den Haag führen zu dürfen. Kriegsverbrechen und Verbrechen gegen die Menschlichkeit in elf Fällen, darunter sexuelle Gewalt, Verstümmelungen, Massenmorde und Plünderungen, so lautet die Anklage, begangen durch Rebellengruppen in Sierra Leone, die Taylor unterstützt und angestiftet haben soll. [...]

Gloria Atiba-Davies, die Ermittlerin aus Sierra Leone, wird sich Taylors Auftritt nicht entgehen lassen. Zweimal schon hat sie ihn aus dem Zuschauerraum heraus beobachtet, wie er akribisch seine Akten sortiert. Seltsam sei es, ihn hier zu sehen, sagt Gloria Atiba-Davies, „wenn man sich erinnert, wie viele Menschen er in Angst versetzen konnte“. Aber auch „befriedigend, weil er jetzt wenigstens dieses Verfahren über sich ergehen lassen muss“. Mit einem Urteil gegen Taylor ist nicht vor 2010 zu rechnen. [...]

Andrea Böhm, „Die Großwildjäger“, in: DIE ZEIT Nr. 10 vom 26. Februar 2009

Denis M. Tull

Zentralafrika: schwache Staatlichkeit und grenzüberschreitende Kriege

Schwache staatliche Strukturen erleichtern in Zentralafrika die grenzübergreifende Ausbreitung gewaltsamer Konflikte und die Einflussnahme auswärtiger Mächte. Die mehrheitlich autokratischen Herrschaftssysteme sorgen dafür, dass die reichen Rohstoffvorkommen nur wenigen zugute kommen.

Pascal Maitre / cosmos / Agentur Focus

Die Felsentürme des Mandara-Gebirges an der Grenze zwischen Kamerun und Nigeria ragen bis nahezu 1500 Meter in die Höhe.

Zur Region Zentralafrika zählen die Länder Äquatorial-Guinea, Burundi, Demokratische Republik Kongo (DRK), Gabun, Kamerun, Republik Kongo (Kongo-Brazzaville), Ruanda, São Tomé und Principe, Tschad und die Zentralafrikanische Republik (ZAR). Gemeinsam mit Angola (aber ohne Ruanda) bilden sie die Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft der Zentralafrikanischen Staaten *(Communauté Economique des Etats de l'Afrique Centrale,* CEEAC), die – ungeachtet ihrer geringen Handlungsfähigkeit – einen der fünf regionalen Pfeiler der Afrikanischen Union darstellt.

Die Existenz dieser Regionalorganisation erlaubt allerdings keinen Rückschluss auf eine starke regionale Identität. Im Gegenteil ist die Region in erster Linie eine soziale und politische Konstruktion, deren Teilstaaten auf inner- wie zwischenstaatlicher Ebene eine beträchtliche Heterogenität aufweisen. Diese ist unter anderem auf historische und räumlich-geographische Faktoren zurückzuführen. Zwar sind die Mehrheit der zentralafrikanischen Staaten ehemalige französische Kolonien, Äquatorial-Guinea sowie São Tomé und Principe gehörten jedoch früher zu Spanien; Burundi, DR Kongo und Ruanda waren belgisch. Räumlich kontrastiert der mit Abstand größte Flächenstaat DR Kongo mit kleinen Insel- und Flächenstaaten – Äquatorial-Guinea, São Tomé und Principe, Ruanda, Burundi. Viele Länder Zentralafrikas ragen in andere afrikanische Großregionen hinein: Burundi, DR Kongo und Ruanda nach Ostafrika, DR Kongo ins südliche Afrika, Kamerun und Tschad nach Westafrika, Tschad nach Nordafrika, DR Kongo, Tschad und die ZAR ins Horn von Afrika. Die politischen, kulturellen und wirtschaftlichen Grenzen der Region sind also fließend.

Trotz ihrer Heterogenität lassen die Staaten der Region – zumindest aber Teilgruppen – gemeinsame Merkmale erkennen. In großer Zahl leiden sie unter schwachen staatlichen Strukturen. Entscheidungen der Regierungen werden aufgrund mangelnder institutioneller Kapazitäten der Behörden nicht durchgesetzt oder reichen kaum über die Grenzen der Hauptstädte hinaus. In der DR Kongo, im Tschad und in der ZAR lässt sich nicht einmal ein staatliches Gewaltmonopol durchsetzen. Eine wichtige Ausnahme ist Ruanda. Sowohl die mörderische Effizienz des Genozids von 1994 als auch die rasche Wiederherstellung politischer Ordnung nach dem Völkermord zeugen davon, dass die staatlichen Strukturen Ruandas relativ konsolidiert sind. Staatsschwäche ist in Zentralafrika keineswegs nur ein vorübergehendes Phänomen; sie ist strukturell und im System angelegt. Wiederkehrende gewaltsame Krisen, Rebellionen und Bürgerkriege sind ein Ausdruck dieser Schwäche. Bis auf Gabun und Kamerun fanden in jedem Land der Region im Verlauf der letzten 15 Jahre Putschversuche, Bürgerkriege oder andere gewalttätige Auseinandersetzungen statt. Die Schwäche staatlicher Strukturen erleichterte dabei, ähnlich wie in Westafrika und am Horn von Afrika, die Ausbreitung von Konflikten über Landesgrenzen hinweg. Jüngstes Beispiel sind die Auseinandersetzungen am Horn von Afrika, insbe-

sondere im Sudan, an denen Tschad und die ZAR zunehmend beteiligt sind. Eine besonders dramatische Konfliktverflechtung ergab sich während des zweiten Krieges in der DR Kongo (1998 bis 2002), an dem sich zahlreiche Länder der Region militärisch beteiligten und dessen Auslöser die regionalen Auswirkungen des Genozids in Ruanda (1994) waren.

Neben der Staatsschwäche weisen die politischen Systeme der Region Gemeinsamkeiten in ihren Grundzügen auf. Mit Ausnahme des Inselstaates São Tomé und Principe wird keiner der Staaten demokratisch regiert. Zwar werden in allen Ländern seit den 1990er Jahren Wahlen abgehalten, sie entsprechen aber in der Regel nicht den Kriterien „frei" und „fair". Der Schutz der Menschenrechte und die Ausübung politischer Freiheiten sind in der Regel nicht gewährleistet.

Die Wechselwirkungen zwischen autoritärer Herrschaft und politischer Stabilität sind in Zentralafrika sehr unterschiedlich ausgeprägt. In Gabun, Kamerun und Äquatorial-Guinea gibt es relativ konsolidierte autokratische Systeme mit einem hohen Maß an Regimestabilität. Dies verdeutlicht die lange Amtsdauer ihrer Staatsoberhäupter. So ist Kameruns Präsident Paul Biya seit 1982 im Amt, Gabuns Präsident Omar Bongo gar seit 1967. Bongo ist damit der dienstälteste Staatschef Afrikas. Deutlich wechselhafter und labiler ist die politische Situation in Burundi, DR Kongo, Tschad und in der ZAR. Diese Länder befinden sich seit Jahren in einer Spirale der Gewalt, die nur kurze Unterbrechungen erfährt. Militärputsche und von Rebellen geführte Anti-Regime-Kriege haben sich hier als Instrument (gewaltsamer) Regierungswechsel etabliert, wobei programmatische oder ideologische Zielsetzungen kaum eine Rolle spielen. Im Mittelpunkt steht vielmehr der Versuch, die Kontrolle über den Staat und seine Ressourcen zu erlangen.

Auch in wirtschaftlicher Hinsicht haben die Staaten der Region manches gemein. Mit Ausnahme der ressourcenarmen Staaten Burundi und Ruanda verfügen alle über wertvolle Bodenschätze, vor allem über Erdöl. Während Gabun und Kongo-Brazzaville lang etablierte Ölproduzenten sind, begann die Ölförderung in Äquatorial-Guinea, Tschad sowie São Tomé und Principe erst in jüngerer Zeit. Eine besonders spektakuläre Entwicklung durchlief Äquatorial-Guinea, das innerhalb weniger Jahre nach Angola und Nigeria zum drittwichtigsten Ölprodu-

Land *Hauptstadt*	*Fläche* *in km²*	*Bevölkerung* *2007*	*Bevölk.-wachstum* *2007, in Prozent*	*Religion* *in Prozent*	*BIP/Kopf* *PPP US-Dollar/ Rang 2006*	*HDI Rang* *2006*
Äquatorial-Guinea *Malabo*	*28.100*	*0,51 Mio.*	*2,4*	*Christen: 80* *Animisten: 20*	*27.161 / 29*	*115*
Burundi *Bujumbura*	*27.834*	*8,5 Mio.*	*3,9*	*Christen: 78* *traditional-afrikanische Religionen: 20* *Muslime: 2 - 3*	*333 / 177*	*172*
Demokratische Republik Kongo *Kinshasa*	*2.344.900*	*62,4 Mio.*	*2,9*	*Christen: ca. 70* *kimbanguistisch: 10* *Muslime: ca. 10* *traditionelle Religionen: 10*	*281 / 178*	*177*
Gabun *Libreville*	*267.700*	*1,33 Mio.*	*1,5*	*Christen: 65* *Naturreligionen: 30* *Muslime: 5*	*14.208 / 52*	*107*
Kamerun *Jaunde*	*475.400*	*18,53 Mio.*	*2,0*	*Christen: 50* *Muslime: 20* *Übrige: lokale traditionelle Religionen*	*2.043 / 133*	*150*
Republik Kongo *Brazzaville*	*342.000*	*3,77 Mio.*	*2,1*	*Christen: 50* *Naturreligionen: knapp 50* *Muslime: 3*	*3.550 / 119*	*130*
Ruanda *Kigali*	*26.300*	*9,74 Mio.*	*2,8*	*Christen: 93* *Muslime: 5* *andere: 2*	*819 / 165*	*165*
São Tomé und Principe *São Tomé*	*1.000*	*160.000*	*1,8*	*Christen: rd. 90* *und andere*	*1.534 / 146*	*128*
Tschad *N'Djamena*	*1.284.000*	*10,76 Mio.*	*2,8*	*Muslime: 56* *Christen: 22* *Animisten: 22*	*1.470 / 147*	*170*
Zentralafrikanische Republik *Bangui*	*623.000*	*4,34 Mio.*	*1,8*	*Animisten: rd. 55* *Christen: rd. 30* *Muslime: rd. 15*	*679 / 170*	*178*

Spalten 2-4: Weltbank; Spalte 5: Auswärtiges Amt (Zeitpunkt der Abfrage: April 2009); Spalten 6 und 7: UNDP

zenten Subsahara-Afrikas aufstieg und allein im Jahr 2006 Einnahmen in Höhe von 3,3 Milliarden US-Dollar verbuchte. Noch sind die politischen und wirtschaftlichen Folgen des Ölbooms ungewiss. Die bisherigen Anzeichen deuten aber darauf hin, dass die neuen Ölproduzenten der Region, vor allem Äquatorial-Guinea und Tschad, einen ähnlichen Weg beschreiten werden wie vor ihnen bereits Gabun und Kongo-Brazzaville. Auch in den neuen Produzentenstaaten wird voraussichtlich eine von Korruption durchzogene Rentenökonomie entstehen, in der die Öleinnahmen den Eliten des Landes zugute kommen statt in produktive, entwicklungsfördernde Vorhaben reinvestiert zu werden. Da es an öffentlicher Transparenz und demokratischen Institutionen fehlt, ist eine am Allgemeinwohl orientierte Nutzung der Ölrenten in den neuen Produzentenstaaten auf absehbare Zeit eher nicht zu erwarten.

Zentralafrika zählt zu den Regionen, in denen außerafrikanische Akteure traditionell eine bedeutsame Rolle spielen. So unterhalten Gabun, Kamerun, Kongo-Brazzaville, Tschad und die ZAR nach wie vor enge Beziehungen zur ehemaligen Kolonialmacht Frankreich, die im Tschad nach wie vor eine Militärbasis unterhält. Paris hat sich zudem immer wieder – auch militärisch – in innenpolitische Machtkämpfe eingeschaltet, um befreundete Regime zu stützen. Französische Wirtschaftsinteressen, insbesondere der Erdölkonzern Elf-Aquitaine, haben traditionell in Gabun und Kongo-Brazzaville Einfluss ausgeübt. Auch wenn Frankreich in seinen ehemaligen Kolonien weiterhin ein gewichtiger Akteur bleibt, haben Interessenverlagerungen die französische Aufmerksamkeit in jüngerer Zeit verstärkt auf Nigeria und Südafrika gelenkt. Als Teil des Golfs von Guinea sind die ölproduzierenden Staaten Zentralafrikas auch in den Fokus der USA und Chinas gerückt. Erdölfirmen beider Länder engagieren sich vor allem in Äquatorial-Guinea, São Tomé und Tschad. Ob der Erdölboom – wie von einigen Beobachtern behauptet – zu einem neuen geostrategischen Wettlauf in der Region führen wird, ist derzeit noch offen.

Die fließenden politischen und kulturellen Grenzen kommen teilweise auch in den Mitgliedschaften der Staaten bei diversen Regionalorganisationen zum Ausdruck. Burundi und Ruanda sind 2006 der Ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft (*East African Community,* EAC) beigetreten, die DR Kongo gehört neben der

Gabun „in der Ressourcenfalle“

Für Reiche lässt es sich gut leben in Libreville, der Hauptstadt Gabuns. Die Regale der Supermärkte sind mit Delikatessen aus Europa voll. Es gibt Räucherlachs aus Schottland, Moët-Champagner und Evian-Mineralwasser, Käse und Joghurt aus Frankreich und Katzenfutter der Marke Rognons de Volaille-Gourmet. Während die Mehrheit der Menschen in Holzhütten mit Blechdach lebt, sind diese Supermärkte das Symbol einer aus dem Ölboom hervorgegangenen Konsum-Elite.

Die Ölförderung macht rund achtzig Prozent der Exporterlöse des Landes aus, das Rabi-Kounga-Ölfeld im Süden bringt den Großteil der Einnahmen. Der seit 1967 autokratisch regierende Präsident El Hadj Omar Bongo – einer der am längsten im Amt befindlichen Staatschefs der Welt – hat die Strandpromenade der Hauptstadt Libreville in ein tropisches Imitat der französischen Riviera verwandelt. [...]

Der Ölboom brachte Partystimmung in das kleine Land: 1984 hielt Gabun den Weltrekord für den höchsten Pro-Kopf-Verbrauch an Champagner. Auf den Boom folgte zwei Jahre später eine Depression: Der Ölpreis fiel um fünfzig Prozent, die Wirtschaft kollabierte. Dann wurde 1989 das Rabi-Kounga-Feld entdeckt, und als die Preise stiegen, ging es erneut steil bergauf. Doch auf der Petro-Hochschaubahn geht es von nun an trotz steigender Preise für Gabun bergab, sagt der Vertreter des Internationalen Währungsfonds in Gabun, Richard Randrianmaholy: „Die Ölförderung sank von achtzehn Millionen Tonnen im Jahr 1996 auf rund dreizehn Millionen Tonnen bis Ende 2003.“ Und weil ein Sinken der Ölförderung auch sinkende Staatseinnahmen bedeutet, schnappt die Schuldenfalle zu. [...]

Anstatt in Bildung und Gesundheitsversorgung zu investieren, hat Gabuns Präsident Omar Bongo eine Menge Geld in das Prestigeprojekt transgabonesische Eisenbahn gesteckt, das allein rund drei Milliarden Euro gekostet hat. Bongos Günstlinge erhielten gut bezahlte Jobs in einem aufgeblähten Staatsapparat. (Der Professor für Politikwissenschaft und Westafrika-Experte an der American University in Paris, Douglas) Yates: „Milliarden wurden gestohlen, Milliarden in Projekte gesteckt, mit denen Geld verloren wurde, und es wurden riesige Kredite aufgenommen. Nun geht viel Geld in den Schuldendienst – rund fünfzig Prozent des Staatshaushalts. Ein großer Teil der Öleinkünfte geht an die Banken zur Rückzahlung der 3,3 Milliarden Dollar, das Ölgeld Gabuns mehrt heute schlicht die Profite der Banken.“

Neben den westlichen Banken waren die wahren Profiteure des Ölbooms in Gabun die Ölkonzerne. Bis zu 75 Prozent trug Gabun Mitte der 80er-Jahre zu den Profiten des französischen Ölkonzerns Elf (heute Total) bei. Als kleines Dankeschön zahlte Elf rund hundert Millionen Euro auf schwarze Konten des Potentaten Omar Bongo, wie André Tarallo, der frühere Chef der Produktionsabteilung bei Elf (auch „Mr. Africa“ genannt), beim Korruptionsprozess gegen den Konzern im Juni 2003 zu Protokoll gab.

Gabun leidet am „Fluch der Ressourcen“. Die Ölkonzerne werden in solchen Ländern übermächtig. Im Fall von Gabun war Elf ein Staat im Staat und gleichzeitig der verlängerte Arm der französischen Geheimdienste. [...] Denn die ehemalige Kolonialmacht verwendete Gabun als Basis für militärische Aktivitäten und Spionage in West-Afrika.

[...] Die fetten Jahre sind aber vorbei für Gabuns Petrokraten. In den kommenden Jahren muss das Land seine Wirtschaft diversifizieren und mit sinkenden Einnahmen aus dem Ölgeschäft fertig werden. [...] Das Erdöl hat die Landwirtschaft verdrängt, nur mehr ein Prozent des Bodens wird bewirtschaftet. Eine typische Entwicklung für Petro-Staaten. Wenn erst einmal die Ölquellen sprudeln, suchen die Menschen Jobs in der Ölindustrie und verlassen ihre Felder. [...] Vom Ölreichtum werden weder Land noch Leute nachhaltig profitiert haben.

Thomas Seifert / Klaus Werner, „Schwarzbuch Öl“ (Schriftenreihe der bpb, Bd. 588), Bonn 2006, S. 190 ff.

Aussichtsreiche Zukunft? Omar Bongo, derzeit dienstältester Staatschef Afrikas, wurde bei den Wahlen 2005 für weitere 7 Jahre im Amt bestätigt.

Xinhua / Das Fotoarchiv

CEEAC auch der Südafrikanischen Entwicklungsgemeinschaft (*Southern African Development Community,* SADC) an. Diese „Zerrissenheit" hat auch Auswirkungen auf die Rolle der CEEAC im Rahmen der neuen Sicherheitsarchitektur der Afrikanischen Union. Die AU plant militärische *stand-by force*s, die als afrikanische *Peacekeeping*-Missionen eingesetzt werden sollen. In jeder der fünf Regionen Afrikas (Nord-, Ost-, Südliches, West- und Zentralafrika) soll je eine Brigade aufgestellt werden. Burundi und Ruanda werden sich dabei nicht an der zentralafrikanischen, sondern an der ostafrikanischen Brigade beteiligen. Angola und die DR Kongo sind sowohl Mitglieder der CEEAC als auch der SADC und werden wohl an beiden regionalen Brigaden teilnehmen. Es existieren also sowohl innerhalb der zentralafrikanischen Großregion als auch an ihren Rändern überlappende, teilweise konkurrierende Regionalorganisationen, die die politische und wirtschaftliche Integration der Region erschweren. Neben den bereits erwähnten Organisationen zählen dazu die Zentralafrikanische Wirtschafts- und Währungsgemeinschaft (*Communauté Economique et Monétaire d'Afrique Centrale*, CEMAC), die Gemeinschaft der sahel-saharanischen Staaten (*Communauté des Etats Sahélo-Sahariens*, CEN-SAD) und die Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft des Landes der Großen Seen *(Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs*, CEPGL).

Demokratische Republik Kongo

Denis M. Tull

Als Ergebnis eines außergewöhnlich kurzen Entkolonialisierungsprozesses erlangte die DR Kongo (ehemals Zaire) 1960 ihre Unabhängigkeit von Belgien. Machtkämpfe, Sezessionsbewegungen sowie Destabilisierungsversuche durch belgische und amerikanische Interessengruppen (Unternehmen und Geheimdienste) führten rasch in einen Bürgerkrieg, der mit Unterstützung einer Friedensmission der Vereinten Nationen beendet wurde. Im Jahr 1965 putschte sich der Generalstabschef Joseph Mobutu an die Macht, die er über mehr als 30 Jahre nicht mehr abgab. Mit Hilfe westlicher Staaten, die ihn als loyalen Verbündeten im Ost-West-Konflikt sahen, errichtete Mobutu einen autoritären Einparteienstaat, der durch die extreme Personalisierung der Herrschaft in Gestalt des Präsidenten gekennzeichnet war. Erst im Jahr 1997 wurde Mobutu von einer Rebellenbewegung aus dem Amt getrieben, die mit der militärischen Unterstützung einiger Nachbarstaaten das Land erobert hatte. Aber auch der neuen Regierung unter dem ehemaligen Rebellenführer Laurent-Désiré Kabila gelang es nicht, der politischen und wirtschaftlichen Krise Herr zu werden. Schon 1998 brach ein erneuter Krieg aus. Gemeinsam mit Burundi, Ruanda und Uganda versuchten mehrere Rebellengruppen, das Kabila-Regime zu Fall zu bringen. Der Konflikt endete 2002 mit einer Machtteilung zwischen Regierung und Rebellen. Im Jahr 2006 fanden schließlich unter weitgehend fairen und friedlichen Bedingungen Wahlen statt, die Amtsinhaber Joseph Kabila, der Sohn des 2001 ermordeten Laurent-Désiré Kabila, für sich entschied.

Auslöser der gewaltsamen Konflikte im Land seit den 1990er Jahren war in erster Linie das Übergreifen der Bürgerkriege in den Nachbarländern Ruanda, Angola, Burundi und Uganda auf den Kongo. Zur vollen Entfaltung konnte die regionale Verflechtung von Konflikten nur aufgrund der krisenhaften innerstaatlichen Bedingungen im Kongo gelangen. Sie sind nicht nur bedeutsam mit Blick auf die Kongo-Kriege (1996 bis 1997; 1998 bis 2002), sie bilden auch die strukturellen Rahmenbedingungen für die aktuellen und künftigen Bemühungen, den politischen und wirtschaftlichen (Wieder-)Aufbau des Landes voranzubringen. Denn Politik und Herrschaft im Kongo werden bis heute stark durch historisch gewachsene Strukturen bestimmt, insbesondere die politische Geographie sowie die politische Ökonomie.

Kongos Geographie weist Merkmale (Grenzen, Demographie, Infrastrukturen) auf, die die Konsolidierung des staatli-

Vizegouverneur in Süd-Kivu

[...] Normen anwenden, Lösungen finden – so kennt er das aus seinem alten Leben, damals als Ingenieur im Tiefbauamt im rheinischen Troisdorf und später bei der Deutschen Bahn. Aber jetzt sitzt Kibala [...] in Bukavu im Osten des Kongos, wo Krisen und Probleme nicht warten, bis sie an der Reihe sind, sondern einfach über einen hereinbrechen. Es ist neun Uhr morgens, und der Tag riecht schon nach Ärger.

In Kabare, nur wenige Kilometer von Bukavu, plündern seit gestern Soldaten der kongolesischen Armee Häuser, weil sie keinen Sold bekommen haben. Die Lehrer, seit vier Monaten ohne Lohn, drohen mit Streik. In Kibalas Vorzimmer wartet der Polizeichef, um Spesen für eine Reise zu kassieren, die eindeutig keine Dienstfahrt war. Und auf Kibalas Schreibtisch stapeln sich Gehaltszettel seiner Angestellten. Eigentlich sollen heute die April-Löhne ausgezahlt werden. Es ist der 3. Juni. Jean Claude Kibala [...] ist der neue Vizegouverneur der Provinz Süd-Kivu und als solcher zuständig für Verwaltung und Finanzen. Er weiß immer noch nicht, wie viele der 275 Lohnempfänger des Gouverneursamts hier wirklich arbeiten und wie viele Karteileichen sind, für die jemand doppelt kassiert, was nach kongolesischer Lesart nicht unter den Tatbestand des Betrugs, sondern unter Selbsthilfe fällt. [...]

Die Provinz Süd-Kivu ist für ein solches Vorhaben selbst nach kongolesischen Maßstäben ein besonders hartes Pflaster: 65 000 Quadratkilometer Fläche, 500 Kilometer kaum bewachter Grenze zu Ruanda, Burundi und Tansania, geschätzte 50 Kilometer geteerte Straße. Auf 4,5 Millionen Einwohner kommen 300 000 Binnenflüchtlinge, mindestens 13 Rebellengruppen. Unter einer spektakulär schönen Berg- und Seenlandschaft liegen die Massengräber aus dem fünfjährigen Krieg, außerdem enorme Vorkommen an Gold, Zinnerz und Coltan, und ganz tief unten der ostafrikanische Graben, der immer wieder die Erde beben lässt. [...]

Es ist 10.30 Uhr, die Auszahlung der April-Gehälter wurde erneut verschoben, Kibala will nach Kabare. Offenbar haben sich die Bewohner dort zum Protest gegen die Armee versammelt, was böse enden kann.

[...] Über eine Stunde braucht die Karawane für die 30 Kilometer nach Kabare. [...] Etwa 200 Menschen, Bauern, Lehrer, Markthändlerinnen, viele mit abgewetzten Bibeln unterm Arm, starren auf die Soldaten der 14. Brigade, die sich auf einer Wiese versammelt haben, Panzerfaust oder Kalaschnikow über der Schulter. [...] Rund 50 Soldaten haben sich in einer Lehmbaracke ohne Dach einquartiert. Es ist feucht, es stinkt, und für einen Moment wirkt dieser Haufen

chen Institutionengefüges nach der Unabhängigkeit erheblich erschwert haben. Kongos Bevölkerung von etwas mehr als 60 Millionen Menschen lebt weit verstreut auf einer Fläche von der Größe Westeuropas. Während weite Teile des Landesinneren dünn besiedelt sind, finden sich die Gegenden mit der höchsten Bevölkerungsdichte in den Grenzregionen, vor allem im Osten des Landes (Kivu-Provinzen). In der Provinz Nord-Kivu etwa leben über sieben Prozent von Kongos Gesamtbevölkerung, für die allerdings die Hauptstädte von nicht weniger als fünf Nachbarstaaten räumlich näher liegen als die eigene Landeshauptstadt Kinshasa.

Die staatliche Durchdringung und Kontrolle des riesigen Territoriums, das staatliche Gewaltmonopol, wird zudem durch äußerst dürftige Kommunikations- und Infrastrukturwege erschwert. Mit einem Netz asphaltierter Straßen von gerade einmal circa 2400 Kilometern verfügt Kongo über die geringste Straßendichte Afrikas. Unverändert seit der kolonialen Zeit blieb die Art und Weise, wie die spärlichen Verkehrswege genutzt werden. Kongos Hauptverkehrsachsen spiegeln die während der Kolonialzeit etablierte Wirtschaftsstruktur wider, die seither in erster Linie darauf ausgerichtet blieb, die enormen mineralischen Bodenschätze (Gold, Kupfer, Erze und Diamanten) zu exportieren. Sie sind bis heute die Lebensadern des Staates, und die Einkommen aus den Exporten dienen den politischen Eliten zur eigenen Bereicherung. Die regionale Konzentration der Rohstoffvorkommen auf einzelne Provinzen – vor allem Kasai und Katanga – förderte die Entstehung einer Rentenökonomie, die sich auf die Ausbeutung von Rohstoffen in reichen Gebietsteilen konzentrieren konnte. Dies hatte wirtschaftlich wie politisch weitreichende negative Konsequenzen. Die auf die rohstoffreichen Regionen konzentrierte Inselökonomie blieb vom Rest des Landes weitgehend abgeschottet, so dass von ihr keine breitenwirksamen Entwicklungsimpulse ausgingen. Auch politisch blieb das Land ein Archipel, das – wie bereits zur Kolonialzeit – in nützliche und weniger nützliche Inseln und Gebiete eingeteilt war. Die Finanzierung des Staates und seiner Eliten war durch die Inselwirtschaft gesichert; es bestanden weder politische noch wirtschaftliche Anreize, staatlicherseits entwicklungsfördernde Strukturen flächendeckend aufzubauen. Diese Verbindung aus demographischen Faktoren, Grenzverläufen sowie der Verteilung und Ausbeutung von Rohstoffen bestimmt daher bis heute die politischen Strukturen des Landes. Es ist aber zu betonen, dass diese koloniale Hinterlassenschaft kein unabwendbares Schicksal war. Alle Regierungen des unabhängigen Kongo haben in ihrem eigenen Interesse – wenn auch nicht in dem des Landes – diese Strukturen fortgeführt und damit den Aufbau eines mo-

C. Pueschner / ZEITENSPIEGEL / VISUM

In der DR Kongo haben Rebellengruppen ca. 20 000 Kinder zum Waffendienst gezwungen. Hier sichern Kindersoldaten in der Provinz Nord-Kivu den Diebstahl von Coltan zur Finanzierung von Waffengeschäften.

Schwerbewaffneter ebenso erbärmlich wie bedrohlich. „Was soll hier schon passiert sein?“, sagt einer achselzuckend. „Wir haben keinen Sold gekriegt, also müssen wir uns selber helfen.“ [...]

Als Kibala gegen 16 Uhr mit seinem Konvoi wieder durch das Tor des Gouverneursamts rollt, ist er um einige Dollar ärmer und sieht aus, als könnte er im Stehen einschlafen. Er hat nicht herausfinden können, wer in den vergangenen Monaten den Sold für die 3000 Soldaten der 14. Brigade in die eigene Tasche gesteckt hat. Dafür haben ihn die Dorfchefs von Kabare vier Stunden lang über schlammige Fußpfade von einer Visite zur nächsten bugsiert. Er musste die Platzwunden der Opfer der jüngsten Plünderungen begutachten, dem mwami, dem traditionellen Gemeindeoberhaupt, seine Aufwartung machen und hinter jeder zweiten Kurve vor einer Menschenmenge eine Stegreifrede halten. [...]

Gegen 21 Uhr sackt Kibala in den Sessel der Lobby seines Hotels [...]. Es warten die allabendlichen Bittsteller: Verwandte ersten, zweiten, dritten Grades, die Geld für ein Stipendium oder eine Arztrechnung brauchen. Alte Schulkameraden aus seiner Heimatstadt Kamituga, die einen Job suchen. Er ist doch jetzt „seine Exzellenz, der Vizegouverneur“, er kann doch bestimmt etwas organisieren.

Der nächste Morgen, 8.30 Uhr. Kassensturz. Der monatliche Finanzausgleich aus Kinshasa ist auf dem Bankkonto der Provinzregierung eingegangen. Umgerechnet gut 700 000 Dollar, dazu kommen Steuereinnahmen von 100 000 Dollar, das macht ein Jahresbudget von knapp zehn Millionen Dollar. Ein Kilometer Straße, von chinesischen Firmen geteert, kostet eine halbe Million Dollar. Zwanzig neue Straßenkilometer – und die Kasse für 2008 wäre leer. Dabei könnte diese Provinz in Geld schwimmen. Jede Nacht schmuggeln Fischer zentnerweise Coltan und Zinnerz über den Kivu-See nach Ruanda [...]. Es raubt der Staatskasse jeden Monat Steuereinnahmen in der Höhe zweistelliger Millionenbeträge.

[...] Das war Anfang Juni. Vier Wochen später ist Kibala noch mal am Telefon und klingt erstaunlich zuversichtlich. [...] Es läuft gut mit der Benzinsteuer, der Bildungsminister in Kinshasa hat Gelder für die Bezahlung der Lehrer freigegeben. Kibala will sich aus Deutschland eine Maschine zur Herstellung von Straßenschildern und Hausnummern schicken lassen – ein erster Schritt zur Reform des Katasteramts.

[...] Ansonsten sei alles einigermaßen ruhig, es gebe halt viel zu tun.

Andrea Böhm, „Herr Kibala macht Staat“, in: DIE ZEIT Nr. 29 vom 10. Juli 2008

Walter Dhladhla / AP

Machtwechsel: Im Mai 1997 muss sich Zaires Machthaber Mobutu (l.) unter Vermittlung des südafrikanischen Präsidenten Mandela mit seinem Rivalen Kabila (r.) verständigen.

Hartmut Schwarzbach / argus

In der Provinz Nord-Kivu im Osten Kongos gibt es zahlreiche Bürgerkriegsflüchtlinge. Blauhelme der UN-Mission MONUC nahe Goma

dernen Staates im westlichen Sinne verhindert. Die Machterhaltungsstrategien Mobutus und seiner Nachfolger, Laurent-Désiré Kabila und dessen Sohn Joseph, führten im Gegenteil seit den 1970er Jahren sogar zur schrittweisen Aushöhlung staatlicher Institutionen.

Da wirtschaftlich keine Notwendigkeit bestand und besteht, politische Herrschaft mit Hilfe staatlicher Bürokratien abzusichern, ruht die Ausübung politischer Macht auf Repression und informellen Institutionen, die ein Mindestmaß an politischer Stabilität gewährleisten sollen. Zu ihnen zählen Klientelnetzwerke politischer Verbündeter auf Provinz- und lokaler Ebene, deren Loyalität durch die Verteilung wirtschaftlicher Ressourcen und Pfründen gesichert wird. Diese informellen Netze, die die Eliten des Landes von der Staatsspitze bis hinunter zur lokalen Ebene miteinander verbinden, sind politisch sehr effektiv, um den Status Quo zu behaupten. Sie untergraben jedoch die Kapazitäten der nebenher existierenden offiziellen Strukturen des Staates (Verwaltung, Gerichte, Polizei), fördern Despotismus auf allen Ebenen und tragen zu wirtschaftlichen Krisen bei. Informelle Politik und die Aufhebung der Trennung zwischen privater und öffentlicher Sphäre durchziehen alle Aspekte des öffentlichen Lebens in der DR Kongo. Dies schließt politische Entscheidungsprozesse ebenso mit ein wie die Rekrutierung von Personal, die Verteilung staatlicher Ressourcen oder die Vergabe von öffentlichen Aufträgen und Lizenzen. Klientelismus, Korruption und die Privatisierung öffentlicher Institutionen und Ressourcen bilden im kongolesischen „Schattenstaat" keine Defekte, sie sind Teile des Systems.

Dieses lange Zeit stabile Modell politischer Herrschaft erwies sich ab Mitte der 1980er Jahre nicht länger als tragfähig. Durch den Zusammenbruch des kongolesischen Bergbausektors und den strategischen Bedeutungsverlust des Landes nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges geriet das Mobutu-Regime in eine schwere Krise. Wie andernorts in Afrika entstand auch im Kongo zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre eine Demokratiebewegung, die pluralistische Wahlen und die Respektierung der Menschenrechte einforderte. Ihren Höhepunkt fand diese Bewegung während der so genannten Nationalkonferenz (1991/92), an der alle wesentlichen politischen und zivilgesellschaftlichen Kräfte des Landes, nicht zuletzt die einflussreichen Kirchen, teilnahmen. Allerdings gelang es Mobutu durch geschicktes Taktieren, sich ohne eine substanzielle politische Öffnung an der Macht zu halten. Seine Blockadehaltung lähmte das Land. Letztlich erwiesen sich Ereignisse außerhalb Kongos als die Triebfedern, die das krisengeschüttelte Land endgültig ins Chaos stürzten. Im östlichen Nachbarland Ruanda kam es unter Führung der mit Mobutu verbündeten Regierung von Juvénal Habyarimana zu einem Genozid, in dessen Verlauf etwa 800 000 Tutsi und gemäßigte Hutu ihr Leben verloren. Das Regime wurde schließlich von der *Rwandan Patriotic Front* (RPF) gestürzt, einer Rebellenbewegung, die seit 1991 im Land vorrückte. Die Völkermörder und rund zwei Millionen Ruander flüchteten in den Osten des benachbarten Kongo. Von dort aus setzen sie ihren Kampf gegen die neue, RPF-kontrollierte Regierung in Ruanda fort. Diese sicherheitspolitische Bedrohung konterte Ruanda 1996 mit dem Einmarsch in den Kongo, wo die Rückzugsbasen der Völkermörder zerstört wurden. Der Krieg, an dem auch Uganda, Burundi und Angola sowie die kongolesische Rebellenbewegung AFDL auf Seiten Ruandas teilnahmen, führte im Mai 1997 zur Vertreibung Mobutus und zur Machtergreifung von AFDL-Führer Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

Kabila erwies sich als ebenso autoritär wie Mobutu, sein Bündnis mit Ruanda zerbrach. Im August 1998 kam es zum Ausbruch eines erneuten Krieges, an dem schließlich sieben ausländische Armeen, vier kongolesische Rebellengruppen sowie Dutzende Milizen aus Kongo und den Nachbarländern beteiligt waren. Unterstützt von Ruanda, Uganda und Burundi versuchten mehrere Rebellengruppen, das Kabila-Regime zu stürzen. Das Eingreifen Angolas, Namibias und Simbabwes auf Seiten Kabilas führte zu einer militärischen Pattsituation. Der Konflikt endete 2002 mit einem Machtteilungsabkommen zwischen Regierung und Rebellen. Im Jahr 2006 fanden – erstmals seit der Unabhängigkeit 1960 – Wahlen statt. Begleitet wurde der Friedensprozess seit 1999 von einer Friedensmission der Vereinten Nationen (*United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Kongo*, MONUC), die auf ihrem Höhepunkt rund 19 000 Blauhelme im Land stationiert hatte. Der Krieg hatte katastrophale humanitäre, politische und wirtschaftliche Folgen. Etwa fünf Millionen Kongolesen verloren ihr Leben, zumeist aufgrund fehlenden Zugangs zu Trinkwasser, Nahrung und medizinischer Versorgung. Schwere Menschenrechtsverletzungen, darunter systematische sexuelle Gewalt gegen Frauen als Kriegswaffe, haben die Bevölkerung traumatisiert, vor allem im Osten des Landes. Selbst bei günstiger Konjunktur wird das Land mehrere Jahrzehnte benötigen, um den niedrigen wirtschaftlichen Entwicklungsstand von 1990 wieder zu erreichen.

Kamerun

Andreas Mehler

Kamerun wurde schon oft als „Lokomotive“ für ganz Zentralafrika ausersehen, hat diese Funktion aber nie erfüllt. Das vergleichsweise große Potenzial für Landwirtschaft und gewerbliche Entwicklung wurde nie ausgeschöpft, im Wesentlichen wegen politischer Fehlentwicklungen.

Nach dem Ende des Ersten Weltkriegs wurde die deutsche Kolonie Kamerun Frankreich und Großbritannien als Mandatsgebiet übertragen. Ab Mitte der 1950er Jahre war Kamerun Schauplatz eines blutigen Guerillakriegs, besonders im Westen des Landes. Mit der Unabhängigkeit 1960 gelangte der Paris-freundliche Ahmadou Ahidjo aus Nordkamerun ins Präsidentenamt und führte die Verfolgung der schon sehr geschwächten Rebellion bis zu ihrem Ende 1971 fort.

Ein Referendum im britischen Mandatsgebiet führte 1961 zum Anschluss des nördlichen Teils an Nigeria, des südlichen an das französisch verwaltete Kamerun. Es entstand ein Föderalsystem aus zwei Staaten, mit einem dominanten frankophonen Landesteil (vier Fünftel der Bevölkerung/neun Zehntel der Fläche) und einem in vielerlei Hinsicht schwachen anglophonen Landesteil. Per Referendum wurde die Bundesstaatlichkeit 1972 beendet, nachdem 1966 bereits alle noch legal existierenden Parteien zur Einheitspartei *Union Nationale Camerounaise* (UNC) verschmolzen waren. Ahidjo führte nun ein zentralistisches Präsidialregime, das in der Rhetorik die nationale Einheit beschwor, in der täglichen Praxis aber auf ein Austarieren der Volksgruppen in hohen Ämtern Wert legte. Dabei entstand eine Dominanz „des“ Nordens im Militär, „der“ Bamiléké, der größten, aber sehr heterogenen ethnischen Gruppe im Westen in der Wirtschaft und „des“ Südens in der zivilen Verwaltung. Das System funktionierte in seiner eigenen Logik zunächst recht gut, zumal es wirtschaftlich aufwärts ging und damit einiges zu verteilen war: Ämter, Posten und Pöstchen, Export- und Importlizenzen.

Für die französische Afrikapolitik blieb Kamerun ein treuer Verbündeter und neben Gabun wichtigster Partner in Zentralafrika. Umgekehrt konnten sich die Regierenden in der Hauptstadt Jaunde lange Zeit einer im Notfall auch militärischen Unterstützung aus Paris sicher sein. Die Regierung Kameruns stand im Kalten Krieg fest im westlichen Lager.

Offenbar aus Amtsmüdigkeit gab Ahidjo 1982 die Präsidentschaft auf. Verfassungsgemäß wurde Paul Biya, bislang Premierminister und aus dem Süden stammend, sein Nachfolger. Er galt vielen als schwach, anderen als Reformhoffnung. Nach ersten Personalentscheidungen trachtete Ahidjo vergeblich,

Kampf um Demokratie in Kamerun

[...] Was gilt als Kampf um Demokratie? Wenn in einem Seminarraum eine Stoffbahn für „Good Governance“ aufgehängt wird? Oder wenn ein gewalttätiger Aufstand ausbricht? Bei den sogenannten Hungerrevolten des Jahres 2008 wurde oft das Bewusstsein und die Entschlossenheit der Beteiligten verkannt. Eine Hungerrevolte hat keine Akteure, so will es das Wort – es ist der Hunger selbst, der revoltiert. Er bemächtigt sich der Menschen, lässt ihnen keine andere Wahl, als um sich zu schlagen. [...]

In Kamerun wurde nicht gehungert, als dort die vermeintliche Hungerrevolte ausbrach. Der Protest gegen die hohen Lebenshaltungskosten wurde vielmehr angeheizt von der lang gehegten Wut auf die korrupte herrschende Klasse, an ihrer Spitze Präsident Paul Biya. Ein Streik gegen den Benzinpreis, begonnen in Douala von 42 000 Mopedtaxifahrern, wurde binnen Stunden zu einem Aufruhr in allen größeren Städten und legte die Infrastruktur des ganzen Landes lahm. [...] Der jüngste Aufstand hatte mit Demokratie zu tun, denn deren schiere Abwesenheit, der völlige Mangel an Rechenschaftspflicht, ist die Hauptursache für die Korruption in Kamerun. Und ausgerechnet jetzt verlangte der 76-jährige Präsident Biya, gegen eine klare Mehrheit in der Bevölkerung, eine Revision der Verfassung, um sich nach einem Vierteljahrhundert an der Macht vollends im Amt verewigen zu können. [...]

Die politische Frustration hat sich in Kamerun, einem Patchwork von mehr als 200 Volksgruppen, nicht in interethnischer Gewalt entladen, obwohl das Regime versuchte, dazu anzustacheln. Für einen Moment haben die Kameruner, die oft als fatalistisch geschildert werden, im Märzaufstand Würde gefunden. Die Würde, sich als Subjekt zu sehen, als Handelnde, mag das Handeln auch verzweifelt, gewalttätig, unorganisiert und darum zum Scheitern verurteilt gewesen sein. Der von außen auf Afrika gerichtete Blick liebt indes nicht die Kämpfenden, sondern die Leidenden – und dem entsprechend haben sich viele Afrikaner eingerichtet in dem Lebensgefühl, das ewige Opfer zu sein.

Dieser Selbstentmächtigung ein Ende zu setzen, ist der Anfang jedes Kampfs um Demokratie. An vielen Orten ist er im Gange. Von den Eliten ist dabei nicht viel zu erwarten, zu oft muss der Kampf ja gerade gegen sie gerichtet sein. Sie beiseitezudrängen, das erfordert allerdings, dass in den Gesellschaftsmehrheiten eine neue Kultur des Sich-verantwortlich-Erklärens entsteht. „Früher“, sagt der kamerunische Oppositionspolitiker Adamou Ndam Njoya, „brachte jeder einen Stein, wenn ein Brunnen gebaut wurde. Diese Kultur, das Öffentliche auch als das Eigene zu betrachten, haben wir verloren, als Teil unserer ganzen kulturellen Entwurzelung. Die Menschen müssen heute anfangen zu begreifen, dass sie nicht Fremde sind bei sich selbst.“

Charlotte Wiedemann, „Die kleinen Münzen der Partizipation“, in: Le Monde diplomatique vom 13. Februar 2009

Proteste gegen Preissteigerungen und korrupte Eliten in Douala Ende Februar 2008

Talla Sop Ruben / REUTERS

Patrick Kovarik / AFP / Getty Images

Seit 1982 regiert Präsident Paul Biya Kamerun. Er gehört zur frankophonen Elite des Landes und unterhält enge Kontakte zu Frankreich, hier bei einem Staatsbesuch in Paris 2006.

seinen Nachfolger am 6. April 1984 per Putschversuch zu entmachten. Nach dem Guerillakrieg war dies die zweite traumatische Gewalterfahrung mit Verhaftungswellen und 800 bis 1000 Todesopfern. Die Armee blieb weitgehend loyal und sah ihr politisches Gewicht nach der überstandenen Krise wachsen. Als zweite Konsequenz ließ Biya die Einheitspartei auf ihrem Parteitag 1985 in *Rassemblement Démocratique du Peuple Camerounais* (RDPC) umbenennen. Es ging hier im Wesentlichen um Symbolik: Auch die einzig zugelassene Partei war nun Biyas Partei. Weitergehende Reformhoffnungen erfüllten sich dagegen kaum.

Der andere große Faktor der Unzufriedenheit war wirtschaftlicher Natur. Die Kameruner Regierung sah sich 1988 dazu gezwungen, bei der Weltbank und dem Internationalen Währungsfonds (IWF) ein Strukturanpassungsprogramm nachzufragen. Das Programm enthielt die für die frühen 1990er Jahre typischen Bestandteile: Reform des Bankensektors, der Verwaltung und der parastaatlichen Unternehmen, Deregulierung von Handel und Vermarktungsorganisationen für agrarische Rohstoffe sowie die Kontrolle und Reduktion staatlicher Ausgaben – zum Teil durch Privatisierung staatlicher Aufgabenbereiche. Nicht enthalten waren währungspolitische Eingriffe, da Kamerun zur CFA-Zone gehört – mit damals festen Wechselkursen zum französischen Franc und heute zum Euro. Die Abwertung des *Franc CFA* gegenüber dem *Franc Français* im Januar 1994 traf Kamerun wie andere afrikanische Staaten im Währungsverbund hart. Die beabsichtigte Ankurbelung des Exports trat kaum ein, zumal die in die Krise geratene klassische Agrarexportproduktion von Kakao, Kaffee, Palmöl und Baumwolle nicht kurzfristig reagieren konnte. Politisch und sozial war die Abwertung aber bedeutsam. Insbesondere die Kaufkraft im öffentlichen Dienst, der zusätzlich Gehaltskürzungen hinnehmen musste, sank dramatisch.

Ein schwerwiegendes Problem ist die Auseinandersetzung zwischen anglophonen und frankophonen Eliten. Circa 20 Prozent der Bevölkerung Kameruns leben in den englischsprachigen Provinzen North West und South West, zeitweise waren aber nur neun Prozent der Kabinettsposten durch Anglophone besetzt. Die Südwestprovinz trägt mit ihren Offshore-Erdölvorkommen einen großen Teil zu den Staatseinnahmen bei, ist aber infrastrukturell schwach erschlossen. Die offizielle Zweisprachigkeit wurde real nicht durchgesetzt, rechtlich entscheidend ist im Zweifelsfall der Wortlaut der französischen Gesetzestexte. Separatistische Gruppen geben sich zunehmend militant; am eindrücklichsten machte der *Southern Cameroons National Congress* (SCNC) auf sich aufmerksam. Viele Anglophone sehen sich selbst als Bürger zweiter Klasse, und eine wachsende Minderheit bevorzugt gar die Abspaltung.

Das äußere Ansehen Kameruns wird einerseits bestimmt durch die überzeichnete Anerkennung seiner „Stabilität in einer instabilen Region", andererseits durch das sprichwörtliche Missmanagement öffentlicher Stellen. Das wirtschaftspolitische Reformtempo nahm erst mit der Jahrtausendwende zu. Einige Privatisierungen wurden abgeschlossen, andere – zum Teil aus politischen Gründen – nicht (zum Beispiel die der Fluglinie Camair). Geber beklagten durchgehend ein mangelndes Engagement für die Reformen.

Dazu passt, dass Kamerun 1998 und 1999 im Korruptions-Perzeptionsindex (CPI) von *Transparency International* weltweit an der Spitze stand. Die Korruption wird als eines der Hauptprobleme der Regierungsführung angesehen. 2007 wurde Kamerun im CPI zwar nur noch auf dem 41. Rang geführt, im Alltag der Menschen ist diese Veränderung jedoch wenig spürbar. Obwohl eine wachsende Anzahl bekannter Elitenvertreter unter Korruptionsanklagen festgenommen wurde, hat sich die Tendenz zur privaten Nutzung öffentlicher Einrichtungen in den letzten Jahren ungebrochen fortgesetzt; es wird nur mehr darüber geredet als früher.

Eine demokratische Transformation begann im Gefolge der weltpolitischen Umwälzungen im Jahr 1990. Nach gewaltsamen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen oppositionellen und Sicherheitskräften ließ Präsident Biya Ende 1990 den Parteienpluralismus zu, wehrte sich aber gegen die von der Opposition geforderte souveräne Nationalkonferenz nach dem Vorbild Benins. Sie hätte unweigerlich seinen Machtverlust bedeutet. Generalstreiks im Jahr 1991 wurden gewaltsam beendet, dies kostete mehrere Hundert Tote. Die Präsidentschaftswahlen im Oktober 1992 wurden mit allen Mitteln durch die Verwaltung manipuliert und Biya zum Sieger erklärt. Der Präsident schuf nun eine Fassadendemokratie. Zwar wurde die Meinungs- und Vereinigungsfreiheit ausgeweitet, aber keine einzige Wahl seit Wiedereinführung des Mehrparteiensystems erfolgte zeitgerecht und fair (Präsidentschaftswahlen 1992, 1997, 2004; Parlamentswahlen 1992, 1997, 2002, 2007; Kommunalwahlen 1996, 2002, 2007). Die Proteste gegen die Manipulationen ver-

kehrten sich in Zynismus, die engagierten Bürger zogen sich ins Private zurück. Die Opposition blieb gespalten, gewährte keine parteiinterne Demokratie und verschliss sich in kommunalen Ämtern. Mit 153 von 180 Sitzen kontrolliert die RDPC seit 2007 fast wie zu Zeiten der Einheitspartei die Legislative. Kamerun zählt heute zu den Staaten mit den geringsten demokratischen Fortschritten auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent.

Während die Demokratiebewegung Anfang der 1990er Jahre landesweit für Unruhe sorgte, sind die meisten der späteren Gewalteskalationen lokalen Ursprungs. Gerade in den dichter besiedelten Landesteilen überlagern sich ökonomische, politische und auf gemeinsamer Identität gründende Interessen. Hinzu kommt das Versagen der staatlichen Sicherheitskräfte, die sehr häufig eher als „Unsicherheitskräfte" einzuschätzen sind, Schutzgelder erpressen und geheime Verbindungen zu grenzübergreifenden Schmugglernetzwerken unterhalten.

Im Februar 2008 entlud sich in landesweiten Demonstrationen gegen Preiserhöhungen die ganze Frustration über ein politisch-ökonomisches System, das einen Großteil der Bevölkerung zwar überleben lässt, aber mehr auch nicht. Biya hatte im Vorjahr sein 25-jähriges Amtsjubiläum gefeiert und dies als Anlass für eine Verfassungsänderung genommen, die ihn womöglich bis 2018 im Amt halten könnte. Protestaktionen gegen verteuerte Nahrungsmittel und Benzinpreiserhöhungen vermischten sich zu einem mehrdimensionalen „Jetzt reicht es!". Ob sich Opposition und organisierte Teile der Gesellschaft aber auf ein mittelfristig funktionierendes Bündnis einigen können, um das autoritäre System friedlich in die Knie zu zwingen, ist nach den bisherigen Erfahrungen mehr als unsicher. Der Blick in die Nachbarschaft – nach Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Kongo – zeigt: Wer die historische Chance eines einigermaßen friedlichen Übergangs Anfang der 1990er Jahre verpasste, bekommt sie so schnell nicht wieder.

Ruanda

Stefan Mair

Kaum ein anderes afrikanisches Land polarisiert Afrikaexperten und Politiker so sehr wie Ruanda: Für die einen ist es ein Modellfall, dem nach einem Völkermord die politische Stabilisierung, wichtige Schritte zur Aussöhnung und der Aufbau eines entwicklungsorientierten Staatswesens gelang; die anderen halten es für einen autoritären Staat, in dem eine Minderheit erneut ihre Macht über die Bevölkerungsmehrheit festigen konnte, der zudem die Sicherheit im benachbarten Ost-Kongo untergräbt und dessen Ressourcen ausbeutet. Für beide Einschätzungen gibt es Belege.

Der Völkermord an der Minderheit der ruandischen Tutsi, dem auch eine große Zahl politisch missliebiger Hutu zum Opfer fiel, forderte 1994 in wenigen Wochen 800 000 bis 1,2 Millionen Todesopfer. Die Bilder von Männern, die ihre Nachbarn mit Knüppeln und Macheten erschlagen, von Kirchen, die nach einem Verrat durch den Geistlichen überfüllt sind mit Toten, die dem Schlachten entfliehen wollten, und die permanenten Aufrufe des Radiosenders *Radio télévision libre des Milles Collines*, die Gräber seien noch nicht voll genug, bestimmen nach wie vor die Wahrnehmung des Landes. Der Völkermord war aber nicht ein spontanes Morden verfeindeter Volksgruppen, sondern er hat eine lange Vorgeschichte, in der

Paula Bronstein / Liaison / Getty Images

Dem Genozid fielen 1994 innerhalb weniger Wochen Hunderttausende zum Opfer. Ermordete Tutsi vor der Kirche in Rukara im Osten Ruandas

politische, ökonomische und internationale Faktoren eine Rolle spielen. Woher Tutsi und Hutu stammen ist in der wissenschaftlichen Literatur aufgrund fehlender Quellen umstritten. Faktisch war das ruandische Königreich aber entlang dieser Volksgruppen organisiert: Die Tutsi stellten Viehzüchter, aber auch den Adel und den König, während die Hutu Ackerbau betrieben und den Tutsi politisch und sozial untergeordnet waren. Damit war also das ethnische Unterscheidungsmerkmal vor allem ein soziales. Hutu konnten aber durch sozialen Aufstieg zu Tutsi werden und Tutsi durch sozialen Abstieg zu Hutu. Zudem gab es nicht wenige Mischehen. Dass es sich bei der ethnischen Differenz in erster Linie um eine soziale Unterscheidung handelte, wird dadurch unterstrichen, dass beide Gruppen dieselbe Sprache sprechen.

Die Kolonialisierung beendete allerdings diese Form sozialer Diffusion. Deutsche und nach 1918 belgische Kolonialherren begünstigten systematisch die herrschende Elite der Tutsi und benachteiligten die beherrschten Hutu. Sie begannen Gliedmaßen und Köpfe zu vermessen, um „wissenschaftlich exakt" die Zugehörigkeit zu der einen oder anderen Volksgruppe zu bestimmen. Die Großen und Schlanken waren Tutsi, die Kleinen und Gedrungenen Hutu. Tutsi wurden als Juniorpartner bei der Beherrschung Ruandas gesehen, entsprechend räumte die Kolonialisierung nur ihnen Bildungs- und Aufstiegschancen ein. Dies zementierte und verschärfte den Gegensatz zwischen beiden Gruppen ins Extreme. In den 1950er Jahren zeichnete sich das Ende der Kolonialherrschaft ab. Forderungen der Hutu nach mehr politischer Mitbestimmung stellten die Tutsi ihren Herrschaftsanspruch mit Hilfe von Gewalt und Unterdrückung entgegen. In der von 1959 bis 1961 dauernden Revolution stürzte eine Hutu-Bewegung die Tutsi-Machthaber und trieb 150 000 der circa 300 000 Tutsi außer Landes. Die meisten von ihnen ließen sich im Süden Ugandas nieder. Schon damals hatte der Putsch zahlreichen Tutsi, aber auch Hutu das Leben gekostet. Dennoch galt in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren das autoritäre Regime des Hutu Júvenal Habyarimana als entwicklungspolitische Vorzeigeregierung, die sich umfangreicher Zuwendungen gerade aus Deutschland erfreuen konnte. Nicht nur wegen seiner zahlreichen Berge und harmonischen Landschaften wurde Ruanda zur Schweiz Afrikas verklärt.

Diese Verklärung fand ein rasches Ende, als 1990 die Nachkommen der 1961 nach Uganda vertriebenen Tutsi-Flüchtlinge ihren Kampf gegen das Habyarimana-Regime aufnahmen. Viele

Mythen ranken sich darum, was diese Tutsi bewog, nach Ruanda zurückzukehren. Sie galten als relativ etabliert in Uganda. Der Tutsi-Rebellenführer Paul Kagame hatte eine zentrale Rolle beim Sieg der von Yoveri Museveni geleiteten Widerstandsbewegung in Uganda gespielt und war unter diesem Chef des militärischen Geheimdienstes gewesen. Vielleicht war es der Wille auf Seiten der vertriebenen Tutsi, eine historische Schmach zu tilgen, oder die Furcht auf Seiten Musevenis, die homogene und disziplinierte Volksgruppe könnte einst selbst zur Bedrohung seiner Macht werden. Internationale Vermittlungsbemühungen zwischen beiden Konfliktparteien schienen schließlich 1993 erfolgreich, als im tansanischen Arusha die Unterzeichnung eines Friedensabkommens gelang, das den Tutsi-Rebellen eine Machtbeteiligung einräumte. Im April 1994 kam Präsident Habyarimana zu Tode, als beim Landeanflug auf den ruandischen Hauptstadtflughafen die Präsidentenmaschine abgeschossen wurde. Auch dieser Gewaltakt ist Anlass für bis heute ungeklärte Spekulationen: Waren die Attentäter die Tutsi-Rebellen, die sich in der militärischen Offensive befanden und das Friedensabkommen nicht wollten? Oder waren es radikale Hutu, die keine Machtbeteiligung der Tutsi wollten und einen Auslöser für den schon lange geplanten Völkermord brauchten?

Eben jener fand in den darauf folgenden Wochen statt. Der im Land anwesenden UN-Friedensmission, die zur Überwachung des zuvor geschlossenen Waffenstillstands entsandt worden war, wurde vom New Yorker Hauptquartier das Eingreifen verboten. Zu frisch war noch der Eindruck der gescheiterten UN-Mission in Somalia, bei der die Blauhelme selbst zur Konfliktpartei geworden waren. Das Morden hielt an, bis es den Tutsi-Rebellen gelang, ganz Ruanda zu erobern. Auch bezogen auf den Kriegsverlauf gibt es bis heute Anschuldigungen und Unklarheiten. Den Tutsi-Rebellen wurde vorgeworfen, sie seien nicht so schnell, wie es ihnen möglich gewesen wäre, vorgerückt, um die Macht nach einem Sieg nicht mit den im Lande verbliebenen Tutsi teilen zu müssen. Ähnlich schwerwiegenden Vorwürfen sah sich Frankreich ausgesetzt, das in der Endphase des Krieges eine Militärmission nach Ruanda entsandte. Diese hatte nicht die Aufgabe, den Völkermord zu beenden oder die Täter zu verhaften, sondern Schutzzonen einzurichten. In sie hatten sich Täter und deren Angehörige zurückziehen können, um später zu Hunderttausenden von dort aus in das benachbarte Zaire (jetzt: Demokratische Republik Kongo) zu flüchten. Frankreich wurde unterstellt, es wollte die frankophonen und damit als Verbündete betrachteten Hutu vor den anglophonen, weil in Uganda aufgewachsenen Tutsi schützen.

Die Entscheidung der UN, nicht in den Völkermord einzugreifen, dürfte wohl eine der falschesten und folgenschwersten in der Geschichte der Weltorganisation gewesen sein. Das belegen nicht nur die hunderttausende Tote, sondern auch die Folgeereignisse, die über Ruandas Grenzen hinausreichen. In den Flüchtlingslagern im benachbarten Osten Kongos konnten sich die Milizen der Hutu, die den Genozid begangen hatten, neu organisieren und wiederaufrüsten. Aufforderungen der neuen ruandischen Regierung an die Regierung des Kongo und die internationale Gemeinschaft, diese zu entwaffnen, verhallten ungehört. Als sich die Übergriffe der Hutu-Milizionäre auf ruandisches Grenzgebiet mehrten, begann Ruanda zusammen mit Uganda dort einen lokalen, zunächst unbedeutenden Kriegsherren zu unterstützen, der seinen Kampf gegen das autoritäre, kongolesische Regime ausweitete. Laurent-Désiré Kabila gelang es binnen weniger Monate mit der Unterstützung ruandischer und ugandischer Soldaten, die im Westen des Landes gelegene Hauptstadt zu erobern und den langjährigen Diktator Mobutu von der Macht zu vertreiben. Allerdings hielt auch er später sein Versprechen nicht, die immer noch im Grenzgebiet zu Ruanda operierenden, auf ungefähr 20 000 Mann geschätzten Hutu-Milizen zu entwaffnen. Dies hatte zur Folge, dass Ruanda und Uganda 1998 eine zweite Intervention wagten. Ihr Vormarsch auf die Hauptstadt wurde durch das militärische Eingreifen Angolas und Simbabwes auf Seiten der kongolesischen Regierung gestoppt. Hieraus entwickelte sich ein Krieg, an dem zeitweilig die Armeen von acht afrikanischen Staaten beteiligt waren. Obgleich die DR Kongo und Ruanda 2002 ein Friedensabkommen im südafrikanischen Pretoria geschlossen haben, ist insbesondere der Osten des Kongo von einem dauerhaften Frieden weit entfernt. Hutu-Milizen, zahlreiche lokale Milizen und Regierungstruppen führen einen brutalen Kleinkrieg gegen Tutsi-Rebellen, die wiederum von Ruanda unterstützt werden. Dessen Machthaber argumentieren, sie engagierten sich im Kongo nur, um die Sicherheit des eigenen Landes und die der ruandischen Minderheit im Kongo zu wahren. Die kongolesische Regierung, aber auch internationale Stimmen unterstellen ihnen, sie betrieben einen Export des eigenen nationalen Konflikts und würden ihn zudem missbrauchen, um über Stellvertreter die reichen Ressourcen des Ost-Kongo: Gold, Diamanten und Coltan, das für die Mobilfunkindustrie (Mobiltelephone, Laptops) von Bedeutung ist, auszubeuten.

Als wäre die Lage nicht schon komplex genug, ist Ruanda auch noch ein außen- und entwicklungspolitischer Streitfall. Die Aufbauleistungen der seit 1994 regierenden Tutsi-Machthaber sind

Nach dem militärischen Sieg der Tutsi-Rebellen fliehen viele Hutu in Flüchtlingslager – unter ihnen auch die Täter des Genozids.

Paula Bronstein / Liaison / Getty Images

Die Aufarbeitung des Völkermords ist ein wichtiges gesellschaftliches Anliegen. Gedenkfeier am Mahnmal in Murambi im Südwesten Ruandas

picture-alliance / dpa

beachtlich, auch ihre Bemühungen, den Völkermord rechtlich aufzuarbeiten. Die Regierung gilt als effektiv, entwicklungsorientiert und relativ korruptionsfrei. Deshalb erfreut sie sich umfangreicher Zuwendungen seitens der internationalen Gebergemeinschaft. Hinzu kommt, dass die USA die ruandische Regierung als einen der engsten Verbündeten in Afrika betrachten. Dies mag zum einen dem schlechten Gewissen geschuldet sein, den Völkermord nicht verhindert zu haben, zum anderen der Bewunderung für den Präsidenten, Paul Kagame, der nicht nur für amerikanische Politiker den Typus der neuen, effektiven und verlässlichen Führungspersönlichkeit in Afrika darstellt. Kritiker dieser Haltung behaupten, die Kooperation der internationalen Geber mit Ruanda würde die Macht der Minderheit über die Mehrheit, der Tutsi über die Hutu, stabilisieren. Zwar fand in dem Land 2008 mittlerweile die zweite Parlamentswahl statt, doch Parteien ist bislang eine effektive Organisation auf lokaler Ebene verboten, und mit Verweis auf den Vorrang der ethnischen Aussöhnung hat die Regierung seither den Wahlsieg von Oppositionsparteien fast unmöglich gemacht. Zugleich weist das ruandische Parlament aber einen Frauenanteil auf, der mit 56 Prozent weit über dem Durchschnitt in europäischen Parlamenten liegt. Noch weitreichender als die Kritik an der Stabilisierung der innenpolitischen Verhältnisse durch internationale Entwicklungs- und auch Militärhilfe ist der Vorwurf, durch beides sei Ruanda erst in die Lage versetzt worden, den Krieg im Kongo zu führen.

Zentralafrikanische Republik

Andreas Mehler

Inmitten des Kontinents liegt das dünn besiedelte und durch Verkehrswege schlecht erschlossene Binnenland Zentralafrikanische Republik (ZAR). Angefangen bei der rein geographischen Staatsbezeichnung (im Vergleich hieße Deutschland „Mitteleuropäische Republik“), über die unkontrollierten Grenzen bis hin zum vollständigen Fehlen staatlicher Verwaltung in weiten Teilen des Ostens der Republik – die ZAR gilt in vielerlei Hinsicht als Sinnbild eines Phantomstaates. Ohne befahrbare Straßen und schiffbare Flüsse sind Teile des Staatsgebiets nur per Helikopter zu erreichen.

Jahrzehntelang unternahm die ehemalige Kolonialmacht Frankreich massive Interventionen: militärisch, wirtschaftlich und politisch. Frankreich segnete 1976 die bizarre Krönung des Militärherrschers Jean-Bédel Bokassa zum „Kaiser“ ab, nur um ihn wenige Jahre später in einer Luftlandeaktion zu stürzen. Zwei Militärbasen machten das Land zu einer wichtigen logistischen Drehscheibe für die *„out of area“*-Einsätze der französischen Armee. Parallel dazu wurden Präsidentenberater eingesetzt, nicht zuletzt im Bereich innerer Sicherheit. Ohne die logistische Hilfe französischer Truppen hätten Wahlen 1993 ebenso wenig stattfinden können wie 1998/99 bzw. 2005, als zuerst UN-Blauhelme und schließlich eine regionale Friedenstruppe die Durchführung sicherstellten. Aus eigener Kraft kann die ZAR so nicht einmal die äußeren Formen einer Demokratie aufrechterhalten.

Der geflügelte Satz, „Der Staat endet am Kilometerstein 12“ (von der Stadtmitte der Hauptstadt Bangui aus), ist vielsagend. Seit einer 1996 einsetzenden Abfolge von Meutereien, Putschversuchen, Rebellionen und einer gewaltsamen Machtübernahme im Jahr 2003 hat sich die Situation noch weiter verschlechtert. Die gegenwärtige Regierung kontrolliert nur Bangui und Umgebung dauerhaft. Straßenräuber machen weite Teile des Nordens und Westens unsicher. Staatsbeamte werden unregelmäßig bezahlt, die Soldaten auch. Der gestürzte Staatschef Ange-Félix Patassé (1993 bis 2003) verließ sich lieber auf Kämpfer einer kongolesischen Rebellenorganisation als auf seine eigene Armee, ein weltweit wohl einzigartiges Beispiel dieser Art von Souveränitätsaufgabe. Der jetzige Staatschef François Bozizé bevorzugte zunächst Hilfstruppen aus dem Nachbarland Tschad. Was vom Staat noch bleibt, dient der Elite zur eigenen Bereicherung. Verwandte des jeweiligen Präsidenten sind seit gut 25 Jahren immer wieder an aussichtsreichen Ausschreibungen und Projekten beteiligt.

Die ZAR ist reich an Rohstoffen und großen Flächen unberührter Natur. Die exklusive Jagd auf Großwild – etwa durch den französischen Präsidenten Giscard d’Estaing oder arabische Prinzen – trug lange Jahre hindurch ihren Teil zum exotischen Reiz der ZAR bei. Bedeutender aber sind die Diamanten: Wenn die gesamte Produktion ordnungsgemäß verzollt

Staatlicher Personenkult: Jean-Bédel Bokassa (1966 bis 1979) ließ sich 1976 zum Oberhaupt des „Zentralafrikanischen Kaiserreichs“ krönen.

Pierre Guillaud / AFP / Getty Images

Kaum vorhandene Infrastruktur und miserable Versorgung der Bevölkerung: medizinische Sprechstunde in einem Pygmäen-Dorf

Roland Knauer / photoplexus

das Land verlassen würde, könnte sich der Staat allein aus diesen Einnahmen finanzieren. Ein großer Teil jedoch wird geschmuggelt, bis vor wenigen Jahren weitgehend unbeachtet.

Mit dem Krieg im sudanesischen Darfur geriet die ZAR in den Fokus internationaler Aufmerksamkeit. Eine europäische Friedenstruppe soll in der Grenzzone zwischen Tschad, ZAR und Sudan zumindest die Sicherheit von Flüchtlingslagern gewährleisten. Auch humanitäre Hilfsorganisationen interessieren sich für Gebiete im Nordwesten und Nordosten des Landes, in denen diverse Rebellenbewegungen (und bewaffnete Straßenräuber) operieren. Plötzlich fließt auch die fast zum Erliegen gekommene Entwicklungshilfe wieder. Aber auch das wird nicht reichen, um ein Mindestmaß an Funktionsfähigkeit herzustellen.

Äquatorial-Guinea

Gerhard Seibert

Das im Golf von Guinea gelegene Äquatorial-Guinea ist das einzige spanischsprechende Land Afrikas und zählte nach UN-Schätzungen 2007 etwa 501 000 Einwohner. Die Gesamtfläche von 28 051 Quadratkilometern umfasst Mbini (früher Rio Muni; 26 003 Quadratkilometer) auf dem Festland, die Inseln Bioko (2007 Quadratkilometer) mit der Hauptstadt Malabo und Annobón (18 Quadratkilometer) sowie die kleinen Küsteninseln Elobeys und Corisco, wobei letztere auch von Gabun beansprucht wird. Wichtigste Bevölkerungsgruppen sind die Fang aus Mbini, die 80 Prozent der Bevölkerung repräsentieren, und die auf Bioko einheimischen Bubi und von befreiten Sklaven abstammenden Fernandinos. 1778 trat Portugal das Gebiet an Spanien ab, das auf Bioko ab 1858 eine Plantagenwirtschaft errichtete. Die Kolonisierung Rio Munis, das seit 1885 spanisches Protektorat war, begann erst 1926.

Kurz vor der Unabhängigkeit am 12. Oktober 1968 wurde Francisco Macías Nguema, ein Fang, zum Präsidenten gewählt. Er errichtete eine der gewalttätigsten Diktaturen Afrikas. Zehntausende von Regimegegnern wurden ermordet, und ein Drittel der Bevölkerung floh ins Ausland. Nigerianische Plantagenarbeiter wurden vertrieben, und die auf Kakao und Kaffee basierende Wirtschaft kam zum Erliegen. 1979 wurde Macías Nguema von Teodoro Obiang, dem Chef der Nationalgarde, gestürzt und hingerichtet. Obiang gehört zu dem Esangui-Clan aus Río Muni, der die politische Macht monopolisiert und den Sicherheitsapparat kontrolliert. Der von Obiang geleitete Oberste Militärrat war weniger brutal, regierte jedoch weiterhin diktatorisch, und Menschenrechtsverletzungen sowie Korruption blieben an der Tagesordung. 1987 gründete Obiang die Staatspartei *Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial* (PDGE), die im Jahr darauf die Parlamentswahlen mit 99,2 Prozent der Stimmen gewann. 1989 liess sich Obiang mit 99 Prozent der Stimmen zum Präsidenten wählen. Bei weiteren „Fassadenwahlen" 1996 und 2002 wurde er im Amt bestätigt.

Das 1991 formell eingeführte Mehrparteiensystem gewährt dem auf sieben Jahre gewählten Präsidenten weitgehende exekutive Macht. Seit 1993 finden Mehrparteienwahlen statt, die von Unregelmäßigkeiten begleitet und deren Resultate von der Opposition angefochten wurden. Das auf fünf Jahre gewählte Parlament wird von der von Obiang geleiteten PDGE kontrolliert. Wichtigste lokale Oppositionspartei ist die *Convergência para la Democracia Social* (CPDS). Im spanischen Exil aktive Oppositionsparteien sind untereinander zerstritten. Bei den Parlamentswahlen im Mai 2008 gewann die PDGE 99 Sitze, während auf die CPDS ein Sitz entfiel. In der Amtszeit Obiangs kam es zu mehreren Putschversuchen, zuletzt 2004 durch ausländische Söldner. Während Obiang weiterhin autokratisch regiert, hat sich die Menschenrechtssituation leicht gebessert.

Tina Hager / Agentur Focus

Äquatorial-Guinea gehört zu den bedeutenden Erdölexporteuren Afrikas. Die Förderung erfolgt offshore, Bohrinsel vor Malabo

Xinhua / Das Fotoarchiv

China zählte bislang zu den Hauptabnehmerländern. Teodoro Obiang (l.) mit dem chinesischen Staatspräsidenten Hu Jintao, 2006

Zwei Drittel der Landwirtschaft beruhen auf Subsistenzwirtschaft. Die Kakaoproduktion auf Bioko fiel 2005 auf 2000 Tonnen, beschäftigt jedoch die meisten einheimischen Arbeiter. Seit der Entdeckung von Offshore-Öl 1990 dominiert der Ölsektor die Wirtschaft, die seither hohe Wachstumsraten verzeichnet. Das Land ist Afrikas sechstgrößter Ölexporteur. Die Ölförderung stieg von 6000 Barrel täglich im Jahr 1996 auf 394 000 Barrel täglich im Jahr 2007. Gleichzeitig stieg der Anteil des Ölsektors am BIP von 18 Prozent 1995 auf 89 Prozent 2004. Das BIP pro Kopf nahm statistisch von 16 350 US-Dollar (2004) auf 32 195 US-Dollar (2008) zu (laut EIU März 2009). Tatsächlich blieb jedoch bisher die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung vom Ölreichtum ausgeschlossen. Profitiert haben dagegen die korrupten Machthaber und ihre Familien, die ihre Macht konsolidieren konnten. 1985 wurde das Land Mitglied der CFA-Zone. Seit 2006 ist China (29 Prozent) vor den USA (21 Prozent) der wichtigste Ölimporteur des Landes.

Annette Weber

Horn von Afrika und Ostafrika

Durch seine Nachbarschaft zu Arabien unterscheidet das Horn von Afrika sich kulturell von Ostafrika. Auch Staatlichkeit und Demokratie sind in beiden Regionen unterschiedlich ausgeprägt. Gemeinsam ist ihnen jedoch die Bedeutung ethnischer und religiöser Zugehörigkeit.

die bildstelle / REX FEATURES LTD.

Landschaftliche Gegensätze: karges Weideland in der heißen Afar-Senke, Dschibuti ...

Allein die unterschiedlichen Länderzuordnungen bei der Beschreibung der beiden Subregionen lassen erahnen, wie viele Überschneidungen es zwischen dem Horn von Afrika und Ostafrika gibt, aber auch, wie unterschiedlich einzelne Länder sich regional orientieren. In der Literatur werden zwei geographische Regionen genannt, wenn das Horn von Afrika beschrieben wird. Die klassische Horn-Region umschließt Eritrea, Äthiopien, Dschibuti und Somalia. Der erweiterte Horn-Begriff, der auch den Sudan und mitunter Kenia und Uganda einschließt, wird vorwiegend verwendet, um Konfliktverstrickungen zu beschreiben. Im erweiterten Horn leben circa 200 Millionen Menschen, davon allein mehr als neun Millionen als Flüchtlinge und Binnenvertriebene.

Auch die Definition der Subregion Ostafrika ist umstritten. Im vorliegenden Heft werden hierzu Kenia, Uganda und Tansania gezählt. Diese Region umfasst weitere 100 Millionen Menschen und stellt eine Art Pufferzone zwischen den Konfliktgebieten am Horn von Afrika und Zentralafrika, vor allem der Demokratischen Republik Kongo, dar.

Das Horn von Afrika ist durch eine jahrtausendealte kulturhistorische Entwicklung geprägt, die mit Äthiopien eines der ältesten Staatswesen für sich reklamiert. Seit der Antike profitierten die Länder am Horn von ihrer privilegierten geostrategischen Lage, die sie zum Zentrum der asiatisch-arabisch-afrikanischen Handelswege machte.

Die Meerenge zwischen Afrika und der arabischen Halbinsel, auch Bab el-Mandeb, „Tor der Wehklage" genannt, weil Sklaven auf ihr nach Arabien verschifft wurden, ist bei Dschibuti nur 26 Kilometer breit und trennt das Rote Meer vom Golf von Aden, der an der Ostküste Somalias in den Indischen Ozean übergeht. Durch die Eröffnung des Suezkanals 1869 erschlossen sich die Europäer die Seehandelsroute vor allem nach Indien, und das Horn wurde zum strategischen Nadelöhr. Überaus deutlich zeigt sich der arabische und asiatische Einfluss an der Inselbevölkerung Sansibars, Madagaskars und aller anderen, kleineren Inseln im Einzugsbereich der ostafrikanischen Region.

McPhoto / vario images

... touristisch genutzte Idylle im Mburo-Nationalpark, Uganda

Die Religionszugehörigkeit gewinnt zunehmend an politischem Gewicht, da sich sowohl am Horn als auch in Ostafrika Islam und Christentum bzw. traditionelle Religionen die Waage halten. Im Sudan und in Somalia bekennt sich die Mehrheit der Bevölkerung zum Islam. Äthiopien, Eritrea und Tansania verfügen zwar nicht mehr über christliche Mehrheiten, im Selbstverständnis ihrer politischen Eliten beansprucht das Christentum allerdings weiterhin die Vorherrschaft. In Ostafrika finden sich muslimische Siedlungsgebiete entlang der Küste, in Äthiopien und Eritrea sind die Hochebenen mehrheitlich von christlichen Ackerbauern besiedelt, die Tiefebenen vermehrt von Muslimen, die sowohl Land bestellen als auch Tiere halten.

AFP / Getty Images

Somalias Gesellschaft ist in Clans organisiert. Deren Oberhäupter suchten in Mogadischu 2007 vergeblich, den Bürgerkrieg zu beenden.

Fredrik Dahl / REUTERS

Auch innerhalb einzelner Staaten sind lebenserhaltende Ressourcen unterschiedlich verteilt. Wassermangel bei Wajir, im Nordosten Kenias ...

Peter Andrews / REUTERS

... Tee-Ernte in Kericho, dem größten Teeanbaugebiet Südwest-Kenias.

Gesellschaft

Am Horn lassen sich asiatische und arabische Einflüsse auch in der Bevölkerung feststellen. Obgleich die dortigen Länder Vielvölkerstaaten sind, die sich aus einer großen Anzahl von Ethnien und Clans zusammensetzen, verbindet die Länder des kleinen Horns jedoch eine kulturelle Ähnlichkeit, die sie vom angrenzenden Ostafrika – mit Ausnahme der Küstengebiete in Kenia und Tansania – unterscheidet.

Die Bevölkerung am Horn von Afrika lebt weiterhin größtenteils in dünner Besiedlung auf dem Land. Die Abwanderung in urbane Zentren hat sich allerdings rapide beschleunigt, wobei Neuankömmlinge in den meisten Fällen direkt in die Armutsspirale der Slums und Arbeitslosigkeit geraten. Zu den Binnenvertriebenen und Flüchtlingen, die als Folge von Kriegen und Konflikten ihre Dörfer verlassen mussten, gesellen sich die Arbeitsmigranten.

Die Region ist in weiten Teilen landwirtschaftlich nur begrenzt nutzbar, die Böden sind meist trocken, und die Flora ist oft karg. Die fortschreitende Ausbreitung der Sahara führt in vielen Gebieten des Sudan zu Streitigkeiten zwischen Ackerbauern und Viehzüchtern, die zunehmend um knappe Ressourcen wie Wasser und Weideland konkurrieren. Im westsudanesischen Darfur, wie auch in Somalia, in Nordost-Äthiopien oder im Ogaden, einer Provinz Äthiopiens, gibt es vorwiegend Tierhalter, die nomadisch oder jahreszeitenbedingt ihre Herden von Weideland zu Weideland führen und aufgrund des fragilen Ökosystems meist in kleinen, flexiblen Gemeinschaften zusammenleben.

Allen Ländern gemeinsam ist, dass sich ihre Bevölkerung stark mit ihrer jeweiligen Herkunftsgruppe, Ethnie oder ihrem Clan identifiziert. Familien- und Clanstrukturen bieten Sicherheit und die Grundlagen für eine Versorgung, die vom Staat nicht gewährleistet wird. Durch die Zerstörung der sozialen Netze in den Kriegen der Region werden diese Verlässlichkeiten allerdings immer brüchiger. Clan, Ethnie und Familie werden zunehmend missbraucht, um die Menschen für ethnische Milizen zu rekrutieren. Schon geringfügige Unterschiede zwischen Gruppen und Clans geben Anlass zu Angriffen und Vergeltungsschlägen, die sich bisweilen über Jahre hinziehen, oder – wie in Somalia – durch die Herrschaft der *Warlords* (Kriegsherren) institutionalisiert werden.

Politische Strukturen

Obgleich nicht alle Staaten am Horn ein einheitliches politisches System aufweisen, zeigen sich systemische Ähnlichkeiten. Anders als in Ostafrika hat am Horn kein Land den Schritt in die Demokratie vollzogen, wobei graduelle Unterschiede zwischen totalitären und autokratischen Regimen auszumachen sind. Die Machtzirkel am Horn sind zentralistisch organisiert, ihre Politik lässt die Belange der Peripherie häufig außer Acht. Somalia als staatenloses Gebilde bleibt in der Region die Ausnahme. Im Sudan sind seit der Unterzeichnung des Friedensabkommens mit der südsudanesischen Rebellenfraktion SPLA/M im kenianischen Naivasha 2005 zumindest formal die Voraussetzungen für eine demokratische Wahl gegeben. Selbst wenn die jüngsten Wahlen in Kenia 2008 zu gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen führten, gestaltet sich die politische Kultur in Ostafrika doch weitaus freier, repressions- und gewaltloser als am Horn. Die Staaten Ostafrikas werden teilweise ebenfalls von ehemaligen Rebellenführern regiert. Doch ist der Umgang mit politischer Opposition und Zivilgesellschaft in Ostafrika zur Selbstverständlichkeit geworden.

Konflikte

Geopolitisch seit dem Mittelalter von Interesse, war das Horn in der Zeit des Ost-West-Konflikts Schauplatz politischer und militärischer Stellvertreterkriege. Vorwiegend durch Staatspatronage und Militärhilfe, teilweise auch durch personelle Unterstützung, suchten die Supermächte USA und Sowjetunion in den 1970er Jahren ihre Hegemonialansprüche durchzusetzen. Wo zuvor koloniale Zugehörigkeiten auch politische Bindungen geknüpft hatten, mischten sich die Loyalitäten im Kalten Krieg neu.

Das Horn von Afrika ist die Region mit der weltweit größten Konfliktdichte. Nahezu jedes Land ist von einem Bürgerkrieg oder anderen innerstaatlichen Auseinandersetzungen betroffen. Mehrere Länder führen zwischenstaatliche Kriege, taten dies in der jüngsten Vergangenheit oder stehen kurz davor, wie Eritrea gegen Äthiopien und Tschad gegen Sudan. Zur Stabilisierung der eigenen Herrschaft unterstützen die Regime der Region die bewaffnete Opposition in den Nachbarländern. Teilweise, wie im Falle Äthiopiens in Somalia, intervenieren sie auch selbst.

Die Konflikte in Ostafrika sind anders geartet oder liegen schon länger zurück. Ausnahmen sind Uganda, das weiterhin in einen

Land *Hauptstadt*	*Fläche* *in km²*	*Bevölkerung* *2007*	*Bevölk.-wachstum* *2007, in Prozent*	*Religion* *in Prozent*	*BIP/Kopf* *PPP US-Dollar/ Rang 2006*	*HDI Rang* *2006*
Äthiopien *Addis Abeba*	*1.104.300*	*79,09 Mio.*	*2,5*	*Christen: ca. 50* *Muslime: ca. 45* *Naturreligionen: ca. 3*	*700 / 169*	*169*
Dschibuti *Dschibuti*	*23.200*	*830.000*	*1,8*	*Muslime: 94* *Christen: 6*	*1.965 / 135*	*151*
Eritrea *Asmara*	*117.600*	*4,84 Mio.*	*3,1*	*Christen: ca. 50* *Muslime: 50* *(lt. Regierungsangaben)*	*519 / 174*	*164*
Kenia *Nairobi*	*580.400*	*37,53 Mio.*	*2,6*	*Christen: ca. 70* *Muslime: 20* *Naturreligionen: 10* *übrige: Hindus, Jains, Sikhs*	*1.436 / 149*	*144*
Komoren *Moroni*	*1.900*	*630.000*	*2,0*	*Muslime: 95*	*1.152 / 154*	*137*
Seychellen *Victoria auf der Hauptinsel Mahé*	*500*	*90.000*	*0,5*	*Christen: 88,7* *Hindus: 2,1* *Muslime: 1,1* *Adventisten, Bahai (gesamt): 2*	*15.105 / 49*	*54*
Somalia *Mogadischu*	*637.700*	*8,7 Mio.*	*2,9*	*Muslime: ca. 99* *Christen: ca. 0,1*	*k. A.*	*k. A.*
Sudan *Khartum*	*2.505.800*	*38,56 Mio.*	*2,2*	*Muslime: ca. 65* *Animisten: ca. 25* *Christen: ca. 10*	*1.887 / 138*	*146*
Tansania *Dodoma*	*947.300*	*40,43 Mio.*	*2,4*	*Christen: ca. 40* *Muslime: ca. 30* *sonstige: ca. 30* *(Sansibar ca. 95 Muslime)*	*1.126 / 156*	*152*
Uganda *Kampala*	*241.000*	*30,93 Mio.*	*3,4*	*Christen: ca. 80* *Muslime: ca. 10*	*888 / 162*	*156*

Spalten 2-4: Weltbank; Spalte 5: Auswärtiges Amt (Zeitpunkt der Abfrage: April 2009); Spalten 6 und 7: UNDP

innerstaatlichen Konflikt mit der paramilitärischen „Widerstandsbewegung des Herrn" (*Lord's Resistance Army,* LRA) verstrickt ist, und Kenia, wo nach den Wahlen ebenfalls tausende Menschen den gewalttätigen Auseinandersetzungen zwischen den Anhängern der beiden rivalisierenden Parteien zum Opfer fielen.

Seit den Anschlägen der islamistischen Al-Qaida auf die amerikanischen Botschaften in Nairobi und Daressalam 1998 und den Attentaten auf israelische Touristen 2002 in Kenia polarisieren der Terrorismus und die Frage, ob und wie man ihn bekämpft, die Region. Auf der einen Seite haben die Regierungen am Horn und in Ostafrika nahezu alle Allianzen zur Terrorbekämpfung mit den USA geschlossen. Auf der anderen Seite rekrutieren gerade islamistische, nichtstaatliche Gewaltakteure immer mehr junge Männer aus der Region für ihre Milizen. Die Region bindet die größten Friedensmissionen der Vereinten Nationen und der Afrikanischen Union. Paradoxerweise dienen in den Missionen zumeist Soldaten aus Ostafrika, die dann am Horn von Afrika eingesetzt werden.

Öl und Ressourcen

Im erweiterten Horn von Afrika (einschließlich des Sudan) herrscht eine ungleiche Verteilung von Ressourcen. Einerseits mangelt es an Rohstoffen, Weideflächen und Wasser, was immer wieder innerregionale Konflikte anheizt. Zum anderen können vorhandene Ressourcen zum Fluch werden, wenn kleptokratische Eliten sich an ihnen bereichern, ohne die breite Bevölkerung daran zu beteiligen, wie es beispielsweise im Sudan der Fall ist.

In Ostafrika stellen weder Ressourcenknappheit noch große Öl- oder Gasvorkommen ein Dilemma dar. Ostafrika exportiert vorwiegend landwirtschaftliche Produkte wie Kaffee und Tee. Am Horn sind vor allem die Viehexporte in die arabische Welt eine wichtige Einnahmequelle. In der gesamten Region profitieren vor allem die Länder mit Zugang zum Meer von ihren Häfen, die für die Versorgung des Inlands maßgeblich sind.

Obgleich Äthiopien über genügend Land und ausreichend Wasser verfügt, ist es nicht in der Lage, die eigene Bevölkerung zu versorgen. Ähnlich ist die Situation in Eritrea. Somalia und Dschibuti haben noch weniger fruchtbare Böden und müssen ihre Einnahmen vorwiegend mit Handel erzielen. Da die Landwirtschaft niederschlagsabhängig ist, bleibt die Ernährungssicherheit für den Großteil der Bevölkerung gefährdet.

In den Grenzregionen – vor allem zwischen dem Horn und Ostafrika – kommt es häufig zu Viehdiebstahl, Waffenschmuggel und illegalem Handel. Keine Seite ist willens oder in der Lage, die Grenzen effektiver zu sichern.

Sudan

Annette Weber

Sudan, das flächenmäßig größte Land Afrikas, ist weniger ein Beispiel für einen gescheiterten Staat als vielmehr ein Beispiel für eine gescheiterte Nationenbildung. Wie unterschiedlich sich die 40 Millionen Sudanesen mit ihrem Staat identifizieren, zeigt die Geschichte des Nationalhelden, Muhammad Ahmed al Mahdi (1844 bis 1885), der ab 1881 Symbolfigur und Anführer einer zeitweilig erfolgreichen Erhebung gegen ägyptische und britische Machtansprüche war. Im Norden gilt er als Befreier von der britischen Kolonialherrschaft, im Südsudan ist er ein Symbol für Unterdrückung und Sklaverei. Unter den 20 verschiedenen ethnischen Hauptgruppen werden 39 Prozent als arabisch und 53 Prozent als schwarzafrikanisch bezeichnet. 70 Prozent der Bevölkerung gehören dem sunnitischen Islam an, die verbleibenden 30 Prozent sind Anhänger traditioneller Religionen und zu einem geringeren Teil Christen.

Wie sehr die einzelnen Landesteile trotz ihrer Unterschiede dennoch auf einander angewiesen sind, zeigt sich am Öl, das zwar weitestgehend im Süden gefördert, aber über eine Pipeline im Norden verkauft wird. Welche Entwicklung das Land nehmen wird, entscheidet sich bei den nun auf 2010 verschobenen Wahlen und dem 2011 vorgesehenen Referendum über die Frage der Unabhängigkeit im Südsudan. Ob der Sudan vereint bleibt oder in zwei oder mehrere Teile zerbricht, wird auch der weitere Verlauf der Konflikte in Darfur und anderen Landesteilen zeigen, die zum Teil vom Wunsch nach Unabhängigkeit und Separation begleitet sind.

Vorkolonial gab es im Sudan verschiedene Königreiche und Sultanate, die neben autochthonen Gemeinschaften existierten. Der nördliche Teil des Sudan, der im Norden an Ägypten und im Westen an den Sahel grenzt, wurde islamisch. Mit der Kolonialisierung – hauptsächlich durch Großbritannien betrieben – begann die Aufteilung des Landes in einen Nord- und einen Südteil. Während der vorwiegend muslimische Nordsudan von der Kolonialregierung mit administrativen Aufgaben betraut und durch eine entsprechende Ausbildung seiner Funktionsträger auf die Übernahme staatlicher Verwaltung vorbereitet wurde, galt für den Südsudan das *closed district rule* (Geschlossenes Gebiet): Die britische Kolonialregierung erklärte den Südsudan zum Sperrgebiet, um zu verhindern, dass sich die islamische Missionierung nach Süden ausbreitete. Nur ein kleines Kontingent christlicher Missionare erhielt Zugang.

Diese Entwicklung hatte fatale Folgen. Der Süden blieb infrastrukturell zurück; Bildung, Krankenversorgung, aber auch Sicherheit wurden von der Kolonialregierung nur sehr rudimentär gewährleistet und weitestgehend in den Händen der Missionare belassen. Die daraus erwachsende Ungleichheit, die sich am augenfälligsten im Gegensatz zwischen dem Verwaltungszentrum Khartum und dem Süden zeigte, führte schon ein Jahr vor der Unabhängigkeit, 1956, zur Bildung der ersten bewaffneten südsudanesischen Bewegung namens *Anya Nya*, die sich gegen die Machthaber in Khartum erhob.

Damit begannen die bewaffneten Konflikte im Sudan, die mit einer kurzen Unterbrechung zwischen 1972 und 1984 bis heute andauern. Da vor allem die Bevölkerung des Südens seit der Unabhängigkeit nahezu immer im Krieg gelebt hat, blieben Stabilität, Entwicklung, Bildung und die Verbesserung der Infrastruktur auf der Strecke. Das Gefälle zwischen Norden und Süden hat sich seit den 1950er Jahren weiter vergrößert.

AIPIX / GEO

Der Ressourcenreichtum Sudans fließt bevorzugt nach Khartum. Im Geschäftszentrum der Hauptstadt verbinden sich Tradition und Moderne.

Dies bot auch den Anlass für das Wiederaufflammen des Bürgerkriegs im Südsudan 1984. Dort gründete sich die Sudanesische Volksbefreiungsarmee SPLA/M *(Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement)* und trat in militärische Auseinandersetzungen mit dem Regime in Khartum ein.

In Khartum kam seit der Unabhängigkeit nahezu jede Regierung durch einen Putsch an die Macht. Die Vorherrschaft des Militärischen prägt seitdem die politische Kultur, im Norden wie im Süden. Kontrolle über die Bevölkerung und die Absicherung des jeweilig herrschenden Regimes sind die vorrangigen Interessen der Politik und lassen wenig Spielraum für demokratische Opposition oder zivilgesellschaftliche Beteiligung. Im Gegenteil – nachdem sich die derzeitige Regierung unter General Omar al-Baschir 1989 als Bündnis von Islamisten und Militärs an die Macht geputscht hatte, waren die 1990er Jahre im Sudan von massiven Repressionen, Verhaftungen und Folter der politischen Oppositionellen bestimmt. Hassan al Turabi, der jahrzehntelang politisch einflussreiche Führer der Nationalen Islamischen Front (NIF), förderte auch die internationale Vernetzung islamistischer Gruppierungen. Mit der Verfassung von 1998 wurde der Sudan zur Islamischen Republik. Die Scharia, die islamische Rechtsprechung, war bereits seit 1983 für das gesamte Staatsgebiet verbindlich.

Nach den islamistischen Anschlägen auf die USA am 11. September 2001 stieg der internationale Druck auf die Regierung in Khartum, sich am Kampf gegen den Terrorismus zu beteiligen. Den entscheidenderen Wendepunkt in der ideologischen Ausrichtung des Regimes hatte zuvor jedoch der Beginn der Ölförderung 1999 bedeutet. Um langfristig Investoren an sich zu binden, verständigte sich die Regierung auf eine Politik der Mäßigung nach außen. Da die meisten Ölvorkommen auf südlichem Territorium lagen, trat sie gleichzeitig in Verhandlungen mit der dortigen Rebellenbewegung, um Frieden zu schließen und damit eine reibungslose Ölförderung zu gewährleisten.

2005 kam es unter diesen Maßgaben und verstärkt durch internationalen Druck zum Friedensvertrag mit der Rebellenorganisation SPLA/M. Diese übernahm nach dem Friedensschluss die Regierung im Südsudan, wo auch sie aufgrund ihrer Prägung einen eher militärischen, weitgehend undemokratischen Führungsstil praktiziert. Gleichzeitig wurde sie zum Juniorpart-

Jörg Boethling/agenda

Der Südsudan wird wirtschaftlich vernachlässigt. Kochstelle in einem Dorf der Dinka, der größten Bevölkerungsgruppe Südsudans

ner der Regierung der Nationalen Einheit (GoNU, *Government of National Unity*) in Khartum. Im Zuge des Friedensabkommens verlor die Scharia im christlichen Süden ihre Geltung, und es wurden freie allgemeine Wahlen für 2009 versprochen.

Die Ausbeutung der Ölvorkommen war damit weiter abgesichert. Derzeit stammen zwei Drittel der Regierungseinkünfte aus Ölverkäufen, die im Jahr 2008 13,9 Milliarden US-Dollar betrugen. Die Erlöse flossen auch in Militärausgaben, die sich von 2003 bis 2006 verdreifachten und 2006 bei 1,65 Milliarden US-Dollar lagen, während die breite Bevölkerung in den sudanesischen Randregionen und speziell im Süden vom neuen Ölreichtum kaum profitieren konnte.

Gleiches gilt für die Bevölkerung im Ostsudan, deren Lebenssituation sich durch einen 2006 geschlossenen Friedensvertrag zwischen der Regierung und bewaffneten Aufständischen nicht wesentlich verbesserte.

Der immer wieder aufflammende Unmut der Bevölkerung über die Zentralregierung in Khartum erwächst aus ihrer fortdauernden Vernachlässigung und entzündet sich an dem Machtmonopol, das die Regierung und eine kleine, ihr verbundene Elite unverändert fest in den Händen halten.

Ein weiterer Konfliktfaktor ist die sich verschärfende Ressourcenknappheit. Durch zunehmende Desertifikation weiter Teile des Nordsudans schwinden wichtige Weideflächen, die für das Überleben von nomadischen Tierhaltern und sesshaften Ackerbauern notwendig sind.

Dies führt zu Verteilungskämpfen der betroffenen Gruppen untereinander. Bislang hat die Regierung in Khartum nicht mit Konfliktlösungsstrategien, etwa einem verbesserten Wassermanagement, reagiert. Vielmehr verfährt sie nach dem Prinzip „Teile und Herrsche“ und hofft, durch die Unterstützung einer der Gruppierungen die Konflikte zu entscheiden. Dies führte bislang dazu, dass mehr bewaffnete Gruppen entstanden und die lokalen Auseinandersetzungen eskalierten.

Aus Vernachlässigung und Ressourcenknappheit erwuchs der Bürgerkrieg in Darfur. Jem-Rebellen stellen eine der beteiligten Kriegsgruppierungen.

Pueschner/Zeitenspiegel/VISUM

Vor allem in Darfur zeigt sich der problematische Umgang der Regierung mit internen Konflikten. Im April 2003 wurden dort militärische Einrichtungen der Regierung angegriffen. Zwei Rebellenbewegungen, die Sudanesische Befreiungsarmee (*Sudan Liberation Army,* SLA) und die „Gerechtigkeits- und Gleichheitsbewegung“ (*Justice and Equality Movement,* JEM) wollten so gegen die eklatante Vernachlässigung Darfurs protestieren. Heute sind in Darfur mehr als 20 bewaffnete Gruppierungen aktiv, mehrere Initiativen für Friedensverhandlungen sind gescheitert. Die bislang größte Friedensmission, die sich aus Truppen der Afrikanischen Union und der Vereinten Nationen zusammensetzt (UNAMID), wurde zum Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung entsandt, von der mehr als 2,5 Millionen in Nachbarländer flohen oder als Binnenflüchtlinge in Camps ihr Leben fristen. Die Fragmentierung der Konfliktparteien hat dazu geführt, dass sich die Konflikte von den Randgebieten in die benachbarten Länder ausbreiten. Die direkte Unterstützung der Regierung für die bewaffneten arabischen *Janjaweed*-Milizen, aber auch die direkten Angriffe der sudanesischen Regierungsarmee auf zivile Ziele in Darfur haben den Internationalen Strafgerichtshof (ICC) am 4. März 2009 veranlasst, einen Haftbefehl gegen den amtierenden Präsidenten Omar al Baschir auszustellen.

In diese Situation fallen die allgemeinen Wahlen, die für 2010 vorgesehen sind, aber nur partiell durchgeführt werden können, solange in Darfur noch Krieg herrscht. Parteien, die in den letzten Jahrzehnten verboten waren, versuchen sich ihre Anhängerschaft zu sichern. Zur Wahl stellen sich neben der Regierungspartei Nationale Kongresspartei (NCP) die Partei der Südsudanesischen Volksbefreiungsbewegung SPLM und die etablierten Parteien, die sich auf Muslimbruderschaften (*Ansar* und *Khatmiya*) stützen, die *Umma* und die *Democratic Union Party.*

Nachdem sich der Sudan in den 1990er Jahren vorwiegend mit Staaten in der arabischen Welt, den Golfstaaten und Iran verbündet hatte und die direkten Nachbarn Eritrea und Äthiopien auf Seiten der südsudanesischen Rebellen gestanden hatten, hat sich die Außenpolitik seit der Ölförderung und dem 11. September 2001 deutlich verändert. Außenhandelsbeziehungen

sind nun vorwiegend auf China, Japan, Indien und Malaysia ausgerichtet – außenpolitische Anknüpfungen werden zunehmend auch mit westlichen Staaten gesucht. Durch den Konflikt in Darfur und den Haftbefehl gegen al-Baschir ist die Annäherung an die USA inzwischen wieder erschwert. Washington führt den Sudan weiterhin auf seiner Liste der Terrorismus unterstützenden Staaten. In der Frage des Umgangs mit Nord- und Südsudan positioniert sich die internationale Staatengemeinschaft unterschiedlich. Die südlichen Anrainerstaaten Uganda und Kenia sind eng mit der SPLM und damit der Regierung Südsudans verbunden, auch Äthiopien und Südafrika sowie westliche Staaten unterstützten die Regierung in der südsudanesischen Hauptstadt Juba. Nachbarstaaten wie der Tschad spielen in der Außenpolitik des Nordsudan eine große Rolle; derzeit werden Rebellengruppen aus Darfur direkt vom tschadischen Präsidenten Déby unterstützt. Im Gegenzug hilft die Regierung in Khartum tschadische Rebellengruppen. Die Liga der Arabischen Staaten ist ebenso wie die Afrikanische Union vornehmlich seit dem Antrag auf Haftbefehl gegen Präsident al-Baschir im Sudan 2008 aktiv geworden und wirbt für innersudanesische Lösungen. Die Afrikanische Union hatte schon kurz nach Ausbruch des Konfliktes in Darfur eine Friedensmission dorthin entsandt.

Seit der Ausstellung des Haftbefehls gegen Präsident al-Baschir hat sich die Lage in Darfur verschlechtert. Unter dem Vorwurf mit dem Internationalen Strafgerichtshof kooperiert zu haben, wurden 13 Hilfsorganisationen aus Darfur ausgewiesen.

Alltag in Darfur

[...] Die Leute nennen sie Janjaweed – die „Geisterreiter". [...] Die Janjaweed plündern, vergewaltigen und morden. Und keiner stoppt sie. Für die Welt sind diese Reiter zum Symbol des Terrors in Darfur geworden: Teufel auf dem Pferde, die Frauen und Kinder vor sich hertreiben. [...] Es gibt noch andere zerstörerische Kräfte [...] Rebellengruppen, die Freiheit predigen, aber jeden Dialog verweigern. Mit ihren Beutezügen machen sie die Straßen unsicher [...].

Das Lager Kassab mit mehr als 30 000 Vertriebenen liegt am Rande der Stadt Kutum. [...] Schon immer hat Kutum Händler von weit her angezogen. So ist es auch jetzt, mitten im Krieg.

Montag ist Markttag, die Stadt füllt sich mit Menschen, meist reiten sie auf Eseln heran. Viele Flüchtlinge sind darunter, die es trotz der Gefahren noch wagen, auf ihre Felder zu gehen und etwas anzubauen. Jetzt verkaufen sie hier ihre Ernte, Zwiebeln oder Karotten. Aber wer durch die Reihen auf dem Markt geht, spürt die Spannung [...]. Die Menschen sprechen kaum, sie kauern reglos am Boden. Jeder ist froh, wenn er hier nach seinen Geschäften wieder fortkommt. Denn wohin man auch blickt – überall kurven schwer bewaffnete Milizionäre in ihren Jeeps herum.

[...] Die Milizen machen den Vertriebenen Angst. Aber was sollen die Leute machen? Nur hier können sie ihre Waren tauschen, wie sie es immer getan haben.

Wer erfahren will, wie es war in alten Zeiten in Darfur, der kann Malik Adam Muhammed Nur in Kutum aufsuchen [...]. Er ist eines der traditionellen Oberhäupter dieser Gegend [...]. Vor 52 Jahren erbte er sein Amt von seinem Vater, auch heute noch sei er ein geachteter Mann, sagt er. Aber sein Einfluss ist geschwunden, der Krieg hat die alten Gesetze ausgehebelt. Auch früher habe es Konflikte zwischen Nomaden und Bauern gegeben, erzählt er. Wenn Tiere die Ernte fraßen oder Ziegen gestohlen wurden, dann gab es ein Schlichtungsverfahren. [...] Hirten und Bauern profitierten oft voneinander, Fleisch und Milch wurden getauscht gegen Gemüse und Hirse.

Doch viele Faktoren haben das Verhältnis allmählich vergiftet. Die Wüste ist in Darfur weiter vorangerückt, die Bevölkerung ist gewachsen, der Kampf um Wasser und Land verschärfte sich. Für die Nomaden wurde es nun immer schwieriger, ihre Herden durchzubringen. Viele verarmten. Ethnische Spannungen zwischen arabischen Nomaden und nichtarabischen Gruppen wie den Fur und den Zaghawa nahmen zu, schon in den achtziger und neunziger Jahren gab es blutige Zusammenstöße. So baute sich der Konflikt auf. Als dann die Darfur-Rebellen zu den Waffen griffen und Khartum herausforderten, suchte die Regierung nach Verbündeten, um den Aufstand niederzuschlagen. Jetzt sahen viele Nomaden ihre Chance. Mit der Waffe in der Hand konnten sie wieder reich werden. Nach fünf Jahren Krieg haben sie vielerorts das Land der Bauern besetzt, und man muss nicht weit hinausfahren aus Kutum, um sich davon einen Eindruck zu verschaffen. [...]

Immer wieder reiten an diesem Tag bewaffnete Nomaden auf Kamelen vorbei. Rebellen lassen sich hier nicht offen blicken. Dennoch kann man sie später noch treffen. Im Schatten einer Akazie, nicht weit von Kutum, ist nach langer Suche Major Abdulahdi Ahmed zu finden. Er gehört zu einer Rebellengruppe, die sich „SLA Free Will" nennt. [...] Abdulahdi ist von Beruf Lehrer. Er ist oft in Khartum gewesen und hat es irgendwann nicht mehr ertragen, all den Reichtum, die schönen Schulen und Krankenhäuser in der Hauptstadt zu sehen. „Khartum hat alles, Darfur hat nichts." Die Kinder hier gingen in Ruinen zur Schule, sagt er, Krankenhäuser gebe es kaum. „Die Regierung hat nichts gegeben, um diese Gegend zu entwickeln." Gespräche darüber seien gescheitert, also hätten die Darfuris zu den Waffen gegriffen, weil das die einzige Sprache sei, die Khartum verstehe. [...] Doch bislang hat der Krieg nur Leid gebracht. Niemand kann diesen Konflikt militärisch gewinnen. [...]

Arne Perras, „Jeden Tag ein neuer Feind", in: Süddeutsche Zeitung vom 20./21. Dezember 2008

Der Krieg in Darfur treibt die Zivilbevölkerung zu Tausenden in die Flüchtlingslager. Notdürftige Behausung im Lager Ardamata in West-Darfur

Hartmut Schwarzbach / argus

Äthiopien

Annette Weber

Äthiopien mit seiner jahrtausendalten Geschichte wurde als einziges Land auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent nie von externen Mächten kolonialisiert. Vielmehr verstand es sich selbst als Großmacht, die sich aus verschiedenen Feudalreichen zusammensetzte. Mit der Einsetzung von Ras Tafari Mekkonen 1916, der vierzehn Jahre später als Kaiser Haile Selassi den Thron bestieg, trat das Staatswesen Äthiopiens in die Moderne ein.

In der Demokratischen Bundesrepublik Äthiopien leben heute circa 80 Millionen Menschen, die neben mehreren kleinen ethnischen Gruppierungen zwei große aufweisen, die Oromos und Amharas, die nach Schätzungen jeweils über 30 Prozent der Bevölkerung stellen.

Stefan Auth / mauritius images / imagebroker

Die Kathedralen der heiligen Stadt Aksum im Norden Äthiopiens, in der nach der Legende die israelitische Bundeslade aufbewahrt wird, sind bedeutende Pilgerstätten der äthiopisch-orthodoxen Christen – im Bild die alte Kathedrale

Geschichte

Äthiopiens Geschichte wurde wesentlich von seiner Brückenstellung zwischen dem afrikanischen Kontinent und der arabischen Halbinsel bestimmt. Die Schifffahrtsverbindungen am Golf von Aden galten schon seit dem Mittelalter und verstärkt nach Eröffnung des Suezkanals 1869 als die wichtigsten Handelswege zwischen Europa und Asien.

Knochenfunde, die auf 3,2 Millionen Jahre zurückdatiert wurden, weisen Äthiopien als „Wiege der Menschheit" aus. Griechische Aufzeichnungen aus dem 5. Jahrhundert v. Chr. stellen es als nahezu mystisches Reich dar. Im 4. Jahrhundert n. Chr. kam die christliche Religion durch Missionare aus Syrien und Ägypten nach Äthiopien, im 7. Jahrhundert erwarb es die Wertschätzung des islamischen Religionsstifters Mohammed, weil es seinen Anhängern Zuflucht gewährt hatte. Heute halten sich die christliche und die muslimische Religion in Äthiopien anteilsmäßig annähernd die Waage. Allerdings prägten konfessionelle Konflikte die Geschichte des Landes bis ins 20. Jahrhundert, und auch heute ist die Religionszugehörigkeit bedeutsam für die Vergabe politischer Führungspositionen. Die christlich-orthodoxe Bevölkerung des fruchtbaren Hochlandes übte bislang durchgehend die Herrschaft im Land aus, während die muslimischen Bevölkerungsgruppen im Tiefland darüber zunehmend unzufrieden sind.

Haile Selassie, der Sohn eines christlich-orthodoxen Provinzgouverneurs, wurde 1930 zum Kaiser Äthiopiens gekrönt und herrschte, unterbrochen nur durch ein kurzes Exil, bis ihn 1974 ein Militärputsch aus dem Amt hob. Die Militärjunta, Derg genannt, unterwarf das Land einer kommunistischen Umerziehung. Der monarchistische Zentralismus, der Äthiopien jahrhundertelang geprägt hatte, wurde durch ein militarisiertes, totalitäres Regime ersetzt. Mengistu Haile Mariam, seit 1977 neuer Militärherrscher Äthiopiens, sorgte dafür, dass die politische Opposition ebenso wie die Royalisten ausgeschaltet wurden.

Im Kalten Krieg zwischen den USA und der Sowjetunion engagierte sich Äthiopien 1977 in einem Stellvertreterkrieg mit Somalia um die äthiopische Provinz Ogaden, die mehrheitlich von ethnischen Somalis bewohnt wurde. Dazu wechselten beide Seiten die Verbündeten. Äthiopien löste sich von den USA, die wegen seiner politischen Neuorientierung und seiner Menschenrechtsverletzungen auf Distanz gegangen waren, während die Sowjetunion Somalia fallen ließ, dessen Präsidenten Siad Barre sie bislang unterstützt hatte. Nun kamen Mengistu im Kampf um Ogaden Soldaten und Ausrüstung der Sowjetunion und Kubas zur Hilfe. Die somalische Armee wurde 1978 geschlagen.

Nachdem verschiedene, meist ethnisch rekrutierte Rebellengruppierungen jahrzehntelang gegen das Derg-Regime gekämpft hatten, wurde Mengistu Haile Mariam 1991 gestürzt. Der Anführer einer ethnischen Minderheitenbewegung, der TPLF *(Tigray People's Liberation Front)*, Meles Zenawi, wurde zum Premierminister Äthiopiens ernannt.

Innenpolitische Herausforderungen

Schon seit der Regierungszeit Kaiser Haile Selassies herrscht eine Diskrepanz zwischen der unsicheren innenpolitischen Situation und dem guten internationalen Ansehen des Landes. Dabei spielen die Interessen externer Akteure ebenso eine Rolle wie die Erkenntnis, dass die Stabilität am Horn von Afrika ohne Äthiopien nicht haltbar ist.

In den Augen internationaler Akteure ist Äthiopien ein wichtiger Partner bei der Bekämpfung des Terrorismus und bei der Intervention in Somalia zur Abwehr einer vermeintlich islamistischen Regierung. Aber auch die geostrategisch wichtige Lage nahe an den ölreichen Golfstaaten führt dazu, dass innenpolitische Verfehlungen von außen kaum kritisiert werden. Dies gilt vor allem für die massiven Menschenrechtsverletzungen, die im Zusammenhang mit den Wahlen 2005 und den Strafexpeditionen gegen die Bevölkerung im Ogaden von der äthiopischen Regierung verübt wurden.

Dabei waren es zumeist innenpolitische Probleme, die die Regime in Äthiopien zu Fall brachten. Kaiser Haile Selassie, der im Ausland als Vorzeigemodernisierer galt, regierte sein Land

noch in den 1960er und 1970er Jahren als absoluter Monarch, der der Bevölkerung keine Mitbestimmung zugestand. Auch die Konzentration der herrschenden Elite auf das Zentrum und die klientelistische Umverteilung der Ressourcen führten zu Unmut. Die Vorherrschaft der Volksgruppe der Amharen unter Kaiser Haile Selassie wurde ebenso kritisiert wie heute die Dominanz der Tigray unter Premierminister Meles Zenawi. Das Derg-Regime stürzte, als die Sowjetunion zerbrach und dem Land die Unterstützung versagte.

Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts erlebte Äthiopien jedoch eine demokratische Öffnung. Der Wahlkampf 2005 weckte Hoffnungen auf freie und demokratische Wahlen, die am Wahltag auch zu einem Sieg der Opposition in der Hauptstadt Addis Abeba führten. Das Ergebnis wurde von der Regierung nicht akzeptiert, Proteste folgten und wurden gewaltsam niedergeschlagen, und eine große Zahl von Oppositionellen wurde verhaftet. Drei Jahre später erließ die Regierung eine Amnestie. Bislang ist es der Opposition allerdings nicht gelungen, sich neu zu formieren und politisch aktiv zu werden.

Äthiopien ist weiterhin eines der ärmsten Länder der Erde. Obgleich Land und auch Wasser des blauen Nils ausreichend vorhanden sind, entstehen aus den klimabedingten Ernteausfällen aufgrund geringer Regenmengen immer wieder Hungerkatastrophen, die auch auf den Mangel an Bewässerungsprojekten zurückzuführen sind.

Das Ungleichgewicht zwischen militärischem Primat und der Vernachlässigung von Wohlfahrtsaufgaben ist ein Langzeitproblem Äthiopiens.

Außenpolitische Spannungsfelder

Der traditionelle Anspruch Äthiopiens, am Horn eine Großmachtrolle zu spielen, hat seit jeher zu Konflikten mit den Nachbarn geführt. Das gilt vor allem für das Verhältnis zu Eritrea, das Äthiopien trotz zwischenzeitlicher italienischer Kolonisierung (1889 bis 1941) stets als äthiopische Provinz begriff. Nach einem langen Krieg gegen Äthiopien, der in den 1960er Jahren seinen Ausgang nahm, erlangte Eritrea 1993 die Unabhängigkeit. Danach arbeiteten die beiden Staaten zunächst eng zusammen, führten eine gemeinsame Währung ein und öffneten die Grenzen sowohl für die Bevölkerung als auch für den Handel. Doch nach einem Grenzzwischenfall fanden sich beide Seiten 1998 in einem erneuten Krieg wieder. Zwei Jahre später und nach 70 - 80 000 Todesopfern auf beiden Seiten unterzeichneten die verfeindeten Regierungen ein Friedensabkommen. Die Stimmung zwischen den beiden Ländern ist seitdem angespannt. Eritrea versucht mit allen Mitteln, Äthiopien militärisch aufzureiben und zu schwächen, um einem möglichen Angriff Äthiopiens vorzubeugen.

Der zweite außenpolitische Konflikt besteht mit dem Nachbarland Somalia. Im Dezember 2006 drang die äthiopische Armee in Somalia ein, um die international anerkannte somalische Übergangsregierung im Kampf gegen aufständische Clanmilizen und jihadistische *Shabab*, deren Ziel die Installierung einer islamistischen Führung in Somalia ist, zu unterstützen. Die Intervention, vor allem aber der lange und kostenintensive Verbleib der äthiopischen Streitkräfte in Somalia, sorgten in Addis Abeba für politischen Zündstoff.

Die Befürchtung der äthiopischen Regierung, sich in Somalia einem islamistischen Regime gegenüber zu sehen, ist sicherlich nicht unberechtigt. Seitdem die Regierung im Sudan in den 1990er Jahren islamistische Gruppierungen in der Region unterstützte, die auch gegen Äthiopien vorgingen, werden islamistische und jihadistische Bewegungen aus den Nachbarländern und aus Saudi-Arabien mit Besorgnis registriert. Im Januar 2009 zogen sich die letzten äthiopischen Truppen aus der somalischen Hauptstadt Mogadischu zurück. Die Friedenssicherung soll die UN-Friedenstruppe AMISOM übernehmen, die seit Anfang 2007 in Mogadischu stationiert ist.

Ägypten, das nach der osmanischen Kolonialisierung des Sudan zeitweise gemeinsam mit Großbritannien die Kolonialmacht im Sudan ausübte, war und ist an der ungebrochenen hegemonialen Vormachtstellung in der Region interessiert – nicht nur wegen des lebensnotwendigen Nilwassers, das aus Äthiopien (und Uganda) kommt und durch den Sudan fließt. Heute ist es neben der Wasserversorgung der „Kampf gegen den Terrorismus", der Ägypten mit Äthiopien verbindet.

Äthiopien ist zwar der engste Verbündete der US-Regierung im Krieg gegen den Terrorismus, als Lieferländer für Handelswaren fallen westliche Staaten jedoch weit hinter Saudi-Arabien (15,2 Prozent 2006/07) und China (17 Prozent) zurück. Exporte aus Äthiopien gehen nach China, dicht gefolgt von Deutschland, Japan und den USA. Noch sind die Rohstoffe in Äthiopien nicht erschlossen, aber chinesische und malaysische Ölfirmen sind vor Ort aktiv.

Obgleich Äthiopien militärisch stärker als seine direkten Nachbarn ist, wird es langfristig nicht durch eine Position der Stärke, sondern eher durch einen Ansatz zu guter Nachbarschaft in der Region zur Stabilisierung beitragen können.

Archaische Landwirtschaft: Geringe Niederschläge und mangelnde Bewässerungssysteme erschweren die Bodenbearbeitung in Äthiopien.

Friedrich Stark

Militärische Stärke: Panzer der äthiopischen Invasionstruppen in der somalischen Hauptstadt Mogadischu Anfang 2007

Michael Kamber / The NewYorkTimes / Redux / laif

Die Somalias

Annette Weber

Schon der Blick auf die wirtschaftlichen Indikatoren macht deutlich, dass etwas außer Kontrolle geraten ist in Somalia. Das Land hat im afrikanischen Vergleich ein sehr niedriges Pro-Kopf-Einkommen, bei den Lebenshaltungskosten und Preisen für Konsumgüter hingegen liegt Somalia an der Spitze. Seit dem Zerfall seiner staatlichen Strukturen 1991 gibt es weder staatliche Sicherheitsorgane noch eine Gerichtsbarkeit, keine politisch legitimierten Volksvertreter oder offizielle Handelsbeziehungen. Alles, was in Somalia geschieht, wird über private Initiative geregelt. Obgleich Somalia ethnisch und religiös fast homogen ist – mehr als 98 Prozent sind Muslime und knapp 89 Prozent ethnische Somali – verhindern persönliche Machtinteressen, aber auch eine stark segmentierte Clankonstellation eine friedliche Koexistenz. Eine ehemals stärkere Zivilgesellschaft konnte sich gegen die gewaltbereiten Akteure auf Dauer nicht durchsetzen.

Somalia galt einst als Herrschaftsgebiet muslimischer Sultanate, die in Auseinandersetzungen mit der vornehmlich christlich-orthodoxen Großmacht Äthiopien verwickelt waren. Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts begann Italien die Region zu besetzen; in der Folge wurden Teile Somalias abgespalten. Das heutige Somaliland wurde britisch kolonialisiert, Somalia und Puntland fielen unter italienische Kolonialherrschaft. Aus dem Zusammenschluss der beiden Kolonialgebiete entstand Somalia, das 1960 unabhängig wurde. 1969 kam Siad Barre durch einen Militärputsch an die Macht.

Der Niedergang des Landes nahm seinen Ausgangspunkt im Ogaden-Krieg 1977. Somalische Truppen waren in die Provinz Ogaden, deren territoriale Kontrolle zwischen Äthiopien und Somalia umstritten ist, einmarschiert. Die Niederlage gegen die weitaus stärkere Armee des äthiopischen Militärmachthabers Mengistu Haile Mariam bereitete den Weg für verschiedene bewaffnete Oppositionsbewegungen in Somalia, die Präsident Siad Barre 1991 gewaltsam stürzten. Schon bald zerbrach die Opposition, wobei ursprünglich die Clanstrukturen als verlässlichste soziale und politische Mechanismen die

Erfolgsgeschichte Telekommunikation

Es raschelt, knattert und dann tutet es. „Yes, hello", sagt eine altbekannte Stimme: „It's Schirwa." Im Moment könne er nicht reden, ruft der somalische Freund gehetzt: Wie sich später herausstellt, wird Abdullahi Schirwa soeben an einem Milizen-Checkpoint im Zentrum Mogadischus um den letzten Cent gebracht. Beim nächsten Anruf eine Stunde später sind im Hintergrund Explosionen zu vernehmen, aber Schirwas Stimme bricht nicht ab. In Somalias Hauptstadt wird [...] geschossen, geplündert und bombardiert: Doch die telefonische Verbindung ist so verlässlich wie nichts anderes in der verwüsteten Stadt.

Trotz Anarchie verlässliche Verbindung – Milizionär im somalischen Distrikt Rabdure

Thomas Mukoya / REUTERS

[...] In dem Land, das weder eine funktionierende Regierung noch eine öffentliche Strom- und Wasserversorgung hat, verfügen bereits mehr als 300 000 Menschen über ein Handy [...]. In der ersten Hälfte der 90er Jahre gab es in dem von einem Bürgerkrieg restlos verwüsteten Land kein einziges Telefon. Die Somalier mussten ins Nachbarland Äthiopien reisen, um mit ihren in alle Welt geflüchteten Verwandten Kontakt aufzunehmen. [...] Der Aufbau des lukrativen Geschäfts erforderte aber auch Zugeständnisse. Die Telefonanbieter mussten zum Beispiel die Kriegsfürsten bezahlen, die Mogadischu unter sich aufgeteilt hatten, um in ihren jeweiligen Territorien Kabel verlegen zu dürfen. Betriebseigene Sicherheitskräfte müssen sämtliche technischen Einrichtungen rund um die Uhr bewachen. Und jedem Konkurrenten, der in das lukrative Marktsegment eindringt, muss entweder der Krieg erklärt werden oder man hat sich mit ihm zu arrangieren. [...] Tatsächlich gründeten die drei großen Telefongesellschaften des Ruinenstaats vor einiger Zeit sogar einen Selbstregulierungsrat. Das Arrangement läuft dermaßen gut, dass die somalischen Telefongesellschaften ihren Kunden nicht nur die günstigsten Tarife in ganz Afrika einräumen können (50 Cent für eine Minute Auslandsgespräch). Sie verdienten dabei auch selbst noch so gut, dass alle drei Anbieter international expandieren konnten. [...]

Die Telekommunikation hat für eine der wenigen wirtschaftlichen Erfolgsgeschichten in Afrika gesorgt. Mobilfunkanbieter erzielen auf dem Kontinent, der mit dem Anschluss an die globalisierten Märkte größte Schwierigkeiten hat, die höchsten Wachstumsraten der Welt. Vor acht Jahren verfügten nur 7,7 Millionen Afrikaner über ein Handy, heute sind es bereits mehr als 100 Millionen.

Der verarmte Kontinent konnte auf diesem Gebiet eine gesamte Entwicklungsstufe überspringen – die der Telekommunikation per Kabel. In Kenia, wo es noch heute nur 400 000 Landleitungen gibt, wurden allein in den vergangenen sechs Jahren fünf Millionen Handybesitzer registriert. Bis vor wenigen Jahren hatte nur jeder vierzigste Afrikaner Zugang zu einem Festnetztelefon. Heute besitzt fast jeder achte Afrikaner ein Handy und fast jeder zweite kann im Bedarfsfall ein Telefon benutzen.

Der Zugang zum Internet gestaltet sich allerdings noch schwierig. Zwar hat sich die Zahl der vernetzten Afrikaner in den vergangenen drei Jahren verdoppelt, doch noch immer surfen höchstens fünf Prozent der Menschen regelmäßig im Cyberspace. Der Grund dafür ist weniger die mangelhafte Infrastruktur, vielmehr liegt es an den hohen Kosten für Computer und Modem: ein Hindernis, das jedoch leichter zu beseitigen ist als Wüsten, Urwald, Sümpfe und Malaria.

Johannes Dieterich, „Die Handy-Connection", in: Frankfurter Rundschau vom 1. Juni 2007

Xinhua / Das Fotoarchiv

Der langjährige Bürgerkrieg hat die Straßen Mogadischus gezeichnet. Szene aus dem Sommer der äthiopischen Intervention 2007

picture-alliance / dpa

Somalische Piraten sehen im Schiffsverkehr vor ihrer Küste eine einträgliche Einnahmequelle. Festnahme durch die französische Marine 2009

Bruchlinien vorgaben, das Land zerfiel. 1991 rief die Somalische Nationalbewegung im Nordwesten des Landes die unabhängige Republik Somaliland aus, die bislang allerdings von keinem anderen Staat anerkannt wurde. Seit 1997 hat Somaliland eine eigene Verfassung, die ersten Parlamentswahlen fanden 2005 statt. Der Nordosten Somalias erklärte sich 1997 als Puntland mit einem eigenen Präsidenten zur autonomen Region.

Für Somalia bildete sich – im Zuge von Friedensverhandlungen seit 2002 – 2004 im kenianischen Exil eine Übergangsregierung unter Präsident Abdullahi Yussuf (2004 bis 2009). Die Regierung residierte in Baidoa, weil sie sich in der Hauptstadt Mogadischu nicht durchsetzen konnte, die ihrerseits seit Mitte 2006 von der äthiopienfeindlichen Union islamischer Gerichte kontrolliert wurde.

Im Dezember 2006 intervenierte die äthiopische Armee, um die Übergangsregierung gegen die Union, islamistische Milizen und Warlords zu stützen und zu konsolidieren. Sie blieb zwei Jahre lang als Konfliktpartei im Land, das seither wieder verstärkt in die Gewaltspirale des Bürgerkriegs geriet. Im Januar 2009 zog sich die äthiopische Armee aus Somalia zurück, der von ihr gestützte Präsident Yussuf trat zurück.

Ende Januar 2009 wählte ein somalisches Übergangsparlament, das in Dschibuti zusammentreten musste, weil die radikal-islamistischen Shabab-Milizen nach dem Abzug der Äthiopier Baidoa besetzten, den gemäßigten Islamistenführer und ehemaligen Ratsvorsitzenden der Union, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, zum neuen Staatschef. Er rief alle bewaffneten Gruppen auf, sich am Friedensprozess zu beteiligen. Die Shabab-Milizen führen ihren bewaffneten Kampf weiterhin fort.

Während es in Somaliland gelungen ist, innenpolitische Konflikte friedlich zu lösen und durch eine stabile Regierung auch Grenzkonflikte diplomatisch zu verhandeln, ist die Regierung in Puntland schwach und trägt nicht zur Stabilisierung der Region bei.

Schlimmer noch steht es um „Rumpfsomalia". Es ist zwar Mitglied der Afrikanischen Union und der Arabischen Liga, die sich in der Vergangenheit bei Verhandlungen zwischen den Fraktionen engagiert hat. Doch trotz mehrfacher Versuche ist es weder den politischen Kräften in Somalia noch externen Akteuren bislang gelungen, Frieden, eine Regierung oder auch nur Sicherheit nach Somalia zu bringen. Die humanitäre Mission der Vereinten Nationen (UNOSOM, *Operation Restoring Hope;* 1992-1995) ist an dieser Aufgabe gescheitert, und auch die Mission der Afrikanischen Union, die 2007 zur Unterstützung der Übergangsregierung eingesetzt wurde, blieb bislang ohne Erfolg.

Die Abwesenheit des Staates begünstigt die Seeräuberei, die vor den Küsten Somalias bedrohliche Ausmaße angenommen hat. Anfang Dezember 2008 begann die EU mit einer militärischen Operation zur Bekämpfung der Piraten. Auch Marineschiffe der NATO, der USA und anderer Länder sind seit 2009 im Golf von Aden im Einsatz.

Kenia

Stefan Mair

In den Augen vieler Deutscher verkörpert Kenia das „typische Afrika". Tier- und Liebesfilme zeigen es als Land endloser Savannen, bevölkert mit Löwen, Elefanten, Giraffen und Zebras, als Schauplatz romantischer Sonnenuntergänge hinter Schirmakazien und Heimat ursprünglicher Volksstämme. Denkt man sich die Strände an der Ostküste des Landes hinzu, ist offenkundig, warum Kenia eines der beliebtesten Touristenziele Afrikas ist. Seit gewaltsame Auseinandersetzungen unmittelbar nach den Wahlen im Dezember 2007 circa 1000 Todesopfer forderten und 300 000 Menschen aus ihrer Heimat vertrieben, steht Kenia aber auch als Symbol für zügellose politische und zwischenethnische Gewalt. Wie immer bei Klischees, enthalten beide Assoziationen ein Körnchen Wahrheit, verdecken aber die Komplexität der Realität. Das Bild des ursprünglichen, betörenden Kenia blendet die tief greifenden gesellschaftlichen Spannungen aus, unter denen es steht, und das Bild ethnischer Gewalt verhüllt die relative Stabilität des Landes und seine Fähigkeit zur Konfliktbewältigung.

Kenia war eine der wenigen Kolonien in Afrika, in der sich vor allem britische Familien auf Dauer niederlassen wollten, um Vieh- und Landwirtschaft zu betreiben. Anfang der 1960er Jahre lebten circa 55 000 europäische Siedler im Land, die sich die fruchtbarsten Ackerflächen angeeignet hatten. Der Traum von der Siedlerkolonie Kenia endete, als sich die Afrikaner des Landes erhoben und einen blutigen Unabhängigkeitskampf begannen. Nach der Unabhängigkeit hinterließen die briti-

schen Kolonialherren ein Erbe, aus dem sich drei nachhaltig wirkende Weichenstellungen ergaben:

Positiv war, dass London in der Siedlerkolonie weitaus mehr als in afrikanischen Kolonien üblich in Infrastruktur, Verwaltung, Bildungs- und Gesundheitswesen investiert hatte. Auch in Gewerbe und Landwirtschaft war das Land am Ende der Kolonialherrschaft entwickelter als andere ehemalige Kolonien.

Zwei andere Weichenstellungen wiederum brachten Nachteile für den gesellschaftlichen Zusammenhalt mit sich. Zum einen hatten britische Farmer gutes Ackerland in Besitz genommen, das sich zuvor traditionell in der Verfügungsgewalt nomadisierender Viehhirten befunden hatte. Diesen gelang es nach der Unabhängigkeit nicht, die Kontrolle über das Land wieder zu erringen. Stattdessen ging der Großteil des Landes in den Besitz der Vertreter eines Volksstamms, der Kikuyu, über, die in Kenia zu den erfahrensten Ackerbauern gehörten und zum Teil auf den europäischen Farmen gearbeitet hatten. Die Kikuyu stellten überdies den ersten Präsidenten nach der Unabhängigkeit.

Zum anderen hatten die europäischen Siedler wesentlich zur Ethnisierung der kenianischen Politik beigetragen. Sie ordneten den einzelnen Ethnien bestimmte Eigenschaften zu, die diesen wiederum besondere Plätze im Sozialgefüge zuwiesen. Die Kikuyu galten als besonders betriebsam und geschäftstüchtig und wurden deshalb gerne in gehobenen Management- und Verwaltungspositionen beschäftigt. Viehhirten und Nomaden, allen voran die Massai, Somali und Kalenjin, galten als kriegerisch und waren deshalb zahlreich in der Armee vertreten. Andere galten als besonders fähige Hausangestellte oder Landarbeiter. Ethnische Zugehörigkeit wurde somit ein wichtiger Faktor für die wirtschaftlichen Perspektiven und sozialen Aufstiegschancen des Einzelnen.

Nebbia / Schapowalow

Savannenlandschaft vor der Kulisse des Kilimandscharo – in den Augen vieler Europäer die ideale Verkörperung Kenias

Diese Entwicklung wurde durch das Herrschaftssystem verstärkt, das der erste Präsident, Jomo Kenyatta, nach der Unab-

Konfliktquelle ethnische Vielfalt

Die Bevölkerung Kenias besteht aus etwa 40 ethnischen Gruppen. Mit einem Anteil von etwa 22 Prozent sind die Kikuyu, zu denen der zum Wahlsieger (der Präsidentenwahl am 27. Dezember 2007 – Anm. d. Red.) ausgerufene Mwai Kibaki gehört, die größte Volksgruppe. Kibakis Widersacher Raila Odinga gehört zu den Luo, der mit etwa 13 Prozent Bevölkerungsanteil drittgrößten Gruppe. Etwas kleiner ist mit etwa 12 Prozent das Volk der Kalenjin, zu denen der frühere Präsident Daniel arap Moi gehörte. Moi versuchte im Wahlkampf erfolglos, die Kalenjin dazu zu bewegen, Präsident Kibaki zu unterstützen. Die mit 14 Prozent zweitgrößte Gruppe der Luhya hat nur geringes politisches Gewicht, weil sie in zahlreiche Untergruppen zersplittert ist. Im Ausland wird das Bild Kenias in starkem Maße von den nomadisch lebenden Massai bestimmt, die allerdings nur etwas weniger als zwei Prozent der Bevölkerung stellen.

Die Kikuyu dominierten die Unabhängigkeitsbewegung und erlangten unter dem zu ihnen gehörenden ersten kenianischen Präsidenten, Jomo Kenyatta, der von der Staatswerdung 1963 bis zu seinem Tod 1978 regierte, eine dominierende Stellung in Wirtschaft und Politik. Zur Führung seiner Kenya African National Union (Kanu), die für fast 30 Jahre faktisch Staatspartei war, gehörten anfangs auch Vertreter der Luo – darunter Raila Odingas Vater Odinga Odinga – und Kalenjin. [...] Das traditionelle Siedlungsgebiet der Kikuyu liegt in Zentralkenia, doch haben sie sich in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten auch in anderen Teilen des Landes niedergelassen. Die daraus resultierende Konkurrenz um Land und Zugang zu wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen hat die Spannungen zwischen den Volksgruppen verschärft.

Die Kalenjin stellten mit Daniel arap Moi den zweiten Präsidenten Kenias. Ihm wird vorgeworfen, für die Ausbrüche ethnischer Gewalt nach der ersten Mehrparteienwahl 1992 und nach der Wahl 1997 verantwortlich zu sein. Nach der Wahl 1992 hatten bewaffnete Gruppen von Kalenjin, die nach Ansicht von Beobachtern gut organisiert waren, Siedlungen von Kikuyu-Bauern im Rift Valley im Westen Kenias überfallen. Bei den Unruhen wurden etwa 2000 Personen getötet. Ähnliche Vorfälle mit einigen hundert Toten gab es fünf Jahre später wiederum im dichtbesiedelten Rift Valley, nachdem der heutige Präsident Mwai Kibaki, der Moi in der Wahl unterlegen war, diesem Wahlfälschung vorgeworfen hatte. Kibaki warf dem Präsidenten damals vor, dieser organisiere die ethnische Gewalt – heute erhebt er als Staatsoberhaupt denselben Vorwurf gegen seinen Widersacher Odinga. Kikuyu und Luo hatten 1997 fast geschlossen gegen die Kanu gestimmt.

Die Luo fühlen sich von der Macht und dem Zugang zu den wirtschaftlichen Ressourcen ausgeschlossen, seit ihre führenden Repräsentanten in den sechziger Jahren aus der Führung der Staatspartei Kanu verdrängt worden waren. Raila Odingas Vater gründete Mitte der sechziger Jahre die sich sozialistisch gebende Kenya People's Union (KPU), die von der Staatsmacht hart verfolgt wurde. Die sozialistische Orientierung der Luo-Politiker hat ihren Ursprung in einer egalitären Tradition dieser vor allem im Westen Kenias lebenden Volksgruppe, deren wichtigste Stadt Kisumu am Viktoriasee ist. [...]

Reinhard Veser, „Weit mehr als das Land der Massai: Die ethnische Vielfalt Kenias war immer schon Quell seiner politischen Instabilität", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 3. Januar 2008

hängigkeit errichtete. Es ist ein Paradebeispiel afrikanischen Klientelismus. Der Präsident versuchte, möglichst viele gesellschaftliche Gruppen in sein Herrschaftsgefüge zu integrieren. Da die Differenzierung des Landes in soziale Schichten anfangs gering war, definierten sich diese gesellschaftlichen Gruppen primär über die Zugehörigkeit zu Sprach- und Volksgruppen. Deren oberste Schutzherren erhielten wichtige Ämter in der Regierung, der Verwaltung, den Sicherheitskräften sowie staatlichen und halbstaatlichen Unternehmen, sie bekamen zinsgünstige Kredite, begehrte Handels- und Devisenlizenzen sowie attraktive Entwicklungsprojekte in ihren Herkunftsregionen. Einen Teil dieser Privilegien reichten die obersten Amtsträger an die mittlere Ebene weiter, die davon wiederum einen Teil für sich einbehielt und den Rest ihrerseits weiterreichte, bis am Ende sogar etwas für den „gemeinen" Bürger übrig blieb. Dieses System war politisch hoch effektiv, volkswirtschaftlich aber extrem ineffizient, da knappe Mittel nicht dort eingesetzt wurden, wo sie den meisten ökonomischen Ertrag erbrachten, sondern dort, wo sie politisch von größtem Nutzen waren. Ein solches System lässt sich aber nur dann aufrecht erhalten, wenn die Regierung über Renteneinnahmen aus dem Rohstoffexport und/oder aus internationaler Entwicklungshilfe verfügen kann. Im Falle Kenias waren es vor allem Leistungen der Entwicklungshilfe, die das System lange Zeit stabilisierten.

Dennoch kam es auch schon in der Endphase der Herrschaft Jomo Kenyattas zu Spannungen, da ihm unterstellt wurde, seine eigene Volksgruppe, die Kikuyu, mehr als andere zu begünstigen. Als er 1978 verstarb und ihm ein Repräsentant einer anderen Volksgruppe nachfolgte, geriet das System vollends in die Krise. Zwei Gründe waren hierfür ausschlaggebend: Zum einen versuchte der neue Präsident, Daniel arap Moi, massiv seine eigene Volksgruppe, die Kalenjin, zu privilegieren, was zusätzliche Kosten im Klientelsystem verursachte. Zum anderen hatten sich in den 1980er Jahren die Weltmarktpreise für die Exportprodukte Kenias deutlich verschlechtert, was sich unmittelbar auf den Staatshaushalt auswirkte. Ab Mitte der 1980er Jahre verlor der Ost-West-Konflikt an Schärfe, was auch die Bereitschaft von Amerikanern und Europäern minderte, den treuen Vasallen Kenia rückhaltlos zu unterstützen. Stattdessen erhöhten sie erst den wirtschaftlichen und später auch den politischen Reformdruck. Somit hatte die Regierung Mois im Verlauf der 1980er Jahre immer weniger Verteilungsmasse, um die Loyalität der ethnischen Gruppen zu entlohnen. Anstatt das weniger Gewordene auf eine gleich bleibende Zahl von Begünstigten zu verteilen, entschloss sie sich, den Kreis der Begünstigten zu verkleinern. Immer mehr Schutzherren und deren ethnische Gruppen gewannen den Eindruck, an den Rand gedrängt zu werden und entwickelten eine oppositionelle Haltung, die Anfang der 1990er Jahre in eine starke Oppositions- und Demokratiebewegung mündete. Ihr gelang es schließlich 2002, die nahezu 40 Jahre herrschende Regierungspartei von der Macht abzulösen.

Diese ethnisch bestimmte Analyse der Entwicklungen in Kenia seit der Unabhängigkeit ist allerdings nur eine Lesart der Ereignisse. Parallel zur Ethnisierung kenianischer Politik vollzog sich eine weitere gesellschaftliche Entwicklung: In den Städten Kenias, aber auch in jenen ländlichen Gebieten, in denen kommerzielle Landwirtschaft betrieben wurde, konnte sich eine Mittelschicht herausbilden, deren wirtschaftliches Wohlergehen nicht mehr unmittelbar von staatlichen Zuwendungen abhängt. Die Entstehung einer zwar kleinen, aber einflussreichen Agrarbourgeoisie ist eine für Afrika relativ untypische Entwicklung. In Kenia kann sie vor allem darauf zurückgeführt werden, dass die Regierung, anders als in den meisten anderen afrikanischen Staaten, individuellen Landbesitz zuließ und förderte. Die Herausbildung einer in der Privatwirtschaft verankerten Mittelschicht verlieh dieser eine soziale Identität jenseits ethnischer Zugehörigkeiten sowie ein bürgerliches Bewusstsein, das sich staatlichem Autoritarismus und Dirigismus entgegenstellt. Letzteres spielte bei der Herausbildung und Stärkung der Oppositionsbewegung eine entscheidende Rolle, ersteres bei der Konfliktprävention und beim Konfliktmanagement.

Somit können die Auseinandersetzungen um die Wahlen am Jahreswechsel 2007/2008 einerseits als Konflikt zwischen Ethnien, andererseits aber auch als Konflikt zwischen Gruppen mit unterschiedlichem Staatsverständnis gelesen werden. Ethnisch sah sich eine Volksgruppe durch Wahlmanipulationen um die Macht gebracht, von der sie sich bereits seit der Unabhängigkeit ferngehalten fühlte. In der Gruppe der Wahlbetrogenen befanden sich aber auch viele, die sich in der Hoffnung getäuscht sahen, dass die Regierungskoalition, die das alte marode Regime 2002 abgelöst hatte, die Staatsgeschäfte weniger korrupt und effektiver leiten würde. Die dominante Mobilisierung im Konflikt nach den Wahlen verlief dennoch nach ethnischen Mustern – was nicht überraschend ist, da kulturelle und sprachliche Unterschiede viel leichter ausgebeutet werden können als die Zugehörigkeit zu einer sozialen Schicht. Dass die Lage nach wenigen Wochen nicht weiter eskalierte und Kenia in einen Bürgerkrieg stürzte, dürfte nicht nur den

Brandstiftung beim Nachbarn. Angriff eines Luo auf das Haus eines Kikuyu während der Unruhen in der Stadt Nakuru im Januar 2008

Roberto Schmidt / AFP / Getty Images

Gediegener Wohlstand in Nairobi. Kann die kenianische Mittelschicht die innergesellschaftlichen Spannungen mäßigend beeinflussen?

Jörg Boethling / agenda

erfolgreichen Vermittlungsbemühungen Externer geschuldet sein, sondern auch der Tatsache, dass die kenianische Mittelschicht ihren mäßigenden Einfluss auf die Protagonisten der Gewalt geltend machte.

Trotz oder vielleicht auch wegen der Erfahrung, in den politischen Abgrund geschaut zu haben, dürfte Kenia auch in den nächsten Jahren relativ stabil bleiben. Es gehört zu jenen afrikanischen Staaten, in denen das Potenzial und die Erfolgsaussichten für nachhaltige politische und wirtschaftliche Reformen vergleichsweise gut erscheinen. Deshalb wird Kenia auch ein bedeutsamer regionaler Akteur und ein attraktiver afrikanischer Partner für die internationale Politik bleiben bzw. werden.

Uganda

Stefan Mair

Als die Briten Uganda 1893 als Protektorat in ihr Kolonialreich eingliederten, galt es ihnen als Perle Afrikas. Die landschaftliche Schönheit Ugandas und die Fruchtbarkeit des Landes berechtigten zu dieser Annahme. Sie verleitete aber auch dazu, die tief greifenden Spaltungen zu übersehen, die das Land durchzogen. Dazu gehörte der Gegensatz zwischen den vier traditionellen Königreichen des Landes und den politisch eher lose organisierten restlichen Volksgruppen. Vor allem die größte der Monarchien, Buganda, nutzten die britischen Kolonialherren, um das Land indirekt und damit kostengünstig zu verwalten. Hinzu kamen Gegensätze zwischen Ackerbauern und Viehzüchtern, zwischen den unterschiedlichen sozialen Schichten innerhalb der Monarchien und zwischen Protestanten, Katholiken und Muslimen. Schon bald nach der Unabhängigkeit des Landes 1962 löste der erste Präsident, Milton Obote, die Königreiche auf und ging in der Folgezeit mit großer Brutalität gegen politische Opponenten vor. Er wurde 1971 durch den berüchtigten Diktator Idi Amin gestürzt, der aus dem politisch an den Rand gedrängten Norden des Landes stammte. Die physische Gewalt gegen oppositionellen Widerstand nahm unter seinem Regime ungeahnte Ausmaße an: Schätzungen zu Folge kamen bis zu 500 000 Bürger und politische Gegner zu Tode. Mit der Unterstützung tansanischer Truppen wurde Amin 1979 gestürzt und Milton Obote kehrte nach einem sehr umstrittenen Wahlsieg 1980 an die Macht zurück. Doch herrschte Obote kaum weniger diktatorisch als Idi Amin und stärkte dadurch unter anderem die Rebellenbewegung Yoweri Museveni, die Obote 1985 aus dem Amt vertrieb.

Museveni reklamiert berechtigterweise für sich, die Wiedergeburt des Ende der 1980er Jahre völlig darnieder liegenden Landes eingeleitet zu haben. Er stellte in weiten Teilen Ugandas Frieden und Sicherheit wieder her, auch wenn es ihm nie gelang, eine Rebellion im Norden niederzuschlagen. Mit Unterstützung der Entwicklungshilfe konnte die Infrastruktur wieder aufgebaut werden, und eine marktfreundliche Wirtschaftspolitik schuf die Voraussetzungen für einen anhaltenden Wirtschaftsaufschwung. Musevenis Regierungsführung galt lange als weitgehend entwicklungsorientiert. Gleichzeitig verspürte er wenig Neigung, seine Machtausübung demokratischer Kontrolle zu unterwerfen. Er stellte sich erst 1996 Präsidentschaftswahlen. Parlamentswahlen fanden zwar statt, doch war den Parteien die Beteiligung daran sowie jegliche andere politische Aktivität verboten. Dennoch erfreute sich Museveni großer Beliebtheit bei westlichen Entwicklungshilfegebern, die in anderen afrikanischen Ländern zeitgleich nachdrücklich auf demokratische Reformen gedrängt hatten. Dies war zum einen der Überzeugung geschuldet, dass ein frühzeitiges Drängen auf politischen Wettbewerb das Land nach den langen Jahren des Bürgerkriegs erneut destabilisieren würde. Zum anderen wurde Uganda als wichtiger regionaler Stabilitätsanker, aber auch als Partner bei der Eindämmung des radikal-islamischen Regimes im benachbarten Sudan betrachtet. Die grundsätzlich positive Einschätzung der Amtsführung Musevenis begann sich erst zu ändern, als er Anfang der 1990er Jahre ruandische Rebellen unterstützte, und wurde stark beschädigt, als er sich später auf der Seite Ruandas am Bürgerkrieg in der DR Kongo beteiligte. Museveni, der diese Intervention damit rechtfertigte, dass sich nur so die Grenzregion stabilisieren ließe, geriet nunmehr in Verdacht, regionale Machtgelüste zu befriedigen und sich an den Ressourcen des Nachbarlandes bereichern zu wollen. In der Folge des Kongo-Krieges geriet Museveni verstärkt international unter Druck, nachdem ihm heimische Kritiker bereits zuvor sein Festhalten an der Macht vorgeworfen hatten. Sollte Museveni nicht dazu in der Lage sein, einen demokratischen Machtwechsel zu akzeptieren, läuft er Gefahr, seinen Erfolg, die Wiedergeburt Ugandas, aufs Spiel zu setzen und eine erneute Destabilisierung verantworten zu müssen.

Touristen schätzen den landschaftlichen Reiz und die Tierwelt Ugandas.

M. Harvey / WILDLIFE

Prägende Politiker: Idi Amin, Milton Obote, Yoweri Museveni (v.l.n.r.)

AP

Stefan Mair

Südliches Afrika: Wirtschaftspotenziale und soziale Herausforderungen

Die Apartheid, ein später Übergang zur Unabhängigkeit und Bürgerkriege sind historische Charakteristika des südlichen Afrika. Die Region verfügt über gute wirtschaftliche Voraussetzungen, leidet aber im Vergleich zum übrigen Afrika am meisten unter der Immunseuche Aids.

Granger Collection / ullstein bild

Territorialstreitigkeiten: Auf dem „Großen Treck" nach Norden gelangen die Buren ins Territorium der kriegerischen Zulu. 1838 gerät eine Delegation unter Pieter Retief am Sitz des Zulukönigs Dingane in einen Hinterhalt.

Zur Region des südlichen Afrika zählen üblicherweise Angola, Sambia, Malawi, Mosambik, Namibia, Botsuana, Simbabwe, Südafrika, Swasiland und Lesotho sowie die Inselstaaten Madagaskar und Mauritius. Der größte Teil des südlichen Afrika ist Hochland, das zum Teil hervorragende Bedingungen für den Ackerbau und damit auch für eine exportorientierte Landwirtschaft bietet, überwiegend aber aus Buschland, Wüsten und Halbwüsten besteht. Zudem gilt das südliche Afrika als eine der Regionen, die weltweit am stärksten vom Klimawandel betroffen sein werden. Schon in den vergangenen 20 Jahren gab es gehäuft klimabedingte Dürren, die in einigen Ländern der Region zu Nahrungsmittelkrisen führten. Das südliche Afrika ist reich ausgestattet mit mineralischen Rohstoffen, insbesondere Öl in Angola, Kupfer in Sambia, verschiedenen Eisenerzen und Schwermetallen in Simbabwe und Südafrika sowie Gold und Diamanten.

Die ältere Geschichte des südlichen Afrika ist von zwei großen Einwanderungswellen geprägt: die sich über Jahrhunderte hinziehende Einwanderung der Bantu, die circa 500 v. Chr. begann, und die Einwanderung der Europäer seit Mitte des 2. Jahrtausends. Diese zweite Einwanderungsbewegung verlief in mehreren Schüben und ist noch heute von großer Bedeutung für gesellschaftliche und politische Konflikte in der Region. Bereits um 1500 begannen Portugiesen im heutigen Angola und in Mosambik Versorgungslager für ihre Schiffe, Handelsposten und Sklavenforts zu errichten. Seit Mitte des 17. Jahrhunderts siedelten vor allem Niederländer am Kap der Guten Hoffnung, zu denen sich bald auch zahlreiche Deutsche, französische Hugenotten und andere Europäer gesellten. Im Laufe des 19. Jahrhunderts strömten britische Einwanderer nach Südafrika. Sie verdrängten die so genannten Buren, Nachfolger der ursprünglich niederländischen, deutschen und französischen Einwanderer, zunächst nach Norden und unterwarfen sie dann im Burenkrieg von 1901/02. Mitte des 20. Jahrhunderts wanderten schließlich viele Portugiesen nach Angola und Mosambik ein.

Für die Entwicklung des südlichen Afrika bedeuteten die Besiedlung und Kolonialisierung durch Europäer zweierlei: Zum Ersten eine gesellschaftliche, wirtschaftliche und politische Dominanz der europäischen Siedler über die afrikanischen Volksgruppen, die sich in Südafrika, Rhodesien (dem heutigen Simbabwe) und Namibia in Apartheidsystemen verfestigte. Zum Zweiten hielten die Kolonialmächte – besonders die Portugiesen – relativ lange an ihrem Besitz fest, was blutige Befreiungskriege zur Konsequenz hatte. Angola und Mosambik wurden erst 1975, Rhodesien 1980 und Namibia 1989 unabhängig. Ein Ende erreichten die Apartheidkonflikte, die das südliche Afrika polarisierten, erst 1994, als in Südafrika eine afrikanische Mehrheitsregierung die Macht übernahm. Obwohl auch die Apartheidkonflikte in Simbabwe und Namibia außerordentlich blutig verliefen, erregte der Konflikt in Südafrika die weitaus größte öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit. Dies hing nicht nur mit der Bedeutung Südafrikas, dem nach Bevölkerungsgröße und Wirtschaftskraft weitaus wichtigsten Land der Region zusammen, sondern auch mit dem Ausgreifen der Auseinandersetzungen weit über die eigenen Landesgrenzen. Da die Gegner des Apartheidsystems ihre Rückzugsgebiete in Sambia, Angola, Mosambik und Simbabwe hatten, attackierte Südafrika diese Länder immer wieder. Besonders stark mischte es sich in die Bürgerkriege Angolas und Mosambiks ein, die unmittelbar nach deren Unabhängigkeit ausbrachen. In beiden Konflikten unterstützte Südafrika die als prowestlich geltenden Rebellengruppen im Kampf gegen ihre Regierungen.

Damit ist neben dem Apartheidkonflikt und der späten Dekolonisierung ein weiteres historisches Charakteristikum der Region genannt: lange andauernde Bürgerkriege. Angola litt ganze 27 Jahre, von 1975 bis 2002, unter gewaltsamen Ausei-

Land Hauptstadt	Fläche in km²	Bevölkerung 2007	Bevölk.-wachstum 2007, in Prozent	Religion in Prozent	BIP/Kopf PPP US-Dollar/ Rang 2006	HDI Rang 2006
Angola Luanda	1.246.700	17,02 Mio.	2,8	Christen: 65 Naturreligionen: ca. 3	4.434 / 107	157
Botsuana Gaborone	582.000	1,88 Mio.	1,2	Christen: ca. 55 sonst überwiegend Animisten; Muslime	12.744 / 57	126
Lesotho Maseru	30.400	2,01 Mio.	0,5	Christen: 93 Animisten: 7	1.440 / 148	155
Madagaskar Antananarivo	587.041	19,67 Mio.	2,6	Animisten: 50 Christen: 40 Muslime: 7	878 / 164	143
Malawi Lilongwe	118.484	13,92 Mio.	2,5	Christen: 82 Muslime: 11 traditionelle Religionen: 7	703 / 168	162
Mauritius Port Louis	2.040 insgesamt	1,26 Mio.	0,7	Hindus: 50 Christen: 32,5 Muslime: 17 Buddhisten: 0,2	10.571 / 63	74
Mosambik Maputo	799.380	21,37 Mio.	1,9	Naturreligionen: 45 Christen: 37 Muslime: 18	739 / 167	175
Namibia Windhuk	824.292	2,07 Mio.	1,3	Christen: 87 Stammesreligionen	4.819 / 102	129
Sambia Lusaka	752.614	11,92 Mio.	1,9	Naturreligionen Christen: ca. 50 Moslems und Hindus	1.273 / 150	163
Simbabwe Harare	390.580	13,4 Mio.	1,3	Christen: 50-60 Naturreligionen; kleine islamische und jüdische Gemeinden	200* / k. A.	151**
Südafrika Tshwane (Pretoria)	1.219.912	47,59 Mio.	0,4	Christen: 75,5 sonstige Religionen: mind. 17,5 davon u.a. Hindus: 1,4; Moslems: 1,4; Juden: 0,2	9.087 / 76	125
Swasiland Mbabane	17.364	1,14 Mio.	0,6	christlich orientierte afrikanische Religionen: 70 Christen: 25	4.705 / 103	141

Spalten 2-4: Weltbank; Spalte 5: Auswärtiges Amt (Zeitpunkt der Abfrage: April 2009); Spalten 6 und 7: UNDP
** CIA World Factbook, 2008 geschätzt lt. FOCUS online; ** http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators*

nandersetzungen, die schätzungsweise 500 000 Tote forderten. Diesen stand der von 1975 bis 1992 währende Bürgerkrieg in Mosambik kaum nach. In Rhodesien erstreckten sich die innerstaatlichen Kämpfe von 1971 bis 1979. Auch die Apartheidkonflikte in Namibia und Südafrika nahmen zeitweilig bürgerkriegsähnliche Züge an. Alle hier genannten Kriege waren eng verwoben mit dem Ost-West-Konflikt. Die sozialistischen Regierungen Angolas und Mosambiks betrachteten ihre Länder als Teil des Sowjetblocks. Zeitweise kämpften auf Seiten der angolanischen Armee bis zu 60 000 Kubaner. Entsprechend galt die Unterstützung, die Südafrika den angolanischen und mosambikanischen Rebellen gewährte, als Verteidigung westlicher Interessen. Dies erklärt zum Teil den lange Zeit sehr nachsichtigen Umgang des Westens mit dem südafrikanischen Apartheidsystem.

Bürgerkriege und Apartheidkonflikte brachten in vielen Ländern der Region Befreiungsbewegungen an die Macht, die nach ihrer Einschätzung diesen politischen Erfolg zum Großteil dem bewaffneten Kampf zu verdanken hatten. Dies gilt vor allem für Angola, Mosambik und Simbabwe, in geminderter Form auch für Namibia und Südafrika. Sind Befreiungsbewegungen erst einmal an der Macht, reklamieren sie für sich aufgrund ihrer historischen Errungenschaften eine besondere Legitimität, die sie in Gegensatz zu demokratischen Prinzipien treten lässt. Ein prominentes Beispiel ist Simbabwe. Dort galt Präsident Robert Mugabe in den 1980er Jahren als einer der wenigen demokratisch legitimierten Vorzeigepolitiker des Kontinents. Eine Mischung aus selbst verschuldeter wirtschaftlicher Krise, wachsendem gesellschaftlichem Widerstand und zunehmendem Druck von außen brachte ihn in der zweiten Hälfte seiner Amtszeit in die Defensive, aus der er sich durch Landenteignungen und gewaltsames Vorgehen gegen Oppositionelle zu befreien suchte. Mittlerweile liegt das einst wirtschaftlich und politisch vielversprechende Land völlig darnieder. Mugabe und seine engere Gefolgschaft haben in der Krise immer wieder deutlich gemacht, dass es für sie als Repräsentanten der Befreiungsbewegung völlig inakzeptabel wäre, die durch hohe Verluste und Verzicht errungene Macht in Folge einer Wahlniederlage abzugeben. So dauerte es fast ein Jahr bis Mugabe im Februar 2009 – unter innen- wie außen-

politischem Druck – den Gewinner der letzten Wahl, Morgan Tsvangirai, zum Premier von seinen Gnaden ernannte.

Im Gegensatz dazu war Sambia 1991 eines der ersten Länder, nicht nur in der Region, sondern in ganz Afrika, das sich von dem bis dahin gängigen Einparteiensystem verabschiedete. Der langjährige Präsident Kenneth Kaunda ließ zuerst mehrere Parteien zu und dann Wahlen abhalten, die er prompt verlor. Ähnliches passierte in Malawi, Lesotho und Madagaskar, wo Anfang 2009 allerdings gewaltsame Proteste den gewählten Präsidenten in die Flucht schlugen. In Mosambik gelang es der Regierung, den demokratischen Druck in eigene Wahlsiege umzuwandeln, in Angola scheiterte eine erste Wahl 1992, und erst 2008 wurde die Mehrheit der angolanischen Regierungspartei durch eine Wahl bestätigt. In Namibia wurde das Apartheidsystem unmittelbar nach der Unabhängigkeit in ein Mehrparteiensystem umgewandelt, in dem die ehemalige Befreiungsbewegung in den beiden Jahrzehnten nach der Unabhängigkeit ungefähr drei Viertel der Parlamentssitze kontrollierte. Gleiches war bis zu den Wahlen im Jahr 2009 in Südafrika der Fall. Botsuana und Mauritius wiederum zählen zu den wenigen langjährigen und stabilen Demokratien in Afrika. Diese relativ positive Gesamtbilanz demokratischer Fortschritte in der Region wird allerdings nicht nur durch die autoritären Ausreißer Simbabwe und Swasiland, die einzige absolute Monarchie Afrikas, getrübt. Vielmehr sind die Demokratien des südlichen Afrika mehrheitlich sehr fragiler Natur und leiden nach wie vor unter strukturellen Defiziten: Korruption und Klientelismus, begrenzte staatliche Handlungsfähigkeit und schwache Institutionen, Dominanz der Exekutive über Legislative und Judikative sowie kaum ausbalancierte Parteiensysteme.

Neben diesen überwiegend politischen Kennzeichen des südlichen Afrika gibt es jeweils ein soziales und ein wirtschaftliches, das die Region deutlich von anderen in Afrika unterscheidet. Das südliche Afrika ist global am stärksten von HIV/Aids-Infektionen betroffen. Obgleich die weltweit verbreitete Seuche relativ spät in der Region ankam, galten 2005 20 Prozent der erwachsenen Bevölkerung Simbabwes, 24 Prozent Botsuanas, 17 Prozent Sambias, 14 Prozent Malawis und 18 Prozent Südafrikas als infiziert. Nachdem die Regierungen es lange Zeit an Entschlossenheit bei der Aids-Bekämpfung hatten fehlen lassen, sind allerdings seit wenigen Jahren deutliche Erfolge bei der Bekämpfung der Seuche und der Behandlung Infizierter zu erkennen. Dennoch hat beispielsweise in Simbabwe HIV/Aids wesentlich dazu beigetragen, dass die Lebenserwartung von knapp 60 Jahren im Jahr 1990 2007 auf deutlich unter 40 Jahre zurückgegangen ist und das jährliche Bevölkerungswachstum 2006 nur bei einem Prozent lag.

Das südliche Afrika ist darüber hinaus die wirtschaftlich weitaus stärkste Region des Kontinents. Das liegt vor allem an Südafrika, das mit seiner diversifizierten Industriestruktur, mit seiner weit entwickelten Landwirtschaft, insbesondere aber mit seinem florierenden Bergbausektor circa ein Drittel des kontinentalen Bruttoinlandsprodukts stellt. Namibia und Botsuana verzeichnen für afrikanische Länder relativ hohe Durchschnittseinkommen, die im Wesentlichen auf dem Export von Rohstoffen beruhen. In den vergangenen Jahren haben auch Mosambik und Sambia deutliche Fortschritte bei der wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung gemacht. Angola ist mittlerweile vor Nigeria der wichtigste Erdölproduzent Afrikas.

Die Region könnte unter positiven weltwirtschaftlichen Vorzeichen, und wenn sie sich wirtschaftlich stärker integrieren würde, der attraktivste und dynamischste Markt und Produktionsstandort Afrikas sein. Entsprechend wird im südlichen Afrika der regionalen Integration zumindest rhetorisch hohe Bedeutung beigemessen. Das wichtigste Organ dieser Integration ist seit 1992 die Südafrikanische Entwicklungsgemeinschaft (SADC/*Southern African Development Community*). Als Südafrika 1994 beitrat, sah man sich dem Ziel, eine wirtschaftliche und politische Union im südlichen Afrika zu schaffen, einen entscheidenden Schritt näher. Seither ist die Bilanz eher enttäuschend. Bei der Reform ihrer Institutionen und der Schaffung eines einheitlichen Wirtschaftsraums hinkt die SADC ihrem eigenen Zeitplan weit hinterher. Das liegt einmal an der ökonomischen Kluft zwischen Südafrika und den restlichen SADC-Mitgliedern, zum Anderen an der Furcht, von Südafrika politisch dominiert zu werden.

Eine erfolgreiche regionale Integration würde das internationale Gewicht des südlichen Afrika stark erhöhen. Bisher basiert es fast ausschließlich aus der hervorgehobenen Rolle, die Südafrika in internationalen Organisationen und Foren als einer der wenigen gewichtigen Staaten Afrikas mit einer demokratisch legitimierten Regierung spielt. Dieses positive Bild Südafrikas und die überwiegend positive Wahrnehmung der Region insgesamt, die allein durch die Vorgänge in Simbabwe negativ getrübt wird, bergen die Gefahr, dass die Vielschichtigkeit der Herausforderungen im südlichen Afrika ausgeblendet wird.

Die SADC ist das wichtigste Integrationsorgan des südlichen Afrika. Im April 2008 suchen die Staats- und Regierungschefs der Mitgliedsländer in Lusaka, Sambia, nach einer Lösung für die politische Krise in Simbabwe.

Themba Hadebe / AP

Aids in Swasiland

[...] Das zweitkleinste Land Afrikas, ein Königreich, das man an einem Nachmittag durchqueren kann. [...] Swasiland hat die höchste HIV-Rate der Welt, 39 Prozent tragen die Krankheit in sich. [...] Südlich der Sahara sind insgesamt elf Millionen Kinder durch die Epidemie Waisen geworden [...].

Beim Anflug präsentiert sich das Krisengebiet als gleichgültige Idylle. Von Johannesburg kommend, streift die kleine Propellermaschine über eine Postkartenlandschaft, ein afrikanisches Berner Oberland mit Terrassenfeldern. [...] In Mbabane, der kleinen Hauptstadt, herrscht Einkaufstrubel. [...] Was hatte man erwartet? Abgezehrte Gestalten, Leichen am Straßenrand? [...]

Swasiland ist eine absolute Monarchie. [...] Lange hat der kleine Potentat die heraufziehende Katastrophe in seinem Land ignoriert. Die Verantwortungslosigkeit an der Spitze paarte sich mit ängstlichem, tabubehaftetem Schweigen aufseiten der Untertanen. 1999 begann das große Sterben, doch es vergingen noch einmal kostbare Jahre, bis endlich 2005 Aufklärung in großem Stil einsetzte.

Nun richtete die Regierung einen Nationalen Notstandsrat ein, [...] sein bescheidenes Büro neben einer Tankstelle wurde zum Bezugspunkt für die Minderheit der Kompetenten, Engagierten im Land, auch für die ausländischen Helfer. [...] Ihre Vision: bis 2015 die Epidemie besiegen. Ein traditioneller Swasi-Speer ist das Symbol der Kampagne, ihre Losung: „Eine Nation im Krieg gegen Aids!“

Aber wo ist die Front in diesem Krieg? Wo sind die Kranken, die Toten? Und wo ist die Trauer?

Die Suche führt hinaus aus der Stadt. Wer stirbt, stirbt auf dem Land. Wenn sich die Krankheit nicht mehr verbergen lässt, wenn sie ihr letztes Stadium erreicht, dann gehen auch die Städter dorthin, wo sie einmal hergekommen sind. Kehren zurück auf ihre homesteads zwischen den grünen Hügeln, wo das Gras schnell über die frischen Gräber wächst. [...] So sind es nicht Friedhöfe, deren Ausmaß den Swasis vor Augen führt, was mit ihnen passiert – es sind die Kinder, hungrige, verwahrloste, gefährdete Kinder. [...] Thembi Tsabedze rührt mit einem Stock durch den Maisbrei. [...]. Auf dem Feuer steht ein schwarzer Kessel, zwei, drei Stunden muss der Brei kochen. Es sind 39 Portionen, 39 Waisenkinder aus der Umgebung essen hier jeden Tag. [...] Der schwarze Topf auf dem qualmenden Feuer ist ein Symbol notdürftiger Hoffnung. Durch ganz Swasiland zieht sich eine Spur dieser Töpfe, sie sind alle identisch, groß, schwarz und schwer, Unicef hat sie geliefert. Mehr als 400 Töpfe sollen es sein – simpelste Essensstationen für 33 000 Waisen.

Thembi Tsabedze kommt nun schon seit drei Jahren, kocht ehrenamtlich, jeden Tag das Gleiche, diesen Brei; es ist nichts anderes da. [...] Thembi Tsabedze steht um 4.30 Uhr mit der Sonne auf, dann kocht sie erst für die eigene Familie, [...]. Ab neun Uhr ist sie an der Lehmhütte, schleppt mit ein paar anderen Frauen erst einmal 25 Liter Wasser heran, die Wasserstelle ist zwei Kilometer entfernt. [...]

Niemand dankt diesen Frauen. Sie bekommen keinen Cent vom Staat und meistens nicht einmal Anerkennung von ihren Ehemännern; mancher holt sich sogar eine neue Frau – weil ihn die Hüterin der Waisen vernachlässige. Und manchmal ist die Gemeinde neidisch, weil für die schwarzen Töpfe Säcke mit gespendetem Maismehl vom Welternährungsprogramm kommen. [...]

Neighbourhood-Care-Point, diesen glanzvollen Namen gab Unicef dem schwarzen Topf, der Feuerstelle und dem gespendeten Sack Maismehl – also der Idee, die Waisen dort zu versorgen, wo sie leben, in der Gemeinde, der Nachbarschaft. [...] Nur ist es meistens nicht die Nachbarschaft, nicht die ganze Gemeinde, die sich verantwortlich fühlt, es sind ausschließlich Frauen.

[...] Zu den ärmsten Ländern Afrikas zählt das kleine Königreich keineswegs – obwohl zwei Drittel der Swasis tatsächlich sehr arm sind und von weniger als einem Dollar am Tag leben. Und die Besitzenden sind nicht nur eine winzige Clique, sondern etwa zehn Prozent der Bürger: die städtische Mittel- und Oberklasse sowie die Creme der verzweigten Königsfamilie. [...]

König Mswati III. steht noch immer über dem Gesetz. Er und sein regierender Clan haben es verstanden, ihren Machterhalt in den Mantel von Kultur und Tradition zu hüllen – und im Ausland wurde lange akzeptiert, dass jeglicher Wandel nur langsam kommen dürfe. Heute nimmt sich die Regierungspolitik der Aids-Krise zwar an, doch der verschwenderische Lebensstil des Königs bleibt sakrosankt.

Und es ist nicht der König allein. Die gesamte Kaste der Wohlhabenden hat in diesem inbrünstig christlichen Land nicht einmal eine Kultur der Mildtätigkeit entwickelt. Obwohl alle, die lesen können, die hohe Infektionsrate kennen, schützt sie eine Art kollektiver Blindheit vor der Wahrnehmung der Realität.

[...] Der Kern der Krise lässt sich noch genauer fassen: Patriarchat, König, Kirche – ein fataler, todbringender Dreierbund. Der polygame König lebt ein Ideal von Männlichkeit vor: viele Frauen! Jungfrauen! Doch die traditionelle Mehrfach-Ehe kann sich kaum ein Swasi mehr leisten: Eine einzige Ehefrau kostet bereits 15 Rinder Brautpreis. Dem königlichen Vorbild an Virilität zu folgen bedeutet also Fremdgehen, Gelegenheitssex, notfalls Vergewaltigen. Die Kirchen haben sich mit der Polygamie arrangiert – obwohl in den Gottesdiensten die Frauen genauso in der Überzahl sind wie in den HIV-Veranstaltungen. Doch allmählich keimt Kritik. [...]

Charlotte Wiedemann, „Das Land der Waisen“, in: DIE ZEIT Nr. 31 vom 26. Juli 2007

In Manzini, Swasiland, warten Kinder am 29. Mai 2007 auf ihre Essensration aus dem „schwarzen Topf“. Die meisten von ihnen haben ihre Eltern durch Aids verloren.

WpN / Agentur Focus

Südafrika

Gero Erdmann

Glowimages / vario images

Kapstadt mit seinem Wahrzeichen, dem Tafelberg, ist die drittgrößte Stadt Südafrikas und die erste Stadtgründung der südafrikanischen Kolonialzeit.

Innenpolitik

Mit dem Ende der Apartheid 1994 stand das neue Südafrika vor zahlreichen Herausforderungen, deren wichtigste die Überwindung der tiefen Spaltung der Gesellschaft war – das Ergebnis von mehreren hundert Jahren Kolonialismus und 50 Jahren Apartheid. Das Apartheidregime baute auf eine Politik strikter Rassentrennung, die die wirtschaftliche Ausbeutung der afrikanischen Bevölkerung durch die aus Europa stammende „weiße" Minderheit politisch absichern sollte. Demokratische Grundrechte blieben den „Weißen" vorbehalten, der afrikanischen Bevölkerung aber vollständig versagt.

Diesem Erbe stellte die neue politische Führung unter Präsident Nelson Mandela die Vision der „Regenbogennation" (geprägt von Erzbischof Desmond Tutu) als ein Sinnbild für das kreative und demokratische Zusammenleben verschiedener Kulturen und „Rassen" entgegen. Beide wurden für ihr Wirken mit dem Friedensnobelpreis ausgezeichnet. Von den 47,6 Millionen Südafrikanern gelten 79 Prozent als „schwarz", 9,6 Prozent als „weiß", 8,9 Prozent als „farbig" und 2,5 Prozent als „Inder".

Die zentralen Herausforderungen für die junge Demokratie waren:

- Konsolidierung der demokratischen Institutionen,
- wirtschaftliche und soziale Reformen zur Überwindung sozialer Ungleichheit,
- Versöhnung zwischen den ethnischen Gruppen,
- Reintegration in Afrika und in die Internationale Gemeinschaft.

Reformstau bei der Landverteilung

[...] Vierzehn Jahre nach Ende der Apartheid ist die Bilanz des mit Abstand ehrgeizigsten Reformvorhabens der schwarzen Regierung Südafrikas ernüchternd. Immer noch befinden sich rund 80 Prozent des landwirtschaftlich nutzbaren Landes am Kap in weißem Besitz. Nicht einmal fünf Prozent wurden seit 1994 nach einem Bericht des Landwirtschaftsministeriums auf Schwarze übertragen. Dabei liegt die politische Vorgabe bei 30 Prozent Land in schwarzem Besitz bis 2014. [...] Die Konsequenz ist, dass nicht einmal fünf Prozent der Produkte, die gegenwärtig in den Supermärkten des Landes angeboten werden, von schwarzen Agrarbetrieben stammen.

Eine Farm profitabel zu betreiben sei ein schwieriges Geschäft, sagt Bheki Kubheka und seufzt. Kubheka ist Chef des „Charlestown Trust", einer Gruppe [...] ehedem Vertriebener, die an den Hängen des Amajuba-Berges in der Provinz Kwa-Zulu-Natal 8000 Hektar zurückerstattetes Land bewirtschaften. Auf 500 000 Rand (40 000 Euro) beziffert Kubheka den jährlichen Umsatz der Farm. Das ist ein Drittel dessen, was ein landwirtschaftlicher Betrieb dieser Größe mit Rinderzucht und Forstwirtschaft erwirtschaften müsste. Uns ging es zunächst nur um die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen", erklärt Kubheka. Jetzt aber hat ihn die Marktwirtschaft eingeholt. Um zehn Prozent muss sein Umsatz jährlich wachsen, wenn er einen kleinen Gewinn erwirtschaften will. Die Voraussetzung für Wachstum aber sind Investitionen und dafür der Zugang zu Krediten. Genau das aber sei das Problem, sagt Kubheka. Die von der Regierung diktierten Statuten seiner Gesellschaft verbieten ihm, das Land zu beleihen. „Es war unmöglich, an Geld zu kommen", erinnert sich Kubheka.

Der Charlestown Trust hatte Glück und fand einen „strategischen Partner", der auf 100 Hektar der 8000 Hektar großen Farm Himbeeren für Großbritannien und den Mittleren Osten züchten wird. [...] Rettung in letzter Minute. Denn ohne diese Partnerschaft und ihr Fachwissen, das schließlich das Anfangskapital sicherte, hätte der Charlestown Trust vermutlich bald aufgeben müssen.

Selbst das Landwirtschaftsministerium gibt inzwischen zu, dass bis zu 50 Prozent der Farmen, die an Schwarze vergeben wurden, nichts mehr produzieren. Die weißen Farmer sprechen von bis zu 80 Prozent. Es gibt mehr als genug Beispiele von hochprofitablen Mango- und Zitrusplantagen, auf denen die neuen Besitzer die Bäume fällten, um sie als Brennholz zu verkaufen. In einigen Regionen Südafrikas hat die Umverteilung von Land bereits zu dramatischen Produktionsausfällen geführt. Dabei ist die Landreform längst zu einer

Der *African National Congress* (ANC), der erfolgreich den Antiapartheidkampf geführt hatte, behielt im neuen demokratischen Südafrika die politische Kontrolle. Von Wahl zu Wahl konnte der ANC seinen Stimmenanteil bei den Parlamentswahlen weiter ausbauen (1994: 62,7 Prozent; 1999: 66,4 Prozent; 2004: 69,7 Prozent), bis hin zu einer Zweidrittelmehrheit im Parlament, die eine Verfassungsänderung ermöglicht hätte. Entsprechende Befürchtungen erwiesen sich jedoch als unbegründet. Trotz dieser Dominanz des ANC, der den Oppositionsparteien kaum wirksamen Spielraum ließ, und trotz wenig durchsichtiger innerparteilicher Politik hielt sich die Partei an die demokratischen Spielregeln. Die Auseinandersetzung um die Nachfolge des zweiten Präsidenten und Parteichefs, Thabo Mbeki, offenbarte, dass die Parteiführung keineswegs die alleinige Kontrolle über die Partei besaß. Gegen den Amtsinhaber wurde im offenen Wettbewerb Jacob Zuma zum neuen Parteichef gewählt. Dabei wurden die Tradition der „Bewegungskultur" aus dem Antiapartheidkampf und ein neuer Populismus erkennbar. Allerdings ist Zumas Ansehen aufgrund von Korruptionsvorwürfen, Gerichtsverfahren und populistischen Neigungen ohne eigene politische Linie sehr umstritten. Die Parlamentswahlen im April 2009 gewann der ANC unter Jacob Zuma erneut klar, verlor mit dem Ergebnis von 65,9 Prozent aber seine Zweidrittelmehrheit.

Der ANC stellt sich zunehmend als Volkspartei dar, in der ein breites Spektrum gesellschaftlicher Interessen, von Unternehmern bis zu Gewerkschaften, einschließlich der kleinen kommunistischen Partei, vertreten ist. Der politische Wahlerfolg des ANC kann jedoch zahlreiche soziale und wirtschaftliche Probleme nicht verdecken, deren mangelnde Lösung zu anhaltender Kritik an der Regierung führt. So ist Südafrika weiterhin eine Gesellschaft, deren soziale Ungleichheit zu den weltweit größten zählt und weitgehend immer noch entlang der Trennung zwischen Weiß und Schwarz verläuft. Mehr als ein Drittel der Bevölkerung lebt in absoluter Armut von weniger als zwei US-Dollar pro Tag. Immerhin ist die offizielle Arbeitslosenquote seit 2000 von 30 auf 23 Prozent (2007) gesunken, inoffizielle Schätzungen beziffern sie aber deutlich höher. Um mehr Wohlstand zu schaffen, setzte die Regierung seit 1996 gegen den Widerstand der mit dem ANC verbündeten Gewerkschaften auf eine als „neoliberal" kritisierte Wirtschafts- und Außenhandelspolitik, die in den letzten Jahren Wachstumsraten von vier bis fünf Prozent erzielte. International wurde die Politik zur Reintegration des Landes in die Weltwirtschaft begrüßt. Daneben hat die Regierung seit dem Ende der Apartheid hohe Investitionen in die Sozialsysteme getätigt und damit die Lebensbedingungen vieler bis dahin benachteiligter Menschen verbessert. Das Pensionswesen wurde ausgeweitet, mehr Menschen haben Zugang zu sauberem Wasser und zu Elektrizität, und mit einem Wohnungsbauprogramm konnten von 1996 bis 2001 mehr als zwei Millionen neue Häuser gebaut werden. Allerdings schränkte Missmanagement in den staatlichen und halbstaatlichen Versorgungsbetrieben die Dienstleistung teilweise wieder ein.

Auch andere Reformvorhaben ließen sich nur sehr langsam verwirklichen. Bei der Landreform sollten 30 Prozent des weißen Landbesitzes bis 2014 umverteilt werden. Die Regierung verfolgt – anders als in Simbabwe – dabei strikt eine Politik der Freiwilligkeit, unterstützt allerdings die Umverteilung mit günstigen Krediten. Bis 2005 waren auf diese Weise gerade einmal 3,1 Prozent erfolgreich umverteilt. Die Politik des *Black Economic Empowerment* (BEE), durch die der Anteil der ehedem benachteiligten schwarzen Afrikaner in der Wirtschaft erhöht werden soll, hat inzwischen einige Erfolge zu verzeichnen. Kritiker werfen der Politik jedoch vor, dass sie nur eine kleine Gruppe begünstige, die dem ANC nahe stehe und die zu „Superreichen" werden. Außerdem monieren sie, dass durch die Günstlingswirtschaft und die *Affirmative Action* (Maßnahmen zur Verminderung sozialer Diskriminierung) viele Positionen mit unzureichend qualifizierten Personen besetzt werden, was die Leistungsfähigkeit von Betrieben und Verwaltungen beeinträchtigt. Eine negative Folge dieser Politik ist auch die vermehrte Auswanderung hoch qualifizierter Arbeitskräfte.

politischen Zeitbombe geworden. 79 696 Forderungen auf Rückerstattung waren zwischen 1994 und 1998 eingegangen. Im September 2007 meldete die Regierung, 74 500 dieser sogenannten Claims seien geregelt, wobei 4,6 Milliarden Rand (377 Millionen Euro) für Kompensationszahlungen und 6,5 Milliarden Rand (530 Millionen Euro) für alternative Landaufkäufe aufgewendet wurden. Doch dabei ging es in erster Linie um urbanisiertes Land. In den ländlichen Gebieten hingegen kommt die Landreform kaum voran und sorgt für stetig wachsenden Frust sowohl bei den Klägern als auch den weißen Bauern. [...]

Land wird überwiegend an ehedem Vertriebene zurückerstattet, die aber aufgrund ihres Vertriebenenstatus meistens aus den Städten kommen. Die auf den Farmen lebenden Schwarzen hingegen, die über Erfahrung im Umgang mit Rindern und im Pflügen verfügen, werden nicht berücksichtigt. Sie werden sogar noch vertrieben, von den weißen Farmern ebenso wie von den neuen schwarzen Farmern. Das South African Human Sciences Research Council befürchtet, dass in den kommenden 15 Jahren bis zu 300 000 landwirtschaftliche Arbeitsplätze verlorengehen könnten – nahezu die Hälfte der existierenden Arbeitsstellen.

[...] Ganze 300 Mitarbeiter beschäftigen sich im Landwirtschaftsministerium mit der Landreform, jede dritte Planstelle ist unbesetzt.

[...] Doch Früchte kennen keine Wartefristen. [...]

Thomas Scheen, „Das riecht nach Zimbabwe", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 29. Juli 2008

Die Farm von Bassie Niehaus (r.) in Badplaats wurde 2001 von rund 100 Familien illegal besetzt. Die Landverteilung gehört zu den ungelösten Problemen Südafrikas.

Per-Anders Pettersson / Getty Images

Insgesamt sind die eklatanten Einkommensunterschiede zwischen den in der Regel relativ gut ausgebildeten „Weißen“ und den benachteiligten „Schwarzen“ in jüngster Zeit aber deutlich geringer geworden. So wird aktuelleren Untersuchungen zufolge neben den steigenden Einkommen der kleinen schwarzen Oberschicht eine deutliche Zunahme der schwarzen Mittelklasse verzeichnet, die um 40 bis 50 Prozent gewachsen sein soll; auch ein Teil der unteren Einkommensgruppen soll danach besser gestellt sein.

Auf vehemente Kritik im Lande ist der Umgang der Mbeki-Regierung mit der Pandemie HIV/Aids gestoßen. Südafrika hat noch immer weltweit die höchste Zahl von Infizierten – 5,5 Millionen Menschen 2005 – und eine der höchsten Infektionsraten. Nachdem die Regierung unter Mbeki die Pandemie lange Jahre nicht hinreichend ernst genommen, teilweise gar negiert hatte, wird seit 2006 ein umfassendes Vorbeuge- und Behandlungsprogramm durchgeführt. Seither geht die Infektionsrate leicht zurück. Allerdings werden bisher kaum zwei Drittel der Aids-Kranken behandelt.

Ungeklärt ist, inwieweit die schwierige Aussöhnung zwischen den Konfliktparteien der Apartheid gelungen ist. Die Arbeit der dazu eingesetzten Wahrheitskommission (1996 bis 1998) unter Erzbischof Tutu und ihr Bericht blieben umstritten. Zahlreiche Menschenrechtsverletzungen des Apartheidregimes, vor allem im benachbarten Ausland, blieben ungesühnt. Die Reaktion der Mbeki-Regierung, die deutlich weniger Mittel für Kompensationszahlungen an die Apartheidopfer zur Verfügung stellte als von der Kommission vorgeschlagen, stieß auf breite Kritik. Die massiven fremdenfeindlichen Übergriffe Mitte 2008 gegen Migranten aus dem benachbarten Ausland werfen einen weiteren Schatten auf die Vision der multikulturellen „Regenbogennation“.

Außenpolitik

Eine weitere zentrale Herausforderung für den ehemaligen Pariastaat der Apartheid ist die politische Reintegration in die internationale Staatengemeinschaft. Die südafrikanische Diplomatie suchte deshalb die internationale Anerkennung innerhalb Afrikas und eine weltpolitische Öffnung. Das Land wurde Mitglied der *Organisation of African Unity* (OAU) und der *Southern African Development Community* (SADC), die einst als Frontorganisation gegen das Apartheidregime gegründet worden war.

Unter Präsident Mandela trat Südafrika zunächst als entschiedener Verfechter von Menschenrechten und Demokratieförderung in Afrika auf. Diese an Normen orientierte Politik stieß im übrigen, noch überwiegend autoritär regierten Afrika zunächst größtenteils auf Ablehnung, zumal sie von einer aggressiven Handels- und Investitionspolitik südafrikanischer Unternehmen begleitet war.

Mandelas Nachfolger Mbeki schlug eine „realistische“ Außenpolitik ein, die nicht nur einen eigenen Führungsanspruch in Afrika formulierte, sondern neben hohen normativen Verpflichtungen zu Frieden, Menschenrechten, Demokratie und Multilateralismus explizit auch von eigenen nationalen, wirtschaftlichen und politischen Interessen sprach. Mit diesem Führungsanspruch wurde die südafrikanische Diplomatie zum maßgeblichen Akteur bei der Reform zahlreicher internationaler Organisationen in Afrika. Sie trug 2001 entscheidend zur Gründung der *New Partnership for Africa's Development* (NEPAD) bei, 2002 zur Transformation der OAU in die *African Union* (AU), zur Reform der SADC und zum Aufbau einer umfassenden kontinentalen Sicherheitsarchitektur der AU. Bei all diesen Reformen sorgte Südafrika mit dafür, dass grundlegende Menschenrechtsregeln und ein prinzipielles Interventionsrecht bei schwerwiegenden Menschenrechtsverletzungen verankert wurden. Bei nahezu jedem größeren Konflikt auf dem Kontinent ist Südafrika seither als Friedensvermittler bemüht und beteiligt sich an internationalen Friedenstruppen.

Die weltpolitischen Ambitionen Südafrikas kommen sowohl im Anspruch auf den „afrikanischen Sitz“ in einem reformierten Weltsicherheitsrat der Vereinten Nationen wie auch in den strategischen Partnerschaften mit den USA, der Europäischen Union und auch mit Deutschland zum Ausdruck. Zugleich versteht sich Südafrika international als Brücke zwischen Nord und Süd, ist dabei aktives Mitglied der Blockfreienbewegung und arbeitet gezielt mit neuen, aufkommenden Regionalmächten anderer Kontinente zusammen, etwa im *India-Brasil-South Africa Forum* (IBSA). Trotz der engen Beziehungen zu westlichen Staaten und bislang ausgeprägter Werteorientierung hat die südafrikanische Diplomatie immer bewusst – und mit dem Verständnis, als Vermittler wirken zu können – Kontakte zu Staaten wie Iran, Kuba und Libyen unterhalten, die einst den Antiapartheidkampf des ANC unterstützt hatten.

Die auf dem Kontinent oft gefürchteten militärischen und wirtschaftlichen Fähigkeiten Südafrikas zu einer regionalen Großmachtspolitik erscheinen indessen weit überschätzt. Sie

Bis 1994 galt in Südafrika die Apartheid. Bahnstation in Randfontein, westlich von Johannesburg gelegen, 1979

Lineair / ullstein bild

Vertreter eines neuen Südafrikas: Präsident Nelson Mandela (1994 bis 1999) und Erzbischof Desmond Tutu (r.) 1998 in Pretoria

Walter Dhladhla / AFP / Getty Images

taugen allenfalls gegenüber unmittelbar benachbarten Kleinstaaten wie Lesotho, wo Südafrika 1998 militärisch intervenierte, um die Demokratie wiederherzustellen. Im Falle der benachbarten Länder Simbabwe und Swasiland hält sich Südafrika indessen merklich zurück.

Darin offenbart sich ein Dilemma. Um seinen Anspruch auf kontinentale Führerschaft auch im Hinblick auf einen Sitz im UN-Sicherheitsrat realisieren zu können, ist Südafrika auf die Unterstützung anderer afrikanischer Staaten angewiesen. Diese dürfen daher nicht durch eine zu offensive, an Menschenrechtsnormen orientierte Politik verprellt werden. So ist Südafrika in Zusammenarbeit mit den anderen liberalen Demokratien Afrikas zwar bei der internationalen Normsetzung auf dem Kontinent erfolgreich, verzichtet aber in der Praxis weitgehend auf eine hegemoniale, „interventionistische" Politik zur Durchsetzung dieser Regelungen.

Angola

Stefan Mair

Angola ist eines jener afrikanischen Länder, dessen geringe öffentliche Wahrnehmung in Deutschland seiner Bedeutung für den afrikanischen Kontinent nicht gerecht wird. In der Medienberichterstattung, aber auch in den einschlägigen wissenschaftlichen Disziplinen spielt Angola nur eine sehr untergeordnete Rolle. Der Hauptgrund hierfür mag relativ banaler Natur sein: In Angola wird portugiesisch gesprochen, eine Sprache also, die als Fremdsprache in Deutschland wenig verbreitet ist. Darüber hinaus hat der jahrzehntelange Bürgerkrieg die Berichterstattung aus und Forschung in dem Land außerordentlich erschwert. Dennoch lohnt sich die Beschäftigung mit Angola – nicht nur, weil es politisch und wirtschaftlich für Afrika wichtig ist. Am Beispiel Angolas lassen sich drei für den Gesamtkontinent zentrale Faktoren herausarbeiten: die Bedeutung des Ost-West-Konflikts für die Entwicklung afrikanischer Staaten, die Rolle des Ressourcenreichtums und ein relativ sorgloser Umgang mit Machtprojektion.

Die Küste Angolas war eine der ersten Afrikas, an der sich dauerhaft europäische Siedler niederließen. Schon 1483 kam es zur Gründung erster portugiesischer Forts an der Mündung des Flusses Kongo. Sie dienten anfänglich vor allem der Versorgung portugiesischer Handelsschiffe, die um das Kap der Guten Hoffnung nach Indien, China und Südostasien segelten. Später wurden sie zu zentralen Umschlagplätzen des Sklavenhandels. Erst in der zweiten Hälfte des 19. Jahrhunderts begannen die Portugiesen, systematischer in das Landesinnere Angolas vorzudringen. Die Gewinnung von Kaffee und anderen landwirtschaftlichen Exportprodukten sowie von Diamanten wurde zum primären Ausbeutungsinteresse. Mit der Berliner Konferenz 1884/85, auf der die europäischen Mächte, das Osmanische Reich und die USA ihre Interessen in Afrika berieten, wurde Angola portugiesische Kolonie. Während sich Frankreich und Großbritannien im Verlauf der 1960er Jahre weitgehend aus ihren Kolonialgebieten in Afrika zurückzogen, hielt das autoritäre Regime Portugals bis 1975 an seinen afrikanischen Besitzungen fest. Es forcierte die Auswanderung in diese Kolonien sogar noch in den 1970er Jahren. Gleichzeitig war das Interesse, aber auch die Fähigkeit der im europäischen Vergleich relativ armen Kolonialmacht, in die Infrastruktur und das Bildungs- und Gesundheitswesen Angolas zu investieren, sehr begrenzt. Die geringe Entwicklungsorientierung und das große Beharrungsvermögen des Kolonialregimes waren sicherlich Hauptgründe dafür, dass die angolanischen Befreiungsbewegungen 1961 den bewaffneten Kampf aufnahmen. Er forderte zahlreiche Opfer und endete erst, als in Portugal das autoritäre Regime durch die Nelkenrevolution im Jahr 1974 gestürzt wurde und die neue Regierung Angola in die Unabhängigkeit entließ.

Darauf war das Land schlecht vorbereitet. Die Kolonialherren hatten es unterlassen, rechtzeitig vor der Unabhängigkeit Übergangsinstitutionen aufzubauen oder gar die Angolaner schrittweise an der Macht zu beteiligen. Zudem fehlten dem Land erfahrene Verwaltungsfachleute, Lehrer und Ärzte. Hinzu kamen starke gesellschaftliche Gegensätze. Da sich die geringen Investitionen der Portugiesen vor allem auf den nördlichen Küstenstreifen um die Hauptstadt Luanda konzentriert hatten, waren deren Bewohner auch deutlich besser gestellt als die Bevölkerung im Landesinneren und im Südwesten. Diese soziale Differenz wurde durch eine ethnische verschärft: der zwischen den beiden zahlenmäßig dominierenden Volksgruppen der Ovimbundu und Kimbundu. Letztere siedelten vor allem im Einzugsgebiet Luandas, erstere im zentralen Hochland des Landes. Auch die beiden dominierenden Befreiungsbewegungen des Landes, die MPLA (Volksbewegung zur Befreiung Angolas) und die UNITA (Union für die völlige Unabhängigkeit Angolas), hatten sich entlang ethnischer und geographischer Trennlinien formiert. Gegen Ende des Befreiungskrieges kam eine politisch-ideologische Trennlinie hinzu, die die bestehenden Gegensätze verschärfte: Die MPLA bekannte sich zum Sozialismus und wurde entsprechend von der Sowjetunion und deren Verbündeten unterstützt. Die UNITA galt einigen als Gründung der Kolonialherren, um die MPLA zu schwächen. Im Gegensatz zur MPLA gab sie sich pro-westlich, wodurch es ihr auch schon in der Endphase des Kolonialregimes gelang, Unterstützung aus den USA und Südafrika zu mobilisieren.

Kubanische Soldaten unterstützten die sozialistische Rebellenbewegung MPLA – Fidel Castro mit MPLA-Führer Agostinho Neto in Havanna 1976

AP

Bruce Stanley / AP

Angola war 2008 führender Erdölexporteur Afrikas. Ölplattform vor der Küste der angolanischen Exklave Cabinda 2002

picture-alliance / dpa

Die Erdöleinnahmen kommen nicht allen zugute. Feldarbeit in Caiense nahe der Provinzhauptstadt Huambo 2006

Dieser Gegensatz zwischen MPLA und UNITA führte zu einem offenen Bürgerkrieg zwischen beiden Befreiungsbewegungen, der faktisch kurz nach der Unabhängigkeit 1975 begann. Die um die Hauptstadt operierende MPLA hatte nach dem Rückzug der Portugiesen formal die Macht übernommen und keinerlei Bereitschaft signalisiert, sie mit der UNITA zu teilen. Die Staaten des Sowjetblocks forcierten im Sinne der Expansionsstrategie die Unterstützung für das neue Regime. Für die Sowjetunion war Angola ein zentraler Baustein in der globalen Auseinandersetzung mit dem Westen um Einflusszonen. Die Armee des Landes wurde sehr gut ausgerüstet, zahlreiche sowjetische Militärberater entsandt; in den 1980er Jahren kämpften zeitweilig bis zu 60 000 kubanische Soldaten auf Seiten der MPLA. In der Logik des Ost-West-Konflikts und der Eindämmungsstrategie sowjetischer Expansion ergriffen westliche Mächte massiv Partei zugunsten der UNITA. Sie erhielt Waffenlieferungen, aber auch unmittelbare militärische Unterstützung, die vor allem durch die südafrikanische Armee geleistet wurde. Das Interesse des international isolierten Apartheid-Südafrika war es, sich zum einen in Angola als nützlicher Verbündeter des Westens zu zeigen. Zum anderen ging es ihm um die Bekämpfung der namibischen Rebellen – Namibia bzw. Südwestafrika stand damals unter südafrikanischer Verwaltung –, deren zentrales Rückzugsgebiet im Süden Angolas lag.

Die Interpretation des angolanischen Bürgerkriegs als Stellvertreterkrieg zwischen Ost und West wurde so dominant, dass die meisten Beobachter nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts davon ausgingen, dass der Bürgerkrieg nunmehr ein schnelles Ende finden würde. Um so größer war die Überraschung, dass die Friedensbemühungen der Vereinten Nationen, deren zentrales Element freie Wahlen waren, 1992 scheiterten, als der Führer der UNITA, Jonas Savimbi, seine Wahlniederlage nicht akzeptieren wollte. Unmittelbar nach Verkündung des Wahlergebnisses nahm die UNITA unter seiner Führung den Kampf gegen die MPLA wieder auf. Damit zeigte sich, dass die Reduzierung des Konflikts zwischen MPLA und UNITA auf den Stellvertreteraspekt weitere zentrale Differenzen ausgeblendet hatte: die Gegensätze zwischen Zentrum und Peripherie, zwischen ethnischen Gruppen und zwischen zwei um die Macht im Staate konkurrierenden Parteien. Nachdem Savimbi sich durch die Wiederaufnahme des bewaffneten Kampfes bei seinen ehemaligen Unterstützern diskreditiert hatte, wurde die wichtigste Finanzquelle für die militärische Aufrüstung der UNITA der illegale Diamantenexport. In der Folge degenerierte die UNITA immer mehr zur Soldateska eines Kriegsherren, bei dem nicht mehr erkennbar war, ob er Diamanten exportierte, um einen Krieg zu führen, oder Krieg führte, um Diamanten zu exportieren. Die Eindämmung des illegalen Diamantenhandels seit Ende der 1990er Jahre schwächte die UNITA entscheidend. Kurz nach der Tötung Savimbis im Jahr 2002 fand der nunmehr 27 Jahre dauernde Bürgerkrieg sein Ende. Die UNITA gliederte sich wieder in den politischen Prozess ein.

Nahezu zeitgleich mit der Beendigung des Bürgerkriegs sorgte der internationale Ölboom zu einem exorbitanten Anstieg des Ölpreises. Angola ist inzwischen vor Nigeria der wichtigste Ölexporteur Afrikas. Schon während des Bürgerkriegs hatte die angolanische Regierung, die sich nunmehr als sozialdemokratisch bezeichnet, glänzende Geschäfte mit dem Ölexport gemacht, wobei es die formal sozialistische Regierung genauso wenig wie die Staaten des westlichen Blocks störte, dass die Lizenzen zur Ausbeutung der Erdölvorkommen an amerikanische und europäische Erdölfirmen vergeben wurden. Die Verwendung der Erdöleinnahmen durch die Regierung gilt im Falle Angolas als noch weitaus weniger transparent als in anderen Erdölstaaten. Zu Zeiten des Bürgerkriegs dienten sie sicherlich zum Großteil der Kriegsfinanzierung, aber auch nicht unwesentlich der Bereicherung der politischen Eliten. Die Hoffnungen, nach dem Ende der kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen würden die Öleinnahmen insbesondere für massive Investitionen in die zerstörte Infrastruktur des Landes verwendet, wurden bisher weitgehend enttäuscht. Sie bereicherten stattdessen vor allem eine kleine Gruppe von Politikern und Unternehmern. Ein beachtlicher Anstieg des Konsums und ein Bauboom in Luanda sind dafür Zeugnis. 2008 war Luanda eine der Städte mit den höchsten Lebenshaltungskosten weltweit.

Die Erdöleinnahmen werden nach wie vor in die angolanische Armee investiert. Sie gilt nicht nur als eine der kampferprobtesten des afrikanischen Kontinents, sondern auch als eine der am besten ausgerüsteten und damit schlagkräftigsten. Diese militärischen Fähigkeiten paaren sich mit der Bereitschaft der Regierung, sie nicht nur im Inneren, sondern auch außerhalb der Grenzen Angolas einzusetzen. Schon 1997 intervenierte die angolanische Armee in der Republik Kongo auf Seiten der Opposition, nachdem der Ausgang der Wahlen dort von beiden Seiten umstritten war und in einen militärischen Konflikt überging. Noch dramatischer war jedoch das Eingreifen Angolas im Bürgerkrieg in der benachbarten DR Kongo. Als eine von Ruanda und Uganda unterstützte Rebellenbewegung 1998 versuchte, durch eine Luftlandeoperation die Macht in Kinshasa an sich zu reißen, intervenierte Angola zusammen mit Simbabwe und

Namibia auf Seiten der Regierung, angolanische Truppen operierten tief im Territorium der DR Kongo. Das Motiv Angolas war dabei sicherlich nicht nur, Solidarität mit einem befreundeten Regime zu zeigen oder die Destabilisierung der eigenen Grenzregion durch einen Bürgerkrieg im Nachbarland zu verhindern. Vielmehr kann das Eingreifen Angolas in der DR Kongo als Ausdruck regionalen Vormachtstrebens gedeutet werden. Noch fünf Jahre nach der offiziellen Beendigung des Bürgerkriegs im Jahre 2003 üben angolanische Berater und Militärs großen Einfluss auf die Regierung in Kinshasa aus. Die angolanische Regierung sieht sich als eine der Kräfte, die die Zukunft Afrikas entscheidend prägen werden, und blendet dabei aus, dass sie bisher kaum Fortschritte dabei erzielt hat, die strukturellen Konfliktursachen im eigenen Land zu beheben.

Simbabwe

Stefan Mair

Noch Mitte der 1990er Jahre war Simbabwe friedlich, stabil und sicher, die Regierung galt als relativ effektiv und nicht besonders korrupt, die allgemeine Versorgungslage war gut, die europäische Prägung stark, der soziale und wirtschaftliche Entwicklungsstand deutlich über dem afrikanischen Durchschnitt. Zehn Jahre später ist das Land nicht wiederzuerkennen. Die Regierung geht mit Sicherheitskräften und Schlägertrupps gegen Oppositionelle und weiße Großgrundbesitzer vor. Sie weigerte sich lange, den Wahlsieg der Opposition vom März 2008 anzuerkennen und blockierte jegliche externe Vermittlungsversuche. Die Wirtschaftsleistung des Landes ist durch eine verfehlte Wirtschaftspolitik nahezu halbiert und die Inflationsrate 2008 auf die unglaubliche Höhe von 230 Millionen Prozent getrieben worden. Das Bildungs- und Gesundheitswesen sind in einem Maße ruiniert, dass mittlerweile die Lebenserwartung deutlich unter 40 Jahren liegt. Der einstige Brotkorb des südlichen Afrika ist auf Nahrungsmittelhilfe angewiesen, und mehr als ein Viertel der Simbabwer hat das Land auf der Flucht vor Unterdrückung oder auf der Suche nach Arbeit verlassen. Was erklärt diese Entwicklung?

Schon Mitte der 1990er Jahre wiesen Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft des Landes viele strukturelle Mängel auf, die zum Teil nur noch sehr notdürftig übertüncht werden konnten. Die Ursprünge dieser Mängel reichen weit in die Geschichte zurück. Der simbabwische Staat verdankt seine Existenz dem privaten Eroberungsfeldzug des britischen Geschäftsmanns Cecil Rhodes (1853 bis 1902), auf den auch der frühere Name des Landes „Rhodesien“ zurückgeht. Er eignete sich Schürfrechte für die beträchtlichen Rohstoffvorkommen des Landes an und ermutigte seine Landsleute zum Zuzug. Gute klimatische Bedingungen machten den Erwerb von Ackerflächen in dem Land, das 1911 zur britischen Kolonie wurde, attraktiv. Binnen 20 Jahren hatten europäische Siedler über 50 Prozent der landwirtschaftlichen Nutzfläche in ihren Besitz genommen, die angestammten afrikanischen Bauern in Reservate getrieben oder zu Landarbeitern gemacht und ein Apartheidsystem errichtet. Als Großbritannien die lokale Kolonialregierung drängte, der afrikanischen Bevölkerung mehr Rechte zu gewähren, erklärte diese 1965 ihre einseitige Unabhängigkeit. Die Folge waren internationale Sanktionen gegen das Land, die dessen Machthaber in eine Lagermentalität und in den Aufbau einer auf Autarkie bedachten Wirtschaftsstruktur trieben. Das ohnehin zerrüttete Verhältnis zwischen Schwarz und Weiß wurde durch den Bürgerkrieg, der zwischen beiden Bevölkerungsgruppen in den 1970er Jahren tobte, noch mehr belastet.

Als Südafrika Ende der 1970er Jahre der rhodesischen Regierung seine Unterstützung entzog, geriet diese in eine unhaltbare Lage. Die Folge war der Abschluss eines Friedensabkommens

Louise Gubb / AP

„Bildersturm“: Die Statue des Staatsgründers Cecil Rhodes wird nach der hart errungenen Unabhängigkeit im Juli 1980 aus dem Stadtzentrum von Salisbury, heute Harare, entfernt.

zwischen weißer Regierung und schwarzen Befreiungskämpfern. Die 1980 abgehaltenen Wahlen gewann Robert Mugabe, der seither regiert. Wider Erwarten propagierte der radikale Rebellenführer vom Tage seines Machtantritts an die Aussöhnung zwischen Schwarz und Weiß. Eine Rückgabe und Umverteilung des den Afrikanern entrissenen Landes war zwar vorgesehen, konnte aber nur auf freiwilliger Basis geschehen. Für zehn Jahre wurden der weißen Minderheit beträchtliche politische Vorrechte eingeräumt. Die 1980er Jahre galten als goldene Jahre Simbabwes, in denen dem Land – nicht zuletzt aufgrund der reichlich strömenden Entwicklungshilfe – der massive Ausbau des Gesundheits- und Bildungswesens gelang. Gleichzeitig hielt die Regierung an einer Wirtschaftspolitik fest, die dem Staat große Eingriffsmöglichkeiten gewährte und die Unternehmen des Landes vor ausländischer Konkurrenz schützte. Politisch sicherte Mugabe seine Macht durch den Aufbau eines umfangreichen Klientelnetzwerkes ab, in dem Loyalität durch die Erteilung vergünstigter Kredite, attraktiver Devisen- und Handelslizenzen sowie Posten in halbstaatlichen Unternehmen oder der staatlichen Verwaltung entgolten wurde. Dieses Konstrukt hielt, solange die internationalen Entwicklungshilfegeber dem Lande gewogen waren und ihnen Mugabe als Vorbild der Aussöhnung in ihrem Umgang mit dem südafrikanischen Apartheidsystem diente. Nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts und mit dem nahenden Ende des Apartheidregimes sank die Bedeutung des Landes und seines Präsidenten Anfang der 1990er Jahre rapide. Folglich erhöhten internationale Finanz-

Tsvangirayi Mukwazhi / AP

In Simbabwe herrscht bittere Armut. Phai Munaingo lebt mit seiner Familie in dieser selbstgebauten Hütte in Epworth bei Harare.

Philimon Bulawayo / REUTERS

Widerwillig geteilte Macht: Skeptisch verfolgt Präsident Robert Mugabe (r.) wie Morgan Tsvangirai (l.) am 11. Februar 2009 seine Ernennung zum Premier unterzeichnet.

organisationen den Druck auf das Land, sich wirtschaftlich zu öffnen; die Geberländer forderten politische Reformen und minderten gleichzeitig deutlich die Entwicklungshilfe.

Die international nicht konkurrenzfähigen Unternehmen des Landes waren einer Marktöffnung nicht gewachsen. Die Folge der mehr als 30 Jahre währenden staatlichen Eingriffe in die Wirtschaft und der Kosten des weit reichenden Klientelsystems war eine Wirtschaftskrise, die in soziale Proteste mündete. Die Zivilgesellschaft, die durch die Bildungserfolge der 1980er Jahre gestärkt worden war, gab ihnen den organisatorischen Rückhalt. Mugabe und die Regierungspartei wollten jedoch dem Reformdruck nicht nachgeben. Ein erster Versuch, ihn in einer von der Regierung vorgegebenen Verfassungsreform zu kanalisieren, scheiterte. Die Entscheidung, dem Druck der Opposition standzuhalten, ist wohl auf drei Gründe zurückzuführen: Erstens sahen sich Mugabe und die anderen Befreiungskämpfer durch ihren gewaltsamen Widerstand gegen und den Sieg über das Apartheidregime in einer Weise zur Machtausübung berechtigt, die weit über die Legitimation durch Wahlen hinausging. Sie betrachteten sich als Väter der Nation mit der Mission und Berechtigung, das Land nach ihren Vorstellungen zu gestalten. Zweitens war für die meisten Mitglieder der Regierung Machtverlust gleichbedeutend mit dem Verlust des durch politischen Einfluss errungenen Wohlstands. Und drittens hatten sich einige von ihnen bei der Niederschlagung der Unruhen im Matabeleland, im Südwesten des Staates, Mitte der 1980er Jahre so massiver Menschenrechtsverletzungen schuldig gemacht, dass sie nach einem Regierungswechsel strafrechtliche Verfolgung befürchten mussten.

Seit dem Ende der 1990er Jahre bedienten sich Mugabe und seine Gefolgschaft vor allem dreier Mittel, um sich die weitere Machtausübung zu sichern:

- massive Unterdrückung der Opposition durch Polizei und jugendliche Schlägertrupps;
- Instrumentalisierung des Konflikts zwischen Europäern und Afrikanern auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene;
- Zugriff auf Land als letzte verbliebene Ressource zur Stabilisierung des Klientelsystems.

Afrikanische Oppositionelle wurden verprügelt, eingesperrt und gefoltert sowie als Marionetten weißer Großgrundbesitzer und der ehemaligen britischen Kolonialmacht diskreditiert. Weiße Großfarmer wurden enteignet und deren Land in kleinen Teilen an Bedürftige und „verdiente Kämpfer", im Ganzen an einflussreiche Politiker und Offiziere verteilt. Die Folge war der fortschreitende Niedergang marktorientierter Landwirtschaft, von deren Einnahmen die Volkswirtschaft und der Staatshaushalt Simbabwes weitgehend abhängen. Unter den Kosten der Beteiligung am Krieg in der DR Kongo und der nachträglichen Entschädigung der Veteranen des Bürgerkriegs der 1970er Jahre brach der Staatshaushalt 1999 zusammen. Dies löste einen Wirtschaftskollaps aus, der den einstigen Hoffnungsträger Afrikas zum Krisenland werden ließ.

Zehn Jahre nach Ausbruch der Krise scheint die Situation ausweglos. Wider Erwarten hat zwar die Opposition die jüngsten Parlaments- und Präsidentschaftswahlen im März 2008 gewonnen, letztere allerdings nicht mit einer absoluten Mehrheit. Deshalb wurde im Juni 2008 eine Stichwahl zwischen Mugabe und dem Oppositionsführer Morgan Tsvangirai notwendig. Die Regierung nutzte diese drei Monate zu massiver Repression, die letztendlich den Oppositionsführer aus Furcht um die Leben seiner Anhänger dazu veranlasste, seine Kandidatur für die Stichwahl zurückzuziehen. Nach der Stichwahl, die Mugabe natürlich gewann, verstärkte der ehemalige südafrikanische Präsident Mbeki seine bis dahin erfolglos gebliebenen Vermittlungsversuche. Ihr Ergebnis war ein absurd anmutendes Abkommen, in dem zahlreiche neue Positionen geschaffen wurden, ohne die zentrale Frage der Machtteilung wirklich zu klären. Erst Anfang Februar 2009 stimmte das Parlament einer Einheitsregierung zu, an deren Spitze Morgan Tsvangirai als Ministerpräsident steht. Mugabe vereidigte ihn am 11. Februar 2009 im Amt. Zugleich schreiten der wirtschaftliche Verfall und die soziale Verelendung des Landes fort. Die Ereignisse der vergangenen zehn Jahre in Simbabwe sind sicherlich ein Lehrstück dafür, wie koloniales Erbe, verfehlte Wirtschaftspolitik, ein autokratisches Selbstverständnis der Machthaber und die Ineffizienz von Klientelsystemen ein potenziell reiches Land in die Krise stürzen können.

Sie sind aber auch ein Musterbeispiel für das nach wie vor durch die koloniale Vergangenheit belastete Verhältnis zwi-

schen Europäern und Afrikanern. Mugabe kann sich auch deshalb an der Macht halten, weil er zum Teil noch immer Rückhalt im ländlichen Simbabwe, aber auch bei Afrikanern außerhalb des Landes genießt. Für viele Landbewohner Simbabwes ist Mugabe trotz all seiner Fehler noch immer derjenige, der sie von der Unterdrückung durch die Weißen befreit und ihre Rechte wiederhergestellt hat. Auch außerhalb seines Landes gilt Mugabe als Idol des Widerstands gegen die ehemaligen Kolonialherren, der sich dabei zwar der falschen Mittel bedient, aber im Prinzip Recht hat. Für die Unterstützung des In- und Auslands spielt die Landfrage eine entscheidende Rolle. Dass jene nach der Unabhängigkeit nicht gelöst werden konnte, liegt nach Mugabes Einschätzung entscheidend in Verantwortung der Briten. Das Friedensabkommen von 1980 sah vor, dass die Briten und andere Geberländer den Ankauf von Großfarmen zu Marktpreisen finanziell unterstützen würden, um dann dort afrikanische Kleinbauern anzusiedeln. Mugabe sah darin eine Verpflichtung der Briten, da sie als Kolonialmacht die Enteignung dieser Kleinbauern durch weiße Großfarmer zu verantworten hatten. Die britische Regierung betrachtete die Unterstützung des Umsiedlungsprogramms als freiwillige Leistung, die sie im Laufe der Zeit aufgrund unbefriedigender Ergebnisse einstellte. Die große Mehrheit afrikanischer Politiker, aber auch ihrer Wähler, teilt die Einstellung Mugabes hinsichtlich der Verpflichtungen, die aus dem historischen Erbe der Kolonialherrschaft erwachsen. Bei den Europäern trifft diese Position entweder auf wenig Verständnis oder sie betrachten die koloniale Schuld zu wesentlichen Teilen durch die umfangreichen Entwicklungshilfeleistungen der vergangenen 40 Jahre als getilgt.

Mosambik

Stefan Mair

Zu Beginn des 21. Jahrhunderts galt Mosambik als eines der wenigen Erfolgsmodelle Afrikas. Dies ist überraschend angesichts der Lage, in der sich die ehemalige portugiesische Kolonie Anfang der 1990er Jahre befand. Nach 16 Jahren blutigen Bürgerkriegs zwischen der sozialistischen und folgerichtig von der Sowjetunion unterstützten Regierungspartei Frelimo (Mosambikanische Befreiungsfront) und der von Südafrika geförderten, pro-westlichen Renamo (Nationaler Widerstand Mosambiks) waren die Wirtschaft und Infrastruktur des Landes weitgehend zerstört und die Gesellschaft durch die exzessive Brutalität der Kriegführung weitgehend traumatisiert. Dennoch war es den Vereinten Nationen, unterstützt von kirchlichen Gruppen, 1992 gelungen, nicht nur ein Friedensabkommen zwischen Frelimo und Renamo zu vermitteln, sondern es auch umzusetzen. UN-Friedenstruppen stabilisierten das Land, 1994 wurden Wahlen abgehalten, die die Frelimo gewann. Die Renamo fügte sich, wie auch bei den folgenden Wahlen, in die Rolle der Oppositionspartei. Diese Entscheidung wurde sicherlich dadurch erleichtert, dass der Führer der Renamo nicht über eigene Einkommensquellen verfügte, um seinen Krieg auch ohne Unterstützung von außen fortsetzen zu können.

Mosambik gilt aber nicht nur wegen dieser politischen Beilegung des Bürgerkriegs als Erfolgsmodell, sondern auch aufgrund der Wiedereingliederung der Rebellen in die Gesellschaft. Die Renamo hatte zum Großteil Kinder als Kämpfer rekrutiert, die zu außergewöhnlich brutaler Gewaltanwendung getrieben wurden. Ihre Wiederaufnahme in Dorfgemeinschaften erfolgte insbesondere durch traditionelle Aussöhnungsrituale. Der dritte Aspekt des Erfolgsmodells Mosambik ist der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung, der nach dem Ende des Bürgerkriegs begann. Er ist vor allem zwei Ursachen zu verdanken: zum einen dem massiven Zustrom von Entwicklungshilfe. In dem Jahrzehnt nach dem Bürgerkrieg lag der Anteil der Entwicklungshilfe an den Staatseinnahmen bei circa zwei Dritteln – einer Quote, die sich auch in den Folgejahren kaum abschwächte. Zum anderen wurde der mosambikanische Wirtschaftsaufschwung von den Investitionen überwiegend südafrikanischer Unternehmer in die Landwirtschaft und den Tourismussektor des Landes getragen.

So beachtlich die Erfolge des Landes seit dem Ende des Bürgerkrieges sind, so brüchig ist der Grund, auf dem sie stehen. Die Wirtschaft Mosambiks ist im hohen Maße außenabhängig und noch weit von einem sich selbst tragenden Wachstum entfernt. Beunruhigend ist insbesondere, dass es der Regierung bisher kaum gelungen ist, ihre Abhängigkeit von Entwicklungshilfegeldern zu verringern. Aber auch die gesellschaftlichen und politischen Gegensätze zwischen dem Norden und Süden Mosambiks, zwischen ländlicher Peripherie und küstennahem städtischem Zentrum, zwischen ethnischen Gruppierungen

Mosambik litt von 1975 bis 1992 unter dem Bürgerkrieg zwischen den Parteien der pro-sowjetischen Frelimo und der pro-westlichen Renamo. Frelimo-Kämpfer in der Provinz Sofala 1985

Bildarchiv / ullstein bild

Trotz positiver Entwicklung ist Mosambik weiter auf Hilfe von außen angewiesen. Kinder in Maputo 2007

Linear / ullstein bild

und zwischen den ehemaligen Bürgerkriegsparteien sind bei weitem noch nicht überwunden. Hinzu kommt, dass der Wirtschaftsaufschwung der vergangenen Jahre die Kluft zwischen Arm und Reich eher vergrößert als gemildert hat. Schließlich übt seit den Wahlen 2004 mit Armando Guebuza ein neuer Präsident die Macht aus, der weniger danach strebt, die demokratischen Errungenschaften und bürgerlichen Freiheiten auszubauen, sondern eher danach, den Einfluss der Regierungspartei zu festigen und zu erweitern. Dies kann sich letztendlich auch negativ auf die wirtschaftliche Erholung Mosambiks auswirken. Die Entwicklung des Landes seit 1992 kann sicherlich – gemessen an den Ausgangsbedingungen – als Erfolgsgeschichte gewertet werden; dies sollte jedoch nicht daran hindern, gegenläufige Trends aufmerksam zu beobachten.

Sambia

Gero Erdmann

Sambia galt einige Zeit als Modellfall der Demokratisierung, die es als erstes Land im englischsprachigen Afrika im Oktober 1991 vollzogen hatte. Der Regimewechsel war weitgehend friedlich verlaufen: Kenneth Kaunda, Präsident des alten Einparteienregimes, hatte die Wahlniederlage eingeräumt und der Opposition nach einem überwältigenden Wahlsieg die Macht überlassen. Der Gewerkschaftsführer Frederik Chiluba war als Kandidat der Oppositionsbewegung *Movement for Multiparty Democracy* (MMD) mit 76 Prozent der Wählerstimmen zum neuen Präsidenten gewählt worden, im Parlament hatte die MMD mit 125 der 150 Sitze eine komfortable Zweidrittelmehrheit. Die alte Staatspartei *United National Independence Party* (UNIP), die das Land seit der Unabhängigkeit beherrscht hatte, war auf eine kleine Regionalpartei im Osten des Landes mit nur noch 25 Mandaten geschrumpft.

Interne Auseinandersetzungen in der MMD um weitere Demokratisierungsschritte und Korruptionsfälle in der Regierung provozierten 1993/4 heftige Auseinandersetzungen innerhalb der neuen Regierungspartei. Zugleich fühlte sich die Regierung von der alten Staatspartei bedroht, in deren Führungsgremien ein Strategiepapier zur Destabilisierung der neuen Regierung kursierte. Darauf reagierte die Chiluba-Regierung 1993 mit dem Ausnahmezustand und mit wachsender Repression gegenüber der kritischen Presse. Die autoritären Tendenzen gipfelten schließlich in einer hastig verabschiedeten neuen Verfassung, die allein zum Ziel hatte, die Wiederwahl von Präsident Chiluba 1996 zu sichern: Die teilweise boykottierten Wahlen 1996, die von Chiluba und der MMD erneut mit absoluter Mehrheit gewonnen wurden, gelten nicht als frei und fair.

Trotz des autoritären Klimas im Lande konnte 1998 als weitere Partei die *United Party for National Development* (UPND) gegründet werden, die sich rasch als stärkste Kraft der Opposition etablierte. Entscheidend für den Niedergang der MMD war schließlich der Versuch Präsident Chilubas, durch eine Verfassungsänderung eine „dritte Amtszeit" zu erreichen. Anders als in benachbarten Ländern verhinderte eine breite zivilgesellschaftliche Protestbewegung die geplante Verfassungsänderung. Dem Widerstand hatten sich auch zahlreiche Minister angeschlossen, die selbst für die Präsidentschaft kandidieren wollten, deshalb aus der Regierung und der MMD ausgeschlossen worden waren und mehrere eigene Kleinparteien gründeten. Der von Chiluba als Präsidentschaftskandidat ausgesuchte Levy Mwanawasa wurde mit nur 28,7 Prozent der Stimmen gewählt – der UPND-Kandidat kam auf 26,8 Prozent, die MMD erreichte kaum die Hälfte der Parlamentssitze. Mwanawasa konnte sich jedoch mit einer geschickten Kooptationspolitik und durch Nachwahlen rasch wieder die absolute Parlamentsmehrheit sichern. Die Wahlen 2006, die allgemein wieder als frei und fair beurteilt wurden, konnte Mwanawasa mit einem deutlich besseren Ergebnis für sich entscheiden. Einmalig in Afrika: Er forcierte im Zuge seiner Antikorruptionspolitik die Anklageerhebung gegen Expräsident Chiluba wegen Korruption im Amt, bevor er im August 2008 verstarb. Sein Nachfolger ist Rupiah Banda, der am 30. Oktober 2008 zum Präsidenten gewählt wurde.

Möglich wurden die Demokratisierung und die anschließende wechselhafte Entwicklung vor allem durch eine vergleichsweise starke Zivilgesellschaft, die von den Gewerkschaften und der katholischen Kirche getragen waren. Beide waren bereits unter dem autoritären Einparteienregime von der Regierung nicht effektiv zu kontrollieren. Sie trugen schließlich dazu bei, dass es keinen neuen Regimewechsel gab, sondern nur eine „schleichende" Rückkehr autoritärer Herrschaftselemente. Maßgeblich verhinderten sie die Verfassungsänderung zur „dritten Amtszeit" und trugen danach zur langsamen „Re-Demokratisierung" bei.

Kenneth Kaunda, 1964 bis 1991 Präsident Sambias

Odd Andersen / AFP / Getty Images

Die katholische Kirche hat in Sambia gesellschaftlichen Einfluss. Katholische Radiostation in Lusaka

Jorgen Schytte / Still Pictures

Afrika in der Weltwirtschaftskrise

[...] Bis vor kurzem hofften die Afrikaner von der Finanzkrise verschont zu bleiben, weil die Länder eine Außenseiterrolle auf den internationalen Kapitalmärkten spielen. [...] Während Finanzinstitute in Europa, Asien und den Vereinigten Staaten im vergangenen Jahr hohe Verluste verbuchten, wiesen die vier größten südafrikanischen Banken Gewinne aus, die Absa-Bank sogar einen Gewinnanstieg.

Über den Rückgang der Rohstoffexporte trifft die internationale Wirtschaftskrise den Kontinent jetzt jedoch mit voller Wucht. [...] Zuvor stark nachgefragte Bodenschätze wie Kupfer, Eisenerz, Platin oder Nickel verbilligten sich im vergangenen Jahr innerhalb von nur sechs Monaten um bis zu 70 Prozent. Auch die Preise für Diamanten sanken – zum ersten Mal seit zehn Jahren. Da sich die kostenintensive Förderung der Bodenschätze bei diesen Preisen kaum noch lohnt, werden Bergwerke geschlossen, Investitionspläne auf Eis gelegt und ganze Belegschaften entlassen. Arbeitsplatzabbau ist in Afrika besonders schwerwiegend, weil von einem Lohn durchschnittlich zehn Menschen ernährt werden.

[...] Fünf Jahre lang profitierte der Kontinent von einem selten zuvor gesehenen Rohstoffboom, während dessen sich die Preise für einige Rohstoffe verdreifachten. Das Edelmetall Rhodium etwa verteuerte sich seit den neunziger Jahren um 3000 Prozent. Die Nachfrage nach Bodenschätzen vor allem in China und Indien schien unersättlich. Das bescherte Afrika in den vergangenen drei Jahren ein Wirtschaftswachstum von knapp 6 Prozent im Jahr.

[...] Botswana beispielsweise [...] bestreitet ein Drittel seines Bruttoinlandsprodukts aus dem Verkauf von Diamanten. [...] Entsprechend ist es für Botswana ein harter Schlag gewesen, als der mit weitem Abstand führende Diamantenkonzern De Beers im Februar mitteilte, die gesamte Förderung mindestens bis Mitte April einzustellen und eine Mine sogar bis Ende des Jahres zu schließen. Im vergangenen Jahr noch investierte De Beers umgerechnet etwa 60 Millionen Euro in die „Diamond Trading Company Botswana", um in dem afrikanischen Staat die größte Diamantenpolier- und -sortierstätte der Welt zu schaffen. Statt Rohdiamanten zum Schleifen nach Antwerpen oder Indien zu verschiffen, sollte Botswana von der Weiterverarbeitung profitieren. Mindestens 3000 neue Arbeitsplätze kündigte De Beers bis Ende dieses Jahres an. Heute ist davon keine Rede mehr. Ähnliches gilt für Namibia, das ebenfalls von seinen Diamantenexporten lebt, und für Moçambique mit seinen immensen Bauxitvorkommen.

[...] Angola ist inzwischen noch vor Nigeria der größte Ölproduzent des Kontinents. Der staatliche Ölkonzern Sonangol verschob seine geplante Notierung an den Börsen von Johannesburg und New York und damit geplante Investitionen in neue Raffinerien. Daneben bringt der zweite Devisenbringer des Landes, Diamanten, ebenfalls kaum noch Einnahmen. Angola ist der fünfgrößte Produzent der Edelsteine in aller Welt. Der russische Konzern Alrosa kündigte an, seine angolanischen Minen schließen zu wollen, weil die Betriebskosten die Erträge längst übertreffen. Angesichts der ohnehin schon großen Arbeitslosigkeit prüft die Regierung derzeit, die Produktion in den Minen mit kurzfristigen Krediten für die Minenbetreiber zu garantieren.

In Sambia, das wie Botswana von einem einzigen Rohstoff – in diesem Fall Kupfer – abhängt, [...] befinden sich zurzeit 20 Explorationen in einem mehr oder weniger fortgeschrittenen Stadium, doch selbst Bergbauminister Kalombo Mwansa glaubt kaum noch daran, dass sich diese Explorationen in neue Minen verwandeln. Dabei bestreitet Sambia 85 Prozent seiner Exporterlöse mit Kupfer und Kobalt. Die Bergwerke stellen jeden zehnten Arbeitsplatz im Land. Die meisten Minen arbeiten aber angesichts des dramatischen Preisverfalls für das rote Metall inzwischen an der Verlustgrenze. Der Preis für Kupfer ist von mehr als 9000 Dollar je Tonne auf rund 3000 Dollar gefallen und macht den Betrieb vor allem von Untertageminen unrentabel. [...]

Auch die stärkste Volkswirtschaft Afrikas, Südafrika, kann sich dem Abschwung nicht entziehen. [...] Im vierten Quartal vergangenen Jahres schrumpfte das Bruttoinlandsprodukt bereits um 1,8 Prozent. Es war der erste Rückgang seit zehn Jahren. Unter den südafrikanischen Rohstoffunternehmen haben vor allem die Platinproduzenten zu kämpfen. Die Hälfte des silbrigen Metalls wird in der Autoindustrie für Katalysatoren eingesetzt. Marktführer Anglo Platinum will allein 10 000 Arbeitsplätze streichen, der drittgrößte Platinproduzent Lonmin kürzt in Südafrika 5500 Stellen. Insgesamt rechnen die Gewerkschaften mit dem Abbau von bis zu 50 000 Arbeitsplätzen. In Südafrika liegt die offizielle Arbeitslosenquote bereits jetzt bei 23 Prozent. Auch das Verarbeitende Gewerbe – Südafrika ist der einzige Staat in Afrika mit einer nennenswerten Industrie – kann diese Verluste nicht wettmachen. Die Produktionszahlen in diesem Wirtschaftszweig fielen jüngst sogar noch schlechter aus als im Bergbau [...]

Wie viele Länder versucht Südafrika sich mit höheren Staatsausgaben gegen den Abschwung zu stellen. [...] Auf lokaler Ebene mühen sich die Provinzregierungen unterdessen verzweifelt, schnell Alternativen zum Rohstoffsektor ausfindig zu machen. [...]

Claudia Bröll, Thomas Scheen, „Der afrikanische Traum ist zu Ende", in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung vom 26. März 2009

Wachstumsbranchen unter Druck: Diamantenbearbeitung in Gaborone, Botsuana ...

Joan Sullivan / REUTERS

... Kupferabbau in Sambia. In Krisenzeiten gefährdet eine sinkende Rohstoffnachfrage Entwicklungsfortschritte.

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Die EU-Entwicklungspolitik zwischen Anspruch und Realität

Europas Verantwortung für den afrikanischen Kontinent

Von der Philosophischen Fakultät der Rheinisch-Westfälischen Technischen Hochschule Aachen zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades eines Doktors der Philosophie genehmigte Dissertation

vorgelegt von

Martin Klever M.A.

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Eupen, Belgien

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Vorwort

Der afrikanische Kontinent weckt seit geraumer Zeit wieder verstärkt das öffentliche Interesse. Seien es nun das von Bob Geldof initiierte „Live Aid“-Event, die G8-Gipfel der führenden Industrienationen, der UN-Weltgipfel in New York oder der „Kampf gegen den Terrorismus“: Afrika ist wieder in aller Munde. Dabei sind es vornehmlich negative bzw. traurige Ereignisse, die die Schlagzeilen beherrschen. Gewaltkonflikte, Hungersnöte, Wirtschaftskrisen und Vertreibungen gehören zu den zentralen Diskussionsschwerpunkten, die in diesem Zusammenhang in den Fokus der medialen Berichterstattung treten. Hintergründe und Ursachenforschung bleiben dabei meist auf der Strecke. Diese Handhabung trifft auf ein anderes, derzeit heiß diskutiertes Themenfeld weit weniger zu: die Politik der Europäischen Union. Kaum vergeht ein Tag, an dem nicht neue Meldungen über Richtlinien, Vorgaben und Entschlüsse aus Brüssel zu verzeichnen sind. Die europäischen Institutionen und Akteure sind längst mit Kompetenzen ausgestattet, die es ihnen ermöglichen, auch auf der weltpolitischen Bühne eine bedeutende Rolle einzunehmen. Auf diese Weise avanciert auch Afrika zum weiteren Aktionsfeld europapolitischer Akteure.

Mein Wunsch war es, diese beiden thematischen Interessenschwerpunkte – Afrika und Europa – auf sinnvolle Weise miteinander zu verbinden. Die EU-Entwicklungspolitik bot mir den entsprechenden Hintergrund, der ein solches Unterfangen zu einem logisch nachvollziehbaren, aber auch zu einem wissenschaftlich ansprechenden macht. Dass ein Promotionsvorhaben kein einfaches Unterfangen darstellt, war mir zu Beginn dieser Arbeit durchaus bewusst, doch lassen persönliche und arbeitsbedingte Rückschläge nur allzu leicht das anvisierte Ziel aus den Augen verlieren. Aus diesem Grund bin ich in erster Linie meinen Eltern und meinen Freunden zu allergrößtem Dank verpflichtet, die mir ein ums andere Mal mit ihren aufmunternden Worten und Taten den Rücken stärkten. Eine große Stütze bot mir auch das von der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft Belgiens gewährte Stipendium, ohne das eine Realisierung des Promotionsvorhabens kaum denkbar gewesen wäre. Des Weiteren möchte ich mich beim Europaabgeordneten der Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft, Herrn Mathieu Grosch, und seinem Mitarbeiterstab bedanken. Sie boten mir einen umfassenden mehrwöchigen Einblick in das Tagesgeschäft der europäischen Akteure in Brüssel und eröffneten mir die Möglichkeit, die Einrichtungen des Europaparlaments zur ausführlichen Recherche zu nutzen. Für die kritische Durchsicht meiner Arbeit danke ich Herrn Eduard Kremer.

Nicht zuletzt gilt mein ganz besonderer Dank den beiden Betreuern meiner Doktorarbeit, Prof. Dr. Ralph Rotte und PD Dr. Manfred Schmitz (beide RWTH Aachen), die mit ihrem Vertrauen das Zustandekommen dieser Arbeit erst ermöglichten und mir mit ihrer fachlichen Kompetenz tatkräftig zur Seite standen.

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Abkürzungsverzeichnis

AA	Auswärtiges Amt
AASM	Association of African States and Madagaskar
AKP	Afrika, Karibik, Pazifik (Staatengruppe)
ALA	Asien und Lateinamerika
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASF	African Standby Forces
AU	Afrikanische Union
BIP	Bruttoinlandsprodukt
BMZ	Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung
BNE	Bruttonationaleinkommen
BSP	Bruttosozialprodukt
CARDS	Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization (EU-Programm der Westbalkanhilfe)
CDI	Centre for the Development of Industry
CEECs/NIS	Central und Eastern European Countries and New Independent States of the former Soviet Union
COREPER	Conseil des représentants permanents (EG-Ausschuss der Ständigen Vertreter)
DAC	Development Assistance Committee (der OECD)
DCECI	Instrument für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (der EU)
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
ECHO	Amt für humanitäre Hilfe der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
ECOMOG	Westafrikanische Friedenstruppen
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
ECU	European Currency Unit (Vorläufer des Euro)
EEA	Einheitliche Europäische Akte
EEF	Europäischer Entwicklungsfonds
EFA-FTI	„Education for All Fast-Track”-Initiative
EG	Europäische Gemeinschaft
EGV	Vertrag der Europäischen Gemeinschaft

EIB	Europäische Investitionsbank
EPZ	Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit
ESVP	Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik
EU	Europäische Union
Eurostat	Statistisches Amt der Europäischen Gemeinschaft
EWG	Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
EZ	Entwicklungszusammenarbeit
GASP	Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization (der UN)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (Allgemeines Zoll- und Handelsabkommen)
GD	Generaldirektion
GTZ	Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit
HDI	Human Development Index
HIPC	Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
IDA	International Development Association
IWF	Internationaler Währungsfonds
LDC	Least developed countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MED	Mittelmeerdrittländer
MEDA	Finanzielle und technische Begleitmaßnahmen zur Reform der wirtschaftichen und sozialen Strukturen im Rahmen der Partnerschaft Europa-Mittelmeer
MERCOSUR	Mercado Común del Sur (Südamerikanische Freihandelszone)
MOEL/GUS	Mittel- und osteuropäische Länder/Gemeinschaft unabhängiger Staaten
MS	Mitgliedsstaaten
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Association (Nordamerikanische Freihandelszone)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEPAD	New Partnership for Africa's Development (Wirtschaftliches Entwicklungsprogramm der AU)
NRO	Nichtregierungsorganisation
NWWO	Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung
OA	Official Aid
OAU	Organization of African Unity

ODA	Official Development Assistance
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PHARE	Poland and Hungary Assistance in Reconstruction of the Economy
RELEX	Relations Extérieures (Außenbeziehungen)
REPA	Regional Economic Partnership Agreement (Regionales Freihandelsabkommen)
SADC	Southern African Development Community
SCR	Service Commun des Relations Exterieures
STABEX	Stabilization of Export Earnings (System zur Stabilisierung der Exporterlöse)
SYSMIN	Système minière (System zur Unterstützung der Einnahmen aus Bergbauerzeugnissen)
TACIS	Technical Assistance to the Community of Independent States (EU-Hilfsprogramm für die Staaten der ehemaligen Sowjetunion)
ÜLG	Überseeische Länder und Gebiete
UN	Vereinte Nationen
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization
VENRO	Verband Entwicklungspolitik deutscher Nichtregierungsorganisationen e.V.
UEMOA	Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest-Africaine
WHO	World Health Organization (der UN)
WTO	World Trade Organization

Einleitung

Europa spaltet die Gemüter. Für die einen stellt die unlängst auf 25 Mitglieder angewachsene Staatengemeinschaft das einzig Erfolg versprechende Zukunftsmodell dar, das entscheidende Schritte zur Lösung der gemeinsamen innereuropäischen und internationalen Probleme einleiten kann. Für die anderen ist der Brüsseler Apparat zu einem bürgerfremden und undurchschaubaren Superstaat herangewachsen, der den Mitgliedsstaaten die politische Marschrichtung diktieren will und mittels ständig neuer Richtlinien den Spielraum für flexibles, eigenständiges Handeln einschränkt. Nicht ganz ohne Hohn ist daher die Rede von einem „politischen Embryo mit den Körperteilen eines Sumo-Ringers“ (vgl. Roloff 2001: 1046).

Die Wahrheit liegt wohl – wie so oft – in der Mitte. Fakt ist jedoch, dass das vereinigte Europa einer Erfolgsgeschichte gleichkommt. Mittlerweile leben mehr als 450 Millionen Menschen in einer einzigartigen Gemeinschaft, die weltweit ihresgleichen sucht. Europa charakterisiert sich längst durch mehr als nur einen gemeinsamen Binnenmarkt. Der europäische Zusammenschluss steht für einen gemeinsamen Wertekanon, der sich mit Begriffen wie Menschenrechte, Rechtsstaat, Eigentum, Freiheit und Verantwortung buchstabiert (vgl. *Die Zeit* vom 11.05.2005). Nichtsdestotrotz zeigte die neuerliche Ablehnung einer gemeinsamen EU-Verfassung, dass eine Vielzahl der europäischen Bürger einer allzu raschen Fortsetzung des Integrationsprozesses nicht unkritisch gegenübersteht. Die Gründe hierfür sind sicherlich vielfältiger Natur. Die These dieser Arbeit ist jedoch, dass die Europäische Union der hohen Erwartungshaltung, die einerseits von außen an sie herangetragen wird, andererseits aber auch aus dem eigenen Anspruchsdenken resultiert, bislang nur selten gerecht wurde. Zu oft und zu deutlich klafft ein Loch zwischen den formulierten Ansprüchen und den politischen Realitäten. Eine strukturelle und konzeptionelle Neuausrichtung bzw. Umorientierung in der gemeinsamen europäischen Vorgehensweise – wie sie gegenwärtig in Angriff genommen wird – scheint vor diesem Hintergrund daher unausweichlich.

Die vorliegende Arbeit setzt sich zum Ziel, diesem „*capability-expection-gap*“ in Hinblick auf die gemeinsame EU-Entwicklungspolitik nachzugehen. Der Fokus richtet sich dabei weniger auf eine Analyse der entwicklungspolitischen Aktivitäten der EU in ihrer Gesamtheit als vielmehr auf eine Herausstellung der Diskrepanz zwischen Ansprüchen und Realisierungen in Teilbereichen. Entsprechend der stets von Seiten der Europäischen Union formulierten Ambition, dem afrikanischen Kontinent in allen entwicklungspolitischen Angelegenheiten die

höchste Priorität einzuräumen, rückt die Arbeit die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit dieser Weltregion in den Mittelpunkt. Eine vor diesem Hintergrund durchgeführte wissenschaftliche Untersuchung wurde meiner Kenntnis nach bislang noch nicht in Angriff genommen. Zwar existieren eine Reihe von Studien, die sich teilweise inhaltlich mit dieser Problematik decken, doch besitzen diese entweder einen allzu allgemeinen Charakter oder verfolgen aufgrund einer anderen Schwerpunktsetzung nur partiell die gleiche Thematik. Zudem reicht der zeitliche Rahmen der bestehenden Forschungsarbeiten nur selten über die ersten zwei Jahre der Jahrtausendwende hinaus. Eine umfassende politikwissenschaftliche Analyse, die den Ist-Zustand der aktuellen EU-Entwicklungspolitik zusammenfasst und zugleich auch die zukünftigen Tendenzen in den relevanten Aktionsfelder auf der Basis aktueller EU-Dokumente skizziert, gibt es somit noch nicht.

Ausgehend von der Überlegung, dass zwischen dem Anspruch und den tatsächlichen Realisierungen der EU-Entwicklungspolitik eine Diskrepanz herrscht, ist danach zu fragen, welche Reformen bereits eingeleitet wurden, um diesem Zustand entgegenzuwirken. Schließlich trifft auch in diesem Fall die altbekannte Formel zu, dass nicht unbedingt ein Mangel an entsprechenden Ansätzen und Vorsätzen besteht, sondern vielmehr der fehlende politische Wille ein schleuniges Vorankommen in Kernfragen behindert. Denn bislang halten sich alle diesbezüglichen Maßnahmen in Grenzen. Um diese These auf ihre Richtigkeit hin zu prüfen, muss eine Vielzahl verschiedener Aspekte berücksichtigt werden, die sich in Hinblick auf die Effizienz der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Wesentlichen auf drei grundlegende Fragestellungen reduzieren lassen:

1. Wer initiiert, finanziert und koordiniert Entwicklungszusammenarbeit? Eine Skizzierung der unterschiedlichen Entscheidungs- und Verfahrensprozesse sowie der spezifischen institutionellen Grundlagen ist zum Verständnis der komplexen Strukturen unerlässlich.
2. Welches sind die Ziele und Ansprüche der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit? Hierbei gilt es nach der konzeptionellen und inhaltlichen Ausrichtung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik zu fragen.
3. Welches sind die langfristigen Wirkungen und Erfolge der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit? In diesem Zusammenhang gilt es letztlich herauszustellen, ob bzw. in welchem Maße die europäische Entwicklungspolitik ihren Ansprüchen gerecht wurde. Oder anders formuliert: Hat sich durch die euro-afrikanische Kooperation die Lage in den betroffenen Entwicklungsländern verändert und/oder verbessert.

Dieses Frageschema soll die Grundlage der Untersuchungen bilden. Inhaltlich ist die vorliegende Arbeit in zwei große Teilbereiche gegliedert. Demnach soll ein erster Abschnitt Auf-

schluss über die Grundlagen des entwicklungspolitischen Engagements der Europäischen Union liefern. In einem *ersten Kapitel* gilt es, die Fragestellung dieser Arbeit aus der theoretischen Perspektive heraus zu begründen und die grundlegenden Faktoren aufzuzeigen, die für das außenpolitische Engagement der Europäischen Union von Bedeutung sind und ein kollektives externes Rollenverständnis der Gemeinschaft – insbesondere gegenüber Afrika – möglich erscheinen lassen. Daran anknüpfend wird im *zweiten Kapitel* in einer retrospektiven Betrachtung die nunmehr fünfzigjährige Geschichte der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit Afrika reflektiert. Das dritte Kapitel richtet des Weiteren das Hauptaugenmerk auf die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen der EU-Entwicklungspolitik. Kompetenz- und Interessenfragen stehen hierbei im Mittelpunkt der Untersuchungen. Mit diesen ersten drei thematischen Blöcken – der theoretischen, der retrospektiven und der institutionellen Perspektive – soll das Fundament für alle folgenden Fragestellungen gelegt werden, die sich mit spezifischen Aspekten der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik auseinandersetzen.

Ausgewählt nach ihrer Bedeutung für die politische Agenda der Europäischen Union und ihrem entwicklungspolitischen Aktualitätsgrad konzentrieren sich die Schwerpunkte des zweiten Teilbereichs auf die gegenwärtig prekärsten Themenfelder der EU-Entwicklungspolitik – ihre Großbaustellen. *Kapitel vier* behandelt die Frage nach der verstärkten Verknüpfung von Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik, die sich spätestens seit dem 11. September 2001 stellt. In diesem Zusammenhang gilt es zu klären, welche Rolle der EU-Entwicklungspolitik als Instrument einer auf sicherheitspolitische Interessen ausgerichteten Außenpolitik zukommt. *Kapitel fünf* hat die Armutsbekämpfung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik zum Gegenstand, die nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund einer möglichen Verfehlung der Millenniumsziele bis 2015 gegenwärtig ein heißes Eisen ist. Und schließlich werden in *Kapitel sechs* die neuen Herausforderungen untersucht, der sich die EU-Entwicklungspolitik aufgrund der Osterweiterung vom 1. Mai 2004 gegenübersieht.

Auf der Basis dieses Querschnitts durch die zentralen thematischen Komplexe soll abschließend ein umfassender Überblick über die gegenwärtig diskutierte Neuausrichtung der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik gewährleistet werden, der zukünftige Trends und Tendenzen auszumachen versucht. Letztendliches Ziel soll es dabei sein, die zum Teil überzogenen Erwartungen an die Entwicklungspolitik zu relativieren und stattdessen alternative Möglichkeiten zur langfristigen Entwicklung aufzuzeigen. Neben der Skizzierung dessen, was von unterschiedlichen Akteuren als machbar hingestellt wird, soll dasjenige herausgestellt werden, was aufgrund der institutionellen und konzeptionellen Möglichkeiten realisierbar und effizient erscheint.

Erster Teil

Die Grundlagen europäischer Entwicklungspolitik

„Nach traditionellem Verständnis ist ‚Außenpolitik' schon begrifflich an die Existenz eines Staates gebunden. Denn gemeinhin fasst man unter diesem Begriff die Handlungen eines Staates […] in Richtung seiner internationalen Umwelt mit dem Ziel, die eigenen Interessen durchzusetzen […] Damit fangen die Schwierigkeiten bei der Analyse der europäischen Außenpolitik schon an, handelt es sich bei der EU doch offensichtlich nicht um einen Staat. Die Union basiert vielmehr auf vertraglichen Beziehungen zwischen mehreren Staaten, die sich auf bestimmte Ziele und eine institutionelle Ordnung zur Umsetzung dieser Ziele verständigt haben. Zu diesen Zielen wiederum gehört eben auch, dass die EU eine außenpolitische Rolle wahrnimmt, obwohl sie selber kein Staat ist" (Wilhelm Knelagen 2003: 3).

Kapitel I.
Die EU-Außenpolitik und Afrika: Theoretische Ansätze und Perspektiven

Dieses Kapitel soll aus theoretischer Sicht die Entwicklung der Fragestellung begründen. Es gilt danach zu fragen, welche Variablen bei einer Analyse der außenpolitischen Rolle Europas zu berücksichtigen sind. Zentrales Anliegen ist es dabei, die grundlegenden Elemente und Faktoren zu benennen, die einen Policy-Wandel in den EU-Außenbeziehungen bewirken, fördern oder bremsen können. Sie sollen – gemeinsam mit den Kapiteln zur retrospektiven Betrachtung der europäischen Afrikapolitik und zu den institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen der EU-Entwicklungspolitik – die Grundlagen für die folgenden Untersuchungen von Teilbereichen europäischer Entwicklungspolitik bilden.

Geht man von der These aus, dass eine gemeinsame europäische Außenpolitik besteht, stellt sich zu Beginn die Frage, welche Qualität eine solche europäische Integration in den Außenbeziehungen besitzt. Wer sind die Akteure und über welche Fähigkeiten verfügen sie? Die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten agieren zweifellos als außenpolitische Akteure und werden auch als solche verstanden. An dieser Tatsache hat auch die Existenz der Europäischen Union nichts geändert. Ein weniger deutliches Bild zeichnet sich hingegen in Bezug auf die außenpolitischen Qualitäten der EU als Ganzes ab. Kann die EU neben den Mitgliedsstaaten überhaupt eine eigenständige Rolle in der Formulierung und Durchführung ihres außenpolitischen Handelns einnehmen? Falls diese Frage bejaht werden kann, ist danach zu fragen, welche Rolle sie dann spielt.

In den folgenden Betrachtungen soll der Versuch unternommen werden, die mögliche Bedeutung der Gemeinschaft für die Außenbeziehungen Europas auf der Grundlage theoretischer Überlegungen zu skizzieren. Ziel des Versuchs ist es, die Faktoren und Mechanismen heraus-

zustellen, die für die Entstehung einer wertbezogenen EU-Außenpolitik und – daran anknüpfend – eines kollektiven externen Rollenverständnisses der Europäischen Union erforderlich sind. Die zentrale Frage diesbezüglich lautet: Fördert oder bremst die Gemeinschaft ein gemeinsames außenpolitisches Handeln oder verfügt sie möglicherweise über keinen nennenswerten Einfluss? Entsprechend der thematischen Ausrichtung dieser Arbeit richtet sich der Fokus der Untersuchungen auf die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als besonderes Aktionsfeld europäischer Außenpolitik.

1. Integrationstheoretische Überlegungen zu den EU-Außenbeziehungen

Der europäische Integrationsprozess schreitet zunehmend voran. Die Übereinkünfte von Amsterdam und Nizza, der – vorläufig gescheiterte – europäische Verfassungsentwurf und die umfassende EU-Osterweiterung stellen deutliche Signale dar, die diesen Prozess untermauern. Parallel zu dieser Entwicklung gewinnen auch integrationstheoretische Fragestellungen wieder an Bedeutung. Die wissenschaftliche Debatte hinsichtlich der Zukunft der europäischen Integration wird bisweilen intensiv und kontrovers geführt. Unterschiedliche Perspektiven zeichnen ein Bild Europas, das vom „Europa der Nationen“ bis zu den „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ reicht. Gemein ist ihnen, dass sie Integration als die friedliche und freiwillige Annäherung bzw. Zusammenführung von Gesellschaften, Staaten und Volkswirtschaften über bislang bestehende Grenzen hinweg auffassen. Dabei bezieht sich Integration sowohl auf einen bestimmten Zustand wie auf den Prozess dieser Entwicklung. Folgende Fragen legen aktuell den Grundstein für den integrationstheoretischen Diskurs:

- Warum findet regionale Integration statt?
- Wie kommt es zu einer Vertiefung und Ausweitung regionaler Integration?
- Wer sind die entscheidenden Akteure im Integrationsprozess?
- Wohin wird oder soll regionale Integration führen?

Im Zuge der europäischen Integration zeichneten sich drei Konzepte ab, die den wissenschaftlichen Diskurs bestimmten: der Föderalismus, der Intergouvernementalismus sowie der Neofunktionalismus.

1.1 Die „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ als Leitbild: der föderalistische Ansatz

Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg standen sich zunächst zwei Konzepte gegenüber: der Föderalismus und der Intergouvernementalismus. Der Föderalismus basiert auf der Grundidee, dass durch eine Zurückstufung der dominierenden Rolle der Nationalstaaten ein sowohl supranational wie auch national geprägtes Institutionengefüge zur Geltung kommt, in dem beide Ebenen in einer föderalen Balance zueinander stehen. Hierbei soll die Bewahrung der Vielfalt bei gleichzeitiger Sicherung der Einheit gewährleistet werden. Das Ziel ist demnach kein „europäischer Superstaat“, sondern die Bändigung zentralistischer Tendenzen durch die Festlegung gemeinsamer Grundrechte und -werte, eine vertikale und horizontale Gewaltenteilung demokratischer Institutionen sowie eine klare Kompetenzzuordnung, die nach dem Prinzip der Subsidiarität allen beteiligten politischen Ebenen eigene Aufgabenbereiche zuweist. Diese Prinzipien – in einem Verfassungsvertrag verankert – würden schließlich einem europäischen Bundesstaat nach dem Leitbild der „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ entsprechen. Da ein solcher Verfassungssprung bislang jedoch nicht stattgefunden hat, geht die Föderalismusforschung inzwischen von einer schrittweisen Föderalisierung aus (vgl. Pinder 2001: 77ff.). Diese Tendenz zeichnet sich bereits in mehreren Entscheidungsprozessen ab. So ist das Subsidiaritätsprinzip im EG-Vertrag verankert (Art. 5 EGV) und auch die verstärkte Anwendung von Mehrheitsentscheidungen im Rat oder die Stärkung des Europäischen Parlaments unterstreichen die zunehmende Föderalisierung der Europäischen Union.

1.2 Nationalstaatliche Entscheidungen als Steuerungs- und Kontrollelemente der europäischen Integration: der Intergouvernementalismus

Der staatszentrierte Intergouvernementalismus wirft im Rahmen einer integrationstheoretischen Betrachtung der europäischen Strukturen die Frage auf, ob nationalstaatliche Entscheidungen die europäische Integration steuern oder kontrollieren. Grundidee ist hierbei die unabdingbare Machtbalance zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten. Die nationalstaatlichen Akteure entscheiden demnach über die Qualität der Kooperation, die sich in Form eines Staatenbundes manifestiert. Beispiele für solche intergouvernementale Institutionen und Instrumente sind der Rat der EU und Regierungskonferenzen. Sie bestimmen die gemeinsame Entscheidungsfindung und üben die Kontrolle über den Kompetenztransfer von den Mitgliedsstaaten auf die Gemeinschaft aus. Die für den Integrationsprozess relevanten Entscheidungen werden durch bi- und multilaterale Abstimmung der nationalen Ebenen vorbereitet, was in der Folge bedeutet, dass oftmals nur der kleinste gemeinsame Nenner nationaler Interessen den jeweiligen Stand der Integration bestimmt. Der Einfluss supranationaler Institutionen wird hingegen wei-

testgehend ausgeblendet. Nationalstaatliche Souveränität spielt demnach eine übergeordnete Rolle. Aus dieser intergouvernementalistischen Perspektive betrachtet, stellen die gemeinsamen Politiken nur einen Verbund von „Regimen“ dar, in denen die Mitgliedsstaaten unter dem Label „Europäische Union“ gemeinsame Regeln, Normen und Institutionen aushandeln, die für alle Akteure von Vorteil sind (vgl. Krasner 1983: 1ff.).

Bezogen auf die außenpolitischen Aktivitäten der EU würde dies bedeuten, dass die Union einzig und allein einen Zusammenschluss von Nationalstaaten darstellt, die glauben ihre nationalen Interessen in der internationalen Arena in Koalition besser durchsetzen zu können als allein. Diese Allianz besteht demzufolge entweder aufgrund von Interessenkonvergenz oder aufgrund von Kompromissen, welche für die beteiligten Staaten noch immer vorteilhafter sind als das aussichtslose Vertreten von nationalen Maximalzielsetzungen. Die Übertragung von Souveränitätskompetenzen in Schlüsselbereichen der nationalen Interessen ist nach diesen Überlegungen nicht möglich. Zudem wird davon ausgegangen, dass die Mitgliedsstaaten die politischen Institutionen der Europäischen Union in deutlichem Maße kontrollieren können (vgl. Marks/Hooghe/Blank 1996: 344). Eine durch mehrere Ebenen bestimmte europäische Außenpolitik würde demnach einer Erosion der Autorität nationaler Regierungen gleichkommen. Auch die Kommission – als potentieller Ersatz für geschwächte nationale Regierungen – könnte ein solches Vakuum nicht ausfüllen, wonach sie schlussendlich keine ernstzunehmende Alternativkraft zu den Nationalregierungen darstellen könnte. Eine Autonomie der Europäischen Union gegenüber ihren konstituierenden Elementen wäre somit nicht gegeben (vgl. Ginsberg 1989: 30).

Mittlerweile ist jedoch längst deutlich geworden, dass die europäische Integration über das Stadium eines auf rein zwischenstaatliche Kooperation ausgerichteten Zweckverbundes hinausgewachsen ist. Eine solche Form der Kooperation trifft für die Nachkriegszeit zu, als die einstigen westeuropäischen Rivalen ihre Kräfte bündelten, um an Profil gegenüber den beiden Supermächten Sowjetunion und USA zu gewinnen. Die Einhaltung von Verpflichtungen, die aus der EU-Mitgliedschaft erwachsen, ist durch diesen Ansatz jedoch nur begrenzt zu erklären. Zudem ist eine Dynamik der EU, die über die Einigung auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner hinausgeht, in den intergouvernementalistischen Erklärungsversuchen nicht vorgesehen. Folglich erweist sich diese theoretische Perspektive zwar als plausibel für die Entstehungsphase der EG, verliert aber mit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges zunehmend an Erklärungskraft.

1.3 Europäische Integration durch den Ausbau gemeinschaftlicher Kompetenzen: der Neofunktionalismus

Die Intergouvernementalisten setzten sich auf dem Haager Kongress 1948 letztlich gegen die Föderalisten durch. Anstelle der föderalen „Vereinigten Staaten von Europa“ wurde mit dem Europarat 1949 ein weitgehend zwischenstaatliches Gremium geschaffen. Damit gaben sich die Staaten, die auf eine verstärkt supranationale Integration setzen wollten, jedoch nicht zufrieden. Vielmehr griffen die 6 Gründerstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl (EGKS) auf einen dritten, funktionalen Weg der Integration zurück. Der auf dem klassischen Funktionalismus, ökonomischen Integrationskonzepten sowie Überlegungen des lerntheoretischen Transaktionsansatzes aufbauende Neofunktionalismus schlägt eine schrittweise Integration vor. Demnach soll die begonnene politische Zusammenarbeit in wenig kontroversen Politikfeldern durch „Spill-over“-Effekte auf weitere Sachgebiete erweitert und somit die supranationale Integration ausgebaut werden (vgl. Haas 1968). Letztendlich – so wird aus neofunktionalistischer Perspektive argumentiert – können die Mitgliedsstaaten im Zuge steigender Interdependenz alleine nicht mehr effektiv agieren, so dass sie sich gezwungen sehen, ihre Souveränität durch Kompetenzübertragungen auf die supranationale Ebene einzuschränken. Dieser Prozess wird durch die Gemeinschaftsorgane und integrationswillige politische Entscheidungsträger gefördert, wie es die ökonomische Integration von einer Freihandelszone über eine Zollunion zum Binnenmarkt und schließlich einer Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion beispielhaft aufzeigt. Dem funktionalistischen Verständnis zufolge mündet diese Entwicklung ebenfalls in einer politischen Integration, wobei offen bleibt, welche Art von „politischer Union“ sich hieraus ergibt.

Da sich Integrationstheorien in erster Linie mit der internen Dynamik der Integration und erst in zweiter Linie mit ihren Außenwirkungen auseinandersetzen, stellen die Außenbeziehungen der Europäischen Union – aus dieser Perspektive betrachtet – das Resultat von internen Prozessen dar. Allen und Smith gehen in ihrer Untersuchung der Außenbeziehungen beispielsweise von dem Konzept der Präsenz Europas im internationalen System aus. Präsenz definieren sie als wirtschaftliche, militärische und politische Autorität. Demnach beruht die Autorität Europas auf Glaubwürdigkeit und Legitimität, den Fähigkeiten zu handeln und Ressourcen zu mobilisieren sowie auf den Vorstellungen der politischen Akteure von ihrer Rolle (vgl. Allen/Smith 1990: 21). Entscheidender Faktor ist somit die Wahrnehmung der Europäischen Union durch die auf internationaler Ebene agierenden Akteure. Eine Verengung auf klassische Außenpolitik im Sinne von Diplomatie und Sicherheitspolitik vermeidet der Ansatz der

Präsenz und erweitert stattdessen die Perspektive auf andere Politikbereiche der Außenbeziehungen.

Überträgt man die neofunktionalistische Sichtweise konkret auf das außenpolitische Engagement der EU, ergibt sich eine in sechs Etappen gegliederte Integrationslogik, wie sie Ginsberg 1989 vorstellte.

Abbildung I-1: Phasen der EG-Außenbeziehungen aus neofunktionalistischer Perspektive



Quelle: Ginsberg 1989: 25-27.

In der Phase der Konsolidierung (1) sind die Behörden der EG und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten mit internen Angleichungen und Politikharmonisierung beschäftigt. Die ausgehandelte Harmonisierung der Wirtschaftspolitik (Zollunion, Gemeinsamer Außentarif, Gemeinsame Agrarpolitik etc.) wird in der Phase der Implementation (2) umgesetzt. Da die Vorzugsbehandlung von Mitgliedern in der Logik einer Gemeinschaft liegt, werden die Interessen der Nichtmitglieder nicht gleichermaßen berücksichtigt, so dass diese einen zwangsläufigen Verlust an Marktanteilen in der EG zu beklagen haben. Die Gemeinschaft sieht sich folglich externen Herausforderungen (3) gegenüber. Einige Nichtmitglieder beantragen die Aufnahme in die Gemeinschaft, ihre Assoziierung oder Handelsvereinbarungen, während wiederum andere Nichtmitglieder die Maßnahmen der EG in internationalen Gremien (z.B. GATT/WTO) überprüfen lassen. Durch den wachsenden Druck muss die Gemeinschaft ihre Interessen verteidigen, auch wenn sie sich noch nicht für ein kohärentes Außenverhalten gerüstet sieht (vgl. Ginsberg 1989: 27). Infolge der Umsetzung des gemeinschaftlichen Harmonisierungsprozesses versuchen die Mitgliedsstaaten die Vorteile ihrer Mitgliedschaft auszuspielen und – bei Möglichkeit – zu maximieren. Kosten werden demnach weitestgehend externalisiert (4), Zollmauern und nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse errichtet, um einheimische Produzenten zu schützen.

Dem wachsenden externen Druck versucht man durch die Ausdehnung der Mitgliedschaft an ausgewählte Antragsteller und durch Assoziierungsangebote zu begegnen. Externe Herausforderungen bestehen jedoch auch weiterhin (5) und neue kommen hinzu, worauf die Gemeinschaft nach wie vor mit Externalisierungsversuchen reagieren wird (6).

Diese Betrachtung der Europäischen Union als eigenständiger Akteur findet sich nur im neofunktionalistischen Ansatz wider. Die internationale Präsenz stellt in diesem Kontext die Vorbedingung für einen eigenständigen Akteurscharakter dar:

„Europäische Präsenz als Konsequenz aus interner Politikgestaltung und inneren Prozessen der Gemeinschaft löst Reaktionen aus, mit denen die Gemeinschaft letztlich aktiv umgehen muss, um für die Bearbeitung künftiger Herausforderungen und Außenansprüche Konzepte zu entwickeln" (Grimm 2003: 28).

Die EU als eigenständiger Akteur muss dabei immer zwei Grundbedingungen erfüllen. Zum einen muss sie sich von ihrer Umwelt abgrenzen können, zum anderen über ein Minimum an innerem Zusammenhalt verfügen (vgl. Sjöstedt 1977: 15). Die Abgrenzbarkeit zu anderen Einheiten bedeutet schlussendlich nichts anderes als die notwendige Herausbildung einer eigenen Identität. Hierzu sind ein gewisses Maß an Autonomie und entsprechende strukturelle Voraussetzungen vonnöten. Zu diesen strukturellen Voraussetzungen in den internationalen Beziehungen zählen u.a. Rechtspersönlichkeit, eine Reihe diplomatischer Agenten und die Fähigkeit, mit Dritten Verhandlungen führen zu können (vgl. Hill 1993: 309). Folglich impliziert die Qualität eines solchen Akteurs eine Einheit, welche einerseits über ein gewisses Maß an Autonomie gegenüber ihrer Umwelt verfügt, andererseits aber auch der Autonomie gegenüber seinen Konstituanten bedarf, um mehr zu sein als die Summe seiner Elemente (vgl. Scharpf 2000: 79). Hinzu kommt die Fähigkeit von Willensbildung und Zielausrichtung (vgl. Bretherton/Vogler 1999: 20). Dieser Definition eines internationalen Akteurs zufolge könnten allerdings auch nichtstaatliche Gebilde wie internationale Organisationen und transnationale Konzerne als internationale Akteure agieren. Demnach ist in diesem Zusammenhang nicht allein die Frage der Rechtspersönlichkeit von Bedeutung, sondern ebenso die Möglichkeit, Ziele im internationalen Umfeld formulieren und auf ihre Umsetzung hinwirken zu können (vgl. Allen 1998: 44).

Als spezifisches Charakteristikum der Europäischen Union erweist sich die Tatsache, dass ihr die Handlungskompetenz in einem Politikbereich von ihren Mitgliedsstaaten zugewiesen werden muss. Sie kann erst nach genereller Beauftragung durch die Mitgliedsstaaten aktiv werden, wobei sie selbst dann meist über kein Handlungsmonopol verfügt, sondern im Zusammenspiel mit den Mitgliedsstaaten agiert. Um als internationaler Akteur wahrgenommen zu werden, muss sich die Europäische Union von anderen Gebilden abgrenzen können. Auf-

grund der ihr zugewiesenen Kompetenz kann sie sich als Akteur jedoch nur allein durch ihre spezifischen Zielsetzungen und Handlungsweisen von ihren Konstituanten abgrenzen. Vor diesem Hintergrund gilt es für die EU alternative Ansätze zum Verständnis ihrer Außenbeziehungen jenseits der Staatenwelt und der hiermit verbundenen staatlichen Souveränität als letztlich entscheidendes Kriterium zu erarbeiten.

Tabelle I-1: Die integrationstheoretischen Ansätze

	Föderalismus (strukturorientierte Ansätze)	**Intergouvernementalismus** (nationalstaatsorientierte Ansätze)	**Neofunktionalismus** (prozessorientierte Ansätze)
Motive	• Frieden • Demokratie • Idealismus	• Machterhalt/ Souveränität • Sicherheit • Balance of Power	• Frieden/ Macht der Nationalstaaten überwinden • Wohlstand
Prozess	• einmaliger Verfassungssprung • schrittweise Föderalisierung	• Gipfeltreffen • Regierungstreffen	• Spill-over • Paketlösungen
Akteure	• alle politischen Ebenen • gesellschaftliche Gruppen	• Nationalstaaten • innerstaatliche Willensbildung	• supranationale Institutionen •Eliten
Ziele/ Leitbilder	• Bundesstaat • Vereinigte Staaten von Europa • Subsidiaritätsprinzip	• Staatenbund/Konföderation • Europa der Nationen	• Politische Union • „Form follows function“

Quelle: Giering 2004: 263 und eigene Darstellung.

1.4 Das europäische Mehrebenensystem

Da keiner der drei vorgestellten integrationstheoretischen Ansätze für sich in Anspruch nehmen kann, das europäische System der Außenbeziehungen vollständig und hinreichend zu erklären, rücken zunehmend Theorien „mittlerer Reichweite“ in den Fokus des wissenschaftlichen Diskurses. Sie analysieren einzelne Politikfelder, um – von dieser Basis ausgehend – Erkenntnisse über die Verknüpfung von Interessenformulierung und -durchsetzung auf nationaler und europäischer Ebene zu gewinnen. Das europäische Entscheidungssystem und seine Charakteristika („Mehrebenensystem“) werden demnach als Rahmen für das Zustandekommen europäischer Regelungen und somit als gegeben hingenommen (vgl. Jachtenfuchs/Kohler-Koch 1996).

Der Ansatz der *multi-level governance* beruht auf der Annahme, dass innerhalb der Europäischen Union die Entscheidungskompetenzen von unterschiedlichen Ebenen geteilt und nicht ausschließlich von staatlichen Exekutiven ausgeübt werden (vgl. Marks/Hooghe/Blank 1996: 346). Demnach besitzen supranationale Organe wie die Europäische Kommission und das Europäische Parlament einen eigenständigen Einfluss auf die Politikgestaltung und fungieren nicht ausschließlich als Agenten der Mitgliedsstaaten. Die kollektiven Entscheidungen gehen

daher häufig über den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner hinaus. Die politischen Arenen sind – diesem Ansatz zufolge – eher miteinander verknüpft als explizit aufeinander bezogen. Das Mehrebenenmodell hebt dabei eine Trennung zwischen Innen- und Außenpolitik, wie sie die Basis für jedwedes staatszentrierte Konzept darstellt, für alle europäisch diskutierten Themen auf. So sind die nationalen Arenen nach wie vor bedeutsam für die Herausbildung exekutiver Präferenzen auf nationaler Ebene, doch orientieren sich die subnationalen Akteure nicht ausschließlich an dieser Ebene, sondern sind gleichfalls in supranationalen Arenen aktiv. Auf europäischer Ebene agieren die Staaten als konstitutiver Teil der Gemeinschaft, jedoch nicht als alleinige vermittelnde Instanz zwischen supra- und subnationaler Ebene. Vielmehr teilen die Staaten auf europäischer Ebene die Kontrolle der politischen Aktivitäten auf ihrem Staatsgebiet (vgl. Marks/Hooghe/Blank 1996: 347).[1]

Das Mehrebenensystem der Europäischen Union ist nicht hierarchisch, Kompetenzen sind nicht immer eindeutig verteilt und das Zusammenwirken ist dynamischen Veränderungen unterworfen. Diese nichthierarchische Struktur des EU-Mehrebenensystems hat zur Folge, dass vornehmlich auf Verhandlungen und Konsens gesetzt wird. Andernfalls würden die Akteure eine zu schwache Legitimität der Entscheidungen und zu hohe Kosten für deren Umsetzung riskieren. Folglich erfordert dieses Mehrebenensystem eine intensive Politikkoordinierung zwischen den beteiligten politischen Institutionen sowie den gesellschaftlichen Akteuren. Zudem ergeben sich deutliche Auswirkungen auf die Politikgestaltung: Es lässt sich eine ansteigende Intransparenz des Systems erkennen, welche zu Schwierigkeiten der politischen Kontrolle und Legitimität führt. Gleichzeitig bedeutet dies aber auch eine Machtverschiebung hin zu den Akteuren an den „Schnittstellen“ der beteiligten Ebenen.[2] Die strukturellen Folgen des europäischen Mehrebenensystems können somit gleichermaßen positive wie auch negative Effekte hervorrufen (vgl. Grimm 2003: 33).

Überträgt man den nichthierarchischen, dynamischen Mehrebenenansatz auf die Organisation der EU-Außenbeziehungen, so wird deutlich, dass bereits auf nationaler Ebene eine Vielzahl von Akteuren beteiligt sind und der staatliche Anspruch auf ein Außenvertretungsmonopol in Frage gestellt wird. Angesichts des dynamischen internationalen Kontexts sehen sich die Nationalstaaten vor immer neue Herausforderungen gestellt, auf welche sie flexibel und teilwei-

[1] Politiken werden auf europäischer Ebene häufig in Fachministerräten diskutiert und verabschiedet, d.h. Vertreter der einzelnen Ministerien verhandeln direkt miteinander. Vor diesem Hintergrund macht es wenig Sinn, auf europäischer Ebene von Staaten oder Regierungen mit einheitlichem Interesse als zentralen Akteuren auszugehen. Zudem sind sowohl die europäische Ebene (EU-Kommission) wie auch die nationale Ebene (Ministerialbeamte der Mitgliedsstaaten) in der Komitologie am Entscheidungsprozess beteiligt (vgl. Marks/Hooghe/Blank 1996: 348).

[2] So öffnen sich beispielsweise weitere Wege zur politischen Beteiligung oder zur Verschiebung eines Problems hin zu einer anderen Ebene.

se mit neu zu entwickelnden Verfahren reagieren müssen. Der Europäischen Union hingegen fehlen Attribute eines Staates:

„Policy-making in the EU is not the same as in a domestic state. There is no central agenda-setting and co-ordinating actor, like the chief executive in a presidential system or the governing party in a parliamentary system" (Hix 1998: 39).

Europäisches Handeln im internationalen Kontext ist – nicht zuletzt durch den Souveränitätsanspruch der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten – begrenzt. Die Europäer agierten in erster Linie kollektiv, individuell, wirtschaftlich und politisch innerhalb eines Systems, jedoch weniger als einheitlicher Akteur (vgl. Hill 1993: 322).

Im Zuge neuer Überlegungen zur Problematik der politischen Steuerung wurde Mitte der 1990er Jahre von unterschiedlichen Autoren angeführt, dass man sich von der Vorstellung einer politischen Steuerung des Gesamtsystems lösen müsste und anstelle dessen den Blick verstärkt auf die Steuerung innerhalb des Systems richten soll (vgl. Mayntz 1995: 165). Diese Überlegung lässt sich auch auf die Außenpolitik der Europäischen Union übertragen. So betreiben die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten auf der einen Seite weiterhin eigenständige, nationale Politiken, auf der anderen Seite koordinieren sie ihre Außenpolitik innerhalb der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP). Ähnliche Tendenzen weisen auch die stark strukturierten Dimensionen der gemeinsamen Außenhandelspolitik und der Entwicklungspolitik auf. Will man jedoch einen einheitlichen außenpolitischen Akteur „EU" ausfindig machen, dem damit eben doch ein dem Nationalstaat entsprechendes Verhalten zugrunde liegt, sucht man vergeblich. Gleichwohl können Organe der Europäischen Gemeinschaft globale Ereignisse beeinflussen und mitgestalten. Somit mag die Europäische Union nicht über das Monopol der außenpolitischen Gestaltung Europas verfügen, sie kann aber nichtsdestotrotz eine Außenpolitik betreiben (vgl. Allen 1998: 43). Vor diesem Hintergrund kann man im Falle strategischen Handelns von einer europäischen Außenpolitik sprechen, die im Folgenden näher untersucht werden soll.

1.5 Konstruktivistische Überlegungen als Ergänzung integrationstheoretischer Ansätze

Auf unterschiedliche Art und Weise nähern sich die einzelnen vorgestellten Konzepte der Frage, welche Qualität eine europäische Integration in den Außenbeziehungen besitzt. Sie alle verweisen mehr oder weniger deutlich auf strukturelle Fragen, die zur Entscheidungsfindung der Akteure beitragen. Integration beruht demnach auf zunehmender Interaktion zwischen den Akteuren. Die Mechanismen der Interessenformulierung und Identitätsbildung bleiben in den genannten Erklärungsansätzen hingegen weitestgehend unberührt. Doch gerade für die Ent-

stehung einer außenpolitischen Rolle der EU sind die Grundlagen von Identitäten und ihre Veränderbarkeiten von großem Interesse. Um diesen Teil der Problematik nicht auszublenden, soll mittels eines alternativen Forschungsansatzes, dem Konstruktivismus, dieser Aspekt untersucht werden.

Der Konstruktivismus stellt einen Ansatz sozialer Forschung dar und ist keine Theorie (vgl. Checkel 1998: 324). Er kann daher nicht die integrationstheoretischen Überlegungen und den Mehrebenenansatz ersetzen, sondern vielmehr als Ergänzung zu diesen verstanden werden. Aus konstruktivistischer Sichtweise gestalten die Akteure soziale Strukturen, bewegen sich aber ihrerseits innerhalb dieser Strukturen, die ihre Vorstellungen und Handlungen beeinflussen. Materielle Strukturen bekommen ihre Bedeutung also erst aus dem sozialen Kontext, in dem sie interpretiert werden (vgl. Bretheron/Vogler 1999: 23). So entstehen beispielsweise nationale Interessen aus Auseinandersetzungen mit Strukturen und werden gleichermaßen auch in Strukturen ausgedrückt (vgl. Checkel 1998: 326).

Konstruktivisten gehen von einem individuell rational handelnden Akteur aus, dessen Interessen nicht exogen vorgegeben und bereits nach Präferenzen in eine eindeutige Reihenfolge gebracht wurden, sondern veränderbar sind (vgl. Engel 2000: 28). Überzeugungssysteme („belief systems“), die auf grundlegenden Wertvorstellungen, Kausalannahmen und Problemperzeptionen basieren, spielen bei der Verarbeitung von Informationen und der Herausbildung von Interessen eine entscheidende Rolle. Ausgehend von gemeinsamen philosophischen Prinzipien, Identitäten und Verhaltensnormen definieren die Akteure erst im Prozess der Bestimmung von Situationen ihre Interessen (vgl. Finnemore1996: 15). Aus diesen Auffassungen ergeben sich die Identitäten der Akteure, wobei ihr Verständnis der eigenen Rolle die Interpretation der externen Herausforderungen beeinflusst. Ihr Handeln orientiert sich an diesem Selbstverständnis und prägt wiederum die an die Akteure gestellten Forderungen. Die Reaktion auf die Anforderungen kann die Identität dann bestätigen und festigen oder aber in Frage stellen. Hieraus erwächst unweigerlich ein moralischer Diskurs:

„Moralische Diskurse fordern nicht nur Normen heraus oder versuchen, sie zu rechtfertigen, sondern sie wirken auch identitätsbildend. Die Vorstellung dessen, was moralisch angemessen ist, hängt auch in gewissem Maß davon ab, wie man sich selbst sieht, in welcher Rolle man sich sieht. Dieses dauerhafte Muster bildet eine außenpolitische Kultur, d.h. einen Rahmen, in dem sowohl staatliche Interessen und Ziele formuliert, als auch Strategien und Instrumente bestimmt werden, die sich zur Verwirklichung dieser Interessen und Ziele einsetzen lassen“ (Grimm 2003: 37f.).

Vor diesem Hintergrund kommt Normen als potentielles Mittel zur Bewertung von Verhalten nach „gut“ und „schlecht“ eine bedeutende Rolle zu.[3] Konstruktivisten sehen in Normen eine unabhängige Größe: Sie müssen sich nicht erst aus Regimebildungen ergeben, sondern können ihrerseits zu Regimebildungen führen. Diese Regime beeinflussen die *Policies* und überwachen die ihnen zugrunde liegenden Normen. Gemeinsame Normen und Identitäten setzen daher nicht zwangsläufig einen gemeinsamen Staat voraus (vgl. Klotz 1995: 19f.).

Abbildung I-2: Konstruktivistische Sicht der staatlichen Politikformulierung



Quelle: Klotz 1995: 20.

Da die Europäische Union seit über fünfzig Jahren ohne formalen Staatscharakter über eine Struktur mit Einfluss auf die Politikgestaltung verfügt, deren Qualität über die eines Regimes hinausreicht, stellt diese nichtstaatszentrierte Sicht ein geeignetes Modell zur Untersuchung der EU dar. Die Europäische Union besitzt in einigen Bereichen staatsähnliche Kompetenzen und ist eine weitere Ebene der Politikformulierung für europäische Staaten, so dass die Darstellung von Klotz leicht in Bezug auf den außenpolitischen Status der EU modifiziert werden kann.

Abbildung I-3: Politikformulierung im außenpolitischen System der EU



Quelle: Grimm 2003: 39.

[3] Normen besitzen im Vergleich zu Regeln eine andere Qualität. Während Regeln Verhaltensabläufe vorgeben, um ein bestimmtes Ziel zu erreichen, ermöglichen Normen eine weitere Bewertungskategorie neben der Überlegung, ob eine bestimmte Aktion zu dem gewünschten Ziel führt; vgl. Finnemore 1996: 23.

Ebenso wie Regime können auch gemeinsame Politikentwürfe der EG nationalstaatliche Politiken beeinflussen. Weiterhin können sie aber auch – abhängig vom Politikbereich – eine zusätzliche Politikebene bilden. Das außenpolitische System der EU ergibt sich daher, wenn man den 25 mitgliedstaatlichen Interessen die EG zur Seite stellt.

Zu den konstruktivistischen Grundannahmen zählt, dass Entscheidungsträgern die Wertschätzung anderer relevanter Personen wichtig ist und sie auf „schlechtes" Verhalten negative Reaktionen der für sie bedeutsamen Umwelt in Form von materiellen oder immateriellen Sanktionen fürchten (vgl. Risse-Kappen/Sikkink 1999: 8). Überträgt man diese Überlegung auf die internationalen Beziehungen, so kann man zu der Annahme gelangen, dass die Wertschätzung durch andere internationale Akteure bedeutsam für das Selbstverständnis von Staaten und auch für Gebilde wie die Europäische Union ist:

„Because a state's political identity emerges not in isolation but in relation to and in interaction with other groups of states and international non-state actors, the concept of socialization may be useful in understanding how the international society transmits norms to its members" (Risse-Kappen/Sikkink 1999: 11).

Risse-Kappen/Sikkink weisen in diesem Zusammenhang zu Recht darauf hin, dass die Staatengemeinschaft nicht aus der Summe aller als souverän anerkannten Staaten besteht, sondern weniger Staaten umfasst. Vielmehr ist die Sozialisation internationaler Normen der entscheidende Prozess, durch den ein Staat Teil der internationalen Gemeinschaft wird (vgl. Risse-Kappen/Sikkink 1999: 11). Innerhalb der internationalen Gemeinschaft bilden sich dann eventuell weitere Untergruppen heraus, welche ein besonders enges Verhältnis zueinander haben und daher stark zur Verbreitung von Normen beitragen. Die Europäische Union als besonders enge Elitekooperation mit stark verflochtenem wirtschaftlichen, kulturellen und historischen Hintergrund stellt ein solches Forum für die Anerkennung – verstanden als Wertschätzung – europäischer mitgliedsstaatlicher Eliten und die Bestätigung ihres außenpolitischen Selbstverständnisses durch Partner dar. Da es sich bei den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten um Demokratien handelt, ist selbstverständlich die „Wertschätzung" der Bürger – ausgedrückt durch die Stimmabgabe – für nationale Politiker vorrangig, wobei Rücksichtsmaßnahmen nach außen damit jedoch ausgeschlossen sind.

Entsprechend dem Mehrebenenansatz ist die Europäische Gemeinschaft eine zusätzliche Ebene der Politikformulierung, die parallel zu den anderen Ebenen existiert. Folglich kann sie theoretisch auch eine eigene außenpolitische Mission verfolgen, d.h. ihr Handeln an anderen Zielsetzungen ausrichten, als es ihre Mitgliedsstaaten tun. Sie muss in den Außenbeziehungen auch nicht auf den kleinsten gemeinsamen Nenner reduziert sein. Zwar setzen gemeinsame Zielformulierungen bei gemeinsamen Normen und Interessen an, doch kann eine veränderte

Wahrnehmung von außen – und somit auch veränderte externe Ansprüche an die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten – zu einer Rollenveränderung führen. Nichtsdestotrotz ist zu berücksichtigen, dass sich die Gemeinschaftsebene in ständiger Interaktion mit den nationalstaatlichen Akteuren befindet, mit denen sie sich die internationale Arena teilen muss.

In der Tradition rationalistischer Ansätze findet sich auch in konstruktivistischen Überlegungen die Idee neuer Präferenzbildung wider. Sie stellen gewissermaßen Abweichungen vom Idealzustand dar, welche aus einem Lernprozess[4] der Akteure auf Expertenebene hervorgehen. In einem System wie der Europäischen Union kommt es zu einem engen Austausch über Konzepte und Präferenzen verschiedener nationalstaatlicher Akteure und der europäischen Organe, der einen Lernprozess initiieren kann. Die unterschiedlichen Überzeugungssysteme der Akteure sind dabei von zentralem Interesse.[5] Da nicht alle Überzeugungen gleich gewichtig sind, lassen sie sich auch unterschiedlich leicht oder schwer verändern. In Bezug auf die europäischen Akteure sollten diese Überzeugungen in erster Linie an den Gegebenheiten der Umwelt orientiert sein und sich gegebenenfalls mit diesen ändern. Eine Kohärenz der verfolgten Politik ist folglich von gemeinsamen Überzeugungen abhängig (vgl. Sabatier 1993: 129f.). Die Dauerhaftigkeit von Überzeugung wird dadurch sichergestellt, dass Menschen Informationen so interpretieren, wie es ihrem Weltbild entspricht (vgl. Levy 1994: 290).

2. Die EU als außenpolitischer Akteur im Nord-Süd-Verhältnis

Nachdem in einer ersten Stufe die Grundzüge integrationstheoretischer Überlegungen zur Europäischen Union und ihres möglichen außenpolitischen Engagements skizziert wurden, soll im Folgenden – auf den dabei erzielten Erkenntnissen aufbauend – eine Vertiefung der Betrachtungen in Bezug auf das eigenständige Handeln der EU als außenpolitischer Akteur erfolgen. Dabei steht der Versuch im Mittelpunkt, eine wertorientierte EU-Außenpolitik zu untersuchen, die nach einer Verbreitung von Normen und deren Übernahme durch andere strebt. Hierzu müssen zunächst die kaum veränderlichen Kernüberzeugungen europäischer Außenpolitik herausgearbeitet werden, um anschließend eventuell gemeinsam zu vertretende

[4] Die konstruktivistischen Ansätze definieren soziales Lernen weitestgehend als Interaktionen, die zur Ausbildung neuer Präferenzen führen, ohne dass dafür offensichtliche materielle Anreize vorhanden sein müssen. Folglich kann soziales Lernen von Akteuren innerhalb der EU-Organe Überzeugungen eventuell verändern, doch sind hierfür nicht zwingend materielle Kompensationen für ein Einlenken in strittigen Fragen notwendig. Zur Idee des Lernens in Außenbeziehungen; vgl. Levy 1994.

[5] Sabatier und andere Autoren nehmen eine Dreiteilung von Überzeugungssystemen vor: (a) *fundamental assumptions and policy objectives*, (b) *strategic policy beliefs* und (c) *tactical beliefs*. Vgl. Sabatier 1993: 131; Levy 1994: 286.

Normen zu benennen. Daran anknüpfend gilt es danach zu fragen, welche Auswirkungen diese Policy-Überzeugungen auf die außenpolitische Rolle der EU im Nord-Süd-Kontext haben.

2.1 Grundlegende Überzeugungen – die europäische Zivilmacht

Laut Amsterdamer Vertrag liegt eines der Ziele der Europäischen Union in der *„Behauptung ihrer Identität auf internationaler Ebene, insbesondere durch eine Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik"* (EUV Art.2). Diese sich auf alle Bereiche der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik erstreckende gemeinsame Politik hat u.a. *„die Entwicklung und Stärkung von Demokratie und Rechtsstaatlichkeit sowie die Achtung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten"* zum Ziel (EUV Art.11, 1). Als logische Konsequenz dieser selbst auferlegten Prinzipien strebt die EU in ihren Erklärungen auf internationaler Ebene demokratischen Frieden und Multilateralismus an (vgl. Schimmelpfennig 2001: 59). Ihren Ursprung haben diese Werte in der Zielsetzung und Gründungsidee der Europäischen Gemeinschaft: Friedliche regionale Konfliktlösung durch Institutionalisierung und Verrechtlichung. Folglich basiert die Europäische Union auf liberalen Vorstellungen von Menschenrechten und Grundüberzeugungen und Praktiken, welche die Gemeinschaft ausmachen. Sie vertritt diese liberalen Prinzipien sozialer und politischer Ordnung nach innen und außen. Aus diesen Grundüberzeugungen heraus leitet sich der Konsens der Europäischen Union ab, der auf sozialen Pluralismus, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, demokratische politische Partizipation und Repräsentation, Privatbesitz und eine Marktwirtschaft abzielt (vgl. Schimmelpfennig 2001: 59).

Versteht man diesen Konsens als anzustrebende Ordnung, die ein friedliches Miteinander gewährleisten soll, so kommt man der Idee des „zivilisatorischen Hexagons" von Senghaas ziemlich nahe. Er benennt mit seinem Hexagon ganz allgemein die inneren Zielvorstellungen der westlichen industrialisierten Gesellschaften und stellt mit seinen Überlegungen zur zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung die Frage nach der „guten" Organisation gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens. In der Tradition der Modernisierungstheorie skizziert er die notwendigen gesellschaftlichen Wandlungsprozesse zur Erreichung des Ziels der Friedenskonsolidierung innerhalb des westlichen Nationalstaates.[6]

[6] (a) *Entprivatisierung von Gewalt*: Entscheidend für jeden Zivilisierungsprozess ist die Entprivatisierung von Gewalt, d.h. die Herstellung eines legitimen, staatlichen Gewaltmonopols. (b) *Kontrolle des Gewaltmonopols*: Damit dieses staatliche Gewaltmonopol als legitim angesehen wird, braucht es eine Einengung durch Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Diese Institution ermöglicht öffentliche demokratische Kontrolle, so dass Konflikte im institutionellen Rahmen ausgetragen werden können. (c) *Interdependenz und Affektkontrolle*: Die „Entwaffnung der Bürger" (Gewaltmonopol) und die institutionalisierte Konfliktregelung (Rechtsstaatlichkeit) erfordern von den Bürgern ein rationales Handeln und damit die Kontrolle von Affekten. Rationalität, Toleranz und Kompromissfähigkeit sind unerlässlich, um die notwendige Berechenbarkeit zur Etablierung von Interdependenzen zu erreichen. (d) *Demokratische Partizipation*: Die Offenheit der Teilnahme muss gewährleistet sein. Diskriminierungen ge-

Abbildung I-4: Das „zivilisatorische Hexagon“ nach Senghaas



Quelle: Senghaas 1994).

Diese nationalstaatlichen Zielsetzungen entsprechen dem Modell einer demokratisch-sozialpolitischen Innenpolitik, das eng mit dem außenpolitischen Verhalten verknüpft ist. Demnach muss die außenpolitische Überzeugung dann von den Bürgern unterstützt werden, wenn sie den Grundwerten der eigenen Gesellschaft nahe steht. Wenn auch von einem Staat als Akteur ausgegangen wird, kann auf der Suche nach einer außenpolitischen Kultur der EU in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Idee des „Zivilmachtskonzepts“ zurückgegriffen werden (vgl. Kirste/Maull 1996). Laut der Definition von Kirste/Maull ist eine Zivilmacht *„ein Staat, dessen außenpolitisches Rollenkonzept und Rollenverhalten gebunden sind an Zielsetzungen, Werte, Prinzipien sowie Formen der Einflussnahme und Instrumente der Machtausübung, die einer Zivilisierung der internationalen Beziehungen dienen“ (Kirste/Maull 1996: 300).*

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fährden die politische Stabilität und stellen die Rechtsstaatlichkeit in Frage. (e) *Soziale Gerechtigkeit*: Politische Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Chancengleichheit sind unerlässlich, um das Gefühl von fairer Behandlung der Mehrheit der Menschen in diesem politischen Rahmen entstehen zu lassen. (f) *Konstruktive politische Konfliktkultur*: Die Gewährleistung der oben genannten Punkte wird – so die Annahme – eine Akzeptanz der auf Kompromiss und Interessenausgleich basierten Konfliktlösungsinstitutionen ermöglichen. Toleranz und Konfliktfähigkeit werden als wesentlich für die politische Kultur verinnerlicht. Vgl. Senghaas 1994: 196-223.

Abbildung I-5: Eckpunkte zivilmachtorientierter Außenpolitik



Quelle: Grimm 2003: 49.

Die Eckpunkte des Zivilmachtskonzepts beruhen im Wesentlichen auf den Grundannahmen von Senghaas, doch liegt der Schwerpunkt nun auf der außenpolitischen Orientierung. Ausgangspunkt ist die Überlegung, dass Zivilmächte eine wertorientierte Außenpolitik betreiben. Demnach werden universelle Werte als Bestandteil nationaler Interessen verstanden. Bei der Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen greifen Zivilmächte – entsprechend ihrer eigenen Zielsetzungen – in erster Linie auf politische Instrumente zurück. Gewaltanwendung wird grundsätzlich abgelehnt (vgl. Kirste/Maull 1996: 302).[7] Auch die EU arbeitet mit dem Konzept der Zivilmacht, wenn sie internationale Ziele formulieren und Interessen durchsetzen will. Da – wie bereits angesprochen – das Rollenverhalten einer Zivilmacht den Versuch beinhaltet, andere Staaten zu veranlassen, eigene Normen zu übernehmen, ist im Falle der Europäischen Union die Fähigkeit notwendig, strategisch handeln zu können. Andernfalls ist eine Normdurchsetzung in außereuropäischen Drittstaaten nicht möglich. Um somit gemäß ihrer Grundsätze außenpolitisch agieren zu können, muss die Europäische Gemeinschaft in der Lage sein, einzelne in ihrer Zuständigkeit liegende Politikbereiche diesem außenpolitischen Ziel unterzuordnen. Sie muss in der Lage sein, in Bereichen, die nicht unmittelbar in ihrer Zuständigkeit liegen, die von ihr mitgestaltete Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten in diesem Sinne zu beeinflussen.

[7] In diesem Zusammenhang ist anzumerken, dass sich rein formal Zivilmächte und Nicht-Zivilmächte kaum voneinander unterscheiden lassen. Staaten handeln weitestgehend mehr oder weniger ausgeprägt als Zivilmächte. Vgl. Tewes 1997: 353.

Oder anders formuliert: Sie muss die Mitgliedsstaaten zu einem – ihren Zielsetzungen entsprechenden – außenpolitischen Handeln bewegen (vgl. Smith 1998: 83f.). Diskrepanzen zwischen den nationalstaatlichen Vorstellungen bezüglich der entsprechenden Politikgestaltung sind vorprogrammiert. Zwar sind die grundlegenden Normen der EU-Außenbeziehungen vertraglich festgelegt und zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten unstrittig, doch halten sich ihre Formulierungen recht allgemein und lassen entsprechend viel (Interpretations-) Spielraum. Folglich sind Unterschiede in den zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln und unterschiedliche Vorstellungen von den adäquaten, einsetzbaren Mitteln entscheidend für die Differenzen in den außenpolitischen Rollenausprägungen der Mitgliedsstaaten. Das Vorhandensein eines vertraglich festgelegten Normengerüsts allein setzt kein gemeinsames Rollenverständnis in der Interpretation externer Herausforderungen voraus. Vielmehr muss sich eine gemeinsame Identität in der europäischen Außenpolitik entwickeln, welche in regelmäßigen internen Positionsabstimmungen und in Verhandlungen mit Drittstaaten von den Akteuren erneut bestätigt oder in Frage gestellt wird (vgl. Friis 1996: 37).

In Hinblick auf die Normenverbreitung jenseits der Europäischen Union ergibt sich ein anderes Bild als innerhalb der EU. Da eine wertorientierte Außenpolitik die Übernahme von Normen verlangt, ruft sie zum Teil massive Widerstände in den Zielländern hervor. Den Partner zu überzeugen erfordert Zeit, Wissen, Erfahrung und Selbstverpflichtung. Die Überzeugungsarbeit muss dabei gegenseitiges Verständnis der Partner umfassen. Ein solcher gegenseitiger Austausch betrifft sowohl die eigene Position, welche immer wieder in Frage gestellt werden kann, als auch die Instrumente der Durchsetzung einer formulierten Position (vgl. Smith 1998: 79). In Bezug auf grundlegende Werte und Normen werden die Akteure immer bestrebt sein, ihre eigenen Überzeugungen zu behaupten. Auch widerstrebende Partner können demokratische Normen und die Achtung der Menschenrechte zunächst verbal übernehmen, ohne von ihnen überzeugt zu sein. Dies kann aus strategischen Gründen – beispielsweise zur Vermeidung von Sanktionsmaßnahmen durch ihre Umwelt – geschehen. Bei nachlassendem äußeren Druck besteht dann jedoch die Gefahr, dass sie in ihr ursprüngliches Verhaltensmuster zurückfallen.[8] Eine erstmögliche Reaktion auf Normenverstöße ist in einem solchen Fall das Ignorieren des Verstoßes, da nicht jedes normabweichendes Verhalten

[8] Risse-Kappen und Sikkink argumentieren in diesem Zusammenhang, dass jedoch selbst in diesem Fall die Chance besteht, dass Normen selbsttragend werden, d.h. die widerstrebenden Akteure aus rein praktischen Überlegungen die Normen an sich nicht argumentativ in Frage stellen. Demnach richten die beiden Autoren ihren Blick auf die „Sozialisation“ von Normen. Ziel der Sozialisation ist demnach die Internalisierung der Normen seitens der Akteure, welche nachfolgend selbst zwischen „gutem“ und „schlechtem“ Verhalten unterscheiden können. Externer Druck ist folglich nicht mehr zwingend notwendig, um die Normenverbreitung zu erreichen. Weiterhin besteht die Option, normenanerkennendes Verhalten positiv zu sanktionieren und damit weitere materielle Anreize für strategisches Verhalten zu bieten. Dies geschieht wohlgemerkt in der Hoffnung, dass eine

Ignorieren des Verstoßes, da nicht jedes normabweichendes Verhalten automatisch die verletzte Norm entwertet. Normenverstöße können zudem auch dann als gerechtfertigte Ausnahmen deklariert werden, wenn sich die beteiligten Akteure darüber einig sind, dass die entsprechende Norm auch künftig als Orientierungsmarke für ihre Entscheidungen dient (vgl. Gehring 1995: 203). Eine Gefährdung der Norm besteht jedoch dann, wenn diese wiederholt verletzt wird. An dieser Stelle stellt sich die Frage nach den Handlungsoptionen bei einem abermaligen Versagen des politischen Dialogs.

Sanktionierung kann sowohl eine positive Reaktion bei normenkonformem Verhalten sein als auch eine negative Reaktion auf Normenverletzung darstellen.[9] Ein Hinweis dafür, dass politischer Dialog als alleiniges Instrument zur Einhaltung von Normen oftmals als unzureichend eingestuft wird, ist die Einführung von Konditionalitäten in der Zusammenarbeit mit nichtwestlichen Staaten. Materielle wie immaterielle Anerkennung kann entzogen werden. Dies kann von diplomatischen Protestnoten und öffentlichem Anprangern von Normenverstößen bis zum Abbruch der diplomatischen Kontakte und Einschränkung des Handels mit Normenverletzern reichen. Weiterhin kann auch der Entzug immaterieller Unterstützung materielle Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen. Wird beispielsweise ein Land von den Geberländern oder -organisationen als nichtkreditwürdig eingestuft, wird diesem Lande auch die Kreditaufnahme auf dem privaten Kapitalmarkt erheblich erschwert. Im Härtefall sind bei Normenverletzungen sogar militärische Aktionen denkbar, wobei ein solches militärisches Engagement im Widerspruch zur Rolle der EU als Zivilmacht und den Gründungsgedanken der EU stehen würde.

Die Wirksamkeit von Sanktionen hängt – über ihren symbolischen Wert hinaus – von Faktoren ab, die allesamt auf dem Machtverhältnis zwischen den Partnern beruhen:

- der internen Machstellung der Regierung des Partnerlandes,
- der Möglichkeit der Regierung des Partners, externen Druck dazu zu nutzen, Unterstützung für die eigene Position zu finden (Bumerang-Effekt)[10],

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Unterstützung des zunächst nur strategischen Verhaltens mittelfristig zu einer Internalisierung der Normen führt. Vgl. Risse-Kappen/Sikkink 1999: 11.

[9] Auch neorealistische und neoliberale Autoren sehen die Möglichkeit von Sanktionierung zur Interessendurchsetzung als wichtiges Instrument der Außenpolitik. Sie stufen die Bedeutung des politischen Dialogs jedoch deutlich geringer ein, da er aus ihrer Sicht vornehmlich als Rechtfertigung für Sanktionierung seitens des Stärkeren oder Verhindern von Sanktionierung seitens des Schwächeren dient. Die rationalistische Theorie legt dabei besonderes Gewicht auf materielle Sanktionen (z.B. Wirtschaftsembargos), während der Konstruktivismus immaterielle und symbolische Sanktionen wie das Aussetzen diplomatischer oder kultureller Kontakte betont. Vgl. Boekle/Rittberger/Wagner 2001: 79.

[10] Ein Bumerang-Effekt erzielt das Gegenteil der intendierten Wirkung. Demnach fallen negative Sanktionen auf den „strafenden“ Staat zurück, welcher durch die Einführung von Sanktionsmaßnahmen als „der Schuldige“ für eine politische Situation wahrgenommen wird.

- der Abhängigkeit der Regierung des Partnerlandes (z.B. vom europäischen Marktzugang und/oder von Entwicklungshilfe),
- dem Umfang und der Bedeutung des Verhältnisses zum Druck ausübenden Geber,
- der Möglichkeit, einen ungewollten Schneeball-Effekt mit den Sanktionen auszulösen, welcher die EU selbst unter Zugzwang setzen könnte,
- der Koordination unter den EU-Staaten, um das Ausscheren wichtiger Mitgliedsstaaten aus den vereinbarten Sanktionen zu vermeiden,
- möglichen weiteren negativen Effekten der Sanktionen, etwa auf regionale Spannungen oder auch eigene Handels- oder Investitionsinteressen oder Rohstoffabhängigkeiten und
- mehrfachen Konditionalitäten (politische, ökonomische, etc.), die aufeinander abgestimmt sein müssen, um wirksam zu sein (Grimm 2003: 55).

Ein heikles Thema bei der Verhängung von Sanktionen ist nach wie vor das Messen mit unterschiedlichen Maßstäben. So erscheint es beispielsweise unwahrscheinlich, dass die westlichen Industriestaaten – angesichts eigener Interessen – konsequent längerfristige Sanktionen gegen die Volksrepublik China wegen eklatanter Menschenrechtsverstöße aufrechterhalten werden. Nicht zuletzt machen Bumerang-Effekte Sanktionen zu einem nicht unproblematischen Instrument.

2.2 Normen und Werte in der entwicklungspolitischen Debatte

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist ein relativ junger Politikbereich innerhalb der Außenbeziehungen. An dieser Stelle gilt es in einer ersten Phase die normativen Grundannahmen („*policy beliefs*“) der entwicklungstheoretischen Diskussion zu untersuchen, die das Aktionsfeld der europäischen Akteure bestimmen. Welcher Entwicklungsbegriff liegt diesen Normen zugrunde und welche Instrumente sind zur Implementation grundsätzlich in Betracht zu ziehen?

Bereits der Versuch einer allgemeinen Definition ruft den Widerspruch der Entwicklungspolitik hervor: Demnach liegt die Eigenständigkeit der Entwicklungshilfe als Politikbereich in der Berücksichtigung der Interessen der Partnerländer und der Langfristigkeit ihrer Perspektive begründet. Sie stellt jedoch als grenzüberschreitende Politik einen Bestandteil der Außenpolitik dar (vgl. Bodemer/Thibaut/Barrios 2001: 84). Motivationen zur Entwicklungshilfe finden sich auf Geberseite im Ideal der Gerechtigkeit, der christlichen Nächstenliebe und dem Gedanken der Solidarität. Folglich orientiert sich Entwicklungspolitik im Idealfall am Gemeinwohl von Gesellschaften in den Partnerstaaten. Ebenso soll sie jedoch auch positive Auswirkungen auf die Gesellschaften in den Geberländern erzielen. Somit wird wenigstens indirekt auf eine meist als sekundär angeführte Motivation der Geberländer hingewiesen: eine Verbes-

serung der Sicherheitslage des Gebers. Dem neorealistischen Argumentationsmuster zufolge können durch die Verbesserung der ökonomischen, sozialen und ökologischen Lage anderer Gesellschaften gewaltsame Konflikte vermieden bzw. abgeschwächt werden:

„ [Die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit] wird durch die Erkenntnis bestimmt, dass ohne Mitwirkung der Staaten und ohne die Einbeziehung aller Menschen auch unsere Zukunft nicht dauerhaft zu sichern ist. Entwicklungspolitik ist eine Investition in unsere eigene Zukunft" (BMZ 1999: 23).

Letztlich sind Eigeninteressen also kaum von normativen Überlegungen wie friedlicher Konfliktbeilegung, Menschenrechten oder demokratischen Regierungsformen zu trennen. Nichtsdestotrotz weist die ursprüngliche Bezeichnung der Entwicklungshilfe als „technische Hilfe" auf ein anfänglich unpolitisches Verständnis der aufgewendeten Hilfsgelder hin. Die Entwicklungstheorie hat ihren Ursprung als eigenständige Disziplin in den 1950er Jahren. Als Gegenmodell zur Attraktivität des sowjetischen Gesellschaftsmodells in den entkolonialisierten Gebieten gedacht, basiert die Entwicklungspolitik im Wesentlichen auf den Annahmen der Modernisierungstheorie, die sich mit Fragen des sozialen und mentalen Wandels in traditionellen Gesellschaften befasst.[11] Entwicklung wurde demnach zu Beginn als lineares Modell aufeinander folgenden Transformationsphasen verstanden. Ziel der Entwicklung war die moderne Industriegesellschaft im Zeitalter des Massenkonsums amerikanischen Zuschnitts (vgl. Menzel 1993: 21). Oder anders formuliert: Entwicklung setzte man mit der Erhöhung des Bruttosozialprodukts gleich (vgl. Finnemore 1996: 95). Entwicklungspolitik mit der Entwicklungshilfe als Katalysator sollte der Förderung eines vorhandenen Potentials dienen. Dieses galt es durch gezielte Hilfe nutzbar zu machen.

Die Idee der wirtschaftlichen, politischen und gesellschaftlichen Steuerung zwecks Initialisierung von Wandlungsprozessen besteht nach wie vor. Verändert hat sich hingegen das Verständnis von „Entwicklung". Einen breiten diesbezüglichen Konsens bietet die Deklaration der UN-Vollversammlung zum Recht auf Entwicklung aus dem Jahr 1986:

„ […] development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process, which aims at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire population and of all individuals on the basis of their active, free and meaningful participation in development and in the fair distribution of benefits resulting therefrom" (zitiert nach: Stokke 1995: 39).

Entwicklung wird demnach als andauernder, vielschichtiger und dynamischer Prozess in den genannten Bereichen verstanden. Jedoch bedeutet die „rein technische" Unterstützung einzelner Projekte in den Partnerländern einen Eingriff von außen mit oftmals weitreichenden Kon-

[11] Nach Mentzel ist innerhalb der Modernisierungstheorie zwischen drei Arbeitsfeldern zu unterscheiden: der Entwicklungsökonomie, den Theorien zur Nationalstaatsbildung sowie den Modernisierungstheorien im engeren Sinne. Die modernisierungstheoretischen Wurzeln reichen jedoch bis zur klassischen Nationalökonomie im 17. und 18. Jahrhundert zurück. Vgl. Mentzel 1993: 3-45.

sequenzen, da Hilfszahlungen der Geberländern meist an Bedingungen – gemäß den eigenen Wertvorstellungen – geknüpft sind. Das Schlüsselelement für entsprechende Konditionalitäten ist der Einsatz von Druck seitens des Gebers, der mit dem Ende der Hilfe droht. Hilfszahlungen werden folglich dazu genutzt, Ziele zu erreichen, denen die Empfängerstaaten andernfalls nicht zustimmen würden (vgl. Stokke 1995: 12). Hieraus lässt sich folgendes Paradigma ableiten:

„Durch Mittelzuwendungen von außen […] werden Regierungen von finanziellem Druck entlastet, der aus gesellschaftlichen Ansprüchen […] entsteht, und erhalten so eventuell Freiräume für Aktivitäten in anderen Bereichen. Externe Akteure erhalten so Möglichkeiten für eine starke gestalterische Einflussnahme" (Grimm 2003: 59).

Hilfszahlungen können demnach Herrschaftsstrukturen stützen oder schwächen. Sie haben in jedem Fall – beabsichtigt oder nicht – explizite politische Auswirkungen. Entwicklungshilfe ist daher zwangsläufig politisch. Die Aufnahme entwicklungspolitischer Überlegungen in außenpolitische Konzepte erscheint vor diesem Hintergrund konsequent, zumal auch das Bewusstsein der Akteure einer Veränderung hinsichtlich ihrer „politischen Rolle" in Empfängerländern bedarf.

Will man den Erfolg bzw. Misserfolg verschiedener Entwicklungsstrategien messen, so erscheint dieses Unterfangen quasi unmöglich, da monokausale Erklärungsversuche hierzu ungeeignet sind. Vielmehr basieren Entwicklungsstrategien auf einem regional unterschiedlichen Zusammenspiel von Faktoren, von denen allenfalls einige wichtige in Fallstudien herausgearbeitet werden können. *Die* Zusammensetzung von Maßnahmen, welche eine künftig erfolgreiche Entwicklung in armen Ländern garantieren würde, existiert nicht. Folglich weisen die Strategien zur Förderung des Entwicklungsprozesses – gemäß der Vorstellung von Entwicklung der involvierten Akteure – unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte hinsichtlich ihrer Zielsetzungen auf. Zudem werden häufig neue Zielvorstellungen formuliert, ohne dass diese zuvor erklärte Ziele unterminieren. Gemein ist den meisten gängigen Entwicklungsstrategien, dass sie die Forderungen nach Demokratisierung und Beachtung der Menschenrechte zur grundsätzlichen Bedingung für Entwicklung erklären. Wichtigster Gradmesser der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist jedoch die *„Official Development Assistance"* (ODA). Der Entwicklungsausschuss (DAC) der OECD definiert sie als *„flows to developing countries and multilateral institutions provided by official agencies, including state and local governments or by their executive agencies, each transaction of which meets the following tests: a) it is administered with the promotion of the economic development and welfare of developing countries as its main objective, and b) it is concessional in character and contains a grant element of at least 25 per cent" (Hook 1995: 19).*

Diese Definition setzt den öffentlichen Transfer von finanziellen Leistungen zu Sonderbedingungen für Entwicklungsbemühungen voraus. Akteure sind die staatlichen und multilateralen Einrichtungen. Es gibt einen Mindestkreditanteil und die Verwendung muss der Entwicklung des Empfängerlandes dienen. Als entscheidender Grundsatz gilt die Orientierung an der Wohlstandsverteilung, wodurch sich diese Definition von anderen Formen der Auslandshilfe (militärische Hilfe, Handelskooperation etc.) unterscheidet. ODA ist *ein* Instrument der Auslandshilfe in Form von Finanztransfers. Bei der Betrachtung des finanziellen Engagements Europas gilt es daher zwischen den Entwicklungshilfezahlungen der europäischen Staaten und den Hilfsleistungen, welche von der Europäischen Gemeinschaft verwaltet und aufgewendet wird, zu unterscheiden.

2.3 Konditionalitäten und „Good Governance" in den Hilfsbeziehungen zum Süden

2.3.1 Konditionalisierung als Verfahrensweise zur Initiierung friedensfördernder Maßnahmen

Die meisten Geberorganisationen praktizieren Konditionalitäten im Durchführungsbereich, wobei sich diese nach dem Grad der Intervention in den Empfängerstaaten richten. Implementationskonditionalitäten sind beispielsweise Fragen des Abrechnungsverfahrens, Sonderbedingungen für Importe von technischem Material für die Durchführung einer Maßnahme oder Fragen der Modalitäten für die Kreditrückzahlung. Sie werden auf unterschiedlichen Ebenen eingesetzt und reichen bis zu systemischen Bedingungen wie die Einführung einer Marktwirtschaft oder eines Mehrparteiensystems.[12]

Konditionalitäten zielen explizit auf systemische Aspekte ab.[13] Demokratische Reformen, Menschenrechte und Rechenschaftspflicht bei der Verwaltung sind hierbei die Kernelemente. Allerdings wirft das Eingreifen in die Strukturen anderer Staaten Fragen hinsichtlich der Legi-

[12] Stokke spricht von sechs Ebenen von Konditionalitäten. Zur höchsten Interventionsstufe zählt er jedwede Konditionalisierung, die auf die systemische Ebene abzielen. Des Weiteren sind der Einfluss auf die nationale Politikagenda, Versuche der Einflussnahme auf einzelne Politikbereiche, die Programm-/Projektebene, finanzielle Konditionalitäten und Durchführungsbedingungen weitere Ebenen von Konditionalitäten. Vgl. Stokke 1995: 14f.

[13] Dies war nicht immer der Fall. Insbesondere in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren orientierten sich Konditionalitäten – in neoklassischer ökonomischer Tradition – ausschließlich an wirtschaftlichen Reformen in den Empfängerländern. Sie wurden in die Strukturanpassungsprogramme des IWF und der Weltbank aufgenommen und fanden Niederschlag in den Forderungen nach Verwaltungsreformen und einem ausgeglichenem Staatshaushalt. Damit hatten diese Konditionalitäten zwar politische Implikationen, doch zielten sie vornehmlich auf Marktliberalisierungen ab. Da Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen als alleiniges „Allheilmittel" in Hinblick auf Entwicklungsfortschritte in den Empfängerländern nicht griffen, ist man mittlerweile von diesem Standpunkt abgerückt. Dies geschah nicht zuletzt auch deshalb, weil sich das Ziel von „Entwicklung" aufgrund globaler ökologischer Probleme von der Massenkonsumgesellschaft zum Ideal einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung verschoben hat. Die allumfassende Vorstellung von Entwicklung ist einer stärker ausdifferenzierten Betrachtung gewichen. Folglich bedarf es auch eines ähnlich ausdifferenzierten Umgangs mit Konditionalitäten. Vgl. Stokke 1995: 1.

timität von Konditionalitäten auf. Jedes politische System ist im Inneren auf ein Mindestmaß an Legitimität angewiesen. Durch Konditionalitäten werden die Handlungsspielräume der Entwicklungsländer zusätzlich von außen durch die Forderungen der Geber begrenzt. Folglich könnte die betroffene Gesellschaft des Empfängerlandes hierin eine Verletzung ihres Souveränitätsanspruchs sehen, wenn die lokalen Ansprüche nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt werden bzw. nicht auf die Forderung nach adäquaten Gegenleistungen verzichtet wird. Auch nicht unmittelbar von Eigeninteressen der Geber geleitete Hilfe verliert ansonsten ihre Legitimität in den Empfängerstaaten. Damit auch die Gesellschaften der Geberländer entwicklungspolitische Hilfsmaßnahmen als legitim betrachten, muss es auf Seiten der Geber ein Minimum an Überzeugung geben, was die Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungspolitik betrifft.

Da – wie bereits festgestellt – externe Hilfe nie vollständig unpolitisch sein kann und über Konditionalitäten gesellschaftliche Veränderungen angestrebt werden, stellt sich für die Legitimität von Konditionalitäten die Frage, welche Ziele gesellschaftlicher Entwicklung grundsätzlich anvisiert werden sollen. Der *Bericht über die menschliche Entwicklung* des UNDP leitet aus den Menschenrechten normativ eine Verpflichtung zur Unterstützung von menschlicher Entwicklung ab. Demnach wird menschliche Entwicklung als die Möglichkeit verstanden, in Freiheit, Wohlergehen und Würde zu leben:

„Menschenrechte und menschliche Entwicklung sind Konzepte, bei denen es um die Sicherstellung grundlegender Freiheiten geht. Menschenrechte bringen den mutigen Gedanken zum Ausdruck, dass alle Menschen Ansprüche auf soziale Ordnungen haben, die sie vor den schlimmsten Missbräuchen und Entbehrungen schützen und die Freiheit für ein Leben in Würde gewährleisten“ (UNDP 2000: 2).

Weiterhin betont das UNDP den Stellenwert von politischen und bürgerlichen Rechten sowie demokratischen Freiheiten. Grundvoraussetzung hierfür ist die Durchsetzung einer demokratischen Kultur auf allen Ebenen der Gesellschaft, welche bestehende Werte verändern kann und in der Lage ist, Ungleichheiten und Ungerechtigkeiten zu beseitigen. Um solch eine Basis für demokratische Werte zu schaffen, erscheinen Konditionalitäten als legitimes Mittel (vgl. UNDP 2000: 69; 82f.). Die Betrachtung der UNDP setzt jedoch die Abwesenheit von Krieg voraus. Nur in einer friedlichen Konfliktbearbeitung können die benannten Ziele – politische und bürgerliche Rechte sowie demokratische Freiheiten – zur Problemlösung beitragen.[14] Daher muss die Förderung von Entwicklung bei den Grundlagen staatlichen Handelns ansetzen. Somit geht es weniger um die Förderung wirtschaftlicher, gesellschaftlicher und sozialer

[14] In vielen Staaten Subsahara-Afrikas stellt die Abwesenheit von Krieg jedoch keine realistische Ausgangssituation dar. Die Unabhängigkeit der Staaten Afrikas ist vielmehr gekennzeichnet von einer Vielzahl militärischer Konflikte innerhalb der Staatsgrenzen. Trotz der „geringen“ Zahl zwischenstaatlicher Kriege ist Afrika ein konfliktreicher Kontinent. So wurden bzw. werden seit 1970 rund die Hälfte der afrikanischen Staaten kontinuierlich oder zeitweilig von Bürgerkriegen heimgesucht. Vgl. Matthies 1998: 50f.

Entwicklung als vielmehr zunächst darum, sie zu ermöglichen (vgl. Grimm 2003: 67). Bürgerkriege sind in diesem Zusammenhang daher weniger als ein militärisches Phänomen, sondern eher als ein politisches (Staatszerfall), soziales (gesellschaftliche Desintegration) und ökonomisches (Bürgerkriegsökonomie) zu verstehen. In einer solchen Situation stellt eine umfassende Friedenskonsolidierung die entscheidende Vorbedingung für Entwicklung dar. Folglich ist sie bei der Formulierung von Konditionalitäten in angemessener Weise zu berücksichtigen. Diese Auffassung erfährt mittlerweile in entwicklungspolitischen Kreisen eine breite Zustimmung. Hierfür verantwortlich sind nicht zuletzt die zahlreichen negativen Erfahrungen:

„Zum einen stellte man fest, dass immense Entwicklungsinvestitionen in langen Bürgerkriegen im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes ‚verpulvert' wurden. Zum anderen erkannte man die Notwendigkeit, in den Wiederaufbau zu investieren, um günstige Ausgangsbedingungen zu schaffen, und um die entwicklungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit nicht zu einem reinen ‚Reparaturbetrieb' für die Beseitigung immer neuer Kriegsschäden verkommen zu lassen" (Matthies 1997: 256).

2.3.2 „Good Governance" als Element europäischer Entwicklungspolitik

Wie zuvor angesprochen, herrscht Konsens darüber, dass die Förderung von Entwicklung in enger Verbindung mit den Grundlagen staatlichen Handelns betrachtet werden muss. In diesem Zusammenhang tauchte in der entwicklungspolitischen Diskussion zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre verstärkt der Begriff *„Good Governance"* – zu deutsch etwa „verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung" – auf.[15] Zentraler Bestandteil des *Governance*-Begriffs ist die Organisation und die praktische Funktionsweise des Staatsapparates, wobei in einem weiter gefassten Verständnis demokratische Willensbildung, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, die Beachtung der Menschenrechte und eine Orientierung an marktwirtschaftlichen Prinzipien als Elemente hinzukommen. Es wird davon ausgegangen, dass *Good Governance* entweder eine Vorbedingung oder ein Produkt eines erfolgreichen Entwicklungsprozesses sei (vgl. Conzelmann 2003: 468). Hingegen besteht keine Einigkeit über den genauen Inhalt des Konzepts.[16] So lässt sich konstatieren, dass die Bedeutsamkeit von *Good Governance* zwar überall anerkannt ist, jedoch so gut wie jeder Akteur etwas Unterschiedliches darunter versteht.[17] Daher stellt sich die Frage, ob es sich lediglich um Akzentuierungen des Begriffsverständnisses handelt, wonach gleichwohl ein gemeinsamer Kern des Begriffsinhalts

[15] Gleiches gilt auch für die entwicklungspolitische Praxis, in der Geber die Beachtung von *Governance*-Kriterien zu einer Bedingung für die Freigabe von Hilfsgeldern machen.

[16] Einendes Band dieses sehr breiten Katalogs von *Governance*-Kriterien ist lediglich der Umstand, dass es sich um endogene Größen handelt, sich also zuletzt mit ihnen eine Absage an ältere dependenztheoretische Ansätze verbindet. Vgl. Conzelmann 2003: 468.

[17] Einen umfassenden Überblick über die divergierenden Auffassungen und Auslegungen des *Governance*-Konzepts bietet Faust 2005.

ein gemeinsamer Kern des Begriffsinhalts feststellbar ist, oder gerade durch das Fehlen expliziter Definitionen *Governance* als „Regenschirm-Konzept“ nutzbar wird, unter welches schwer greifbare politische Prozesse und Interessen sowie Wertpräferenzen subsumiert werden können (vgl. Adam 2000: 272). In Hinblick auf die thematische Ausrichtung dieser Arbeit ist daher vor allem danach zu fragen, welche inhaltlichen Konkretisierungen *Good Governance* im Rahmen der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit den AKP-Staaten erfährt und in welcher Weise sie zu einem operationellen Konzept gemacht wird.[18]

Bereits 1991 wurde die *Governance*-Thematik von der EU aufgegriffen. In einer Entschließung des Entwicklungsministerrats über Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Entwicklung vom 28. November 1991 heißt es:

„[Der Rat] unterstreicht die Bedeutung einer verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung. Souveräne Staaten haben sicherlich das Recht, ihre eigenen Verwaltungsstrukturen zu schaffen und sich ihre eigenen verfassungsrechtlichen Strukturen zu geben, doch eine ausgewogene Entwicklung kann auf Dauer nur wirksam erzielt werden, wenn eine Reihe allgemeiner Grundsätze des Regieren beachtet werden: Eine vernünftige Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik, demokratische Beschlussfassung, angemessene Transparenz des Regierens und finanzielle Verantwortlichkeit, Schaffung eines mit marktwirtschaftlichen Grundsätzen kompatiblen Entwicklungsumfeldes, Maßnahmen zur Bekämpfung der Korruption sowie Wahrung der Rechtsstaatlichkeit, der Menschenrechte sowie der Presse- und Meinungsfreiheit“ (zitiert nach Duparc 1993: 57).

Die Formulierung dieser Entschließung darf jedoch nicht so verstanden werden, dass es bereits zum damaligen Zeitpunkt eine geteilte Auffassung zur Bedeutsamkeit von *Good Governance* in der Entwicklungspolitik gegeben hätte. Vielmehr überdeckt das obige Zitat die damals noch weit auseinander liegenden *Good Governance*-Auffassungen zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten. Ein konkreteres, wenngleich auch deutlich enger gefasstes Verständnis von *Good Governance* fand sich erst 1995 im revidierten Lomé-IV-Abkommen wieder:

„Development policy and cooperation shall be closely linked to respect for und enjoyment of fundamental human rights and to the recognition and application of democratic principles, the consolidation of the rule of law and good governance. The role and potential of initiatives taken by individuals and groups shall be recognized in order to achieve in practice real participation of the population in the development process in accordance with Article 13. In this context good governance shall be a particular aim of cooperation operations” (Art. 5 des revidierten Lomé-IV-Abkommens).

Durch diese Formulierung wird der Begriffsinhalt von *Good Governance* von den Fragen der Demokratie, der Achtung der Menschenrechte und der Rechtsstaatlichkeit geschieden. Die begriffliche Abtrennung von Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Demokratie und Menschenrechten erlaubte derweil die Ausweisung von *Good Governance* als einem nicht wesentlichen Element des

[18] Mit „operationell“ ist in diesem Zusammenhang ein Zustand gemeint, in dem das Konzept im Rahmen seiner Implementation eine konkrete Bedeutung jenseits einer allgemeinen Bezugnahme auf *Governance*-Normen erhält. Dies gilt beispielsweise im Hinblick auf Förderprogramme oder Konditionalitäten.

Lomé-IV-Vertrags und erwies sich somit auch für die AKP-Staaten als akzeptabel. Vor diesem Hintergrund konzentrierte sich die europäische Gemeinschaftspolitik auf die Förderung von *Governance*-Projekten in den AKP-Staaten, während eine Sanktionierung von Verstößen gegen eine „gute" Regierungsführung auch weiterhin nicht möglich war. So flossen in der zweiten Hälfte der 1990er Jahre die *Governance*-bezogenen Entwicklungshilfegelder vornehmlich in Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Verwaltungsreformen und Dezentralisierung und in die Korruptionsbekämpfung.[19] Der relative Stellenwert dieser Förderung wird jedoch weitestgehend als verhältnismäßig gering eingestuft, auch wenn *Good Governance* in der EU-Entwicklungspolitik einen geringfügig höheren Stellenwert genießt als in den bilateralen Entwicklungspolitiken vieler europäischer Staaten (vgl. Crawford 2000: 111-114; Zanger 2000).[20]

In Reaktion auf den lockeren Zusammenhang zwischen den offiziell geäußerten Zielsetzungen und den praktischen Förderentscheidungen sowie auf die Kritik der AKP-Staaten am schwammigen Begriffsinhalt von *Good Governance* unternahm die Kommission 1998 den Versuch einer näheren inhaltlichen Bestimmung, der in eine Ratsentschließung vom 30. November mündete. Demnach lautete die Definition der Kommission wie folgt:

„The concept of good governance remains implicit in a political and institutional environment respecting human rights, democratic principles and the rule of law. But it takes specific account of the role of the authorities in managing resources, promoting a favourable climate for economic and social initiatives and deciding how to allocate resources. Good governance therefore implies the existence of competent and effective institutions respecting democratic principles. The concept therefore extends the aims of democratisation into the sphere of resource management" (Kommission 1998d: 14f.).

Doch auch dieses Konzept erwies sich in den Verhandlungen mit den AKP-Staaten zu einer Revision des Lomé-Abkommens als problematisch. Die AKP-Staaten lehnten die Aufnahme eine *Governance*-Klausel mit der Begründung ab, dass es weder eine präzise Definition des Konzepts selbst noch Standards zu seiner Messung gibt. Zudem befürchtete man eine willkürliche Verwendung des Prinzips durch die EU, zumal die mit dem *Governance*-Begriff verbundenen Zielsetzungen – Demokratie, Achtung der Menschenrechte und Rechtsstaatlichkeit – bereits in den bestehenden Abkommen enthalten seien. Im Gegenzug argumentierte die EU-Seite, dass *Good Governance* mit der Konzentration auf das Management des Entwicklungsprozesses sehr wohl Fragen anspreche, welche von den damals existierenden wesentlichen

[19] So wurden in den Jahren 1996 bis 1999 ca. 1,5 Mio. € für Korruptionsbekämpfung und Schaffung von Transparenz in der öffentlichen Verwaltung in den AKP-Staaten eingesetzt. Vgl. Kommission 2000c: 21.

[20] Cox und Chapman sprechen von einem Anstieg der für *Governance* und zivilgesellschaftliche Projekte veranschlagten Ausgaben von einem Anteil von 0,1 Prozent am gesamten entwicklungspolitischen EU-Haushalt (ca. 3 Mio. €) im Jahr 1987 auf einen Wert von 9,4 Prozent im Jahr 1997 bzw. 6,1 Prozent im Jahr 1998 (Dies entspricht Zahlen von 612 bzw. 525 Mio. €). Vgl. Cox/Chapman 1999: 31.

Elementen nicht abgedeckt wurden (vgl. Conzelmann 2003: 472). Schließlich einigte man sich im Rahmen des Cotonou-Abkommens auf eine Kompromisslösung, welche – zusätzlich zu den bereits seit 1995 vereinbarten wesentlichen Elementen der Lomé-Verträge (Beachtung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten, Rechtsstaatlichkeit) – verantwortungsvolle Regierungsführung als ein „fundamentales" Element beinhaltete, aber lediglich die Freiheit von Korruption als ein neues wesentliches Element einstufte. In Art. 9 (3) des Cotonou-Abkommens selbst findet sich eine Interpretation von *Good Governance*, die eng an die von der Kommission 1998 vorgeschlagene Definition angelehnt ist:

„In einem politischen und institutionellen Umfeld, in dem die Menschenrechte, die demokratischen Grundsätze und das Rechtstaatsprinzip geachtet werden, ist verantwortungsvolle Staatsführung die transparente und verantwortungsbewusste Verwaltung der menschlichen, natürlichen, wirtschaftlichen und finanziellen Ressourcen und ihr Einsatz für eine ausgewogene und nachhaltige Entwicklung. Sie beinhaltet klare Beschlussfassungsverfahren für Behörden, transparente und verantwortungsvolle Institutionen, den Vorrang des Gesetzes bei der Verwaltung und Verteilung der Ressourcen und Qualifizierung zur Ausarbeitung und Durchführung von Maßnahmen insbesondere zur Verhinderung und Bekämpfung der Korruption" (Europäische Union 2000: 9).

Fasst man die bisherigen Ansätze zur Definition und Interpretation des *Governance*-Begriffs zusammen, so ist zu konstatieren, dass *Good Governance* zu einem wiederholt benutzten Referenzkonzept in der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit geworden ist und sich dabei im Verlauf von zehn Jahren eine zunehmende Präzisierung und Einengung des Konzepts ergeben hat. Kennzeichnend für die fortschreitende Begriffsklärung der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung war insbesondere die Einengung auf den Aspekt der Verwaltungsführung und der Institutionenreform. Zudem wurden in Hinblick auf die Korruptionsbekämpfung vergleichsweise klare kausale Zusammenhänge formuliert (vgl. Kommission 1998d: 16). Bemerkenswert ist dieser Prozess nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund der eingangs definierten, breiten *Governance*-Definition zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre und dem Umstand, dass zu diesem Zeitpunkt noch eine relativ starke Uneinigkeit der Mitgliedsstaaten über die konkrete Ausgestaltung von *Good Governance* vorherrschte.

Mit der Konkretisierung des Begriffsinhalts und der Aufnahme von *Good Governance* als „fundamentales" Element des neuen Cotonou-Abkommens ergibt sich eine prozessuale Neuerung. So muss sich zumindest theoretisch die Operationalisierung des Konzepts nicht mehr nur auf der Ebene der einzelnen Förderentscheidungen niederschlagen, sondern kann auch im Rahmen einer stärker negativen Sanktionierung erfolgen. Oder anders formuliert: Die Nichteinhaltung von *Governance*-Kriterien würde eine negative Konditionalisierung bedeuten, welche von der Zurückhaltung von Hilfsgeldern bis hin zur Suspendierung der Zusammenarbeit im Falle ernsthafter Verstöße gegen die Anforderungen verantwortungsvoller Regie-

rungsführung reichen kann. Allerdings ist in Hinblick auf den *Governance*-Aspekt des Cotonou-Abkommens zu konstatieren, dass weder eindeutige Handlungsverpflichtungen der betroffenen Staaten geschaffen noch eine völkerrechtliche Verbindlichkeit der Beachtung von *Good Governance* installiert wurden. Zwar erklären sich die AKP-Staaten mit ihrer Ratifikation des Abkommens bereit, den Maßstab von *Good Governance* an ihr eigenes Handeln anlegen zu lassen, doch wird dabei der Sanktionierung eines etwaigen Fehlverhaltens durch die Einstufung von *Good Governance* als „fundamentalem" Element des Vertragswerks ein Riegel vorgeschoben.[21] Zudem greift in Hinblick auf das neue „wesentliche" Element der Freiheit von Korruption ein abgeschwächter Konsultations- und Sanktionsmechanismus. Er ist nur in „schweren Fällen" anwendbar und selbst nur dann, wenn die Gemeinschaft ein wichtiger Partner bei der finanziellen Unterstützung der Wirtschaftspolitik und der sektorbezogenen Politik und der entsprechenden Programme ist. Zudem ist es in erster Linie Aufgabe der Vertragspartei, in der die schweren Fälle von Korruption aufgetreten sind, erforderliche Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, um Abhilfe zu schaffen (Art. 97). Jedoch wird in Art. 96 (2) die Suspendierung des Vertrags als letztes Mittel akzeptiert (vgl. Europäische Union 2000: 40).

Für die praktische Anwendung und Durchsetzung von *Good Governance* scheint ohnehin der Mechanismus der Zuteilung von Hilfsgeldern bedeutsamer zu sein als die skizzierten Sanktionsmechanismen. Daher sieht das Cotonou-Abkommen vor, dass – wie in den bisherigen Lomé-Verträgen – den AKP-Staaten für 5 Jahre ein bestimmter Mittelumfang zur Verfügung gestellt wird. Allerdings wird die Zuteilung von Mitteln erstmals nicht mehr nur anhand der Bedürftigkeit des Landes, sondern auch anhand seiner „Performanz" in der Entwicklungspolitik bestimmt. Hierbei kommen Kriterien zum Tragen, die sich zumindest ansatzweise mit der oben geschilderten Definition von *Good Governance* decken:

- Fortschritt in der Implementierung institutioneller Reformen;
- Leistung in der Nutzung der Ressourcen;
- Effektivität der Implementierung laufender Programme;
- Armutsbekämpfung;
- Maßnahmen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung;
- Leistungen im Bereich der makroökonomischen und sektoralen Politik (vgl. Europäische Union 2000: 76).

[21] Durch den feinen semantischen Unterschied zwischen einem „wesentlichen" und einem „fundamentalen" Element verschwindet der implizite Verweis auf Art. 60 der Wiener Vertragsrechtkonvention aus dem Abkommen, welcher es den Vertragsparteien erlaubt, im Falle einer auch einseitig perzipierten Verletzung bestimmter Vertragsgrundlagen die Zusammenarbeit auszusetzen oder sogar ganz zu beenden. Vgl. Conzelmann 2003: 473.

Zudem benennt Art. 20, 1 (d) des Cotonou-Abkommens die Förderung der Reform und die Entwicklung der Institutionen, die für die Festigung der Demokratie und der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung erforderlich sind, als eines der Ziele der Kooperation zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten, wodurch zusätzlich sichergestellt wird, dass *Good Governance* auch auf der Ebene der Entwicklungsfinanzierung Beachtung findet (vgl. Europäische Union 2000: 13).

Als weiteres Element kommt schließlich der im Rahmen des Cotonou-Abkommens weiter gestärkte politische Dialog hinzu. In seinem Kontext soll auch eine regelmäßige Bewertung der Entwicklungen bei der Achtung der Menschenrechte, der demokratischen Grundsätze, des Rechtsstaatsprinzips sowie der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung erfolgen. Gemäß Art. 8 (2) soll der Politikdialog dabei als präventiver Ansatz verstanden werden, der ausdrücklich die oben angesprochene Anwendung der Verfahren bei Verletzung von wesentlichen bzw. fundamentalen Elementen des Vertrags verhindern soll (vgl. Europäische Union 2000: 8).

Insgesamt bietet der Cotonou-Vertrag eine Reihe von Ansatzpunkten für die Durchsetzung von *Good Governance*. Zugleich ist jedoch in verstärktem Maße zu beobachten, dass die Definition des konkreten Begriffsinhalts in die Institutionen des politischen Dialogs zwischen der EU und den einzelnen AKP-Staaten abwandert, wodurch die oben festgestellte Präzisierung des Governance-Begriffs abgeschwächt wird. In diesem Zusammenhang wäre *Good Governance* dann dasjenige, was sich in den Verhandlungen mit der AKP-Gruppe insgesamt oder mit einem einzelnen Staat als kompromissfähig und im Kontext der spezifischen Besonderheiten des betreffenden Landes als machbar herausstellt.[22]

Gerade vor dem Hintergrund der gewählten dialogischen Strategie in der Umsetzung führt die Suche nach einer operationalen Definition von *Good Governance* im Verhältnis zu den AKP-Staaten ins Leere. Die Bewertung wird daher – abhängig vom normativen Maßstab – unterschiedlich ausfallen. In Hinblick auf die Effektivität der Implementationsphase muss das gefundene Modell kein Nachteil sein, da eine abschließende Definition des Governance-Begriffs den auf genau diese Frage bezogenen Dialog entleeren und Anlass zu einer schematischen Implementation des *Governance*-Kriteriums geben könnte. Demgegenüber hat die derzeitige Situation den Vorteil, dass die Diskussion um *Good Governance* einen ständigen Verwal-

[22] Dennoch ist zu beachten, dass die Notwendigkeit der Konkretisierung von *Good Governance* in dialogischen Verfahren die beteiligten Parteien nicht ihrer Verpflichtung zur grundsätzlichen Beachtung des Maßstabs der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung enthebt. Im Gegensatz zu einer unverbindlichen Norm sind die EU und die AKP-Staaten zumindest dazu verpflichtet, die Ausdeutung von *Good Governance* zum Gegenstand eines permanenten Austauschsprozess zu machen und in diesem Rahmen zu gemeinsamen Ausdeutungen der Vertragsvorschrift zu gelangen.

tungsdialog initiiert, dessen Ergebnisse nicht nur realitätsangemessene Entwicklungsstrategien, sondern auch ein schrittweises Heranführen der AKP-Staaten an den Sinngehalt von *Good Governance* sein könnten. Durch die Nichtfestlegung eines einheitlichen Modells von *Good Governance* besteht die Möglichkeit eines Mechanismus des *„Co-operative Scoping“*. Dieser besagt, dass Entwicklungsziele für einzelne Staaten gemeinsam in dialogischer Form erarbeitet und gemeinschaftlich überwacht werden. Dies ermöglichte es den AKP-Staaten, Einfluss auf die vereinbarten Ziele zu nehmen, und erhöht möglicherweise auch den Grad der Anerkennung von *Good Governance* durch die AKP-Staaten, was der Durchsetzungskraft und der Reichweite des Konzepts überaus dienlich wäre. Andererseits macht das gefundene Modell deutlich, dass die gewählte organisatorische Struktur die faktischen materiellen Ungleichheiten nicht automatisch relativieren kann. Durch die prinzipielle Möglichkeit der EU zur Kürzung oder gänzlichen Verweigerung von Hilfszahlungen werden die Verhandlungen um die Entwicklungsfinanzierung de facto im Schatten einseitiger Abhängigkeiten geführt. Ähnliche Tendenzen zeigen sich auch in Hinblick auf die Ausgestaltung des politischen Dialogs zwischen den Vertragsparteien. Dementsprechend richten sich die gegenwärtigen Diskussionen innerhalb der AKP-Gruppe nicht zuletzt auf eine Konkretisierung der Verfahren des Dialogs.

3. Zusammenfassung – Theoretische Überlegungen zum außenpolitischen Engagement der EU

Zentrale Elemente der integrationstheoretischen Diskussion sind implizite Annahmen über das Ziel der Integration. Intergouvernementalistische Überlegungen gehen von einer weiterhin bestimmenden Rolle der Nationalstaaten aus und damit von einem europäischen Verbund. Europäische Integration wird mit der Annahme eines strategischen Austauschs der beteiligten Akteure erklärt, wodurch vor allem das Verhalten der Akteure auf Regierungskonferenzen und in den Räten nachvollziehbar dargestellt werden kann. Allerdings zeichnet das entsprechende „Modell der nationalen Interessen“ in Hinblick auf die realpolitischen Vorgänge ein zu allgemeines Bild. Schließlich existieren auf staatlicher Ebene mehrere Interessenskoalitionen, so dass nur schwer von einem homogenen Staatsinteresse ausgegangen werden kann. Im Gegenzug kann das Argument des „nationalen Interesses“ jedoch zur gleichzeitigen Begründung von gegenteiligen Konzeptionen außenpolitischen Handelns herangezogen werden. Der Einfluss supranationaler Institutionen wird weitestgehend ausgeblendet. Zwar sprechen Intergouvernementalisten Institutionen eine Rolle als intervenierende Variable zu, welche Hand-

lungen von Akteuren begrenzen oder fördern, doch können sie eine eigene, aus der europäischen Integration heraus entstehende Dynamik nur unbefriedigend erklären.[23] Neofunktionalisten bringen an dieser Stelle die Idee von „spill-over"-Effekten ein, welche eine schrittweise europäische Integration erklären, die zum Ausbau der supranationalen Ebene führt. Gemein ist den intergouvernementalistischen und neofunktionalistischen Ansätzen, dass sie eine starke teleologische Ausrichtung verfolgen, d.h. einen finalen Zustand der Europäischen Union zu skizzieren versuchen.

Das Mehrebenenmodell durchbricht die starre Vorstellung von „nationalen Interessen" und erfasst Interessenvertretungen jenseits der Nationalstaaten. Demnach sind Interessenverbände nicht gezwungen, über die nationalen Regierungen Einfluss zu nehmen, sondern können sich auch unmittelbar an die europäischen Institutionen wenden und auf europäischer Ebene Netzwerke bilden. Die Diskussion um den Endzustand der EU wird bei diesem Modell vermieden. Vielmehr bildet es einen Betrachtungsrahmen für gegenwärtige europäische Politikformulierung. In ihren Außenbeziehungen bildet die EU ein System, in dem 25 mitgliedsstaatliche Politiken und die Politik der Gemeinschaften nebeneinander stehen. In diesem Kontext erklären sich außenpolitische Aktivitäten der EU zum einen durch Reaktionen auf externe Herausforderungen, zum anderen durch die Vertretung der Interessen und des Selbstbildes europäischer Akteure nach außen.

Generell lassen sich die außenpolitischen Aktivitäten in drei Phasen einteilen:

1. Die externen Anforderungen an bzw. der internationale Kontext für die Akteure ist bestimmt durch die **Präsenz der Akteure** in der entsprechenden Region bzw. dem entsprechenden Politikfeld.
2. Der **institutionelle Aspekt** beleuchtet das Verhältnis der Akteure zueinander in diesem System. Institutionelle Eigenschaften des außenpolitischen Systems sowie die Eigeninteressen und Wertvorstellungen der beteiligten Akteure bestimmen ihre außenpolitischen Aktivitäten, die *policies*.
3. Die ***Policy* der EU** ergibt sich aus der Gesamtheit der Aktivitäten. Wenn sie mehr sein soll als die Summe ihrer Einzelteile, bedarf es einer institutionellen Dynamik. Eine Kommunikation über Interessen kann über die EU-Organe erfolgen und so eventuell Lernprozesse anregen. Die *Policy* der EU hat Rückwirkungen auf ihre internationale Präsenz. Demnach können gemeinsame Aktionen im Sinne des „fordernden" Partners ausfallen oder der gemeinsamen Abwehr von Außenansprüchen dienen.

[23] Bestes Beispiel für diese Dynamik ist das Zustandekommen der Einheitlichen Europäischen Akte (EEA).

Abbildung I-6: Die Funktionsweise des außenpolitischen Systems der EU



Quelle: Grimm 2003: 75.

Die außenpolitischen Aktivitäten – sowohl der Mitgliedsstaaten als auch der Gemeinschaftsorgane – basieren auf externen Forderungen und dem eigenen Rollenverständnis. Aufgrund des unterschiedlichen Grads an Präsenz der europäischen Akteure in der Welt werden unterschiedlich starke Außenforderungen hervorgerufen, weshalb auch die Rollenvorstellungen außenpolitischer Akteure regional verschieden sind. Je stärker die Präsenz einzelner Mitgliedsstaaten im Vergleich zu anderen ist, desto stärker ausgeprägt dürften ihre Interessen in der Region sein und desto geringer ihre Kooperationsbereitschaft auf EU-Ebene. Das bedeutet im Umkehrschluss, dass eine gleichmäßige Gewichtung der Präsenz der Mitgliedsstaaten auch eher Außenforderungen an die europäischen Institutionen zulassen wird. Folglich können die Außenforderungen den europäischen Integrationsprozess unterstützen, ihn – wenn sie sich exklusiv an einzelne Mitgliedsstaaten richten – aber auch bremsen. Schreitet der Integrationsprozess daher voran, wird das auch von externen Akteuren wahrgenommen, die ihre Erwartungshaltung gegenüber der Gemeinschaft erhöhen und die EU so zu verstärktem gemeinsa-

men Handeln bewegen. Außenansprüche könnten von den Gemeinschaftsorganen zur Unterstützung der eigenen Position bzw. zur Ausweitung gemeinschaftlicher Handlungsfähigkeit genutzt werden.[24] Das Konzept der Präsenz erfasst die Beziehung zwischen interner Entwicklung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und den daraus resultierenden externen Anforderungen. Diese externen Anforderungen bieten Möglichkeiten für effektives Handeln oder grenzen dieses ein. Das nicht-hierarchische Mehrebenensystem bietet Platz für nebeneinander existierende unterschiedliche Vorstellungen und Verfahren. Es erschwert der EU jedoch die Fähigkeit, mit „einer einzigen Stimme“ in der Welt zu sprechen.[25] Folglich muss das Zusammenspiel der verschiedenen Ebenen geplant und mit den Instrumenten der verschiedenen Politikbereiche umgesetzt werden.

Aus dem Eigenverständnis und den Außenanforderungen, welche im Austausch mit Drittländern und Regionen von diesen formuliert werden, ergibt sich die außenpolitische Rolle der EU. Da in den Ländern und Regionen unterschiedliche Ausgangslagen bestehen, werden auch unterschiedliche Anforderungen an die Europäische Union gestellt, auf welche die Union mit ihren Politikinstrumenten nicht in jedem Fall gleichermaßen adäquat reagieren kann. Eine langfristige Veränderung der außenpolitischen Identität Europas ist daher nur dann denkbar, wenn in der Außenwahrnehmung durch die externen Akteure nicht prinzipiell zwischen Gemeinschafts- und nationalstaatlicher Ebene unterschieden wird. Zudem kann eine andere Akzentsetzung der Gemeinschaft bei den zugrunde gelegten Normen außenpolitischen Handelns die Möglichkeit bieten, eine weitere Identität – zusätzlich zur nationalstaatlichen - herauszubilden. Strategisches Einwilligen in Normenformulierung auf europäischer Ebene kann auch zu einem veränderten Verhalten der nationalen Akteure führen, da sie an der Beschlussfassung mitgewirkt haben und sich folglich an Erklärungen auf europäischer Ebene messen lassen können. Im Folgenden gilt es ganz allgemein zu untersuchen, woraus sich die europäische Identität gegenüber Subsahara-Afrika ergibt und welche Veränderungen sich hinsichtlich der ihr zugrunde liegenden Normen konstatieren lassen.

[24] Allerdings ist die Realisierung eines solchen Unterfangens nicht zuletzt auch von den verfügbaren Ressourcen abhängig.

[25] Das mitunter häufig kritisierte inkohärente Auftreten europäischer Akteure führte zu der skizzierten Diskussion um den Akteurscharakter der EG.

„Die Tatsache, dass nach Jahrzehnten internationaler Zusammenarbeit immer noch mehrere hundert Millionen Menschen nicht die Mindestanforderungen für das tägliche Überleben decken können, machte in den letzten Jahren Armutsbekämpfung in nationalen und internationalen Strategien der Entwicklungspolitik zu einer der wichtigsten Zielsetzungen. Auch die Europäische Union hat sich zu Beginn der Kooperation mit den AKP-Ländern diesem Ziel verpflichtet. Über einen sehr langen Zeitraum hatte sie die Ziele der Kooperation jedoch offenbar aus strategisch-politischen und ökonomischen Gründen aus den Augen verloren“ (Kappel 1999: 23).

Kapitel II.
Die europäische Afrikapolitik: Eine retrospektive Betrachtung

Wenn der Schwerpunkt dieser Arbeit auch eindeutig auf den neueren und neuesten Entwicklungen in den Beziehungen zwischen Europa und Afrika liegt, so kann ein historischer Rückblick auf die vorausgegangenen Etappen einer europäischen Präsenz in Afrika nicht unterlassen werden. Das liegt in erster Linie daran, dass ein Großteil der gegenwärtigen Tendenzen ohne eine retrospektive Betrachtung nicht deutlich nachvollziehbar wäre. Wie in so vielen Fällen ist auch im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung „ein Blick zurück“ unverzichtbar, um aktuelle Zusammenhänge verstehen zu können.

Als Beginn des historischen Rückblicks wird der unmittelbare Zeitraum vor der Gründung der EWG angesetzt. Jedoch nicht, weil dieser Zeitpunkt den tatsächlichen Beginn der euro-afrikanischen Beziehungen markiert, welche ohne Zweifel eine für Afrika zum Teil Jahrhunderte lange leidvolle Tradition haben, sondern weil mit der Schaffung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft ein Zusammenschluss ins Leben gerufen wurde, der in seinen Vereinbarungen mit den afrikanischen Staaten Handel und Hilfe kombinierte. Anhand der Verknüpfung dieser beiden Dimensionen der Zusammenarbeit soll im Folgenden der Ursprung der europäischen Afrikapolitik und die damit unweigerlich verbundene Präsenz Europas in Afrika verdeutlicht werden. Der zeitliche Rahmen reicht dabei bis in die jüngste Vergangenheit. Den Schlusspunkt bildet eine ausführliche Analyse des Lomé-Abkommens und seiner Auswirkungen auf die gegenwärtigen Konstellationen innerhalb der euro-afrikanischen Kooperation.

1. Die Entstehung einer europäischen Präsenz

Betrachtet man die Ausgangssituation der Verhandlungen zur Gründung der EWG aus kolonialpolitischer Perspektive, so sticht ins Auge, dass vier der sechs Gründungsstaaten noch Kolonialmächte waren und somit Sonderbeziehungen zu Gebieten außerhalb Europas unterhielten. Zwar hatten sich Italien und die Niederlande weitestgehend von ihren Kolonialgebieten getrennt, doch verfolgten insbesondere Belgien und Frankreich nach wie vor kolonialpolitische Ambitionen.[26] Aufgrund des staatsrechtlichen Verständnisses der Kolonialmächte galten die Kolonien nicht als Drittstaaten, sondern als Überseegebiete mit engen Verbindungen zum „Mutterland", so dass die europäische Gemeinschaft in ihrer Gründungsphase über keine explizit außenpolitischen Beziehungen verfügte.

1.1 Die Gründung der EWG und die Politik der Assoziierung

Den Ausgangspunkt europäischer Integration bildeten die Römischen Verträge von 1957 zur Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die ihren Fokus auf die ökonomische Zusammenarbeit der beteiligten Staaten richteten. Diesem Verständnis zufolge fixierte sich die Kooperation zunächst auf die Mitgliedsstaaten selber, wobei allein die Existenz dieser Gemeinschaft für Außenwirkungen über das Sextett hinaus sorgte. Dieser unausweichbaren Entwicklung war man sich bereits 1957 bewusst, so dass in Bezug auf folgende Aspekte eine gemeinschaftliche Verfahrensweise im Vertragswerk von Rom verankert wurde: eine gemeinsame Handelspolitik (EGV, Art. 113), die Assoziierung überseeischer Gebiete (EGV, Art. 132) und dritter Staaten (EGV, Art. 238) sowie die Möglichkeit, internationale Verträge abzuschließen (EGV, Art. 228).

Will man daher davon ausgehend von den Anfängen einer europäischen Afrikapolitik sprechen, so ist zu berücksichtigen, dass eine solche überaus einseitiger Natur war. Die Kolonialgebiete wurden ungefragt assoziiert und ihren Forderungen wurde kaum Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt. Vielmehr zielte Art. 132 des EWG-Vertrags auf die langfristige Sicherung des Einflusses der Kolonialmächte in ihren überseeischen Gebieten ab. Forderungen nach politischer Selbstbestimmung und Dekolonisation, wie sie von Seiten der afrikanischen Gebiete geäußert wurden, standen hierbei keineswegs zur Debatte. Vielmehr ging es um eine ange-

[26] Während Deutschland bereits nach dem Ersten Weltkrieg seine Koloniegebiete verloren hatte, erfuhr Italien nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg ein ähnliches Schicksal. Allein über Somalia behielt Italien als Mandatsmacht die Kontrolle. Die Niederlande hatten ihre Kolonie Indonesien 1949 aufgeben müssen, verfügte aber noch immer über Gebiete in Amerika (Antillen, Surinam). Frankreich besaß das größte Kolonialreich der EWG-Gründerstaaten, u.a. in Nord-, West- und Zentralafrika. Belgien nannte in Zentralafrika ein riesiges Gebiet sein Eigen, das in erster Linie aus Belgisch-Kongo, der heutigen Demokratischen Republik Kongo, bestand. Einzig und allein das Fürstentum Luxemburg hatte keine Kolonialgeschichte. Vgl. Grilli 1993: 7.

messene Berücksichtigung wirtschaftlicher Interessen innerhalb des Kolonialverbandes.[27] Insbesondere Frankreich drängte auf eine Einbindung der Überseegebiete in den gemeinsamen Markt und machte seine Unterzeichnung des EWG-Vertrags hiervon abhängig.[28] Diese von vielen als überzogen empfundene Haltung Frankreichs erscheint jedoch dann verständlich, wenn man sich die direkten Auswirkungen eines solchen Ausschlusses der Überseegebiete auf die französische Wirtschaft vor Augen führt: Rund ein Viertel der französischen Importe kamen 1957 aus den Kolonien, umgekehrt fanden französische Exporte durch Präferenzzölle und weitere protektionistische Maßnahmen einen geschützten Markt. Schätzungen zufolge hingen zu diesem Zeitpunkt rund 300.000 Arbeitsplätze von diesem Handel ab (vgl. Brüne 1995: 43).

In diesem Zusammenhang bot Frankreich die schrittweise Öffnung seiner Übersee-Märkte für die europäischen Partner an, forderte aber als Gegenleistung die Verpflichtung zur Abnahme von Überseeprodukten und einen gemeinsam finanzierten Investitionsfonds für die Überseegebiete. Der Wunsch nach Lastenverteilung lässt sich mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit aus dem französischen Zahlungsbilanzdefizit heraus erklären, welches sich 1957 auf 1,76 Mrd. Dollar belief. Frankreich war in dieser Situation auf weitere Geldzuflüsse aus dem Ausland angewiesen (vgl. Grosser 1989: 154). Die Vorteile einer Assoziierung der afrikanischen Kolonien mit der EWG waren für Frankreich daher offensichtlich, da

- mit der Einrichtung eines Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds zusätzliche Finanzierungsmittel für die Entwicklung der Überseegebiete bereitgestellt würden;
- aus der Erweiterung der Absatzmärkte für die kolonialen Rohstoffe und Agrarprodukte ein höheres Devisenaufkommen für Frankreich resultieren würde;
- die geschützten Absatzmärkte der französischen Industrien in den Überseegebieten aufgrund ihrer guten kommerziellen und kulturellen Beziehungen für die französische Industrie erhalten bleiben würde.

Als Gegner einer solchen Lastenverteilung über einen gemeinsamen Entwicklungsfonds erwiesen sich insbesondere Deutschland, die Niederlande und Luxemburg. Rein ökonomisch betrachtet war der französische Vorschlag für diese Länder ein nur wenig verlockendes Angebot[29], doch sah Deutschland in dieser Situation die Chance, sein nach dem Zweiten Welt-

[27] Zwar zeigte sich schon damals, dass die Kolonialherrschaft in Auflösung begriffen war, doch rechnete man auf Seiten der Kolonialmächte mit einem Jahrzehnte andauernden Prozess der Lösung statt mit einer schnellen Entkolonialisierung, wie sie sich in den 1960er Jahren vollzog. Vgl. Grilli 1993: 5.

[28] Nicht alle Kolonialmächte vertraten die gleiche Auffassung über die zukünftigen Beziehungen der EWG zu den Kolonien. Vor allem die Niederlande zeigten sich überaus skeptisch. Vgl. Babarinde 1994: 13.

[29] Die Handelspartner Deutschlands in Afrika befanden sich überwiegend in den britischen Gebieten. So kamen aus den frankophonen Gebieten nur ein Sechstel der deutschen Importe aus Afrika. Im Gegenzug übertrafen die

krieg arg angekratztes Image im Rahmen einer Versöhnung mit Frankreich aufzupolieren. Trotz innenpolitischen Widerstandes wurde nach Verhandlungen zwischen Adenauer und de Gaulle der Europäische Entwicklungsfonds für die Kolonien der EWG-Gründungsländer ins Leben gerufen (vgl. Brüne 2000: 296).

Mit dem Römischen Vertrag von 1957 wurde der Weg für eine Assoziierung der überseeischen Länder und Hoheitsgebiete schließlich auch formal geebnet. In Hinblick auf die Ziele der Anbindung an die EWG hielt man fest:

„Ziel der Assoziierung ist die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung der Länder und Hoheitsgebiete und die Herstellung enger Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen ihnen und der gesamten Gemeinschaft." (EWG-Vertrag Art. 131, Abs. 2-3).

1.2 Die Übergangsphase im Jahrzehnt der Dekolonisation

Die einzelnen Bestimmungen zur Umsetzung des EEF wurden als *„Implementing Convention"* in die Römischen Verträge aufgenommen und traten zum 1. Januar 1958 in Kraft. Es traten 31 Entwicklungspartnerländer der europäischen Staaten der Konvention bei. Neben 20 französischen Kolonien in Afrika sowie sieben weiteren französischen Überseegebieten zählten zwei belgische Gebiete (Kongo, Ruanda-Urundi), ein italienisches Gebiet (Somalia) und ein niederländisches Gebiet (Neu-Guinea) dazu. Zunächst für fünf Jahre (1958-1963) geltend, belief sich der EEF auf 581 Mio. US$. Die von Frankreich ursprünglich geforderte Aufwendung in Höhe von 1 Mrd. US$ wurde somit nicht annähernd erreicht, doch bedeuteten auch die nunmehr zugesagten Gelder einen 15%igen Anstieg der Finanzleistungen für die assoziierten Länder im Vergleich zu den bestehenden bilateralen Verbindungen (vgl. Grilli 1993: 13).

Die Essenz der Vereinbarungen zur Assoziierung der Kolonien lag in der Gleichbehandlung der Bürger und Unternehmen aller EWG-Staaten in den assoziierten Gebieten und innerhalb des EWG-Territoriums. Diese bezog sich in erster Linie auf das Niederlassungsrecht und die Zölle. Demzufolge konnten sich europäische Firmen in den afrikanischen Kolonien Frankreichs niederlassen und die dort produzierte „Kolonialware" erhielt freien Zugang zum europäischen Markt. Frankreich verlor auf diese Weise seinen exklusiven Zugang zu den Märkten seiner Kolonien, konnte sich jedoch aufgrund seines Sprachvorteils und seiner langjährigen Beziehungen zu den afrikanischen Gebieten seine Vormachtstellung weiterhin sichern. Trotz

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deutschen Exporte in die britischen Gebiete Afrikas diejenigen in die französischen um das Zehnfache. Die Niederlande befürchteten zudem eine Diskriminierung ihrer eigenen Kolonialgebiete. Vgl. Ferdowsi 1999b: 4 f.; Brüne 1995: 44.

offizieller Aufgabe des wirtschaftlichen Monopols war man auf französischer Seite nicht gewillt, die (west-)afrikanischen Märkte der europäischen Konkurrenz vollständig zu öffnen.[30]
Als das Durchführungsabkommen 1963 auslief, hatte sich der politische Hintergrund der Zusammenarbeit erheblich verändert. Fast alle der EWG-assoziierten Gebiete waren inzwischen unabhängige Staaten geworden und weiterhin an einer Fortsetzung der Zusammenarbeit interessiert. Auf Seiten der EWG-Staaten herrschte ebenfalls weitgehende Einigkeit über die Fortsetzung der Assoziierungspolitik, wenn diese auch auf neuen vertraglichen Grundlagen basieren sollte. Aus europäischer Perspektive kam es nun nicht mehr darauf an, neue Einflusszonen zu schaffen, sondern alte Einflussbereiche ohne künftige politische Bevormundung zu sichern (vgl. Ferdowsi 1999b: 5f.).
Die beste Möglichkeit hierzu bot ein erneuertes Abkommen, das die ökonomischen Bindungen stabilisierte und den afrikanischen Staaten gleichzeitig die Gelegenheit zur Bestätigung ihrer Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit gab. Eine solche Neuorganisation des Verhältnisses zwischen der EWG und den ehemaligen Kolonien fand schließlich in den Verträgen von Yaoundé ihren Ausdruck.[31] Wie auch der EEF hatten die Yaoundé-Abkommen eine Laufzeit von fünf Jahren.[32] Dabei umfasste das Yaoundé-I-Abkommen auf nicht-europäischer Seite 18 afrikanische Staaten (AASM-Staaten), zu denen im Nachfolgeabkommen Yaoundé-II Mauritius hinzukam. Auf europäischer Seite vergrößerte sich im Rahmen des zweiten Vertrags ebenfalls der Teilnehmerkreis, als aufgrund der EGW-Erweiterung 1973 Großbritannien, Dänemark und Irland als neue Vertragspartner hinzustießen. Betrachtet man die inhaltliche Ausgestaltung der beiden Verträge, so lassen sich kaum Unterschiede feststellen. Ganz in der Tradition der „*Implementing Convention*“ von 1958 stehend, bezogen sich die Vereinbarungen in erster Linie auf den gegenseitigen Marktzugang. Die vertraglichen Bestimmungen betrafen dabei einzig den Handel zwischen den europäischen Staaten und den assoziierten Ländern Afrikas und Madagaskars. Freihandel unter den assoziierten Staaten war im Rahmen dieser Verträge nicht vorgesehen, jedoch auch nicht ausgeschlossen (vgl. Grilli 1993: 19). Von den assoziier-

[30] Frankreich reagierte 1960 mit einer Beschwerde gegen die Bundesrepublik Deutschland, nachdem diese den Versuch unternommen hatte, ihre Handelsbeziehungen zu den jungen westafrikanischen Staaten zu intensivieren. Dabei zeigte man sich besonders misstrauisch gegenüber den Beziehungen Deutschlands zu seiner ehemaligen Kolonie Togo. Vgl. Engel 2000: 235 f.
[31] Die neuen vertraglichen Bestimmungen galten nicht nur zwischen diesen neuen Staaten und der ehemaligen Kolonialmacht, sondern ebenso auch mit der EWG. Das erste Yaoundé-Abkommen wurde im Juli 1963 unterzeichnet und trat am 1. Juli 1964 in Kraft. Der zweite Vertrag wurde im Juli 1969 unterzeichnet und trat am 1. Januar 1971 in Kraft.
[32] Zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung der assoziierten Staaten während der fünfjährigen Laufzeit wurde ein Betrag von 730 Mio. US$ zur Verfügung gestellt. Davon sollten über den Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds 620 Mio. US$ in Form nicht rückzahlbarer Zuschüsse, 46 Mio. US$ in Form von Darlehen zu Sonderbedingungen und 64 Mio. US$ in Form von Darlehen durch die Europäische Investitionsbank gewährt werden. Vgl. Ferdowsi 1999b: 6.

ten Staaten forderten die Abkommen eine Gleichbehandlung der EWG-Staaten, wohingegen eine Vorzugsbehandlung der EWG-Staaten gegenüber anderen Handelspartnern nicht verbindlich festgelegt wurde.[33] Wie schon damals hatte Frankreich auch jetzt eine dominierende Rolle in den Verhandlungen gespielt, was sich aus seiner dreifachen Funktion als Vertreter der eigenen Interessen, inoffizieller Berater der Assoziierten sowie Vermittler zwischen den afrikanischen Staaten und den anderen EWG-Mitgliedsstaaten erklären lässt (vgl. Gruhn 1976: 245 ff.).

Als allgemeine Kriterien einer erfolgreichen Zusammenarbeit wurden von den Vertragsparteien folgende Leitlinien und Grundsätze umschrieben:

- die Stärkung der Eigenverantwortlichkeit ihrer Entwicklung,
- die Förderung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit in Afrika,
- die Einleitung von Maßnahmen zur Förderung des Handels und
- die Verbesserung und Stabilisierung der Regelungen zur Einfuhr von Agrarerzeugnissen in die EWG (vgl. Grilli 1993:19f.; Gruhn 1976: 245ff.).

Aller äußerlichen Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit der afrikanischen Staaten und deren vertraglich zugesagten Gleichbehandlung zum Trotz muss man rückblickend konstatieren, dass die Yaoundé-Bestimmungen keinesfalls auf eine ausdrückliche Anfrage der ehemaligen Kolonien zurückgingen. Die Entscheidungsfreiheit der assoziierten Staaten erwies sich angesichts ihrer Abhängigkeit vom europäischen Markt und vom Kapitalzufluss als äußerst begrenzt (vgl. Brüne 2000: 296; Babarinde 1994: 15). Nicht zuletzt deshalb stand das anglophone Afrika den Entwicklungen in den ehemals französischen Kolonien ablehnend gegenüber. Mit dem Beitritt Großbritanniens in die EWG rückte jedoch zusehends die Frage in den Mittelpunkt, wie denn in Zukunft die Beziehungen zwischen dem Vereinigten Königreich und seinen Kolonien auszusehen haben.

Während sich die europäischen Staaten zunächst nur dazu bereit erklärten, den afrikanischen Commonwealth-Staaten Handelsvereinbarungen im Sinne der Yaoundé-Bestimmungen zu gewähren, gingen die afrikanischen Forderungen weiter. Die ehemals britischen Kolonien waren sich ihrer weltwirtschaftlichen Bedeutung bewusst geworden, was auch von europäischer Seite akzeptiert werden musste.[34] 1968 konnten erste handelspolitische Resultate verzeichnet werden, als es in Arusha/Tansania zur Unterzeichnung eines gleichnamigen Ab-

[33] Nichtsdestotrotz war sie gängige Praxis vieler assoziierter Partner. Vgl. Gruhn 1976: 246.

[34] Spätestens die Ölkrise von 1973 sollte den Europäern deutlich vor Augen führen, in welchem Maße ihre Wirtschaft von den Rohstofflieferungen der Erdöl exportierenden Länder abhängig war.

kommens[35] mit den drei Staaten der afrikanischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kenia, Tansania und Uganda kam. Da dieses zeitlich an den Yaoundé-Vertrag gekoppelt war, mussten wenig später neue Verhandlungen aufgenommen werden, die schließlich am 24. September 1969 in der Unterzeichnung eines neuen Vertrags, Arusha-II, mündeten. Dieser trat wie Yaoundé-II am 1. Januar 1971 in Kraft und sollte für 5 Jahre gelten (vgl. Ferdowsi 1999b: 7).

Ein ausführliches Eingehen auf die inhaltliche Ausgestaltung der Verträge und deren Ergebnisse würden den Rahmen sprengen, doch bleibt festzuhalten, dass die Bilanz dieser handelspolitischen Zusammenarbeit aus Sicht der afrikanischen Länder eher enttäuschend ausfiel. So hatten sich aufgrund der Verträge weder die Exporte in die EWG-Staaten erhöht noch zeigte die Handelsstruktur zwischen den Staaten Westeuropas und Afrikas eine Veränderung. Zwar konnten die assoziierten afrikanischen Staaten ihr Exportvolumen in die EWG bis 1974 von 914 Mio. US$ im Jahr 1958 auf eine Summe von 3,3 Mrd. US$ erhöhen, doch ging die Hälfte des Exports in die EWG alleine von den beiden Ländern Zaire und Elfenbeinküste aus, während Tschad, Obervolta und Mali zusammen gerade einmal einen Anteil von 2 % am Gesamtexport aufwiesen. Auch die gewährten Zollpräferenzen führten nicht zu einer Erhöhung der Importe der assoziierten Staaten in die EWG. Hatte deren Anteil im Jahr 1960 noch 12,6 % betragen, so verringerte er sich 1972 auf 9,06 % und 1974 gar auf 7,47 %. Eine ähnliche Tendenz weisen auch die handelspolitischen Effekte der gewährleisteten Gegenpräferenzen für EWG-Waren auf. So exportierte die EWG 1974 zwar Waren im Wert von 2,178 Mrd. US$ in die afrikanischen Staaten, doch ging der Anteil dieser Staaten am Gesamtexport der EWG in Entwicklungsländer von 12 % 1958 auf 8,4 % 1974 zurück (vgl. Gerth-Wellmann 1979: 107-117).

Aufgrund dieser Negativbilanz sowie neu aufgetretenen Entwicklungen innerhalb der EWG[36] war bereits vor Ablauf der Abkommen von Yaoundé-II und Arusha-II klar, dass eine gründliche Neuordnung der Assoziierungspolitik vorgenommen werden musste. Insbesondere galt es eine Neufassung des Kooperationsmodus für die dem Commonwealth angehörenden Staaten zu finden. Schließlich ermöglichte das Protokoll 22 des Beitrittsvertrages der drei neuen Mitglieder diesen eine grundsätzliche Aufnahme in das Assoziierungssystem der EWG.[37]

Angesichts der Forderungen der afrikanischen Staaten galt es, die drei ursprünglich von der EG-Kommission für die Yaoundé-Nachfolge geplanten Optionen – Erweiterung der Yaoundé-

[35] Das Arusha-Abkommen war ein Handelsabkommen, welches auf Gegenseitigkeit beruhende Rechte und Verpflichtungen festlegte. Es umfasste jedoch keine finanziellen und technischen Hilfen aus dem Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds. Vgl. Gruhn 1976: 245.

[36] In erster Linie ist die EWG-Erweiterung durch den Beitritt Großbritanniens, Irlands und Dänemarks gemeint.

[37] Hierbei handelte es sich um 20 weitere Kolonien Großbritanniens in Afrika, in der Karibik und im Pazifik.

Konvention, eine losere Kooperation wie das Arusha-Abkommen oder eine reine Handelsvereinbarung mit den ehemaligen Kolonien – zu modifizieren. Dies spiegelte auch der neu gewählte Umgangston wider: So sprach man nicht länger von einer *Assoziierung* der afrikanischen Länder, sondern von einer *Partnerschaft* zwischen Europa und Afrika. Im Rahmen dessen handelten 46 formal gleichberechtigte afrikanische, karibische und pazifische Staaten ein Assoziationsabkommen mit der EG aus (vgl. Grimm 2003: 86).

Formal traten somit nur zwei Parteien in Erscheinung, da man grundsätzlich von der Annahme ausging, dass beide Seiten jeweils einheitliche Verhandlungspositionen vertraten.[38] Dieses Verständnis von Gleichberechtigung bedeutete aber, dass parallel zu den Hauptverhandlungen beide Seiten in gesonderten Treffen ihre Verhandlungsführung abstimmen mussten. Das stellte insbesondere die 46 AKP-Staaten vor Probleme, die zur gemeinsamen Standortbestimmung zwischen Januar und Juli 1975 493 Sitzungen auf Botschafter- und Expertenebene benötigten (vgl. Opitz 1983: 38-40). Trotz dieses umfassenden Austauschs zeigte sich das AKP-Lager keineswegs durch Einigkeit geprägt, sondern vielmehr durch

- Bedenken der 18 afrikanischen Staaten und Madagaskar („Yaoundé-Staaten“), durch die Vergrößerung der Assoziierung ihre „Vorteile“ einzubüßen;
- Vorbehalte einiger afrikanischer Commonwealth-Staaten gegen das „neokoloniale Yaoundé-Modell“ und
- Befürchtungen einiger Staaten, infolge einer Sonderbeziehung zur EG den eigenen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Spielraum einzuschränken und sich unsolidarisch gegenüber dem Rest der Entwicklungsländer zu verhalten.

Aufgrund dieser Bedenken und der Interessensdisharmonie innerhalb der AKP-Staaten verliefen die Verhandlungen schleppend. Erst auf der gemeinsamen Ministerkonferenz in Kingston/Jamaika im Juli 1974 kam es zum politischen Durchbruch und am 1. Februar 1975 zur endgültigen Einigung. Am 28. Februar 1975 wurde schließlich in Lomé/Togo der gleichnamige Vertrag unterzeichnet.

[38] Allerdings lässt sich zu Recht an der Tatsache zweifeln, ob jeder der teilnehmenden AKP-Staaten in einem gleichen Machtverhältnis zu den auftretenden EWG-Staaten stand. Hieran mag auch die durch die „Öl-Schock“-Erfahrung Europas veränderte Wahrnehmung der Machtverhältnisse nicht grundlegend etwas ändern. Vgl. Hewitt 1984: 100.

Abbildung II-1 : Chronologie des Lomé-Abkommens

Jahr/Abkommen	Unterzeichnende Staaten	
	Europa	**Entwicklungspartnerländer der europäischen Staaten**
1. Römische Verträge Unterzeichnet: 28.02.1957 In Kraft getreten: 01.01.1958	**EWG 6** Belgien Frankreich BRD Italien Luxemburg Niederlande	**ÜLGs (31 Staaten)**: *Französische Kolonien in Afrika (20):* Algerien, Tschad, Komoren, Dahomey, Französisch-Kamerun, Französisch-Somalia, Französischer Sudan, Gabun, Guinea, Elfenbeinküste, Madagaskar, Mauretanien, Mittlerer Kongo, Niger, Réunion, Senegal, Togo, Ubangi-Chari, Obervolta (Burkina Faso); *Andere französische Kolonien (7)*: Guadeloupe, Guyana, Französisch-Polynesien, Französische Südatlantische Territorien, Martinique, Neukaledonien und abhängige Gebiete, St. Pierre und Miquelon; *Belgische Kolonien (2)*: Belgisch-Kongo, Ruanda-Urundi, *Italienische Kolonie (1)*: Somalia; *Niederländische Kolonie (1)*: Neuguinea.
2. Yaoundé-I-Abkommen Unterzeichnet: 20.07.1963 In Kraft getreten: 01.07.1964	**EWG 6**	***AASM-Staaten (18)***: Burundi (früher Teil des Ruanda-Urundi), Zentralafrikanische Republik, Tschad, Kongo-Brazzaville (später Volksrepublik Kongo), Kongo Léopoldville (früher Belgisch-Kongo, später Kongo-Kinshasa/Zaire und derzeit Demokratische Republik Kongo), Dahomey (derzeit Benin), Gabun, Elfenbeinküste, Madagaskar, Mali (früher Teil des Französischen Sudans), Mauretanien (früher Teil des Französischen Sudans), Niger, Ruanda (früher Teil des Ruanda-Urundi), Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Vereinigte Republik Kamerun (Zusammenschluss der beiden Teile, die früher von Großbritannien bzw. Frankreich regiert wurden), Obervolta.
3. Yaoundé-II-Abkommen Unterzeichnet: Juli 1969 In Kraft getreten: 01.01.1971 Ablauf: 01.03.1976	**EWG 6 (+3)**	***AASM (18+1+3)*** - Die 18 AASM, wie unter Yaoundé-I - plus Mauritius, das dem Abkommen im Jahr 1972 beitrat - plus Kenia, Tansania und Uganda
4. Lomé-I-Abkommen Unterzeichnet: 28.02.1975 In Kraft getreten: 01.04.1976 Ablauf: 01.03.1980 AKP-Bevölkerung 250 Mio.	**EWG 9**	***AKP (46)***: *Afrika (37)*: Wie oben plus Botswana, Äquatorialguinea, Äthiopien, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Swasiland, Sambia; *Karibik (6)*: Bahamas, Barbados, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaika, Trinidad und Tobago; *Pazifik (3)*: Fidschi, Samoa, Tonga.
5. Lomé-II-Abkommen Unterzeichnet: 1979 In Kraft getreten: 01.01.1981 AKP-Bevölkerung: 348 Mio.	**EWG 9 (+1)**	***AKP (57):*** *Afrika (42):*Wie vorher plus Kap Verde, Dschibuti, São Tomé und Principe, Seychellen, Simbabwe (Beitritt 1980); *Karibik (9)*: Wie vorher plus Domenica, St. Lucia, Surinam; *Pazifik (8)*: Wie vorher plus Kiribati, Papua-Neuguinea, Salomonen, Tuvalu.
6. Lomé-III-Abkommen Unterzeichnet: 08.12.1984 In Kraft getreten: 01.05.1986 AKP-Bevölkerung: 413 Mio.	**EWG 10 (+2)**	***AKP (66)****: Afrika (44):* Wie vorher plus Angola (Beitritt 1985) und Mosambik; Karibik (13): Wie vorher plus Antigua und Barbuda, Belize, St. Christopher und Nevis, St. Vincent und die Grenadinen; Pazifik (8): Wie vorher plus Vanuatu.
7. Lomé-IV-Abkommen Unterzeichnet: 15.12.1989 In Kraft getreten: 1990 Ablauf: 21.02.2000 AKP-Bevölkerung: 460 Mio.	**EWG 12**	***AKP (70)****: Afrika (46)*: Wie vorher plus Eritrea (früher Teil Äthiopiens), Namibia (Beitritt 1990); *Karibik (15)*: Wie vorher plus Dominikanische Republik, Haiti; *Pazifik (8)*: Wie vorher
8. Konvention von Cotonou Unterzeichnet: 23.06.2000 In Kraft getreten: 2000 Ablauf: 2020 AKP-Bevölkerung: 638 Mio.	**EWG 15 (+10): 25**	AKP (77): Afrika (48); Karibik (15); Pazifik (14): Wie vorher plus Cook Inseln, Marshall Inseln, Mikronesien, Nauru, Niue, Palau

Quelle: Brüne 2000: 297.

1.3 Die Forderung nach einer „Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung“

Der Abschluss des Lomé-Vertrags rief zum Teil geradezu euphorische Reaktionen hervor. Von Vielen wurde das zustande gebrachte Vertragswerk als Meilenstein auf dem Weg zu einer Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung (NWWO) verstanden, da immerhin rund die Hälfte der UN-Vollmitglieder an den neuen Bestimmungen mitwirkten. Vieles deutet darauf hin, dass insbesondere die Verabschiedung eines Aktionsprogramms zur Errichtung einer Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung durch die 6. Sondergeneralversammlung der UN – mit Stimmenmehrheit der Dritte-Welt-Staaten – zum Umdenken hinsichtlich der vertraglichen Ausgestaltung der EU-AKP-Beziehungen beigetragen hatte (vgl. Babarinde 1994: 32).

Betrachtet man den historischen Kontext, in dem die Diskussion um die NWWO stattfand, so wird deutlich: Noch bei Erlangung der Unabhängigkeit herrschte die Meinung vor, dass viele Probleme der jungen Staaten vornehmlich auf ihrem bisherigen politischen Abhängigkeitsverhältnis basierten und sich mit dem Erreichen der Unabhängigkeit, der vollen Teilnahme an den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und mit Unterstützung einer Reihe regionaler und internationaler Entwicklungsprogramme die wirtschaftliche Situation rapide verbessern würde. Am Ende der sechziger Jahre hatten sich diese Hoffnungen jedoch zerschlagen (vgl. Matthies 1980). Trotz der florierenden Weltwirtschaft sowie bi- und multinationaler Hilfsprogramme hatte sich nicht nur das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen den Industrieländern und einem Großteil der Entwicklungsländer verschärft, sondern auch die wirtschaftliche Lage der Entwicklungsländer blieb weiterhin katastrophal. Weder die regionalen und internationalen Entwicklungsprogramme noch die Mechanismen des internationalen Wirtschaftssystems hatten das erreicht, was sie zu versprechen schienen. Die 1961 von der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen verkündete erste Entwicklungsdekade erwies sich ebenso als Fehlschlag wie die im August desselben Jahres von der Kennedy-Administration kreierte „Allianz für den Fortschritt“ zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Lateinamerika. Während die Handels- und Entwicklungskonferenz der UN 1964 einen viel versprechenden Anfang machte, gingen von der nachfolgenden zweiten Konferenz 1968 kaum weitere Impulse aus, so dass sich die Frustration der Entwicklungsländer weiter erhöhte (vgl. Ferdowsi 1999c: 537-544).

Nicht nur unter den jungen Entwicklungsstaaten verbreitete sich die Einsicht, dass die internationalen Mechanismen und Strukturen, durch die die Staaten der Dritten Welt mit den Industrieländern verbunden waren, sich als unfähig erwiesen, den spezifischen Interessen gerecht zu werden. Insbesondere die sich verschlechternden Austauschverhältnisse infolge der stetig sinkenden Rohstoffpreise einerseits und steigender Preise für Industriegüter andererseits weckten die Kritik am bestehenden Weltwirtschaftssystem. Unter den neuen Staaten verfes-

tigte sich daher die Ansicht, dass dieses System nicht für, sondern gegen sie arbeitete oder sie zumindest als die wirtschaftlich schwächeren Akteure erheblich benachteiligte. Die Konsequenzen manifestierten sich in den Forderungen nach grundlegenden Eingriffen und Umstrukturierungen zugunsten der Entwicklungsländer im Rahmen einer neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung (vgl. Ferdowsi 1999b: 11).

Dieses wachsende Selbstbewusstsein der Dritte-Welt-Länder und die letztendliche Durchsetzung der Erklärung zur Errichtung einer NWWO im Rahmen der UN werden jedoch nur dann verständlich, wenn sie vor dem Hintergrund der sich zeitgleich abspielenden politischen Entwicklungen umschrieben werden. So zählt beispielsweise die Bildung einer „Gruppe der 77", die in den folgenden Jahren zum Wortführer dieser Forderungen avancierte, zu den entscheidenden Faktoren. Ihren Forderungen schloss sich Anfang der siebziger Jahre auch die „Bewegung der Blockfreien" an, die sich seit ihrer offiziellen Gründung 1961 in Belgrad zu einer der einflussreichsten Interessenvertretungen der Dritten Welt („*pressure groups*") entwickelt hatte (vgl. Matthies 1985).

Die offenkundigste Manifestierung dieses politischen Wandels findet sich in der „Erklärung über Blockfreiheit und wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt" der 3. Gipfelkonferenz der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Blockfreienbewegung in Lusaka/Sambia 1970 und die Verpflichtung der Teilnehmerstaaten

„(i) den Geist der Self-Reliance zu pflegen und zu diesem Zweck eine entschiedene Politik zur Organisation des eigenen sozio-ökonomischen Fortschritts einzuschlagen und ihr den Rang eines vorrangigen Aktionsprogramms einzuräumen; (ii) ihre Rechte zur Sicherung der bestmöglichen Ausnutzung der natürlichen Ressourcen in ihren Hoheitsgebieten und den angrenzenden Meeren voll auszuüben und ihre Verpflichtung dazu für die Entwicklung ihrer Völker zu erfüllen; (iii) die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu den anderen Nationen auszubauen und zu diversifizieren, um so eine echte Interdependenz zu fördern." Ferner *„die gegenseitige Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Entwicklungsländern zu fördern, um deren nationalen Bestrebungen um Stärkung ihrer Unabhängigkeit Kraft zu verleihen; [...] Kooperations- und Sicherheitsbewegung zwischen den Entwicklungsländern auf subregionaler und interregionaler Ebene im größtmöglichen Ausmaß zu intensivieren und auszuweiten." (Kushi/Matthies 1978: 78).*

Dass es allerdings erst im Jahre 1974 zur Präsentation einer konzeptionell kompakten und politisch massiven Forderung der Staaten der Dritten Welt nach einer Neuordnung der Weltwirtschaft kam, hängt mit einer Reihe ökonomischer wie politischer Faktoren zusammen.[39]

[39] Als wesentlicher Aspekt kann hier die bereits erwähnte Energiekrise von 1973-74 und der hieraus resultierende Erfolg der OPEC, Erdöl als Instrument zur wirtschaftlichen und politischen Macht einzusetzen, genannt werden. Des Weiteren wirkte sich die Gewichtsverlagerung der UN weg von Fragen des Ost-West-Konflikts hin zur Nord-Süd-Problematik verstärkt aus. Denn im Zuge der fortschreitenden Dekolonisation weiter Teile Asiens und Afrikas in den sechziger Jahren traten zunehmend junge Staaten der Dritten Welt den Vereinten Nationen bei

Ihren politischen Niederschlag fand das Konzept schließlich im Rahmen der als 6. Sondergeneralversammlung der Vereinten Nationen vom 9. April bis zum 2. Mai 1974 abgehaltenen Tagung. Diese präsentierte als Ergebnis die Verabschiedung einer Erklärung und eines Aktionsprogramms zur Errichtung einer neuen internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung. Deren wesentliche Forderungen lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen:

- Eine souveräne Gleichheit der Staaten, Selbstbestimmung aller Völker, Unzulässigkeit des Gebietserwerbs durch Gewalt, territoriale Unversehrtheit und Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten;
- Das Recht eines jeden Landes, das wirtschaftliche und soziale System anzunehmen, welches es für seine eigene Entwicklung als am besten geeignet erachtet; es darf deshalb nicht diskriminiert werden;
- Volle und ständige Souveränität jedes Staates über seine natürlichen Hilfsquellen einschließlich des Rechts der Verstaatlichung oder der Eigentumsübertragung an seine eigenen Staatsangehörigen;
- Eine Regelung und Überwachung der Tätigkeit transnationaler Gesellschaften durch Maßnahmen im Interesse der Volkswirtschaft der Länder, in denen derartige Gesellschaften tätig sind, und zwar auf der Grundlage der uneingeschränkten Souveränität;
- Gerechte und faire Relationen zwischen den Preisen von Rohstoffen, die von Entwicklungsländern ausgeführt werden und den Preisen von Rohstoffen, die von ihnen eingeführt werden;
- Ausdehnung der aktiven Hilfe für Entwicklungsländer ohne irgendwelche politischen oder militärischen Bedingungen;
- Präferentielle und nicht auf Gegenseitigkeit beruhende Behandlung von Entwicklungsländern;
- Zugang zu den Errungenschaften der modernen Technologie für die Entwicklungsländer und Schaffung einer einheimischen Technologie nach Verfahren, die ihren Volkswirtschaften entsprechen;
- Stärkung der wirtschaftlichen, kommerziellen, finanziellen und technischen Zusammenarbeit der Entwicklungsländer auf der Grundlage von Präferenzen;
- Zulassung von Rohstofferzeugerkartellen;
- Beschleunigte Ausarbeitung von Grundstoffabkommen, um die Weltmärkte für Roh- und Grundstoffe soweit erforderlich zu regulieren und zu stabilisieren und Ausarbeitung eines

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und machten diese zu einem politischen Forum, auf dem sie ihre spezifischen Interessen diskutierten und verhandelten.

integrierten Gesamtprogramms für eine umfassende Reihe von Grundstoffen, an denen die Entwicklungsländer ein Exportinteresse haben;

- Errichtung von Marktausgleichen („*buffer stocks*“) im Rahmen von Grundstoffabkommen mit dem Ziel der Begünstigung der erzeugenden und verbrauchenden Entwicklungsländer und der Leistung eines Beitrags zur Erweiterung des Welthandels insgesamt;
- Verbesserung des Zugangs zu den Märkten in den entwickelten Ländern durch schrittweise Beseitigung von tarifären und nicht-tarifären Hemmnissen und restriktiven Geschäftspraktiken;
- Reform des Welternährungssystems;
- Maßnahmen zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung und zur Überwindung der Zahlungsbilanzkrisen der Entwicklungsländer;
- Förderung der „Industrialisierung der Entwicklungsländer“;
- Stärkung der Rolle der Vereinten Nationen bei der internationalen wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit, insbesondere der „Tätigkeit der Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen für Handel und Entwicklung“ (vgl. Jonas/Tietzel 1976: 214-232).

Für die Industrieländer stellten diese Forderungen eine gewichtige politische und wirtschaftliche Herausforderung dar. Letztlich bedeutete dies einerseits eine Veränderung der Nord-Süd-Verhältnisse zugunsten der Interessen der Entwicklungsländer, andererseits das Infragestellen der althergebrachten Privilegien der Industrieländer (vgl. Galtung 1979: 337-379; Tetzlaff 1982: 273-291). Hinsichtlich der EG-Dritte-Welt-Beziehungen lässt sich feststellen, dass die EG-Staaten im Rahmen der bereits seit Juli 1973 laufenden eigenen Verhandlungen versuchten, dieser Tendenz entgegenzuwirken, zugleich aber den Forderungen der Dritten Welt entgegenzukommen. Als nach zweijährigen Verhandlungen die erzielten Übereinkünfte mit den 46 AKP-Staaten im Februar 1975 präsentiert wurden, wertete man diese – laut Präambel des Lomé-I-Abkommens – als „einen Schritt in die Richtung einer gerechteren Weltwirtschaftsordnung“ (Europäische Gemeinschaft 1975: 13).

Wie diese Einschätzungen allgemein zu bewerten sind, lässt sich am ehesten anhand der entwicklungspolitischen Folgen der Lomé-Vereinbarungen aufzeigen. Um dies auf eine umfassende, zugleich aber auch detaillierte Art und Weise bewerkstelligen zu können, sollen im Folgenden die Ansprüche und Zielsetzungen der Lomé-Konvention einerseits, aber auch ihre Umsetzungen und Auswirkungen auf die nachfolgenden Entwicklungen andererseits dargelegt werden.

2. Die Lomé-Konvention. Ansprüche, Realisierungen und ihre Folgen

Will man den Erfolg bzw. Misserfolg einer weitreichenden Zusammenarbeit, wie sie im Rahmen der Lomé-Bestimmungen ausgehandelt wurde, dokumentieren, so bedarf es als Ausgangspunkt einer gewissen Zielsetzung, im Folgenden einer daran anknüpfenden Umsetzung sowie als letzten und entscheidenden Schritt eines entsprechenden Resultats. Lässt sich zwischen dem, was als Ziel anvisiert wurde, und dem, was als erreicht angesehen werden kann, eine außerordentliche Diskrepanz erkennen, so muss das Vorhaben als misslungen gelten. Überträgt man diese Überlegung auf das von 1975 bis 2000 währende Lomé-Modell, so muss man aus heutiger Sicht kein Prophet sein, um dessen Misserfolg als bestätigt zu erachten.

Die Gründe hierfür sind vielseitiger Natur. Während die Lomé-Konvention von einigen als Verfestigung einer post-kolonialen Kooperation betrachtet wird, die lediglich den Interessen der EG dient, sehen andere in ihr zu viele planerische Elemente, die dringend einer Liberalisierung bedürfen. Wie man diese Einschätzungen auch werten mag, die allgemeine Forderung nach einer Neuausrichtung des Konzepts ist und bleibt unumgänglich. Klar scheint auch, dass man sowohl auf europäischer als auch auf afrikanischer Seite zum Umdenken gezwungen ist. Kappel analysiert daher richtig, wenn er die Situation wie folgt beschreibt:

„Insgesamt ist das Modell [...] in eine Krise hineingeraten, weil die AKP-Länder an überkommenen Ausgleichsmaßnahmen festhalten und die EU durch die neuen Herausforderungen in Osteuropa, im Mittelmeer sowie vor allem im Globalisierungsprozess neue Handlungsräume erschließen möchte“ (Kappel 1999: 23f.).

Somit sind die AKP-Länder, aller Kooperations-Rhetorik zum Trotz, immer mehr zu einem lästigen Partner für die EU geworden. Lästig zum einen deswegen, weil sie, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, nur geringe wirtschaftliche Fortschritte gemacht haben. Zum anderen, weil sie in der Armutsbekämpfung nicht vorangekommen sind. In Kritikerkreisen ist in diesem Sinne gar die Rede von „Afrika als Prototyp eines von externer Hilfe abhängigen Kontinents“ (vgl. Hofmeier 2004: 49). Eine Trendwende, wie sie schon so oft prognostiziert bzw. herbeigewünscht wurde, ist auch in naher Zukunft nicht in Sicht. Für diese Entwicklung, so die These, ist nicht zuletzt auch die EU aufgrund ihrer verfehlten Afrikapolitik mitverantwortlich. Anhand der entwicklungspolitischen Folgen der Lomé-Konvention soll diese Argumentation verifiziert werden, wobei zunächst die Rahmenbedingungen und die Instrumente der Kooperation sowie die spezifischen Interessenlagen untersucht werden sollen, bevor es die Grundzüge und Tendenzen dieser Entwicklung aufzuzeigen gilt.

2.1 Rahmenbedingungen des Kooperationsmodells

Seit 1975 sind die Beziehungen zwischen den AKP-Ländern und den europäischen Mächten vor allem durch die Lomé-Vereinbarungen und bilaterale Verträge mit den einzelnen Ländern geprägt. Dem ersten Lomé-Vertrag folgten bis zum Jahr 2000 drei weitere Abkommen, die ein einzigartiges Kooperationsmodell darstellten. So berücksichtigten sie einerseits die AKP-Belange, wahrten andererseits aber auch die Interessen der EU (vgl. Bach 1993: 34 f.). Dabei lassen sich die EU-Interessen im Wesentlichen auf folgende Aspekte reduzieren:

- Sicherung der Zufuhr mineralischer und fossiler Rohstoffe, die deshalb ohne Probleme in die EU eingeführt werden können.
- Sicherung der Einfuhr tropischer Früchte und Gemüse, die in der EG nicht oder in nicht ausreichendem Maße wachsen.
- Absicherung der strategischen Interessen der europäischen Nationalstaaten, insbesondere Frankreichs. Die AKP-Staaten fungierten somit als Verbündete der EU bei der Durchsetzung ihrer Interessen auf UN-Ebene und bei der Reduzierung hegemonialer Interessen der Sowjetunion (bis 1989).

Als Absatzmarkt für Fertigwaren, Investitions- und Luxusgüter sowie für subventionierte Nahrungsmittel (bspw. Fleisch, Milch, Getreide) waren die AKP-Staaten hingegen von geringem Interesse. Für die AKP-Staatengruppe bestanden die Interessen im Zugang zum europäischen Markt durch präferentielle Zugeständnisse, im Zugang zu günstigen Krediten und zur Entwicklungshilfe der EG.

Im Verhältnis zu allen anderen Kooperationsformen, sei es das nordamerikanische Kooperationsabkommen NAFTA oder die Kooperation der EU mit Lateinamerika, weist die Lomé-Konvention die weitgehendsten wirtschaftlichen Präferenzen und die höchsten Entwicklungshilfeleistungen auf. Erklären lässt sich dies durch den im Rahmen der Lomé-Vereinbarungen zustande gekommenen Interessenausgleich. Im Zuge der Dekolonisation verloren die europäischen Staaten in ihren ehemaligen Kolonien an Einfluss. Durch das post-koloniale Lomé-Kooperationsmodell sahen die europäischen Staaten unterdessen ihre wirtschaftlichen und strategischen Interessen gewahrt. Im Gegenzug gestanden sie der AKP-Staatengruppe Privilegien zu. Es handelt sich somit um eine vertikale Kooperation, d.h. eine Kooperation von wirtschaftlich schwachen Staaten mit starken, die die Form einer klientelistischen Beziehung annimmt. Die schwächere Partei sucht aus der Dialektik der Abhängigkeit Vorteile zu ziehen, indem sie die historisch gewachsenen Beziehungen nutzt, um Ressourcen zur Milderung der Abhängigkeit zu erhalten (vgl. Kappel 2004: 114).

Mit dem Zusammenbruch der Sowjetunion und dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes veränderten sich jedoch die Bedingungen der Interessenkoalition. Einen ersten deutlichen Hinweis für die Kursänderung in der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik lieferten die Maastrichter Verträge 1992. Dort heißt es in Art. 130u:

„Die Politik der Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die eine Ergänzung der entsprechenden Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten darstellt, fördert

- *die nachhaltige wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung der Entwicklungsländer, insbesondere der am meisten benachteiligten Länder;*
- *die harmonische, schrittweise Eingliederung der Entwicklungsländer in die Weltwirtschaft;*
- *die Bekämpfung der Armut in den Entwicklungsländern“ (Europäische Gemeinschaft/Europäische Union 1993: 116).*

Demzufolge werden künftig alle Entwicklungsländer gleich behandelt. Der Vertrag fordert Kohärenz in der Entwicklungspolitik der Gemeinschaft und den Mitgliedsstaaten, was, wie sich zeigen wird, Konsequenzen für die Kooperationsbeziehungen mit den AKP-Staaten nach sich zieht. Nicht zuletzt wirkten sich die GATT-Beschlüsse und die Gründung der WTO, aber auch die neuen Konstellationen im pazifischen (Gründung der APEC) und nordamerikanischen Raum (Gründung der NAFTA) auf das Kooperationsverhältnis zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten aus. Die Rahmenbedingungen der euro-afrikanischen Zusammenarbeit hatten sich zunehmend geändert.

Durch den Zusammenbruch des sozialistischen Ostblocks ergab sich eine veränderte geostrategische Landschaft. Osteuropa, die Mittelmeerländer und des Weiteren auch lateinamerikanische und asiatische Schwellenländer rückten verstärkt in den Fokus der EU. Die Rolle der AKP-Staaten als Hinterland und Bollwerk gegen den Kommunismus entfiel, so dass sie aufgrund ihrer strategischen Bedeutungslosigkeit und wirtschaftlichen Schwäche gegenüber anderen Regionen der Dritten Welt ins Hintertreffen gerieten. Diesen Bedeutungsverlust der AKP-Staatengruppe in Hinblick auf die europäische Außenpolitik möchte eine Vielzahl der Kooperationskritiker auch in Form von Kürzungen der finanziellen Mittel übertragen sehen. Es mehren sich die Stimmen, die auf eine Beendigung der präferentiellen Kooperation drängen. Allgemein wird eine Revision des Lomé-Modells gefordert: Während einige Autoren grundlegend gegen eine Fortführung der Kooperation argumentieren, sehen andere wiederum Perspektiven für eine Reform des Lomé-Modells (vgl. Lingnau 1991; Brigaldino 1994: 26-37; Brigaldino 1995). Von Seiten der AKP-Staatengemeinschaft wird unterdessen die Beibehaltung des Präferenzstatus’ eingefordert. Eine innovative, dynamische und langfristig orientierte Zusammenarbeit zeichnet sich aus ihrer Perspektive nicht ab, was nicht zuletzt auch eine Folge lang gehegter Klientelstrukturen zur EU ist.

Nichtsdestotrotz gewann die Diskussion zur Neuordnung der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre zunehmend an Intensität (vgl. Nuscheler/Schmuck 1992; Grilli 1993; Reithinger 1995: 387-394; Lingnau 1996: 355-366; Medhanie 1996: 397-408). Die weltweiten Veränderungen mit dem Verlust der Hegemonieposition der USA, der Bildung der Triaden im Globalisierungsprozess und die Veränderungen innerhalb der EU lassen grundlegende Reformbestrebungen unausweichlich erscheinen. Schließlich wurden die Verhandlungen über die zukünftige Ausgestaltung des Lomé-Abkommens 1998 in Angriff genommen und mündeten im Juni 2000 in das so genannte Cotonou-Abkommen, dem Lomé-Nachfolger.[40]

2.2 Die Lomé-Instrumente und ihre Wirkungen

2.2.1 Die handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit

Es erwies sich als entscheidend bei der Aushandlung der Vertragsbedingungen, dass die AKP-Staaten an ihrer langjährigen Forderung festhielten, einseitige Vorteile beim Zugang zum europäischen Markt zu erhalten. Dies hatte zwar nicht den Verhandlungszielen der EG entsprochen, die diesbezüglich auf gegenseitige Zugeständnisse spekulierte, doch, so argumentierten die AKP-Staaten, würden gegenseitige Präferenzen sie daran hindern, auf die günstigsten Märkte zurückzugreifen, und somit eine „Entwicklungsbarriere“ darstellen.[41]

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass ein Großteil der Exporte der AKP-Staaten in die EG ging, sollten somit, gemäß der Vorstellung „Hilfe durch Handel“, neue Entwicklungsimpulse durch eine intensivierte handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit initiiert werden. Diese Kooperation sah dreierlei Maßnahmen vor:

- Allen Produkten aus den AKP-Staaten, mit Ausnahme jener landwirtschaftlichen Produkte, für die die EG gemeinsame Marktordnungen beschlossen hatte[42], wurde freier Zugang zum europäischen Markt gewährt. Demnach konnten nach Darstellungen der Kommission 99,4 bis 99,6% aller Exporte aus den AKP-Staaten zoll- und kontingentfrei importiert werden. Während hierbei auf Gegenpräferenzen verzichtet wurde, galt stattdessen das Prinzip der Meistbegünstigung. Dies bedeutete, dass Handelsvereinbarungen der AKP-

[40] Auf den Cotonou-Vertrag soll im Rahmen dieser Untersuchung nicht näher eingegangen werden, da zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt noch kaum profunde Ergebnisse hinsichtlich seiner gesamten Ausmaße und all seiner Dimensionen vorliegen. Aus diesem Grund ist er für den historischen Rückblick dieser Arbeit, dessen Ziel in der Beleuchtung von zurückliegenden Maßnahmen zur Nachvollziehbarkeit von gegenwärtigen Strukturen und Vorgehensweisen liegt, nur bedingt von Nutzen.

[41] Dieser Auffassung entgegnete man von europäischer Seite erst sichtbar, als im Juni 2000 das Cotonou-Abkommen unterzeichnet wurde, das einseitige Präferenzen nur für eine Übergangszeit festschreibt. Vgl. Clapham 1996: 100.

[42] Dies waren Zucker, Bananen, Rum, Rindfleisch und Reis.

Staaten mit Dritten nicht günstiger als die Regelungen sein durften, die für die Importe aus der EG bestanden.

- Neu gegenüber den Yaoundé-Bestimmungen war der so genannte kumulative Ursprung. Diese Maßnahme sollte verschiedene Bearbeitungsstufen eines Produkts in unterschiedlichen Staaten der AKP-Gruppe ermöglichen. Ferner diente sie zur Förderung und Intensivierung der Süd-Süd-Beziehungen. Mit ihr gingen Vorkehrungen zur Ausbildung von Fachkräften für den Außenhandel, die Verbreitung von Handelsinformationen sowie die Beteiligung der AKP-Staaten an Fachausstellungen und Messen einher.

Die eingeräumten Handelsvorteile als zentraler Bestandteil der Lomé-Bestimmungen sind in ihrer Wirkung seit ihrer Vereinbarung 1975 von abnehmender Bedeutung. Trotz des präferentiellen Zollsystems sank der Anteil der Importe aus den AKP-Ländern an den EU-Gesamtimporten kontinuierlich. Zurückführen lässt sich dies auf die Tatsache, dass die Präferenzen insbesondere dann an ihre Grenzen stießen, wenn es sich um so genannte „sensible Güter“ handelte, die in Konkurrenz zu europäischen Agrarerzeugnissen standen. Während zu Beginn des Lomé-Modells zwischen 90 und 95 Prozent der AKP-Exporte zollfrei in die EG eingeführt werden konnten, war es im Jahre 2000 nur noch die Hälfte der Agrarexporte der AKP-Staaten (vgl. Cox/Chapman 1999: 55).

Insbesondere die Nichtberücksichtigung des Entwicklungsstandes der Partnerländer bei der Gewährung von Präferenzen ließ den Wettbewerbsvorteil der AKP-Staaten weiter schmelzen. So wurden Nicht-AKP-Staaten im Falle einzelner Erzeugnisse größere Handelspräferenzen eingeräumt als den AKP-Staaten. Mehrere weltweite Zollsenkungen aufgrund der GATT-Runden verringerten die Handelsvorteile der Lomé-Vereinbarungen im Vergleich zum allgemeinen Präferenzsystem für Nicht-AKP-Staaten. Demzufolge relativierten sich mit der Zeit die Zollpräferenzen für die AKP-Staaten, zumal sich die Erzeugerstrukturen anderer Anbieter auf dem Weltmarkt als weitaus produktiver erwiesen.[43] So profitieren gerade einmal 7 Prozent aller Erzeugnisse der AKP-Staaten noch tatsächlich von den Lomé-Vereinbarungen. Bei diesen handelt es sich mit tropischen Agrarerzeugnissen und Rohstoffen vor allem um die traditionellen Exportgüter dieser Staaten.

Das Handelspräferenzabkommen erwies sich somit als Behinderung der Diversifizierung der Export- und Produktionsstrukturen der AKP-Staaten. Einer grundlegenden Problemlösung waren die Lomé-Instrumente nicht dienlich:

„[...] Weil das Problem der AKP-Produzenten nicht der Marktzugang ist, sondern die zu teure Produktion, zu niedrige Produktivität, die unzureichenden Kenntnisse der Nachfragemärkte, die schwach entwickelte Produkt-

[43] Zu nennen ist in erster Linie die südostasiatische Konkurrenz.

palette und die Behinderung der exportorientierten verarbeitenden Industrie durch reformunfähige Staaten." (Kappel 1999: 34).

Folglich hat das handelspolitische Instrument der Lomé-Vereinbarungen, das Präferenzsystem, seinen eigentlichen Sinn verfehlt. Daher gilt es, die ursprüngliche Strategie, Armut mittels präferentiellen Handels zu beseitigen, in Zukunft zu überdenken bzw. vollkommen neu zu gestalten.

Ein erster diesbezüglicher Schritt wurde im Rahmen der Verhandlungen zum Lomé-Nachfolgeabkommen von Cotonou bereits getroffen. So soll mittelfristig, trotz des Widerstandes vieler AKP-Staaten, der handelspolitische Fokus auf die Einführung regionaler Partnerschaften gerichtet werden. Diese *„Regional Economic Partnership Agreements"* sollen bis 2008 die bisherigen einseitigen Handelspräferenzen ersetzen (vgl. Weiland 2000: 50). Dabei birgt das Abweichen vom bisherigen Prinzip der einseitigen Handelspräferenzen für die afrikanischen Staaten völlig neue Schwierigkeiten in sich. So sind durch den Wegfall von Zöllen massive Einbrüche in den Staatseinnahmen zu befürchten, wodurch eine Umorientierung der Staatshaushalte – weg von den Rohstoff-Renteneinnahmen – unumgänglich erscheint (vgl. Mair 2002: 15-23). Aus praktischer Perspektive betrachtet, dürfte dies jedoch nicht ohne größere politische Umstrukturierungen innerhalb der afrikanischen Staaten möglich sein, da gerade deren Eliten ihre Einnahmen im Wesentlichen aus Renten beziehen und diese zum eigenen Machterhalt einsetzen (vgl. Erdmann 2001: 294-297). Andererseits verhindert die wettbewerbsverzerrende heimische Subventionspraxis der EU auch weiterhin die Einführung fairer Freihandelsabkommen. Insbesondere in Bezug auf den für die afrikanischen Staaten so wichtigen Agrarsektor lassen sich keine richtungsweisenden Neuerungen erkennen (vgl. Weiland: 2000: 55).

2.2.2 Finanzielle und technische Kooperation

Angesichts der wirtschaftlichen Krise in den meisten AKP-Staaten kommt neben den nationalen Maßnahmen einzelner EU-Mitgliedsstaaten der finanziellen Unterstützung der EU eine wichtige Rolle zu. Die Europäische Union in ihrer Gesamtheit zahlt mehr als die Hälfte der weltweit geleisteten Entwicklungshilfe und ist somit die größte Geberin. Die europäische Hilfe teilt sich in gemeinschaftliche und bilaterale Hilfszahlungen auf, wobei die europäische Entwicklungspolitik laut EG-Vertrag „eine Ergänzung der entsprechenden Politik der Mitgliedsstaaten" darstellen soll (EGV, Art. 177, ex-Art. 130 u). Betrachtet man nur die über die Kommission verwalteten Hilfsleistungen, so ist die Europäische Gemeinschaft die viertgrößte

Geberin von Entwicklungshilfe.[44] Will man daher die gesamten europäischen Hilfsleistungen erfassen, muss sowohl die bilaterale Hilfe der Mitgliedstaaten als auch die Hilfen aus dem seit der EWG-Gründung bestehenden EEF berücksichtigt werden.
Die EU unterscheidet in Hinblick auf ihre Entwicklungshilfe grundsätzlich zwischen Programmhilfe und nicht-programmierbarer Hilfe. Die Mittel der Programmhilfe wurden zu Beginn der Lomé-Abkommen zwischen den Vertragsparteien ausgehandelt und umfassen im Wesentlichen Entwicklungshilfeprojekte, die Förderung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit für sieben Regionen in den AKP-Staaten, Programme in den Bereichen Gesundheit und Aids-Bekämpfung, Hilfe für Mikroprojekte, industrielle Zusammenarbeit, Entwicklung des Handels und des Fremdenverkehrs, kulturelle Zusammenarbeit, Bildung und Ausbildung und Strukturanpassungsprogramme. Hinzu kommen sektorale Entwicklungs- und Einfuhrprogramme. Hierbei handelt es sich zumeist um indirekte Budgethilfen, die den Ländern Deviseneinsparungen bei notwendigen Importen ermöglichen. Die nicht-programmierbare Hilfe beinhaltet unterdessen Mittel für Sonderdarlehen, Risikokapital, STABEX und SYSMIN und beinhaltet alle Ausgaben, die zu Beginn der Kooperation nicht geplant werden.

Der EEF wird nicht aus dem Haushaltsbudget der EU finanziert, sondern aus den Beiträgen der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten. Demnach sind die Zahlungen an den EEF nicht automatisch an das Bruttoinlandsprodukt des Landes gekoppelt, so dass allein der politische Wille über die Beiträge des jeweiligen EU-Mitgliedsstaates entscheidet. Alle fünf Jahre werden die aktuellen Finanzierungsanteile am EEF neu ausgehandelt, wobei die zunehmende Heftigkeit der Aushandlung auf eine abnehmende Bereitschaft zur Eingliederung des EEF in den EU-Haushalt schließen lässt. Schließlich würden dann die anfallenden Zahlungen obligatorisch am BIP errechnet (vgl. Grimm 2003: 127). Traditionell sind Deutschland und Frankreich mit jeweils ca. 25 Prozent die größten Geldgeber. Während Frankreich, Luxemburg und die Europäische Kommission eine Erweiterung des finanziellen Engagements befürworten, hält die Vielzahl der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten an den gegenwärtigen Zahlungsgrößen fest. Einzig Großbritannien forderte im Zuge der Verhandlungen zum achten EEF eine Reduktion seines nominalen Anteils. Diese reduzierten Anstrengungen einiger Länder konnten lediglich durch die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten Österreich, Finnland und Schweden aufgefangen werden (vgl. Kappel 1996: 25).

[44] Dies sind 17 Prozent der geleisteten EU-Gesamthilfe.

Tabelle II-1: Die Finanzierungsanteile der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten am EEF

	Anteil am EG-Haushalt (% 1995)	EEF 7 (% 1990-1995)	EEF 8 (% 1995-2000)	Anteil bilateraler Hilfe der Staaten (% 1997)
Belgien	3,8	4,0	3,9	57
Dänemark	1,9	2,1	2,1	62
Deutschland	29,5	26,0	23,4	62
Griechenland	1,4	1,2	1,2	-
Spanien	7,7	5,9	5,8	62
Frankreich	18,3	24,4	24,3	76
Irland	0,8	0,6	0,6	64
Italien	13,3	13,0	12,5	36
Luxemburg	0,2	0,2	0,3	70
Niederlande	6,1	5,6	5,2	72
Portugal	1,6	0,9	1,0	65
Großbritannien	15,5	16,4	12,7	58
Österreich	2,7	-	2,6	58
Finnland	1,4	-	1,5	53
Schweden	2,5	-	2,7	70
Insgesamt	100	100	100	Durchschnitt: 62

Quellen: DAC 1997; Van Reisen 1999: 27; Grimm 2003: 129.

Seit der Einführung des EEF 1957 und der Aushandlung der Lomé-Konvention 1975 wurde der Finanzumfang der europäischen Entwicklungshilfe zunehmend ausgeweitet. Während der erste EEF mit einem Volumen von 581 Mio. ECU für die assoziierten Länder einen Anstieg der Finanzleistungen um 15 Prozent im Vergleich zu den bestehenden bilateralen Verbindungen bedeutete, stiegen die europäischen Hilfszahlungen vom dritten zum vierten EEF – also von Yaoundé zum Lomé-Vertrag – um das 3,7fache. Dabei muss diese eindrucksvolle Steigerung der europäischen Aufwendungen wohlgemerkt dadurch erklärt werden, dass sowohl die Anzahl der Empfängerstaaten als auch der finanzstarken Geber durch EG-Erweiterungen zugenommen hatte.[45] Die aktuellsten Erkenntnisse über den finanziellen Umfang der europäischen Entwicklungshilfe liefert der achte EEF (1995-2000), der sich auf ca. 13 Mrd. Ecu belief. Das Gesamtvolumen der Lomé IV/2-Vereinbarungen beträgt unterdessen 14,6 Mrd. Ecu. Für den 9. EEF sind 13, 5 Mrd. Euro vereinbart worden (vgl. Schmidt 2002: 31).

[45] Die Anzahl der Empfängerstaaten wuchs von ursprünglich 17 französischen Kolonien mit insgesamt 77 Millionen Einwohnern auf heute 77 Staaten mit mehr als 500 Millionen Einwohnern. Zudem sind die genannten Zahlen nominal, also nicht inflationsbereinigt. Vgl. Cox/Chapman 1999: 56.

Tabelle II-2: Die Finanzmittel der Lomé-Abkommen im Vergleich (in Mrd. Ecu und %)

	Lomé I 1975-1980 4. EEF insg.	**Lome II** 1980-1985 5. EEF insg.	%	**Lomé III** 1985-1990 6. EEF insg.	%	**Lomé IV/1** 1990-1995 7. EEF insg.	%	**Lomé IV/2** 1995-2000 8. EEF insg.	%
Programm-hilfe (1-2)	**2.057**	**2.986**	**54**	**4.860**	**57**	**7.995**	**67**	**9.592**	**65.6**
1 Zuschüsse	2.057	2.986	54	4.860	57	6.845	57	8.192	56.0
2 Struktur-anpassungs-darlehen	-	-	-	-	-	1.150	10	1.400	9.6
Nicht pro-Grammier-bare Hilfe (3-6)	**0.923**	**1.641**	**30**	**2.540**	**30**	**2.800**	**23**		
3 Sonder-darlehen	0.116	0.518	9	0.600	7	-	-	-	-
4 Risiko-kapital	0.097	0.284	5	0.600	7	0.820	7	1.000	6.8
5 Stabex	0.380	0.557	10	0.925	11	1.500	12	1.800	12.3
6 Sysmin	-	0.282	5	0.415	5	0.480	4	0.575	3.9
7 EEF (1-6)	**2.980**	**4.627**	**84**	**7.400**	**87**	**10.800**	**90**	**12.967**	**88.7**
8 EIB	0.390	0.885	16	1.100	13	1.200	10	1.658	11.3
Insgesamt (7-8)	**3.457**	**5.512**	**100**	**8.500**	**100**	**12.000**	**100**	**14.625**	**100**

Quelle: Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften 1990.

Bis einschließlich dem sechsten EEF wurden die Beträge zu zwei Drittel als Zuschuss vergeben, der Rest als Darlehen zum Zinssatz von einem Prozent bereitgestellt. Daneben treten Zinsbelastungen für die Mittel der EIB auf. Seit dem siebten EEF werden die Mittel nun ausschließlich als nichtrückzahlbare Zuschüsse vergeben, so dass der Zuschussanteil des siebten und achten EEF jeweils bei ca. 90 Prozent lag. Der Schenkungsanteil ist somit äußerst hoch.

Trotz dieser über die Jahrzehnte verstärkten finanziellen Kooperation nahm der auf den afrikanischen Kontinent fallende Anteil der EU-Gesamthilfe (Mittel aus der bilateralen Entwicklungshilfe plus EEF) ab. Während 1980 rund 80 Prozent der europäischen Hilfsgelder Afrika zugute kamen, waren es 1993 nur noch 45 Prozent. Parallel hierzu sank auch der Anteil des EEF am Gesamtvolumen der europäischen Entwicklungshilfe von 50 Prozent (1990) auf 33 Prozent (1993) (vgl. Kappel 1996: 27).

Die abnehmende europäische Bereitschaft, Afrikas Entwicklung weiterhin durch einseitige finanzielle Unterstützung voranzutreiben, erklärt sich in erster Linie durch die Veränderung der geostrategischen Landschaft im Zuge der Beendigung des Kalten Krieges. Die jahrzehntelang vorherrschenden Interessenkoalitionen galt es aus europäischer Sicht zu revidieren.

Schließlich wirkten sich die Probleme und Konstellationen der neuen mittel- und osteuropäischen Nachbarstaaten weitaus folgenschwerer auf das Handeln Europas aus, als es die der afrikanischen Kooperationspartner jemals taten. Folglich maß man einer erfolgreichen Transformation Osteuropas eine größere Aufmerksamkeit als einer Intensivierung der euro-afrikanischen Kooperation bei. Der Öffentlichkeit gegenüber versicherten die EU-Vertreter zwar, dass die Hilfe für Ost- und Mitteleuropa nicht auf Kosten der Hilfe für den Süden geschehen werde, doch wurde schnell deutlich, dass der Versuch, alle Interessen unter einen Hut zu bringen, zu Widersprüchen bzw. zur Konkurrenz um die Entwicklungshilfegelder führen musste (Vgl. Van Reisen 1999: 12). Bezeichnend hierfür ist die Stellungnahme des damaligen Bundeskanzlers Helmut Kohl auf der Rio-Konferenz 1992:

„[...] Deutschland empfindet gegenüber seinen Nachbarn in Mittel-, Ost- und Südosteuropa eine besondere Verantwortung. Wir unterstützen deshalb den demokratischen und wirtschaftlichen Aufbau in diesen Ländern mit einem großen Hilfsprogramm. Trotz dieser großen Anstrengungen sind wir fest entschlossen, unserer Verantwortung für die Entwicklungsländer gerecht zu werden. Wir wissen, daß dies auch ein Beitrag zur Sicherung unserer eigenen Zukunft ist. Wir bekennen uns deshalb zur Verstärkung der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe und bestätigen ausdrücklich das 0,7%-Ziel. Dabei weise ich daraufhin, dass die Hilfen Deutschlands für seine östlichen Nachbarn angemessen zu berücksichtigen sind." (Rede von Helmut Kohl bei der UN-Konferenz über Umwelt und Entwicklung am 12.06.1992 in Rio de Janeiro; zitiert nach: van Reisen 1999: 12).

Somit blieb das Ziel, die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe auf 0,7 Prozent des BSP zu erhöhen, nach außen hin unverändert. Was sich jedoch veränderte, war die Vorstellung, welche Länder in die Liste der ODA-Empfänger aufgenommen werden sollten. Diese Ansicht wurde nicht nur vom deutschen Bundeskanzler, sondern von fast allen EU-Regierungschefs vertreten. Dies beweisen die entsprechenden regionalen Zusagen, die im Rahmen der europäischen Entwicklungsfinanzierung (Haushalt und EEF) in den 1990er Jahren erteilt wurden.

Abbildung II-2: Zusagen zur Verteilung der EU-Entwicklungshilfe nach Regionen



Quelle: Europäische Kommission 1998.

Bei näherer Betrachtung dieser beiden Grafiken wird deutlich, dass eine klare Gewichtsverschiebung zuungunsten des Südens stattfand. So profitieren nunmehr insbesondere diejenigen Länder von europäischen Hilfsgeldern, die sich in direkter Nachbarschaft zur EU befinden und deren spezifische Interessen- und Problemlagen unverzüglich auch entsprechende Auswirkungen auf die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten nach sich ziehen können.

Entsprechend ihren individuellen nationalen Interessen zeichneten sich in der Diskussion um die zukünftige Verteilung der EU-Entwicklungshilfe unter den Mitgliedsstaaten folgende Tendenzen ab: Während die nordeuropäischen Staaten sich für eine verstärkte Hilfe für Osteuropa einsetzten, argumentierten Italien und Spanien, dass eine solche nur dann erhöht werden könne, wenn die Kooperation mit den Ländern des Mittelmeerraumes ebenfalls substantiell erhöht würde. Zusätzlich kämpfte Spanien für eine Intensivierung der Zusammenarbeit mit Lateinamerika. Frankreich und Großbritannien mahnten unterdessen die Aufrechterhaltung des Hilfeniveaus für Afrika an und die skandinavischen Länder betonten die Priorität der Hilfe für die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder. Folglich stieg bei den Verhandlungen über die finanzielle Perspektive des EG-Programms für auswärtige Beziehungen[46] das angesetzte Hilfsvolumen für alle Regionen dramatisch an. Das EG-Programm wuchs zum fünftgrößten ODA-Programm weltweit. Nichtsdestotrotz nahm der prozentuale Anteil der Hilfsgelder für den Süden – und somit Afrika – weiter ab (vgl. Van Reisen 1999: 12f.).

Abbildung II-3: Regionale Verteilung der weltweiten Entwicklungshilfe 1994-2002



Quelle: DAC 2004.

[46] Diese fanden für die Jahre 1993 bis 1999 in Edinburgh statt.

Wie man diese Gewichtsverschiebung auch bewerten mag, klar ist, dass die bisherige finanzielle Kooperation nicht zu einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung in den Empfängerländern beigetragen hat. Ganz im Gegenteil, die Hilfsabhängigkeit nimmt seit 1975 zu.[47] Ein schlagartiger Wegfall der Hilfszahlungen würde sich auf die Ökonomien der Entwicklungsländer verheerend auswirken und wäre von ihnen kurzfristig nicht aufzufangen (vgl. Goldsmith 2001: 126). Daher stellt sich die Frage, welches die langfristigen Ziele dieser Form der finanziellen Kooperation sein können. Bislang jedenfalls wirkten sie zumeist wie vereinzelte Tropfen auf einem heißen Stein.

2.2.3 Die Subventionssysteme STABEX und SYSMIN

Die beiden Stabilisierungsfonds für landwirtschaftliche Exportprodukte und für Bergbauerzeugnisse sind wesentliche Bestandteile des Kooperationsabkommens zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten. Ziel des in Lomé-I ausgehandelten Systems der Exporterlös-Stabilisierung (STABEX) sollte es sein, die Mindereinnahmen bei den Exporterlösen (z.B. infolge von Preissenkungen) in gewissem Umfang auszugleichen, um auf diese Weise die nachteiligen Auswirkungen von Einnahmeverlusten in Grenzen zu halten.

Anwendungen von STABEX:

1. Die Stabex-Regelung kann für Waren in Anspruch genommen werden, auf die im Jahr vor der Inanspruchnahme des Systems 5% der vom jeweiligen Land im Exportgeschäft mit sämtlichen Bestimmungsländern insgesamt erwirtschafteten Ausfuhrerlöse fallen.
2. Jedes Land kann die Stabex-Regelung in Anspruch nehmen, in dem – gemessen am Durchschnitt der sechs dem Jahr der Inanspruchnahme des Systems vorausgegangenen Jahre – ein Rückgang der Ausfuhrerlöse um mindestens 4,5% festgestellt wird, wobei weder der niedrigste noch der höchste Jahreswert berücksichtigt wird. Für die am wenigsten entwickelten AKP-Staaten sowie die AKP-Binnen- und Inselstaaten ist der Anteil in beiden Fällen auf 1% festgelegt (vgl. Europäische Kommission 1995: 87; Herrmann 1991: 99-143).

In diesem Punkt wurden die Forderungen nach einer NWWO am weitesten aufgegriffen. Die große Weltmarktabhängigkeit vieler AKP-Staaten und ihre Verwundbarkeit gegenüber Preisschwankungen erkannte man an und versuchte entsprechend auftretenden Tendenzen mittels des Sonderfonds entgegenzuwirken. Zwar existierte über den Internationalen Währungsfonds

[47] Als hilfsabhängig sind die Länder einzustufen, in denen Hilfszahlungen mehr als 10 Prozent ihres Bruttosozialprodukts ausmachen. Traf diese Einschätzung zwischen 1975 und 1979 auf 17 Staaten im subsaharischen Afrika zu, waren es zwischen 1990 und 1997 31 Staaten. Aus der Abhängigkeit von Hilfsleistungen konnten sich in dieser Zeitspanne unterdessen nur zwei Länder befreien: Botswana und die Seychellen. Vgl. Goldsmith 2001: 125.

zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits eine *Compensatory Financing Facility*, doch orientierte sich diese im Gegensatz zu STABEX nicht an einzelnen Exportprodukten. Zudem griffen STABEX-Maßnahmen unabhängig davon, ob andere Exportprodukte des betroffenen Landes gerade ein Hoch erlebten und infolgedessen den Verlust eines Sektors mit den Gewinnen eines anderen ausgleichen konnten (vgl. Grilli 1993: 30).

Im Rahmen des Lomé-II-Abkommens kam es zur Aufnahme eines weiteren Systems, das die Sicherung der Exporterlöse einiger Bergbau-Erzeugnisse[48] zur Aufgabe hatte: der Sonderfonds SYSMIN. Im Unterschied zu STABEX ist SYSMIN kein System zur Erlösstabilisierung, obwohl Erlösminderungen ausgeglichen werden. Vielmehr verfolgt SYSMIN den Zweck, die Zufuhr von Rohstoffen für die rohstoffarme EU zu sichern.[49] Demzufolge werden SYSMIN-Gelder zur Verfügung gestellt, um der Gefahr von Stilllegungen der Bergbauproduktion durch sinkende Rohstofferlöse zu entgehen. SYSMIN stellt somit ein Anreizsystem für eine höhere Produktion von entsprechenden Rohstoffen dar.[50]

Abbildung II-4: STABEX und SYSMIN (die zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel in Mio. Euro)



Quelle: Cox/Chapman 1999: 56.

[48] Hierzu zählten Kupfer, Kobalt, Phosphate, Mangan, Bauxit, Aluminiumoxyd, Zinn, Schwefelkiesabbrände, Eisenerz, Gold und Uran.
[49] So erhielten beispielsweise die vier Länder Sambia, Zaire, Guinea und Guyana von 1980-1990 zwei Drittel aller zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel. Vgl. Kappel 1996: 32.
[50] Ausführlich zu diesen beiden Subventionssystemen: Kappel 1999: 34-40.

Anwendung von SYSMIN:
Die Fazilität dient dazu, die nachteiligen Auswirkungen vorübergehender schwerer Störungen des Bergbausektors auf die Einnahmen dieser Länder abzufangen. Ein Land kann einen Antrag auf Inanspruchnahme von SYSMIN stellen, wenn der Anteil der fraglichen Erzeugnisse an den Gesamtausfuhren vier Jahre in Folge im Schnitt mehr als 15% (10% im Falle der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder) oder der Anteil der Ausfuhrerlöse für sämtliche Bergbauerzeugnisse 20% oder mehr ausmacht (12% im Falle der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder sowie der Binnen- und Inselstaaten). Seit Lomé-IV werden nicht rückzahlbare Zuschüsse vergeben (vgl. Europäische Kommission 1995: 93).

Den formulierten Ansprüchen konnte jedoch keines der beiden Subventionssysteme gerecht werden: Als System zur Ausgleichung von Mindereinnahmen bei Exporterlösen sollten die entsprechenden STABEX-Mittel der Diversifizierung dienen. Tatsächlich wurden die ausgezahlten Mittel teilweise für andere Zwecke als die vorgegebenen ausgegeben. Demzufolge kamen Ausgleichszahlungen des STABEX-Fonds keineswegs den entscheidenden Akteuren, den Bauern, zugute. Ebenso lassen sich weitere „Schwachstellen“ des STABEX-Systems ausmachen:

- Die Gesamtzahlungen sind auf bestimmte Plafonds begrenzt, so dass extreme Preissenkungen nicht aufgefangen werden können. Der Ausgleich eines langfristigen Verfalls der Rohstoffpreise erscheint daher nicht möglich.
- Die Zahl der einbezogenen Produkte ist begrenzt. Es fehlen die Agrarprodukte, die durch die EG-Marktordnungen gestützt werden (z.B. Zucker und Tabak).
- Durch die Festlegung einer Abhängigkeitsgrenze von fünf Prozent besteht kaum ein Anreiz zur Diversifizierung. Vielmehr konzentrieren sich die von STABEX begünstigten Länder noch stärker auf die Produktion entsprechender Güter und verfestigen somit die vorhandenen monokulturellen Strukturen.
- Die Auszahlung der Mittel verläuft zum Teil sehr schleppend, da zwischen den AKP-Ländern und der EU zunächst eine Rahmenvereinbarung der gegenseitigen Verpflichtung geschlossen werden muss.
- STABEX-Zahlungen stellen einen Einkommenstransfer an die jeweilige Regierung dar. Es handelt sich folglich um Entwicklungshilfe ohne Lieferbindung (vgl. Kappel 1999: 37).

Aus diesen Überlegungen heraus ist das STABEX-System eher negativ zu bewerten. In zwei Drittel der Empfängerländer konnten die Instabilitäten um weniger als fünf Prozent reduziert werden, bei sechs weiteren Ländern verringerten sie sich um zehn Prozent., so dass die langfristigen Wirkungen äußerst schwach blieben. Daran änderte auch der Reformversuch im

Rahmen von Lomé-IV, das Zuschusselement auf 100 Prozent festzulegen, nichts Entscheidendes. Schließlich korrelieren die Einkommenstransfers beispielsweise nicht mit dem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen. Da STABEX sich an Waren ausrichtet und nicht an Kriterien für Unterentwicklung, stellt dieser Reformversuch eher einen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Lage in Ländern mit mittlerem Einkommen dar (vgl. Badiane 1993: 75-94). Ähnliche Tendenzen sind auch in Bezug auf SYSMIN zu beobachten: Da SYSMIN-Mittel mit dem Ziel vergeben werden, Anreize für eine höhere Produktion von SYSMIN-Produkten zu schaffen, wirken sie einer Diversifizierung entgegen. Beide Subventionssysteme bedürfen einer grundlegenden Reform, da sie ein klassisches Mittel zur Verfestigung von veralteten Außenhandelsstrukturen und zur Erhaltung einer Staatsklasse darstellen, die gute Beziehungen zur EU pflegt. STABEX und SYSMIN erweisen sich vor diesem Hintergrund als monetäre Instrumente zur Absicherung eines kollektiven Klientelismus, die in erster Linie den afrikanischen Middle-Income-Ländern und den jeweiligen Staatseliten zugute kommt.[51] Einen entscheidenden Beitrag zur Entwicklung der Exportwirtschaft der ärmsten Länder leisten die beiden Subventionssysteme nicht. Aus dieser Perspektive wäre daher gar eine vollkommene Streichung dieser Instrumente zu erwägen, da die schwachen positiven Auswirkungen für wenige Länder von den langfristig negativen Wirkungen eindeutig überschattet werden (vgl. Lingnau 1991: 24). Im Rahmen der Verhandlungen zum Cotonou-Abkommen verwies die EU-Kommission darauf, dass die Europäische Union STABEX und SYSMIN keinesfalls in bisheriger Weise fortführen werde, nannte jedoch keine näheren Spezifizierungen in Bezug auf die zukünftige Handhabung der Kompensation von Einnahmeverlusten im Exportbereich (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002: 5).

2.2.4 Industrieförderung

Im Bereich der Industrie setzten sich die Vertragsparteien von Lomé-I das Ziel, den Anteil der AKP-Staaten an der weltweiten Industrieproduktion von damals 7 Prozent auf 25 Prozent im Jahre 2000 zu steigern (vgl. Gerth-Wellmann/Kayser 1980). In Bezug auf diesen Gesichtspunkt wurden fast alle Forderungen der Dritte-Welt-Staaten in den Lomé-Vertrag aufgenommen, die bereits den Nord-Süd-Dialog im Rahmen von UNCTAD und UNIDO bestimmten. Die entsprechenden Ziele werden in Art. 26 des Vertrags wie folgt umschrieben:

- Ausbau und Diversifizierung der Industrien der AKP-Staaten,

[51] So machte zwischen 1986 und 1998 der STABEX-Anteil beispielsweise 54 Prozent der gesamten EU-Hilfsgelder für die Elfenbeinküste aus, für Kamerun betrug der entsprechende Anteil 49 Prozent. Vgl. Cox/Chapman 1999: 63.

- Förderung neuer Beziehungen im industriellen Bereich,
- Ausbau der Verbindungen zwischen der Industrie und den übrigen Wirtschaftsbereichen,
- Erleichterung des Technologietransfers und Hilfe bei der Entwicklung angepasster Technologien sowie
- Förderung der industriellen Exporte der AKP-Staaten auf ausländische Märkte (vgl. Europäische Gemeinschaft 1975: 45).

Ferner enthielt Art. 26 des Vertrags eine Zusicherung zur Erleichterung der allgemeinen industriellen Entwicklung der AKP-Staaten, vor allem ihrer Fertigwarenprodukte, durch angemessene Berücksichtigung ihres spezifischen Bedarfs bei der Formulierung der Politik zur Anpassung der Industriestrukturen der Gemeinschaft an weltweite Veränderungen.

Art. 17 des Lomé-IV-Abkommens formuliert als Ziel der Industrialisierung ein sich selbst tragendes Wachstum und eine ausgewogene und vielfältige Entwicklung. Insbesondere unterstützt werden soll die vertikale und horizontale Diversifizierung der Volkswirtschaften. Vergleicht man die Industrieförderungsmaßnahmen von Lomé-I mit Lomé-IV, so zeigt sich, dass zur Entwicklung der verarbeitenden Industrie und somit zur Umsetzung dieser Ziele immer weniger Mittel aufgewendet werden.[52] Diese Tendenz zur De-Industrialisierung Afrikas reflektieren nicht zuletzt auch die abnehmende Förderung der verarbeitenden Industrie und die zunehmende Förderung des Bergbaus und der Landwirtschaft. Mittel für den informellen Sektor stehen kaum zur Verfügung, da sich die Kooperation konzeptionell auf den modernen Sektor konzentriert. An dieser Entwicklung ändern auch die Mittel für Mikroprojekte, die der Förderung von Klein- und Mittelindustrie dienen, wenig (vgl. Babarinde 1994: 163 ff.). Dies zeigt sich auch an der Tätigkeit der beiden Institutionen, die im Rahmen der Lomé-Konvention für den Sektor der industriellen Entwicklung verantwortlich sind: die Europäische Investitionsbank und das *Centre for the Development of Industry* (CDI).[53]

Allgemein betrachtet ist die industrielle Kooperation zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten alles andere als von Erfolg gekrönt. Das liegt in erster Linie an den unbefriedigenden Rahmenbedingungen. So mangelt es u.a. an entsprechenden Instrumenten, an einem stabilen wirtschaftspolitischen Umfeld und an einer Harmonisierung mit der Handelspolitik. Die Lomé-Bestimmungen bieten keinen Ansatz zur Unterstützung von endogenen Industriepotentialen oder zur Erarbeitung anderweitiger industrieller Förderkonzepte. Schon Anfang der 1990er Jahre konstatierte Grilli, dass ein Schlüsselelement für eine erfolgreiche

[52] Während in Lomé-I noch 25 Prozent der Mittel des EEF der Industrieförderung zukamen, waren es in Lomé-II-IV nur noch ca. 10 Prozent. Vgl. Parfitt 1992: 383.
[53] Seit 2000 heißt das CDI nun *Centre for the Development of Entreprise (CDE)*. Vgl. Hinzen 1995: 416-423.

Jahre konstatierte Grilli, dass ein Schlüsselelement für eine erfolgreiche Industrie-Förderpolitik die Sicherheit von Investoren sei, was in den Lomé-Vereinbarungen überhaupt nicht berücksichtigt wurde (vgl. Grilli 1993: 32). Dies scheinen die Kooperationsakteure mittlerweile begriffen zu haben. Im Rahmen des Cotonou-Abkommens legt man verstärkt Wert auf die Gewährleistung halbwegs investitionsfreundlicher Rahmenbedingungen wie Frieden, Marktzugang nach Europa, Infrastruktur etc. (vgl. Schmidt 2002). Wie Erfolg versprechend diese Maßnahme tatsächlich ist, wird sich zeigen. Die Chance, nun eine Trendwende eingeläutet zu haben, dürfte jedoch minimal sein. Vielmehr liegt die Annahme nahe, dass sich die meisten afrikanischen Ökonomien in einer Abwärtsspirale bewegen.

2.2.5 Regionale Kooperation

2.2.5.1 Lomé als Mittel zur Stärkung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit

Im Zuge des Lomé-Vertrags wurde auf Initiative der AKP-Staaten vereinbart, dass zehn Prozent der Mittel des EEF für Regionalprojekte zu verwenden sind. Von der regionalen Kooperation erhofften sich die afrikanischen Staaten eine bessere Abstimmung im gemeinsamen Vorgehen und eine vorteilhaftere Atmosphäre untereinander, insbesondere zwischen den frankophonen und anglophonen Staaten Westafrikas (vgl. Gruhn 1976: 257 ff.). Logische Konsequenz dieser Absichten war kurze Zeit später die Gründung der *Economic Community of West African States* (ECOWAS).

Im Einzelnen versprach man sich von einer solchen Zusammenarbeit eine Intensivierung des internen Handels und Wachstums, eine Effizienz- und Produktivitätssteigerung durch zunehmenden Wettbewerbsdruck, einen höheren Selbstversorgungsgrad bei Agrar- und Industrieprodukten, einen Ausbau der gemeinsamen Infrastruktur sowie eine Stärkung der ökonomischen und politischen Verhandlungsmacht. In Lomé-IV wurden 1,25 Mrd. € für regionale Kooperation zur Verfügung gestellt, die der Begleichung von Übergangskosten, Kompensationszahlungen für die Verlierer der Kooperation, der Finanzierung von technischer Hilfe, Ausbildung und Forschung sowie der Begünstigung grenzüberschreitender Maßnahmen dienen sollten. In Hinblick auf die konkreten Ergebnisse der regionalen Kooperation erscheinen die bisherigen Integrationsbemühungen jedoch eher bescheiden. Folgende Überlegungen zeichnen sich hierfür mitverantwortlich:

1. Es besteht die Notwendigkeit, Primärgüter, deren Preise tendenziell nicht steigen, in erster Linie auf europäischen Märkten zu verkaufen.
2. Die Volkswirtschaften der Lomé-Partnerstaaten sind allesamt stark außenhandelsorientiert, so dass ihre Integration in den Weltmarkt sie leicht verwundbar macht.

3. Durch die schwache Entwicklung einer regionalen Integration sind die Ausgangsbedingungen für eine konkurrenzfähige Integration in den Weltmarkt ungünstig. Dieser Mangel behindert einen aktiven Integrationsprozess in den Weltmarkt und fördert stattdessen die nationale Binnenmarktorientierung.
4. Angesichts der Verschuldungskrise und der wirtschaftlichen Misere in vielen afrikanischen Staaten ist ein regionaler Integrationsprozess nur schwer zu realisieren, da sich fast alle Exportaktivitäten auf die Produktion von Primärgütern konzentrieren (vgl. Kappel 1996: 43).

Begreift man Integration als Prozess der Entstehung und Ausweitung horizontaler und vertikaler Verbindungen zwischen sozialen, ökonomischen und politischen Akteuren[54], so scheint die innerafrikanische Kooperation – allen Bemühungen um ein gemeinsames Vorgehen zum Trotz – durch machtpolitische und ökonomische Interessenlagen ins Abseits gedrängt zu werden. So griffen beispielsweise zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre westafrikanische Friedenstruppen (ECOMOG) unter dem Vorwand der Wiederherstellung demokratischer und rechtsstaatlicher Verhältnisse in den Bürgerkrieg in Liberia sowie in Sierra Leone ein. Als treibende Kraft dieses Unternehmens deklarierte man unterdessen mit Nigeria ein Land, das selbst von einer Militärdiktatur beherrscht wurde.

Unglaubwürdigkeit strahlten die Kooperationsbemühungen nicht zuletzt auch aufgrund des vorherrschenden wirtschaftlichen Konkurrenzverhältnisses zwischen den ehemals französischen und britischen Kolonien aus.[55] Die andauernde Ausrichtung an den Bedürfnissen der ehemaligen Kolonial-Metropolen und die geringe Verflechtung der Ökonomien über die ehemaligen Kolonialgrenzen hinaus stellten eine dauerhafte Belastung bzw. Behinderung für eine regionale Kooperation dar. Infolgedessen stieg beispielsweise der Handelsanteil zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten der frankophonen Westafrikanischen Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion (UEMOA) zu Beginn des dritten Jahrtausends kaum merklich von neun auf zehn Prozent.[56]

Durch den Sturz der Militärdiktatur in Nigeria und durch Projekte wie die UEMOA lassen sich gegen Ende der 1990er Jahre schließlich auch im größeren Rahmen der ECOWAS Versuche zur Wiederbelebung der Bemühungen um regionale Integration erkennen. Diese unter-

[54] Unter vertikalen Verbindungen verstehen Stone Sweet/Sandholtz stabile Beziehungen von Akteuren auf der Ebene der Regionalorganisation. Horizontale Verbindungen beziehen sich auf Akteure innerhalb eines Mitgliedstaates, welche mit Akteuren eines anderen Mitgliedstaates verbunden sind. Vgl. Stone Sweet/Sandholtz 1997: 9.
[55] So exportieren sowohl Ghana und Nigeria als auch die Elfenbeinküste Kakao. Gambia wie auch der Senegal erzeugen Erdnüsse. Vgl. Grilli 1993: 17.
[56] Dabei kann die UEMOA als eine im afrikanischen Kontext doch vergleichsweise eng verflochtene Union betrachtet werden, die massive finanzielle Unterstützung durch die Europäische Union erhält. Vgl. Grimm1999: 5-32.

stützte die EU, welche an starken Regionalpartnern – auch hinsichtlich der angestrebten REPAs – interessiert ist, mit insgesamt 228 Mio. € aus dem achten EEF. Inwiefern diese Regional-Institutionen tatsächlich wirksame unabhängige Aktivitäten entfalten können, hängt nicht zuletzt von der Durchsetzung allgemein anerkannter Rahmenbedingungen und demokratischer Strukturen ab.

2.2.5.2 Ansätze regionaler Kooperation in Afrika: ECOWAS und SADC im Vergleich

Sowohl die westafrikanische ECOWAS als auch die SADC (*Southern African Development Community*) im südlichen Afrika zählen zu den viel versprechenden Ansätzen regionaler Integration in Afrika. Ein Vergleich dieser beiden Wirtschaftskooperationen erscheint deshalb interessant, weil sie über äußerst differierende Ausgangsbedingungen verfügen und unterschiedliche Integrations- und Kooperationsstrategien verfolgen.

Während die SADC[57] – formal gesehen – eine relativ junge Organisation ist, deren Gründungsvertrag aus dem Jahr 1992 stammt, kann die ECOWAS[58] bereits auf eine 25jährige Existenz zurückblicken. Jedoch pflegte die ECOWAS bis zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre ein „Dornröschendasein". Erst die verstärkte Hinwendung der EU zur SADC sowie die deutlich spürbaren Bemühungen der frankophonen Staaten Westafrikas, ihre Integration voranzutreiben, sorgten für eine Wiederbelebung der ECOWAS. Ihren Ausdruck fand die erneute Mobilisierung in der Unterzeichung eines überarbeiteten Gründungsvertrags 1993, doch hat sich dadurch die grundlegende Ratio der Existenz der ECOWAS nicht entscheidend verändert: Nach wie vor gilt sie als Versuch Nigerias, seinem regionalen Vormachtsstreben – in Konkurrenz zu Frankreich – einen institutionalisierten Rahmen zu geben (vgl. Petretto 2005: 55f. + 69f.). Unterschiedliche Ausgangsbedingungen ergeben sich für die beiden regionalen Kooperationsmodelle auch in Bezug auf ihr jeweiliges Wirtschaftspotential. Westafrika ist mit beträchtlichem Vorkommen hochwertigen Erdöls, bedeutsamen Gold-, Bauxit-, Eisenerz-, Uran- und Diamantenlagern selbst im internationalen Vergleich gut ausgestattet. Die Bevölkerungszahl des regionalen Marktes ist hoch, wenngleich die Nachfrage privater Haushalte aufgrund des geringen Einkommens relativ gering ist. Der intraregionale Handel mit einem Anteil von zehn Prozent am gesamten Außenhandel der Mitgliedsländer wird durch Ausfuhren Nigerias

[57] Die SADC ging aus der alten „Southern African Development Co-ordination Cooperation" hervor, wobei der Wegfall des zweiten „C" nicht nur eine kosmetische Änderung, sondern eine Ausweitung der Zielsetzung bedeutete: Statt ausschließlicher Sektorkooperation, um die Abhängigkeit der so genannten Frontlinienstaaten von Südafrika zu mildern, stand nun Integration im südlichen Afrika im Vordergrund der Anstrengungen. Zu den SADC-Mitgliedsstaaten zählen Angola, Botswana, DR Kongo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mosambik, Namibia, Sambia, Simbabwe, Swasiland, Tansania, Südafrika, Mauritius und Madagaskar. Vgl. Berman/Sams 2000: 151ff.

[58] Zu den Mitgliedsländer der ECOWAS zählen Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kap Verde, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone und Togo.

und der Elfenbeinküste dominiert. Allerdings gibt es eine gewisse Bereitschaft der Ausfuhrstaaten der Region, für Einnahmeverluste und Handelsverschiebungen, die aus der regionalen Integration resultieren, Kompensationszahlungen zu leisten. Das regionale Wirtschaftswachstum hat sich nach einer Boom-Phase Mitte der 1990er Jahre wieder deutlich abgeschwächt (vgl. Mair 2000: 31ff.). Ein anderes Bild zeichnet sich da für das südliche Afrika: Es übertrifft das Wirtschaftspotential Westafrikas bei weitem. Es verfügt nicht nur über umfangreiche mineralische Rohstoffe und ein weltweit herausragendes hydro-elektrisches Energiepotential, sondern auch über eine Volkswirtschaft, die international als einzige Afrikas zu den *Emerging markets* gerechnet wird: Südafrika. Obschon die wirtschaftlichen Probleme Südafrikas groß sind, besteht berechtigte Hoffnung auf eine Lokomotiv-Funktion. Jene bedingt allerdings auch, dass der intraregionale Handel mit einem Anteil von 20 Prozent am Gesamthandel der Mitgliedsstaaten einseitig von südafrikanischen Exporten dominiert wird. Das regionale Wirtschaftswachstum war in den 1990er Jahren mäßig, was nicht zuletzt auf die weiträumige Zerstörung von Verkehrswegen und Kommunikationsverbindungen im Norden der Region zurückzuführen ist.[59] Gemein ist sowohl der westafrikanischen wie auch der südafrikanischen regionalen Kooperation eine hohe Mobilität von ethnischen Gruppen und Arbeitskräften. Die primären Aufnahmeländer der Arbeitsmigration in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten waren im westlichen und südlichen Afrika Nigeria, Senegal, die Elfenbeinküste, Ghana, Südafrika und Simbabwe (vgl. Mair 2002: 16).

Tabelle II-3: Mineralische Rohstoffvorkommen innerhalb der ECOWAS

	Benin	Burkina Faso	Côte d'Ivoire	Gambia	Ghana	Guinea	Guinea-Bissau	Kap Verde	Liberia	Mali	Mauretanien	Niger	Nigeria	Senegal	Sierra Leone	Togo
Bauxit			■		■	■									■	
Diamanten					■	■			■						■	
Eisenerz									■		■					
Erdöl													■			
Gold					■				■			■				
Kalziumphos..														■		■
Mangan					■											
Uran												■				

Quelle: Mair 2000: 31.

[59] Im Gegensatz hierzu verfügt die südliche Region über eine relativ gut ausgebaute und funktionierende physische Infrastruktur.

In Bezug auf die politischen Rahmenbedingungen sind beide Kooperationsmodelle gespalten. Insbesondere das südliche Afrika kennzeichnet sich diesbezüglich durch Extreme aus. Mit Südafrika, Namibia, Botswana und Mauritius verfügt die südliche Region Afrikas über vier Staaten, die als relativ stabil und demokratisch gefestigt gelten können. Angola und die Demokratische Republik Kongo – geprägt von Gewaltherrschaft, Bürgerkrieg und Staatszerfall – liegen am anderen Ende des Spektrums. Als hemmender Faktor für ein Fortschreiten des Integrationsprozesses kommt hinzu, dass Simbabwe und andere Staaten der Region Südafrika Hegemonialbestrebungen unterstellen. In Westafrika hingegen ist eine demokratische Konsolidierung bisher nur Benin, Senegal, Ghana und – mit erheblichen Einschränkungen – Mali gelungen. Angesichts der historischen Erfahrungen kann allerdings auch nicht von einem hohen Maß an politischer Stabilität in Westafrika ausgegangen werden.[60] Darüber hinaus gibt es zahlreiche weitere Spannungen zwischen Nachbarländern Westafrikas (vgl. Mair/Peters-Barries 2001: 189f.).

Hinsichtlich der Struktur der beiden Regionalorganisationen finden sich zahlreiche Parallelen – insbesondere in Bezug auf die politischen Entscheidungsorgane. Sowohl bei der ECOWAS als auch bei der SADC trifft allein das jährliche Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs für die Mitglieder verbindliche Entscheidungen, wobei das Prinzip der Einstimmigkeit herrscht. Unterhalb der Gipfeltreffen ist ein Ministerrat für das politische Alltagsgeschäft zuständig. Bei der ECOWAS nehmen hierbei die Außen- und Regionalminister eine zentrale Rolle ein, im Falle der SADC dominieren nach wie vor die Finanzminister.[61] Dem Ministerrat stehen wiederum Fachausschüsse zur Seite, die in der Regel mit niederrangigen Vertretern der Fachministerien besetzt sind (vgl. Mair 2002: 18). Beide Regionalorganisationen zeichnen sich durch ein großes Machtgefälle zwischen dem obersten Entscheidungsorgan – dem Gipfeltreffen der Staats- und Regierungschefs – und den untergeordneten Entscheidungsebenen aus. Hieraus ergibt sich folgende Problemlage:

- Es besteht bei den Gipfeltreffen eine gewisse Tendenz zu wenig durchdachten Ad-hoc-Entscheidungen, deren negative Implikationen von einigen Staaten häufig erst dann wahrgenommen werden, wenn ihre Umsetzung ansteht. Dies führt wiederum nicht zu einer Revision der Entscheidung, sondern zu einer Blockade des Integrationsvorhabens.

[60] Die Region weist seit der Unabhängigkeit der Staaten die im internationalen Vergleich höchste Anzahl von Staatsstreichen auf. Auch während der Demokratisierungswelle in den 1990er Jahren gab es eine Reihe von Rückschlägen in Form von Militärputschen. Vgl. hierzu auch Kapitel IV 2.1.

[61] Die Finanzminister sind zwar zögerlicher in der Übertragung zentraler Bereiche der Fiskalverantwortung auf die Regionalorganisationen, aber verfügen innerhalb ihrer nationalen Kabinette über eine starke Stellung.

● Der Fortschritt der regionalen Integration hängt wesentlich von der Bereitschaft der Staats- und Regierungschefs ab, sich an den Gipfeltreffen zu beteiligen, und von deren Fähigkeit, sich untereinander zu verständigen. In beiden Organisationen sind persönliche Animositäten zwischen den Präsidenten ein erhebliches Integrationshemmnis.

● Die Organisationsstruktur wirkt sich demotivierend auf die untergeordneten Organe aus, da ihre Vorarbeit auf den Gipfeltreffen häufig ignoriert oder gar entgegen ihren Empfehlungen gehandelt wird.

Beide Regionalorganisationen verfügen über Zentralsekretariate, die jedoch zu schwach sind, um den ihnen zugedachten Aufgaben – Vorantreiben und Umsetzen des Integrationsprozesses – gerecht zu werden. Der Hauptgrund für die Schwäche des ECOWAS-Sekretariats besteht in seiner Organisationsstruktur: Einer Vielzahl von Angestellten auf Leitungsebene steht nur eine geringe Zahl von Sachbearbeitern gegenüber. Des Weiteren sind die Mittel für operative Maßnahmen äußerst begrenzt. Auch der dem Sekretariat unterstellte ECOWAS-Regionalfonds kennzeichnet sich durch Unterfinanzierung, so dass dessen Funktionsfähigkeit als äußerst beschränkt einzustufen ist. Ähnliche Tendenzen lassen sich für das Zentralsekretariat der SADC erkennen. Dessen Funktionsfähigkeit wird zudem durch die dezentrale Verwaltungsstruktur der SADC beeinträchtigt (vgl. Petretto 2005: 57).

ECOWAS und SADC streben gleichermaßen die Schaffung nichtexekutiver Kontroll- und Beratungsorgane an. Dazu gehören ein regionaler Gerichtshof, eine regionale parlamentarische Vertretung und ein Forum zur Abstimmung mit Interessenverbänden und NROen. Während die ECOWAS bereits wesentliche Schritte zur Realisierung dieser Vorhaben eingeleitet hat, besteht in der SADC noch eine erhebliche Diskrepanz zwischen den ehrgeizigen Zielsetzungen in den Gründungsverträgen und der Realität. So hat sich die SADC – nach langen Kontroversen – bislang nur zur Schaffung eines parlamentarischen Forums durchgerungen, zu dem jede nationale Volksvertretung die gleiche Zahl von Abgeordneten delegiert und dessen Tätigkeit sich bisher in der Entsendung von Wahlbeobachtern erschöpft. Die für das ECOWAS-Regionalparlament vorgesehene Beratung der Exekutivorgane und Debatte regionaler Fragestellungen hat in das SADC-Forum noch keinen Einzug erhalten (vgl. Mair 2002: 19).[62]

Für die Finanzierung der Aktivitäten der Regionalorgane sieht die SADC jeweils gleiche Beiträge der Mitgliedsländer vor. Die Zuwendungen reichen jedoch bei weitem nicht aus, um die

[62] Selbst wenn diese Aufgaben wahrgenommen würden, gingen die Kompetenzen des Regionalparlaments kaum über das hinaus, was in den Gründungsverträgen der Regionalorganisationen den Interessenverbänden und den NROen zugestanden wird.

regionalen Entwicklungsprojekte zu finanzieren. Deren Kosten werden vor allem durch Zuschüsse der internationalen Geber bestritten.

Tabelle II-4: Organisationsstruktur der ECOWAS

Organ	Zusammensetzung	Tagesfrequenz	Funktion	Kompetenzen
Authority	Staats- und Regierungschefs	mindestens 1/Jahr	Oberstes Entscheidungsorgan	- Richtlinien - Monitoring - Ernennung des *Executive Secretary*
Council	- Minister zuständig für regionale Kooperation - ausgewählte Fachminister	mindestens 2/Jahr	Direktivorgan	- Empfehlungen an *Authority* - Ernennungen - Einrichtung von *Sectoral Councilss and Committees* - Umsetzung der Gipfelbeschlüsse
Technical Commissions	Repräsentanten der Mitgliedsstaaten	bei Bedarf	- Beratung und Beschlussvorlagen - Harmonisierung und Koordinierung von Gemeinschaftsprogrammen und -projekten	- Empfehlungen an den *Council*
Gemeinschaftsparlament	- 120 Mitglieder - pro Land mind. 5. restliche 40 Sitze werden nach Bevölkerungsgröße verteilt	zweimal drei Monate pro Jahr	Beratungsorgan insbesondere in Menschenrechtsfragen	- Beratung
Court of Justice	7 Richter von Mitgliedsländern nominiert und von *Authority* ausgewählt	bei Bedarf	- Interpretation und Anwendung des Vertrags - Schlichtung	- Entscheidungen des Gerichtshofs bei Schlichtung und Interpretation des Vertragswerks bindend
Economic and Social Council	gemäß Protokoll	bei Bedarf	- Beratungsorgan des Privatsektors und der Zivilgesellschaft	- Beratung - Information
Secretariat	gemäß Länderquoten	Permanent	Exekutivorgan	- Empfehlungen, Studien und Forschung - Umsetzung von Programmen - Strategische Planung und Monitoring - Politikharmonisierung und -koordinierung - Budgetentwurf - Agendaentwurf für Treffen anderer Organe
Fond für Kooperation, Kompensation und Entwicklung	- Exekutivorgan und Aufsichtsrat	Permanent	Finanzierungsinstrument	- Finanzierung regionaler Kooperationsvorhaben - Finanzierung regionaler Entwicklungsprojekte - Finanzierung von Ausgleichsmaßnahmen für Verluste, die aus dem Vertrag resultieren

Quelle: Mair 2000: 21f.

Im Gegensatz hierzu errechnen sich die jährlichen Beiträge der Mitgliedsstaaten zur Finanzierung ECOWAS auf der Basis eines Koeffizienten aus BIP und Pro-Kopf-Einkommen. Die ECOWAS erhielt zudem bislang nur in geringem Umfang Zuschüsse von der internationalen Gebergemeinschaft. Allgemein kann konstatiert werden, dass die Zahlungsmoral in beiden Regionalorganisationen schlecht ist.[63] So erreichten die tatsächlichen Beiträge innerhalb der ECOWAS nie mehr als 50 Prozent der Verpflichtungen (vgl. Berman/Sams 2000: 71f.).

ECOWAS und SADC verfolgen gleichermaßen das Ziel der wirtschaftlichen Integration. Die beabsichtigte Abfolge zur Umsetzung dieser Vorgabe folgt dem klassischen Muster Freihandelszone, Zollunion, Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion. Die ECOWAS hatte sich diesbezüglich den ehrgeizigen Zeitplan – das so genannte *„Trade Liberalization Scheme“* – gesetzt, innerhalb von zehn Jahren – beginnend am 1. Januar 1990 – eine Freihandelszone zu errichten. Ab dem 1. Januar 2000 war die Bildung einer Zollunion vorgesehen, woraus im Jahr 2005 die Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion hervorgehen sollte. Nachdem jedoch 1999 endgültig feststand, dass die ECOWAS weit hinter ihrer eigenen Zielsetzung zurücklag, wurde der Zeitplan gestreckt. Die SADC einigte sich erst im Jahr 2000 auf eine Vereinbarung zur Durchführung einer Freihandelszone. Demnach soll bis 2008 der intraregionale Handel vollkommen liberalisiert werden (vgl. Hinkle/Schiff 2004).
Innerhalb beider Regionalorganisationen gehen die realen Integrationsfortschritte jedoch weit über die offiziell dokumentierten Anstrengungen hinaus. In diesem Zusammenhang ist zwischen der informellen und der privatwirtschaftlichen Integration zu unterscheiden:

„Insbesondere in Westafrika hat der informelle Handel zur wechselseitigen Durchdringung der nationalen Märkte geführt. Dabei werden vor allem Rohstoffe von den unterentwickelten in die wirtschaftlich fortgeschritteneren Länder geschmuggelt, Konsumgüter aus den halbwegs industrialisierten Ökonomien in die vom Privatsektor geprägten. […] Während in Westafrika die informelle Integration überwiegt, macht im südlichen Afrika die privatwirtschaftliche Integration große Fortschritte. Sie beruht vor allem auf der erheblich gesteigerten Investitionstätigkeit südafrikanischer Unternehmer in den Nachbarländern“ (Mair 2002: 20).

Explizit verpflichten sich ECOWAS und SADC nur zur politischen Kooperation, die im Wesentlichen auf zwei Idealzustände abzielt: die Garantie von Frieden und Sicherheit in der Region sowie die Konsolidierung von Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Menschenrechtsschutz in den Mitgliedsländern. Dabei gelten nach wie vor die nationale Souveränität und die Gleichberechtigung der Mitgliedsstaaten als oberste Prinzipien. Als weiteres Kooperationsziel

[63] Im Falle der ECOWAS ist sie noch schlechter als in der SADC. Auch wenn die Gesamtaufwendungen der ECOWAS-Mitgliedsländer höher als im Falle der SADC liegen, so ist der Prozentualwert der eingehaltenen Zahlungsverpflichtungen bei Letzterer deutlich höher.

wird in beiden Regionalorganisationen die Vertretung gemeinsamer Interessen in internationalen Gremien und gegenüber Drittstaaten definiert. In Bezug auf die politische Kooperation weist die ECOWAS bislang die größeren Fortschritte auf. So hat sie in Liberia, Sierra Leone und Guinea-Bissau militärisch interveniert, um Frieden und Sicherheit wiederherzustellen (vgl. Petretto 2005: 38f. + 74-88). Die SADC konnte dem Selbstanspruch einer politischen Wertegemeinschaft nicht gerecht werden. So blieb beispielsweise eine deutliche Kritik an der Zerstörung rechtsstaatlicher Verhältnisse in Simbabwe aus und die Haltung gegenüber dem quasifaschistischen Regime Mugabe ist weiterhin von Rücksichtsnahme und falsch verstandener Solidarität geprägt. Zudem verschlechtert die zwiespältige Haltung der SADC-Mitgliedsstaaten in Bezug auf den Bürgerkrieg in der DR Kongo ihre Bilanz (vgl. Petretto 2005: 60ff.). Als größter Erfolg der SADC in Sachen politischer Kooperation kann zweifelsohne ihre Positionierung als weltweit privilegierter Gesprächs- und Verhandlungspartner der EU bewertet werden (vgl. BMZ 2001: 15).

ECOWAS und SADC sind nicht die einzigen Organisationen, die in ihren Regionen Integration und Kooperation anstreben. Insbesondere der ECOWAS ist mit der – fast ausschließlich aus frankophonen Staaten Westafrikas bestehenden – UEMOA ein Konkurrent erwachsen, der mit ihr um die knappen regionalen Ressourcen wetteifert und der ihr in wichtigen Integrationsfeldern einen Schritt voraus ist. Die UEMOA bildet eine – wenn auch von außen gesteuerte – Währungs- und Zollunion. Ihre Kommission gilt als effizient und kompetent besetzt und solange die frankophone Führungsmacht der Region, die Elfenbeinküste, mit Unterstützung Frankreichs ihre regionale Rolle vor allem in Konkurrenz zu Nigeria definiert, wird die UEMOA ein wesentliches Integrationshindernis für die ECOWAS bleiben. Im Gegensatz hierzu sind die Herausforderungen der SADC durch konkurrierende Regionalorganisationen gering.[64]

Allgemein betrachtet kann die Förderung regionaler Integration und Kooperation kein Selbstzweck der Entwicklungspolitik sein. Sie muss unter dem Vorbehalt stehen, dass Regionalorganisationen eher als staatliche Einheiten in der Lage sind, grundlegende Entwicklungsziele zu erreichen. Eine andere Ausgangslage ergibt sich für die Außen-, Sicherheits- und Außenwirtschaftspolitik. Die zunehmende Vergemeinschaftung europäischer Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ruft ein wachsendes Interesse an ähnlich strukturierten Partnerregionen hervor, zumal sich die EU hierdurch größere regionale Stabilität erhofft. Schließlich ist es für die Au-

[64] Lediglich Sambia und Tansania betrachten ihre Mitgliedschaft im *„Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa"* (COMESA) als prioritär. Jedoch ist Tansania innerhalb der SADC eher ein Randakteur, dessen regionale Prioritätensetzungen nur geringen Einfluss auf den Integrationsprozess der SADC haben.

ßenwirtschaftspolitik attraktiver, mit einem einheitlich agierenden Verbund und großen regionalen Märkten zu agieren als mit einer Vielzahl staatlicher Einheiten und fragmentierter Märkte. Für die externe Förderung regionaler Integration und Kooperation in Afrika südlich der Sahara gibt es folglich zwei unterschiedliche Ansätze:

1) die massive Umschichtung personeller und materieller Mittel der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zugunsten der Regionalorganisationen und zu Lasten der bilateralen Hilfe;
2) die Beschränkung der Unterstützung auf Projekte regionaler Kooperation und auf die Verbesserung der Managementkapazitäten regionaler Organe – verbunden mit einer Unterstützung des Differenzierungsprozesses innerhalb der Regionalorganisationen.

Der erste radikale Ansatz basiert auf der Tatsache, dass eine zunehmende Anzahl afrikanischer Staaten nicht mehr in der Lage ist, wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Prozesse zu steuern und somit auch keine Entwicklung zu fördern. Dementsprechend wird eine Stärkung der Regionalorganisationen zur zentralen Entwicklungsagentur angestrebt, die nicht nur grenzüberschreitende, sondern auch lokale Projekte durchzuführen vermag und langfristig einen Suprastaat hervorbringt. Tendenzen hierzu gibt es im Bereich Konfliktmanagement sowohl in der ECOWAS als auch in der SADC, wo Mitgliedsländer in zerfallenden Nachbarstaaten ein regionales Gewaltmonopol ausüben. Die Realisierung dieses radikalen Ziels erfordert eine umfangreiche Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit den Regionalverbänden und eine massive Beteiligung an den regionalen Kompensationsfonds, um das Kosten-Nutzen-Kalkül neopatrimonialer Herrscher in Bezug auf die Regionalintegration zu verändern. Zudem gilt es, effektive und kompetente regionale Institutionen der politischen Partizipation und Kontrolle zu schaffen. Ferner vertraut der radikale Ansatz darauf, dass auf der Ebene der Regionalorganisationen gelingen könnte, was auf nationaler Ebene weitgehend misslungen ist: effizientes Ressourcenmanagement, Gewährleistung von *„good governance“*, Zurückdrängen neopatrimonialer Strukturen sowie das Funktionieren der exekutiven, legislativen und judikativen Institutionen. Bislang gibt es jedoch wenig Anzeichen für die Richtigkeit dieser Annahme, so dass gute Gründe dafür sprechen, auf eher konventionelle Formen der regionalen Integration und Kooperation zurückzugreifen, auch wenn diese die Ursachen des bisherigen Versagens regionaler Integration nur sehr langfristig und indirekt bekämpfen können. Im Einzelnen beinhaltet der konventionelle Ansatz folgende Maßnahmen:

- Förderung regionaler Kooperationsprojekte, insbesondere in Hinblick auf die allgemeinen entwicklungspolitischen Ziele;

● Förderung ausgewählter Organe der Regionalorganisationen, insbesondere des Sekretariats, regionaler Gerichtshöfe und parlamentarischer Versammlungen, um die Institutionalisierung politischer Prozesse voranzutreiben;
● Verbesserung der zwischenstaatlichen Beziehungen;
● Verbreiterung des außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Diskurses in den Mitgliedsländern und in der Region;
● Förderung regionaler Zusammenschlüsse von Interessenverbänden, Medien und NROen;
● Förderung des Aufbaus von nationalen Besteuerungsystemen;
● Förderung von Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und *„good governance“* (vgl. Mair 2002: 22f.).

2.3 Grundlegende Entwicklungsprobleme in den AKP-Staaten

Ausgehend von den Einschätzungen in Bezug auf die Wirkungskraft der Lomé-Instrumente – und somit auch auf den Erfolg der Maßnahmen – lassen sich des Weiteren die gegenwärtigen Entwicklungsprobleme Afrikas in einem allgemeineren Rahmen skizzieren. Diese besitzen nach wie vor einen aktuellen Charakter und sind zuletzt Gegenstand verschiedenster politischer, wirtschaftlicher, sozialer wie auch wissenschaftlicher Diskussionen gewesen (vgl. Hansohm/Kappel 1994; Ferdowsi 1998 und 1999). Stets aus unterschiedlicher Perspektive betrachtet, ergab sich ein zum Teil asymmetrisches Afrikabild, welches in erster Linie auf die unterschiedliche Prioritätensetzung der Akteure zurückzuführen ist. Dennoch lassen sich aus der Vielzahl der vertretenen Standpunkte einhellige Annahmen herausfiltern, die eine grundlegende Bewertung der Entwicklungsproblematik in Hinblick auf die euro-afrikanische Kooperation zulassen. Folgende Aspekte sind in diesem Zusammenhang von zentraler Bedeutung:

Erstens: Afrika wird im internationalen Handel zunehmend marginalisiert. Die Ökonomien Afrikas weisen einen hohen Anteil der Exporte und Importe am Bruttoinlandsprodukt auf. Diese Quote hat sich jedoch aufgrund hoher Protektion und nicht-tarifärer Handelshemmnisse in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten verringert. Die Einbindung Afrikas in den Weltmarkt war 1960 größer als gegen Ende der 1990er Jahre. Gleiches gilt in Bezug auf die euro-afrikanische Wirtschaftskooperation. Während 1960 noch ein Zehntel der europäischen Exportgüter in die AKP-Staaten ging, waren es im Jahre 2000 nicht einmal mehr drei Prozent. Auf ähnlich drastische Weise sank der Importanteil der EU-Staaten aus den AKP-Staaten: 1980 lagen sie noch bei 8,1 Prozent der Gesamtimporte, 2000 hingegen bei 3,4 Prozent (vgl. Eurostat 2002).

Tabelle II-5: Die AKP-Staaten als Exportmarkt für europäische Güter

	1960	1970	1980	1990	1995	2000
Exportvolumen der EU in die AKP-Staaten (in Mrd. €)	2,46	4,33	17,94	17,50	17,76	26,60
Anteil der AKP-Staaten an den europäischen Exporten (in %)	10,2	8,4	8,5	4,5	3,1	2,8

Quelle: Eurostat 2002.

Tabelle II-6: Anteil der AKP-Staaten am Volumen des EU-Handels (in %)

	1980	1990	1995	2000
Anteil der AKP-Staaten an den Gesamt-Exporten der EU	8,5	4,5	3,1	2,8
Anteil der AKP-Staaten an den Gesamt-Importen der EU	8,1	4,8	3,6	3,4

Quelle: Eurostat 1999 und 2002.

Deutlich wird diese Entwicklung ebenfalls, wenn man einen Blick auf die Rangliste der wichtigsten Handelspartner der EU wirft: Gerade einmal drei afrikanische Staaten (Südafrika, Nigeria und die Elfenbeinküste) tauchen unter den Top 50 auf. Die Tendenz ist diesbezüglich eindeutig rückläufig.[65] Demzufolge fällt das Volumen des europäischen Handels mit den AKP-Staaten kaum ins Gewicht. Der afrikanische Markt ist aus europäischer Perspektive von geringfügigem Interesse. Jedoch befinden sich in der Liste der bedeutendsten Handelspartner der EU bezüglich der wichtigsten Waren afrikanische Staaten unter den zehn wichtigsten Handelspartnern in sechs Kategorien.[66] Von diesen sechs Gütergruppen dürften jedoch nur zwei von größerer Bedeutung sein: Rohöl und metallurgische Erze.[67] Unter den wichtigsten Rohöl-Lieferanten belegt Nigeria mit einem Anteil von 5,3 Prozent an den Gesamtlieferungen Platz 5, bei den Eisenerz-Lieferanten finden sich Südafrika auf Platz 6 (6,1 Prozent) und Guinea auf Platz 10 (1,9 Prozent) (vgl. Eurostat 2002). Von einer europäischen Rohstoffabhän-

[65] Sowohl die Bedeutung dieser drei Länder als Exportmarkt der EG als auch als europäischer Importmarkt nahm weiter ab. Vgl. Eurostat 1999.

[66] Die Bedeutung des Handels Europas mit der AKP-Gruppe kann nicht ausschließlich über das Handelsvolumen ermittelt werden, da das Volumen keine Aussage über die strategische Position der Handelsgüter für den europäischen Markt zulässt.

[67] Die übrigen vier Bereiche sind:
- Kork und Holz (Kamerun mit 5,4% auf Platz 4, die Elfenbeinküste mit 2,4% auf Platz 10),
- Gemüse und Früchte (Südafrika mit 5,6% auf Platz 2),
- Papierstoffe und -abfälle (Südafrika mit 2,1% auf Platz 7) und
- Spinnstoffe und -abfälle (Südafrika mit 2,8% auf Platz 6). Vgl. Eurostat 2002.

gigkeit von Afrika kann somit nicht die Rede sein. Afrika verliert somit als EU-Handelspartner zunehmend an Bedeutung.

Zweitens: Afrikas Aus- und Einfuhrstruktur hat sich kaum diversifiziert. Die afrikanischen Ökonomien sind nach wie vor durch das einseitige, typisch koloniale Strukturmuster gekennzeichnet. Als bedeutende Importwaren gelten weiterhin Fertigprodukte, Investitionsgüter, Öl und Nahrungsmittel. Bei der Ausfuhr dominieren landwirtschaftliche, mineralische und fossile Rohstoffe. Die strukturelle Benachteiligung schlägt sich dabei insbesondere auf die Exportstruktur nieder. Die Lomé-Konvention hat einseitige strukturelle Abhängigkeiten durch Subventionsfonds für landwirtschaftliche Produkte und Rohstoffe weiter vertieft.

Kaum ein afrikanisches Land kann aus diesem Teufelskreis völlig aussteigen, wenn auch in manchen Nischen kleinere Erfolge zu verbuchen sind. Hierüber kann auch die Tatsache nicht hinwegtäuschen, dass einige afrikanische Staaten im Bereich der verarbeitenden Industrie positive Wachstumsraten erzielen. Die Abhängigkeit von europäischen Exporten ist weiterhin gegeben. Dies untermauert die entsprechende Außenhandelsbilanz Afrikas. Während, wie bereits dargelegt, Europa nicht vom Import afrikanischer Erzeugnisse abhängig ist, bezieht Afrika zwei Drittel seiner Importe aus der EG (vgl. Kappel 1999: 25).

Drittens: Die Liberalisierung des Welthandels marginalisiert die meisten Länder Afrikas nur noch weiter. Berücksichtigt man die Effekte der Liberalisierung der WTO und die der Lomé-Handelsbeschlüsse, so zeigt sich, dass die Handelsperspektiven für die meisten afrikanischen Länder düster aussehen. Die vielfach zitierte Meinung, die Öffnung des europäischen Marktes würde die Entwicklungsländer endlich die Früchte ihrer Reformanstrengungen ernten lassen, entbehrt jedweder realistischen Einschätzung der derzeitigen Situation. Weitere Präferenzen, der Wegfall von Zollbarrieren[68] etc. helfen den betroffenen afrikanischen Staaten nicht weiter; nicht zuletzt auch deshalb, weil 60 Prozent der AKP-Exporte heute keinen Zollvorteil mehr gegenüber Erzeugnissen von Wettbewerbern aus Asien oder Südamerika haben. Die Begünstigung der AKP-Gruppe ist daher zu relativieren, zumal sich ihre Wettbewerbssituation gegenüber anderen Staaten des Südens zunehmend verschlechtert. Vielmehr zeigen diese von den Industrienationen geforderten Maßnahmen, dass die Vielzahl der afrikanischen Staaten derzeit keine potenten Partner darstellen.[69]

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[68] Schließlich benötigen insbesondere die Staatshaushalte der armen und ärmsten Länder dringend die Zolleinnahmen.

[69] Eine Studie des IWF geht davon aus, dass die Öffnung der Märkte einen Exportzuwachs von ca. 2,5 Mrd. US$ und einen Wohlfahrtsgewinn von 1,8 Mrd. US$ allein für das subsaharische Afrika bescheren würde. Vgl. Kappel 2001: 248-249.

Viertens: Ausländische Direktinvestitionen meiden Afrika zusehends (vgl. Kappel 1996: 12). Diese Entwicklung lässt sich in erster Linie durch die fortschreitende Isolierung Afrikas auf dem Weltmarkt erklären. Die durchschnittliche Investitionsquote liegt bei etwa 15 Prozent, wobei sich die ausländischen Investitionen vorrangig auf die Erdöl exportierenden Länder Angola, Kongo, Kamerun, Gabun und Nigeria konzentrieren. Von den als am wenigsten entwickelt eingestuften Ländern haben zahlreiche überhaupt keine ausländische Direktinvestitionen zu verzeichnen.

Fünftens: Die geringe Kommunikationsentwicklung und die hohen Transportkosten verhindern Entwicklung. In diesen Bereichen besitzt Afrika einen Rückstand gegenüber allen anderen Weltregionen. Verantwortlich hierfür ist vor allem die fehlende oder unzureichende Infrastruktur. Auch mangelnde technische Kompetenz und wenig innovative Regierungen stellen eine weitere strukturelle Barriere in diesem Prozess dar, so dass selbst das Überspringen von Technologiestufen keine vernünftige Lösung darstellt, um diesen gewaltigen Rückstand zu verkleinern bzw. aufzuholen.

Sechstens: Die Behinderung der Entwicklung durch strukturelle Faktoren der Unterentwicklung. Hierbei sind folgende Probleme zu nennen:

- Die schwache industrielle Basis bietet eine ungünstige Voraussetzung für Afrikas Weltmarktintegration und den regionalen Handelsaustausch.
- Die prekäre Verschuldungssituation der meisten afrikanischen Länder trägt zur Verschärfung der Lage bei.
- Die Produktivitätsrate ist in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten konstant gesunken. Wenn auch die Lohnkosten überwiegend niedrig sind, so stellt Afrika aufgrund der hohen Transport- und Kommunikationskosten eine der teuersten Produktregionen der Welt dar.
- Das extrem niedrige Niveau an „human resources“ ist ein zentrales Hindernis für Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung. Ohne ausgebildete Fachkräfte und technologische Kompetenz kann Afrika jedweden Entwicklungsprozess langfristig abschreiben.
- „Braindrain“ und Kapitalflucht haben negative Auswirkungen. Durch das Auswandern der Intellektuellen nach Europa, USA etc. mangelt es den afrikanischen Gesellschaften an Innovationsfähigkeit.
- Es besteht ein Mangel in der Ausschöpfung vorhandenen Wissenspotentials.

Will man nun aus diesen fünf Aspekten der Entwicklungsproblematik eine allgemeine Tendenz ableiten, so ergibt sich ein weithin hoffnungsloses Bild. Gerade aufgrund der fortschreitenden Globalisierung sieht sich Afrika größeren Probleme gegenüber als je zuvor. Schwache Institutionen, Rentenorientierung der Staatseliten, politische Instabilität etc. vereiteln flexible

Anpassungsstrategien. Die Folgen dieser Schwächen zeigen sich in Informalität, Illegalität und Kriminalität. Die Strukturanpassungsprogramme verstärken diese Prozesse einerseits durch die Schwächung des Rentenstaates, tragen jedoch andererseits zu einem Prozess der schnellen Veränderung – mit neuen Wachstumspotentialen – bei. Der Anpassungsdruck auf Afrika wächst, ohne dass Hoffnung auf tief greifende Veränderung besteht. Es fehlt die Nähe zu den OECD-Märkten, es mangelt an einer ausdifferenzierten Produktpalette und an Direktinvestitionen. Eine mittelfristig verbesserte Weltmarktintegration Afrikas erscheint aussichtslos.

Insgesamt sind die Ökonomien Afrikas durch strukturelle Faktoren, exogene Schocks und Informalität von Staat und Gesellschaft gekennzeichnet. Ein struktureller Wandel, der den Anforderungen des Globalisierungsprozesses gerecht wird, ist nicht zu erwarten. Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen und Strukturanpassungsprogramme haben diesbezüglich bislang nur wenigen Ländern Anstöße geben können. Auch die Entwicklungshilfe scheint dieser Tendenz nicht entgegenwirken zu können. Vielmehr begünstigt sie die Rentenaneignung und scheint die Informalität von Staat und Gesellschaft eher zu stärken als zu mildern. In diesem Zusammenhang bildet auch die Lomé-Kooperation keine Ausnahme (vgl. Box/von Braun/Gabas 1999).

3. Zusammenfassung - Europas Afrikapolitik in der Retrospektive

Unterzieht man die europäische Afrikapolitik einer retrospektiven Betrachtung, so lassen sich im Wesentlichen drei Phasen erkennen: a) eine post-koloniale Übergangsperiode, die durch die Gründung der EWG eingeleitet wurde, b) ein Zeitabschnitt, der durch die Diskussion um eine NWWO gekennzeichnet war, sowie c) eine Phase des Umbruchs nach dem Ende des Kalten Kriegs.

a) Die Bestimmungen von Yaoundé gewährten den involvierten afrikanischen Staaten eine Reihe von handelspolitischen Vorteilen gegenüber Drittländern. Sie boten den Vertragspartnern aufgrund ihrer mehrjährigen Laufzeiten die Möglichkeit zur mittelfristigen Planung, besaßen einen hohen Schenkungsanteil und verliehen Rohstoff produzierenden Partnerländern Erleichterungen in Bezug auf den Zugang zum europäischen Markt (vgl. Brüne 2000: 297f.). Im Gegenzug sicherten sich die ehemaligen europäischen Kolonialmächte auf diese Weise ihren fortwährenden ökonomischen und politischen Einfluss in diesen Gebieten. Das koloniale Abhängigkeitsverhältnis bestand somit, wenn auch unter anderen Konzessionen, weitestgehend fort. Diese Ein-

flussnahme erhielt im Kontext des Kalten Kriegs schließlich eine völlig neue Dimension. Nun zeigten sich auch Nicht-Kolonialmächte an einer verstärkten Kooperation mit den afrikanischen Ländern interessiert, da das Gewinnen neuer strategischer Partner eine Festigung des westlichen Blocks bedeutete.

b) In den 1970er Jahren setzte ein Wandel in der post-kolonialen Wahrnehmung ein. Die Diskussion um eine Neuordnung des Nord-Süd-Verhältnisses und die Erweiterung der EWG um die nordeuropäischen Staaten Großbritannien, Irland und Dänemark erforderten eine Modifikation der bestehenden Verhältnisse. Sowohl Irland als auch Dänemark hatten keine Kolonien besessen und konnten sich gar eher mit den ehemaligen Kolonien als mit den Kolonialmächten identifizieren. Vor diesem Hintergrund war damit die einseitige Fokussierung auf die afrikanischen Ex-Kolonien in Frage gestellt. Eine Vergrößerung des Kreises der Partnerstaaten erschien folgerichtig, zumal der Beitritt Großbritanniens diese Überlegung stärkte. Zudem hatte sich im Rahmen der Lomé-I-Verhandlungen das Kräfteverhältnis innerhalb der Partnerstaatengruppe erheblich verändert. Nicht nur rein zahlenmäßig besaß die AKP-Gruppe ein stärkeres Gewicht gegenüber den Yaoundé-Ländern. Die Ölkrise hatte den Industrienationen das Machtpotential der afrikanischen Staaten deutlich vor Augen geführt. Wollte man von europäischer Seite das Gesamtergebnis der Zusammenarbeit nicht gefährden, musste man sich zu partiellen Zugeständnissen bereit erklären. Die Diskussion nahm – sicherlich auch aufgrund der Entspannungspolitik – jedoch bald sichtbar weniger ambitionierte Züge an, die an einer tatsächlichen Reform der Weltwirtschaftsordnung vorbeiliefen. Durch die regressiven europäischen Handelsinteressen in Afrika verloren die afrikanischen Staaten zudem weiter an Verhandlungsmacht. Afrika avancierte zunehmend zu einem marginalen Handelspartner Europas. Die Idee einer gleichberechtigten euro-afrikanischen Partnerschaft bestand somit nur noch auf dem Papier.[70] Während den rohstoffreichen afrikanischen Entwicklungsländern aufgrund der Ölkrise und der Debatte um eine NWWO in den Siebzigerjahren ein entsprechend bedeutendes Gewicht beigemessen wurde, veränderte sich diese Auffassung nach der Wirtschaftskrise des Südens in den Achtzigerjahren. Der Fokus Europas richtete sich fortan auf die erfolgreich zu gestaltende Transition der osteuropäischen Länder.

[70] Diesem öffentlich formulierten Anspruch wurden selbst die anfänglichen Bemühungen zu keinem Zeitpunkt gerecht.

c) Das Ende des Kalten Kriegs mitsamt den anknüpfenden politischen Umbrüchen, der Beitritt weiterer europäischer Staaten in die EU und die fortschreitende weltweite Handelsliberalisierung ließ Afrikas Bedeutung für Europa weiter schwinden. Andere Weltregionen rückten stärker in den Blickpunkt der Europäischen Union. So scheinen die Erweiterungspartnerschaften mit Mittel- und Osteuropa und den Mittelmeerdrittländern für die Identität der Union bedeutender geworden zu sein als die Entwicklungen im subsaharischen Afrika, zumal sich auch die affektiven Beziehungen Frankreichs zu seinen Ex-Kolonien deutlich abgeschwächt haben.

Zwar erweisen sich die Zahlungen im Rahmen der Entwicklungshilfe als relativ stabil, in Relation zum Bruttosozialprodukt der Geberländer und der regionalen Verteilung der gesamten EU-Entwicklungshilfe allerdings als rückläufig. Wenn dies jedoch auch in unterschiedlichem Maße auf die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten zutrifft, so scheinen die Bemühungen um die EU-Erweiterung zu einem EU-Identitätsverlust gegenüber den AKP-Staaten beigetragen zu haben. Innerhalb der EU verschoben sich, bei abnehmendem Interesse der Mitgliedsstaaten, die Gewichtungen. Der Anteil der von der Kommission verwalteten Hilfsgelder nahm zu und machte im Jahre 2000 bereits 19 Prozent der gesamten EU-Entwicklungshilfe aus (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002). Von einer stark auf Entwicklungsgesichtspunkte ausgerichteten Gemeinschaftspolitik kann jedoch nicht die Rede sein, da generell die europäischen Handels- und Agrarinteressen denen der AKP-Gruppe vorgezogen werden. Des Weiteren nahm die Bevorzugung der afrikanischen Staaten gegenüber anderen Entwicklungsländern ab.

Was die nachhaltige Effizienz der geleisteten Entwicklungshilfe angeht, so lassen sich bislang kaum Erfolge vorweisen. Zwar sind in spezifischen Bereichen und in einigen Ländern wie Mauritius, Botswana und Ghana Fortschritte erkennbar, doch fehlt die afrikanische Erfolgsgeschichte, die auch auf die Hilfsleistungen Europas zurückzuführen wäre (vgl. Grimm 2003: 136). Will man den UN-Milleniumszielen, die eine Halbierung der weltweiten Armut bis 2015 vorsehen, eine realistische Chance einräumen, so ist, nach Einschätzungen der Weltbank, zwangsweise eine Verdopplung der bisher geleisteten Entwicklungshilfe nötig (vgl. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* vom 16./17.03.2002). Dieses Bestreben rückt jedoch selbst dann nicht in erreichbare Nähe, wenn das seit den 1970er Jahren anvisierte Ziel, 0,7 Prozent des Bruttosozialprodukts für Entwicklungshilfe aufzubringen, tatsächlich erreicht würde.[71] So scheint sich die Asymmetrie im Verhältnis Europas zu Afrika eher weiter zu verstärken als zu dezimieren.

[71] Viele EU-Staaten sind von dieser getroffenen Vereinbarung weit entfernt und entfernen sich auch in den letzten Jahren zum Teil weiter davon.

Dass die Zahlung von Entwicklungshilfe in einigen afrikanischen Partnerstaaten auch zu unerwünschten Nebeneffekten führen kann, wurde lange Zeit ignoriert. Rentenökonomien und undemokratische Strukturen verhindern einen zweck- und zielgerichteten Einsatz von Hilfsgeldern. Die ursprüngliche Zielgruppe von Entwicklungshilfe, die ärmsten Bevölkerungsschichten, bleibt in diesen Fällen weitestgehend außen vor, da es ihnen an gesellschaftlichem, wirtschaftlichem und politischem Einfluss fehlt. Die Frage nach der Effizienzsteigerung gilt es daher vor diesem Hintergrund neu zu überdenken.

„Die Institutionen und Strukturen der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit prägen ihre Interessen und Politiken ebenso wie der seit Jahrzehnten laufende Lernprozeß der Entwicklungspolitik mit seinen wechselnden Moden und Prioritäten. Dieses Erbe schränkt Reformmöglichkeiten der EU-Südpolitik ein und definiert die Grenzen ihrer Entwicklung“ (vgl. Dauderstädt/Kesper 1994: 1f.).

Kapitel III.
Der institutionelle Rahmen der europäischen Afrikapolitik

Wie gestaltet sich die europäische Afrikapolitik im Einzelnen? Wie bereits kurz angesprochen, besteht die europäische Präsenz in Afrika aus einer Mischung aus Außen-, Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik. Insbesondere die Außenpolitik gewinnt an Bedeutung, so dass ihre Koordinierung mit den weiteren Politikfeldern zunehmend notwendig erscheint. Im Rahmen der europäischen Außenpolitik agieren die administrativen Strukturen der Mitgliedsstaaten parallel zueinander, im Idealfall miteinander abgestimmt und sich ergänzend. Die Zuständigkeiten der nationalen Strukturen variieren jedoch; sie sind historisch gewachsen und können daher Aufschluss über das Selbstverständnis der von ihnen repräsentierten Gesellschaft in einer Region geben. Die gleiche Idee lässt sich auch auf die Institutionen des gemeinsamen Systems der Außenbeziehungen auf europäischer Ebene übertragen. Daher sollen im folgenden Kapitel die institutionellen Rahmenbedingungen einer europäischen Afrikapolitik skizziert werden. Schließlich lässt sich nur auf der Basis einer formellen Analyse der Organisationsstrukturen der EU-Entwicklungspolitik im weiteren Verlauf der Arbeit ein nachvollziehbares Bild der europäischen Afrikapolitik nachzeichnen. Hierbei stellt sich die Frage nach der Verteilung der einzelnen Kompetenzen sowohl auf Gemeinschaftsebene als auch – im Kontrast hierzu – auf nationalstaatlichem Niveau.

1. Die spezifischen nationalen Regierungsstrukturen und -ausrichtungen

Es scheint klar, dass eine ausführliche Darstellung der einzelnen nationalstaatlichen Hilfsprogramme für Afrika nicht erfolgen kann, da dies ohne Frage den Rahmen dieser Arbeit sprengen würde, zumal die schwerpunktmäßige Ausrichtung eine andere ist. Daher beschränken sich die Ausführungen im Folgenden auf die Strukturen Frankreichs, Deutschlands und Dänemarks. Die Auswahl dieser drei Beispiele basiert auf der Überlegung, möglichst unterschiedlich strukturierte und politisch ausgerichtete Kooperationsformen mit Afrika vorzustellen. So besteht in Deutschland seit 1961 ein eigenständiges Ministerium für wirtschaftliche

Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklung (BMZ), dessen Existenzberechtigung jedoch immer wieder angezweifelt wird. In Dänemark ist die Zuständigkeit für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Außenministerium angesiedelt. Die ehemalige koloniale Großmacht Frankreich verfügt unterdessen seit der Regierung Jospin über kein eigenes Ministerium für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mehr.[72] Vor diesem Hintergrund kann im Folgenden danach gefragt werden, inwiefern die unterschiedliche administrative Verortung der Entwicklungskooperation in den einzelnen Ländern eine eigene Dynamik in den Beziehungen zum südlichen Afrika beeinflussen.

1.1 Frankreich

1.1.1 Personalisierte Zuständigkeiten und Netzwerke: der institutionelle Rahmen

Bis in die 1980er Jahre zeichnete sich das *Ministère de la Coopération* für die Zusammenarbeit mit den ehemaligen Kolonien Frankreichs verantwortlich. Dabei sah es sich nahezu konstanter Kritik von unterschiedlichen politischen Richtungen ausgesetzt.[73] Nichtsdestotrotz erwies sich die Kooperation mit Afrika als reformresistent. Reformversuche wurden von afrikanischen Staatschefs offen und heftig kritisiert und auch über die persönlichen Kontakte mit dem Afrikaberater des Präsidenten unterminiert (vgl. Brüne 1995: 134f.).

Die fünfte französische Republik zeichnet sich als semi-präsidentielles Regierungssystem durch eine starke Präsidialmacht aus. Der Ministerpräsident und das Kabinett werden vom Präsidenten berufen[74]; Letzterer führt auch den Vorsitz im Ministerrat. Insbesondere in Zeiten der Kohabitation, d.h. wenn Präsident und Ministerpräsident rivalisierenden Parteien angehören, ist es von Bedeutung, dass der Oberbefehl über die Streitkräfte und die Richtlinienkompetenz der Außenpolitik beim Präsidenten liegen. Dementsprechend stellte Mitterand auf einer Pressekonferenz 1983 klar: „C'est moi qui définis la politique étrangère de la France, pas mes ministres" (vgl. Le Monde Dossier 1997).

Bis 1974 bestand ein Generalsekretariat für afrikanische und madegassische Angelegenheiten, welches jedoch von Giscard d´Estaing aufgelöst wurde. Ein Ministerium für Zusammenarbeit sowie eine direkt dem Präsidenten zugeordnete afrikapolitische Beratergruppe („*cellule africaine*" im Elysée) wurde eingerichtet, über welche bevorzugt die Kontakte mit den afrikani-

[72] Der für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit Frankreichs zuständige „ministre délégué" ist in seiner Stellung nicht einem Minister gleichgesetzt, aber doch herausgehoben: Er sitzt bei Kabinettssitzungen der französischen Regierung mit am Tisch. Vgl. Grimm 2003: 192f.

[73] Charles de Gaulle kritisierte bereits 1966 die Aufgabenkonzentration des Kooperationsministeriums, der Kooperationsminister Josselin beklagte sich unterdessen über informelle Netzwerke und Geheimniskrämerei. Präsidentschaftskandidat Jacques Chirac prangerte in den 1990er Jahren die Komplexität und Ineffizienz des Ministeriums an. Vgl. Marchesin 1998: 104f.; Brüne 1995: 145.

[74] Sowohl Ministerpräsident als auch Kabinett müssen des Weiteren vom Parlament bestätigt werden.

schen Staaten liefen. Den Afrikaberatern des Präsidenten kam in der Folgezeit eine Schlüsselposition in den Beziehungen zwischen Frankreich und seinen ehemaligen Kolonien zu. Persönliche Bekanntschaften ließen Netzwerke entstehen, die wichtige Kanäle für informelle Kontakte und Geschäftsinteressen darstellten (vgl. Martin 1997: 9).

Die Zuständigkeiten des französischen Kooperationsministeriums bezogen sich ausschließlich auf die ehemaligen Kolonien bzw. auf die Region, die als französisches *pré-carré* angesehen wurde.[75] Mit dem Bedeutungsverlust Afrikas für Frankreich und die stärkere Hinwendung zu Europa veränderten sich auch schrittweise die Bedingungen der französischen Afrikapolitik. So konstatiert Brüne hinsichtlich der veränderten Wahrnehmung der Bedeutung Afrikas:

„Bereits die 1983 getroffene Entscheidung, die politische und wirtschaftliche Integration in die Europäische Gemeinschaft zu forcieren, kann rückblickend als indirekte Einleitung eines graduellen Rückzugs aus Afrika […] gewertet werden"(Brüne 1995: 234) .

Vor diesem Hintergrund eröffneten sich auch Optionen für institutionelle Reformen der französischen Afrikapolitik. So wurde zum Januar 1999 das Kooperationsministerium in das Außenministerium eingegliedert; der für die Kooperation und die Frankophonie zuständige Minister fortan dem Außenminister unterstellt.[76] Zahlungen an den Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds erfolgen nun über das Finanz- und Wirtschaftsministerium, die Verwaltung der Gelder obliegt grundsätzlich dem Außenministerium. In der Praxis verwalten beide Ministerien gemeinsam den EEF-Anteil Frankreichs, wobei das Sekretariat des Interministeriellen Ausschusses für europäische Wirtschaftszusammenarbeit (SGCI), das direkt dem Ministerpräsidenten untersteht, eine vorherige Koordinationsmöglichkeit bietet. Für die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit ist unterdessen ein Interministerielles Komitee der internationalen Kooperation (CICID) eingerichtet worden. Das CICID hat die Aufsicht über die Hauptdurchführungsagentur, die *Agence française de développement*.

Trotz der Reform Ende der 1990er Jahre und der Tatsache, dass die französischen Ansprüche an ihre Entwicklungspolitik noch immer weitgehender sind als die der europäischen Partner, sollte die afrikapolitische Reform Frankreichs eher zurückhaltend bewertet werden, denn die „cellule africaine" des Präsidenten besteht weiterhin. Ihre Abstimmung mit den Ministerien ist formal nicht gewährleistet, sondern liegt im Ermessen des Präsidenten. Der protokollarisch zurückgestufte Kooperationsminister sitzt weiterhin am Kabinettstisch und ist wichtigster

[75] Hierzu zählten neben den ehemaligen Kolonien auch das frankophone Zaire sowie die ehemaligen Klein-Kolonien von Spanien (Äquatorial-Guinea) und Portugal (Guinea-Bissau, die Kapverdischen Inseln, São Tomé e Principe). Vgl. Brüne 1995: 133.

[76] Um ein Fortbestehen des Kooperationsministeriums in dieser neuen Struktur – lediglich unter anderem Namen – zu verhindern, wurden einzelne Abteilungen des Ministeriums mit Abteilungen des Außenministeriums zusammengelegt. Vgl. DAC 2000: I-33.

Gesprächspartner für afrikanische Staatschefs. Und nicht zuletzt sind es nach wie vor die ehemaligen Kolonien, mit denen Frankreich bevorzugt Militärabkommen unterhält, weshalb sich die Frage nach der konkreten Neuausrichtung der französischen Afrikapolitik aufdrängt (vgl. Marchesin 1998: 101).[77]

1.1.2 Hegemonialinteressen und Entwicklungsanspruch: die französische Afrikapolitik

Frankreichs Beziehungen zu Afrika sind stark personalisiert, d.h. persönliche Kontakte zwischen französischen und afrikanischen Politikern bestimmen das Verhältnis. Lange Zeit wurden afrikanische Gesellschaften von den französischen Eliten als zu „traditionalistisch" betrachtet, um Forderungen nach Demokratie gegenüber befreundeten Staatsmännern Nachdruck zu verleihen. Zwar sah Frankreich in der Beachtung der Menschenrechte und der Demokratie wichtige Entwicklungsziele, doch waren explizite Konditionalitäten im französischen Verhältnis zu Afrika undenkbar (vgl. Bayart 1989).[78]

Mit dem sozialistischen Wahlsieg 1981 und der Ernennung Jean-Pierre Cots zum Entwicklungsminister wurde von einem stärkeren Bezug auf Menschenrechte und einer verantwortungsvolleren Nutzung der Finanzmittel in der Vergabepraxis gesprochen. Cot setzte sich zum Ziel, die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zu „entafrikanisieren" und somit auch anderen armen Staaten zu öffnen. Entwicklungspolitik sollte stärker an Institutionen und Vergabekriterien gebunden sein und weniger auf persönliche Kontakte. Präsident Mitterand missbilligte die Reformen, da er offenbar – in der Tradition seiner Amtsvorgänger – an der Sonderrolle Frankreichs in der Nord-Süd-Politik festhalten wollte, die auf einer „afrikanischen Berufung" und persönlichen Kontakten beruhte (vgl. Brüne 1995: 109). Nach nur 18 Monaten Amtszeit beendete der Rücktritt Cots im Dezember 1982 die Reformbemühungen. Selbst die gaullistische Opposition zeigte zu dieser Zeit keinerlei Interesse an einem Richtungswechsel in der französischen Afrikapolitik. So hatte sich der gaullistische damalige Oppositionspolitiker Jacques Chirac im Februar 1990 in Abidjan/Elfenbeinküste für die Beibehaltung von Einparteiensystemen in Afrika ausgesprochen (vgl. Le Monde dossier 1997).

Einen Richtungswechsel läutete dem Anschein nach das 16. franko-afrikanische Gipfeltreffen im Juni 1990 in La Baule ein, auf welchem Mitterand erstmals zu demokratischen Reformen in Afrika mahnte. Demnach sollte Entwicklungshilfe künftig an die Abhaltung freier Wahlen,

[77] Eine ausgezeichnete retrospektive Betrachtung der französischen Afrikapolitik bis hin zur Gegenwart liefert Claeys 2004: 113-132.

[78] Eventuelle Forderungen stellte man „innerhalb der Familie" hinter verschlossenen Türen. Insbesondere François Mitterand bezeichnete die franko-afrikanischen Gipfeltreffen gerne als „Familientreffen". Man kannte sich aus gemeinsamen Zeiten in der französischen Nationalversammlung oder gar – wie Mitterand und der ivorische Staatspräsident Houphouët-Boigny – vom Kabinettstisch in der IV. Republik. Vgl. Grimm 2003: 142.

die Existenz eines Mehrparteiensystems und die Abschaffung der Zensur gekoppelt sein (vgl. Brüne 1995: 142). Die Öffentlichkeit zeigte sich vom unerwarteten Einlenken Mitterands überrascht, doch wurde schnell deutlich, dass die außenpolitischen Aktivitäten Frankreichs in Afrika kaum einer Neuorientierung erfuhren. Vielmehr wurde nunmehr ein zweigleisiger Kurs gefahren: Während beispielsweise gegenüber Diktator Kérékou in Benin auf die Durchsetzung von Menschenrechten und Demokratie gedrängt wurde, blieb dem Regime Eyadéma im Nachbarland Togo eine an gleichen Zielen ausgerichtete Politik erspart (vgl. Engel 2000). Bereits auf dem nächsten franko-afrikanischen Gipfeltreffen 1991 in Paris klang Mitterand in der Frage von Demokratisierungen weitaus zurückhaltender. So betonte er die Nichteinmischung Frankreichs in die inneren Angelegenheiten der afrikanischen Partner und stellte fest, dass jedes Land seinen eigenen Rhythmus in der Entwicklung finden müsse (vgl. Engel 2000: 255; Brüne 1995: 147). Der erhoffte Wendepunkt blieb damit aus. Durch die Demokratie- und Menschenrechtserklärungen Mitterands war die französische Afrikapolitik eher inkonsistent geworden. Insbesondere wegen der bisher anders lautenden Rhetorik aus Frankreich war die Abwertung des über den Französischen Franc (FF) garantierten west- und zentralafrikanischen Franc CFA, der Währung 15 ehemaliger afrikanischer Kolonien Frankreichs, ein großer Schock für die franko-afrikanischen Beziehungen. Über Nacht wurde am 11. Januar 1994 die Halbierung des Franc CFA gegenüber dem FF verkündet, was von der französischen Regierung mit einer ökonomischen Notwendigkeit gerechtfertigt wurde. Die afrikanischen Partner sahen hierin jedoch eine Abwertung der franko-afrikanischen Beziehungen (vgl. Le Monde dossier 1997). Die ökonomische Haltung Frankreichs stand im Gegensatz zur nicht vollständig aufgegebenen traditionellen Afrikapolitik. Einerseits beschwor man das besondere Verhältnis zu den ehemaligen Kolonien, andererseits vertrug sich dieses jedoch nicht mit den neueren politischen und ökonomischen Konzepten (vgl. Grimm 2003: 146).

Einen weiteren Rückschlag für die französisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen löste der Völkermord in Ruanda aus. 1990 ergriff Frankreich im Konflikt mit der aus Uganda operierenden *Front Populaire Rwandais* (FPR) Partei für Ruandas Präsidenten Habyarimana – mit der wenig überzeugenden Begründung der Eindämmung des „angelsächsischen Einflusses“.[79] Mit dem Tod Habyarimanas im März 1994 begann der zuvor organisierte und angekündigte Völkermord an Tutsi und moderaten Hutus. Frankreich soll seine militärische Kooperation mit dem mordenden Regime auch nach Beginn des Völkermordes bis mindestens Mai aufrechter-

[79] Die aus Kolonialzeiten stammende Rivalität mit „angelsächsischen“ (anfänglich rein britischen und zunehmend auch US-amerikanischen) Einflüssen wird als „Faschoda-Syndrom“ bezeichnet. Ihren Ursprung hat diese Bezeichnung in dem von britischen Truppen erzwungenen Rückzug der französischen Kolonialtruppe aus dem sudanesischen Faschoda Ende des 19. Jahrhunderts. Vgl. Marchesin 1998: 96.

halten haben, also rund zwei Monate nach Beginn des Massentötens und 14 Tage nach dem Verhängen des UN-Waffenembargos (vgl. Marchesin 1998). Folglich bedeutete diese Politik eine massive Delegitimation französischen Engagements in Afrika. Die verkündete Konditionalität Frankreichs blieb in den meisten Fällen theoretisch, was nicht zuletzt auch das lange französische Festhalten an Mobuto Sese Seko im Konflikt in Zaïre untermauerte.

Eine Verhaltensänderung Frankreichs lässt sich erst mit dem Putsch an der Elfenbeinküste im Dezember 1999 erkennen. Im Gegensatz zur vorherigen Praxis in der Afrikapolitik griffen französische Truppen – trotz militärischer Präsenz vor Ort – nicht auf Seiten der Regierung ein. Stattdessen verurteilte Frankreich den Militärputsch und forderte die Wiederherstellung von Ordnung und Sicherheit. Eine Forderung nach der Wiedereinsetzung der legalen Regierungen blieb jedoch aus, da zwischenzeitlich Differenzen zwischen französischen Politikern und dem ivorischen Präsidenten Bédié aufgetreten waren.[80] Trotzdem markierte diese Haltung das Ende der langen Praxis der automatischen Parteinahme für amtierende Regierungen in Afrika. Seitdem ist auch in Frankreich häufiger von der „Konvergenz" französischer Politik mit anderen westlichen Mächten zu hören. Zudem scheint eine Mehrzahl französischer Beobachter zumindest langfristig von einer Europäisierung der französischen Afrikapolitik auszugehen (vgl. Engel 2000: 223). Zwar ist die Sonderrolle Frankreichs in Afrika längst nicht mehr unumstößlich, sie gehört dennoch nicht der Vergangenheit an. Nicht zuletzt die weiterhin vorhandenen persönlichen Netzwerke mit afrikanischen Spitzenpolitikern geben Anlass zu der Annahme, dass auch in Zukunft französisches Engagement von afrikanischen Partnern gefordert wird, zumal Paris Interventionen als Schutz seiner zahlreichen Staatsbürger in Afrika verstanden sehen will. Vor diesem Hintergrund bietet die französische Perspektive wenig Hoffnung auf ein baldiges gemeinsames Engagement Europas, zumal die anhaltend hohe Präsenz Frankreichs im Vergleich zu anderen europäischen Staaten der *grande nation* auch zukünftig eine Sonderrolle in der europäischen Afrikapolitik sichern dürfte.

1.2 Deutschland

1.2.1 Aufgegliederte Kompetenzen und Rivalitäten: der institutionelle Rahmen

Das deutsche Bundesministerium für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit wurde 1961 gegründet. Mit den Jahren bekam das BMZ weitere Aufgabenbereiche zugeteilt. So erhielt es 1972 die Aufsicht über die multilaterale finanzielle Zusammenarbeit, 1998 des Weiteren vom Wirtschaftsministerium die Zuständigkeit für die europäische Entwicklungspolitik. Somit ist das

[80] Weiterhin ist anzumerken, dass das französische Interesse nach Wiederherstellung der Ordnung in der Sicherheit für die rund 20.000 französischen Staatsbürger zu suchen ist, die in der Elfenbeinküste ansässig sind.

BMZ erst seit diesem Zeitpunkt für die Aushandlung des Lomé-Abkommens und die wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit mit Mittel- und Osteuropa verantwortlich. Seit dem Regierungswechsel 1998 ist das BMZ auch im Bundessicherheitsrat vertreten, was als eine symbolische Aufwertung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit verstanden werden kann (vgl. BMZ 2002).[81]

Mit dem rot-grünen Regierungswechsel 1998 veränderte sich die Sichtweise der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Mit dem Anspruch, „globale Strukturpolitik" leisten zu wollen, rückte sie näher an bislang vom Auswärtigen Amt bearbeitete Aufgabengebiete (vgl. Messner 2001). Während das Auswärtige Amt über deutlich höhere personelle Kapazitäten verfügt, verwaltet das BMZ erheblich mehr operative Mittel. Die hieraus resultierenden Rivalitäten mündeten generell in der Diskussion um die Eingliederung des BMZ in das Außenministerium.[82] Den Anspruch, alleiniges Koordinationsministerium für Außenkontakte der Bundesregierung zu sein, hält das Auswärtige Amt unterdessen noch immer aufrecht. Diesem Selbstverständnis folgend, setzte das Auswärtige Amt in einzelnen Fällen die Aufnahme von Entwicklungshilfe durch, obwohl die entsprechenden BMZ-Kriterien nicht erfüllt wurden.[83] Mangels umfassender außenpolitischen Zielsetzungen ist die Region Afrika kaum von solchen Streitfällen zwischen Außenministerium und BMZ betroffen. Das Aufgeben der Doppelstruktur aus BMZ und Auswärtigem Amt ist derzeit nicht wahrscheinlich. Dies hat in erster Linie koalitionsbedingte, nicht inhaltliche Gründe. Dabei ist auffällig, dass das BMZ grundsätzlich parteipolitisch anders besetzt ist als das Auswärtige Amt. So war in den bisherigen Regierungskoalitionen das Außenministerium dem kleineren Koalitionspartner vorbehalten, während das BMZ quasi als eine Art „Kompensation" einer anderen Koalitionspartei übertragen wurde. Daher dürfte nicht zuletzt die unterschiedliche parteipolitische Justierung die Rivalitäten zwischen beiden Ministerien schüren (vgl. Hoyer 1998: 80).[84]

Die Bundesrepublik verfügt aufgrund ihrer Größe im Vergleich zu anderen EU-Staaten über ein dichtes Netz an diplomatischen Vertretungen, wobei die deutschen Botschaften allein dem

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[81] Der Bundessicherheitsrat wird vom Bundeskanzler einberufen und befasst sich in erster Linie mit der Frage von Rüstungsexporten und internationaler Rüstungskooperation. Seine Sonderrolle als kollektives Beschlussorgan für sicherheitspolitische Entscheidungen und Maßnahmen hat es jedoch weitestgehend eingebüßt, da Beschlüsse mittlerweile im Zusammenwirken zwischen Auswärtigem Amt und BMZ unter genereller Anleitung des Bundeskanzleramtes getroffen werden. Vgl. Rühl 1998: 91.

[82] Die Diskussion um die Eingliederung des BMZ in das AA ist jedoch kein neues Phänomen, sondern so alt wie das BMZ selbst. Vgl. Messner 2001: 21.

[83] So wurde etwa nach dem zweiten Golfkrieg an Syrien und Ägypten ausgezahlt, obwohl das BMZ aufgrund der schlechten Menschenrechtslage und der kaum erkennbaren Entwicklungsorientierung dieser Transaktion ablehnend gegenüberstand. Im Fall Pakistan bremste das Außenministerium unterdessen die Anwendung der Konditionalitäten, um weiterhin Partner dieses als wichtig eingeschätzten Landes zu sein. Vgl. Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 36.

[84] Ein Novum in Bezug auf die Rivalität zwischen den beiden Ministerien ergibt sich mit der Festlegung auf eine „große" Koalition – bestehend aus SPD und CDU. Sowohl das BMZ als auch das AA unterstehen sozialdemokratischen Ministern (AA: Steinmeier/BMZ: Wieczorek-Zeul).

Auswärtigen Amt unterstellt sind. Dieses personelle Außenvertretungsmonopol hat auch auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent Gültigkeit, wo das BMZ weitestgehend die Afrikapolitik Deutschlands dominiert. So kommt es bei der Betreuung von Projekten dazu, dass die häufig durch Landesbüros ebenfalls vor Ort vertretenen Durchführungsagenturen[85] mit den Botschaften zusammenarbeiten müssen, die Auftragsprüfung und -vergabe aber über das BMZ erfolgt (vgl. Urban 1997: 137). Das Verhältnis vor Ort ist ebenfalls nicht reibungsfrei, da der Stellenwert der Durchführungsagenturen nicht selten höher stehend wahrgenommen wird als der der lokalen Botschaft.

1.2.2 Ein großer Geber mit schwachem Profil: die deutsche Afrikapolitik

Im Kontext der Nachkriegszeit wurde die deutsche Außenpolitik in besonderer Form vom Ost-West-Konflikt dominiert. Mit dem Wiederbeginn deutscher Außenpolitik verband sich in den 1950er Jahren das Ringen um internationale Anerkennung. Die erste „politische Konditionalität“ in der deutschen Afrikapolitik betraf zwischen 1957 bis Mitte der 1960er Jahre den Alleinvertretungsanspruch der Bundesrepublik, der aus der sogenannten „Hallstein-Doktrin“ hervorging. Ein Bezug zur Praxis staatlicher Verwaltung in den Empfängerländern wurde in diesem Rahmen nicht hergestellt. Die politischen Rahmenbedingungen in den Partnerländern rückten damit auch in Deutschland erst nach dem Ende des Kalten Kriegs ins Blickfeld. Seit der deutschen Einheit scheint Konsens darüber zu bestehen, dass ein größeres weltweites Engagement des vereinten Deutschlands nötig ist. So wurden 1991 die Vergabepraxis der deutschen Entwicklungshilfe evaluiert und politische Konditionalitäten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit vorgestellt, die sich an folgenden Kriterien ausrichten:

● ***Beachtung der Menschenrechte:*** bewertet an den Indikatoren Freiheit und Folter, Rechte bei Festnahmen und in Justizverfahren, Religionsfreiheit und Minderheitenschutz.

● ***Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Gewährleistung von Rechtssicherheit:*** Als Indikatoren dienen die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz, das Prinzip „Gleiches Recht für alle“ und die Transparenz staatlichen Handelns.

● ***Partizipation der Bevölkerung an politischen Entscheidungen:*** bewertet nach demokratischer Wahlpraxis, freier Meinungsäußerung der Opposition, Vereinigungsfreiheit sowie Presse- und Informationsfreiheit.

[85] Wichtigste Einrichtungen sind die Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), der Deutsche Entwicklungsdienst (DED), die Parteistiftungen (FES, KAS, HSS, FNS und HBS) sowie die InWent GmbH. Vgl. BMZ 2002b.

● ***Marktwirtschaft:*** beurteilt nach Schutz des Eigentums, Bodenrecht, „realistische Wechselkurse“, Gewerbe- und Niederlassungsfreiheit. 1995 wurde zudem der Aspekt der „sozialen“ Marktwirtschaft stärker betont und die Säuglingssterblichkeit sowie die Einschulungsrate in Grundschulen als Sozialindikatoren hinzugefügt.

● ***Entwicklungsorientierung der Partnerregierung:*** gemessen an der Armutsorientierung der Regierungsprogramme, dem Anteil der Militärausgaben am Gesamthaushalt, an umwelt- und bevölkerungspolitischer Orientierung, Dezentralisierung, Korruptionsbekämpfung, solider Finanz- und Haushaltspolitik sowie der Zusammenarbeit mit der Weltbank und dem IWF (vgl. Hofmeier 1994: 74f.).

Die Kriterien und ihre Indikatoren lassen Raum für politische Interpretationen. Ein Automatismus von Sanktionen ist nach diesen Kriterien nicht möglich und sicherlich auch nicht beabsichtigt. Gerade für Subsahara-Afrika – der größten Empfängerregion deutscher Entwicklungshilfe – fehlte lange Zeit ein Regionalkonzept in der deutschen Außenpolitik. Gerade wegen des fehlenden außenpolitischen Gesamtkonzepts bildeten die Konditionalitäten einen zentralen Orientierungspunkt. So wurde beispielsweise bereits 1991 die Zusammenarbeit mit Zaïre und Togo aufgrund von Menschenrechtsverstößen suspendiert (vgl. Engel 2000: 99+104). Des Weiteren wurden auf der Grundlage der Konditionalitäten mehrere Länder bei Neuzusagen von Entwicklungshilfe nicht mehr berücksichtigt.[86]

Ein Großteil der deutschen Entwicklungshilfe – rund 28,8 Prozent – fließt in die multilaterale Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, also UN-Unterorganisationen, die Weltbank etc. Die im Haushalt des BMZ ausgewiesene finanzielle Zusammenarbeit (2001: 31 Prozent des Etats) beinhaltet auch den deutschen Beitrag zum EEF und unterliegt somit bei weitem nicht den deutschen Vergabekriterien (vgl. BMZ 2002). Ebenso fallen Zahlungen an die politischen Stiftungen und NROen nicht unter die Konditionalitäten, sondern unter die in diesen Organisationen geltenden Vergabekriterien. Insgesamt unterliegt somit nur ein schwer zu beziffernder Teil der BMZ-Mittel – wohl weniger als die Hälfte der Haushaltsmittel – den Vergabekonditionalitäten (vgl. Grimm 2003: 152).

Mitte der 1990er Jahre sprach die damalige Bundesregierung aus CDU/CSU und FDP erstmals von „globaler Strukturpolitik“ als Mittel zur Sicherung der eigenen Zukunft. Vor dem Hintergrund der Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern des ehemaligen Ostblocks verstand sie hierunter die Armutsbekämpfung, die Eindämmung von Flüchtlingsströmen, die Begrenzung

[86] Von 12 Fällen, die mit den politischen Konditionalitäten begründet wurden, waren sieben afrikanische, vier asiatische und ein lateinamerikanischer Staat. Zu diesen afrikanischen Ländern zählten Burundi, Liberia, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan und Togo. Vgl. Deutscher Bundestag 1997.

des Bevölkerungswachstums und den Erhalt der natürlichen Lebensgrundlagen. Dabei sollten diese Aufgaben mit der Gestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik verbunden werden (vgl. BMZ 1998: 64). Zu den Zielsetzungen vor 1998 zählte man die Förderung von Demokratisierungs- und Liberalisierungsprozessen sowie die Berücksichtigung der politischen und gesellschaftlichen Gesamtsituation im Partnerland, wodurch die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zunehmend von einer ehemals technischen zu einer politischen Aufgabe avanciert (vgl. BMZ 1998: 32). Diese Zielsetzung wurde auch nach dem Regierungswechsel 1998 weitestgehend verfolgt. Hinzu kamen weitere Ziele wie die Krisenprävention und friedliche Konfliktbearbeitung, die Förderung einer stärkeren Regionalisierung in Afrika und die Public-Private-Partnership, d.h. eine stärkere Einbindung der Privatwirtschaft in entwicklungspolitisches Engagement (vgl. BMZ 1999: 44f.).

Im Jahr 2000 wurde in den beiden afrikapolitischen Debatten des Bundestags ein breiter Konsens hinsichtlich der Konditionalitäten in der deutschen Afrikapolitik deutlich. Demnach plädierten alle Fraktionen für eine stärkere Umsetzung der oben genannten Ziele, wobei die Bundesregierung aus SPD und Bündnis 90/Die Grünen der Krisenprävention eine zentrale Funktion zuschrieben. Eine umfassende afrikapolitische Konzeption, die über die Entwicklungspolitik hinausreicht, besteht jedoch auch nach dem Regierungswechsel nicht. Aus diesem Grund mahnten Afrika-Experten im Oktober 2000:

„Entwicklungspolitik allein ist mit den Herausforderungen Afrikas überfordert; deutsche Politik im nationalen Alleingang ist dies auch. Ein radikales Nachdenken über die politischen Implikationen dieser Einsichten kann nur zu folgender Schlussfolgerung führen: Eine neue deutsche Afrikapolitik muss kohärent politisiert und konsequent europäisiert werden“ (vgl. Engel u.a.: 2000: 1).

Einer – in absehbarer Zukunft greifenden – ökonomischen Entwicklung vieler afrikanischer Staaten stehen die Wissenschaftler zudem äußerst skeptisch gegenüber. Da es an strategischen, außenpolitischen und wirtschaftlichen Interessen Deutschlands fehlt, werde die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auch weiterhin das Hauptinstrument der deutschen Afrikapolitik bleiben. Vor diesem Hintergrund sprechen sich die Afrikanisten für eine sehr viel selektivere Förderung von Ländern aus. Eine – wie von den Bundestagsfraktionen zumindest rhetorisch unterstützte – Europäisierung der Afrikapolitik bedeutet eine verstärkte Abstimmung mit den europäischen Partnern und erfordert nicht zwingend eine Aufgabe der bilateralen Hilfspolitik. Daher gilt es den von der EU vorgegebenen Rahmen europäischer Afrikapolitik mit gemeinsamen konkreten Zielen, Strategien und Inhalten auszufüllen (vgl. Engel u.a. 2000: 5).

1.3 Dänemark

1.3.1 Zentralisierte Strukturen: der institutionelle Rahmen

Die Organisation der dänischen Außenbeziehungen wurde zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre umstrukturiert, zeitgleich mit der zunehmend politischen Ausrichtung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit (vgl. Grimm 2003: 158-160). Die vormals eigenständige Hilfsorganisation *Danida (Danish International Development Assistance)* gliederte man in das Außenministerium ein. Neben dem Außenminister gab es zu dieser Zeit noch einen Entwicklungsminister, deren inhaltlich unterschiedliche Aufgaben im selben Haus bearbeitet wurden.

Das dänische Außenministerium setzt sich aus drei inhaltlichen Gruppen zusammen, die jeweils von einem Staatssekretär geleitet werden: der Nord- und der Südgruppe sowie dem Handelsrat. Innerhalb der Nordgruppe sind die Beziehungen zu den Industriestaaten, zur NATO und zur EU angesiedelt, aber auch die Zusammenarbeit mit den mittel- und osteuropäischen Ländern. Die Südgruppe umfasst regional angegrenzte Abteilungen für Asien und den Pazifik, das südliche Afrika, Ost- und Westafrika sowie den Mittleren Osten, Nordafrika und Lateinamerika. Daneben gibt es Gruppen für Planung, Umweltschutz, Evaluation, UN-Angelegenheiten sowie humanitäre Hilfe. Die einzelnen Regionalabteilungen verwalten und koordinieren die zur Verfügung stehenden länderspezifischen Hilfsgelder (vgl. Grimm 2003: 200). Entwicklungshilfe wird im dänischen Staatssystem als Teil der Außenpolitik verstanden. Innerhalb des Ministeriums erfolgt zugleich die Bearbeitung von Diplomatie und Entwicklungshilfe. Die Konsequenzen dieser Bündelung von Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik blieben jedoch bislang auf internationaler Ebene gering.

Seit der Eingliederung der Danida in das Ministerium bearbeiten dänische Diplomaten vor Ort unter anderem auch die Entwicklungsprojekte. Diplomatische Vertretungen Dänemarks finden sich in allen Partnerländern. Aufgrund der geringen Größe des Landes ist das Netz der Vertretungen relativ klein. Aus diesem Grund konzentriert sich die Hilfe auf wenige Partnerländer. Im Falle der Mittelüberweisung an den EEF muss sich Dänemark daher weitestgehend auf die Angaben anderer Staaten verlassen. Schwieriger wird die Position eines kleinen Landes bei der Übernahme der Ratspräsidentschaft. In dieser Zeit erweitert sich das Tätigkeitsfeld um ein Vielfaches. Bislang nicht fokussierte Regionen werden zum Arbeitsgegenstand, so dass beizeiten auf das Informationsnetz anderer EU-Staaten, die bereits die Ratspräsidentschaft führten, zurückgegriffen werden muss (vgl. Grimm 2003: 200f.).[87]

[87] Ist die Ratspräsidentschaft nicht vor Ort vertreten, wird die Präsidentschaft vom nächsten Ratsvorsitz übernommen, der dort eine Botschaft hat. Unter Umständen kann eine Ratspräsidentschaft vor Ort daher ein oder eineinhalb Jahre dauern. Vgl. Grimm 2003: 201.

1.3.2 Entwicklungshilfe mit geringer internationaler Präsenz: die dänische Afrikapolitik

Bereits 1989 veröffentlichte das dänische Parlament Kriterien für die Auswahl von Partnerstaaten, woraufhin sich die Zahl der Partnerländer verringerte. So wurde beispielsweise die Zusammenarbeit mit Simbabwe aufgrund der destruktiven Haltung der Regierung eingestellt. Demokratie wird als ein wesentliches Ziel der Entwicklungspolitik angesehen, das auf bedeutende Weise zur Bekämpfung der Armut beiträgt (vgl. Danida 2000: 54). Die Nutzung der Entwicklungspolitik zur Wertevermittlung in die Partnerstaaten wird offensiv in dänischen Regierungspublikationen vertreten. In diesem Zusammenhang kommt der Armutsbekämpfung und der Förderung von Demokratisierung eine zentrale Rolle bei der friedlichen Konfliktbearbeitung zu. Aufgrund der geringen internationalen Präsenz Dänemarks außerhalb der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit ist kaum zu befürchten, dass die Glaubwürdigkeit dänischer Politik unter der Anwendung doppelter Standards leiden könnte. Gerade wegen seines geringen weltpolitischen Gewichts betont Dänemark seinen „positiven Ansatz“. Demnach sei die Kooperation mit Partnerstaaten über einen Zeitraum von 15 bis 20 Jahren angelegt und nicht bei den ersten Schwierigkeiten beendet (vgl. Grimm 2003: 159).

Zu den drei thematischen Schwerpunkten der dänischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zählt neben Gender-Fragen und der Umweltpolitik die Demokratisierungsunterstützung. In Bezugnahme auf die Ergebnisse und die Überlegungen des EEF-Komitees der Europäischen Union wird über Projekte entschieden. Dies ist deswegen notwendig, da Dänemark – als kleiner Mitgliedsstaat ohne diplomatische Vertretung vor Ort – auf den Wortlaut eines beantragten Projekts angewiesen ist (vgl. Danida 2000: 54).

Der Anteil der NRO-Projekte an den Gesamtausgaben der dänischen bilateralen Entwicklungshilfe liegt bei etwa einem Zehntel, wobei dieser Anteil nicht politisch vorgegeben ist, sondern sich aus der Antragslage ergibt. Budgetbegrenzungen sind jedoch auch in Dänemark nicht ohne Folgen geblieben, so dass eines von zwei Großprojekten einer deutschen NRO abgelehnt wurde, um den Etat nicht vollständig auszuschöpfen. Zwar fordert die dänische Regierung NROen dazu auf, verstärkt *„capacity-building“* zu betreiben und mit lokalen Institutionen zusammen zu arbeiten, doch gibt es in diesem Bereich noch immer deutliche Defizite, da vor allem Unterstützung für kurzfristig ausgerichtete humanitäre Hilfe beantragt wird (vgl. Danida 2000: 110). Trotz dieser Defizite führen Eigeninteressen in der Unterstützung der dänischen NROen zur weiterhin bestehenden Konzentration auf nationale Partner:

„It makes it possible to put a Danish fingerprint on the activities and enables Danish NGOs to exert influence on their international network, thereby promoting Denmark’s development policies and administrative values” (Danida 2000: 111).

2. Akteure und Strukturen auf Gemeinschaftsebene

2.1 Die Akteure auf Gemeinschaftsebene

Gemeinsame Ziele formulieren, Entscheidungen fällen und schließlich konkrete Projekte und Programme in den Partnerländern umsetzen - an diesen Aufgaben sind in der EU vor allem drei Akteure beteiligt: der Rat der Europäischen Union, das Europäische Parlament und die Europäische Kommission als „Hüterin der Verträge". Der Rat als Vertretung der Mitgliedsstaaten beschließt entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen mit qualifizierter Mehrheit. Er erlässt auf Vorschlag der Kommission und nach Anhörung des Parlaments die notwendigen Vorschriften zur Ausübung finanzieller, humanitärer und technischer Hilfe. Nur der Ministerrat allein hat das Recht, Abkommen mit Drittländern zu schließen. Da die Abkommen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit gegenseitige Rechte und Pflichten beinhalten, muss der Rat einen solchen Vertrag einstimmig verabschieden. Gemeinsam mit dem Europäischen Parlament entscheidet er über die Höhe der für die Entwicklungspolitik ausgewiesenen finanziellen Mittel. Des Weiteren verfügt der Rat über die Möglichkeit, das allgemeine Präferenzsystem für einzelne Staaten auszusetzen, falls diese fundamentale Prinzipien (Menschenrechte, Rechtsstaatsprinzip etc.) missachten (vgl. Sven Grimm 2004: 2).

Im Zuge der Reform des Ministerrats wurde im März 2002 der Rat der Entwicklungsminister aufgelöst und der Bereich der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit dem neuen Rat der „Allgemeinen Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen" eingegliedert. Von offizieller Seite rechtfertigte man diesen Schritt durch eine zu erwartende Kohärenzsteigerung auf dem Gebiet der Außenbeziehungen. Aus Kritikerkreisen hieß es jedoch nicht ganz zu Unrecht, dass dies eine Reduzierung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik auf ein Hilfsinstrument der EU-Sicherheitspolitik bedeute (vgl. Claasen 2002: 31).[88]

Als zweiter wichtiger Akteur der EU-Entwicklungspolitik besitzt das Europäische Parlament zwar einen eigenen „Ausschuss für Entwicklung und Kooperation", verfügt aber in Bezug auf die Entwicklungspolitik lediglich über ein Anhörungsrecht. Einfluss kann das Parlament nur durch seine Mitwirkung an der Festsetzung des EU-Budgets, und somit auch an der Bewilligung der für die Entwicklungspolitik zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel nehmen. Das wichtigste Instrument der gemeinsamen europäischen Entwicklungshilfe für die AKP-Staaten, den Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds, kann es jedoch nicht kontrollieren, da dieser nicht Teil des EU-Haushalts ist, sondern von den Mitgliedsstaaten finanziert wird. Ein eigenes Komitee verwal-

[88] Vgl. hierzu Kapitel IV: Entwicklungspolitik – die andere Sicherheitspolitik?

tet den EEF, dessen Budget durch ein Abkommen zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten festgesetzt und von den nationalen Parlamenten ratifiziert werden muss (vgl. Van Reisen 1999: 17f.).

Zentrale Figur in der Gestaltung der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik ist die EU-Kommission. Sie verwaltet die Mittel, besitzt in entwicklungspolitischen Angelegenheiten ein Initiativrecht und kann dem Rat neue Projekte und Maßnahmen vorschlagen. Bei der Ausarbeitung von Abkommen zwischen der Gemeinschaft und anderen Staaten oder internationalen Organisationen legt die Kommission dem Rat zunächst Empfehlungen nahe, bevor dieser dann die Kommission beauftragt, entsprechende Verhandlungen einzuleiten. Bei diesen Verhandlungen muss sich die Kommission jedoch an die vom Rat vorgegebenen Richtlinien halten. Innerhalb der EU-Kommission sind die Generaldirektionen Entwicklung und Außenbeziehungen für die Programmierung der gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und für die Analyse der Bedürfnisse und politischen Rahmenbedingungen in den Partnerländern verantwortlich. Die Zuständigkeiten sind geographisch aufgeteilt: Die Generaldirektion Außenbeziehungen arbeitet mit den Partnerländern in Asien, Lateinamerika, dem Mittleren Osten, dem Südlichen Mittelmeer, Osteuropa, dem Kaukasus, den Zentralasiatischen Republiken und dem westlichen Balkan zusammen. Die Generaldirektion Entwicklung ist für die Zusammenarbeit mit den Staaten Afrikas, der Karibik und des Pazifik (AKP) zuständig. Die Generaldirektion für Entwicklung formuliert die Strategien der EU-Entwicklungspolitik und verteilt die finanziellen Mittel auf die verschiedenen Bereiche (Gesundheit, Lebensmittelhilfe, etc.). Sie überwacht die Durchführung der Entwicklungsprogramme und koordiniert die Zusammenarbeit mit der Europäischen Investitionsbank, der Afrikanischen Union, der G-8-Gruppe und anderen. Viele Vorzeichen deuten darauf hin, dass die GD Entwicklung in naher Zukunft aus verwaltungstechnischen Überlegungen in die GD Außenbeziehungen eingegliedert wird (vgl. Burgdorff 2004).

Im Rahmen einer umfassenden Personal- und Verwaltungsreform der Kommission wurde im Januar 2001 das Amt für Zusammenarbeit, *EuropeAid*, geschaffen. Grundgedanke bei der Einrichtung des Amtes war es, Zuständigkeiten in weitestgehendem Maße zu bündeln, ohne jedoch alle Entscheidungen zu zentralisieren. Somit steht den beiden für die Programmierung zuständigen Generaldirektionen eine Implementierungsinstanz zur Seite. Ziel von *EuropeAid* ist es, die Programme der beiden Generaldirektionen effizient umzusetzen sowie Entwicklungsprojekte von der Projektfindung bis zur abschließenden Evaluierung zu betreuen. Unterstützt wird es dabei von den EU-Delegationen in den Partnerländern, die eine schnelle Umsetzung der Projekte sicherstellen sollen (vgl. Grimm 2004: 3).

In einem allgemeinen Kontext bleibt festzuhalten, dass die Kommission die zentralen Aufgaben mit Außenwirkungen wahrnimmt. Ihre ursprüngliche Rolle als Verhandlungsführerin in Außenhandelsfragen erweiterte sich im Rahmen des Maastrichter Unionsvertrags von 1993 enorm. So ist sie nicht nur Hauptverhandlungsführerin in Fragen der Gemeinsamen Außenhandelspolitik (EGV Art. 133), sondern auch für breiter angelegte Handels- und Hilfsabkommen – wie die Konvention von Cotonou – zuständig. Die Kommission vertritt die EU nach außen – teilweise gemeinsam mit der Ratspräsidentschaft – in allen gemeinschaftlichen Politikfeldern mit Außenwirkungen (Umwelt, Transport, Energie etc.). Des Weiteren berät sie den Rat in Fragen der Erweiterung, koordiniert die humanitäre Hilfe und nimmt an der Arbeit internationaler Organisationen sowie an der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) teil. In Letzterem verfügt sie jedoch über kein Initiativmonopol und muss sich zusätzlich mit dem Hohen Repräsentanten des Rates für die GASP – seit 1999 Javier Solana – koordinieren (vgl. Nugent 2001: 297f.). Dieser steigt – sollte der Verfassungsentwurf in naher Zukunft angenommen werden – zum Europäischen Außenminister auf. Als Vorsitzender des Außenministerrates und Vizepräsident der EU-Kommission wird er zudem über vielfältige Kompetenzen und Eingriffsmöglichkeiten verfügen, deren tatsächliche Reichweite sich noch zeigen muss.[89]

2.2 Die Struktur des EG-Entwicklungsprogramms

Insgesamt können auf europäischer Ebene zwei Kategorien von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unterschieden werden. Zum einen sind dies Entwicklungsprogramme, die unmittelbar von den Mitgliedsstaaten durchgeführt werden und sowohl bilaterale als auch multilaterale Beiträge umfassen können. Zum anderen handelt es sich um das von der Europäischen Kommission durchgeführte Programm, das im Folgenden als EG-Programm bezeichnet wird.[90]

Ursprünglich regelte vor allem das jeweilige Lomé-Abkommen die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten. Daneben wurden in den letzten zwei Jahrzehnten eine Reihe weiterer Hilfsprogramme auf Gemeinschaftsebene geschaffen. Prinzipiell lassen sich diese in die folgenden zwei Formen der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unterteilen:

[89] So erwartet man ein engeres und kohärenteres Zusammenspiel der betroffenen Institutionen und eine allgemeine Stärkung der gemeinsamen Positionen in außenpolitischen Angelegenheiten. Schließlich hatten nicht zuletzt die Verwerfungen in der Irak-Frage deutlich gemacht, wie es um die Stabilität des Hauses Europa bestellt ist.

[90] Die Bezeichnung „EG-Entwicklungsprogramm“ beruht auf der schlichten Tatsache, dass die Europäische Kommission dieses Programms für die Europäische Gemeinschaft ausführt.

1. Zusammenarbeit außerhalb des Haushalts: Die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten erfolgt im Rahmen des Cotonou-Abkommens, welches ein breites Themenspektrum umfasst, einschließlich der Handelsbeziehungen und spezieller Rohstoffprotokolle. Die Finanzierung ist kein Teil des EG-Haushalts und geschieht auf rein freiwilliger Basis. Aus diesem Grund hat der Ministerrat die alleinige Entscheidungsgewalt. Europaparlament und Kommission müssen demnach de jure nicht einbezogen werden.
2. Zusammenarbeit innerhalb des Haushalts: Die Entscheidungen über alle anderen EG-Entwicklungsprogramme obliegen dem EU-Rat, dem Parlament und der Kommission im Rahmen des Mitentscheidungsverfahrens (Art. 251 EGV), wobei das Parlament in Haushaltsangelegenheiten die höchste Entscheidungsinstanz darstellt.[91]

   Grundlegend lassen sich drei Arten von Haushaltslinien erkennen:

   a) *Kooperationsprogramme mit einzelnen Regionen*, wie bspw. ALA (das Programm für Asien und Lateinamerika), Südafrika, MED (Mittelmeer), PHARE (Mittel- und Osteuropa) und TACIS (frühere Sowjetunion).
   b) *Sektorale oder thematische Kooperationsprogramme*, die sich auf spezielle Bereiche konzentrieren, wie z.B. Nahrungsmittelhilfe, Demokratie und Menschenrechte, geschlechtsspezifische Fragen, Kinder, Umwelt und nachhaltige Entwicklung.
   c) *Kooperationsprogramme für spezielle Akteure*, bspw. NROen.

   Daneben bestehen Haushaltslinien für eine Reihe weiterer entwicklungsbezogener Aktivitäten:

   - Humanitäre Hilfe;
   - Bilaterale oder regionale Kooperationsabkommen zwischen der EU und anderen Ländern oder Regionen;
   - Spezielle politische Vereinbarungen für ausgewählte Ländergruppen. Hierunter fällt u.a. auch das Allgemeine Präferenzsystem (APS) für den Handel mit Entwicklungsländern außerhalb der AKP-Gruppe.

[91] Da es jedoch eine institutionelle Vereinbarung zwischen den verschiedenen Instanzen gibt, übt das Parlament seine Entscheidungsbefugnis nur im Rahmen der Obergrenzen aus, die in der mittelfristigen Finanzplanung festgelegt wurden.

2.3 Zuständigkeiten auf Ebene der Kommission

Im Zuge der Reformen der Außenbeziehungen wurden in den 1990er Jahren drei große organisatorische Veränderungen vorgenommen. Eine Erste - die Trennung zwischen Außenwirtschaftspolitik und Außenpolitik auf Kommissionsebene - führte in Reaktion auf den Maastrichter Vertrag der damalige Kommissionspräsident Jacques Delors durch. Delors erweiterte die Direktion für EPZ-Fragen zu einer vollwertigen Generaldirektion. Die Generaldirektion I für Außenbeziehungen unterteilte er derweil in GD I (Außenwirtschaft) und GD IA (Außenpolitik) (vgl. Forster/Wallace 2000: 480).[92]

2.3.1 Auf der Suche nach einer geeigneten Organisationsform: die Santer-Kommission

Einen weiteren Umbau nahm die Santer-Kommission (1995-1999) vor. Sie machte die Trennung zwischen Außenwirtschafts- und Außenpolitik wieder rückgängig und teilte stattdessen die Generaldirektionen nach geographischen Gesichtspunkten ein. Kommissionspräsident Jacques Santer selbst übernahm die Koordination der Außenbeziehungen (vgl. Nugent 2001: 301). Der entsprechende Fingerzeig Santers, den Außenbeziehungen größere Bedeutung beizumessen, wurde zwar verstanden, doch sorgte die undeutliche inhaltliche Abgrenzung der einzelnen Zuständigkeiten für Rivalitäten zwischen den Kommissaren. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass fünf Kommissare für verschiedene Schwerpunkte eines einzigen Aufgabenkomplexes verantwortlich waren, erschien dies kaum verwunderlich. Folglich erwies sich die Aufgabenverteilung als ineffizient.[93] Zeitgleich stellte man auch auf nationaler Ebene die alleinige Zuständigkeit eines Ministeriums für Außenbeziehungen in Frage und ergriff unterschiedliche Umstrukturierungsmaßnahmen.[94] Vor diesem Hintergrund können daher die wechselnden Zuständigkeiten und Neuorganisationen der Generaldirektionen als Beleg dafür angeführt werden, dass sich die Kommission seit 1993 auf der Suche nach einer geeigneten Organisationsform für die deutlich zunehmenden Außenkontakte befand.

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[92] Einen umfassenden Überblick über die institutionellen Veränderungen auf Kommissionsebene bieten Hewitt/Whiteman 2004: 133-148.

[93] So nahmen häufig mindestens fünf der sechs für Außenbeziehungen zuständigen Kommissare an den Beratungen des Allgemeinen Rates der EU-Außenminister teil, plus weitere Kommissare, falls die erörterten Themen in ihre Kompetenzbereiche fielen. Vgl. Nugent 2001: 299.

[94] Während beispielsweise Dänemark und Frankreich eine organisatorische Stärkung des Außenministeriums vornahmen, erweiterte Deutschland die Kompetenzen des bestehenden Entwicklungsministeriums. Vgl. Hocking 1999.

Abbildung III-1: Die Zuständigkeiten der EU-Kommission in den Außenbeziehungen (Kommission Santer, 1995-1999)

GD I Kommissar: Sir Leon Brittan	GD IA Kommissar: H. van den Broek	GD IB Kommissar: Manuel Marin	GD VIII Kommissar: João Deus de Pinhero
Multilat. Handelspolitik – WTO, Beziehungen zu Nordamerika, Fernost und Australien, auch: Sektorielle Handelspolitik (Textilien, Kleidung, etc.), Anti-Dumping	Hilfen an die GUS und die MOEL **gemeinsam mit Präsident J. Santer** zuständig für die Koordination mit GASP, Menschenrechtspolitik und die Delegationen	Hilfen an Süd- und Südostasien, Lateinamerika, Mittelmeer, Nord-Süd-Fragen	Handel mit und Hilfe für AKP-Staaten, Südafrika

Amt für Humanitäre Hilfe [ECHO (seit 1992)] Kommissarin: Emma Bonino	Gemeinsamer Außendienst (SCR) (seit 1998)
Weltweite Humanitäre Hilfe (Direktorat, keine GD)	Verwaltung der Entwicklungshilfe (Implementation und Evaluation)

Quelle: Stevens 2000: 403.

Bei der Suche nach einer geeigneten Organisationsform spielte die Effizienz der Strukturen eine wichtige, aber nicht ausschlaggebende Rolle. So galt es ebenso der wachsenden Zahl der Mitgliedsstaaten Rechnung zu tragen. Im Zuge der Beitritte Österreichs, Schwedens und Finnlands 1995 wurde die Zahl der Kommissionsmitglieder erhöht, wobei für die neuen Kommissare erst noch prestigeträchtige Aufgabenbereiche geschaffen werden mussten (vgl. Nugent 2001: 304). In diesem Zusammenhang kann man die Schaffung des Amtes für Humanitäre Hilfe (ECHO) und des Gemeinsamen Außendienstes (SCR) der Kommission nachvollziehen. Während ECHO mit der Vergabe von Hilfsprogrammen beauftragt wurde, zeichnete sich der Gemeinsame Außendienst fortan für die Umsetzung und Evaluierung von Hilfsprogrammen verantwortlich. Die Zuständigkeiten für die Planung und Formulierung sowie die finanziellen Entscheidungen blieben jedoch der GD Außenbeziehungen vorbehalten. Somit teilte man die Verwaltung des Projektzyklus zwischen dem SCR und der GD Außenbeziehungen auf, was schließlich im Jahre 2000 von Kommission wie auch Parlament als misslungener Versuch einer Neustrukturierung bezeichnet wurde (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2000b: 7; EP-Bericht Sauquillo vom 17.11.2000: 8).

2.3.2 Neustrukturierung der Außenbeziehungen unter Romano Prodi

Gewissermaßen als Lehre aus dem Scheitern der Santer-Kommission erklärte daher Romano Prodi nach seiner Ernennung zum Kommissionspräsidenten im Mai 1999:

„Es gibt eine politische Verantwortung, die nur dem Kollegium der Kommissare und letztendlich dem Kommissionspräsidenten obliegen darf, und es gibt eine Verwaltungsverantwortung, die in einem System mit sowohl deutlich abgegrenzten Zuständigkeitsbereichen wie auch mit klar festgelegten Kontrollformen und -instrumenten bei den Generaldirektoren liegen muss“ (Rede von Romano Prodi vor dem EP am 04.04.1999).

Diese klare Trennung von politischer Verantwortung und Verwaltungsaufgaben schlug sich schließlich auch in der Organisation seiner Kommission nieder. So übertrug Prodi einem Außenkommissar (Chris Patten) mit neu strukturierter Verantwortung die Koordination der Außenbeziehungen und den Vorsitz in der RELEX-Gruppe, zu der insgesamt fünf Kommissare zählten: die Kommissare für Außenbeziehungen, Entwicklung, Handel, Erweiterung sowie für Wirtschafts- und Währungsangelegenheiten (vgl. Nugent 2001: 301). Auf diese Weise sollte ein Kommissar die Kohärenz der Außenkontakte der Kommission gewährleisten können. Der für das Ressort „Entwicklung“ zuständige Kommissar Poul Nielson war Außenkommissar Chris Patten in der Planung der Außenbeziehungen untergeordnet, verfügte aber erstmals über die gesamte EG-Entwicklungspolitik und die Humanitäre Hilfe. Von Seiten des Europäischen Parlaments wurde die Reform als qualitative Weiterentwicklung gegenüber früheren Versuchen verstanden, da man die traditionellen Barrieren zwischen der GD Außenbeziehungen und der GD Entwicklung zu überwinden versuchte. Dennoch bestand die Befürchtung, dass der Einfluss der GD Entwicklung auf Entwicklungsfragen zukünftig vermindert würde (vgl. EP-Bericht Sauquillo vom 17.11.2000: 18).

Der Prodi-Kommission gelang zwar eine verstärkte Koordination der Entwicklungspolitik mit anderen Fragen der Außenpolitik, doch blieben die nationalen, bilateralen Hilfsprogramme bestehen. Insbesondere entwicklungspolitisch aktive Staaten wie Dänemark, die Niederlande und Schweden sträubten sich gegen eine von der Kommission geleitete Koordination (vgl. Urban 1997: 111 ff.). Dies begründete man unter anderem mit der Tatsache, dass man auf Anfragen seitens der Partnerstaaten und nicht auf fertige Hilfspakete der Europäer setze. Einen Vorteil in der Zusammenlegung der bilateralen Zusammenhilfe sehe man daher nicht (vgl. Grimm 2003: 206 f.). Im Gegenzug mussten die dieser Überlegung abgeneigten Staaten einsehen, dass ohne Geberkoordination Werte wie eine breite Bürgerpartizipation kaum gegen Widerstände durchzusetzen wären. Angesichts der äußerst limitierten personellen Mittel der EU-Kommission schien eine effektive Koordination durch diese jedoch unwahrscheinlich,

weshalb sich die Koordinationsmöglichkeiten der Kommission auch weiterhin ausschließlich auf die Gemeinschaftsprogramme beschränken.

Abbildung III-2: Die Zuständigkeiten der EU-Kommission in den Außenbeziehungen (Kommission Prodi, 1999-2004)



Quelle: Stevens 2000: 403.

2.3.3 Integration des Außenministers als außenpolitische Aufgabe: die Barroso-Kommission

In der Verteilung der Zuständigkeitsbereiche knüpft der neue EU-Kommissionspräsident José Manuel Barroso an viele Elemente der Prodi-Kommission an. Eine revolutionäre Umgestaltung der Dienststellen der Kommission hielt Barroso für unnötig. Dort, wo er die Dienststellen und den Aufgabenzuschnitt verändert hat, erfolgte dies hauptsächlich, um seinen politischen Zielen bessere Ausgangsmöglichkeiten zu schaffen. So räumt er den Maßnahmen zur Ankurbelung des flauen Wirtschaftswachstums und zur Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen oberste Priorität ein. Entsprechend seiner Devise „Wohlstand, Sicherheit und Solidarität für alle Europäer“ erklärte er die Umsetzung der Lissabonner Strategie bis 2010 zum zentralen Element seiner Politik.[95] Somit stehen in den kommenden fünf Jahren vor allem wirtschaftspolitische

[95] Die Lissabonner Strategie, Resultat des Treffens der Staats- und Regierungschefs im März 2000 in Lissabon, hat das Ziel, Europa bis zum Jahre 2010 zum leistungsfähigsten Wirtschaftsraum der Welt zu machen - noch vor den USA. Dabei geht es vor allem darum, die Attraktivität des Standortes „Europa“ für Unternehmen zu steigern. Nur dann werde es das nötige Wirtschaftswachstum geben, um den Arbeitsmarkt zu beleben. Ein wichtiger

Themen im Vordergrund. In der Außenpolitik legt Barroso unterdessen den Schwerpunkt auf den Friedensprozess im Nahen Osten und den Ausbau der Nachbarschaftspolitik mit Russland und der Ukraine (vgl. Kommission 2005: 13 f.). Inwiefern die Rolle Afrikas von dieser schwerpunktmäßigen Neuausrichtung der europäischen Außenpolitik tatsächlich betroffen ist, kann derzeit noch nicht bestimmt werden.

Ausgehend von einer eigens propagierten „gefestigten Teamarbeit" will Barroso die jeweiligen Aufgabenressorts der Kommissare als gleichwertig eingestuft wissen.[96] Seinen Willen zur Teamarbeit unterstrich er unlängst in seiner Entscheidung, alle Büros der Kommissare im Berlaymont-Gebäude unterzubringen. Des Weiteren soll sich die Aufgabe des einzelnen Kommissionsmitglieds nicht darin erschöpfen, seinen Zuständigkeitsbereich zu verwalten. Vielmehr handelt die Kommission als Kollegium und beschließt über alle Fragen gemeinsam (vgl. Rede von José Manuel Barroso vor dem EP am 21.07.2004). Jeder Kommissar hat im Prozess der kollektiven Entscheidungsfindung genau die gleichen Rechte. Eine Delegation von Zuständigkeiten an Gruppen von Kommissaren wird nicht stattfinden. Vielmehr soll die Arbeit der Kommission gegebenenfalls im Vorfeld von thematischen Gruppen und *Task Forces* vorbereitet werden, um schnell auf Ereignisse reagieren und die Tagesordnung bestimmen zu können. Diese führen diejenigen Kommissare zusammen, deren Zuständigkeiten von einer bestimmten politischen Herausforderung berührt werden.

Im Vergleich zu seinem Amtsvorgänger Prodi betont Barroso wieder die Koordination der Außenbeziehungen durch den Kommissionspräsidenten. So führt er den Vorsitz in der Gruppe der Kommissare für Außenbeziehungen selbst. Seine Stellvertreterin auf diesem Gebiet ist die Österreicherin Benita Ferrero-Waldner. Als Kommissarin für Außenbeziehungen kommt ihr – wie vormals Chris Patten – eine Sonderrolle zu. Zusätzlich wurde der Außenkommissarin der Zuständigkeitsbereich EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik übertragen, dem in letzter Zeit eine wachsende Bedeutung zugemessen wird. Das Ressort des Kommissars für Entwicklung und Humanitäre Hilfe, Louis Michel, konzentriert sich hingegen verstärkt auf die AKP-Staaten. Des Weiteren zeichnen sich Peter Mandelson für die Außenhandelspolitik und Olli Rehn für die EU-Erweiterung verantwortlich.

Grundpfeiler der Strategie von Lissabon ist der Wachstums- und Stabilitätspakt, der alle EU-Staaten verpflichtet, gewisse Obergrenzen bei der Staatsverschuldung einzuhalten. Pro Jahr darf die Netto-Neuverschuldung nicht mehr als 3 % und die Gesamtverschuldung nicht mehr als 60 % des Bruttoinlandsproduktes betragen. Verfehlt ein Land diese Obergrenzen, können empfindliche Strafen verhängt werden. Mittlerweile ist die vormals als „Allzweckwaffe" präsentierte Strategie längst nicht mehr unumstritten. Vgl. Becker 2005.

[96] Diese Intention Barrosos kann ohne Frage als Lehre aus den Fehlern seines Vorgängers Prodi verstanden werden, der des Öfteren Entscheidungen „hinter dem Rücken" seiner Kommissionsmitglieder fällte und diese damit nachträglich „überraschte".

Abbildung III-3: Die Zuständigkeiten der EU-Kommission in den Außenbeziehungen (Kommission Barroso, seit November 2004)[97]



Quelle: eigene Darstellung

Die größte und wohl schwierigste Aufgabe in den Außenbeziehungen wird sich für die Barroso-Kommission mit dem – derzeit noch nicht absehbaren – Inkrafttreten der EU-Verfassung[98] ergeben. Dann nämlich erhält die Europäische Union eine weitere Institution: den europäischen Außenminister (Art. I-28). Designiert für dieses Amt ist der Spanier Javier Solana, der bislang als Hoher Vertreter der GASP und Generalsekretär des EU-Rates fungiert.[99] Als Au-

[97] Mit der Einsetzung des EU-Außenministers tritt die Kommissarin für Außenbeziehungen ihr Ressort an diesen ab. Derzeitigen Angaben zufolge bleibt sie dann jedoch weiterhin Kommissionsmitglied und leitet den Teilbereich „Europäische Nachbarschaftspolitik“ ihres vormaligen Aufgabenressorts.

[98] Am 29. Oktober 2004 unterzeichneten die Staats- und Regierungschefs der 25 EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und der drei Kandidatenländer den Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa, den sie am 18. Juni 2004 einstimmig angenommen hatten. Die EU-Verfassung kann jedoch erst in Kraft treten, wenn sie von jedem Unterzeichnerstaat nach dem in seiner Verfassung vorgeschriebenen Verfahren (parlamentarisches Verfahren oder Volksabstimmung) angenommen wurde. Da jedoch die Volksabstimmungen in Frankreich und den Niederlanden den Verfassungsvertrag ablehnten, ruhen derzeit alle diesbezüglichen Bemühungen. Eine künftige Verfahrensweise im Umgang mit der EU-Verfassung wurde bislang noch nicht erarbeitet. Als dementsprechend unklar erweist sich die gegenwärtige Situation. Alle folgenden Ausführungen bezüglich des EU-Außenministers basieren auf den Aussagen des Verfassungsvertrags und sind somit – jedenfalls zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt – eher spekulativ. Nichtsdestotrotz finden sie Erwähnung in dieser Arbeit, da sie – mit relativ hoher Wahrscheinlichkeit – in ähnlicher Form zukünftig Einzug in den institutionellen Rahmen der EU erhalten werden. Aus diesem Grund werden sie bereits an dieser Stelle vorgestellt, wenn ihnen auch der finale Charakter fehlt.

[99] Hierzu war die Ernennung durch den Europäischen Rat mit qualifizierter Mehrheit und die Zustimmung des Kommissionspräsidenten notwendig. Das gleiche Verfahren gilt auch für die Beendung des Mandats (Art. 28 (1)).

ßenminister der Union soll er sowohl die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Mitgliedsstaaten effizienter gestalten, als auch die Kohärenz zwischen einzelnen Bereichen ihres auswärtigen Handelns sowie zwischen diesen und der internen Politik sicherstellen. Dies soll durch die Fusion des Amtes des Hohen Vertreters der GASP und des für die Außenbeziehungen zuständigen Vizepräsidenten der Kommission in einem „Doppelhut“ gewährleistet werden. Entsprechend diesem „Doppelhut-Modell“[100] agiert der europäische Außenminister zugleich als Vorsitzender des Außenministerrates und als Vizepräsident der Kommission[101]. Er stellt das Bindeglied zwischen der Kommission und dem Rat dar und trägt des Weiteren die Verantwortung für die Ausführung der Außenpolitik in ihrer Gesamtheit.[102]

Abbildung III-4: Das „3-Funktionen-Modell“ des Außenministers der Union



Quelle: Wessels 2003: 22.

Im Ministerrat wird seine Stellung zusätzlich dadurch gestärkt, dass er bei den regelmäßigen Sitzungen der Außenminister den Vorsitz übernimmt, dort selbst Initiativen ergreifen kann

[100] Unter dem „Doppelhut“-Modell wird in diesem Zusammenhang das Mitwirken des Außenministers an zwei bislang voneinander getrennten Institutionen – nämlich Kommission und Ministerrat – verstanden. Parallel hierzu entstand die Bezeichnung „3-Funktionen-Modell“, die die wesentlichen Aktionsfelder des Amtes umschreibt. Siehe hierzu Abbildung III-6: Struktur der GASP nach dem Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa.
[101] In seiner Funktion als Vizepräsident der Kommission wird er seinen Landsmann Joaquin Almunia, derzeit Kommissar für Wirtschaft und Währung, ablösen.
[102] Demnach kann das Amt des europäische Außenministers durchaus als aufgewerteter Nachfolger des bisherigen Hohen Vertreters der GASP verstanden werden, der darüber hinaus über eine eindeutige Rolle in der Kommission verfügt: Die Rede ist auch von einer Fusion (Art. 26 EUV).

und in der Außenpolitik das bisherige System rotierender EU-Präsidentschaften nicht mehr gilt.[103]

Die Möglichkeit zur verstärkten Kohärenz aller Bereiche der europäischen Außenpolitik scheint daher gegeben. Diese Einschätzung beruht nicht zuletzt auf der Tatsache, dass in der Person des Außenministers die bisher strikt gehaltene institutionelle Trennung zwischen dem Ministerrat, der die Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten vertritt, und der dem gemeinsamen europäischen Interesse verpflichteten Kommission überbrückt wird (vgl. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* vom 03.03.2005).

Inwiefern es dem europäischen Außenminister tatsächlich gelingen wird, die außenpolitischen Interessen der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten verstärkt aufeinander abzustimmen und gegenüber Dritten ‚mit einer Stimme' zu vertreten, ist abzuwarten. Die Chancen für eine erfolgreiche Integration des Außenministeramtes in den institutionellen Rahmen der Europäischen Union stehen nicht schlecht. Das „Für und Wider" einer erfolgreichen Etablierung halten sich dabei die Waage:

„Seine Stärke könnte in der mehrfachen Rollenausführung liegen. Er hat die Möglichkeit, seine vielschichtigen Funktionen und Aufgabenfelder derartig zu verkoppeln, dass er mit einem Informations- und Einflussvorsprung aus jeweils einer Arena Positionen in der anderen eher durchsetzen kann. Andererseits ist sein Einfluss ständig einseitig vom Wohlwollen anderer Mitspieler abhängig, die das Profil und die Reputation des neuen Kollegen recht einfach und nachhaltig beeinträchtigen können. Sie werden mit großer Wahrscheinlichkeit ‚testen', ob und wie er Rücksicht auf ihre eigenen Interessen und Rechte nimmt" (Wessels 2003: 25f.).

Demzufolge muss der Außenminister mehreren Ansprüchen zwischen unterschiedlich geregelten Bereichen mit dahinter stehenden Interessendivergenzen gerecht werden. In der gelebten Verfassungspraxis wird er sowohl der engen Beobachtung von Regierungen im Rat und Diplomaten im Politischen und Sicherheitspolitischen Komitee als auch seiner Kollegen in der Kommission unterliegen. Um angesichts dieses institutionellen Drucks eine breite Akzeptanz zu etablieren und Konsens aufzubauen, wird der Außenminister voraussichtlich eine eher verhaltene Politik zu verfolgen haben. Diese Zurückhaltung hat wahrscheinlich insbesondere in Konflikt- und Krisensituationen zu gelten, bei denen Mitglieder und Organe der EU unter-

[103] Der rotierende Vorsitz des Europäischen Rates wird aufgehoben. Stattdessen führt ein hauptamtlich in Brüssel ansässiger Präsident den ständigen Vorsitz des Europäischen Rates. Er wird mit der qualifizierten Mehrheit der Mitglieder des Europäischen Rates für eine Amtszeit von zweieinhalb Jahren gewählt und kann einmal wieder gewählt werden. Der Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa weist ihm die Rolle als Vorbereiter und Konsensmanager des Rates vor, gesteht ihm aber auch ausführende Kompetenzen zu: „Der Präsident des Europäischen Rates nimmt in seiner Eigenschaft auf seiner Ebene, unbeschadet der Befugnisse des Außenministers der Union, die Außenvertretung der Union in Angelegenheiten der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik wahr" (Art. I-22 Abs. 2). Dabei stimmt die Wahl des Wortes „unbeschadet" prinzipiell nachdenklich, da erkannte Rollenkonflikte nicht in dem Verfassungstext selbst geklärt, sondern auf die zukünftige Alltagspraxis verlagert werden. Vgl. Wessels 2003: 21.

schiedliche Positionen einnehmen. Sein Spagat zwischen doppelten oder dreifachen „Hüten“ bedeutet daher immer auch ein hohes Risiko, interinstitutionell zwischen zwei oder mehr Stühle zu fallen.

Eine erste Bewährungsprobe stellen da bereits die gegenwärtigen Überlegungen zur Bildung eines Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes dar. Dieser soll den Außenminister bei seinen vielfältigen Aufgaben unterstützen (Art. III-296 Abs. 3). Der Verfassungsvertrag regelt die Zusammensetzung des neuen Dienstes[104], seine Verankerung im Institutionengefüge der EU bleibt hingegen ungeklärt (vgl. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* vom 03.03.2005). Ein entsprechender Kompromiss zwischen dem designierten Außenminister Solana und Kommissionspräsident Barroso ist bislang nicht möglich gewesen, so dass die Streitfrage an die Mitgliedsstaaten weitergereicht wurde. Demnach ist zu klären, ob der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst eine autonome Stellung erhalten und weder zur Kommission noch zum Ratssekretariat gehört oder teilweise der einen oder anderen Einrichtung angegliedert werden soll (vgl. Maurer/Reichel 2004).

Eine umfassende Einschätzung bezüglich der gegenwärtigen Tendenzen in den Außenbeziehungen der EU erscheint nicht möglich, da die Kommission erst so langsam ihren neuen Arbeitsrhythmus zu finden scheint. Folglich waren es vor allem grundlegende Überlegungen und Prognosen zur Ausrichtung der Barroso-Kommission, die in diesem Kapitel angesprochen wurden. Auf konkrete Ergebnisse hinsichtlich der Effizienz- und Kohärenzsteigerung in den gemeinsamen Außenbeziehungen ist noch zu warten. Klar erscheint jedoch bereits zum derzeitigen Zeitpunkt, dass vor allem der Integration des EU-Außenministers in die Kommission als auch in den gesamten institutionellen Rahmen eine Schlüsselrolle zukommt. Insbesondere die EU-Kommission wird sich am Ende ihrer Amtszeit daran messen lassen müssen, inwiefern ihr eine Einbindung der neuen starken Figur ins EU-Gefüge gelungen ist.[105]

2.3.4 Die Kommissions-Delegationen

Ebenso wie die Mitgliedsstaaten verfügt auch die EU-Kommission über ein breites Netz von Außenbeziehungen in Drittländern und bei internationalen Organisationen (OECD, OSZE, UNO und WTO). Diese Delegationen eröffnen der Kommission neue Informationsquellen und wirken sich unmittelbar auf das politische Selbstverständnis der Kommission aus. Mit der zunehmenden Bedeutung der Außenbeziehungen für die Europäische Union stieg auch die

[104] Der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst soll von vorübergehend nach Brüssel abgeordneten Diplomaten aus den Mitgliedstaaten sowie Beamten des Ratssekretariats und der Kommission gebildet werden.

[105] Dies ist wohlgemerkt nur dann zu berücksichtigen, wenn umfassende Fortschritte in Bezug auf das Inkrafttreten der EU-Verfassung zu verzeichnen sind.

Anzahl der Delegationen an: Während sich 1979 47 der weltweit 53 Delegationen auf die AKP-Staaten konzentrierten, war 1989 die Zahl der Delegationen in Afrika, der Karibik und dem Pazifik bereits auf 65 angewachsen. 1998 arbeiteten ebenso viele Delegationen in Ländern außerhalb der AKP-Gruppe (60) wie in den Lomé-Staaten (65), 2003 waren es weltweit 123 (vgl. Bruter 1999: 184).

Die Entscheidung über die Entsendung einer EU-Delegation erfolgt aufgrund zweier Kriterien:

1. „der politischen, wirtschaftlichen und handelspolitischen Bedeutung des Gastlandes für die EU";
2. „der Notwendigkeit einer lokalen Verwaltung der Kooperationsprogramme der Kommission" (Europäische Kommission 2000b: 10).

Aufgrund der schwachen Personal- und Finanzlage innerhalb der Kommission geht die Diskussion derzeit eher in Richtung Verkleinerung bzw. Schließung einiger Delegationen, um in anderen Regionen präsent zu sein.[106] So haben bereits ein Viertel aller Delegationsleiter regionale Zuständigkeiten, d.h. großräumige Aufgabenbereiche, übernommen. Da insbesondere in Subsahara-Afrika ein enges Netzwerk an Delegationen besteht, wird die geopolitische Neuausrichtung wohl in erster Linie Vertretungen aus dieser Region betreffen.[107]

Formal gesehen sind die Delegationen der Kommission diplomatische Institutionen mit den gleichen Rechten wie diejenigen von Nationalstaaten oder internationalen Organisationen (vgl. Duke 2000: 849-870). Das diplomatische Protokoll ordnet die Delegationen der Kommission jedoch keiner der beiden anderen Formen von Abordnungen zu, indem es auf die Sonderposition der EU hinweist:

„It is, therefore, clear that the external delegations are involved in some form of diplomacy, but without a state" (Bruter 1999: 185).

Ursprünglich lag die Aufgabe der Delegationen in der Verwaltung und Überwachung der EG-Hilfsprogramme, die durch die Verträge von Yaoundé bzw. Lomé vorgeschrieben wurden. Im Laufe der Jahre haben die Vertretungen der Kommission jedoch eine Reihe zusätzlicher Aufgaben in den Bereichen Erweiterung, Regionalintegration, Sektorpolitik, politische Berichterstattung, Handelspolitik, Presse und Information, Menschenrechte etc. übernommen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2000b: 4f.). Nicht zuletzt der weltpolitische Wandel durch den Zusammenbruch des Ostblocks ließ die Aufgaben der Delegationen sprunghaft ansteigen. So

[106] So wird darüber nachgedacht, Vertretungen in der Golfregion und Zentralasien zu schaffen und die vorhandenen Strukturen auf dem Balkan (Kroatien, Mazedonien) auszubauen. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2000b: 11.
[107] Im Gespräch sind gegenwärtig die Kapverden und Togo, welche künftig vom Nachbarland (Senegal bzw. Benin) aus betreut werden sollen. Vgl. Ebd.: 10.

wurden allein zwischen 1989 und 1999 100 neue bilaterale Vereinbarungen geschlossen, deren Umsetzung den Delegationen anvertraut ist (vgl. Bruter 1999: 194). Unterdessen betont die Kommission regelmäßig ihre Bedeutung für die Kohärenz und die Kontinuität der politischen Maßnahmen, da sie aufgrund ihres dichteren Vertretungsnetzes und im Vergleich zum Durchschnitt der EU-Staaten als einziger ständiger Vertreter der Troika in Drittländern gelten kann (vgl. Grimm 2003: 210).

Die Delegationen können darüber hinaus für weitere europäische Institutionen als die Kommission arbeiten. So leisten die Delegationen in vielen Fällen politische Berichterstattung und organisatorische Hilfe für den Hohen Vertreter der GASP bzw. seine Mitarbeiter. Ebenso stehen sie oftmals in engem Kontakt zu *EuropeAid* und der Ratspräsidentschaft. Trotzdem sind sie formal Vertretungen der Kommission vor Ort, nicht der Gemeinschaft oder der Union. Zwar bestehen immer wieder Versuche seitens des Europäischen Parlaments, mehr Einfluss in den Außenbeziehungen zu gewinnen, doch blieben diese bislang ohne Erfolg.[108]

Als wesentlich konsequenter erwies sich die zur gleichen Zeit aufkommende Überlegung, durch ein europäisches Beamtenkolleg, dass gleichermaßen EU-Personal und mitgliedsstaatlichen Diplomaten offen stehen sollte, einen verstärkten gemeinsamen Nenner für alle Akteure zu schaffen. Dies wurde jedoch von den Mitgliedsstaaten zunächst abgelehnt. Dabei scheinen die Vielschichtigkeit des europäischen Regelungssystems und die verwirrende Kompetenzabgrenzung zwischen Mitgliedsstaaten und der EU-Kommission für die Partner in Drittländern häufig nicht nachvollziehbar.[109] Neue Impulse in dieser Frage verleiht jedoch die gegenwärtige Diskussion um die Einrichtung eines Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienstes, der dem zukünftigen EU-Außenminister zuarbeiten soll. Während alle Beamten, die zur Zeit im Ratssekretariat oder in der Kommission mit Fragen der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik und der Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik befasst sind, in den Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst übernommen werden sollten, herrscht hinsichtlich der Eingliederung der Auslandsvertretungen der Kommission Uneinigkeit. Das neuerliche gemeinsame Diskussionspapier Solanas und Barrosos lässt jedoch erkennen, dass beide eine solche Integration als die naheliegendste Lösung betrachten (vgl. *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* vom 03.03.2005).

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[108] So schlug das EP 2000 vor, die Delegationen in Vertretungen der Gemeinschaft umzuwandeln und Delegationsleiter künftig vor ihrer Berufung dem Auswärtigen Ausschuss des EP ein Arbeitsprogramm darlegen zu lassen. Des Weiteren diskutierte man die Möglichkeit, die diplomatischen Missionen der Mitgliedsstaaten in Drittländern zusammenzulegen. Vgl. EP-Bericht Galeote vom 24.07.2000: 11.

[109] Diese Annahme erhärtet sich durch die Tatsache, dass selbst ein Großteil der EU-Bürger diese Abgrenzung in den Aufgaben der Delegationen nicht vornehmen kann. Daher zeigt sich auch in dieser Situation wieder, dass das große Manko der EU-Politik in der mangelnden Transparenz des Systems zu suchen ist.

2.3.5 Planung und Verwaltung der Gemeinschaftshilfen

Entgegen allen Klischees vom „Moloch Europa“ weist die Kommission im Bereich der Außenbeziehungen ein personelles Defizit auf. Insbesondere die Verwaltung der in absoluten Zahlen ansteigenden Entwicklungsfonds-Mittel stellt die Kommission vor wachsende strukturelle Probleme, da ein zügiger Mittelabfluss nicht garantiert werden kann.[110] Hierfür verantwortlich ist in erster Linie die komplexe und vielschichtige Bearbeitungsformel der vorliegenden Anträge, die ein schnelles Ausschütten der Gemeinschaftshilfen unterbindet.[111] Dementsprechend zielt die im Jahre 2000 initiierte Reform der Außenhilfe auf einen kohärenteren Rahmen für die Außenbeziehungen mit Drittstaaten ab.[112]

Die Projektverwaltung des EEF erfolgt über einen Komitologie-Ausschuss der Kommission, die den Mitgliedsstaaten in diesem Rahmen Projektvorschläge vorlegt. Da der EEF nicht eindeutig „vergemeinschaftet“ ist, sind es in erster Linie die Mitgliedsstaaten, die eng an der Beschlussfassung beteiligt sind.[113] Dies spiegelt sich auch in den Abstimmungsmodalitäten des EEF-Ausschusses wider, wo – entgegen der üblichen Stimmengewichtung in der EU – die Stimmen entsprechend dem jeweiligen Einzahlungsanteil in den EEF gewichtet werden und folglich zwischen den verschiedenen Förderphasen schwanken. Durch die Modalität einer qualifizierten Mehrheit im EEF-Ausschuss kann sich mitunter eine Sperrminorität ergeben, wenn beispielsweise Deutschland und Frankreich einen Projektvorschlag ablehnen. Für die Kommission werden kleinere (Geber-)Staaten daher immer dann interessant, wenn die qualifizierte Mehrheit in Gefahr geraten könnte. Nichtsdestotrotz besitzen die kleineren Staaten bei EU-Beschlussfassungen nur eingeschränktes politisches Gewicht. Andererseits erweitert sich jedoch ihr geographischer Aktionsradius, da sie an Entscheidungen mitwirken, zu denen sie ansonsten keinerlei Zugang hätten. Der Einfluss auf größere Zusammenhänge kann deswegen innerhalb der Europäischen Union nicht allein auf die Stimmengewichtung reduziert werden. Eine ebenso entscheidende Rolle spielt die Reputation eines Landes als engagierter Geber (vgl. Grimm 2003: 214).

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[110] Die Ausweitung der Hilfsprogramme seit dem Beginn der 1990er Jahre ging nicht mit einer Personalaufstockung in der Kommission einher, so dass 1999 statistisch 2,9 Mitarbeiter für die Verwaltung von 10 Mio. US$ zuständig waren. Zeitgleich lag der entsprechende Durchschnitt in den Mitgliedsstaaten und internationalen Organisationen weitaus höher. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2000: 16+46; Cox/Chapman 1999: 23.

[111] Neben der schleppenden Antragsbearbeitung der Kommission (Personalmangel) sorgen vor allem die unübersichtlichen Verfahren und die Zuständigkeitsüberschneidungen für Unklarheit. So gab es allein im Jahr 2000 für die Außenhilfe der EU insgesamt 64 verschiedene Haushaltslinien, wobei für die Ausschreibungen der Projekte 46 verschiedene Vergabeverfahren bestanden. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2001.

[112] Vgl. Ebd.

[113] Vgl. 2.1 Die Akteure auf Gemeinschaftsebene.

Wie bereits angesprochen, erweist sich bei der bisherigen Durchführung der EU-Hilfsprogramme die schleppende Auszahlung als Kernproblem. So wurden beispielsweise 1999 nur 43 Prozent der veranschlagten Mittel ausgegeben, während 9 Mrd. € aus den vorherigen Programmen noch nicht ausbezahlt wurden.[114] Seit 2000 lässt sich indessen ein leichter Positivtrend in Bezug auf die „Mittelabflüsse" bemerken. Dem letzten Entwicklungsjahresbericht der Kommission zufolge wurden 2003 bereits 65 Prozent der zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel ausgezahlt und der RAL („Reste à liquider"[115]) – wenn auch spärlich – dezimiert (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004: 138ff). Wie man diese Entwicklung auch einschätzen mag, klar ist, dass das Ziel einer beschleunigten Mittelauszahlung nicht im Widerspruch zu den Bemühungen um die Qualität der jeweiligen Projekte stehen und der Schwerpunkt statt auf den Ergebnissen und Auswirkungen auf den Einsatzmitteln liegen darf (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2000: 16).

Ein weiterer Knackpunkt bei der Mittelauszahlung liegt in den schwachen administrativen Strukturen der Empfängerländer, die dem Management größerer Aufgaben kaum gewachsen sind.[116] So erfolgt die Mittelplanung des EEF über sogenannte Länderstrategiepapiere, in denen nationale Richtprogramme entworfen werden. Diese sollen von den begünstigten AKP-Staaten ausgearbeitet werden, womit insbesondere die ärmsten und hilfsbedürftigsten Länder administrativ überfordert werden. Während Projektfindung und -vorbereitung im EEF bei den betreffenden AKP-Staaten liegt, erfolgt die Projektüberprüfung gemeinsam mit der Gemeinschaft. Die schlussendliche Programmerstellung und Projektauswahl wird in der Praxis von der jeweiligen Delegation vorgenommen, so dass bei der Projektplanung weitestgehend eine klare Zuständigkeitsverteilung existiert (vgl. EG-Rechnungshof 2001: 6ff.). Hier scheint die recht langfristige Verwaltung von Hilfsgeldern positive Effekte zu haben, zumal den Delegationen in den AKP-Ländern ein detailliertes Verfahrenshandbuch von 1978 vorliegt.[117]

Schwierigkeiten bestanden jedoch hinsichtlich der Abrechnung, da Maßnahmen einerseits über den EEF, andererseits über den allgemeinen EG-Haushalt finanziert wurden. Als Reaktion hierauf wurde der Außendienst der EU 2001 erneut verändert und das Amt für Zusammen-

[114] Folglich erwies sich die Frage der Anrechnung der bereits zugesagten, aber noch nicht ausgegebenen EEF-Gelder bei den Verhandlungen zum Lomé-Nachfolgeabkommen als strittig. Angesichts solch großer Restbestände erschien eine substantielle Erhöhung wenig sinnvoll. Vgl. Weiland 2000: 53.

[115] Gemeint ist hiermit die Differenz der zur Verfügung gestellten und ausgezahlten Mittel, also die noch ausstehenden EEF-Gelder.

[116] Dabei sind die Kapazitäten für die sinnvolle Mittelverwaltung in den ärmsten Ländern noch deutlich geringer als in – hinsichtlich ihrer Bevölkerungszahl vergleichbar – großen Staaten. Entsprechende wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen liegen für Mali und Senegal vor. Vgl. Brigaldino 1997: 134 f.; Grimm 2003: 215.

[117] Weder für Asien noch für den Mittelmeerraum gab es einen solchen Leitfaden. Für Lateinamerika lag unterdessen nur ein Ratgeber in spanischer Sprache vor. Vgl. EG-Rechnungshof 2001: 13.

arbeit, *EuropeAid*, geschaffen. *EuropeAid* ist sowohl für Entwicklungshilfe aus dem Budget als auch für die Verwaltung der EEF-Gelder zuständig. Es besteht damit erstmals ein Dienst für die gesamte multilaterale EU-Entwicklungshilfe, der zudem den gesamten Projektzyklus verwaltet: Ausschreibungen, Umsetzung von Projekten und ihre Evaluation. Während die Gründung von und die Aufgabenzuweisung an *EuropeAid* den Forderungen aus dem Europäischen Parlament entsprachen, betrachteten einige Mitgliedsstaaten die Einrichtung von *EuropeAid* äußerst kritisch. Dabei zeigte man sich in erster Linie darüber besorgt, dass die bestehenden nationalen Organisationen gegenüber *EuropeAid* ins Hintertreffen geraten könnten (vgl. EP-Bericht Sauquillo vom 17.11.2000: 20).

3. Die Gemeinsame europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik

Die Ursprünge der europäischen Außenpolitik liegen außerhalb des Gemeinschaftsrahmens. Erst mit dem Vertrag von Maastricht wurde eine Gemeinsame europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik geschaffen, doch blieb sie aus institutioneller Perspektive als so genannte „zweite Säule“ der EU-Tempelkonstruktion von den EG-Vertragsvereinbarungen getrennt. Aus diesem Grund läuft die Bearbeitung von Hilfspolitik und Außenpolitik in der EU formal getrennt voneinander und muss über institutionelle Grenzen miteinander abgestimmt werden.

3.1 Die Entstehung einer europäischen Außenpolitik

Mit der Gründung der Europäischen Politischen Zusammenarbeit (EPZ) konkretisierten die Mitgliedsstaaten 1970 erstmals ihre Absichten, ein informelles Kontaktnetz zur Koordination ihrer Außenpolitiken gegenüber Drittstaaten zu erschaffen. Eine weitgehende und umfassende Zusammenarbeit, wie es der Name erwarten lässt, kam jedoch nicht zustande. So blieb es meist bei Übereinkünften der Außenministerien zur gemeinsamen Verfahrensweise und Politikgestaltung. Auf drei Prinzipien der EPZ hatte man sich im Rahmen des Kopenhagener Berichts 1973 geeinigt:

1. Man wollte als „single entity“ – mit dem späteren Ziel einer „Europäischen Union“ – handeln,
2. gemeinsame Verhandlungen mit Dritten sollten den „distinct character of the European entity“ widerspiegeln und

3. in den bilateralen Beziehungen sollten vereinbarte, gemeinsame Positionen zunehmend die Grundlage bilden.[118]

Insgesamt führte die EPZ aufgrund ihres informellen Charakters zu einem sehr unregelmäßigen Kooperationsmuster, da sie in erster Linie als diplomatisches „Gentlemen's Agreement" fungierte. In ihrer alltäglichen Funktionsweise entwickelte sie eine ganz eigene organisationsinterne Dynamik. So warnten sich beispielsweise die jeweiligen nationalen Mitarbeiter telefonisch gegenseitig vor heraufziehenden Schwierigkeiten. Die leitenden Politischen Direktoren zeigten sich vor allem an Problemlösungen in ihren Sachgebieten interessiert:

„The system [of EPC] was run by the Political Directors (senior policy officials in the Foreign Ministries) themselves. This was important because the Political Directors, unlike the Permanent Representatives in Brussels, were not diplomats ‚sent to lie abroad for their countries' but officials in the home ministry with direct responsability for the conception and implementation of policy." (Nuttall 1992: 16).

Dieser „esprit de corps" findet sich auch in dem von deutschen Diplomaten verwendeten Wortspiel wieder, den ‚Ständigen Vertreter' als ‚Ständigen Verräter' (nationaler Interessen) zu bezeichnen. Die Rede war vom Politischen Komitee als die „Europäische Republik der Diplomaten" (vgl. Jørgensen 1997: 167-180).

Als rein intergouvernementales Netzwerk gedacht, war die EPZ ausschließlich auf eine Konsensbildung aller Beteiligten ausgerichtet. Mit Hilfe dieses diplomatischen Clubs gelang es den Mitgliedsstaaten, einzelnen Fragen von gemeinsamem Interesse in internationalen Verhandlungen mehr Bedeutung zu verleihen.[119] Zugleich wurde die nationale Souveränität nicht in Frage gestellt. Für ökonomische Fragen zog man bereits 1973 die Kommission hinzu, doch verbesserte erst die erfolgreiche Konferenz von Helsinki die Beziehungen zwischen EPZ und Kommission. Mit dem Londoner Bericht 1981 wurde die Kommission der EPZ „assoziiert", während der Europäische Gerichtshof und das Parlament außen vor blieben (vgl. Bonvicini 1998: 61-75).

De facto stellten die Außenministerien die einzig beteiligten Stellen der Mitgliedsstaaten in der EPZ dar. Mit der Verankerung der GASP im Vertrag von Maastricht 1992 stieg der Arbeitsumfang der Außenminister stark an, so dass neben Außen-, Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik kaum noch Zeit für andere Koordinationsfragen blieb. Die zunehmende Europäisierung der einzelnen Politikfelder stellte den Anspruch des Außenministeriums auf eine k

[118] Einige dieser Formulierungen finden sich schließlich auch in den Vertragsbestimmungen zur Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik nach Maastricht wieder. Vgl. Nuttall 1992: 90.

[119] So beispielsweise in Fragen bezüglich der KSZE oder des Nahen Ostens. Vgl. Regelsberger/de Schoutheete de Tervarent/Wessels 1997b: 1-15.

nierende Funktion in Frage. Die EPZ hingegen gab den Außenministerien ein exklusives Tätigkeitsfeld:

„As a bonus, the Foreign Ministry officials were able to recover ground lost to colleagues from other ministries who had, in spite of the Foreign Ministry's co-ordinating role, inevitably been more closely involved than they in the frequently technical transactions of the European Community" (Nuttall 2000: 16).

3.2 „Verrechtlichung" der EG-Außenpolitik: die Einheitliche Europäische Akte

Ursprünglich mit dem Ziel erarbeitet worden, einen europäischen Binnenmark zu verwirklichen, beinhaltet die Einheitliche Europäische Akte (EEA) unter Titel III aber auch *„Treaty provisions on European cooperation in the sphere of foreign policy"*.[120] Die Neuerung lag dabei in der Behandlung der EPZ und der EG in einer *Einheitlichen* Europäischen Akte. Hatte man zunächst noch daran gedacht, zwei separate Dokumente zu beiden Bereichen zu entwerfen, stellte sich jedoch angesichts der Existenz der EPZ außerhalb des EG-Vertragswerks die Frage nach der Kohärenz. Die EPZ bediente sich in ihrer Praxis der Instrumente der EG, ohne dass die Zuständigkeitsbereiche klar von denen der EG geklärt waren. Daraus leitete sich die Frage ab: Kann die EPZ – bei gegebenem Konsens und ohne Vorschlag seitens der Kommission – die politische Richtung entscheiden, die von der EG umzusetzen ist? Dies würde somit die Aushebelung der spezifischen Prozeduren der EG bedeuten, da schlussendlich Kommissionsmonopol und qualifizierte Mehrheitsentscheidungen unerlässlich für den supranationalen Charakter der Gemeinschaft sind. Folglich erwies sich die betonte Trennung zwischen Allgemeinem Rat der EG und Treffen der EPZ als zunehmend schwierig und nahm mitunter absurde Züge an:

„Während die Außenminister sich morgens in Brüssel als Allgemeiner Rat trafen, flogen sie gegen Mittag weiter nach Kopenhagen, um sich dort in gleicher Zusammensetzung als EPZ-Rat zu treffen." (Grimm 2003: 223f.).

Mit der EEA erfolgte eine Zusammenlegung beider Treffen. Weniger Umständlichkeit brachte auch eine weitere institutionelle Neuerung der EEA – die Einrichtung eines ständigen Sekretariats für die EPZ in Brüssel – mit sich, wobei ihr in erster Linie symbolische Bedeutung beizumessen ist.[121]

Eine zentrale Rolle in der Politischen Zusammenarbeit fiel der jeweiligen Präsidentschaft zu. Sie organisierte die Arbeitstreffen der verschiedenen beteiligten Ebenen (Minister, Europäische Korrespondenten, Arbeitsgruppen) und verhandelte mit und vermittelte zwischen den europäischen Partnern. Zugleich repräsentierte die Präsidentschaft die EPZ nach außen (vgl.

[120] Einen umfassenden Überblick über die EEA bietet Nuttall 2000: 17ff.

[121] Seit dem Londoner Bericht von 1981 bestand ein mobiles Sekretariat in der Hauptstadt der jeweiligen Präsidentschaft. Die Wahl für Brüssel als festen Sitz des Sekretariats blieb jedoch umstritten, da die belgische Metropole bereits als Symbol für Europa gewertet wurde. Vgl. Nuttall 2000: 21f.

Regelsberger/ de Schoutheete de Tervarent/Wessels 1997: 71). Das Sekretariat sollte derweil die administrative Arbeitsbelastung der Präsidentschaft reduzieren, ohne deren politische Bedeutung zu beschneiden. Dabei erwies sich die Frage der Finanzierung dieses ständigen Sekretariats als besonders heikel. Bisher waren die Kosten für EPZ-Treffen vom jeweiligen Gastgeber (Präsidentschaft) getragen worden, die EPZ als diplomatisches Netzwerk verfügte über kein eigenes Budget. Eine Eingliederung in das EG-Budget wurde insbesondere von Dänemark abgelehnt, das die Distanz zur supranationalen Institution gewahrt sehen wollte.[122] Schlussendlich einigte man sich darauf, dass die Investitionen für die Errichtung des Sekretariats von den Mitgliedsstaaten übernommen, die laufenden Kosten vom Ratsgeneralsekretariat getragen und die Mitarbeiter weiterhin von ihren Heimatstaaten bezahlt wurden. Die Errichtung des ständigen Sekretariats in Brüssel hatte schließlich auch zur Folge, dass verschiedene Gruppen – insbesondere die Ausschüsse des Europäischen Parlaments – den Vorortkontakt des Sekretariats nutzten, welches Informationen bereitstellte und praktisch die Repräsentation der Ratspräsidentschaft übernahm (vgl. Nuttall 2000: 22-24).

3.3 Die GASP und die Änderungen mit Maastricht und Amsterdam

Mit dem Maastrichter Vertrag wurde die Europäische Politische Zusammenarbeit in Gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik (GASP) umbenannt und als solche in die Vertragsgrundlage mit aufgenommen. Im Maastrichter wie auch im Amsterdamer Vertrag ist fortan von einer *Gemeinsamen* Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik die Rede, jedoch nicht von einer *einheitlichen* Außenpolitik. Der Hohe Repräsentant der GASP, Javier Solana, erläuterte den Unterschied zwischen beiden Formen wie folgt:

„Of course ‚Europe's Foreign Policy' remains a Common Foreign Policy. And that is different from Europe having a single foreign policy. It means that the Member States choose those areas where they think they can make a difference by acting together rather than apart" (Rede von Javier Solana am 25. April 2001 in Brügge).

Die GASP wurde demnach in einer „Säulen-Konstruktion" – ebenso wie die Zusammenarbeit in Fragen der Innen- und Justizpolitik – von der Gemeinschaftsebene und ihren supranationalen Organen weiterhin getrennt und lediglich unter dem gemeinsamen Dach des Europäischen Unionsvertrags zusammengefasst.

[122] Die Kommission erhoffte sich unterdessen, dass der Rückgriff auf den EG-Haushalt eine langfristige Heranführung an die Gemeinschaftsorgane herbeiführen würde. Eine finanzielle Eigenständigkeit der EPZ hätte in den Augen der Kommission die institutionelle Trennung dauerhaft vorgeschrieben. Vgl. Nuttall 2000: 23.

Abbildung III-5: Tempelkonstruktion des EU-Vertrags nach dem Nizza-Vertrag



Quelle: Diedrichs/ Wessels 2002: 169.

Die Vertragsbestimmungen schrieben weitgehend fest, was sich in der EPZ bereits als Praxis herausgebildet hatte. Hinzu kamen einige Neuerungen:

- Der Kommission wurde neben den Mitgliedsstaaten ein Initiativrecht in außenpolitischen Fragen zugestanden.
- Es bestand die Möglichkeit, mit qualifizierter Mehrheit zu entscheiden.
- Das EPZ-Sekretariat verschmolz mit dem Sekretariat des Rates.
- GASP-Aktionen konnten aus dem Gemeinschaftshaushalt finanziert werden.[123]

Während die GASP fortan auch *Gemeinsame Aktionen* (Art. 14 EUV) umfasste, hatte sich die EPZ auf das Formulieren von *Gemeinsamen Standpunkten* (Art. 15 EUV) beschränkt. Für diese Beschlüsse bedurfte es nach den Bestimmungen von Maastricht einer einstimmigen Zustimmung der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, so dass jedem Mitgliedsstaat ein Vetorecht zugestanden wurde. Mit dem Amsterdamer Vertrag wurden den Instrumentarien weiterhin *Gemeinsame Strategien* (Art. 13 und 23 Abs. 2 EUV) hinzugefügt, welche einen übergeordneten Rahmen

[123] Eine Finanzierung über den allgemeinen EG-Haushalt sicherte dem EP Mitwirkungsrechte zu, da dort über den Haushalt entschieden wird. Der Rat kann außerdem einstimmig eine anderweitige Finanzierung beschließen, also direkt über Beiträge aus den Mitgliedsstaaten. Vgl. Pippan 1997: 36; Bonvicini 1998: 65f.

für die Gemeinsamen Standpunkte und Aktionen bilden, aber nicht die Voraussetzung für das Handeln der GASP darstellen sollen (vgl. Pippan 1997: 33). Das Amsterdamer Abkommen unterscheidet zwischen grundlegenden Beschlüssen und ihren Umsetzungen. Für Erstere – insbesondere die Gemeinsamen Strategien – bedarf es weiterhin der Einstimmigkeit, Letztere – die Umsetzung Gemeinsamer Standpunkte und Aktionen – können auch mit qualifizierter Mehrheit entschieden werden. Art. 23 Abs. 1 EUV ermöglicht zudem mit der „konstruktiven Enthaltung" einer bestimmten Anzahl von Mitgliedsstaaten die Möglichkeit, aus der gemeinsamen Linie auszuscheren, ohne einen Beschluss der Mehrheit zu behindern.[124] Eine Blockademöglichkeit besteht jedoch künftig für ein Ratsmitglied, das diese mit entsprechend wichtigen nationalen Beweggründen untermauert.[125]

Der am 1. Februar 2003 in Kraft getretene Vertrag von Nizza enthält hinsichtlich der Strukturen der GASP keine wesentlichen Änderungen. Zwar beinhaltet er mit den Bestimmungen zur Europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik neue Gesichtspunkte, die vor allem aus den Erfahrungen mit dem Kosovo-Krieg resultieren, doch sind diese für die Afrikapolitik der EU weitestgehend irrelevant.[126]

3.3.1 Der Allgemeine Rat der EG

Die GASP ist in vier Hierarchiestufen aufgebaut, an deren Spitze der Europäische Rat der Staats- und Regierungschefs als Leitliniengeber (Art. 13 EUV) steht. Er stellt die oberste Entscheidungsinstanz dar, ist Initiator von Gemeinsamen Strategien und fungiert als Sprachrohr nach außen. Für die laufenden Geschäfte ist jedoch der Allgemeine Rat – in der Zusammensetzung der Außenminister der Mitgliedsstaaten – das zentrale Entscheidungsgremium der EU. Er soll die Tätigkeit des Europäischen Rates in seinen diversen Fachministerzusammensetzungen koordinieren und dient als höhere Instanz bei strittigen Fachfragen.[127] Schließlich vertreten die Fachminister in den Entscheidungen nicht nur ihre Nationalstaaten, sondern auch ihren jeweiligen Politikbereich. Folglich können transnationale Koalitionen der Fachressorts mit ähnlichen Interessen auch auf nationaler Ebene gegen Interessen, die eher in anderen Fachressorts Gehör finden, eingesetzt werden. Dies gilt insbesondere für jene Ressorts, die in

[124] Auf diese Weise soll vermieden werden, dass Mitgliedsstaaten mangels eigenen Interesses an einem Engagement Entscheidungen blockieren. Enthaltungen zählen folglich nicht bei der Ermittlung der Einstimmigkeit mit.
[125] Anders als in der EG war in der GASP zuvor Einstimmigkeit nur dann gegeben, wenn alle Mitgliedsstaaten aktiv zustimmten. Vgl. Pippan 1997: 33f.
[126] Einen Überblick über die neuesten diesbezüglichen Entwicklungen liefert: Wessels 2003.
[127] Koordinierungsbedarf besteht durchaus, da auch zwischen den nationalen Fachministern Differenzen in bestimmten Politikbereichen bestehen können, etwa zwischen dem Umwelt- und dem Agrarminister. Vgl. Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 43.

der politischen Hierarchie weiter unten rangieren (vgl. Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 43). Zu diesen zählt neben dem Umweltressort sicherlich jenes der Entwicklungshilfeminister.[128]

Die Aufgliederung in Fachministerräte belegt zudem die veränderte Sichtweise europäischer Themen. So gelten sie nicht mehr als Außenpolitik im eigentlichen Sinne, sondern vielmehr als europäische Politikgestaltung mit eigenem Anspruch und eigenen Verfahren. Dies untermauert nicht zuletzt die angestiegene Sitzungshäufigkeit der verschiedenen Fachministerräte von durchschnittlich 57 Tagungen im Jahr 1975 auf 79 Tagungen zwanzig Jahre später (vgl. Hix 1999: 67). Darunter befanden sich seit dem Maastrichter Vertrag neue Ratszusammensetzungen; so etwa ein Rat der Entwicklungshilfeminister.[129]

Unterdessen lässt sich die Rolle der Außenminister als Schlichter zwischen den Fachministern nicht aus der nationalen Verfassungslage ableiten, weswegen ihre Legitimation auch innerhalb des Ratsgefüges zunehmend angezweifelt wird. Hinzu kommen organisatorische Probleme der nationalen Außenministerien:

„Der Minister, seine Vertreter und praktisch alle Fachleute müssen nicht nur eine ständig anwachsende Zahl von bi- und multilateralen Konsultationsverpflichtungen mit unzähligen Gremiensitzungen und Reisen erfüllen, sondern parallel dazu müssen sie dafür sorgen, dass das komplexer und wichtiger werdende Netz der Außenbeziehungen der Fachministerien dem staatlichen Gesamtinteresse dient“ (Andreae/Kaiser 1998: 46).

Durch das Zusammenlegen von EPZ- und Allgemeinen Ratstagungen im Rahmen der Europäischen Einheitlichen Akte versuchte man den Organisationsaufwand teilweise zu reduzieren. Die Einrichtung der GASP führte hingegen zu einer neuerlichen Erhöhung der Ratstagungen, die in der Folgezeit jedoch teilweise wieder nachließ (vgl. Gomez/Peterson 2001: 59). Neben der generellen Ausweitung der EU-Kompetenzen führten insbesondere die häufigen Verweise von strittigen Themen auf die Ebene der Außenminister zu einer starken Ausweitung der dort behandelten Themen. So verlängerte sich die Tagesordnung von ursprünglich neun Themen pro Sitzung im Jahr 1990 auf knapp 30 Themen 1999 (vgl. Gomez/Peterson 2001: 60). Dementsprechend nahm die Zeit für Diskussionen der einzelnen Tagesordnungspunkte ab. Auf diese Schwachpunkte des Rates wies Generalsekretär Javier Solana im Rahmen eines Berichts zur EU-Erweiterung im Juni 2001 deutlich hin. Ähnliches geschah auch von Seiten des Europäischen Parlaments, das bezüglich dieser Problematik gar von einer zunehmenden Unzulänglichkeit des Allgemeinen Rates sprach:

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[128] Ein informelles Netzwerk wurde hier im Rahmen der sogenannten „Utstein-Gruppe“ – benannt nach dem norwegischen Ausgangspunkt der Initiative – geschaffen, der u.a. die Entwicklungshilfeminister Norwegens, Großbritanniens, Deutschlands und der Niederlande angehörten. Vgl. BMZ 2002b.

[129] Die auf dem Gipfel von Sevilla 2002 beschlossene Reduzierung der Fachministerräte von 16 auf 9 traf auch den Rat der Entwicklungshilfeminister. Diese Maßnahme lässt schlussendlich deutlich erkennen, welche Bedeutung dem Ressort „Entwicklungshilfe“ im politischen Ranking zukommt.

„Es kann nicht hingenommen werden, dass die europäischen Angelegenheiten von einem Rat behandelt werden, der einmal im Monat zusammentritt, bei dem einige der zuständigen Minister lediglich während einiger Stunden anwesend sind, eine Pressekonferenz einberufen (während ihre Kollegen weiter beraten) und anschließend in ihre Hauptstädte zurückfliegen und dabei ihre Verantwortung an die Ständigen Vertreter delegieren […] Zu oft werden die heikelsten und aktuellsten GASP-Themen nur beim Mittagessen behandelt. So wird das Mittagessen leicht zum wichtigsten Termin, nicht aufgrund der Speisekarte, sondern weil die Minister dort unter sich sind und bis zum Kaffee zusammenbleiben" (EP-Bericht Poos vom 17.09.2001: 12f.).

Demzufolge ist der Rat bereits vor der EU-Osterweiterung deutlich an die Grenzen seiner Arbeitsfähigkeit gestoßen. Dieser Tatsache trug auch der 2001 ins Leben gerufene „Konvent zur Zukunft Europas" bei seiner Ausarbeitung einer EU-Verfassung Rechnung. So sieht der am 29. Oktober 2004 von den Staats- und Regierungschefs unterzeichnete Vertrag über eine Verfassung für Europa in Bezug auf den Allgemeinen Rat Neuerungen vor. So wird der bisherige Allgemeine Rat durch den „Rat für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten" ergänzt, in dem der Europäische Außenminister den Vorsitz führt. Der Allgemeine Rat gewährleistet weiterhin die Kohärenz der Arbeiten des Rates und stützt sich dabei auf den Ausschuss der ständigen Vertreter. Der zum Teil ausufernden Praxis, bei Nichtübereinkunft an die übergeordnete Instanz weiterzuleiten, konnte hingegen kein wirkliches Instrument entgegengestellt werden. So kann in vertraglich geregelten Ausnahmefällen zwar das Verfahren der qualifizierten Mehrheit zum Tragen kommen, das Vetorecht der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten ist damit jedoch nicht abgeschafft (vgl. EU-Parlament 2004: 4f.).

3.3.2 Der Hohe Vertreter der GASP

Die Hauptneuerung des Amsterdamer Vertrags fand sich in der Schaffung eines Hohen Repräsentanten der Gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, der für fünf Jahre gewählt wird. Dieses Amt bekleidet seit dem 18. Oktober 1999 der ehemalige NATO-Generalsekretär Javier Solana. Er soll als „Mr. GASP" der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik mehr Effizienz, mehr Kohärenz und größere Sichtbarkeit verleihen. Er unterstützt den Rat in Angelegenheiten der GASP, indem er insbesondere zur Ausformulierung, Vorbereitung und Durchführung politischer Entscheidungen beiträgt. Auf Ersuchen der Präsidentschaft handelt er im Namen des Rates und führt den politischen Dialog mit Dritten im Sinne einer höheren Transparenz der GASP (Art. 18 Abs. 3 EUV). Seine Aufgaben sind – kurz gesagt – nicht wirklich klar gefasst und daher deutlich abhängig von seiner Persönlichkeit (vgl. Regelsberger 2001: 156ff.).

Der Hohe Vertreter der GASP befindet sich somit in einer ständigen Balance zwischen der Ratspräsidentschaft, die es zu unterstützen gilt, der er aber nicht zu stark erscheinen darf, und

dem Kommissar für Außenbeziehungen, dessen Aufgaben sich nicht eindeutig von den seinen abgrenzen lassen. In der Praxis läuft diese unklare Regelung auf eine informelle Arbeitsteilung hinaus. So arbeitet der Außenkommissar die zivile Außenpolitik aus, während sich Solana für die militärische Handlungsfähigkeit der EU verantwortlich zeichnet (vgl. *Die Zeit* vom 12.10.2000). Dieser nicht festgeschriebenen Arbeitsteilung folgend, hält Solana auch den Kontakt zur NATO aufrecht und ist für das EU-Engagement auf dem Balkan und dem Nahen Osten zuständig. Seine Missionen bedürfen jedoch eines Mandats der europäischen Außenminister.[130] Die deutsche Wochenzeitung „Die Zeit" kommentierte dieses personelle Arrangement mit den Worten, die EU dürfe sich – vorausgesetzt eine größere Krise bleibe aus – „weiter an einer Außenpolitik versuchen, die sich den Luxus von zwei Außenpolitikern nebst 15 Außenministern" leiste (vgl. *Die Zeit* vom 12.10.2000).

Der Hohe Repräsentant der GASP ist auf die mitgliedsstaatlichen Außenminister angewiesen, darf zugleich jedoch auch nicht zu schwach erscheinen, da er als eine Art „intergouvernementales Korrektiv" gegenüber außenpolitischen Ambitionen der Kommission – insbesondere des Außenkommissars – eingesetzt wurde und selbstverständlich weltweit Einfluss nehmen soll. Folglich ist das Gleichgewicht zwischen beiden Außenrepräsentanten prinzipiell heikel. Dies zeigte sich seit der Einsetzung der Barroso-Kommission im November 2004 bereits in voller Deutlichkeit: Während Solana in seiner Rolle als EU-Außenbeauftragter in Kiew diplomatisch über die zukünftige Zusammenarbeit mit der neuen ukrainischen Regierung verhandelte, stellte Außenkommissarin Ferrero-Waldner in Brüssel den EU-Beitritt der Ukraine in Aussicht (vgl. *Die Zeit* vom 9.12.2004). Ein ähnlich verwirrendes Bild bot sich den Teilnehmern auf der Geberkonferenz für den Irak im ägyptischen Scharm al-Scheich. Dort redeten erst die Außenminister Deutschlands, Frankreichs, Italiens und Großbritanniens als Mitglieder der G 8, dann der niederländische Außenminister als Vertreter der EU-Präsidentschaft, später Solana als Repräsentant des EU-Rates und schließlich Ferrero-Waldner im Namen der Kommission. Joschka Fischer erinnert sich wütend an die Folgen: „Amerikaner und Araber machten sich beim Essen über uns lustig" (*Die Zeit* vom 9.12.2004).

[130] So kam beispielsweise eine von Belgien gewünschte Reise in die Krisenregion der afrikanischen Großen Seen aufgrund französischer Einwände nicht zustande.

Abbildung III-6: Struktur der GASP nach dem Verfassungsvertrag für Europa



Quelle: Wessels 2003: 13.

Einen Lösungsansatz zur Behebung dieses Durcheinanders ist mit der Schaffung eines Außenministerpostens für die Union auf den Weg gebracht worden. Javier Solana übernimmt mit der Ratifizierung der EU-Verfassung neben seiner Aufgabe als EU-Außenbeauftragter den Posten der Außenkommissarin Ferrero-Waldner und steigt somit zum ersten europäischen Außenminister auf. Er soll der europäischen Außenpolitik ein fassbares Gesicht geben und eine charakteristische Stimme verleihen.[131]

4. Zusammenfassung – Institutionen europäischer Entwicklungspolitik

Die Europäische Union befindet sich hinsichtlich ihrer Außenbeziehungen in einer Umbruchsphase, die sich seit Ende der 1990er Jahre in der umfassenden Verwaltungsreform widerspiegelt. Sie musste lernen, drastisch gestiegene Mittel mit gleich bleibenden personellen Kapazitäten effektiv einzusetzen, was ihr jedoch nur begrenzt gelang. Während die Santer-Kommission an ihrer unklugen Organisation des Außenbereichs scheiterte, zeigten die Reformen der Prodi-Kommission den Weg in die richtige Richtung. So bemühte sich die Prodi-Kommission, in der Erarbeitung von Konzeptionen bei der Problemlage anzusetzen, und nicht von der internen Kompetenzverteilung ausgehend, die Problemstellungen zu erschließen. Außenpolitik wurde eine größere Bedeutung zugemessen. Diesem Kurs folgt auch die neue Kommission unter Barroso. Fast schon symbolischen Charakter hat die Entscheidung Barrosos, selbst den Vorsitz der Außenkommissare zu übernehmen. Des Weiteren veranschaulicht insbesondere die Schaffung eines neuen Super-Postens, des EU-Außenministers, die allgemein gestiegene Wertschätzung der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik durch die Mitgliedsstaaten. Inwiefern mit der Integration des zukünftigen EU-Außenministers in das institutionelle Gefüge der EU ein weiterer Schritt zum dauerhaften, gemeinsamen außenpolitischen Handeln der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten geschaffen wird, muss sich indessen noch zeigen. Klar erscheint jedoch schon jetzt, dass sich die gegenwärtige Kommission nicht zuletzt am Erfolg oder Misserfolg dieser institutionellen Neuerung messen lassen muss.

Als schwieriges Pflaster entpuppte sich in der Vergangenheit die Kooperation über die Säulen der EU hinweg. So sind die im Zusammenhang mit der EPZ gemachten Erfahrungen auch für die GASP generell gültig: Es herrscht eine hohe Interaktionsdichte zwischen den Außenministern und ein gemeinsamer Korpsgeist der Diplomaten. Den Erfolg der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik bestimmen die jeweiligen internationalen Herausforderungen. Die Position des Mr. GASP erweist sich dabei als potentielle Schwachstelle in der Konstruktion; ihr zukünftiger

[131] Derzeit ist vorgesehen, dass Ferrero-Waldner auch nach dem Abtritt ihres Ressorts an den EU-Außenminister Mitglied der Kommission bleibt und sich fortan auf die EU-Nachbarschaftspolitik konzentriert.

Werdegang ist an die Entwicklung des EU-Außenministerpostens geknüpft. Mögliche Konflikte wurden in der Amtszeit Prodis durch eine gut funktionierende informelle Kooperation zwischen dem Außenkommissar Patten und dem Hohen Vertreter Solana vermieden. Die neue personelle Konstellation in der Barroso-Kommission zeigt sich diesbezüglich jedoch schon fragiler.[132]

Hinsichtlich der Frage nach der Koordination der gemeinsamen Politik zeigt sich, dass nach wie vor die unterschiedlichen nationalen Traditionen und damit die anders gewichtete Präsenz das Bild prägen. Deutlich wird dies im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik. Während sich Frankreichs Kooperation mit Afrika vornehmlich durch personalisierte Zuständigkeiten und Netzwerke charakterisiert, kennzeichnen aufgegliederte Kompetenzen und fortdauernde Rivalitäten die Situation in Deutschland. Dänemark setzt hingegen auf eine Zentralisierung aller außenpolitischen Aufgabenbereiche, so dass Entwicklungshilfe als Teil der Außenpolitik verstanden und folglich auch als solche bearbeitet wird. Auch in Relation zueinander weisen die nationalen Afrikapolitiken dieser drei Länder unterschiedliche Ausrichtungen aus. So schwankt Frankreich nach wie vor zwischen alten „Gewohnheiten“ und zunehmend gemeinsamen europäischen Schritten. Es begreift sich noch immer als „Anwalt der Interessen Afrikas“ in Europa. Die Interessen Afrikas werden dabei in den meisten Fällen mit denen der afrikanischen Regierungen gleichgesetzt, wobei negative Erfahrungen mit dem zu langen Festhalten an falschen Partnern in den letzten Jahren zu Veränderungen der französischen Politik beitrugen. Die deutsche Afrikapolitik ist im Vergleich zur französischen Politik deutlich weniger engagiert – insbesondere, was größere strategische Überlegungen angeht. Ausschlaggebend hierfür ist nicht zuletzt auch das weitaus distanziertere Verhältnis der BRD zum afrikanischen Kontinent. Auch Dänemark agiert entwicklungspolitisch deutlich neutraler als Frankreich. Das Problem der dänischen Afrikapolitik liegt – wie in so vielen kleinen EU-Staaten – in der geringen internationalen Präsenz, so dass es bei der Umsetzung seiner Vergabekriterien oftmals auf international präsentere Einrichtungen zurückgreifen muss.

Da den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten auf allen Entscheidungsebenen eine wichtige Rolle zukommt, gestalten sich die Verfahrens- und Entscheidungsabläufe überaus komplex. Dies wirkt sich im Weiteren auf die Quantität und Qualität der EU-Außenpolitik – und somit auch der Entwicklungspolitik – aus, da die personellen Kapazitäten der Kommission als ausführendes Organ der vielschichtigen Bearbeitungsformel nur selten gewachsen sind. Das größte hieraus resultierende Problem ist der schleppende Mittelabfluss.

[132] An dieser Stelle sei nur auf die Unstimmigkeiten hingewiesen, die sich im Rahmen des möglichen EU-Beitritts der Ukraine zwischen Solana und Ferrero-Waldner auftaten.

Die Annahme, mit der Einsetzung des EU-Außenministers würden sich Koordinationsdefizite weitestgehend von selbst lösen, erscheint naiv und fadenscheinig. Vielmehr muss das Hauptaugenmerk auf eine verstärkte Annäherung der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten gerichtet werden. Aus unterschiedlichen nationalen Ausgangspositionen gilt es dauerhaft eine gemeinsame Position gegenüber Dritten zu erarbeiten. Dies insbesondere auch gegenüber dem Partner Afrika. Auf diesem Weg der Annäherung mitgliedsstaatlicher Politiken scheint man sich zu befinden; ein klar zu umschreibendes Resultat ist jedoch noch nicht erkennbar.

Zweiter Teil

Die Großbaustellen der europäischen Entwicklungs-politik

„Die Sicherheitspolitik muss „entwickelt“ werden, also auf menschliche Sicherheit erweitert und langfristiger angelegt werden. […] Die beste und kostengünstigste Sicherheitspolitik ist eine effiziente, armutsorientierte Entwicklungspolitik. Denn Frieden kann nur mühsam erarbeitet werden. Frieden ist kein Naturzustand, […] er muss gestiftet werden. Dazu sind langfristige Strategien erforderlich und eine eigenständige Entwicklungspolitik, die in die Überwindung von Armut investiert, unerlässlich. Dieser Rolle als Friedensbund kann Europa gerecht werden“ (Hermle/Lawo 2004).

Kapitel IV.
EU-Entwicklungspolitik – die andere Sicherheitspolitik?

Bereits in der Darstellung des institutionellen Gefüges auf EU-Ebene wurde deutlich, dass der außenpolitischen Zusammenarbeit der Mitgliedsstaaten ein zunehmend höherer Stellenwert zukommt. Diese Tendenz bekam nicht zuletzt auch die Entwicklungspolitik zu spüren, die zukünftig als ein Teil der Außenpolitik operiert. So betraf die auf dem Gipfel von Sevilla 2002 beschlossene Reduzierung der Fachministerräte auch den Rat der Entwicklungshilfeminister. Ihre Interessen sind zum Gegenstand des Allgemeinen Rates geworden. Vor diesem Hintergrund lässt sich somit deutlich erkennen, welche Bedeutung dem Ressort „Entwicklungspolitik“ im politischen Ranking beigemessen wird. Oder um es leicht überspitzt zu formulieren: Die Entwicklungspolitik ist zu einem Nebenschauplatz der Außenpolitik herabgestuft worden. Sie dient nunmehr als Instrument der außenpolitischen Diplomatie.[133]

Spätestens seit den terroristischen Angriffen des 11. Septembers 2001 haben sich die Parameter für eine erfolgreiche Außenpolitik der Industrieländer verändert. Fragen der Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik haben verstärkt an Aufmerksamkeit gewonnen und zählen zu den wichtigsten Eckpfeilern des außenpolitischen Handelns (vgl. Schneckener 2004b: 5). Auch die Europäische Union trug dieser Entwicklung Rechnung, indem sie im Dezember 2003 eine gemeinsame Sicherheitsstrategie formulierte, die auf einen Entwurf des Hohen Vertreters Solana zurückging. Aller bisherigen Rückschläge bei der GASP zum Trotz stellt die Strategie einen qualitativen Fortschritt im konzeptionellen Bereich dar und reicht über die im Jahr 2000 vereinbarte Europäische Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik (ESVP) hinaus (vgl. Flechtner 2003: 10f.). Zwar birgt die gemeinsame Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik als intergouvernementale Säule der EU nach wie vor aufgrund einer Vielzahl nationaler Interessen ein starkes Ko-

[133] Hilfsgelder können demnach beispielsweise als Druckmittel gegenüber Entwicklungsländern eingesetzt werden, welche den vereinbarten Kriterien der Zusammenarbeit nicht nachkommen.

härenzproblem, doch leistet die Sicherheitsstrategie mit ihren konkreten strategischen Zielsetzungen einen wichtigen Beitrag zur Behebung dieses Problems (vgl. Faust/Messner 2005: 137).

Vor diesem Hintergrund gilt es die sich anbahnende stärkere Verknüpfung von europäischer Entwicklungs-, Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik einer näheren Untersuchung zu unterziehen. Zu diesem Zweck sollen zunächst die Eckpunkte der EU-Sicherheitsstrategie herausgearbeitet werden, die in einem Gesamtkontext Aussagen über die zukünftige Gestaltung europäischer Außenbeziehungen zulassen. Des Weiteren sind mögliche Zukunftsszenarien, die sich aus der engeren Verzahnung von Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik ergeben, aufzuzeigen und einzuschätzen.

1. Europäische Entwicklungspolitik und internationale Sicherheit

1.1 Die europäische Sicherheitsstrategie: Eckpunkte und Charakteristika

Die Sicherheitsstrategie definiert im Wesentlichen drei zentrale sicherheitspolitische Bedrohungen. Eine erste Kategorie umfasst einen extrem gewaltbereiten, transnational vernetzten und meist mit religiösem Fundamentalismus einhergehenden Terrorismus, wobei Europa diesem gleichermaßen als Ziel und Stützpunkt dient bzw. dienen kann. Eine zweite sicherheitspolitische Bedrohung stellt die Verbreitung von Massenvernichtungswaffen dar, die sowohl zu neuen Rüstungswettläufen in für Europa strategisch wichtigen Regionen, aber auch zu einer gefahrvollen Kombination von Proliferation und Terrorismus führen könnte. Eine dritte Form der Bedrohung für Europa ergibt sich schließlich aus dem Scheitern staatlicher Systeme und dem Zuwachs organisierter Kriminalität in vielen Weltregionen. Folge dieser Phänomene ist das Entstehen staats- und rechtsfreier Räume, so dass terroristische Aktivitäten sowie Menschen-, Drogen- und Waffenhandel nur ungenügend unterbunden werden kann (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union 2003: 4-6). Auf der Basis dieser Annahmen lautet die sicherheitspolitische Folgerung der Sicherheitsstrategie:

„Bei einer Summierung dieser verschiedenen Elemente – extrem gewaltbereite Terroristen, Verfügbarkeit von Massenvernichtungswaffen, organisierte Kriminalität, Schwächung staatlicher Systeme und Privatisierung der Gewalt – ist es durchaus vorstellbar, dass Europa einer sehr ernsten Bedrohung ausgesetzt sein könnte“ (Rat der Europäischen Union 2003: 5).

Da sicherheitspolitische Bedrohungen globaler Natur sind, fordert die Sicherheitsstrategie, auch die EU müsse in sicherheitspolitischen Fragen als globaler Akteur auftreten und ihre strategischen Ziele entsprechend weltweit ausrichten. Folglich werden im Sinne einer global angelegten europäischen Sicherheitspolitik verschiedene Stoßrichtungen abgeleitet:

1. Der europäische Sicherheitsgürtel um Europa ist auszudehnen, da aufgrund weltweiter Entgrenzungsprozesse sowie der EU-Erweiterung die geographische Distanz zu aktuellen Krisenherden (z.B. Naher und Mittlerer Osten, Kaukasusregion) geringer werde. Insbesondere der Zusammenarbeit mit den neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und EU-Nachbarn in Ost- und Südosteuropa sowie der Kooperation mit den Mittelmeeranrainern sowie Beiträgen zur Lösung des Nahostkonflikts komme eine hohe Bedeutung zu.
2. Angesichts der neuen transnationalen Sicherheitsbedrohungen habe sich die EU noch stärker für eine effektive multilaterale Weltordnung einzusetzen. Nur die Stärkung internationaler Organisationen und eine internationale Rechtsordnung in Übereinstimmung mit den Normen der UN-Charta bieten für die Staatengemeinschaft einen verbindlichen Rahmen zur Eingrenzung der bestehenden Risiken.
3. Die EU müsse ihre Fähigkeiten zur Bekämpfung von Terrorismus und Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen weiter ausbauen. Ebenso gelte es, im Falle von Staatszerfall krisenreduzierend einzugreifen. Hierzu sei in erster Linie eine gezielte Ausrichtung auf die neuen Gefahrenpotentiale notwendig (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union 2003: 7 ff.).

Die Sicherheitsstrategie betont jedoch auch, dass die skizzierten Sicherheitsrisiken nicht allein auf der Basis militärischer Maßnahmen zu bewältigen sind. Sie setzt auf einen Mix der verschiedenen Instrumente:

„Die Herausforderung besteht nun darin, die verschiedenen Instrumente und Fähigkeiten, darunter die europäischen Hilfsprogramme und den Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds, die militärischen und zivilen Fähigkeiten der Mitgliedstaaten und andere Instrumente zu bündeln. All diese Instrumente und Fähigkeiten können von Wirkungen für unsere Sicherheit und die Sicherheit von Drittländern sein. Sicherheit ist die wichtigste Voraussetzung für Entwicklung“ (Rat der Europäischen Union 2003: 14).

Betrachtet man die Sicherheitsstrategie im Kontext der gesamten europäischen Außenbeziehungen, so wird deren limitierter Wirkungsradius deutlich. So begrenzt sich das Konzept ausschließlich auf sicherheitspolitische Überlegungen im außenpolitischen Handeln der EU. Es behandelt zwar einen zentralen Aufgabenbereich der europäischen Außenbeziehungen, blendet jedoch weitere wichtige Herausforderungen – z.B. das Management weltwirtschaftlicher Verflechtungen oder technologisch-wissenschaftlicher Kooperationen zur Stärkung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der EU – weitgehend aus. Ein Strategieentwurf zur Gestaltung der vielfältigen Außenbeziehungen der EU liegt somit nicht vor. Doch gerade eine solche Gesamtstrategie zur Formung einer weiter gefassten EU-Außenpolitik ist künftig vonnöten, wenn die Eu-

ropäische Union ihrer Rolle als „global player“ gerecht werden will (vgl. Flechtner 2003: 10f.).

Positiv ist unterdessen die Loslösung von einem traditionellen, durch ein territorial geteiltes Staatensystem und durch staatliche Militärpotentiale gekennzeichneten Sicherheitsbegriff. Stattdessen basiert der Sicherheitsgedanke auf einem Konzept der „erweiterten Sicherheit“. Demnach können Unsicherheit und Gewalteskalationen komplexe ökonomische, machtpolitische, aber auch soziokulturelle und umweltpolitische Ursachen haben (vgl. Roehder 2004: 11f.).

Abbildung IV-1: Das Konzept der „erweiterten Sicherheit“



Quelle: Hippler 2003: 300.

Vor diesem Hintergrund folgern Faust und Messner richtig, wenn sie behaupten:

„Zukunftsfähige Sicherheitspolitik ist […] nicht nur eine Frage militärischer Kapazitäten, sondern basiert auf der Fähigkeit, politische wie sozio-ökonomische Krisen, die in Gewalt umzuschlagen drohen, möglichst frühzeitig durch eine Kombination aus zivilen sowie militärischen Instrumenten zu entschärfen. Diese Kombination beinhaltet mithin zum einen ein breites Spektrum an entwicklungs-, außen-, außenwirtschafts- und umweltpolitischen Instrumenten sowie zum anderen das klassische sicherheitspolitische Set aus polizeilicher Zusammenarbeit, Geheimdienstkooperation bis hin zu militärischen Aktivitäten“ (Faust/Messner 2005: 140).

Aus dieser Perspektive kann daher gefolgert werden, dass die EU-Sicherheitsstrategie mit ihrer Forderung nach einer stärkeren Verknüpfung von unterschiedlichen Instrumenten aus diversen Feldern der EU-Außenbeziehungen den Weg in die richtige Richtung weist.

Vergleicht man das europäische Sicherheitskonzept mit der *National Security Strategy* der USA, so lässt sich in wesentlichen Bereichen ein Konsens ausmachen (vgl. The White House 2002). Allerdings kommen die beiden Strategiepapiere zu unterschiedlichen Schlussfolgerungen, weshalb vor diesem Hintergrund ein spezifisch europäisches Profil des Sicherheitskonzeptes erkennbar wird. So betont die EU-Sicherheitsstrategie die Stärkung einer multilateralen Weltordnung, die Verbesserung der Fähigkeiten zur Konfliktprävention und ziviler Zusammenarbeit sowie die Einbettung militärischer Interventionen in den Rahmen der internationalen Rechtsordnung.[134] Dieses europäische Profil könnte im transatlantischen Verhältnis eine sicherheitspolitische „Arbeitsteilung" fördern. Angesichts begrenzter Mittel zum Umbau der europäischen Militärpotentiale und der fortbestehenden nationalen Differenzen zwischen den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten bleibt die herausgehobene militärische Stellung der USA mittelfristig unangetastet (vgl. Flechtner 2003: 12f.). Daher könnte sich die EU verstärkt im Rahmen der Prävention, der Konfliktbearbeitung und Stabilisierung fragiler Staaten einsetzen, während der USA weiterhin vorrangig den robusten militärischen Part übernimmt.[135] Eine solche europäisch-amerikanische Kooperation setzt jedoch voraus, dass massive Anstrengungen zur Weiterentwicklung des multilateralen Rechtsrahmens unter den veränderten Bedingungen in Zeiten des transnationalen Terrorismus unternommen werden. Militärische Interventionen müssen unweigerlich an klare internationale Regeln, Verfahren und Rechtsinstitutionen gebunden sein (vgl. BMZ 2004: 11f.). Zudem kann eine transatlantische Partnerschaft „auf gleicher Augenhöhe" nur dann gelingen, wenn die EU ihre Verantwortung in den skizzierten Bereichen zukünftig auch tatsächlich und umfassend wahrnimmt und ihr Engagement entsprechend intensiviert. In diesem Rahmen kann schließlich auch Entwicklungspolitik eine tragende Rolle übernehmen. Folgen den formulierten Ansprüchen jedoch keine Taten, sind diese bedeutungs-, in manchen Fällen gar verantwortungslos (vgl. Cooper 2003: 39).

[134] Eine umfassende Einschätzung der Kapazitäten und Defizite der EU in den Bereichen der Konfliktprävention und zivilen Konfliktbearbeitung bietet Debiel/Fischer 2000.

[135] In Anbetracht der Tatsache, dass die USA als einzige Militärmacht über einen globalen Interventionsradius verfügen, scheint diese Aufgabenteilung in naher Zukunft die einzige effektive Option zu sein. Zudem könnten die Probleme der USA im Irak dazu beitragen, die „soft-power"-Kapazitäten und Erfahrungen der EU ernster zu nehmen. Vgl. Rummel 2003: 5.

1.2 Zur Verknüpfung von Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik

Das Strategiepapier der Europäischen Union kombiniert auf nachvollziehbare Weise die Agenden der Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik. Einerseits geschieht dies aus der Überzeugung heraus, dass Entwicklung ohne Sicherheit nicht zustande kommen kann. So haben nicht zuletzt die Beispiele Kongo, Sudan, Palästina und Afghanistan gezeigt, dass Investitionen in Entwicklungsprogramme kaum Wirkung entfalten können, solange regionale Konflikte, organisierte Kriminalität oder Warlords die Gesellschaften zerstören.[136] Unter solchen Rahmenbedingungen kann Entwicklungspolitik nur dann etwas ausrichten, wenn parallel Beiträge zur sicherheitspolitischen Stabilisierung dieser Länder geleistet werden (vgl. Schneckener 2004b: 14f.). Daraus lässt sich andererseits die Auffassung ableiten, dass ohne Entwicklung auch keine Sicherheit denkbar wäre. Angesichts einer zunehmend entgrenzten Welt gehen von fragilen Staaten wie Afghanistan, dem Sudan, Kongo oder Somalia, deren sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung aufgrund der politischen Rahmenbedingungen gehemmt ist, grenzüberschreitende sicherheitspolitische Bedrohungen aus. Verarmungsprozesse, unzureichende Bildungs- und Gesundheitssysteme, schwache staatliche Institutionen sowie Korruption und politische Ausgrenzung erzeugen hierbei jenes sicherheitspolitisch gefährliche Gemisch aus organisierter Kriminalität, religiös oder ethnisch begründetem Extremismus, Hoffnungs- und Perspektivlosigkeit in weiten Bevölkerungskreisen und politischer Gewalt. Im Extremfall resultieren hieraus Staatszerfall und Bürgerkrieg, die als deutliche Merkmale sicherheitspolitischer Unordnung hervorstechen und die betroffenen Gebiete zu bevorzugten Zufluchtsorten des transnationalen Terrorismus, der internationalen Kriminalität und der Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen werden lässt (vgl. Schneckener 2004). Vor dem Hintergrund dieser wechselseitigen Beziehungen zwischen Entwicklung und internationaler Sicherheit besteht die Notwendigkeit einer neuen strategischen Verzahnung von Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik.

Für die Sicherheitspolitik bedeutet dies auf langfristige Sicht eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung. Zum einen sprechen moralische Gründe dafür, dass der Nexus zwischen Sicherheit und Entwicklung stärker bei der Gestaltung der europäischen Außenpolitik berücksichtigt wird. Diese moralischen Verpflichtungen fordert zudem eine kritische Öffentlichkeit, wonach die öffentliche Meinung in Europa den Druck hinsichtlich der Verknüpfung von beiden Politikbereichen erhöht. Zum anderen veranlasst das bestehende Eigeninteresse ein engeres Zusammenwirken von Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik. Wenn sich angesichts des wachsenden Ausmaßes von Globalisierung Entwicklungsbarrieren in geographisch weit entfernten Regio-

[136] Von den 60 ärmsten Ländern der Welt ist circa die Hälfte durch akute oder latente bewaffnete Konflikte bedroht. 20 Prozent der afrikanischen Bevölkerung leben in Konfliktzonen. Vgl. Roehder 2004: 11f.

nen der Welt immer konkreter auf die Sicherheitslage Europas auswirken, besteht ein zunehmend eigennütziges Interesse zur Kopplung der beiden Domänen. Falls Europa daher auf ein durch internationales Recht sicherheitspolitisch untermauertes Weltsystem hinarbeitet, wird Entwicklungspolitik hierbei eine tragende Rolle spielen müssen. Hieraus resultiert die Überlegung, dass sich die europäische Sicherheitspolitik der Förderung liberaler Staatlichkeit verschreiben müsste, die bereits gegenwärtig eine der zentralen Leitlinien der Entwicklungspolitik darstellt. Aus diesem Grund ist es nahe liegend, Entwicklungspolitik auf gleicher Augenhöhe in die Krisenanalyse und Strategieformulierung miteinzubeziehen.[137]

Hinsichtlich dieser unumgänglich stärker sicherheitspolitisch orientierten Entwicklungspolitik treten bei den entwicklungspolitischen Akteuren mehrere Befürchtungen auf:

1) Dass es zu einer beträchtlichen Umverteilung von Ressourcen innerhalb des EZ-Portfolios zugunsten von sicherheitspolitisch relevanten Investitionen kommt. Die Folge wäre eine Mittelumlenkung von sicherheitspolitisch unbedeutenden Entwicklungsländern in „Risikoländer".
2) Hieraus ergibt sich die Befürchtung, dass das Zielsystem der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik zuungunsten anderer Themenfelder der Entwicklungskooperation verändert und eigenständige Ziele der Entwicklungspolitik wie Armutsbekämpfung und nachhaltige Entwicklung der EU-Sicherheitskonzeption zum Opfer fallen. Oder anders formuliert: Entwicklungspolitik dient einzig und allein dem eigenen Sicherheitsbestreben.
3) Ebenso wird befürchtet, dass die Entwicklungspolitik ihre Eigenständigkeit als Politikbereich verliert und zum Instrument der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik avanciert.

All diese Befürchtungen sind nicht ungerechtfertigt. Die Erfahrungen des Kalten Krieges haben gezeigt, dass sich die Entwicklungspolitik nur allzu oft den Interessen der Sicherheitspolitik hat unterwerfen müssen. Das Ausblenden der derzeitigen Diskussion zu den Interdependenzen zwischen Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik wäre aus der Perspektive der EZ-Akteure hingegen auch keine von Erfolg gekrönte Strategie. Vielmehr droht der Entwicklungspolitik gerade dann ein Bedeutungsverlust, wenn sie sich der Debatte verweigert. Angesichts dieser Tatsache ist für eine pro-aktive Strategie der Entwicklungspolitik zu plädieren, die sich mit einem Verweis auf ihre Stärken in die Debatte zu einer komplexen Sicherheitspo-

[137] Dass die EU-Sicherheitsstrategie diesen Überlegungen noch nicht Rechnung trägt, manifestiert sich in der Tatsache, dass angesichts der aktuellen Unruhen im Irak die Rufe manch europäischer Beobachter nach einer klassischen Stabilitätspolitik unter Inkaufnahme autoritärer Herrschaft immer lauter werden.

litik einbringt. Eine solche pro-aktive Positionierung birgt mehr Chancen als Risiken, zumal sie ihre Legitimität nicht aus Eigeninteressen gegenüber anderen Politikfeldern erhält, sondern aufgrund ihres hohen Erfahrungsschatzes in Fragen der Konfliktprävention und der Stabilisierung schwacher Gesellschaften. Diese Einschätzung trifft insbesondere dann zu, wenn es zu einer Form der Arbeitsteilung in der transatlantischen Zusammenarbeit kommen sollte, bei dem die USA vornehmlich den militärischen Part übernehmen würden. In diesem Zusammenhang käme der Entwicklungspolitik eine kompensierende Funktion zu, die auf die Schwachstellen der europäischen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik zurückzuführen ist. So wird deutlich, dass den bisherigen Beiträgen zur neuen europäischen Sicherheitspolitik weitestgehend das Hintergrundwissen über die konkreten Wirkungszusammenhänge der skizzierten Bedrohungen fehlt. Hieraus lässt sich ein eher kurzfristig angelegtes Handeln ableiten, das jedoch kaum zu den Ursachen führen würde. Ebenso weist die EU-Sicherheitsstrategie einen überwiegend eurozentrierten Kern auf. Die sicherheitspolitischen Interessen reichen dabei nur geringfügig über die OECD-Staatenwelt hinaus. So sollten neben der Sorge um zerfallende Staaten, transnationalen Terrorismus und die Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen auch jene um die essenziellen Grundlagen der menschlichen Sicherheit in den Entwicklungsländern Berücksichtigung finden, wenn der Anspruch einer globalen Sicherheitsarchitektur aufrechterhalten bleiben soll.[138]

Angesichts der skizzierten Schwachpunkte der europäischen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungspolitik wird es zur Aufgabe der Entwicklungspolitik werden, genau in jenen Themenbereichen ihre komparativen Stärken auszuspielen, in denen die klassische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik konzeptionell vergleichsweise unterbelichtet ist (vgl. BMZ 2004: 12). Dabei kann die Entwicklungspolitik im Wesentlichen auf drei komparative Stärken bauen:

1) Die Entwicklungspolitik hat sich seit den 1990er Jahren intensiv mit der Förderung von *„Good Governance“* auseinandergesetzt, die schlussendlich die Grundlage für die Beseitigung von sicherheitspolitischen Bedrohungen darstellt. Das in der EU-Sicherheitsstrategie formulierte Ziel der Beseitigung langfristiger Bedrohungen durch schwache Staaten kann letztlich nur mit einer Stärkung liberaler Staatsstrukturen erreicht werden (vgl. Conzelmann 2003: 468-477).
2) Ein detailliertes Hintergrundwissen über die sozio-ökonomischen, ethnischen, religiösen und politischen Zusammenhänge ist Grundvoraussetzung, um in zerfallenden

[138] Gerade diese eingeschränkte Wahrnehmung globaler Risikofaktoren als solche Faktoren, die die unmittelbare Sicherheit der OECD-Staatenwelt betreffen, und die Indifferenz gegenüber Problemlagen in den ärmeren Weltregionen ist nicht widerspruchsfrei, da sich die sozio-ökonomischen Ursachen der neuen sicherheitspolitischen Bedrohungen nicht zuletzt aus der Unordnung in der Weltpolitik und -wirtschaft ableiten.

Staaten in Kooperation mit anderen Akteuren entwicklungsorientierte und gleichzeitig sicherheitspolitisch relevante Unterstützung zu leisten. Über solche Erfahrungen in der Länderexpertise verfügen die Akteure der Entwicklungspolitik.

3) Als die natürlichen Agenten zwischen den Interessen der Europäischen Union und denen der Entwicklungsländer können die entwicklungspolitischen Akteure eine wichtige Vermittlerrolle einnehmen. Aufgrund ihrer Vertrautheit mit den thematischen Problematiken und ihrer Rolle als außenpolitische Akteure besteht die Möglichkeit, sowohl die sicherheitspolitischen Interessen Europas zu vertreten als auch die Interessen der Entwicklungsländer zu berücksichtigen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund geht es nicht in erster Linie darum, neue Instrumente zu schaffen, sondern eine strategische Perspektive zu entwickeln, die die Risikoanalyse der Solana-Strategie einbezieht. Sinnvoll wäre daher, die EU-Sicherheitskonzeption entwicklungspolitisch zu konkretisieren, um zu einer europäischen entwicklungspolitischen Strategie zur Stabilisierung schwacher Staaten zu gelangen. Von Seiten der Entwicklungspolitik muss ein schlüssiges Konzept der bewährten Praktiken vorgelegt werden, die zum Umgang mit sicherheitspolitisch relevanten Themen geeignet sind.

Eine solche pro-aktive Orientierung der Entwicklungspolitik macht sie letztendlich zu einem strategisch wichtigen Partner der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, der sich auch in essenziellen Fragen Gehör verschaffen kann. Gelingt dies nicht, so droht ihr die Festlegung der Instrumentarien und Mittelverteilung durch andere Akteure. Daher stellen sich der Entwicklungspolitik zwei zentrale Herausforderungen. Zum einen muss sie sich verstärkt in die Verteilungskonflikte mit den anderen Politikfeldern einschalten, um im Streit um inhaltliche Zuständigkeiten ihre spezifischen Aufgabengebiete zu verteidigen. Hierzu ist eine Überwindung der vielfältigen Kohärenzprobleme Grundvoraussetzung.[139] Zum anderen gilt es die Abstimmungsmängel zwischen den nationalen Ministerien und den Durchführungsorganisationen zu beheben. Derweil wird der Abstimmungsprozess noch immer durch die Vielzahl von autonomen und semiautonomen Akteuren erschwert. Ein höherer Grad an interinstitutionellem Austausch würde hingegen einen weiteren Schritt hin zu einer gemeinsamen europäischen Entwicklungspolitik bedeuten.

[139] In diesem Zusammenhang stellt die Zersplitterung der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik die größte Barriere für eine kohärente und strategische Ausrichtung des Politikfeldes dar. Nicht nur die Tatsache, dass mehrere EU-Kommissare mit dem Ressort betraut sind, sondern auch das Mitwirken des Hohen Vertreters und späteren EU-Außenministers verkomplizieren die vergemeinschaftete entwicklungspolitische Tätigkeit.

Tabelle IV-1: Beiträge der Entwicklungspolitik zur Stabilisierung von Krisen- und Konfliktländern

	Krisenprävention	**Akute Krise**	**Post-Krisen-Intervention**
Merkmale des Partners	Erosion des staatlichen Gewaltmonopols, Zunahme politisch motivierter Gewalt	Bürgerkrieg, zerfallenes staatliches Gewaltmonopol	Nach Waffenstillstand oder externer militärischer Intervention
EZ-Merkmale	Brokerfunktion zwischen Partnerland und Europäischer Außenpolitik Jeweilige Maßnahmenpakete stark abhängig von spezifischen Bedingungen und Krisenursachen (z.B. Verteilungskonflikte, Umweltkrisen, wachsende Gewaltökonomie, Elitenkonflikte) in Partnerländern Langfristig angelegt, angepasst an Absorptionskapazitäten des Partners Moderationsfunktion zwischen Konfliktparteien Good Governance, Beiträge zur sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung und sicherheitsorientierte EZ verschmelzen	Sicherheitsorientierte EZ plus entwicklungsorientierte Nothilfe Zivile Beiträge zu Friedensmissionen Kurzfristig und flexibel	Brokerfunktion zwischen Partnerland und Europäischer Außenpolitik Herstellung von Sicherheit als primärer Bezugspunkt Langfristig angelegt, angepasst an Absorptionskapazitäten des Partners Wiederaufbausymbolik (Schulen, Krankenhäuser), Aufbau physischer Infrastruktur plus *capacity building* Good Governance, Beiträge zur sozio-ökonomischen Entwicklung und sicherheitsorientierte EZ verschmelzen
Zielsetzungen	Deeskalation, Konfliktbearbeitung, Stabilisierung, Good Governance	Überlebenssicherung, Stabilisierung, Konflikttransformation	Herstellung von Sicherheit, state building, sozio-ökonomische Entwicklung, Good Governance

Quelle: Faust/Messner 2005: 147.

1.3 Die Bedeutung der EU-Sicherheitsstrategie für die europäische Entwicklungspolitik

Berücksichtigt man die vorausgegangenen Einschätzungen, so wird deutlich, dass eine proaktive Positionierung der Entwicklungspolitik im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich nur dann gelingen kann, wenn sich die europäische Entwicklung organisatorisch und inhaltlich neu ausrichtet. Im Zuge dieses Prozesses bedarf es einer gestalterischen Kraft, die sowohl die Eigenständigkeit und Relevanz des Politikfeldes bewahrt als auch die Interdependenzen der europäischen Außenbeziehungen berücksichtigt.

Trotz stagnierender Investitionen in die europäische Entwicklungskooperation hat die Entwicklungspolitik ihre Agenda seit den 1990er Jahren kontinuierlich ausgeweitet. Mit der Verknüpfung von Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik im Rahmen der EU-Sicherheitsstrategie kristallisiert sich ein weiteres komplexes Aufgabenfeld heraus, das grundsätzlich in drei Megaprojekte der internationalen Entwicklungspolitik mündet: die MDG-Agenda zur Armutsbekämpfung, die Sicherheitsagenda und die Rio-Agenda mit ihrem Fokus auf globale Herausforderungen. Jedes dieser Megaprojekte ist zweifelsohne von großer Bedeutung, doch sollte den betroffenen Akteuren bewusst werden, dass angesichts einer durch knappe Ressourcen gekennzeichneten Welt Spannungsfelder zwischen den einzelnen Megaprojekten vorprogrammiert sind. Konflikte können sich demnach insbesondere in Hinblick auf die Verteilung der monetären Ressourcen, die Gewichtung der Megaprojekte und die unterschiedliche Bedeutung anderer außenorientierter Ministerien und Agenturen jenseits der Entwicklungspolitik entstehen.

Zur MDG-Agenda: Sie stellt das klassische Spielfeld der Entwicklungspolitik dar. Ihr wesentliches Ziel ist es, bis zum Jahre 2015 die absolute Armut zu halbieren, Armutskrankheiten auszurotten und die allgemeine Primarschulbildung zu ermöglichen (vgl. UNDP 2003). Die Entwicklungspolitik sollte sich daher auf die 60 ärmsten Entwicklungsländer konzentrieren, die aus eigener Kraft nicht in der Lage sind, die Millenniumsziele zu erreichen. Hierunter fallen auch circa 20 Staaten, die durch kriegerische Gewalt geprägt sind. Aus MDG-Sicht wäre es jedoch genauso wichtig, entwicklungspolitische Programme in solchen Staaten zu fördern, von denen keine internationalen Sicherheitsrisiken ausgehen. Schließlich trägt Armutsreduzierung mittelfristig zu mehr Sicherheit und Stabilität bei, was sich auch auf das internationale System niederschlägt. Solche Entwicklungen werden im Rahmen der Millennium Development Goals zwar als positiver „Nebeneffekt“ betrachtet, sie zählen aber nicht zu den eigens formulierten Zielen. Demnach können sich Strategien zur Armutsreduzierung gemäß der MDG-Logik nicht auf solche Länder beschränken, die aus der Perspektive der Industrieländer Sicherheitsbedrohungen darstellen, sondern müssen die sozio-ökonomisch schwächsten Gesellschaften zum Ziel haben. Nach derzeitigen Schätzungen müssten die Geberländer ihre ODA-Investitionen jedoch verdoppeln, um die MDGs überhaupt bis 2015 erreichen zu können (vgl. *Süddeutsche Zeitung* vom 16./17.03.2002).

Zur Sicherheitsagenda: Im Rahmen der EU-Sicherheitsstrategie wird Entwicklungspolitik als Baustein zur Eindämmung internationaler Krisenherde und Stabilisierung politisch schwacher Staaten verstanden. Armutsbekämpfung, der Aufbau von sozialen Infrastrukturen und Institutionen bilden dabei die Instrumente, um Zerfallsprozessen in Entwicklungsländern – und so-

mit auch möglicherweise auftretenden internationalen Sicherheitsrisiken – entgegenzuarbeiten (vgl. Schneckener 2004b: 22f.). Überträgt man die sicherheitspolitische Strategie auf die Anstrengungen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik, so müssten die verfügbaren Mittel in erster Linie für die 20 bis 30 „gescheiterten“ oder von Zerfall bedrohten Staaten verwendet werden. Demnach avancieren nicht die bedürftigsten Länder, sondern solche, von denen die größten internationalen Sicherheitsbedrohungen ausgehen, zur primären Zielgruppe. Zur zentralen Aufgabe würde es daher, das Abrutschen von Ländern in die Kategorie der zerfallenden Staaten zu verhindern. Eine wirksame Strategie zur Stabilisierung dieser sicherheitsrelevanten Länder wäre von langfristiger Natur und würde enorme finanzielle Ressourcen verschlingen.[140]

Zur Rio-Agenda: Angesichts der Bedrohungen durch transnationalen Terrorismus und die Fokussierung der internationalen Entwicklungsorganisationen auf die Halbierung der weltweiten Armut bis 2015 haben die drängenden globalen Umweltprobleme an Aufmerksamkeit verloren. Diese waren noch zentraler Bestandteil der globalen Umweltkonferenz von Rio 1992. Im Kontext der Ereignisse des 11. Septembers 2001 wird es jedoch immer schwieriger, die notwendigen Mittel zur Anpassung an den Klimawandel und zum Schutz globaler Umweltgüter zu mobilisieren. Der Entwicklungspolitik kommt hierbei eine zentrale Rolle zu, da keines der weltweiten Umweltprobleme ohne die Kooperation mit den Entwicklungsländern gelöst werden kann. Auf das Zusammenwirken von Armut und Umweltzerstörung ist vielfach hingewiesen worden, doch ergeben sich aus der Agenda zur Bearbeitung der globalen Umweltprobleme andere Prioritäten als aus der MDG-Perspektive. So richtet sich der Fokus der Rio-Agenda auf die Länder, die entscheidend zu globalen Umweltproblemen beitragen – beispielsweise durch stetig steigende CO_2-Emissionen oder die Zerstörung von Urwäldern – und ohne deren Mitwirkung an grenzüberschreitenden Umweltpolitiken eine globale Umweltwende nicht durchführbar ist. Dabei ist diese Ländergruppe keineswegs identisch mit den 60 Entwicklungsländern, die von der UNDP als wesentliche Partner der MDG-Agenda ausgemacht wurden. Ebenso wenig sind sie deckungsgleich mit den Gesellschaften, die gegenwärtig als sicherheitspolitisch relevant eingestuft werden. Vielmehr macht ein Großteil der Anker- und Schwellenländer diese Gruppe aus.[141] Die Kosten für eine wirkungsvolle Strategie zur Bewältigung der globalen Umweltprobleme sind enorm. Hochrechnungen des

[140] Allein die längst noch nicht abgeschlossene Stabilisierung des Kosovo kostet die internationale Gemeinschaft seit 1999 zweistellige Milliardenbereiche. Größere Interventionen wie die in Afghanistan verschlingen ein Vielfaches (pro Jahr allein über 3,5 Mrd. US$ an internationalen Mitteln für den Wiederaufbau). Der Versuch der USA, den Irak im Kontext einer militärischen Intervention im Sinne des Westens zu stabilisieren, erforderte seit Anfang 2003 Ausgaben in Höhe von über 100 Mrd. US$. Vgl. Hippler 2003b: 89-98.

[141] Es ist zu unterscheiden zwischen Anker- und Schwellenländern. Ankerländer werden Länder genannt, denen im jeweiligen regionalen Kontext eine herausragende ökonomische und politische Bedeutung zukommt. Diese

tigung der globalen Umweltprobleme sind enorm. Hochrechnungen des „Wissenschaftlichen Beirats Globale Umweltveränderungen“ der Bundesregierung zufolge müssten die OECD-Länder jährlich ein Prozent ihres BSP in die globale Umweltpolitik investieren, um die zunehmende Beeinträchtigung des Weltökosystems zu unterbinden (vgl. Faust/Messner 2005: 151).

Tabelle IV-2: Drei Megaprojekte der Entwicklungspolitik

	Die MDG-Agenda	**Die Sicherheitsagenda**	**Die Rio-Agenda**
Primäre Ziele	Armutsreduzierung	Prävention bzw. Befriedung von Konflikten, Vermeidung von Staatszerfall, nation building, Etablierung liberaler Staatlichkeit	Sicherung globaler Kollektivgüter (z.B. Umwelt, Finanzarchitektur, Welthandel)
Akteure auf Seiten der Industrieländer	Im Kern Akteure der klassischen Entwicklungspolitik	Vernetzte Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik	Vernetzte Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik plus jeweilige Fachpolitiken (z.B. Umwelt-, Finanz-, Handelspolitik)
Schwerpunktpartner/Adressaten	LDCs	20-30 fragile Staaten; zentrale Krisenregionen	Anker- und Schwellenländer
Ressourcenbedarf	Verdopplung von ODA	z.B. Investitionen der Staatengemeinschaft für zivilen Wiederaufbau in Afghanistan ca. 3,5 Mrd. US $ pro Jahr	z.B. 1 % des BSP der OECD-Länder zur Stabilisierung globaler Umweltgüter

Quelle: Faust/Messner 2005: 151.

Vor dem Hintergrund dieser drei Großprojekte stellt sich nun die Frage, welche strategischen Optionen die europäische Entwicklungspolitik zukünftig wählen soll. Eine Möglichkeit wäre es, die skizzierten Verteilungskonflikte zwischen den drei Megaprojekten auszublenden und sich weiterhin mit begrenzten Mitteln in allen drei Bereichen zu engagieren. Dies würde der bisherigen Handhabung entsprechen, langfristig jedoch nicht zum Ziel führen. Des Weiteren wäre es denkbar, dass sich die entwicklungspolitischen Akteure auf einen oder zwei Bereiche konzentrieren. Eine solche Perspektive hätte die Stärkung einzelner Politikfelder zur Folge,

kann positiv im Sinne einer regionalen Lokomotivfunktion oder negativ im Sinne von länderübergreifender Stagnation oder Krisenanfälligkeit sein. Sie erwächst aus wirtschaftlichen Verflechtungen mit anderen Ländern und aus ihrer besonderen Bedeutung für regionale Integrationsprozesse. Hierzu zählen insbesondere Brasilien, Mexiko, China, Indien, Südafrika, Russland, Thailand, Indonesien, Iran und Ägypten. Als Schwellenländer werden Länder bezeichnet, die einen überdurchschnittlichen Stand der menschlichen Entwicklung erreicht haben und über die Wettbewerbsvoraussetzungen verfügen, um diesen Entwicklungsstand in Zukunft halten oder weiter ausbauen zu können. Zu dieser Kategorie gehören in der Regel Chile, Costa Rica, Brasilien, Uruguay, Mexiko und Mauritius. Vgl. Stamm 2004: 7.

die angesichts der gegenwärtigen Prioritätensetzung insbesondere sicherheitspolitische Dimensionen annehmen würde. Eine damit einhergehende Vernachlässigung anderer Bereiche kann sich die internationale Gemeinschaft gleichwohl nicht erlauben. Das Ergebnis wären möglicherweise Bumerangeffekte, da die enge Verknüpfung aller relevanten Problemstellungen ein partielles Ausblenden von Themenschwerpunkten unmöglich erscheinen lässt.

Da sowohl ein kontinuierliches Engagement in allen Bereichen als auch die Konzentration auf einige wenige Strategien Risikopotential bergen, wäre eine Arbeitsteilung zwischen bilateralen, europäischen und multilateralen Akteuren der Entwicklungspolitik die sinnvollste Option. Diesbezüglich gilt es vorab zu klären, welche entwicklungspolitischen Akteure in welchen Kernbereichen über spezifische Fähigkeiten und Vorteile verfügen:

1) Der Fokus der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit sollte sich auf die Sicherheitsagenda der Solana-Strategie richten. In einer vernetzten Welt ist die Sicherheit Aufgabe einer Staatengemeinschaft. Kein einzelner EU-Mitgliedsstaat kann durch entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen internationale Krisenherde im Alleingang eindämmen. Die Erfahrungen auf dem Balkan haben gezeigt, dass das Nebeneinander einer Vielzahl von bi- und multilateralen Akteuren einen durchaus ernstzunehmenden Lösungsansatz darstellen kann. Die Führungsrolle der EU auf diesem Gebiet würde eine Einbindung der Erfahrungen der Mitgliedsstaaten in spezifischen Krisenregionen – beispielsweise Frankreichs in Teilen Afrikas – keineswegs ausschließen (vgl. Rummel 2003: 11).
2) Die großen internationalen Organisationen sollten sich auf die Durchsetzung der MDG-Agenda konzentrieren und in diesem Feld ihre Spezialisierungsvorteile ausschöpfen. Angesichts der Schwächen einiger multilateraler Organisationen in der operativen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit müsste eine solche Ausrichtung durch entsprechende Strukturreformen unterstützt werden.
3) Aufgabe der bilateralen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der EU-Mitgliedsländer sollte es unterdessen sein, die MDG-Aktivitäten der multilateralen Organisationen durch Finanztransfers und aktive Strategien die Weiterentwicklung dieser Akteure zu stärken. In Anbetracht der Mittelknappheit scheint es wenig hilfreich, wenn einzelne Geberländer neben multilateralen Programmen eigenständige Aktivitäten mit vergleichsweise geringem Finanzvolumen in MDG-Ländern umsetzen. Stattdessen könnte der Kernbereich der bilateralen Entwicklungspolitik zukünftig in der Kooperation mit Ankerländern liegen, ohne die zentrale Weltprobleme unlösbar bleiben. Zwar ist zur wirkungsvollen Bearbeitung globaler Problemkonstellationen eine europäische Abstim-

mung und eine solche Europas mit den internationalen Organisationen unerlässlich, doch entspricht die bilaterale Zusammenarbeit mit Ankerländern dem herausragenden außen-, sicherheitspolitischen, ökonomischen und technologischem Gewicht dieser Ländergruppe, so dass kein größeres EU-Land auf diese Zusammenarbeit verzichten kann (vgl. Stamm 2004: 21-23).

2. Die neue Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur Afrikas

2.1 Positive Tendenzen und fortdauernde Gewaltkonflikte

Nach wie vor ist Afrika der am stärksten von gewaltsamen Konflikten und Kriegen betroffene Kontinent (vgl. Debiel 2002). Schätzungen der African Union zufolge haben sich seit den 1960er Jahren etwa 30 Gewaltkonflikte ereignet, bei denen rund sieben Millionen Menschen ums Leben kamen und den Kontinent etwa 250 Mrd. US$ kosteten.[142] Trotz dieser traurigen Statistik lassen sich auch positive Tendenzen erkennen. So stellt UN-Generalsekretär Kofi Annan in seinem 2004 erschienenen *„Report on the causes of conflict and promotion of durable peace und sustainable development in Africa“* einen Rückgang gewaltsamer Auseinandersetzungen fest. Demnach sind derzeit sechs afrikanische Länder in bewaffnete Konflikte verwickelt und wenige weitere in schwerwiegende politische Krisen (vgl. Secretary General 2004: 2f.).

Diese Zahlen dürfen jedoch nicht darüber hinwegtäuschen, dass die weiterhin bestehenden Krisenherde über eine enorme Tragweite verfügen.[143] Friedensverträge und Waffenstillstände konnten zeitweilige Erfolge erzielen, die Konflikte und Krisen aber nicht dauerhaft beenden.

Summa summarum lassen sich zwar einzelne positive Entwicklungen erkennen, die jedoch weitere Krisen- und Konfliktpotentiale nicht entscheidend zu minimieren vermögen. Die hierfür verantwortlichen Gründe sind vielfältiger Natur. Zieht man geringes Einkommen, negatives Wirtschaftswachstum sowie hohe Abhängigkeit von Primargütern als Indikatoren in Hinblick auf die Wahrscheinlichkeit bewaffneter Konflikte heran, sind die strukturellen Gefährdungen für Subsahara-Afrika als besonders hoch einzuschätzen (vgl. UN Panel 2004: 15). Des Weiteren verschlechtern sich die Lebensbedingungen für junge Menschen aufgrund hoher Arbeitslosigkeitsraten und der raschen Verbreitung von HIV/AIDS und erhöhen die Destabilisierungspotentiale (vgl. Secretary General 2004: 19).

[142] Nach anderen Einschätzungen ist die Zahl der Todesopfer deutlich höher.
[143] Betroffen sind vor allem Teile Westafrikas, das Gebiet der Großen Seen, der Sudan und das Horn von Afrika.

Abbildung IV-2: Kriege und bewaffnete Konflikte in Afrika 2003



Quelle: Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung (AKUF).

Nicht zuletzt auch die geringen Fortschritte im Bereich der verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung sprechen gegen eine effektive Eindämmung von Konflikt- und Krisenpotentialen:

„Good Governance and conflict prevention in Africa are two sides of the same coin. The key early indicators of intra-state conflict and regional instability have repeatedly proven to be an abuse of power and transgression of human rights, bad governance and circumstances of democracy-soon resulting in substantial refugee flows and the internal displacement of people" (Cilliers/Sturman 2004: 101).

Vor diesem Hintergrund gibt es – trotz derzeitiger Bemühungen und einzelner Forschritte – eine Reihe defizitärer Bereiche. Hierzu zählen insbesondere die demokratischen Regierungsstrukturen, die administrativen Kapazitäten, die Unabhängigkeit der Justiz sowie die Transparenz der öffentlichen Strukturen (vgl. ECA 2004). Mit der Ausnahme von Südafrika weisen alle großen Länder Subsahara-Afrikas einen deutlichen dysfunktionalen Charakter in ihrer politischen, ökonomischen und sozialen Ausrichtung auf (vgl. Ottaway/Herbst/Miller 2004: 2). Angesichts der verstärkten internationalen Fokussierung auf sicherheitspolitische Bedrohungen durch instabile Staaten wird eine umfassende Debatte über eine effektive Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur Afrikas daher zur notwendigen Priorität der politischen Agenda.

2.2 Grundlagen der afrikanischen Friedens- und Sicherheitsagenda

Drei Jahre nach der Gründung der *African Union* (AU) lässt sich eine weitgehende Dynamik in der Reform der afrikanischen Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur erkennen. Während ihr Vorläufer, die *Organization of African Unity* (OAU), keine echte Rolle als gestaltende Kraft übernommen hatte, fungierten bislang die regionalen Strukturen als treibende Kraft.[144] Mit der AU hat eine grundlegende Verschiebung stattgefunden, die die Friedens- und Sicherheitsproblematik auf kontinentaler Ebene verankert, ohne den regionalen Einrichtungen weitgehend ihre Aufgaben zu entziehen. Hierbei lassen sich sieben zentrale Pfeiler ausmachen, die für eine Neuausrichtung der Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik sprechen:

1. Abkehr von einer indifferenten Politik: Während die OAU von der Prämisse der Nichteinmischung und Nichtintervention ausging, interpretiert die AU ihre Rolle verantwortungsbewusster. Sie rückt von einer indifferenten Politik ab und orientiert sich an folgenden Grundsätzen:

   „the right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; [...] the right of Member States to request intervention from the Union in order to restore peace and security" (Organization of African Union 2001: Chapter 4 (h) and (j)).

2. Nexus von Sicherheit und Entwicklung: Im Rahmen der AU herrscht ein neuer Konsens über das enge Wechselverhältnis von Sicherheit und Entwicklung. Sicherheit wird als zentrale Voraussetzung für Entwicklung anerkannt, womit der Sicherheitsdimension indirekt Priorität eingeräumt wird. Gewaltkonflikte erkennt man als wesentliches Hindernis für die Erreichung der MDGs an.

3. Verantwortung kontinentaler Mechanismen: Die African Union formuliert explizit eine selbstverantwortliche und emanzipierte Friedens- und Sicherheitspolitik. In diesem Sinne ist ein entsprechendes Engagement anderer Staaten nur dann erwünscht, wenn dies im Rahmen einer AU-Intervention geschieht. Im Widerspruch hierzu stehen jedoch die begrenzten finanziellen und materiellen Ressourcen des Kontinents, die zum Aufbau einer erforderlichen Infrastruktur und möglicher Militäreinsätze – beispielsweise in Darfur/Sudan – notwendig sind. Zusätzlich hat die AU-Versammlung auf ihrer zweiten außerordentlichen Tagung im Februar 2004 in Libyen eine Gemeinsame Afrikanische Verteidigungs- und Sicherheitspolitik (*Common African Defence and Security Policy* – CADSP) verabschiedet.

[144] Dies gilt insbesondere für die Economic Community of West African States. Vgl. Hettmann 2004.

4. Friedens- und Sicherheitsinfrastruktur: Die African Union hat auf diesem Gebiet eine umfassende organisatorische Neustrukturierung eingeleitet. Drei Institutionen sind hierbei von zentraler Bedeutung:
    a) Zentrales Organ der AU ist der Friedens- und Sicherheitsrat (*Peace and Security Council – PSC*). Er setzt sich aus 15 wechselnden Mitgliedern zusammen, welche die fünf afrikanischen Regionen repräsentieren.[145] Bislang hat sich der PSC mit insgesamt 14 Krisensituationen befasst (vgl. Secretary General 2004: 10).
    b) Die AU verfügt über eine Kommission, deren Abteilung für Frieden und Sicherheit die Agenda unterstützt. Die Tatsache, dass diese Abteilung die größte innerhalb der Kommission ist, unterstreicht die Relevanz der Friedens- und Sicherheitsproblematik, verweist aber gleichzeitig auch auf das gesteigerte Interesse der Geber an dieser Einrichtung.
    c) Ferner befinden sich weitere Strukturen im Aufbau, die für die zukünftige Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur von Bedeutung sein können. Hierzu zählen vor allem der *Panel of the Wise* als beratendes Gremium und ein Krisenfrühwarnsystem.
5. Militärische Fähigkeiten: Die African Union hat den Aufbau einer afrikanischen Eingriffstruppe (*African Standby Force* – ASF) bis zum Jahre 2010 beschlossen. Diese soll eine Truppenstärke von 15.000 Personen haben und sich aus fünf regionalen Eingreifbrigaden zusammensetzen. Angesichts der unterschiedlichen finanziellen und strukturellen Voraussetzungen in den fünf Regionen erscheint dieses Vorhaben besonders ambitioniert. Diesbezügliche Anstrengungen sind gegenwärtig in Ost- und Westafrika am weitesten fortgeschritten, doch lässt das insgesamt schwache militärische Potential auf kontinentaler und regionaler Ebene den Aufbau der ASF bis 2010 unrealistisch erscheinen (vgl. Atwood/Browne/Lyman 2004: 27).
6. Leadership: In der Gründungsphase der African Union zeigt sich, dass sie über eine Reihe konstruktiver Führungspersönlichkeiten verfügt. Mit Alpha Oumar Konaré als Vorsitzenden der AU-Kommission und Said Djinnit als Kommissar für Frieden und Sicherheit hat die AU afrika- und weltweit respektierte Persönlichkeiten in ihren Reihen. Zudem trugen auch die Initiativen des südafrikanischen Präsidenten Mbeki – z.B. beim Konflikt um die Côte d'Ivoire – zum sichtbaren Engagement der AU bei.

[145] Hierbei besitzen fünf Mitglieder des PSC ein dreijähriges Mandat, die zehn anderen Mitglieder ein fünfjähriges.

7. Unabhängiges Know-how: Im Hinblick auf das Gesamtbild einer funktionsfähigen und legitimierten Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur ist den afrikanischen *„think tanks“* und Nichtregierungsorganisationen eine hohe Bedeutung beizumessen. Einrichtungen wie das *Institute for Security Studies* (ISS), das *Centre for Conflict Resolution*, das *African Peace Forum* (APFO) und die *African Human Security Initiative* (AHSI) spielen bei der Ausarbeitung analytischer Fähigkeiten und für die Ausdehnung der Debatte auf dem Kontinent eine zentrale Rolle. Allerdings beschränkt sich dieses Know-how im Wesentlichen auf wenige Länder, insbesondere Südafrika.

In verschiedenen Situationen wurde die African Union bereits aktiv, wobei der externen Unterstützung jeweils ein großer Anteil bei der Umsetzung zukam. So sollte die *African Mission in Burundi* (AMIB) einen Beitrag zur Stabilisierung des Landes leisten. Finanzielle Unterstützung zur Durchführung der Mission leisteten die USA, Großbritannien, Frankreich und die EU. 2004 wurde die Aufgabe der AMIB durch eine Peacekeeping-Mission der UN übernommen (vgl. Klingebiel/Roehder 2004: 16). Einen Meilenstein für die Funktionsfähigkeit der AU stellt der Beschluss zum Einsatz einer *African Mission in the Sudan* (AMIS) dar. Der auf ein Jahr angelegte Einsatz wird rund 178 Mio. € kosten, wobei die EU und die USA den größten Finanzierungsanteil tragen. Der Umgang der AU mit der Darfur-Krise wird gemeinhin als „Testfall“ für die Funktionsfähigkeit der neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur gewertet. Obwohl die AU nur über begrenzte Wirkungsmöglichkeiten verfügt, würdigt man ihre Auseinandersetzung mit der Krise als konstruktiv (vgl. Klingebiel 2005: 15).

2.3 Afrika und die neuen Ansätze externer Akteure

Die neue afrikanische Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur wird von einer sich verändernden Politik externer Akteure begleitet. Die Veränderungen bei den externen Akteuren vollziehen sich dabei auf drei Ebenen:

1) Afrika erfährt eine bedeutendere Rolle in der neuen internationalen Sicherheitsagenda und der damit einhergehenden geostrategischen Interessenbestimmung.
2) Es lassen sich Änderungen hinsichtlich der Bereitschaft zum militärischen Engagement bzw. zur Entsendung von Friedensmissionen in afrikanische Krisengebiete feststellen.
3) Es gibt eine Tendenz zu vermehrten gemeinsamen Ansätzen von Außen-, Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik, um die afrikanische Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur langfristig zu etablieren.

2.3.1 Afrikas Rolle in der internationalen Sicherheitsagenda

Die Wahrnehmung Afrikas in sicherheitspolitischen und geostrategischen Überlegungen spielt heute eine eindeutig wichtigere Rolle als in den 1990er Jahren. Exemplarisch hierfür ist die entsprechende Debatte in den USA. Während George W. Bush zu Beginn seiner Amtszeit einer amerikanischen Afrikapolitik kaum Aufmerksamkeit schenkte, reiste er 2003 als erster republikanischer US-Präsident nach Subsahara-Afrika. Dieses neu geweckte Interesse stand dabei im Wesentlichen unter dem Eindruck des 11. Septembers, wie seine diesbezügliche Einschätzung in der Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategie der USA vermuten lässt:

„Together with our European allies, we must help strengthen Africa's fragile states, help build indigenous capability to secure porous borders, and help build up the law enforcement and intelligence infrastructure to deny havens for terrorists. An ever more lethal environment exists in Africa as local civil wars spread beyond borders to create regional war zones" (The White House 2002: 10f.).

Afrika wird in erster Linie vor dem Hintergrund des Kampfes gegen den internationalen Terrorismus wahrgenommen. Eine bedeutende Rolle kommt hierbei der vermuteten engen Verbindung zwischen fragilen Staaten und internationalen Bedrohungen zu.[146] Auf ähnliche Weise richtet auch Europa im Rahmen der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie den Fokus auf den afrikanischen Kontinent, wobei insbesondere auf die Interdependenz von Problemen hingewiesen wird:

„Die Armut im südlich der Sahara gelegenen Teil Afrikas ist heute größer als vor zehn Jahren. In vielen Fällen ist wirtschaftliches Versagen mit politischen Problemen und Gewaltkonflikten verknüpft" (Rat der Europäischen Union 2003: 2).

Die britische Regierung als traditionell wichtiger Partner für viele afrikanische Staaten strebt vor dem Hintergrund ihrer G8- und EU-Präsidentschaft 2005 an, Afrika insgesamt einen höheren Stellenwert für die internationale Agenda zu verschaffen. Ein erstes entsprechendes Signal stellt die von der britischen Regierung eingesetzte *Commission for Africa* dar (vgl. Commission for Africa 2004).

In Bezug auf die deutsche Diskussion lässt sich erkennen, dass Afrika in der Gesamtpolitik der Bundesregierung eine relative hohe Aufmerksamkeit zukommt. Neben dem Motiv der neu zu definierenden Sicherheitsanforderungen sprechen auch die unternommenen Afrikareisen – im Jahr 2004 u.a. durch die Bundespräsidenten Rau und Köhler, Bundeskanzler Schröder und andere Regierungsmitglieder – für ein gewachsenes Afrikainteresse. Stabilität und Sicherheit bestimmen dabei die aktuellen Dokumente der Bundesregierung, so dass der Aspekt der mili-

[146] Immerhin gelten rund ein Drittel aller afrikanischen Staaten als so instabil, dass eine effektive Kontrolle des gesamten Staatsgebiets nicht möglich ist. Vgl. Herbst/Mills 2003: 21.

tärischen und zivilen Konfliktverhütung in der Kooperation mit Afrika an Bedeutung gewinnt (vgl. Engel/Kappel 2002).

Das zunehmende US-amerikanische Interesse an Afrika beruht hingegen auch auf energiepolitischen Überlegungen. So wirkt sich der wachsende Anteil der amerikanischen Erdölabhängigkeit von der Region erheblich auf das geostrategische Gewicht der Region aus (vgl. Keenan 2004: 478f.).

2.3.2 Militärinterventionen und Friedensmissionen

Militärische Aktionen externer Akteure wurden in Afrika bereits vielfach durchgeführt. Allerdings richtete sich der internationale Fokus in jüngster Vergangenheit verstärkt auf Afrika. Dabei machten einige Einsätze deutlich, welchen Einfluss externe Akteure hinsichtlich der zeitweiligen Stabilisierung von Krisenregionen im Einzelfall haben können.

- Von den 16 am 11. November 2004 laufenden *Peacekeeping*-Operationen der Vereinten Nationen entfallen sieben auf den afrikanischen Kontinent. Für diese Einsätze sieht das Jahresbudget (Juli 2004 bis Juni 2005) ein Volumen von 3,87 Mrd. US$ vor. Davon wird ein Großteil – nämlich 2,89 Mrd. US$ - für Maßnahmen in Afrika veranschlagt. Der weltweit größte Einsatz mit einer Truppenstärke von 14.500 Soldaten findet derweil in Liberia statt (vgl. Klingebiel 2005: 18).
- Die erste außereuropäische Militäraktion der EU fand von Juni bis September 2003 unter dem Namen „Operation Artémis“ in der Demokratischen Republik Kongo statt. Der Einsatz zielte darauf ab, Übergriffe verfeindeter Milizen auf die lokale Bevölkerung in der Region Bunia zu unterbinden. Auf Bitten der Vereinten Nationen wurde die *Mission de l'Organisation des Nation Unies en RD Congo* (MONUC) durch eine multinationale Eingreiftruppe unter Führung der EU eingesetzt, wobei Frankreich die Leitung der EU-Operation übernahm (vgl. Auswärtiges Amt 2004: 55ff.).
- Derweil bauen verschiedene Akteure Kapazitäten zum raschen militärischen Eingreifen auf. Von Bedeutung sind dabei die *Response Force* der NATO, die seit Oktober 2004 ihre vorläufige Einsatzfähigkeit erreicht hat, und das „*battle group*“-Konzept der Europäischen Union. Insbesondere Letzteres ist von großer Relevanz, da mögliche Einsätze in erster Linie für den afrikanischen Kontinent vorgesehen sind. Als gemeinsame Initiative hatten die EU-Verteidigungsminister im November 2004 ein entsprechendes Konzept vorgelegt. Insgesamt sollen 13 *battle groups* mit einer Größe von jeweils 1500 Soldaten entstehen, die mit einer Reaktionszeit von 15 Tagen verfügbar sein sollen. Frag-

lich ist jedoch, in welcher Form sich das Konzept konkret mit den afrikanischen Ansätzen (*African Standby Forces* u.a.) verbinden lässt (vgl. Europäische Union 2004).

- Militärhilfen und -trainingsprogramme für afrikanische Partner erhalten insbesondere durch die USA und andere G8-Mitglieder (Frankreich, Großbritannien u.a.) verstärkt Aufmerksamkeit. Im Rahmen des G8-Gipfels 2004 verkündeten die USA eine erhebliche Steigerung der Mittel in diesem Bereich auf 660 Mio. US$ für fünf Jahre, die im Wesentlichen für Afrika vorgesehen sind (vgl. Presseerklärung des *White House* vom 10.06.2004).

2.3.3 Politikfeldübergreifende Ansätze zur Unterstützung afrikanischer Fähigkeiten für Friedenseinsätze

Zur Unterstützung der afrikanischen Kapazitäten im Bereich Frieden und Sicherheit sind gemeinsame politikfeldübergreifende Ansätze externer Akteure sowie entwicklungspolitische Beiträge ein wichtiges Kennzeichen. Beide Tendenzen sind vergleichsweise neu. Dabei handelt es sich teilweise um grundsätzliche Anpassungen, die über Afrika hinausgehen. Hierfür lassen sich mehrere Beispiele anführen:

- So strebt die UN verstärkt umfassende Friedensmissionen in Afrika an. Integrierte Missionen mit zivilen und militärischen Elementen wurden erstmals in Sierra Leone, seitdem auch in anderen Ländern wie Angola, Burundi, Côte d'Ivoire und Liberia eingesetzt. Hierbei geht es in erster Linie um die gezielte gegenseitige Unterstützung von entwicklungspolitischen Ansätzen und dem abgestimmten Vorgehen der Friedenstruppen zur Stabilisierung der jeweiligen Krisenregion (vgl. Secretary General 2004: 8f.).
- Die G8 hat seit ihrem Gipfel 2002 in Kanada einen Afrika-Aktionsplan verabschiedet, der die Unterstützung afrikanischer Kapazitäten zur Verhütung und Bewältigung bewaffneter Konflikte als einen zentralen Schwerpunkt in der Partnerschaft mit Afrika vorsieht. Auf den Gipfeltreffen 2003 in Evian/Frankreich und 2004 in Sea Island/USA wurden weitere Pläne zur Umsetzung dieses Ziels aufgestellt. Dabei versteht sich die G8 als ein wesentlicher Motor und Unterstützer der laufenden Bemühungen auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent.
- Ein großes Gewicht kommt auch der von der Europäischen Union eingerichteten *Peace Facility for Africa* zu, die, basierend auf einem Vorschlag des EU-Kommissars Poul Nielson, von der Afrikanischen Union beantragt wurde und seit Mai 2004 eingesetzt werden kann. Ausgestattet mit 250 Mio. € dient die Friedensfazilität dazu, durch afrikanische Akteure umgesetzte *Peacekeeping*-Operationen zu finanzieren. So hat die EU be-

reits im Juni 2004 12 Mio. € und im Oktober 2004 weitere 80 Mio. € für die AU-Mission in Darfur bereitgestellt (vgl. Europäische Union 2004b).

- Die britische Regierung richtete 2001 zwei ressortübergreifende Finanzierungspools – davon einer mit dem regionalen Fokus auf Afrika – ein, um gemeinsame konfliktbezogene Vorhaben verschiedener Ressorts fördern zu können. Beteiligt sind das *Foreign and Commonwealth Office* (FCO), das *Department for International Development* (DFID) und das *Ministry of Defense* (MOD), wobei die Federführung für den Afrika-Pool beim DFID liegt (vgl. Klingebiel/Roehder 2004: 30ff.).
- Verschiedene Geber (Deutschland, Kanada u.a.) unterstützen die Kapazitäten des *Peace and Security Directorate* der Afrikanischen Union, wobei das UN-Entwicklungsprogramm (UNDP) hierbei eine Katalysatorrolle einnimmt (vgl. Secretary General 2004: 12).

2.4 Chancen und Risiken der neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitskonstruktion

Wie aus den vorhergehenden Ausführungen deutlich geworden ist, besteht ein relativer Bedeutungszuwachs Subsahara-Afrikas für politisches Handeln in verschiedener Hinsicht. Dieser gewachsene Stellenwert liegt im afrikanischen Interesse und zugleich in dem der Europäischen Union und der gesamten internationalen Gemeinschaft. Dabei erscheint es sinnvoll, dass Afrika nicht allein von der Entwicklungspolitik, sondern ebenso von anderen Politikbereichen verstärkt auf die politische Prioritätenliste gesetzt wird. Schließlich hat das Interesse an Afrika auch einen instrumentellen Charakter, weil es vielfach nicht in erster Linie um Frieden und Sicherheit des afrikanischen Kontinents per se, sondern um die Gefährdungen Dritter – insbesondere der USA und Europa – und deren Interessen geht[147]:

„Militärische Ansätze wie das battle group-Konzept sind […] nicht als Reaktion auf originäre afrikanische Sicherheitsinteressen zu sehen, sondern Afrika ist […] zum potentiellen Einsatzgebiet im Rahmen neuer Aufgaben für die militärische Sicherheitspolitik geworden“ (Klingebiel 2005: 21).

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird sich das bereits in der Vergangenheit vorhandene Dilemma von militärischer Intervention und Nicht-Intervention auch zukünftig verstärkt auftun. Die entscheidende Frage lautet dabei: Welche militärische Intervention ist gerechtfertigt, welche Intervention sollte angesichts der Dringlichkeit einer humanitären Katastrophe und gleichzeitiger Untätigkeit der internationalen Gemeinschaft stattfinden? Schließlich dürfte kaum damit zu rechnen sein, dass bis zum geplanten Datum 2010 der Aufbau der *African Standby Forces* abgeschlossen ist und diese Einsatzkräfte die zu erwartenden militärischen Fähigkeiten auf-

[147] So stehen vor allem Überlegungen zu Fragen der Energieversorgung und Migration im Vordergrund.

bringen können. Zudem dürfte die Bereitschaft von außen, sich in extremen Situationen – ohne die unmittelbare Berührung eigener Interessen – militärisch zu engagieren, weiterhin gering bleiben. Dies gilt vor allem für nicht-klassische Kriegssituationen, bei denen zunehmend nichtstaatliche Gewaltakteure auftreten.[148] Daher weisen einige Beobachter mit Recht auf die Risiken des neu geweckten Interesses an Afrika hin. Insbesondere in der Afrikapolitik von Präsident Bush sieht man Gefahren in den neuerlichen strategischen Überlegungen. Demnach nehmen periphere Zonen nun die Position ein, die mit der Situation des Kalten Krieges vergleichbar ist (vgl. Prendergast 2003: 5).

Angesichts der laufenden Debatten über die afrikanische Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur sowie den Verbindungen zu zentralen internationalen Diskussionen ist es sinnvoll, Standards für die Unterstützung durch externe Akteure zu finden. Insbesondere für die Entwicklungspolitik sind viele Fragen in diesem Zusammenhang neu und praktische Erfahrungen Mangelware. Vor diesem Hintergrund bieten sich für die Entwicklung eine Reihe von Orientierungspunkten an. So müsste den zivilen Präventionsbemühungen oberste Priorität zukommen. Die Eröffnung neuer militärischer Kapazitäten sollte keinesfalls zu einem Automatismus beitragen, der den Einsatz militärischer Optionen begünstigt. Auch wenn manche Situationen einen militärischen Eingriff erforderlich machen, sollte dieser stets als „letzte Möglichkeit“ in Betracht gezogen werden. Daher muss der Vorrang ziviler Mittel eindeutig durch den konsequenten Aufbau ziviler Kapazitäten erkennbar sein. Erscheint ein militärisches Engagement dennoch notwendig, muss seine völkerrechtliche Legalität und Legitimation gewährleistet sein. Einem solchen Anspruch wird man zukünftig vor allem dann gerecht, wenn das Engagement einen Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Sicherheit der lokalen Bevölkerung leistet (vgl. Secretary General 2004: 13f.). Die politische Führung des Einsatzes von außen sollte indes bei den afrikanischen Strukturen liegen, die in Form der Afrikanischen Union eine solche Rolle zu Recht für sich beanspruchen.

Die an die afrikanische Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur gerichteten Erwartungen sind gewaltig und teilweise sicherlich überzogen. Es wäre vermessen, von der AU und den regionalen Mechanismen funktionsfähige und wirksame Antworten in allen auftretenden Krisen- und Konfliktsituationen zu verlangen. Nichtsdestotrotz gilt es der militärischen Unterstützung nachprüfbare Verbesserungen im verantwortungsvollen Regierungshandeln der afrikanischen Partner vorauszusetzen. Das gegenwärtige Wohlwollen externer Akteure gegenüber der Afri-

[148] Hier sei nur exemplarisch auf die komplexe Problemlage im Umgang mit Kindersoldaten hingewiesen.

kanischen Union sollte dazu führen, klare Veränderungen im Laufe des Prozesses zu verlangen.

Insgesamt sind die bisherigen afrikanischen Bemühungen zur Umsetzung einer neuen Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur positiv zu bewerten. Unübersehbar ist jedoch, dass viele Kapazitäten noch nicht vorhanden sind. Aus diesem Grund sind einige der formulierten Ziele als derzeitig unrealistisch einzustufen.[149] Daher wird sich in Zukunft verstärkt die Frage stellen, wie eine handlungsfähige Afrikanische Union bzw. die Finanzierung der afrikanischen Friedens- und Sicherheitsarchitektur garantiert werden kann. Dass ein Großteil der Finanzierung von externen Akteuren getragen werden muss, steht dabei außer Frage. Nicht zuletzt die AU-Mission in Darfur hat dies gezeigt, wo der überwiegende Teil durch die EU, die USA und andere Geber geleistet wurde (vgl. African Union 2004: 7f.). Ob die externen Geber langfristig dazu bereit sind, diese notwendigen Mittel aufzubringen, ist eine weitere Frage. Prinzipiell ist der *Ownership*-Ansatz der Afrikanischen Union für Frieden und Sicherheit sicherlich richtig, doch steht er im Widerspruch zu den eigenen Umsetzungs- und Finanzierungsmöglichkeiten. Folglich wäre die AU nur dann handlungsfähig, wenn die relevanten Geber die Politik der AU mittragen bzw. finanzieren.

3. Zusammenfassung: Europäische Entwicklungspolitik und afrikanisches Sicherheitsstreben

Die Idee eines gemeinsamen Agierens auf dem Feld der Außenbeziehungen hat für die Vielzahl der EU-Mitgliedstaaten an Bedeutung gewonnen. Durch die Ereignisse und Folgen des 11. Septembers rücken zudem sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitische Überlegungen verstärkt in den Vordergrund. Dies schlägt sich deutlich in der formulierten Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie nieder, die erstmals konkrete gemeinsame strategische Zielsetzungen nennt. Ihr zufolge ist eine zukunftsfähige Sicherheitspolitik nicht nur von militärischen Kapazitäten abhängig, sondert basiert ebenso auf der Fähigkeit, politische und sozio-ökonomische Krisen durch eine Kombination aus zivilen und militärischen Komponenten zu entschärfen. Der Aspekt des nachhaltigen Handelns in Krisen- und Konfliktregionen wird stärker denn je einbezogen, so dass der Entwicklungspolitik – als jahrelanger Verfechter einer nachhaltigen Politik – ein neuerliches Interesse zukommt. Zuvor oftmals von vielen als ein Nebenschauplatz der Außenpolitik eingestuft, gilt es nun die erfolgreichen der über Jahrzehnte gewonnenen Kenntnisse und Methoden der Entwicklungspolitik in das neu zu definierende weite Feld der Au-

[149] So erscheint die Etablierung aller fünf regionalen Eingreiftruppen unter den gegenwärtigen Rahmenbedingungen utopisch.

ßenbeziehungen zu integrieren. Entwicklungspolitik kann demnach zu einem mitbestimmenden Faktor der außenpolitischen Sicherheitsüberlegungen Europas avancieren. Folglich könnte ein erfolgreiches außenpolitisches Handeln der EU künftig aus einer abgewogenen Mixtur von Sicherheits-, Handels- und Entwicklungspolitik bestehen. Diese Verknüpfung von Entwicklungs- und Sicherheitspolitik beruht auf der nachvollziehbaren Überlegung, dass Sicherheit nicht ohne Entwicklung gewährleistet werden kann, wie auch gleichermaßen Entwicklung ohne Sicherheit nicht möglich erscheint.
In diesem Rahmen müssen sich beide Politikfelder einander annähern. Für die Sicherheitspolitik bedeutet dies auf langfristige Sicht eine grundlegende Neuausrichtung. Zum einen sprechen moralische Gründe dafür, zum anderen veranlasst das bestehende Eigeninteresse ein engeres Zusammenwirken. Die Entwicklungspolitik muss sich hingegen verstärkt sicherheitspolitisch relevanten Themen zuwenden. Dabei sollte sie in genau jenen Themenbereichen ihre komparativen Stärken ausspielen, in denen die klassische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik konzeptionell vergleichsweise unterbelichtet ist. Von Seiten der Entwicklungspolitik ist daher zu erwarten, dass sie ein schlüssiges Konzept der bewährten Praktiken vorlegt, die zum Umgang mit sicherheitspolitisch bedeutsamen Themen geeignet ist. Damit eine solche pro-aktive Positionierung der Entwicklungspolitik im sicherheitspolitischen Bereich gelingen kann, muss sich die europäische Entwicklung organisatorisch und inhaltlich neu ausrichten.

Der Anspruch einer global ausgerichteten Sicherheits- und Friedensagenda ist ambitioniert und lässt sich von den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten alleine sicherlich nicht durchsetzen. Zur Umsetzung der Strategie ist die Kooperation mit ähnlichen Strukturen notwendig. In Bezug auf Afrika bedeutet dies eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit mit der Afrikanischen Union, deren Sicherheits- und Friedensarchitektur sich im Aufbau befindet. Erste Einsätze der *African Standby Forces* in Burundi und Darfur wurden auf internationaler Ebene als konstruktiv bewertet, wobei hier insbesondere die mangelnden Kapazitäten zutage kamen.
Insgesamt erfährt Afrika in der neuen internationalen Sicherheitsagenda und der damit einhergehenden geostrategischen Interessenbestimmung einen Bedeutungszuwachs. Dabei hat das Interesse an Afrika nicht unbedingt etwas mit dem Bestreben um Frieden und Sicherheit auf dem afrikanischen Kontinenten zu tun, sondern mit der Gefährdung der eigenen Interessen. Dies gilt sicherlich auch für Europa. Wie man dieses Bestreben auch einzuschätzen vermag, so hat es doch den politischen Willen zur verstärkten Unterstützung afrikanischer Akteure gestärkt. Die Bereitschaft, sich in extremen Situationen militärisch zu engagieren, bleibt jedoch nach wie vor gering.

Die EU sieht ihre Aufgabe vor allem in der finanziellen Unterstützung der Sicherheits- und Friedensarchitektur der Afrikanischen Union. Die von der EU eingerichtete *Peace Facility for Africa* – ausgestattet mit 250 Mio. € - ist seit Mai 2004 einsetzbar und dient der Finanzierung von *Peacekeeping*-Operationen durch afrikanische Akteure. Zudem sollen 13 *battle groups* entstehen, die kurzfristig einsetzbar sind. Konkrete Konzeptionen stehen derweil noch nicht zur Verfügung, so dass die Europäische Union ihr Engagement in Afrika vorerst in erster Linie auf die umfassende finanzielle Unterstützung afrikanischer Kapazitäten beschränkt. Der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik als Teil der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik kommt in diesem Zusammenhang die Aufgabe der Stärkung ziviler Kapazitäten zu.

„Die Union ist fest überzeugt davon, dass es politisch und moralisch inakzeptabel ist, dass über eine Milliarde Menschen auf unserem Planeten mit weniger als einem Euro pro Tag ums Überleben kämpfen müssen. Diese Zahl wird wohl im Zuge des Bevölkerungswachstums auf der Erde weiter ansteigen. Deshalb ist die Bekämpfung der Armut die zentrale Stoßrichtung der Bemühungen der EU in der Entwicklungspolitik, wobei sie sich auf eine kleinere Anzahl von Politikbereichen konzentriert" (Europäische Kommission 2001d: 28).

Kapitel V.
Armutsbekämpfung - nur eine entwicklungspolitische Vision?

Spätestens seit dem Millenniumsgipfel der Vereinten Nationen vom September 2000 ist das Thema der Armutsbekämpfung auf der Prioritätenliste der internationalen Entwicklungsagenda wieder weit nach oben gerückt, obwohl die Erkenntnis, dass Globalisierung und Liberalisierung nicht automatisch zur Beseitigung der weltweiten Armut führen, schon länger allgemeine Zustimmung gefunden hat. In der Millenniumserklärung verpflichtet sich die Weltgemeinschaft zu einer Reihe von klar definierten sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Zielen, von denen die Halbierung der extremen Armut bis zum Jahr 2015 das bekannteste und gleichwohl ambitionierteste darstellt.

Extrem arm sind den Kriterien der Weltbank und der UN zufolge diejenigen, die mit weniger als einem Dollar pro Tag ihren Lebensunterhalt bestreiten müssen. Diese Definition extremer Armut traf Anfang der 1990er Jahre auf circa 1,2 Milliarden Menschen zu. Seitdem wurden – mit der Ausnahme Chinas und einiger südostasiatischer Staaten – in der Armutsbekämpfung nur geringe Erfolge erzielt. Alleine in Subsahara-Afrika beläuft sich die Zahl der extrem Armen gegenwärtig auf 360 Millionen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 12). Dies entspricht in etwa der Hälfte der Bevölkerung, wobei nach derzeitigen Schätzungen die Zahl der extrem Armen bis 2015 weiter zunehmen wird (vgl. Klingebiel 2005: 1). Vor diesem Hintergrund müssen alle Akteure ihre Bestrebungen zur Erreichung der Millenniumsziele verstärken. Dies trifft auch für die Europäische Union zu, der als zweitgrößte Geberin von Entwicklungshilfe eine bedeutende Rolle zukommt. Im Folgenden sollen die diesbezüglichen Initiativen und Bemühungen der EU zur Armutsbekämpfung untersucht werden, wobei der Fokus stets auf die Diskrepanz zwischen formulierten Ansprüchen und der tatsächlichen Umsetzung derselben gerichtet ist.

Abbildung V-1: Regionale Verteilung der extremen Armut in Entwicklungs- und Transformationsländern



Quelle: BMZ 2001.

1. Grundlegende Überlegungen zum Armutsbegriff

Die Frage nach der Definition von Armut mag nicht ganz unproblematisch sein, doch haben sich im Laufe der Zeit eine Reihe von Kriterien herauskristallisiert, auf die auch die Überlegungen der entwicklungspolitischen Akteure aufbauen. Einen Meilenstein in der Herausbildung eines allgemein anerkannten Armutsbegriffs stellte hierbei der erstmals 1990 erschienene und seitdem jährlich erscheinende *Human Development Report* und die Schaffung eines *„Human Development Index“* (HDI) dar. Letzterer misst den Grad menschlicher Entwicklung anhand dreier Indikatoren: der Lebenserwartung bei der Geburt, der Alphabetisierungsrate und der realen Kaufkraft.[150] Neben dem HDI hat der menschenrechtsbezogene Ansatz das Verständnis von Armut und Entwicklung durch die Einbeziehung von neuen Dimensionen wesentlich erweitert. So fließen in diesem Kontext Überlegungen zum Zugang zu sozialen Grunddiensten – vor allem im Gesundheits- und Bildungswesen – mit ein. Demnach ist Armut nicht als reine Einkommensarmut zu verstehen, die mit der Bereitstellung von zusätzlichen Nahrungsmitteln und der Erhöhung der Tageseinkommen getilgt werden kann. Vielmehr fordert dieses Armutsverständnis auch eine Verbesserung der Gesundheitsversorgung und

[150] Vormals diente im Wesentlichen das „Pro-Kopf-Einkommen“ sowie die Ernährungssicherung – gemessen an der Verfügbarkeit von Nahrungsmitteln – als Maßstab des Entwicklungsstandes eines Landes.

Strategien für eine universelle Grundausbildung, für mehr Gleichberechtigung und ökologische Nachhaltigkeit (vgl. Fischer/Wils 2003: 8). Oder anders formuliert:

„Macht- und Rechtlosigkeit und die fehlenden Möglichkeiten, die eigenen Interessen überhaupt zu artikulieren, sind ebenso Elemente von Armut wie tägliche existenzielle Sorgen oder die Angst vor der Zukunft" (Van Reisen 2002: 5).

Tabelle V-1: Die Millennium Development Goals

Ziel 1: Beseitigung der extremen Armut und des Hungers	
Zielvorgabe 1:	Den Anteil der Menschen halbieren, deren Einkommen weniger als ein Dollar pro Tag beträgt.
Zielvorgabe 2:	Den Anteil der Menschen halbieren, die Hunger leiden.
Ziel 2: Verwirklichung der allgemeinen Primarschulbildung	
Zielvorgabe 3:	Sicherstellen, dass alle Jungen und Mädchen eine Primarschulbildung vollständig abschließen können.
Ziel 3: Förderung der Gleichheit der Geschlechter und Ermächtigung der Frauen	
Zielvorgabe 4:	Das Geschlechtergefälle in der Primar- und Sekundarschulbildung beseitigen, vorzugsweise bis 2005, und auf allen Bildungsebenen bis spätestens 2015.
Ziel 4: Senkung der Kindersterblichkeit	
Zielvorgabe 5:	Die Sterblichkeitsrate von Kindern unter fünf Jahren um zwei Drittel senken.
Ziel 5: Verbesserung der Gesundheit von Müttern	
Zielvorgabe 6:	Die Müttersterblichkeitsrate noch vor 2015 um drei Viertel senken.
Ziel 6: Bekämpfung von HIV/AIDS, Malaria und anderen Krankheiten	
Zielvorgabe 7:	Die Ausbreitung von HIV/AIDS zum Stillstand bringen und allmählich umkehren.
Zielvorgabe 8:	Die Ausbreitung von Malaria und anderen schweren Krankheiten zum Stillstand bringen und allmählich umkehren.
Ziel 7: Sicherung der ökologischen Nachhaltigkeit	
Zielvorgabe 9:	Die Grundsätze der nachhaltigen Entwicklung in die Politik und Programme jedes einzelnen Staates einbeziehen und den Verlust von Umweltressourcen beseitigen.
Zielvorgabe 10:	Den Anteil der Menschen um die Hälfte senken, die keinen nachhaltigen Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser haben.
Zielvorgabe 11:	Bis 2020 eine erhebliche Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen von mindestens 100 Millionen Slumbewohnern herbeiführen.
Ziel 8: Aufbau einer weltweiten Entwicklungspartnerschaft	
Zielvorgabe 12:	Ein offenes, regelgestütztes, berechenbares und nicht-diskriminierendes Handels- und Finanzsystem weiterentwickeln. Umfasst die Verpflichtung auf eine gute Regierungs- und Verwaltungsführung, die Entwicklung und die Armutsreduzierung sowohl auf nationaler als auch auf internationaler Ebene.
Zielvorgabe 13:	Den besonderen Bedürfnissen der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder Rechnung tragen. Dies umfasst einen zoll- und quotenfreien Zugang für Exportgüter dieser Länder, ein verstärktes Schuldenerleichterungsprogramm für die hochverschuldeten armen Länder und die Streichung der bilateralen öffentlichen Schulden sowie die Gewährung großzügiger öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe für Länder, die zur Armutsminderung entschlossen sind.
Zielvorgabe 14:	Den besonderen Bedürfnissen der Binnen- und kleinen Inselentwicklungsländer Rechnung tragen.
Zielvorgabe 15:	Die Schuldenprobleme der Entwicklungsländer durch Maßnahmen auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene umfassend angehen und so die Schulden langfristig tragbar werden lassen.
Zielvorgabe 16:	In Zusammenarbeit mit den Entwicklungsländern Strategien zur Beschaffung menschenwürdiger und produktiver Arbeit für junge Menschen erarbeiten und umsetzen.
Zielvorgabe 17:	In Zusammenarbeit mit den Pharmaunternehmen erschwingliche unentbehrliche Medikamente in den Entwicklungsländern verfügbar machen.
Zielvorgabe 18:	In Zusammenarbeit mit dem Privatsektor dafür sorgen, dass die Vorteile der neuen Technologien – insbesondere der Informations- und Kommunikationstechnologien – genutzt werden können.

Quelle: Hamm 2004: 8.

Somit bedeuten die 2015-Ziele in vielen Bereichen nichts anderes, als die bereits 1966 im Internationalen Pakt über wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Rechte der Vereinten Nationen kodifizierten Menschenrechte zu realisieren. Diese Perspektive des auf den Menschenrechten basierenden Entwicklungsansatzes verschiebt die entwicklungspolitische Debatte von der Wohltätigkeit zur Partnerschaft und damit zur Förderung der Selbsttätigkeit der von Armut Betroffenen (vgl. Hamm 2004: 5ff.).

Zur Durchsetzung der hochgesteckten Ziele ist ein ganzes Bündel von Maßnahmen notwendig, die auf die Schlüsselbereiche der menschlichen Entwicklung abzielen. Eine erfolgreiche Armutsbekämpfung muss alle mit der Thematik in Verbindung stehenden Akteure und Sektoren einbeziehen. Erfolgreiche bzw. nachhaltige Entwicklungsprogramme setzen voraus, dass alle involvierten Bevölkerungsgruppen in die Überlegungen miteinbezogen werden. Nachhaltige Erfolge können nur erzielt werden, wenn eine aktive Partizipation der Zivilgesellschaft erfolgt, d.h. wenn den Betroffenen ein wirkliches Mitspracherecht in den sie betreffenden Fragen von Entwicklung zugestanden wird (vgl. Van Reisen 2002: 9f.).

2. Die Armutsbekämpfung der Europäischen Union

Mit der Entscheidung des Europäischen Rates von Sevilla am 21./22. Juni 2002, den Rat der Entwicklungsminister in den Rat für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten und Außenbeziehungen zu integrieren, hat sich die Ausgangslage für eine breit angelegte Reform der EU-Entwicklungspolitik verschlechtert. Welche Konsequenzen die Entscheidung von Sevilla für eine am Primat der Armutsbekämpfung orientierte Reform im Einzelnen haben wird, ist derzeit jedoch noch nicht absehbar.

Klar ist jedoch, dass die Europäische Union erst relativ spät die Notwendigkeit einer konsistenten Armutsbekämpfung entdeckte. Mittlerweile aber reiht sie sich in die globalen Orientierungen ein, denen auch die Armutskonzepte der deutschen Regierung, der Vereinten Nationen und der Weltbank zugrunde liegen. Besonders deutlich wurde dies erst in den kürzlich geführten Verhandlungen der EU mit den AKP-Staaten. So bezog man ausdrücklich Maßnahmen zur Armutsbekämpfung in die konkrete Arbeit auf der Makro-, Meso- und Mikroebene ein.[151] Zudem weist die Einbindung der Europäischen Union in die Strukturanpassungsprogramme

[151] Auf der Makroebene ging es dabei neben einer besseren Gestaltung der Rahmenbedingungen um Fragen des internationalen Handels und der globalen und regionalen Wirtschaftspolitik sowie der Steuer- und Außenhandelspolitik. Auf der Mesoebene standen Fragen nach Institutionen, die für eine wirksame Armutsbekämpfung erforderlich sind, im Vordergrund. Zu den Einwirkungen auf der Mikroebene gab es aufgrund der lokalspezifischen Bedingungen und der unterschiedlichen Projektansätze eine Vielzahl von unterschiedlichen Themenschwerpunkten. Vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999b: 310.

der Weltbank darauf hin, dass sich die EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit verstärkt an einer Gesamtstrategie zur Armutsbekämpfung ausrichtet, um eine besonders in ihren Anfängen kritisierte bloße Aneinanderreihung unterschiedlicher Instrumente zu vermeiden (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999).

2.1 Der Weg hin zu einer armutsorientierten Entwicklungspolitik: eine Retrospektive

In der Armutsbekämpfung der EU erhielten auf der Meso- und Mikroebene die Programme für Mikroprojekte, für dezentralisierte Kooperation und zur Förderung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen ein besonderes Gewicht. In der Konzeptionsdebatte gehören sie zur Kategorie direkter und indirekter Maßnahmen zur gezielten Armutsverringerung. Eine nähere Betrachtung der praktischen Anwendung der auf diesen beiden Ebenen angesiedelten EU-Entwicklungsinstrumente zeigt allerdings, dass in der Umsetzung Schwierigkeiten in Zusammenhang mit den Zielen der Armutsverringerung auftreten können. Gemessen an den Auswirkungen müssen die bis dato erzielten Ergebnisse als eher gering eingestuft werden. Viele der Administratoren in der EU und in den Entwicklungsländern konnten innerhalb der gegebenen Strukturen die komplexen Zusammenhänge partizipativer Entwicklung mit den damit verbundenen hohen Anforderungen in Bezug auf Kenntnisse und Motivation noch nicht mit der Praxis vereinen. So ergeben sich immer wieder Diskrepanzen zwischen dem Bedarf und der Verfügbarkeit an qualifiziertem Personal. Eine verstärkte Einbindung von lokalen sowie externen privaten Akteuren könnte folglich eine Arbeitserleichterung für die Institutionen darstellen, wobei dieser Überlegung der essentielle Nachteil gegenübersteht, dass die zuständigen Vertreter der Institutionen in der EU und den AKP-Ländern nicht unmittelbar an den notwendigen Lernprozessen teilnehmen würden. Es bestände somit die Gefahr, dass bereits gemachte Fehler wiederholt werden und die in den Projekten gewonnenen Erkenntnisse den externen Experten vorenthalten bleiben (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999b: 312).

Die Zusammenhänge von Schwächen in den konzeptionellen Grundlagen und der praktischen Umsetzung werden aus einem Rückblick auf die Entstehung der europäischen Entwicklungskooperation besonders deutlich. So entstand die EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Wesentlichen aus dem kolonialen Nachlass der einzelnen europäischen Staaten. Der Beginn der EWG markierte im Jahr 1957 die Grundkonzepte der späteren europäischen Entwicklungskooperation, die von einer „Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung der Länder und Hoheitsgebiete und der Herstellung enger Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen ihnen und der gesamten Gemeinschaft“ (EWG-Vertrag Art. 131) ausging. Die Sonderstellung der ehemaligen Kolonien wurde im Verlauf der Programme auf weitere Länder übertragen, die

der Konvention beitraten. Der im Zuge des EEF aufkommende „Geist von Lomé“ verband die Partner in der gemeinsamen Suche nach einem Höchstmaß an Zusammenarbeit und in dem Wunsch, etwas zu der schwierigen Genese einer neuen internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung beizutragen. Ein Konzept zur Armutsbekämpfung lässt sich zu dieser Zeit allerdings noch nicht erkennen. Ein allmähliches Umdenken setzte erst mit dem Pisani-Memorandum von 1982 ein, welches die Notwendigkeit der Ernährungssicherung der Bevölkerung und der Armutsbekämpfung unterstrich. Man rückte von der Idee der ausschließlichen Eigenverantwortung der AKP-Staaten ab und rückte anstelle dessen den Politikdialog in den Vordergrund. So wurden im Lomé-IV-Abkommen erstmals politische Konditionalitäten und wirtschaftliche Strukturanpassungsprogramme fixiert. Entsprechend euphorisch wurde dieses Abkommen als Meilenstein der Entwicklungskooperation gefeiert. Die Bilanz bisheriger Erfolge bzw. Misserfolge dämpfen jedoch mittlerweile allzu hohe Erwartungen (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999b 313).

Neue Impulse für die EU-Entwicklungspolitik brachte der 1992 unterzeichnete Maastrichter Vertrag zur europäischen Einigung. Neuere Rahmenbedingungen entstanden nicht zuletzt auch durch den Zusammenbruch des Ostblocks sowie die Gründung der WTO. Von dieser Konstellation – als zukünftig wichtigster Wirtschaftsblock – ausgehend, sieht sich die EU als zentrale Figur einer partnerschaftlichen Nord-Süd-Zusammenarbeit. Selbstkritisch konstatierte man jedoch, dass angesichts der bisherigen Bilanz die Unterentwicklung des Südens höhere Kosten für den Norden nach sich ziehen müsse. Schließlich seien nicht zuletzt die Wirtschaftsmodelle des Nordens eine schwere Hypothek für den Süden und schränken dessen langfristige Entwicklungsaussichten ein (vgl. Kommission der EG 1992: 8ff.). Aus dieser Erkenntnis heraus formulierte die EU vier vorrangige Ziele der Entwicklungskooperation, in der die Armutsbekämpfung eine der Prioritäten darstellt: 1. die Förderung der Demokratie, 2. eine harmonische Integration der Dritten Welt in die Weltwirtschaft, 3. die Priorität der Armutsbekämpfung, 4. eine nachhaltige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung. „Good Governance“, institutionelle Reformen sowie wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung stellen somit entscheidende Parameter für eine Neuordnung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit dar. Sie sollen dazu dienen, dass Wirtschaftsakteure, politische Organisationen und gesellschaftliche Gruppen die geschaffenen Handlungsspielräume nutzen, um mit ihrem Einsatz zur Verringerung und letztendlich zur Beseitigung von Armut beizutragen.

Will man anhand dieser Ansprüche die Frage beantworten, was die EU bisher erreicht hat, so ergeben sich bei den Basisdaten Probleme. Unterschiedliche Quellen kommen zu ganz verschiedenen Schätzwerten, welche die für die Armutsbekämpfung aufgewendeten EU-Mittel auf 15 bis 25 Prozent veranschlagen (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999b: 314). Nicht zuletzt die erst im

Maastricht-Vertrag verankerte formale Anerkennung der Armutsbekämpfung als zentrale Maßnahme der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erschwert eine diesbezüglich genaue Bestimmung.

2.2 Die armutsrelevanten Instrumente der EU-Entwicklungshilfe

Von den Instrumenten der EU-Entwicklungshilfe lassen sich vor allem drei als „tauglich“ in Bezug auf die Armutsbekämpfung charakterisieren, die auch in den Diskussionen um neue Entwicklungsstrategien, um die Einbeziehung der Zivilgesellschaft und Demokratisierung von Bedeutung sind. Zum einen handelt es sich um die Förderung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen, zum zweiten um Programme für die Durchführung von Mikroprojekten und zum dritten um die dezentralisierte Zusammenarbeit. Alle drei Instrumente überschneiden sich teilweise.

2.2.1 Nichtregierungsorganisationen

NROen gelten beispielsweise als potentielle Hauptakteure sowohl bei Mikroprojekten als auch bei Programmen dezentralisierter Kooperation. NROen nehmen demnach eine Vermittlerfunktion zwischen der EU und den Zielgruppen ein. Bezogen auf die Armutsbekämpfung haben die Programme auf der Mikroebene eine besondere Relevanz, da sie in erster Linie auf die Grundbedürfnisse der armen Bevölkerung eingehen und in weitestem Maße Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe leisten. Ihre Effektivität wird jedoch dadurch eingeschränkt, dass die für diesen Zweig der Entwicklungshilfe zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel immer noch relativ gering sind und nur einen Bruchteil der Bevölkerung erreichen. Als basisnahe Programme konnten sie die Probleme des hohen Bedarfs an qualifiziertem Personal noch nicht lösen. Zudem wird die notwendige Kontinuität an Personal- und Finanzausstattung nur selten zufrieden stellend gewährleistet.

Mittels der NROen versucht die EU, die ärmsten Teile der Bevölkerung effektiv über lokale Organisationen zu erreichen. Die Grundlage hierfür bildet das 1976 eingesetzte Kofinanzierungsprogramm, demzufolge die EU Gelder an NROen ausschüttet, damit diese Programme und Projekte in Entwicklungsländern unterhalten können. Eine genaue Aufstellung der diesbezüglich vergebenen Mittel ist allerdings nicht möglich, da diese Form der Unterstützung in die Gesamtstatistik der sektoralen Förderung einfließt (z.B. Landwirtschaft, humanitäre Hilfe etc.). Es ist jedoch davon auszugehen, dass die an NROen vergebene EU-Hilfe aufgrund dieser Konstellation eher unterschätzt wird (vgl. Cox/Healey 1998).

Die EU-Förderung von NROen verläuft im ständigen Spannungsfeld zwischen EU, europäischen NROen und Nord-Süd-NROen. Besonders in den ärmsten Entwicklungsländern erge-

ben sich Interessenskonflikte zwischen schwachen staatlichen Institutionen und NROen über Zuständigkeiten und Aufgabengebiete, da die staatlichen Akteure in der Finanzierung von NROen eine Schwächung ihrer Positionen sehen. Auf EU-Ebene wurde als Basis für Informationsaustausch, Koordination und Einflussnahme auf die Entwicklungspolitik ein NRO-Verbindungsbüro in Brüssel eingerichtet, das inzwischen mehr als 1000 NROen aus EU-Ländern vertritt. Unter einem Dachverband sind somit Organisationen unterschiedlichster Strukturen und Kapazitäten sowie mit häufig divergierenden Interessen zusammengefasst, was einer Festlegung genereller Ziele nicht unbedingt dienlich ist. Aus diesem Grund kam es auf Konferenzen zum Thema „Beteiligung der NROen an der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit“ nicht selten zu eher allgemeinen Empfehlungen, die nur bedingt neue Impulse für die EU-Entwicklungspolitik geben konnten (vgl. Liaison Committee 1997). Insofern stellt sich die Frage, welche Rolle und Bedeutung dem Verbindungsbüro zukünftig überhaupt zukommen soll.

2.2.2 Mikroprojekte

Die Möglichkeit der Finanzierung von Mikroprojekten wurde 1975 in der ersten Lomé-Konvention festgeschrieben und seitdem mit leichten Veränderungen in jeder Vertragsrunde erneuert. Mikroprojekte können demnach auf Antrag eines AKP-Staates in den jeweiligen nationalen „Richtplan“ aufgenommen werden. Ziel der Programme sind wirtschaftliche und soziale Verbesserungen für die lokale Bevölkerung, die den lokalen Entwicklungsprioritäten entsprechen und eine aktive Beteiligung der Zielgruppen verlangen. Zur Realisierung des Projekts muss die lokale Bevölkerung Arbeitsleistungen und Dienste erbringen oder Geldbeträge sammeln, die mindestens ein Viertel des Projektwertes ausmachen. Im Rahmen des letzten EU-AKP-Partnerschaftsabkommens belief sich die Höchstsumme für ein solches Mikroprojekt auf 300.000 €, wobei diese Obergrenze bislang in keinem Fall erreicht wurde. Vielmehr bewegten sich die durchschnittlichen Ausgaben im Bereich von weniger als einem Zehntel der Vorgaben (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999b: 318).

Die Umsetzung von Programmen für Mikroprojekte ging zunächst meist von Mitarbeitern der EU-Vertretungen zusammen mit dem jeweils zuständigen Ministerium des AKP-Landes aus. Mittlerweile werden jedoch auch NROen als Partner einbezogen. Zur Durchführung richtete man regionale Büros ein, trotzdem blieb die Gliederung der Programme weitestgehend hierarchisch und von einer Zentrale kontrolliert. In mehrjähriger Laufzeit konnten die unterschiedlichen Programme auf diese Weise hunderte von Klein- und Kleinstprojekten verwirklichen. Nach Häufigkeit angeordnet gehören hierzu Brunnenbau, kleine Stauwehre, Bewässerungsan-

lagen, der Bau von Schulen, Gesundheitsstationen, Lagerhäusern und Anlagen für Erosionsschutz. In der Retrospektive muss allerdings konstatiert werden, dass insbesondere in den Anfangsjahren Mikroprojekte als Instrument der Regierungen der AKP-Staaten fungierten, anstatt als Hilfsmittel der lokalen Bevölkerung zu dienen. Personalabbau in staatlichen Institutionen im Rahmen von Strukturanpassungsprogrammen einerseits, aber auch die Stärkung von dezentralen Strukturen und NROen andererseits trugen in einigen Programmen dazu bei, dass die Arbeit näher an die Zielgruppen angesiedelt wurde (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999). Problematisch ist jedoch nach wie vor die unzureichende Verfügung über angemessene personelle Kapazitäten. Dies trifft sowohl auf die EU-Vertretungen in den AKP-Ländern als auch auf die zuständigen Ministerien zu. Folglich suchen die staatlichen Akteure verstärkt den Kontakt zu Entwicklungsorganisationen. Entsprechende Kooperationsverträge werden vor allem in Ländern mit schwachen staatlichen Strukturen abgeschlossen. Hierhinter steckt die Idee, dass die EU-Vertretungen und die verantwortlichen Ministerien Partner suchen, die Programme auf den unterschiedlichen Ebenen weitgehend selbständig durchführen und die finanziellen Mittel effektiv verwalten können. Zusätzlich geht es um die Vermittlung von qualifiziertem Personal, für welches die Organisationen zum Teil Ausbildung, Einsatz und Betreuung übernehmen sollen.

Welche Rolle Programme für Mikroprojekte in Bezug auf die Armutsbekämpfung spielen können, hängt derweil von mehreren Faktoren ab. Da Kleinprojekte grundsätzlich von der Bevölkerung initiiert werden sollen, hat in den Programmen das Prinzip, auf Anträge zu reagieren, Priorität. Dadurch konnten vor allem solche Bevölkerungsgruppen diese Möglichkeiten nutzen, die über ein Mindestmaß an Kommunikationsmöglichkeiten und Kenntnissen verfügten oder bereits mit Hilfsorganisationen zusammengearbeitet hatten. Die ärmsten Bevölkerungsschichten konnten daher nur in den wenigsten Fällen erreicht werden. Selbst Programmen, die speziell auf eine verstärkte Einbeziehung der marginalisierten Gruppen hinarbeiteten, gelang dies nur teilweise. Des Weiteren wurde auch dem Prinzip, dass Mikroprojekte dem gesamten Dorf – oder auch Gemeinde, städtischem Vorort etc. – zugute kommen sollte, nicht immer entsprochen.[152] Nichtsdestotrotz bieten Mikroprojekte die Chance zur Intensivierung der Kontakte zur Bevölkerung in den Projektgebieten. Da die einzelnen Projekte spezifische Lösungen erfordern, sind Lösungsmöglichkeiten nicht allgemein übertragbar.[153]

[152] So waren beispielsweise Bewässerungsanlagen häufig nur wenigen Familien eines Dorfes zugänglich. Ähnliches galt auch für Lagerhäuser, die oftmals von wenigen Teilgruppen eines Dorfes kontrolliert wurden.

[153] Aufgrund unterschiedlicher Rahmenbedingungen können die Gesamtkosten derselben Projektüberlegung an unterschiedlichen Orten stark voneinander abweichen. Entsprechend misst sich die Höhe der Eigenbeteiligung der Bevölkerung, wobei kleine Gemeinden im Vergleich zu Regionen mit höherer Bevölkerungsdichte die not-

Allgemein liegen die Potentiale für die Armutsbekämpfung bei Mikroprojekten darin, dass sie sich auf Maßnahmen zur Befriedigung der Grundbedürfnisse konzentrieren. Durch die direkte Partizipation der Bevölkerung an Vorbereitung, Planung, Finanzierung und Durchführung der Projekte wird zudem der Grundstein für längerfristige Mobilisierungen gelegt, die sich auch auf Einkommen und Produktivität auswirken können. Positive Wirkungen ergaben sich zudem dadurch, dass erfolgreiche Projekte beispielhaft für andere Gruppen und Dörfer wurden, die sich daraufhin nicht nur mit der EU, sondern auch mit anderen Geberorganisationen zusammensetzten. Nicht zuletzt trugen Mikroprojekte zu einer Effizienzsteigerung in der Lokalverwaltung bei, indem sie die Verantwortung für die Bezahlung des für die Gesundheitsdienste notwendigen Personals übernahmen und für die Besetzung von Lehrerstellen sorgten. Nachhaltige Auswirkungen wurden auch durch Verbesserungen bei den örtlichen Kleinunternehmen festgestellt, die mit Hilfe des Projektpersonals ihre Angebotspalette verbessern und verbreitern konnten.

2.2.3 Dezentralisierte Kooperation

Die zu Beginn der 1990er Jahre eingeführte dezentralisierte Kooperation der Europäischen Union geht im Wesentlichen auf Überlegungen von internationalen Organisationen und nationalen Entwicklungshilfekonzepten aus den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten zurück, die partizipativen Methoden zunehmend Priorität einräumten. Aber auch die zahlreichen kritischen Beurteilungen herkömmlicher Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in den letzten beiden Jahrzehnten trugen dazu bei, indem sie Chancen für eine Verbesserung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in erster Linie in Fortschritten bei der Umsetzung von Prinzipien partizipativer Entwicklung sahen (vgl. Bossuyt 1995).

Die von der EU-Kommission in die Lomé-Konvention von 1990 aufgenommenen Beschreibungen und Analysen dezentralisierter Kooperation gehen davon aus, dass es sich nicht um ein neues Instrument der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit handelt, sondern um einen neuen Modus, Entwicklungsprobleme zu lösen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 1998b). Demnach soll in Form der dezentralisierten Kooperation Entwicklung gemeinsam mit der Bevölkerung stattfinden, die lokale Verantwortung gefördert sowie die Nachhaltigkeit von Entwicklung gesichert werden. Diesem Konzept zufolge soll ein Dialog zwischen zivilgesellschaftlichen Gruppen, Regierungsinstitutionen, den EU-Vertretern und lokalen Akteuren dazu führen, eine Entwicklung voranzutreiben, die von der Bevölkerung gewollt wird und die von ihr als Priori-

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wendigen Dienste nicht unbedingt eigenständig leisten können. Zudem setzen manche Arbeiten bestimmte Kenntnisse und Fähigkeiten voraus, so dass die Allgemeinheit nicht generell beteiligt werden kann.

tät entschieden wurde (vgl. Ay/Kappel 1999b: 321). Auf diese Weise erhält die dezentralisierte Kooperation auch eine politische Dimension, da sich die Akteure mit den politischen Rahmenbedingungen auseinandersetzen müssen.

Die Europäische Union beschränkte die dezentralisierte Kooperation nicht auf die AKP-Länder, sondern setzte auch EU-Haushaltsmittel in Lateinamerika, Asien und dem Mittelmeerraum dafür ein. Allgemein erhob man den Anspruch, mit den Prinzipien der dezentralisierten Kooperation alle bisherigen Instrumente der finanziellen, technischen und wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit zu verändern. Gemessen an diesen Ambitionen waren in der praktischen Durchführung zunächst nur kleine Fortschritte zu verzeichnen. Die allgemeinen Formulierungen in der Konvention von 1990 trugen dazu bei, dass in einzelnen AKP-Ländern nur begrenzte Pilotprojekte eingerichtet wurden. Bis zur Halbzeitkonferenz 1995 in Mauritius zog man folglich vor allem Erfahrungen aus Programmen für Mikroprojekte heran, um die Konventionsartikel zu dezentralisierter Kooperation präziser fassen zu können. So übernahmen die konkreten Hinweise zur Durchführung den Plafond von 300.000 € für die Projektfinanzierung und die Eigenbeteiligung der Bevölkerung von 25 Prozent des Projektswertes aus dem Instrument für Mikroprojekte.

Die Umsetzung des Konzepts dezentralisierter Kooperation begann in den einzelnen AKP-Staaten 1993. Zu den ersten Ländern zählten Côte d'Ivoire, Benin, Senegal, Madagaskar, Uganda und Niger. Anlässlich der Halbzeitverhandlungen von Lomé-IV gab die EU-Kommission eine Datenerhebung bezüglich der ersten Erfahrungen mit dem neuen Programm in Auftrag. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Mikroprojekte den wichtigsten Beitrag zu einer dezentralisierten Zusammenarbeit leisten, da sie weitestgehend jene Akteure mit einbeziehen, die auch als solche der dezentralisierten Kooperation fungieren. Jedoch betonen Auswertungen zu den Mikroprojekten vornehmlich die materiellen Beiträge, während bei den Programmen dezentralisierter Kooperation auch die Förderung von Zivilgesellschaft und Demokratie im Vordergrund stehen.

Eine allgemeine, einheitliche Verfahrensweise in Bezug auf die dezentralisierte Kooperation gibt es jedoch bis heute nicht, da die Vorstellungen und Ziele der dezentralisierten Zusammenarbeit weitgehend auf Prinzipien und Werten beruhen. Zudem gab es in der praktischen Umsetzung von Anfang an durch lokale Rahmenbedingungen hervorgerufene Unterschiede. Wenn auch aufgrund der Verschiedenartigkeit der Situationen keine klare Definition von dezentralisierter Kooperation möglich erscheint, so sieht die EU-Kommission hierin auch Positives. In einem Bericht an den EU-Rat gibt sie zu verstehen, dass dezentralisierte Zusammenarbeit nur dann Sinn macht, wenn sie sich jeweils an der Realität orientiere und auf die Be-

schränkungen in jeder bestimmten Situation eingehe. Demnach sieht der Bericht gerade in der Vielfalt dezentralisierter Kooperation Vorteile. Voraussetzung ist allerdings, dass alle Beteiligten einbezogen und die Grundprinzipien von Partizipation und Demokratisierung berücksichtigt werden (vgl. Europäische Kommission 1998c).

Während die Programme dezentralisierter Kooperation im Mittelmeerraum relativ erfolgreich sind, zeigt sich in den ärmsten Ländern, dass die dezentralisierte Zusammenarbeit eher auf bisherigen Modellen von Entwicklungszusammenarbeit aufbaut. Ausschlaggebend sind hierfür die geringen Personalkapazitäten und Widersprüche zu der seit langem eingespielten Vorgehensweise. Probleme ergeben sich auch dort, wo dezentralisierte Strukturen in die Entwicklungsarbeit einbezogen werden, weil staatliche Institutionen noch nicht oder nicht mehr funktionieren. Werden unter solchen Umständen staatliche Strukturen gestärkt, bedeutet dies möglicherweise das Ende der Programme dezentralisierter Kooperation. Des Weiteren gibt stets die EU die Form der Zusammenarbeit vor. Den betroffenen Ländern und Akteuren bleibt meist wenig Spielraum bei der Aushandlung der Kooperationsbedingungen, was eindeutig im Widerspruch zu den propagierten partizipativen Ansätzen steht (vgl. Van Reisen 2002: 13).

2.2.4 Neue und neueste Tendenzen auf EU-Ebene

Nicht zuletzt auch die Komplexität der EU-Verfahrensweise erschwert es den Akteuren, genaue Kenntnisse über Möglichkeiten und Grenzen der bestehenden Instrumente in Erfahrung zu bringen. Laufend neue Erläuterungen und Richtlinien machen es selbst für die EU-Mitgliedsländer nicht leicht, sich über den jeweils aktuellsten Stand zu informieren. Aus diesem Grund hat die EU-Kommission eine vereinfachte politische und administrative Struktur für die Durchführung ihrer Hilfs- und Kooperationsprogramme angeregt. In der Kommissionsmitteilung an den Rat und das Parlament vom 29. September 2004 wird vorgeschlagen, die verschiedenen geografischen und thematischen Instrumente, deren Zahl im Laufe der Zeit stetig zugenommen hat, durch sechs Außenhilfeinstrumente zu ersetzen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004c: 2). Drei dieser Instrumente sollen hierbei der Durchführung bestimmter Politiken dienen, während die drei weiteren die erforderliche Reaktion auf bestimmte Erfordernisse – gemeint ist ein kurzfristiges Krisenmanagement – sicherstellen sollen. Nur vier dieser sechs Instrumente sind neu, zwei sind bereits vorhanden und bedürfen nach Ansicht der Kommission keiner weiteren Änderung. Namentlich handelt es sich bei diesen neuen Instrumenten um ein Instrument für Heranführungshilfe, ein Europäisches Nachbarschafts- und Partnerschaftsinstrument, ein Instrument für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und ein Instrument für Stabilität (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004c: 2). Langfristig sollen diese Neuerungen eine Vereinfachung der

2). Langfristig sollen diese Neuerungen eine Vereinfachung der bestehenden RELEX-Strukturen nach sich ziehen und somit auch die allseits geforderte Effizienzsteigerung des europäischen Apparates implementieren. Um diesen eigenen Ansprüchen gerecht werden zu können, will die EU-Kommission bei den neuen Instrumenten und den Mittelzuweisungen größeres Gewicht auf Bedarfs- und Leistungskriterien legen. Gerade in Hinblick auf Afrika erweist sich die Absicht, die EEF-Hilfe in den Haushaltsplan einzugliedern, als entscheidende Neuerung. Ziel dieser Einbindung in den EU-Etat ist eine Erleichterung der praktischen Verfahrensweise bei der Programmierung (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004c: 8).

Der in der Kommissionsmitteilung dargelegte Rahmen reduziert die bisherigen komplizierten Bestimmungen und schlägt drei neue Hauptinstrumente für die drei übergeordneten Politiken im Bereich Außenbeziehungen vor. Neben der Heranführungspolitik, die sich an potentiellen Beitrittskandidaten ausrichtet, und der Nachbarschaftspolitik, die sich auf die Länder des südlichen und östlichen Mittelmeerraums sowie die östlichen EU-Nachbarn inklusive Russland konzentriert, ist dies die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Das entsprechende Instrument für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (DCECI) soll in diesem Kontext zum Mittel werden, in dem sich die Kooperation zwischen EU und Entwicklungsländern zukünftig abspielt. Laut Vorstellung der EU-Kommission handelt es sich beim DCECI *„um ein umfassend angelegtes Instrument, dass sowohl die Zusammenarbeit mit den Partnerländern und -regionen als auch horizontale und thematische Initiativen zur Förderung der Partnerländer abdeckt, die für die Verwirklichung der in den Artikeln 177 bis 181 a des Vertrages zur Gründung der Europäischen Gemeinschaft festgelegten Ziele sowie für die Einhaltung der von der Gemeinschaft eingegangenen internationalen Verpflichtungen relevant sind“ (Europäische Kommission 2004c: 10).*

Das Europäische Parlament lehnt hingegen diese Konzeption eines einzigen Instruments ab (vgl. EP-Bericht vom 09.02.2005). Grund hierfür sind die vielen Unklarheiten und weitreichenden Konsequenzen des Kommissionsvorschlags. Das EP fordert eine deutliche Präzisierung der politischen Ziele, die aus dem DCECI resultieren, zumal die *„Zusammenlegung von zwei Politikbereichen (wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit) mit ganz unterschiedlichen Zielsetzungen und Arbeitsmethoden in einer unnatürlichen Verbindung [erfolgt], was sich zu Lasten der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auswirkt“ (EP-Bericht vom 09.02.2005: 6).*

Des Weiteren moniert das Europäische Parlament die Ausweitung des DCECI auf ein breites Spektrum von Ländern – sowohl Entwicklungs- als auch Industrieländer -, während die EU-Verfassung und der EG-Vertrag die Grundlage für eine gesonderte Entwicklungspolitik für Entwicklungsländer bieten. Ebenso wird der Eindruck erweckt, dass dieses neue Instrument eine „Standardfunktion“ erfüllt, d.h. all das abdecken soll, was nicht von anderen Verordnungen erfasst wird (vgl. EP-Bericht vom 09.02.2005: 7).

Wie man diese Diskussion über die zukünftigen armutsrelevanten Instrumente der EU-Entwicklungshilfe letztendlich auch einschätzen mag, so wird deutlich, dass sich die EU auf diesem Feld in einer Transformationsphase befindet. Ein neues, schlüssiges und allseits akzeptiertes Konzept liegt gegenwärtig noch nicht vor. Angesichts dessen hat sich die Kommission dazu durchgerungen, die nichtstaatlichen Akteure mittels einer öffentlichen Diskussion über die zukünftige Gestaltung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik in die allgemeinen Reformüberlegungen mit einzubeziehen. So fand im Januar 2005 eine öffentliche Anhörung statt, bei der 529 Anregungen von NROen, akademischen Einrichtungen, Privatpersonen etc. eingereicht wurden. Die Ergebnisse dieser Anhörung mündeten in dem Entwurf über einen neuen Konsens in der EU-Entwicklungspolitik, den die Kommission am 13. Juli 2005 präsentierte. Dieser Entwurf schlägt eine Zweiteilung der Verfahrensweise vor: Der erste Teil der Strategie widmet sich den Zielen, Grundsätzen und Werten der EU-Entwicklungspolitik, während der zweite die Leitlinien für ihre Umsetzung auf Gemeinschaftsebene umfasst (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2005b; 2005c). Ob das EP und der Rat anschließend einen Konsens über den Kommissionsvorschlag erzielen werden, bleibt hingegen abzuwarten.

2.3 Die EU-Armutsbekämpfung und die Millennium Development Goals

In der im September 2000 angenommenen Millenniumserklärung verpflichtet sich die Weltgemeinschaft zu einer Reihe klar definierten Zielen, von denen die Halbierung der extremen Armut bis zum Jahr 2015 die oberste Priorität genießt. Inwiefern sich dieses Ziel überhaupt noch erreichen lässt, ist mehr als fraglich. Die seit langem vereinbarte Aufstockung der durchschnittlichen Entwicklungshilfe auf 0,7 Prozent des BSP – als Mindestkriterium zur Realisierung des Millenniumsprojekts – liegt in weiter Ferne. Hierbei machen auch die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten keine Ausnahme. So konnten sich die EU-Länder – im Kontext der UN-Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung in Monterrey/Mexiko 2002 – gerade einmal auf eine Erhöhung ihrer Leistungen auf durchschnittlich 0,39 Prozent ihres BSP bis zum Jahr 2006 einigen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004d: 4). Vor diesem Hintergrund erscheinen neuerliche Absichtserklärungen, wie sie zuletzt vor Beginn der EU-Regierungskonferenz im Juni 2005 in Brüssel unterzeichnet wurden, als reine Farce. Insbesondere Spanien, Deutschland und Italien wehren sich nach wie vor gegen eine Festschreibung der Erhöhung ihrer Entwicklungsfinanzierung. Mit Dänemark, Luxemburg, den Niederlanden und Schweden erreichen gegenwärtig gerade einmal vier EU-Mitgliedsstaaten die angestrebte 0,7%-Marke (vgl. *epo* vom 24.05.2005).

Tabelle V-2: Die EU-Entwicklungshilfe in Relation zum Bruttonationaleinkommen

EU- Mitgliedsstaat	ODA in % des Bruttonationaleinkommens in 2003	ODA in % des Bruttonationaleinkommens in 2002	Prozentualer Unterschied 2002-2003
Belgien	0,60	0,43	40,7
Dänemark	0,84	0,96	-12,8
Deutschland	0,28	0,27	5,3
Finnland	0,35	0,35	0,3
Frankreich	0,41	0,38	8,7
Griechenland	0,21	0,21	5,7
Großbritannien	0,34	0,31	14,0
Irland	0,39	0,40	3,8
Italien	0,17	0,20	-15,3
Luxemburg	0,81	0,77	8,4
Niederlande	0,80	0,81	-3,2
Österreich	0,20	0,26	-20,5
Portugal	0,22	0,27	-19,4
Schweden	0,79	0,84	-2,8
Spanien	0,23	0,26	-7,8
EU insgesamt	0,35	0,35	3,0

Quelle: OECD 2005: 3.

Eine längerfristige Besserung der Lage scheint nicht in Sicht. Wie die führenden europäischen Industrienationen auf dem G8-Gipfel im Juli 2005 in Gleneagles zu verstehen gaben, wird die Entwicklungshilfe der Europäischen Union aller Voraussicht nach erst im Jahre 2015 die vereinbarte 0,7%-Hürde überspringen (vgl. G8 Africa Progress Report 2005: 20; Europäische Kommission 2005d). Zu denken geben auch die neuerlichen Anstrengungen der führenden Industrieländer hinsichtlich eines umfassenden Schuldenerlasses für die ärmsten Länder. So soll – Angaben führenden entwicklungspolitischen NROen zufolge – den betroffenen Entwicklungsländern Entwicklungsgelder in exakt jener Höhe gestrichen werden, die ihnen zuvor erlassen wurden.[154] Demzufolge läuft die Übereinkunft der G8-Finanzminister auf eine „Nullrunde“ hinaus. Profiteure dieses Arrangements sind einzig und allein die drei multilateralen Institutionen IWF, Afrikanische Entwicklungsbank und IDA, die von den Geberländern Entschädigungen für ausstehende Rückzahlungen erhalten, die sie ansonsten kaum hätten einfordern können (vgl. *epo* vom 16.06.2005; *Die Zeit* vom 30.06.2005).

[154] Eine exakte Summe der erlassenen Schulden ist nicht bekannt. Experten halten jedoch einen Schuldenerlass von rund 40 Mrd. US$ für realistisch. Vgl. *Die Zeit* vom 30.06.2005.

Abbildung V-2: ODA-Quoten der einzelnen EU-Mitgliedstaaten im Jahr 2003



Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2005e: 4.

Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt sich zwingender denn je die Frage, welche Anstrengungen die Europäische Union als führende Wirtschaftsmacht zur Erreichung der *Millennium Development Goals* bereits unternommen hat und auch bereit ist, zukünftig zu unternehmen. Die folgende Analyse will einerseits den Ist-Zustand der EU-Bemühungen hinsichtlich der Millenniumsziele erfassen, andererseits aber auch die bevorstehenden Ambitionen und Innovationen ausloten und skizzieren.

2.3.1 Zur Verknüpfung von EU-Entwicklungspolitik und den Instrumenten der MDGs

Spätestens seit der gemeinsamen Erklärung von Ministerrat und EU-Kommission vom November 2000[155] ist die Armutsbekämpfung offiziell zur obersten Priorität der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik erhoben worden (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union und Kommission 2000). Die gemeinsame Erklärung stellt zwar keine direkte Verbindung zur Millenniumserklärung her, erweist sich aber in einer Vielzahl von Punkten mit ihr verträglich. So skizziert die Erklärung sechs essentielle Aktionsbereiche, auf die sich die EU-Entwicklungspolitik im Kontext einer langfristigen Beseitigung der Armut konzentrieren will: 1. Handel und Entwicklung; 2. Regionale Integration und Zusammenarbeit; 3. Unterstützung von makroökonomischen Politiken und die Sicherung sozialer Grunddienste; 4. Transport; 5. Ernährungssi-

[155] Ziel dieser Erklärung vom 20. November 2000 ist die Festlegung einer klaren und schlüssigen Politik der Europäischen Gemeinschaft für die Zusammenarbeit in Entwicklungsfragen, um eine möglichst hohen Mehrwert der Gemeinschaft in diesem Bereich zu erzielen, Qualität und Wirkung ihrer Maßnahmen zu steigern und auf die weltweiten Herausforderungen einzugehen.

cherheit und ländliche Entwicklung; 6. Aufbau institutioneller Kapazitäten. Dabei sollen stets drei sektoren- und länderübergreifende Schwerpunkte berücksichtigt werden: Menschenrechte, ökologische Nachhaltigkeit und Geschlechtergleichstellung. In der praktischen Umsetzung orientiert sich die gemeinsame Erklärung an der allgemeingültigen Forderung nach einer verstärkten Koordination, Komplementarität und Kohärenz der verschiedenen involvierten Bereiche auf europäischer sowie nationaler Ebene. Alle Verfahren sollen die Prinzipien von *ownership* und Partizipation berücksichtigen, wobei den am wenigsten entwickelten Länder die höchste Aufmerksamkeit zukommt (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union und Kommission 2000: 2ff.).

Seit der Verabschiedung der Grundsatzerklärung im November 2000 hat die EU den Fokus ihres außenpolitischen Handelns zunehmend auf die MDG-Ziele und die damit einhergehende Armutsbekämpfung gerichtet. Dies schlägt sich nicht zuletzt in einer Reihe von Kommissionsvorschlägen nieder, die vom Rat und EP angenommen wurden. So integrierte man u.a. migrations- und handelspolitische Überlegungen ins entwicklungspolitische Konzept (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002b; 2002c). Um eine konkrete Verbindung zwischen den entwicklungspolitischen Ansätzen der EU und den *Millennium Development Goals* herzustellen, konzipierte die Kommission – in Zusammenarbeit mit den EU-Mitgliedstaaten, der Weltbank, der UNDP und der OECD – eine Liste von zehn Schlüsselindikatoren, die sich aus dem MDG-Index ableiten.[156]

Tabelle V-3: Die Kommissionskriterien in Bezug auf die MDG-Ziele:

1. Anteil der Bevölkerung, dessen Einkommen weniger als ein Dollar pro Tag beträgt.
2. Vorhandensein von Unterernährung bei Kindern unter fünf Jahren.
3. Verhältnismäßige Teilnehmerzahl an der Primarschulbildung.
4. Abschlussquote der Primarschüler.
5. Geschlechterverhältnis bei der primären, sekundären und tertiären Bildung.
6. Sterblichkeitsrate bei Kindern unter fünf Jahren.
7. Anteil der Einjährigen, die gegen Masern geimpft sind.
8. Anzahl der Geburten, die unter Aufsicht von ausgebildetem Pflegepersonal erfolgten.
9. Anteil von HIV-infizierten Schwangeren zwischen 15 und 24 Jahren.
10. Bevölkerungsanteil mit gesichertem Zugang zu sauberem Wasser.

Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2004d: 6.

[156] Ausschlaggebend für die Selektion der Indikatoren war die Verfügbarkeit, Zuverlässigkeit und Häufigkeit der vorhandenen Angaben hinsichtlich der länderspezifischen europäischen Entwicklungsausrichtung. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 6.

Von 2003 an versucht die Kommission diese zehn Schlüsselindikatoren auf all jene Länder und Regionen zu übertragen, in denen sie Entwicklungshilfe leistet. Der Erfolg bzw. Misserfolg dieser Maßnahme soll zukünftig anhand der Länderstrategiepapiere[157] gemessen werden, die man jährlich einer systematischen Revision unterzieht und – bei negativer Bewertung – inhaltlich korrigiert. Da hierfür jedoch bereits zu Beginn ein umfangreiches, qualitativ hochwertiges und weiter zurückreichendes Datenmaterial vonnöten ist, können sich die vorläufigen Bemühungen vornehmlich nur auf die AKP-Staaten – als langjährige Kooperationspartner – beschränken (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 6).

Dass die Schlüsselindikatoren alleine keinen detaillierten Aufschluss über den Entwicklungszustand eines Landes geben können, ist unterdessen auch der Kommission bewusst:

„While useful as a measuring tool, indicators do not tell the full story. MDGs are closely interrelated, and development strategies rarely target just one objective" (Europäische Kommission 2004b: 6).

Demnach gewähren sie ausschließlich einen partiellen Einblick in diejenigen Bereiche und Lebenslagen, die Armut beschreiben oder als Folge haben. Ein Beispiel: Die HIV-Epidemie ist ohne eine Stärkung der Rolle der Frau unmöglich. Fortschritte in der Geschlechtergleichstellung haben daher auch einen direkten Einfluss auf die Armutsreduzierung. Eine ähnliche armutsbezogene Argumentation lässt sich in Bezug auf die Forderung nach Zugang zu sauberem Wasser aufbauen. Um den Anteil der Menschen zu verringern, die in extremer Armut leben und Hunger leiden, muss ein Minimum an sauberer Wasserversorgung gewährleistet sein. Zum einen zur Sicherstellung des Trinkwassers, zum anderen um die Selbstversorgung mit landwirtschaftlichen Erzeugnissen zu ermöglichen. In der Konsequenz bedeutet dies, dass ein Zugangsmangel zu sauberem Wasser direkte Auswirkungen auf die Gesundheit, die Kindersterblichkeit etc. hat und den oftmals schon überstrapazierten öffentlichen Gesundheitssektor weiter beansprucht. Zudem stellt mangelnde Hygiene in Schulgebäuden insbesondere für Mädchen eine hohe Hürde dar.

Die Erkenntnisse, die sich aus der Orientierung an den zehn Schlüsselindikatoren ergeben, reflektieren somit eine Vielzahl von Armutszuständen, die in ihrer Summe eine generelle Einschätzung der jeweiligen Lage zulassen, anhand derer ebenso allgemeine Tendenzen abgeleitet werden können. Vor diesem Hintergrund sieht die Kommission die zentrale Aufgabe der EU in der Schaffung von entwicklungsförderlichen Rahmenbedingungen. Folgt man dieser Argumentationslinie, kommt beispielsweise die verstärkte Intervention der Europäischen Union auf dem Transportsektor in den Entwicklungsländern einem Beitrag zur Armutsbekämpfung gleich, da ein Ausbau der Infrastruktur die Basis für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und

[157] Zur Bedeutung und Rolle der Länderstrategiepapiere, vgl. Wolff 2005.

eine effiziente Versorgung mit Grunddiensten impliziert (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 6). Die Europäische Union leistet auf diese Weise einen indirekten Beitrag zur Armutsbekämpfung und zur Erreichung der MDGs, was ihr von unterschiedlichen Akteuren jedoch schon des Öfteren als fehlende Armutsorientierung ausgelegt wurde (vgl. Van Reisen 2002: 11f.).

2.3.2 Der entwicklungspolitische Beitrag der EU zur Erreichung der Millenniumsziele

Nachdem sich eine konzeptionelle Verknüpfung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik mit der Millenniumserklärung erkennen lässt, stellt sich im Folgenden die Frage, welche Maßnahmen die Europäische Union in Bezug auf die einzelnen Millenniumsziele eingeleitet hat. Um eine entsprechende Aufschlüsselung der entwicklungspolitischen Beiträge der EU möglichst deutlich und nachvollziehbar zu gestalten, wird dies im Folgenden schritt- bzw. zielweise erfolgen.

MDG 1: Beseitigung der extremen Armut und des Hungers

Zielvorgabe 1: Den Anteil der Menschen halbieren, deren Einkommen weniger als ein Dollar pro Tag beträgt.[158]

Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Armut aus einer Vielzahl von Faktoren resultiert und nicht auf einen einzigen Umstand zurückzuführen ist, besteht die Notwendigkeit zur Ausarbeitung umfassender Strategien zur Armutsbekämpfung. Die EU hat seit November 2000 ihre Bemühungen, solche *poverty reduction strategies* in ihr entwicklungspolitisches Konzept zu integrieren, sichtbar verstärkt. Da die EU-Entwicklungspolitik prinzipiell alle Entwicklungsländer umfasst, richten sich die Strategien an den spezifischen Merkmalen und Formen von Armut des jeweiligen Entwicklungslandes aus. Priorität genießen dabei die LDCs und Länder mit niedrigem Einkommen, aber auch Länder mittleren Einkommens, in denen der Armutsanteil in der Bevölkerung weiterhin hoch bleibt, rücken vermehrt in den Fokus.[159] Allgemein räumt man dem afrikanischen Kontinent den höchsten Stellenwert ein (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2005d: 11).

Die EU-Kommisssion verspricht sich von den *poverty reduction strategies* vor allem eine Maximierung der Partizipation der betroffenen Länder und eine Effizienzsteigerung der Hilfe, da die Strategien gezielt auf Probleme, Notwendigkeiten und Stärken hinweisen, so dass

[158] Zu den spezifischen Zielvorgaben der MDGs, vgl. Tabelle V-1.

[159] Viele middle-income Länder konnten den Anteil der extrem Armen kaum senken, was nicht zuletzt darauf hindeutet, dass nur ein geringer Bevölkerungsteil für den Anstieg des durchschnittlichen Einkommens verantwortlich ist.

schlussendlich allen involvierten Akteuren optimierte Verfahrensmöglichkeiten geboten werden (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 13).

Zielvorgabe 2: Den Anteil der Menschen halbieren, die Hunger leiden.

Die EU-Kommission setzt bei der Bekämpfung von Hungerleiden auf national verankerte Maßnahmen, die – bei Bedarf – auch auf ein regionales bzw. subnationales Niveau angehoben werden können. Als Bestandteil der Strategien zur Armutsreduzierung spielen Überlegungen der Nahrungssicherung und -verfügbarkeit eine wichtige Rolle. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Fragen zur Nahrungssicherheit längst einen multidimensionalen Charakter aufweisen, hat die EU im Zuge ihrer Reformbestrebungen ihre Strategie zur Nahrungssicherung einer Überholung unterzogen. So integrierte sie das *Food Security Programme* in ihr langfristig ausgerichtetes Entwicklungskonzept. Die Idee der Nahrungshilfe wird in diesem Kontext aufgewertet und bedeutet fortan mehr als die Verteilung eigener Nahrungsüberschüsse. Auf internationaler Ebene rief die EU dazu auf, Nahrungshilfe nicht zur Absatzstrategie für nationale Nahrungsüberschüsse zu missbrauchen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 14).
Die feste Absicht der Europäischen Union, ihre Politik zur Nahrungshilfe neu auszurichten, wurde dadurch untermauert, dass sie für dieses Vorhaben eine Budgetlinie von rund 450 Mio. € einrichtete, die es der Kommission erlaubt, zeitgleich in 30 von Nahrungssicherheitsproblemen betroffenen Ländern zu intervenieren. Dies geschieht jedoch nicht ausschließlich auf direktem Weg, sondern auch durch die finanzielle Unterstützung von NROen und anderen involvierten Akteuren.[160] Weiterhin setzt ECHO einen erheblichen Teil seines Jahresbudgets von 600 Mio. € für kurzfristige Interventionen ein, wie sie im Zuge einer Hungersnot notwendig werden (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 14).

MDG 2: Verwirklichung der allgemeinen Primarschulbildung

Zielvorgabe 3: Sicherstellen, dass alle Jungen und Mädchen eine Primarschulbildung vollständig abschließen können.

Seit der Weltkonferenz zum Thema „Bildung für alle“ 2000 in Dakar hat die Europäische Union die bildungspolitischen Maßnahmen innerhalb ihres Entwicklungskonzepts zunehmend auf die primäre Schulbildung ausgerichtet. Diese Umorientierung drückt sich nicht zuletzt auch in einer Reihe von EU-Bestimmungen aus, die den Abschluss einer Primarschulbildung zu einer der Prioritäten der Entwicklungspolitik erklären. Zur Erreichung dieses Ziels ist es

[160] Neben nationalen Regierungen handelt es sich hierbei um das World Food Programme (WFP).

vorgesehen, parallel die Kinderarbeit und die Geschlechtergleichstellung als zentrale Elemente mit einzubeziehen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002d; Rat der Europäischen Union 2002). Um das Ziel der allgemeinen Primarschulbildung zu realisieren, stützt sich die EU auf Länderprogramme und internationale Initiativen. Insgesamt beläuft sich der für den Bildungssektor veranschlagte Finanzrahmen auf 1,3 Mrd. € für die Jahre 2002 bis 2007 (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 16).

In letzter Zeit setzt die EU zudem zunehmend auf die *„Education for All Fast-Track"*-Initiative (EFA-FTI), die Mitte 2002 von der Weltbank ins Leben gerufen wurde.[161] So trat die EU-Kommission international als deutliche Befürworterin dieser *Fast-Track*-Initiative auf und forderte eine ebenso deutliche Annäherung von den Mitgliedsstaaten. Allerdings konnte sich die Europäische Union bislang zu keinen festen finanziellen Zugeständnissen durchringen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b16).

MDG 3: Förderung der Gleichheit der Geschlechter und Ermächtigung der Frauen

Zielvorgabe 4: Das Geschlechtergefälle in der Primar- und Sekundarschulbildung beseitigen, vorzugsweise bis 2005, und auf allen Bildungsebenen bis spätestens 2015.

Das MDG-Ziel der Geschlechtergleichstellung in der Primar- und Sekundarschulbildung bis 2005 wurde nicht erreicht. Dennoch ließen sich in den letzten Jahren leichte Fortschritte in solchen Bereichen erkennen, die aus frauenrechtlicher Sicht bislang als kritisch einzustufen waren. Hierzu zählen beispielsweise der Wirtschaftssektor und der politische Entscheidungsprozess. Weiterhin gilt jedoch die Maxime, dass diese ersten kleinen Teilerfolge genauso fragil sind wie die vorhandenen demokratischen Strukturen, die sie legitimieren und schützen.

Die Europäische Kommission hat bereits 2002 die Problematik der Geschlechtergleichstellung zu einem Kernelement ihrer bildungspolitischen Maßnahmen im Bereich der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit erklärt. Wichtigste Kriterien und Aspekte stellen in diesem Zusammenhang der chancengleiche Zugang zu Bildungseinrichtungen und die Qualität derselben dar. Vor diesem Hintergrund müssen zukünftige Bildungsstrategien verstärkt der Genderproblematik Rechnung tragen. Schließlich erweist sich die Unterrepräsentierung der Frauen in be-

[161] Die Initiative unterstützt die teilnehmenden Entwicklungsländer systematisch bei der Erreichung des Ziels einer umfassenden Grundschulbildung auf der Grundlage ihrer Armutsbekämpfungsstrategie. Dabei knüpft sie zusätzliche Geberleistungen an eine verbesserte Sektorpolitik und stärkere Prozess- und Ergebnisverantwortung. Beteiligt sind auf Seiten der Gebergemeinschaft neben Weltbank, UNESCO und UNICEF alle großen bilateralen Geber, darunter die G8-Staaten und die EU-Kommission. Als Voraussetzungen für intensivierte Förderleistungen im Rahmen der FTI gelten aus Sicht der Entwicklungsländer ein akzeptierter nationaler Strategieplan zur Armutsreduzierung (PRSP) und ein von der Gebergemeinschaft als glaubwürdig eingeschätzter Politikansatz zur Grundschulbildung. Vgl. ÖFSE 2003.

zahlten nicht-agrikulturellen Tätigkeiten als Knackpunkt bei der Erreichung des dritten MDG-Ziels (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2005: 16). Daher würde eine größere Frauenpartizipation in der – von Männern dominierten – Arbeitswelt langfristig die Rolle der Frau erheblich stärken. Den Rahmen für dieses hochgesteckte Ziel gibt die internationale Übereinkunft der vierten UN-Weltfrauenkonferenz 1995 in Beijing vor. Daran anknüpfend präsentierte die EU 2001 ein entsprechendes Aktionsprogramm (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2001b). Seitdem wuchsen die gesamtpolitischen Bemühungen, der Geschlechterproblematik den notwendigen Stellenwert zu verschaffen. Tatsächlich besteht jedoch nach wie vor eine deutliche Kluft zwischen politischen Ambitionen und dem Umfang vorhandener Finanzmittel und Programmumsetzungen. Daher ist eine ständige Überprüfung der diskutierten politischen Inhalte mit den zukünftig zu erarbeitenden Länderstrategiepapieren unabdingbar.

MDG 4: Senkung der Kindersterblichkeit

Zielvorgabe 5: Die Sterblichkeitsrate von Kindern unter fünf Jahren um zwei Drittel senken.

Jedes Jahr sterben weltweit 11 Mio. Kinder vor ihrem fünften Geburtstag. Das sind 30.000 Kinder jeden Tag. Ein Großteil dieser Kinder lebt in Subsahara-Afrika, wo nach wie vor die schlechtesten Rahmenbedingungen vorliegen. Zwar konnte die Kindersterblichkeitsrate seit 1960 von einem von fünf Kindern auf eins von zehn bis 1990 reduziert werden, doch haben sich insbesondere in Subsahara-Afrika entsprechende positive Entwicklungen in letzter Zeit stark verlangsamt (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2005: 18f.). Daher erscheint es unter den gegenwärtigen Vorzeichen relativ unwahrscheinlich, dass die Kindersterblichkeitsrate bis zum Jahr 2015 um zwei Drittel gesenkt werden kann. Nichtsdestotrotz müssen alle Bemühungen, die zu einer Annäherung an das vierte Millenniumsziele beitragen, weiterhin ausgebaut und intensiviert werden.

Diese Ansicht teilt auch die EU-Kommission, die im März 2002 eine Mitteilung zur Gesundheit und Armutsreduzierung in Entwicklungsländern annahm, welche den Rahmen für ein verstärktes Engagement auf diesem Gebiet festlegen sollte. Im Kern beruht die Kommissionsmitteilung dabei auf der Überlegung, dass insbesondere den verwundbarsten Bevölkerungsteilen ein größeres Maß an Schutz vor armutsbedingten Krankheiten zugestanden werden muss (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002e). Dies soll sich konkret vor allem in einer verstärkten Unterstützung von Waisenkindern und der Entwicklung eines gerechten Finanzierungsmechanismus für den Gesundheitssektor äußern. Diesem Aufruf der Kommission schloss sich im Mai 2003 der Rat an, indem er in einer eigenen Mitteilung zur Gesundheit und

Armut eine Anhebung des entsprechenden Finanzrahmens und eine Verbesserung der Hilfeleistungen verspricht (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union 2002: 23-28). Ein Großteil dieses Zuwachses soll in die Unterstützung von sozialer Entwicklung vor allem in solchen Entwicklungsländern fließen, die mit hohen Kindersterblichkeitsquoten zu kämpfen haben. Des Weiteren fördert die EU zahlreiche Gesundheitskampagnen, nicht zuletzt auch in Zusammenarbeit mit der WHO, UNICEF und anderen Organisationen.
Inwiefern sich jedoch in absehbarer Zukunft sichtbare Erfolge in Bezug auf dieses MDG-Ziel einstellen werden, bleibt mehr als ungewiss. Dass eine Reduzierung der Kindersterblichkeitrate um zwei Drittel mittlerweile unrealistisch erscheint, ist klar. Die Frage, die sich nun stellt, lautet: In welchem Maße können die Industrieländer dem tragischen Sterben von Millionen hilfloser Kinder dennoch begegnen? Welchen Beitrag ist man bereit zu leisten?

MDG 5: Verbesserung der Gesundheit von Müttern

Zielvorgabe 6: Die Müttersterblichkeitsrate noch vor 2015 um drei Viertel senken.

Jedes Jahr sterben 600.000 Frauen und einige Millionen Neugeborene an den Folgen einer Schwangerschaft oder einer durch Komplikationen geprägten Geburt. Insbesondere Subsahara-Afrika ist von einer überaus hohen Müttersterblichkeitsrate geprägt, doch auch in anderen Regionen ist die Müttersterblichkeit nach wie vor unannehmbar hoch. Hierin manifestiert sich nicht zuletzt die geringe öffentliche Aufmerksamkeit für die Bedürfnisse von Frauen und des unzureichenden Zugangs zu Informationen und Dienstleistungen auf dem Gebiet der sexuellen und reproduktiven Gesundheit, einschließlich der geburtshilflichen Notfallversorgung (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2005b:12f.).
Die Europäische Union sieht in der umfassenden Unterstützung von Verbesserungsmöglichkeiten bei der sexuellen und reproduktiven Gesundheit mittlerweile eine ihrer politischen Prioritäten. Den Anstoß hierfür gab die 1994 in Kairo abgehaltene UN-Konferenz zum Thema „Bevölkerung und Entwicklung“, deren Bekundungen sich auf die Schwerpunktsetzungen der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik niederschlugen. Der Fokus der EU-Bemühungen richtet sich dabei auf die Umsetzung eines allgemeinen Zugangs zu reproduktiven Gesundheitseinrichtungen und den damit einhergehenden Dienstleistungen, wobei der Gesundheit der Mütter prioritäre Bedeutung zugeschrieben wird (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002e).

Abbildung V-3: Müttersterblichkeitsrate im Jahr 2000



Quelle: Vereinte Nationen 2005: 22.

Auf Länderebene unterstützt die EU Reformbestrebungen im Bereich des Gesundheitssektors mit einer jährlichen Aufwendung von fast 200 Mio. €.[162] Des Weiteren stellt sie für den Zeitraum 2003-2006 weitere 74 Mio. € für Aufklärungsprojekte hinsichtlich der sexuellen und reproduktiven Gesundheit von Frauen bereit, die von NROen vor Ort geleitet werden. Damit bekräftigt die Europäische Union zumindest finanziell ihren Willen zur Erreichung des formulierten Millenniumsziels. Gegenwärtige Tendenzen zeigen, dass durch gezieltes Handeln regionale Fortschritte durchaus möglich sind, doch gerade in den ärmsten Ländern – allen voran in den Ländern Subsahara-Afrikas – lässt der sichtbare Erfolg der Maßnahmen weiterhin auf sich warten. Daher gilt es auch in Bezug auf dieses MDG-Ziel die bereits unternommenen Bemühungen weiter zu verstärken (vgl. Vereinte Nationen 2005: 23).

MDG 6: Bekämpfung von HIV/AIDS, Malaria und anderen Krankheiten

Zielvorgabe 7: Die Ausbreitung von HIV/AIDS zum Stillstand bringen und allmählich umkehren.

Zielvorgabe 8: Die Ausbreitung von Malaria und anderen schweren Krankheiten zum Stillstand bringen und allmählich umkehren.

Rund 40 Millionen Menschen sind heute mit HIV/AIDS infiziert. Im südlichen Afrika herrscht eine Pandemie, die insbesondere für Frauen und Jugendliche eine ernsthafte Bedrohung darstellt. Das nach wie vor extrem hohe Vorkommen der Tuberkulose steigt weiter an,

[162] Diese Angaben gelten für den Zeitraum 2002-2004.

wobei sie insbesondere in Verbindung mit HIV/AIDS auftritt. Ebenso bleibt auch die Malaria eine erhebliche Gesundheitsbedrohung in vielen tropischen Regionen, wobei sie insbesondere in Subsahara-Afrika pandemische Züge trägt.

Abbildung V-4: Ausbreitung von HIV/AIDS in Subsahara-Afrika zwischen 1990-2004



Quelle: Vereinte Nationen 2005: 24.

Im Jahr 2000 veröffentlichte die Europäische Kommission im Rahmen ihrer Armutsreduzierungsbestrebungen eine Mitteilung zur beschleunigten Vorgehensweise gegen HIV/AIDS, Malaria und Tuberkulose, welche in einem auf fünf Jahre angelegten Aktionsprogramm mündete und in enger Relation zu den allgemeinen EU-Gesundheitsstrategien steht (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2001c). Während sich die finanziellen Aufwendungen der durch die Europäische Kommission begleiteten Programme für den Zeitraum 1994 bis 2002 auf jährlich 73 Mio. € beliefen[163], wurde der Finanzrahmen – nicht zuletzt auch angesichts der unzureichenden Erfolge – vervierfacht. Demnach sind alle auf die Bekämpfung von HIV/AIDS, Malaria und Tuberkulose ausgerichteten Programme und Maßnahmen[164] für die Periode 2003-2006 mit insgesamt knapp 1,2 Mrd. € ausgestattet (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 23), womit sich die EU weltweit zum Vorreiter im Kampf um das Erreichen dieses Millenniumsziels aufschwingt.

[163] Die zur Verfügung gestellten Mittel verteilten sich dabei auf die einzelnen Krankheiten wie folgt: 71% für HIV/AIDS, 17% für Malaria und 12% für Tuberkulose, vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004e: 4f.
[164] Diese Maßnahmen sind vielfältiger Natur. Zum einen umschließen sie ohne Frage das konkrete Handeln vor Ort, zum anderen aber die Entwicklung neuer pharmazeutischer Produkte, Impfstoffe, therapeutischer Methoden etc.

MDG 7: Sicherung der ökologischen Nachhaltigkeit

Zielvorgabe 9: Die Grundsätze der nachhaltigen Entwicklung in die Politik und Programme jedes einzelnen Staates einbeziehen und den Verlust von Umweltressourcen beseitigen.

Zielvorgabe 10: Den Anteil der Menschen um die Hälfte senken, die keinen nachhaltigen Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser haben.

Zielvorgabe 11: Bis 2020 eine erhebliche Verbesserung der Lebensbedingungen von mindestens 100 Millionen Slumbewohnern herbeiführen.

Bis Ende 2003 konnten 41 Länder Fortschritte in der Festlegung einer nationalen Strategie zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung vorweisen. 27 Staaten verfügten bereits über eine bewährte Strategie und 23 weitere Staaten waren im Begriff eine solche Strategie zu implementieren. Hinzu kamen 79 Länder, die Teilkomponenten nachhaltiger Entwicklung in ihre Politik integrierten. Dennoch ist die gegenwärtige Situation alles andere als befriedigend. Noch immer verfügen 2,6 Mrd. Menschen nicht über grundlegende Sanitäreinrichtungen. Nur jeder sechste Mensch hat Zugang zu sauberem Trinkwasser. Ein ähnlich erschreckendes Bild zeichnen die Statistiken in Hinblick auf den steigenden Urbanisierungsgrad und die damit einhergehende Bildung neuer Elendsviertel. Demnach lebten bereits 2001 mehr als 70 Prozent der Stadtbevölkerung in Entwicklungsländern in Slums. Die Prognosen sehen diesen Trend insbesondere in Subsahara-Afrika fortgesetzt (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 25).

Abbildung V-5: Anteil der Bevölkerung ohne grundlegende Sanitäreinrichtungen



Quelle: Vereinte Nationen 2005: 33.

Im Februar 2002 legte die EU-Kommission eine Strategie einer „globalen Partnerschaft für nachhaltige Entwicklung“ vor, die auf den Eindrücken des im Juni 2001 in Göteborg stattgefundenen EU-Gipfels basierte. Die Strategie betont, dass insbesondere dem vielseitigen Charakter von nachhaltiger Entwicklung – allen voran der ökonomischen, sozial- und umweltpolitischen Dimension – eine stärkere Bedeutung zugemessen werden muss (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002f). Schon bei den Verhandlungen der Weltkonferenz zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung erwies sich die EU als eine der führenden Kräfte. So forderte sie unter anderem, dass zukünftige Übereinkünfte weit über die bisherigen multilateralen Beschlüsse hinausreichen müssten. Sie selbst ging mit gutem Beispiel voran, indem sie umweltpolitische Überlegungen in ihr entwicklungspolitisches Konzept integrierte. In ihrer im April 2001 präsentierten *„Environmental Integration Strategy“* werden konkret Möglichkeiten und Ansatzpunkte dargelegt, in welcher Form die umweltpolitische Dimension Einzug in die europäische Wirtschafts- und Entwicklungskooperation erhalten kann. Um diesen Überlegungen schließlich auch in der praktischen Umsetzung gerecht werden zu können, integrierte man sie in die bestehenden Länderstrategiepapiere (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 25).

In Hinblick auf die zehnte Zielvorgabe der MDGs bestehen eine Reihe von internationalen Abkommen[165], die das internationale Handeln reglementieren und bestimmen. Diesen allgemeinen Richtlinien folgend, nahm auch der EU-Rat im Mai 2002 eine Resolution zum Wassermanagement in Entwicklungsländern an. Diese betont die notwendige Integration grundlegender Überlegungen zum nachhaltigen Umgang mit Wasserressourcen in die nationalen und regionalen Entwicklungsstrategien und eine umfassende Unterstützung der Partnerländer bei der Suche nach nachhaltigen Lösungsmodellen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002g). Allgemein folgt die EU bei dieser Zielvorgabe jedoch weitestgehend nur den allgemeinen internationalen Bestimmungen.

MDG 8: Aufbau einer weltweiten Entwicklungspartnerschaft

Zielvorgabe 12: Ein offenes, regelgestütztes, berechenbares und nicht-diskriminierendes Handels- und Finanzsystem weiterentwickeln. Umfasst die Verpflichtung auf eine gute Regierungs- und Verwaltungsführung, die sich der Entwicklung und Armutsreduzierung sowohl auf nationaler als auch internationaler Ebene verpflichtet.

Zielvorgabe 13: Den besonderen Bedürfnissen der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder Rechnung tragen. Dies umfasst einen zoll- und quotenfreien Zugang für Exportgüter dieser Länder, ein verstärktes Schuldenerleichterungsprogramm für die hochverschuldeten armen Länder und die Streichung der bilateralen öffentlichen Schul-

[165] Es sei an dieser Stelle nur auf die Übereinkünfte von Den Haag und Bonn sowie die Kyoto-Konferenz verwiesen.

den sowie die Gewährung großzügiger öffentlicher Entwicklungshilfe für Länder, die zur Armutsreduzierung entschlossen sind.

Zielvorgabe 14: Den besonderen Bedürfnissen der Binnen- und kleinen Inselentwicklungsländer Rechnung tragen.

Zielvorgabe 15: Die Schuldenprobleme der Entwicklungsländer durch Maßnahmen auf nationaler und internationaler Ebene umfassend angehen und so die Schulden langfristig tragbar werden lassen.

Eine Partnerschaft der Industrienationen mit den Entwicklungsländern muss – wenn sie nachhaltig von Erfolg gekrönt sein soll – sowohl eine finanzpolitische als auch eine handelspolitische Dimension beinhalten. Dieser Tatsache versuchen die Zielvorgaben des achten Millenniumsziels Rechnung zu tragen. Dabei richtet sich der Fokus auf drei zentrale Aktionsfelder: die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe, die Verknüpfung von Handel und Entwicklung sowie die Schuldenproblematik.

Wie bereits mehrfach erörtert, leistet die Europäische Union mehr als die Hälfte der weltweiten öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe. Rund ein Fünftel dieses Finanzvolumens verwaltet die Europäische Kommission, womit sie zur drittgrößten Geberin avanciert. Im Jahr 2003 belief sich das ODA-Volumen der EU auf 6,3 Mrd. €, was einen 20%igen Anstieg im Vergleich zum Jahr 2000 bedeutete. Allerdings veränderte sich – proportional gesehen – der Anteil von Geldern, die den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern zugute kommen, nur geringfügig, auch wenn er nach wie vor über dem DAC-Durchschnitt liegt.[166]

Abbildung V-6: Die durch die EU geleistete öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe 1990-2003



Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2004b: 34.

[166] Während 2000 32,84% der öffentlichen Entwicklungshilfe der EU den LDCs zugute kamen, waren es 2003 34,55%, vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 35 und eigene Berechnung.

Die positiven Signale der internationalen Konferenz zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung 2002 in Monterrey/Mexiko modifizierte der EU-Rat zu einer Reihe von Verpflichtungen im Rahmen seines Barcelona-Gipfels im März 2002 (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 34). Diese stimmen weitestgehend mit den Zielvorgaben des achten MDG überein, wobei sich allerdings die Frage stellt, inwiefern allgemeine Absichtserklärungen tatsächlich mit den politischen Realitäten zu vereinbaren sind. Dies wird besonders in Bezug auf die bedeutendste Verpflichtung des Barcelona-Gipfels – die Erreichung der 0,7%-Marke – deutlich, die bislang von nur wenigen EU-Staaten erreicht wurde.

In Hinblick auf den zweiten Schwerpunkt einer angestrebten Entwicklungspartnerschaft – die Verknüpfung von Handel und Entwicklung – spielt die laufende Doha-Runde der WTO eine entscheidende Rolle, deren angestrebtes Ziel eine bessere Integration der Entwicklungsländer in das Welthandelsystem ist (vgl. VENRO 2003). Ob dieser Anspruch eingelöst werden kann oder sich am Ende nur als „Etikettenschwindel“ herausstellen wird, lässt sich zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt noch nicht absehen. Die EU jedenfalls will die Chance dieser Verhandlungsrunde nutzen und sieht die Möglichkeit, durch handelsbezogene Aktivitäten einen elementaren Beitrag zur Erreichung der Millenniumsziele zu leisten. Vor diesem Hintergrund versucht sie ihre handelspolitischen Überlegungen verstärkt in ihr Entwicklungskonzept einzubeziehen. Dies geschieht konkret dadurch, dass entsprechende Überlegungen Berücksichtigung in den *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* finden. Handelspolitik wird somit zu einem Schlüsselfaktor bei dem Versuch, eine multidimensionale nachhaltige Entwicklungsstrategie zu implementieren.

Die Absicht der EU ist es, die gleichwertige Integration der Entwicklungsländer in das internationale Handelssystem auf drei Ebenen voranzutreiben: einer multilateralen, einer bilateralen und einer unilateralen. Auf multilateraler Ebene fungierte die Europäische Union als treibende Kraft, die im Zuge der Doha-Entwicklungsrunde entscheidende Vorschläge für die fortlaufenden Verhandlungen einbrachte. Diese schlagen sich teilweise in dem im Juli/August 2004 erzielten Rahmenabkommen nieder. So fand die EU-Anregung, Zuschüsse für den Export von Agrarprodukten aus Industrienationen langfristig zu streichen, partielle Zustimmung, wonach – wenn auch in stark relativierter Form – entsprechende weitere Schritte eingeleitet wurden. Allerdings erscheint die vollständige Streichung aller Subsidien für den Agrarsektor zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt alles andere als realistisch bzw. durchsetzbar. In Hinblick auf den Dienstleistungsbereich regte die EU die WTO-Mitgliedsstaaten dazu an, verbesserte Angebote vorzubringen und sich offener gegenüber den Interessen der Entwicklungsländer zu zeigen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 38). Inwiefern solche Bekundungen jedoch

tatsächlich zum Erfolg führen, ist mehr als fraglich. Die EU selbst ging allerdings schon im Frühjahr 2001 mit gutem Beispiel voran, indem sie die „*Everything but arms*“-Initiative startete. Diese räumt fast allen Importen aus den LDC zoll- und quotenfreien Zugang zu ihren Märkten ein. Ausgenommen sind – wie der Name schon sagt – Waffen sowie Bananen, Zucker und Reis (vgl. VENRO 2003: 7).

Nach dem Rückschlag der Cancun-Verhandlungen legte die EU den WTO-Mitgliedsstaaten eine Reihe von Vorschlägen vor, die dem zukünftigen Agieren der Welthandelsorganisationen einen funktionaleren und transparenteren Charakter verleihen soll. Dabei laufen alle EU-Vorschläge auf den Grundgedanken hinaus, dass den Entwicklungsländern ein verstärktes Mitspracherecht bei allen sie betreffenden Fragen eingeräumt werden muss. Dies trifft insbesondere auf solche Problematiken zu, in denen Industrienationen und Entwicklungsländer schlussendlich gemeinsame Ziele verfolgen. Als Paradebeispiel hierfür führt die EU die Verknüpfung von handels- und umweltpolitischen Thematiken an. So könnte – nach Einschätzung der EU-Kommission – die Handelsliberalisierung beispielsweise die Chance bieten, Entwicklungsländern die Beschaffung neuer Technologien im Bereich des Wasser- und Energiesektors zu erleichtern, die in der Folge positive Auswirkungen in Bezug auf die Einhaltung von internationalen Umweltbestimmungen haben könnte (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 39).

Auf bilateraler Ebene pflegt die EU schon seit dem Inkrafttreten der Lomé-Konvention 1975 einen primär auf handelspolitische Überlegungen ausgerichteten Entwicklungsansatz mit den AKP-Ländern. Das im Juni 2000 unterzeichnete Cotonou-Abkommen erweiterte den Aktionsradius der Vertragspartner um die Dimensionen der politischen und ökonomischen Zusammenarbeit, wodurch sich die Entwicklungskooperation auf alle handelsrelevanten Bereiche ausdehnt. Die neuen Übereinkünfte – die sogenannten *Economic Partnership Agreements* – gehen somit über reine Handelspräferenzen hinaus:

„EPAs are not classical free trade negotiations but are instruments for development. The aim is further to establish a joint body (‘Observatoire’) under each EPA to develop dialogue and partnership on sustainable development issues” (Europäische Kommission 2004b: 39f.).

Zusätzlich zu den EPAs hat die EU im Rahmen mehrerer bilateraler Handelsabkommen Staaten wie Südafrika, Mexiko und Chile einen präferentiellen Zugang zum europäischen Markt zugestanden. Die Verhandlungen mit dem MERCOSUR dauern an. Mit ihren mediterranen Nachbarstaaten vereinbarte die EU im Kontext des Barcelona-Prozesses zudem, dass bis spätestens 2010 eine europäisch-mediterrane Freihandelszone entstehen soll. Auf unilateraler Ebene handelte die Europäische Union mit 178 Staaten ein vergünstigtes Präferenzsystem

aus, das es diesen erlaubt, die eine Hälfte ihrer Produkte zollfrei, die andere zu reduzierten Zöllen in die EU zu exportieren. Diesen Zugeständnissen gegenüber zeigt man sich insbesondere von afrikanischer Seite besorgt, da diese – fast schon einer globalen Zollsenkung gleichkommend – den tatsächlichen Wert der Handelsvereinbarungen des Cotonou-Abkommens erheblich schmälern.[167] Diese Einschätzung belegen auch die allgemeinen Wirtschaftsfakten. So verliert Afrika sowohl für Importe, als auch als Absatzmarkt für europäische Exporte konstant an Bedeutung (vgl. Grimm 2003: 88ff.).

In Hinblick auf die Zukunft der Armutsbekämpfung stellt sich die äußerst wichtige Frage, wie der Teufelskreis von Verschuldung, Zahlungsunfähigkeit, Entschuldung und erneuter Verschuldung durchbrochen werden kann. Auf internationaler Ebene hat sich daher die HIPC-Initiative[168] zum entscheidenden Instrument zur Schuldentragfähigkeit herauskristallisiert. Für diese Entschuldungsinitiative haben sich bislang 27 Länder aufgrund ihrer hohen Verschuldung sowie ihrer Erfolg versprechenden Wirtschaftspolitik und Armutsreduzierungsprogramme qualifiziert. Bis Juli 2004 hatten 13 Länder die Initiative abgeschlossen und damit eine umfassende Schuldenerleichterung erhalten. Weitere 14 Länder überschritten den Entscheidungszeitpunkt und nehmen daher an der Initiative teil. Allerdings konnten sich 11 Länder – insbesondere aufgrund von politischer Instabilität und inkonsistenten *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* – nicht für die Initiative qualifizieren (vgl. Berensmann 2005: 315).

Die erweiterte HIPC-Initiative kann bislang einige Erfolge vorweisen, doch bleibt die Frage ungeklärt, inwiefern eine langfristige Schuldentragfähigkeit erreicht werden kann, da viele der involvierten Länder – die meisten aus Subsahara-Afrika – einer nichttragfähigen Verschuldung gegenüberstehen. Indes zeichnen die vom Internationalen Währungsfonds prognostizierten Daten ein weitgehend positives Bild der HIPC-Initiative, was der realen finanzpolitischen Situation in vielen verschuldeten Staaten keineswegs entspricht (vgl. Kaiser 2000; IWF/IDA 2003). In einzelnen Ländern liegt die Verschuldung im Verhältnis zu den Exporterlösen immer noch oder wieder über 150% und damit über der vom IWF festgelegten Grenze für Schuldentragfähigkeit. Folglich ist es kein Wunder, dass unabhängige Finanzexperten schon

[167] Praktisch verlieren die AKP-Staaten aufgrund der zunehmenden Anzahl der getroffenen Handelsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und anderen Drittstaaten ihre handelspolitische Sonderstellung, die sie seit dem Inkrafttreten der Lomé-Vereinbarungen besaßen.

[168] Auf dem Kölner Gipfel 1999 haben die G8-Staaten auf Initiative der Bundesregierung einen Vorschlag zur Ausweitung und Beschleunigung der Entschuldung hoch verschuldeter armer Länder unterbreitet, der von der Weltbank und dem IWF verabschiedet wurde. Für die Entschuldung können sich Länder qualifizieren, die bei der Weltbank ausschließlich Kredite zu den günstigsten Bedingungen erhalten und die einen Schuldenstand aufweisen, der mehr als 150% der Exporterlöse oder mehr als 250% der Staatseinnahmen ausmacht. Die Gesamtkosten der HIPC-Initiative belaufen sich auf circa 54 Mrd. US$. Vgl. Cohen 2000.

jetzt vielen HIPC-Länder nach Abschluss der Initiative einen Rückfall in eine nichttragfähige Verschuldung prophezeien (vgl. Berensmann 2005: 318).

Tabelle V-4: HIPC-Initiative

Länder, die ihren Abschlusszeitpunkt erreicht haben (13)		**Länder, die den Entscheidungspunkt erreicht haben (14)**		**Länder, die sich noch nicht qualifiziert haben (11)**	**Länder mit einem tragbaren Schuldenniveau (4)**
	Zeitpunkt		**Zeitpunkt**		
- Benin	März 2003	- Kamerun	Okt. 2000	- Elfenbeinküste	- Angola
- Bolivien	Juni 2001	- Tschad	Mai 2001	- Burundi	- Jemen
- Burkina Faso	April 2002	- DR Kongo	Juli 2003	- Zentralafrikanische Republik	- Kenia
- Äthiopien	April 2004	- Gambia	Dez. 2000	- Komoren	- Vietnam
- Guyana	Dez. 2003	- Ghana	Febr. 2002	- Republik Kongo	
- Mali	März 2003	- Guinea	Dez. 2000	- Laos	
-Mauretanien	Juli 2002	- Guinea-Bissau	Dez. 2000	- Liberia	
- Mosambik	Sept. 2001	-Honduras	Juli 2000	- Myanmar	
- Nicaragua	Januar 2004	- Madagaskar	Dez. 2000	- Somalia	
- Niger	April 2004	- Malawi	Dez. 2000	- Sudan	
- Senegal	April 2004	- Ruanda	Dez. 2000	- Togo	
- Tansania	Nov. 2001	- São Tomé e Príncipe	Dez. 2000		
- Uganda	Mai 2000	- Sierra Leone	März 2000		
		- Sambia	Dez. 2000		

Quelle: Berensmann 2005 : 329.

Da Schuldenerlasse alleine nur die Symptome beheben, aber nicht die Ursachen von Entwicklungsblockaden beseitigen, spielen insbesondere wirtschaftliche Reformen eine bedeutende Rolle, um eine langfristige Rückzahlungsfähigkeit zu garantieren. Aus diesem Grunde werden Schuldenerleichterungen im Rahmen der HIPC-Initiative an wirtschaftliche und politische Reformen gekoppelt, die sich schlussendlich in Form eines Armutsbekämpfungsprogramms auf der Basis der *Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers* manifestieren sollen. Diese Verknüpfung von Entschuldung und nationalen Strategien zur Armutsbekämpfung soll langfristige Erfolge in der Armutsreduzierung implizieren. Diese Vorgehensweise wird auch von Seiten der Europäischen Union für gut befunden. So hat sie bislang 1,2 Mrd. € zur Durchführung der HIPC-Initiative beigesteuert (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 46).

Darüber, wie die Schuldenproblematik zukünftig angegangen werden soll, sind sich nicht alle Akteure vollständig einig. Klar ist aber, dass eine langfristige Schuldentragfähigkeit nur dann realistisch erscheint, wenn alle Beteiligten – Gläubiger und Schuldner – geeignete dauerhafte wirtschaftspolitische Maßnahmen ergreifen, die vor allem die Rückzahlungsfähigkeit der HICP-Länder stärken. Da vorwiegend externe Schocks und eine verfehlte Wirtschaftspolitik

in den HICP-Ländern die Fähigkeit, Kredite zurückzuzahlen, beeinträchtigen, gilt es Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, die solchen Entwicklungen entgegenwirken.

Abbildung V-7: Schuldendienste im Verhältnis zum Exporteinkommen 1990-2003 (in %)



Quelle: Vereinte Nationen 2005: 39.

Da die meisten armen Länder aufgrund ihrer schwierigen ökonomischen Situation aus eigener Kraft nicht in der Lage sein werden, die für eine Armutsreduzierung notwendigen Schritte in die Wege zu leiten, sind sie auf die Hilfe der Gebergemeinschaft angewiesen. Daher ist eine langfristige Erhöhung der Zuschüsse und der konzessionären Kredite erforderlich. Jedoch weder der IWF noch die Weltbank oder andere multilaterale Geber verfügen derzeit über funktionierende Instrumente, um externe Schocks abzufedern. Aus diesem Grund gilt es auf Seiten der Gläubiger geeignete Instrumente zu finden, die folgende Kriterien erfüllen: eine kurzfristige Verfügbarkeit dieser Instrumente, eine mittelfristige Rückzahlungsfrist und eine hohe Subventionierung der Kredite. Auch die Geberländer können einen Beitrag zur tragfähigen Verschuldung leisten, indem sie ihre Märkte für die Produkte aus den Schuldnerländern öffnen. Schließlich führen steigende Exporte der HICP-Länder zu höheren Exporterlösen und damit zu einer besseren Rückzahlungsfähigkeit der externen Schulden. In der Umsetzung bedeutet dieser Ansatz, dass die Industrieländer zum einen die Zölle gegenüber Entwicklungsländern aufheben oder zumindest erheblich senken, zum anderen die Subventionen für ihre hergestellten Produkte – allen voran die Agrarerzeugnisse – reduzieren sollen. Die Schuldnerländer selbst stehen vor der Aufgabe, wirtschaftspolitische Reformen eigenständig zu initiieren und zur Stärkung ihrer fiskalischen und externen Rückzahlungsfähigkeit ihr Schulden-

management zu verbessern. Nicht zuletzt auch die Diversifizierung der Exporte ist eine an den Ursachen ansetzende Strategie, die externen Schocks entgegenwirkt, jedoch eine umfassende Änderung der Wirtschaftsstruktur des jeweiligen Landes erfordert und sich somit als langwieriger Prozess darstellt (vgl. Berensmann 2005: 323f.).

Vor diesem Hintergrund wird deutlich, dass die HICP-Initiative alleine keine langfristige Schuldentragfähigkeit garantieren kann. Vielmehr übernimmt sie eine Katalysatorfunktion für weitere politische und wirtschaftliche Reformen in den HICP-Staaten und trägt somit dazu bei, den Schuldenkreislauf zu durchbrechen und langfristig eine tragfähige Schuldenlast zu erzielen.

2.4 Die Prioritäten der EU bis 2015

Allen bisherigen Schwierigkeiten und Rückschläge zum Trotz zeigt sich die EU-Kommission nach wie vor davon überzeugt, dass die Millenniumsziele bis zum Jahr 2015 umgesetzt werden können. Man müsse die verbleibenden zehn Jahre „nur“ noch konsequenter und ambitionierter angehen, um die vereinbarten Zielsetzungen zu realisieren. Dabei sei es gleichermaßen Aufgabe der Industrie- und Entwicklungsländer, dem globalen Projekt der Armutsreduzierung neue Impulse zu verleihen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 47). Die EU-Kommission als zentrales Organ der Europäischen Union sieht sich dabei selbst in der Pflicht, einen entscheidenden Beitrag zum Gelingen des Vorhabens zu leisten. Dementsprechend umfassend und ambitioniert gestaltet sich ihre Prioritätenliste, die drei Schwerpunkte hervorhebt:

Entwicklungsfinanzierung:

Der Konsens von Monterrey, der auf der Internationalen Konferenz über die Finanzierung der Entwicklung in Mexiko (18.-22. März 2002) erzielt wurde, beinhaltet eine Reihe grundlegender Verpflichtungen zur „*Annahme der Herausforderungen der Entwicklungsfinanzierung in der Welt, insbesondere in den Entwicklungsländern*”. Die EU legte ihren Beitrag dazu in einer Reihe von ausdrücklichen Verpflichtungen fest, die vom Europäischen Rat auf seiner Tagung in Barcelona am 14. März 2002 angenommen wurden. Sie umfassen im Folgenden:

• eine Prüfung der Möglichkeiten und des zeitlichen Rahmens für die Leistungen der einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten bei der Erreichung des UN-Zielwerts für die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe von 0,7 % des Bruttovolkseinkommens mit einem Zwischenziel von 0,39% bis 2006, wobei die Mitgliedstaaten bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt jeweils mindestens 0,33% erreicht haben sollten;

• eine Verbesserung der Wirksamkeit der Hilfe durch eine engere Koordinierung und eine Harmonisierung und Ergreifung konkreter Maßnahmen zu diesem Zweck noch vor 2004;
• Maßnahmen im Hinblick auf die Aufhebung der Bindung der Hilfe für die am wenigsten entwickelten Länder;
• eine Erhöhung ihrer handelsbezogenen Hilfe;
• eine Unterstützung bei der Ermittlung der relevanten globalen Kollektivgüter;
• eine Unterstützung der Reformen der Internationalen Finanzsysteme und Stärkung der Stimme der Entwicklungsländer in internationalen Wirtschaftsentscheidungsprozessen;
• eine Fortsetzung der Bemühungen zur Wiederherstellung einer tragbaren Schuldensituation im Kontext der HIPC-Initiative für die hoch verschuldeten armen Länder (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004d: 4).

Kohärenz der für Entwicklung relevanten Politikbereiche:
Um überhaupt die Hoffnung aufrechterhalten zu können, die MDGs bis 2015 zu erreichen, müssen endlich mehr der längst zugesagten Bedingungen eingehalten und umgesetzt werden, um den Weg für eine fairere Globalisierung zu ebnen. Insbesondere den zentralen Ausgangspunkten für Entwicklung – *„Good Governance“*, Wirtschaftswachstum, Infrastruktur, Umweltschutz, etc. – gilt es dabei größere Aufmerksamkeit zu schenken. Damit solche Bemühungen schlussendlich von Erfolg gekrönt sein können, hat sich die EU folgende Prioritäten gesetzt:
• Ein Hinarbeiten zu einem entwicklungsfreundlichen Ausgang der Handelsverhandlungen auf bilateraler und multilateraler Ebene; in erster Linie in Hinblick auf EU-AKP Partnerschaftsverträge und die Doha-Entwicklungsagenda;
• eine Einschränkung der Wettbewerbsverzerrungen, die sich durch die Subventionierung der EU-Agrarpolitik ergeben;
• durch eine verstärkte Politikkohärenz auf allen Ebenen die soziale Dimension von Entwicklung stärker in den Vordergrund rücken;
• institutionelle Reformen unterstützen, die Entwicklungsambitionen – insbesondere auf dem Arbeitsmarktsektor – neue Impulse verleihen;
• eine stärkere Einbindung nichtstaatlicher Akteure in die unterschiedlichen Arbeitsprozesse;
• eine Ausschöpfung der Synergien zwischen migrations- und entwicklungspolitischen Problematiken, um Migration zu einem Teilaspekt von entwicklungspolitischen Überlegungen werden zu lassen;

• Entwicklungsländern zu einem größeren Mitspracherecht in globalen Angelegenheiten verhelfen, nicht zuletzt vor dem Hintergrund einer Optimierung der WTO-Funktionsweise (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004b: 48f.).

Schwerpunkt auf Afrika:

Subsahara-Afrika ist die Region, die im Vergleich zu anderen Teilen der Welt bei der Erreichung der Millenniumsziele am wenigsten Fortschritte erzielt. Zwar wurde durch die Aufstellung der NEPAD-Agenda ein gemeinsamer Rahmen für neue Initiativen geschaffen, doch reichen diese – gegenwärtigen Einschätzungen zufolge – nicht aus, um die angestrebten Zielsetzungen bis 2015 zu realisieren. Die EU sieht daher vor, im Rahmen des von der *Commission for Africa* ausgearbeiteten Aktionsplans eine weitere Initiative ins Leben zu rufen. Die Schwerpunkte einer solchen Initiative sollen sich aus den bereits bestehenden Orientierungen der EU-Entwicklungspolitik und den Prioritäten des NEPAD-Programms ergeben. Somit bleiben die Absichten der EU in Bezug auf ein verstärktes Engagement in Afrika recht allgemein (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2005c).

Ihre weitere Vorgehensweise in Hinblick auf die Armutsbekämpfung und die Millenniumsziele wollte und will die EU von den Ergebnissen des großen UN-Weltgipfels abhängig machen, der vom 12. bis 14. September 2005 stattfand. Die Bilanz der Konferenz fällt allerdings recht mager aus, da fast ausschließlich bereits bekannte Positionen bekräftigt wurden, ohne neue Ansätze vorzulegen. In vielen Punkten konnte keine Einigkeit im Detail erzielt werden, was sich nicht zuletzt auch in der verabschiedeten Gipfelerklärung niederschlägt, die sich vornehmlich auf vage Grundsatzerklärungen beschränkt. So bekräftigen die UN-Mitgliedsstaaten zwar die Gültigkeit der Millenniumsziele, erklärten die 0,7%-Marke – auf Drängen der USA – aber nicht zur allgemein verbindlichen Zielvorgabe. Demnach bleiben die getätigten Zusagen weit hinter dem entwicklungspolitisch Notwendigen zurück und lassen die Hoffnung, die Millenniumsziele bis 2015 zu erreichen, weiter schmelzen (vgl. *epo* vom 17.09.2005).

3. Zusammenfassung - Der EU-Beitrag zur Armutsbekämpfung

Die Armutsbekämpfung ist längst zum Thema Nr. 1 der internationalen Entwicklungsagenda avanciert. Dies schlägt sich in der 2000 verabschiedeten Millenniumserklärung nieder, die das wohl bislang umfangreichste Unternehmen der Weltgemeinschaft darstellt. Der Europäischen Union als zweitgrößten Geberin von Entwicklungshilfe kommt bei der Erreichung der formulierten Zielsetzungen eine bedeutende Rolle zu. Sie selbst sieht sich als treibende Kraft in diesem Prozess und versucht ihren eigenen Ansprüchen mittels Initiativen auf allen Ebenen gerecht zu werden. Dabei bereitet ihr insbesondere die Komplexität ihrer eigenen Verfahrensweise größte Schwierigkeiten: Zahlreiche Instrumente und Kompetenzfelder überschneiden und behindern sich, so dass für externe Akteure nur selten eine klare Aufgabenverteilung und -trennung deutlich wird. Aus diesem Grund hat die EU-Kommission eine Vereinfachung der komplexen Strukturen angeregt, die zwar eine allgemeine Zustimmung erfährt, auf deren konkrete Ausgestaltung man sich jedoch noch nicht einigen konnte. Die EU befindet sich in diesem Bereich in einer Transformationsphase.

Dass die EU-Kommission ihre Verpflichtung zu einer armutsorientierten Entwicklungspolitik ernst nimmt, wird nicht zuletzt aus den zahlreichen, nachdrücklich formulierten Kommissionsmitteilungen an den Rat und das Parlament deutlich. Dieser engagierten Haltung steht jedoch nicht zuletzt das schleppende Nachkommen der einzelnen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten gegenüber. So können gerade einmal vier Mitgliedsstaaten – Dänemark, Luxemburg, die Niederlande und Schweden – von sich behaupten, die seit langem vereinbarte Aufstockung der durchschnittlichen Entwicklungshilfe auf 0,7 Prozent des BSP zu erfüllen. Insbesondere Spanien, Deutschland und Italien wehren sich nach wie vor gegen eine Festschreibung der Erhöhung ihrer Entwicklungsfinanzierung. Vor diesem Hintergrund lesen sich die zahlreichen, allgemein gehaltenen Absichtserklärungen wie leere Phrasen.

Diese Tendenz zeichnet sich deutlich dann ab, wenn man die bisherigen EU-Initiativen in Relation zu den einzelnen Millenniumszielen stellt: Ambitionierte Vorhaben wurden in umfangreichem Maße in Angriff genommen und erfahren zum Teil regelmäßige Ausbesserungen, doch sind längst nicht alle Potentiale ausgeschöpft. Hierzu sind vor allen Dingen höhere Finanzmittel notwendig, die bislang noch nicht in angepasster Form von Seiten der Mitgliedsländer zur Verfügung gestellt wurden. Der Kommission als entwicklungspolitische Initiativkraft sind somit oftmals die Hände gebunden. Eine längerfristige Besserung der Lage scheint nicht in Sicht, wie auch die Resultate des G8-Gipfels belegten. Ohne ein sichtbares Einlenken der EU-Staaten und anderer Industrienationen dürften – allen optimistischen Einschätzungen

der Kommission zum Trotz – die MDGs jedoch nicht annähernd erreicht werden. Regelmäßige Bekräftigungen bereits bestehender Absichtserklärungen helfen an dieser Stelle nicht mehr weiter. Aus dieser Perspektive muss insbesondere die im September 2005 in New York abgehaltene UN-Konferenz, von der sich alle entwicklungspolitischen Akteure wegweisende Entscheidungen erwarteten, als eindeutige Stagnation auf dem Weg zur Erreichung der Millenniumsziele eingeschätzt werden. Gerade dem afrikanischen Kontinent, der in allen MDG relevanten Feldern deutliche Fortschritte vermissen lässt, helfen keine halbherzigen Zusagen.

Vor diesem Hintergrund steht die Glaubwürdigkeit und Funktionsfähigkeit des internationalen Systems auf dem Spiel. Sollte es nicht es bald zu einem Durchbruch kommen, wird das ohnehin geringe Vertrauen in internationale Zusagen zur Armutsbekämpfung wohl ganz verschwinden. Die Europäische Union als selbsternannte Vorreiterin bei diesem Unterfangen will und muss daher – ihrer weltpolitischen Rolle entsprechend – mit gutem Beispiel vorangehen. Oder wie es EU-Entwicklungskommissar Louis Michel formulierte:

„The EU has expressed the will to make a difference. This implies that we bridge the gap between theory and practice and that we back up our words with resources and action [...] Anything less is not an option”(Europäische Kommission 2004b: 51).

„Die EU wird in Zukunft nur erfolgreich sein, wenn die Mitgliedsstaaten ein gemeinsames Verständnis für die wirtschafts-, außen- und sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen Europas entwickeln und den politischen Willen aufbringen, diese gemeinsam zu meistern. Jedes Mitgliedsland besitzt das Recht, möglichst viel von seinen Interessen und Ideen in der Gemeinschaft durchzusetzen; aber das funktioniert nur, wenn jeder zugleich das Wohl des Ganzen im Auge behält. Ob sich die Größe auch in adäquate Macht umsetzt, ist eine noch offene, zugleich aber die ausschlaggebende Frage der Zukunft. Denn wenn die EU nur groß, aber nicht stark wird, dann verliert sie, was sie durch die Beitritte zu gewinnen hoffte“ (Martens 2004: 5).

Kapitel VI.
Die EU-Entwicklungspolitik im erweiterten Europa

Seit dem 1. Mai 2004 ist die Zahl der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten auf 25 angewachsen. Neben Malta und Zypern traten die acht postkommunistischen Staaten Estland, Lettland, Litauen, Polen, Slowakische Republik, Slowenien, Tschechische Republik und Ungarn der Europäischen Union bei. Somit leben nunmehr über 450 Millionen Menschen unter dem Dach der EU. Dass eine solche Vergrößerung nicht ohne weitreichende Anstrengungen zu bewältigen ist, war von Beginn an klar, zumal die EU-Erweiterung nicht nur eine Perspektive, sondern auch eine moralische Verpflichtung darstellt. So zielt die Osterweiterung der EU programmatisch auf die Schaffung eines friedlichen und prosperierenden Gesamteuropas ab, indem es zur Stabilisierung von Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft in den Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas beiträgt. Auf diese Weise soll nicht nur eine sicherheitspolitische Aufgabe ersten Ranges erfüllt werden, sondern ebenso ein längst überfälliger Demokratisierungs- und Modernisierungsprozess an der Peripherie Westeuropas forciert werden. Andererseits stellt die Erweiterung der EU um die beitrittsfähigen Länder in Mittel- und Osteuropa eine historische Notwendigkeit dar, zumal diese Staaten – vor dem Hintergrund der Präambel der Römischen Verträge – grundsätzlich das Anrecht auf Mitgliedschaft haben. Die europäische Integrationsidee ist gesamteuropäisch angelegt, so dass die Erweiterung schlussendlich nur der Logik der seit 1989 eingesetzten „europäischen Normalität“ entspricht. In diesem Zusammenhang muss die Öffnung der EU gegenüber den mittel- und osteuropäischen Staaten nicht als strategische Neuorientierung, sondern als das Nachholen des ursprünglichen, größeren europäischen Projektes verstanden werden. Nichtsdestotrotz darf nicht übersehen werden, dass das Europa der 25 sich einer Vielzahl neuer Herausforderungen stellen muss. So zieht die Erweiterung ein bislang nicht

gekanntes wirtschaftliches und soziales Gefälle innerhalb der EU nach sich, auf das es die passenden (institutionellen) Antworten zu finden gilt (vgl. Martens 2004: 3).

Vor diesem Hintergrund stellt der Beitritt der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten auch die EU-Entwicklungspolitik vor neue Herausforderungen. So muss die Frage erlaubt sein, inwiefern zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt in den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten überhaupt Potential zu entwicklungspolitischem Engagement vorhanden ist, das sich mit den vorhandenen Kapazitäten und Ansprüchen der alten Mitgliedsstaaten messen lassen kann. Schließlich bedeutet der EU-Beitritt auch die Annahme der dort vertretenen Überzeugungen und Ambitionen. Daran anknüpfend gilt es danach zu fragen, ob der notwendige Rollentausch – von Empfänger- zu Geberländern – von den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten überhaupt bewerkstelligt werden kann. Oder drastischer formuliert: Können Staaten, die teilweise selbst auf Hilfsgelder angewiesen sind, einen nachhaltigen Beitrag zu einer armutsorientierten Entwicklungspolitik leisten?

1. Die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten und ihre Transition von Empfänger- zu Geberländern

1.1 Die Entwicklungspolitik Mittel- und Osteuropas: ein Rückblick

Im Zeitalter des Kalten Krieges konkurrierte der kommunistische Osten auf einer Vielzahl von Politikfeldern mit dem Westen. So auch in der Entwicklungspolitik, die vornehmlich dazu benutzt wurde, Einfluss in Drittstaaten – vor allem in der Dritten Welt – zu gewinnen. Die raschen Industrialisierungserfolge der Ostblockländer in den 1950er und 1960er Jahren waren für viele Entwicklungsländer ein Vorbild und führten zur Übernahme planwirtschaftlicher Ansätze in vielen Staaten der Dritten Welt. Umgekehrt konzentrierte sich die Hilfe des Ostblocks auf Länder, die ein sozialistisches Entwicklungsmodell verfolgten und auch außenpolitisch einen mit dem Ostblock sympathisierenden Kurs verfolgten.[169] Das Volumen der Hilfe belief sich bei den osteuropäischen Staaten 1980 auf 0,06% des BSP, was deutlich unter dem OECD-Niveau lag (vgl. Machowski/Schultz 1981: 13ff.).

Dem Zusammenbruch des Kommunismus folgten eine Neuordnung der Staatenstruktur in Mittel- und Osteuropa, ein massiver wirtschaftlicher Umbruch und eine ebenso drastische Veränderung der Außenbeziehungen. Während Polen und Ungarn ihre staatliche Identität behielten, zerfielen die Tschechoslowakei, Jugoslawien und die Sowjetunion. Die Beitrittsländer Tschechien, Slowakei, Slowenien, Lettland, Litauen und Estland entstanden als neue, unabhängige Staaten mit eigener Außen-, Entwicklungs- und Handelspolitik. Alle Länder

[169] Eine Ausnahme bildete die Türkei, die eines der wichtigsten Empfängerländer von Krediten war. Vgl. Dauderstädt 2002: 5.

traten in den folgenden Jahren der Weltbank, dem IWF und ab 1995 der WTO bei. Mitte der 90er Jahre wurden Tschechien, Ungarn, Polen und etwas später auch die Slowakei Mitglieder der OECD, womit sie formell in die Gruppe der Geberländer einzogen (vgl. Dauderstädt 2002: 6). Tatsächlich überwog und überwiegt bis heute die empfangene Hilfe, vor allem von der EU, bei weitem die gegebene.

Angesichts des schweren Rückgangs des Volkseinkommens in der ersten Phase des Systemwechsels konnte es auch nicht überraschen, dass die betroffenen Länder ihre Hilfe weitgehend einstellten, zumal auch ihre politischen Ziele aus der Zeit der Systemkonkurrenz weggefallen waren. Auch der Außenhandel mit Entwicklungsländern veränderte sich im Zuge der Transformation, die von einer massiven Umorientierung des Außenhandels Ostmitteleuropas vom Ostblock auf den Westen und insbesondere die EU begleitet war. So hat das Gewicht der Entwicklungsländer im Handel mit den Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas zunächst deutlich abgenommen, um sich anschließend auf einem relativ geringen Niveau wieder zu stabilisieren. Mit der Überwindung der Transformationskrise und der Vorbereitung auf den EU-Beitritt begannen die Beitrittsländer wieder mit eigenen entwicklungspolitischen Aktivitäten. Das Volumen der eingesetzten Mittel hielt sich dabei in einem bescheidenen Rahmen. So wendeten die Länder im Durchschnitt nicht mehr als 0,03 % des BIP für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit auf (vgl. Dauderstädt 2002: 7f.).[170]

1.2 Schwerpunkte, Prinzipien und Verfahrensmodelle

Während die meisten Geberländer über ein politisches Rahmenkonzept verfügen, welches die Schwerpunkte und Prinzipien ihrer Entwicklungshilfe definiert, verfügt nur etwa die Hälfte aller neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten über eine ähnliche systematische Ausgestaltung. Aber selbst in diesen Staaten, die in regelmäßigen Abständen ihr entwicklungspolitisches Handeln darlegen, ist man von einer breit gefächerten, alle Akteure umfassenden Politikformulierung noch weit entfernt. So bestand beispielsweise in Tschechien bis 2002 keine systematische Einbindung von NROen in die allgemeine Formulierung entwicklungspolitischer Zielsetzungen. Auch in Ungarn setzte ein solcher Partizipationsprozess erst 2001 ein. In der Slowakei wird die Plattform der entwicklungspolitischen Nichtregierungsorganisation sogar erst seit 2003 zur zukünftigen Gestaltung der nationalen Entwicklungspolitik befragt (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 20).

[170] Zum Vergleich: Der OECD-Durchschnitt liegt fast zehnmal höher.

Im Allgemeinen ist die Zahl der Regierungsmitteilungen zu nationalen Entwicklungsstrategien äußerst gering, was zum Teil auch auf ein Fehlen eines deutlichen Empfängerkreises für entwicklungspolitische Themen schließen lässt. So interessieren sich zwar NROen für die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, doch richtet sich das Bevölkerungsinteresse in erster Linie auf kurzfristige Hilfsaktionen in den Nachbarstaaten. Hierhinter verbirgt sich die allgemeine Intention der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten, Fragen der regionalen Stabilität und Sicherheit oberste Priorität einzuräumen. Der Armutsbekämpfung schenken sie im Rahmen ihrer Entwicklungspolitik hingegen weit weniger Aufmerksamkeit. Dies spiegelt sich nicht zuletzt im Verteilungsschlüssel der Entwicklungshilfe wider. So erreichten in der Periode von 1999 bis 2001 beispielsweise nur fünf Prozent der öffentlichen tschechischen Entwicklungshilfe den afrikanischen Kontinent und nur zehn Prozent flossen in Länder mit niedrigem Einkommen. Im Kontrast hierzu verteilten sich 30% der tschechischen ODA auf Osteuropa und 52% auf andere (Nachbar-)Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen, wobei sich das Hauptaugenmerk der Hilfe auf den Ausbau von Sicherheitsmaßnahmen richtete. Noch deutlicher wird die Ausblendung der globalen Armutsproblematik bei einer näheren Betrachtung der slowakischen Entwicklungshilfe für das Jahr 2001: Gerade einmal 0,5% der aufgebrachten Hilfsgelder wurde für Projekte in Afrika eingeplant (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 7).

Tabelle VI-1: Die entwicklungspolitischen Schlüsselfelder der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten

Key ODA Objectives	Cyprus	Czech	Estonia	Hungary	Latvia	Lithuania	Malta	Poland	Slovak	Slovenia	Total
Democracy and the rule of law		☑	☑	☑	☑	☑			☑	☑	7
Regional security	☑		☑	☑	☑	☑				☑	6
Sustainable development/ environmen	☑	☑		☑	☑			☑		☑	6
Poverty reduction			☑				☑	☑			3

Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 7.

Auch ist die organisatorisch-institutionelle Verankerung der Entwicklungspolitik in den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten eine andere als in den meisten OECD-Ländern. Wenn die zehn neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten selbstverständlich über kein entsprechend einheitliches Modell verfügen, so lassen sich doch eine Reihe grundlegender Verfahrensweisen erkennen, die in den meisten neuen Mitgliedsstaaten angewendet werden. Grundsätzlich wird die staatliche Entwicklungspolitik nicht durch ein eigenes Ministerium geleitet, sondern durch entsprechende Referate im

Außenministerium verwaltet. Oftmals sind dabei weitere Fachministerien in die Projektabwicklung involviert. Hinzu kommt, dass die Ausarbeitung und Koordinierung von Projekten nicht systematisch erfolgt. Projektvorschläge stammen meist von privaten Organisationen und Initiativen und anderen Regierungsministerien, weswegen der Aktionsradius nationaler Entwicklungsprojekte äußerst breit angelegt ist. Die Folge ist eine starke Fragmentierung der bilateralen Entwicklungshilfe.[171] Ein gutes Beispiel hierfür liefert Tschechien: So wurden im Jahr 2001 79 Projekte in 49 Ländern von 12 verschiedenen Ministerien und Agenturen betreut. Lettland, ein Land mit einem verhältnismäßig geringen Entwicklungsbudget, unterhielt im gleichen Jahr 40 verschiedene Projekte. Und selbst Estland und Malta, die beiden neuen Mitgliedsstaaten mit den kleinsten Entwicklungsprogrammen, engagierten sich in bis zu 10 Staaten. Einzig Litauen und Slowenien konzentrierten ihre Entwicklungshilfe auf vier bis fünf Länder.[172] Aus diesen Daten lässt sich erkennen, dass der Fokus eindeutig auf die Projekthilfe und nicht auf programmbasierte Maßnahmen gerichtet ist. Entwicklungshilfe wird als eine Serie von Hilfsprojekten verstanden. Dabei erweisen sich die institutionelle Verfahrensweise, die eingebrachten Interessen der unterschiedlichen Ministerien und Agenturen sowie der Mangel an einem mehrjährigen Verfahrensmechanismus als entscheidende Faktoren, die einer programmbasierten Hilfe im Weg stehen.

Tabelle VI-2: ODA- Schlüsseldaten der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten für das Jahr 2001

Country	Size of ODA program (2001, US$ Million)	No. of Countries	No. of Projects	Number of Staff at MFA	Average ODA per staff (US$m)
Cyprus	2.3	>10	N/A	2	1.1
Czech Republic	26.5	49	79	12	2.2
Estonia	0.5	8	11	4	0.1
Hungary	8.5	>10	N/A	20	0.4
Latvia 1/	1.4	N/A	40	3	0.4
Lithuania 1/	2.0	4	8	4	0.5
Malta	0.5	>10	N/A	2	0.3
Poland	35.5	>15	>15	7	5.1
Slovak Republic	11.7	>10	N/A	5	2.4
Slovenia	25.5	5	N/A	2	12.3

1/ No breakdown available. Overall rather than bilateral was used.

Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 28.

[171] Im Gegensatz hierzu versuchen viele andere EU-Mitgliedsstaaten und Industrienationen ihre Entwicklungshilfe vornehmlich auf eine begrenzte Anzahl Entwicklungsländer zu beschränken, um auf diese Weise eine Effizienzsteigerung der geleisteten Hilfe zu erzielen.

[172] Entsprechend zuverlässige Daten der anderen neuen Mitgliedsstaaten liegen für diesen Zeitraum nicht vor. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 28.

Eine unzureichende Personalausstattung in der Projektbetreuung ist in den meisten der zehn neuen Mitgliedsstaaten nicht zu verzeichnen. Einzig Polen und Slowenien scheinen im europäischen Vergleich leicht unterbesetzt.[173] Als größeres Problem erweist sich jedoch die mangelnde entwicklungspolitische Erfahrung. Ausschlaggebend sind hierfür zwei Gründe. Zum einen entstanden die jetzigen Strukturen erst in der Zeit nach 1989 und sind dementsprechend noch relativ neu, zum anderen liegen die staatlichen Gehälter dieser Länder weit unter dem Durchschnitt, den andere internationale Geberorganisationen zahlen. Folglich wandern Experten zu letzteren ab. Damit jedoch künftig eine umfassende Partizipation dieser Staaten an der allgemeinen EU-Entwicklungspolitik möglich erscheint, muss insbesondere eine Steigerung der professionellen Personalkapazitäten erfolgen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 29). Diese Notwendigkeit scheint – kurzfristig gesehen – fast unmöglich, da das Finanzvolumen für Entwicklungshilfe wahrscheinlich weiterhin konstant gering bleiben wird und weit unter den Monterrey-Verpflichtungen – geschweige denn der 0,7%-Marke der Millenniumsziele – liegt.[174]

Abbildung VI-1: Die Entwicklungshilfe der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten 2001 (in Mio. US$)



Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 9.

[173] In der Europäischen Union verwaltet bei kleinen ODA-Programmen – beispielsweise Luxemburg und Griechenland – ein Mitarbeiter 4-5 Mio. US$, bei größeren Programmen kommt ein Mitarbeiter auf 8 Mio. US$ (z.B. Deutschland).

[174] Im Durchschnitt erreichen die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten zwischen einem Sechstel und einem Sechzehntel des in Monterrey vereinbarten Entwicklungsvolumens. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 9.

2. Rechte und Verpflichtungen der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten

Vor dem Hintergrund künftiger Beitrittsverhandlungen hat der Europäische Rat auf seiner Kopenhagener Tagung im Juni 1993 die sogenannten „Kopenhagener Kriterien“ aufgestellt. Sie verlangen von den Beitrittsländern:

- stabile Institutionen als Garantie für Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Menschenrechte und den Schutz von Minderheiten,
- eine funktionierende Marktwirtschaft und die Fähigkeit, dem Wettbewerbsdruck und den Marktkräften innerhalb der EU standzuhalten,
- die Fähigkeit, alle Pflichten der Mitgliedschaft, d.h. das gesamte Recht der EU zu übernehmen, und das Einverständnis mit den Zielen der Politischen Union sowie mit denen der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion als das „Acquis-Kriterium“ (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2002h).

Aufgrund des entwicklungspolitischen Kontexts dieser Arbeit ist insbesondere das letztgenannte Kriterium, die Umsetzung des EU-Rechtsbestandes, von Interesse. Die Übernahme des gesamten EU-Rechts gewährt den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten eine Reihe neuer Rechte und somit auch Garantien, aber impliziert auch gleichermaßen eine Vielzahl an Verpflichtungen, denen es nachzukommen gilt. In Bezug auf die EU-Entwicklungspolitik bildet der Maastrichter Vertrag von 1993 die Ausgangsbasis. Die Verträge von Amsterdam und Nizza schufen weitere Spezifikationen. Insgesamt markieren drei Bestimmungen das entwicklungspolitische Rahmenkonzept der EU. Zum einen sind dies die Artikel 177-181 des EG-Vertrags, die die Ziele der gemeinsamen Entwicklungspolitik – ökonomische und soziale Entwicklung, Integration der Entwicklungsländer in den Weltmarkt, Armutsbekämpfung, Förderung von Demokratie und Rechtstaatlichkeit – definieren und die Entscheidungsakteure (Ministerrat mit qualifizierter Mehrheit) und Prinzipien (Kohärenz, Komplementarität, Koordinierung und Konsistenz) benennen. Zum zweiten handelt es sich um Artikel 181a des EG-Vertrags, der durch den Nizza-Vertrag hinzugefügt wurde. Er erlaubt der EU Verträge mit Drittländern auf der Basis einer qualifizierten Mehrheit auszuhandeln. Und zum dritten erklären die Artikel 182-188 des EG-Vertrags, dass Frankreich, Großbritannien, die Niederlande und Dänemark über Überseegebiete verfügen. Diesen wird einerseits ein präferentieller Zugang zum europäischen Markt zugestanden, andererseits eine finanzielle Unterstützung von Seiten der EU garantiert.

Für die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten bedeutet dies, dass sie die vorgegebenen entwicklungspolitischen Zielsetzungen annehmen müssen. Themen wie Armutsbekämpfung, Demokratisierung

und Rechtstaatlichkeit, die von ihnen bislang fast vollkommen ausgeblendet wurden, müssen nun zu zentralen Aspekten ihrer Entwicklungshilfe werden. Zudem stellt die EU mit dem EU-Rat an der Spitze die oberste Instanz in allen entwicklungspolitischen Angelegenheiten dar. Der Rat legt – meist in Anlehnung an UN-Vorgaben – die Maßnahmen zur Erreichung der Zielsetzungen fest. Den vier „K-Prinzipien“ haben auch die Mitgliedsstaaten Folge zu leisten. Zwar bleibt den Mitgliedsstaaten ein Handlungsspielraum erhalten, doch sollen sie ihre jeweiligen Verfahrensweisen bei der Handhabung der Hilfsprogramme weitestgehend miteinander abstimmen.

EU-Bestimmungen haben für alle EU-Mitgliedsstaaten einen verbindlichen Charakter und sind ohne zusätzliche nationale Gesetzgebung direkt umzusetzen. Aus den entwicklungsbezogenen Bestimmungen lassen sich für die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten daher zwei zentrale Folgerungen ableiten:

1. Von den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten wird verlangt, dass sie die Formen der EU-Entwicklungspolitik, die geeigneten Empfängerländer, die Intention der EU-Hilfe und die spezifische Verfahrensweise in jeder Region und bei jedem Thema akzeptieren.
2. Sie übernehmen den Koordinierungsprozess in den Regionen, die ihnen von der Kommission zugeteilt wurden und der von allen Mitgliedsstaaten spezifischen Handlungsbedarf erfordert.

Um in Hinblick auf den zweiten Aspekt eine ständige Abstimmung zwischen der Kommission und den Mitgliedsstaaten gewährleisten zu können, wurden verschiedene Ausschüsse gebildet (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union 1999). Sie dienen als Diskussionsforen und sind sowohl nach themenspezifischen als auch nach geopolitischen Gesichtspunkten ausgerichtet, wobei die Kommission den Vorsitz führt.[175] Auf diese Weise erhält die Kommission die Möglichkeit, ihre Planungen mit den nationalen Behörden abzustimmen, bevor sie Maßnahmen ergreift. Damit dieses Aufeinanderabstimmen nicht nur partieller Natur ist, müssen alle Mitgliedsstaaten Vertreter entsenden. Folglich sind auch die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten gezwungen, an allen entwicklungsrelevanten Ausschüssen teilzunehmen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 40).

Die im Juni 2003 inkraftgetretenen Cotonou-Vereinbarungen, welche die künftige Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und der AKP-Staatengruppe regeln, werden aufgrund einer Klausel des Beitrittsvertrages (Art. 6, Abs. 4) automatisch auch für die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten verbindlich (vgl. Europäische Union 2000: 39; Europäische Union 2003: 34).

[175] Gegenwärtig existieren sieben entwicklungsbezogene Komitees. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 42.

Laut Artikel 4 der internen Vereinbarung über die Implementierung des EU-AKP-Partnerschaftsabkommens muss ein EU-Land alle anderen Mitgliedsstaaten und die Kommission über Verträge, Konventionen und Vereinbarungen unterrichten, die es mit einem oder mehreren AKP-Staaten ausgehandelt hat oder zukünftig aushandeln will, falls deren Inhalte auch die EU-AKP-Partnerschaft betreffen (vgl. Rat der Europäischen Union 2000: 1). Weiterhin kann auf Ersuchen eines Mitgliedsstaates oder der Kommission irgendeine dieser Übereinkünfte zum Diskussionsgegenstand des EU-Rates gemacht werden. Die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten haben aus diesem Grund eine „Bestandsaufnahme" ihrer bestehenden Übereinkünfte mit AKP-Staaten vorzubereiten. Hingegen wird von den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten noch nicht verlangt, eine Leistung zur Finanzierung des 9. EEF beizutragen. Dafür wurde ihnen jedoch nahe gelegt, ihre Entwicklungshilfe verstärkt auf ihre Kompatibilität hinsichtlich der ökonomischen Partnerschaftsabkommen (EPA) mit den AKP-Staaten zu überprüfen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 46ff.).[176]

Im Bereich der Handelspolitik verfügt die EU-Kommission über exklusive Kompetenzen und hat mit 138 Entwicklungsländern Vereinbarungen – in Form von Rahmenabkommen oder in Bezug auf spezifische Sektoren – abgeschlossen. Diese Abkommen sind verbindlich für alle Mitgliedsstaaten, folglich durch ihren EU-Beitritt auch für die zehn neuen. Die Verpflichtungen, die sich diesbezüglich aus der EU-Mitgliedschaft ableiten, sind jedoch recht begrenzt. So müssen beispielsweise in regelmäßigen Abständen statistische Angaben zu Produktion, Konsum und Handel von und mit bestimmten Waren vorgelegt werden (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 51).

Von besonderem Interesse sind des Weiteren die auf UN-Ebene ausgehandelten Abkommen. Die EU-Staaten stellen mit rund 40 Prozent den größten Teil des UN-Budgets und der UN-Friedensmissionen und leisten 50 Prozent zur Durchführung der einzelnen UN-Programme. Folglich resultiert aus dieser umfangreichen Unterstützung ein enger Informationsaustausch zwischen der Kommission und den unterschiedlichen Körperschaften des UN-Systems.[177] Derweil unterzeichnete die EU und ihre Mitgliedsstaaten eine Reihe von internationalen UN-Vereinbarungen. Für die Entwicklungspolitik sind hiervon in erster Linie die Konventionen zur Bekämpfung der Desertifikation (UNCCD), zur biologischen Diversivität (Cartagena-Protokoll zur Lebenssicherheit, zum Klimaschutz und zur Lebensmittelhilfe von Bedeutung.

[176] Die Realisierung der *Economic Partnership Agreement*s wurde noch 2002 allein von den alten Mitgliedsstaaten initiiert.

[177] Dies geschieht in Form von Memoranden, Briefwechseln etc. Zudem bestehen formale Übereinkommen zwischen Kommission und einzelnen UN-Körperschaften (z.B. ILO, WHO, UNESCO, UNHCR, FAO) wie es auch Art. 302 des EG-Vertrags vorsieht.

Diese Konventionen wurden bislang auch von den meisten neuen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten unterzeichnet. Einzig Estland und Litauen haben die Übereinkunft zur Bekämpfung der Desertifikation noch nicht ratifiziert (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 54).

3. Auswirkungen der EU-Erweiterung auf die Entwicklungspolitik

Die Folgen der EU-Osterweiterung sind vielfältiger Natur. Der Fokus aller Überlegungen richtet sich verständlicherweise in erster Linie auf die finanzielle Dimension der Erweiterung, doch sind geopolitische und international-organisatorische Gesichtspunkte ebenfalls von entscheidender Bedeutung. Aus diesem Grund gilt es ebenso danach zu fragen, welche Konsequenzen die Erweiterung in Hinblick auf die internationalen Operationen der EU beinhaltet. In welcher Form und in welchem Maße werden die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten in das außenpolitische Handeln der EU integriert? Außerdem stellt sich die Frage, wie sich die Erweiterung auf die zukünftige EU-Präsenz in internationalen Organisationen auswirkt. Wird die EU weiterhin als ein weitestgehend einheitlicher Interessensblock auftreten? Und welche Auswirkungen ergeben sich in Bezug auf die Entscheidungsverfahren innerhalb der europäischen Institutionen?

3.1 Die finanziellen Auswirkungen auf die EU-Entwicklungspolitik

Als Ausgangspunkt aller weiteren Ausführungen dient der Konsens der internationalen Entwicklungskonferenz von Monterrey. Im Gegensatz zur allseits geforderten, aber gegenwärtig doch recht unrealistischen Erhöhung der Entwicklungshilfe auf 0,7% des Bruttonationaleinkommens bis 2015, gibt die Monterrey-Verpflichtung einen kurzfristigen – und somit auch überschaubaren – Zeitplan vor. So soll vor dem Hintergrund des 0,7%-Marke zunächst ein Zwischenziel von 0,39% bis 2006 erreicht werden.[178] Als Minimalziel gab die EU vor, bis spätestens 2006 0,33% des Bruttonationaleinkommens für die öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe aufzubringen. Dies bedeutet für einige der größten Mitgliedsstaaten wie Deutschland und Italien, dass sie ihre ODA erheblich anheben müssen, um allein dieses Minimalziel zu erreichen. Für die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten dürfte die Erreichung der 0,33%-Marke daher quasi unmöglich sein. Zwar beteiligen sie sich nicht – wie bereits erwähnt – an der Finanzierung des neunten EEF, doch ist das ODA/BNE-Verhältnis in den neuen EU-10 gegenwärtig noch so niedrig,

[178] Die EU machte sich dieses Ziel im Rahmen der Barcelona-Verpflichtungen zu eigen. Paradoxerweise erklärte sie im gleichen Zusammenhang, dass die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten bis 2006 jeweils mindestens 0,33% erreicht haben sollten, was nicht gerade für die Glaubwürdigkeit des Vorhabens spricht. Vgl. Europäische Kommission 2004e: 6.

dass durchschnittlich eine Verdreifachung der aufgebrachten Entwicklungshilfegelder notwendig wäre.

Abbildung VI-2: Prognostizierte Kluft zwischen dem ODA/BNE-Verhältnis und den Monterrey-Verpflichtungen für die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten 2006



Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 14.

Auf EU-Ebene müssten insgesamt zusätzliche 7,1 Mrd. € zur Verfügung gestellt werden, um der Monterrey-Verpflichtung von 0,39% gerecht zu werden. Entsprechend dem gegenwärtigen Verteilerschlüssel fielen hiervon 1,3 Mrd. € zu Lasten der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten. Orientiert man sich hingegen an dem formulierten Minimalziel von 0,33%, so müssten die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten ihre öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe um 0,98 Mrd. € anheben. Angesichts der gegenwärtigen Situation in den meisten neuen Mitgliedsstaaten können diese den Fehlbetrag wohl kaum im Alleingang stemmen. Daher erscheint es realistischer, wenn die EU-15 den Großteil der notwendigen 7,1 Mrd. € aufbringen würden. Prognosen zufolge wäre die Kluft zwischen den derzeitigen Einzahlungen und dem Minimalziel von 0,33% dann zu schließen, wenn die EU-15 ihre öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe kurzfristig auf 0,35% anheben würden. Auf diese Weise würde das für 2006 zu erwartende Finanzloch, das im Wesentlichen aus der Erweiterung resultiert, geschlossen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 59f.).

Tabelle VI-3: Die ODA der Union im Verhältnis zum Monterrey-Ziel (2004-2006)

Net ODA (millions of euro)	2001	2003	2004	2005	2006
EC Budget	4,241	4,258	4,275	4,292	4,310
EDF	1,274	2,500	2,700	2,900	3,000
Total EC Net ODA	**5,516**	**6,758**	**6,975**	**7,192**	**7,310**
EU 15 (net of EC ODA)	23,839	24,788	25,284	25,789	26,305
EU 10 (net of EC ODA)	127	159	181	209	249
Total EU25 ODA	29,482	31,705	32,440	33,191	33,863
Monterrey Target	37,154	38,073	39,014	39,978	40,966
EU15 ODA/GNI	0.32%	0.34%	0.33%	0.33%	0.33%
EU25 ODA/GNI	0.31%	0.32%	0.32%	0.32%	0.32%
Monterrey Target	0.39%	0.39%	0.39%	0.39%	0.39%
Gap	7,672	6,369	6,574	6,787	7,102

Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 62.

3.2 Auswirkungen auf die regionale Verteilung der EU-Hilfe

Wie schon an anderer Stelle in dieser Arbeit erwähnt, sinkt der Anteil der EU-Entwicklungshilfe für die LDCs seit 40 Jahren stetig, obwohl das absolute Finanzvolumen zunimmt. So fließt ein immer größerer Anteil der Hilfsgelder in Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen, wovon die meisten in der näheren geographischen Umgebung der EU situiert sind. Dieser Trend reflektiert deutlich die politische Linie der EU, die vornehmlich auf die politische und ökonomische Stabilität ihrer unmittelbaren östlichen und südlichen Nachbarländer abzielt (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003b). Im Zuge der Osterweiterung wurden diese Intentionen weiter verstärkt, zumal sich nun die Grenzen der Europäischen Union deutlich verschoben und neue Nachbarländer in Erscheinung traten. Die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten konzentrierten seit jeher ihre Entwicklungshilfe auf ihre direkten Nachbarn und so brachten sie einerseits formulierte Versprechungen gegenüber diesen Ländern, andererseits aber auch die praktischen Sachkenntnisse im Umgang mit diesen Ländern mit ihrem Beitritt in die EU mit. Folglich profitieren nunmehr insbesondere die Empfängerländer in den MEDA- und CARDS-Regionen von der EU-Erweiterung (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 64f.).

Die AKP-Staaten erzielen aus dem Beitritt der zehn neuen Staaten keinen Mehrwert, zumal sich die EU-10 nicht an der Finanzierung des neunten EEF beteiligen. Insgesamt sind die Interessen der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten am afrikanischen Kontinent gering, so dass Afrika höchstens aufgrund der Zielsetzung des Monterrey-Konsenses von den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten profitieren kann. Ein ähnliches Bild zeichnet sich auch in Bezug auf die ALA-Länder. Ihre geo-

politische Bedeutung ist im Vergleich mit den CARDS- und MEDA-Länder deutlich geringer. Vielmehr vertreten andere Geberländer in diesen Ländern Interessen.[179]

3.3 Auswirkungen auf die EU-Präsenz in internationalen Organisationen

Im Zuge der Osterweiterung hat die Stimmenanzahl der Europäischen Union in vielen internationalen Organisationen zugenommen, was sich folglich auf ihre Stimmkraft auswirkt. Allerdings wird die EU-Präsenz vor allem in Organisationen wie der OECD und EBRD stärker, in denen sie schon bislang über eine starke Präsenz verfügte. Insbesondere in den Bretton Woods-Institutionen und ihren Organen verfügt die EU nunmehr über einen überaus deutlichen Stimmenanteil. So vereinigt die EU beispielsweise in der IDA, in der Estland, Litauen und Malta bislang keine Mitglieder waren, knapp 30 Prozent aller Stimmen. Auch in Hinblick auf den UN-Sicherheitsrat lässt sich eine stärkere Präsenz der EU attestieren. Bis zu fünf Mitglieder des Rates – oder ein Drittel der Mitglieder – können demnach aus Reihen der Europäischen Union stammen.[180] Dieser Stimmenzuwachs muss jedoch nicht unbedingt eine Steigerung des Einflusses der EU in diesen Organisationen bedeuten. Bestes Beispiel hierfür sind die Vereinten Nationen und der Internationale Währungsfonds. Gegenüber beiden Institutionen zeichnet sich die EU als größte Geberin aus, ohne dass sie dort den größten Einfluss ausübt. Das Stimmrecht steht somit nicht automatisch in direkter Relation zu den geleisteten Einzahlungen.

Auf der einen Seite ist es derzeit unwahrscheinlich, dass der Einfluss der Europäischen Union in den internationalen Organisationen aufgrund der Osterweiterung erheblich zunimmt, da die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten nur minimal die aufgebrachten Geberleistungen der EU erhöhen. Auf der anderen Seite sehen Nicht-EU-Mitgliedsstaaten möglicherweise jedoch gerade in der prozentualen Zunahme des EU-Stimmenanteils einen Einflussgewinn der EU. Letztere Tendenz spiegelt sich beispielsweise in der Überlegung wider, ob und in welcher Form die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten in das DAC-Komitee der OECD aufgenommen werden sollen. Hintergrund ist hierbei die Befürchtung einer Überrepräsentation der EU. Ähnlich verhält sich die Lage in Bezug auf die Integration der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten in die Organe des IWF. So machen Überlegungen die Runde, die eine Reduzierung des EU-Stimmrechts vorsehen. Diese Maßnahme dürfte für die EU insbesondere dann drastische Konsequenzen nach sich ziehen, wenn –

[179] So richtet sich beispielsweise der Fokus Japans auf Asien und der Kanadas und der USA auf Lateinamerika.
[180] Großbritannien und Frankreich sind als ständige Mitglieder des Sicherheitsrates gesetzt. Hinzu kommen normalerweise zwei gewählte Mitglieder aus West- und Osteuropa, die EU-Mitglied sein können, aber nicht unbedingt sein müssen.

wie in Betracht gezogen – die Stimmkraft an das Volumen des Bruttoinlandsprodukts der Mitgliedsstaaten gekoppelt wird (vgl. van Houtven 2002).

Tabelle VI-4: Stimmrecht der großen Industrienationen im Verhältnis zum BIP im IWF

Country/Group	Voting power in the IMF (2002)	GDP (1999, trillion US$)
EU 15	29.9%	8.5
United States	17.2%	9.3
Japan	6.2%	4.5

Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 66.

Vor diesem Hintergrund dürfte es in Zukunft vor allen Dingen darauf ankommen, inwiefern es der Union als Ganze gelingt, ihre Interessen und Intentionen zu koordinieren und aufeinander abzustimmen. Durch die Osterweiterung ist die Durchsetzung einer solchen Koordinierung der gemeinsamen internationalen Interessen sicherlich schwerer geworden, zumal einige der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten – vor allem Polen und die baltischen Staaten – teilweise unter US-amerikanischen Einfluss stehen. Allerdings hat sich bislang gezeigt, dass das aktuelle Abstimmungsverhalten der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten hinsichtlich wichtiger UN-Abkommen – wie dem Kyoto-Protokoll, dem Vertrag zur Bekämpfung von Landminen etc. – die EU-Kohäsion auf internationaler Ebene nicht schwächt.[181]

Vorbedingung für die Koordinierung des Agierens in internationalen Organisationen ist ohne Frage die allseitige Bereitschaft der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, gemeinsame Standpunkte auf internationale Fragen zu entwerfen. Eine bezüglich dieser Einschätzung unternommene Studie kommt zu dem Ergebnis, dass die Koordinierung insbesondere dann gut verläuft, wenn ein fester politischer Wille mit den vitalen Interessen der Mitgliedsstaaten harmoniert (vgl. Lehtinen/Sindzingre 2003). Diese Einschätzung trifft nicht nur in diesem Kontext zu, doch kann die Osterweiterung den neuen Mitgliedsstaaten aufgrund des gemeinsamen Gewichts der EU-25 in den internationalen Organisationen sicherlich einen Anreiz zu einer optimierten Koordinierung bieten.

[181] Die Zusage zu den genannten Abkommen wird von den USA verweigert. Allerdings sei an dieser Stelle nochmals auf die „Kopenhagener Kriterien“ verwiesen, die von den EU-Beitrittsländer u.a. die Übernahme der politischen Ziele der Union verlangt.

3.4 Auswirkungen auf die Entscheidungsfindung der EU

Der Ministerrat ist das wichtigste Entscheidungsorgan in der Europäischen Union. Unterstützung erfährt er vom Komitee der ständigen Vertreter (COREPER) und den 164 Arbeitsgruppen, die jährlich insgesamt 2500 Sitzungen abhalten. Jeder Kommissionsvorschlag wird zunächst auf Ebene der Arbeitsgruppen und des COREPER behandelt. Falls in diesen Gremien kein Konsens zustande kommt, wird der Antrag an den Rat weitergeleitet.[182] Themenabhängig kann dieser dann mit einfacher Mehrheit, qualifizierter Mehrheit oder Einstimmigkeit über den Kommissionsvorschlag entscheiden, wobei Legislativentscheidungen immer häufiger mit qualifizierter Mehrheit beschlossen werden.

Während der Übergangszeit von der Unterzeichnung des Beitrittsvertrags am 16. April 2003 bis zu dessen Inkrafttreten am 1. Mai 2004 hatten die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten die Möglichkeit, als „aktive Beobachter" am Entscheidungsverfahren der meisten EU-Institutionen teilzunehmen. So wurde ihnen zugestanden, in entsprechenden Diskussionen das Wort zu greifen, ohne allerdings über ein Stimmrecht zu verfügen. Diese Kompetenz verlieh ihnen erst der offizielle EU-Beitritt. Der Beitrittsvertrag sieht für die Entscheidungsfindung vor, dass ab dem 1. November 2004 eine qualifizierte Mehrheit dann erreicht ist, wenn ein Beschluss von 55% der Stimmen und mindestens 15 Mitgliedsstaaten getragen wird und diese Mehrheit gleichzeitig 65% der Bevölkerung der Union repräsentiert (vgl. Europäische Union 2003: 36f.). Im Bereich der Entwicklungspolitik sind Entscheidungen mit Einstimmigkeit oder qualifizierter Mehrheit für bilaterale Kooperationsabkommen und vom Rat gebilligte Bestimmungen vorgesehen.

Da die vielschichtigen Ratsstrukturen einen hohen Personalaufwand verlangen, konzentrieren sich die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten mit ihren begrenzten personellen Möglichkeiten in entwicklungspolitischen Angelegenheiten vornehmlich auf solche Regionen, in denen sie die stärksten handels- und sicherheitspolitischen Interessen verfolgen. Aus diesem Grund werden die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten mittels ihres Einflusses und Stimmrechts den Fokus der EU wieder verstärkt auf die näheren östlichen Drittstaaten zu richten versuchen.[183] Abstriche muss in diesem Kontext wohl auch die auf die ärmsten Länder ausgerichtete Entwicklungshilfe in Kauf nehmen. Dies nicht zuletzt deshalb, weil durch die Aufnahme der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten in den Rat nicht mehr das gleiche Know-how in Bezug auf armutsorientierte Entwicklungszusammenarbeit vorhanden ist. Im Gegenzug dürften die Auswirkungen der Osterweiterung auf die Arbeit der Komitees relativ klein sein, da diese dem Kommissionsvorschlag

[182] Dies ist jedoch nur in 30 Prozent aller Legislativvorschlägen der Fall.
[183] Die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten verfügen insgesamt über ein Viertel aller Stimmen.

meist nachkommen. Es wird indessen erwartet, dass die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten – vor allem Polen – in den TACIS- und CARDS-Komitees eine entscheidende Rolle spielen werden. Ihre diesbezüglich großen Sachkenntnisse können den bestehenden Politiken in diesen Regionen möglicherweise neue Impulse verleihen (vgl. Europäische Kommission 2003: 70f.).

Tabelle VI-5: Ratsbestimmungen mit qualifizierter Mehrheit nach der Erweiterung

Legal basis	Examples	Voting method of the Council of Ministers	Likely Impact
Art. 133 Common Commercial Policy	Generalised System Preferences, EBA, Co-operation with South Africa	Qualified majority	Medium
Art. 179 Development Cooperation	Regulations on cross-cutting themes (gender, poverty, human rights, environment), humanitarian aid, food aid	In case of disagreement between Council and EP, qualified majority voting by Council and absolute majority by EP may be required	Low
Art. 181a[55] Economic, Financial and Technical Cooperation with Third Countries	Regulations on ALA, MEDA, CARDS, European Agency for Reconstruction	QMV, except for association agreements which require unanimity	Medium-to-strong

Quelle: Europäische Kommission 2003: 71.

4. Zusammenfassung – Entwicklungspolitik und EU-Osterweiterung

Es ist zu konstatieren, dass sich die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten hinsichtlich der Qualität ihrer institutionellen Kapazitäten und politischen Rahmenkonzepte deutlich voneinander unterscheidet. In allen Fällen fehlt jedoch eine entwicklungspolitische Gesamtstrategie. Dabei zeigt sich, dass insbesondere die reichsten (Slowenien, Malta, Zypern) und größten (Polen) unter ihnen über die schwächsten Kapazitäten und politischen Netzwerke für entwicklungspolitische Maßnahmen verfügen. In vielen Ländern besteht die Notwendigkeit einer Erweiterung und Optimierung der institutionellen Kapazitäten, damit in einer zwei-

ten Phase ein umfassender Dialog mit den zivilgesellschaftlichen Akteuren angeregt werden kann, der wiederum die Gestaltung eines breit angelegten politischen Rahmenkonzepts möglich macht. Nur auf diese Weise erscheint es denkbar, ein weitläufiges nationales Verständnis für die Entwicklungshilfe der EU und anderer Geberorganisationen zu verankern. In denjenigen der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten, in denen bereits entsprechende Rahmenbedingungen existieren, gilt es unterdessen das öffentliche Bewusstsein verstärkt für entwicklungspolitische Problematiken zu sensibilisieren.

In allen neuen Mitgliedsstaaten fehlen eine zentrale entwicklungspolitische Ausrichtung auf die Armutsbekämpfung sowie eine sektorale und länderspezifische Schwerpunktsetzung. Dieser Tatsache kann zum einen dadurch entgegengewirkt werden, dass die Anzahl der Interventionen erheblich reduziert wird und sich stattdessen auf einen bestimmten Empfängerkreis konzentriert. Zum anderen muss eine verstärkte Abstimmung mit anderen Gebern erfolgen, die sich bereits mehrheitlich einer armutsorientierten Entwicklungsstrategie verschrieben haben. Insbesondere wird aber eine intensivere Koordination mit den anderen EU-Geberländern notwendig, da nicht zuletzt die anderen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten von den Erfahrungen der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten im Bereich der Transitionsforschung profitieren können.

Unter diesen Vorzeichen muss folglich eine grundsätzliche Neuausrichtung des entwicklungspolitischen Engagements der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten erfolgen, wobei die EU-15 und die Kommission diese Reformbestrebungen unterstützen sollten. Gerade bei der Politikformulierung und der Einführung neuer entwicklungspolitischer Ansätze kann auf die erfolgreichen der bereits bestehenden Initiativen der alten Mitgliedsstaaten zurückgegriffen werden. Eine entsprechende Modifizierung dieser Maßnahmen muss dabei die vorhandenen Kapazitäten und Potentiale der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten berücksichtigen, um ein realistisches und funktionsfähiges Entwicklungskonzept zu entwerfen.

Schlussbetrachtung.
Die EU-Entwicklungspolitik zwischen Anspruch und Realität

Ruft man sich das bisherige entwicklungspolitische Engagement der Europäischen Union in Erinnerung, so muss konstatiert werden, dass bislang zwar schon einiges in die Wege geleitet wurde, aber vieles davon nicht den gehofften Erfolg erzielte und einer noch konsequenteren Umsetzung bedarf. Die Ursachen für die deutliche Diskrepanz zwischen formulierten Ansprüchen und politischen Realitäten, die deutlich ihren Niederschlag im generellen Rückgang der Entwicklungshilfe findet, sind in erster Linie in veränderten interessens- und machtpolitischen Konstellationen zu suchen. Periphere Regionen – wie sie sich in Afrika in hoher Zahl finden – werden im Welthandel zunehmend marginalisiert. Ihre strategische Bedeutung hat nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges drastisch abgenommen. Zudem erweist sich die nur in begrenztem Maße vorhandene kritische Öffentlichkeit für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit als zu schwach, um ein stark regressives ökonomisches Interesse auszugleichen. Die Schwäche dieser entwicklungspolitischen Öffentlichkeit lässt sich zum einen aus dem geringen Grad der unmittelbaren Betroffenheit der Bevölkerung erklären, zum anderen auf die geringen entwicklungspolitischen Erfolge zurückführen.

Wenn die Europäische Gemeinschaft auch lange Zeit jegliche Äußerungen hinsichtlich ihres außenpolitischen Anspruchs vermied, so war ihre an Drittstaaten gerichtete Hilfe stets politisch motiviert. Die Aufstellung einer politischen Agenda durch die Europäische Kommission untermauert dies. Folglich kann die Organisationsform der Außenbeziehungen als Ausdruck des eigenen Rollenverständnisses gewertet werden. Wie im ersten Kapitel dargestellt, beeinflussen sowohl Eigeninteressen als auch Werte die außenpolitischen Zielsetzungen, so dass verschiedene Erklärungsfaktoren außenpolitisches Verhalten motivieren. Hierbei ist insbesondere die Mischung der Faktoren von Bedeutung, wobei generell zwischen den Interessen der nationalstaatlichen und europäischen Organen zu unterscheiden ist.

Ein Eigeninteresse für Hilfsleistungen der europäischen Staaten beschränkt sich auf einige wenige Bereiche. Zu diesen zählt die Armutsmigration, die auf einem „steuerbaren“ Niveau gehalten werden soll. Ebenso spielen ökologische Interessen im Rahmen einer globalen Klimapolitik eine bedeutende Rolle. Allerdings reicht das Maß an unmittelbarer Betroffenheit von Politikmaßnahmen als Erklärungsfaktor für entwicklungspolitisches Engagement nicht aus. Massenproteste bei G8- oder EU-Gipfeln und auch die Unterschiede des entwicklungspolitischen Engagements europäischer Staaten in Afrika lassen sich so nicht hinreichend erklä-

ren. Auch eine zunehmende Verknüpfung der geleisteten Hilfe mit Forderungen nach ökonomischen und administrativen Reformen in den Empfängerstaaten kann unter der Annahme von generell abnehmenden strategischen Interessen nicht ausschließlich auf geostrategische Machtpolitiken reduziert werden. Vor diesem Hintergrund scheinen vielmehr politische Werte zur Begründung einer gemeinsamen Außenpolitik von zunehmender Bedeutung zu sein (vgl. Hill 1993). Insbesondere im Falle Afrikas, dessen ökonomische Marginalisierung auch einen Rückgang nicht-strategischer Interessen nach sich zog, kommt den politischen Werten ein hoher Stellenwert zu. Diesbezüglich ist jedoch zwischen den einzelnen Mitgliedsstaaten und den Organen der Europäischen Union zu differenzieren.

Aufgrund ihrer unterschiedlichen bzw. nicht vorhandenen kolonialen Vergangenheit weist die Politik der EU-Mitgliedsstaaten gegenüber Afrika erhebliche Differenzen auf. Dies trifft auch auf die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und die generellen Veränderungen hin zu einer stärkeren Wertorientierung zu. So bestand vor allem in Frankreich und Belgien anfänglich der Anspruch einer „zivilisatorischen Mission“ in Afrika. Mit dem Ende des Kolonialismus verlor diese Motivation in den europäischen Öffentlichkeiten ihre Legitimation. Mittelmächte wie Frankreich und Großbritannien büßten seither weiter an weltpolitischer Bedeutung ein. Kleinere EU-Mitgliedsstaaten ohne Kolonialtraditionen blieben von dieser Delegitimation weitgehend verschont und verfolgten konsequenter eine an Werten orientierte Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik. Erst seit dem Ende des Kalten Krieges lässt sich eine solche wertorientierte Politik auch in Bezug auf die ehemaligen Kolonialmächte feststellen (vgl. Olsen 1998: 66). Eine nähere Betrachtung dreier EU-Staaten macht dies deutlich. Frankreichs Kooperation mit seinen ehemaligen Kolonien beruht im Wesentlichen auf post-kolonialen Verflechtungen und nicht auf der Logik entwicklungspolitischen Handelns. Dänemark hingegen verfolgt als kleines europäisches Land ohne afrikanische Kolonialvergangenheit und mit geringem Eigeninteresse vor allem entwicklungspolitische Zielsetzungen. Deutschland hat – ähnlich wie Dänemark – in Afrika kaum Eigeninteresse. Die eigene Kolonialvergangenheit ist kaum noch präsent und ökonomische Interessen sind unerheblich. Aufgrund der Größe Deutschlands wird das deutsche entwicklungspolitische Engagement – im Gegensatz zu Dänemark – zusätzlich mit „weltpolitischer Verantwortung“ begründet und umfasst somit deutlich außenpolitische Ambitionen. Ein übergeordnetes politisches Konzept in Afrika, das einem solchen Anspruch gerecht würde, existiert jedoch jenseits der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nicht.

Vor dem Hintergrund des abnehmenden strategischen und deutlich verringerten ökonomischen Interesses Europas an Afrika wird die Kooperation verstärkt von europäischen Wertvorstellungen und einem erweiterten Stabilitätsverständnis geprägt. Folglich finden sich in

den Beziehungen der EU zu Subsahara-Afrika grundlegende Werte wie Demokratie und Menschenrechte wieder, mit der die EU ihren weltpolitischen Anspruch zu untermauern versucht. Die Europäische Union sieht sich in diesem Zusammenhang als Modell für Friedenspolitik durch Regionalintegration, welche von einer Verrechtlichung der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zur Förderung des Handels ausging (vgl. Grimm 2003: 256). Die Wertbezogenheit der EU-Kooperation mit Drittstaaten wurde von Seiten der Empfängerländer bisher jedoch vor allem als der Versuch begriffen, die Reduzierung ihrer Entwicklungshilfe zu legitimieren. Diese Einschätzung vertritt offenbar auch die EU-Kommission, die im Sinne der AKP-Partnerstaaten für eine quantitative Ausweitung der EU-Hilfe an Afrika plädiert. Die Frage des sinnvollen Mitteleinsatzes und einer übergeordneten Strategie bezüglich der Probleme des afrikanischen Kontinents rückte hingegen allzu oft in den Hintergrund.

Veränderungen traten auch in der Wahrnehmung der Partner auf. Während in den 1970er Jahren aufgrund der Ölkrise und der Debatte um eine NWWO den rohstoffreichen Entwicklungsländern eine nicht unerhebliche Bedeutung zukam, nahm diese nach der Wirtschaftskrise des Südens in den 1980er Jahren ab. Ausbleibende Entwicklungserfolge Afrikas und die Hinwendung zu den Transformationsländern im Osten führten zu einer allgemeinen „Gebermüdigkeit“ gegenüber Afrika. Diese Wahrnehmung schlägt sich im Lomé-IVb-Vertrag (1995) und noch deutlicher im Abkommen von Cotonou (2000) nieder, die auf eine Verringerung der realen Hilfe bei gleichzeitiger Verstärkung der Konditionalitäten hinausliefen. Gründe hierfür sind unter anderem das Versagen nationalstaatlicher Politik in Afrika und die Delegitimation europäischer Politik angesichts des Völkermordes in Ruanda. Aber auch die Erweiterungsrunde um entwicklungspolitisch progressive Staaten wie Schweden setzten den Trend zu einem Verlust an spezifischer, „unpolitischer“ EU-Identität gegenüber Afrika fort (vgl. Grimm 2003: 257). Allgemein war und ist die Zusammenarbeit zwischen EU und der AKP-Staatengruppe nicht von einem partnerschaftlichen Charakter geprägt. Entscheidend für die Mittelbereitstellung in der europäischen Entwicklungszusammenarbeit waren die zwischenstaatlichen Verhandlungen innerhalb der Europäischen Union und weniger die Verhandlungen zwischen starken (europäischen) und schwachen (AKP) Partnern. Demnach bestimmen weitgehend die Normen und Identitäten der europäischen Staaten das Verhandlungsergebnis zwischen Europa und Afrika. Um folglich einen Schritt hin zu einem verstärkten Verständnis ihrer politischen Aufgaben und damit einer Veränderung ihrer Rolle in Afrika zu unternehmen, muss die EU einräumen, dass sie nicht allen Außenforderungen gerecht werden kann und will. Diese Einschätzung beruht dabei auf der Tatsache, dass die Union einer „Club-Logik“ folgt, die ihre Mitglieder gegenüber Nicht-Mitgliedern bevorzugt und somit nicht alle

Außenforderungen erfüllen kann. Diese Tendenz verstärkt sich im Zuge der Vertiefung der europäischen Integration, wie sie im Rahmen der EU-Osterweiterung in einem weiteren Schritt vollzogen wurde.

Allgemein befindet sich die Europäische Union hinsichtlich ihrer Außenbeziehungen in einer Umbruchsphase. Auf institutioneller Ebene schlägt sich dies in der umfassenden Verwaltungsreform nieder, die Ende der 1990er Jahre eingeleitet wurde. Sie ist der Versuch, eine angemessene Antwort auf die drastisch gestiegenen EU-Mittel bei gleich bleibenden personellen Kapazitäten zu finden. Das bisherige Resultat erweist sich jedoch als äußerst bescheiden. Nicht zuletzt die nach wie vor vorhandenen, zahlreichen institutionellen Verästelungen in Form der Vielzahl von Verwaltungs- und Programmlinien stellen erhebliche Hindernisse dar. Weitergreifende Reformen – z.B. die Schaffung des Postens eines EU-Außenministers und die Einführung des DCECI – sind zwar in Planung, doch muss sich noch zeigen, ob sie die in sie gesteckten Erwartungen erfüllen können.

Ein außenpolitisches Umdenken der EU erfordern auch die Ereignisse des 11. September 2001. Sicherheits- und verteidigungspolitische Überlegungen bestimmen nunmehr verstärkt die politische Debatte, die ihren Ausdruck in der Europäischen Sicherheitsstrategie finden. Die Strategie setzt dabei auf eine Kombination aus zivilen und militärischen Komponenten, wobei der Aspekt der Nachhaltigkeit stärker denn je einbezogen wird. Der Entwicklungspolitik als jahrelange Verfechterin einer nachhaltigen Politik kommt vor diesem Hintergrund eine erhöhte Aufmerksamkeit zu. Ihre über Jahrzehnte gewonnen Kenntnisse und Methoden in Postkonfliktsituationen gilt es in das neue, vom Sicherheitsbegriff bestimmte Feld der Außenbeziehungen zu integrieren. Entwicklungspolitik kann demnach zu einem zentralen Faktor der außenpolitischen Sicherheitsüberlegungen Europas avancieren. Die Überlegung, dass Sicherheit nicht ohne Entwicklung gewährleistet werden kann wie auch gleichermaßen Entwicklung ohne Sicherheit nicht möglich erscheint, wird daher zur unerlässlichen Formel für die Zukunft. In diesem Rahmen müssen sich beide Politikfelder einander annähern. Dies bedeutet eine organisatorische wie auch inhaltliche Neuausrichtung der europäischen Sicherheits- und Entwicklungspolitik. In Bezug auf Afrika bedeutet dies eine verstärkte Zusammenarbeit mit der Afrikanischen Union, deren Sicherheits- und Friedensarchitektur sich im Aufbau befindet. Das in diesem Zusammenhang aufkeimende Interesse an Afrika hat in erster Linie nichts mit dem Bestreben um Frieden und Sicherheit auf dem afrikanischen Kontinent zu tun, sondern mit der Gefährdung der eigenen europäischen Interessen. Dass man die europäischen Interessen gegenwärtig jedoch nicht direkt gefährdet sieht, manifestiert sich in der Tatsache, dass sich das Handeln der EU weitestgehend auf die finanzielle Unterstützung der Sicherheits- und

Friedensarchitektur der Afrikanischen Union beschränkt. Die Bereitschaft zum militärischen Engagement bleibt weiterhin gering. Der europäischen Entwicklungspolitik als Teil der gemeinsamen Außenpolitik kommt in diesem Zusammenhang die Aufgabe der Stärkung ziviler Kapazitäten zu.

Die Europäische Union ist der weltweit größte Handelspartner und fungiert als zweitgrößte Geberin von Entwicklungshilfe. Aus dieser Position heraus leitet sie zu Recht ihre Rolle als *„global player“* ab. Aus diesem Anspruch resultieren jedoch auch eine Reihe von internationalen Verpflichtungen, von denen die Millenniumserklärung die wohl ambitionierteste und zugleich bedeutendste darstellt. Die EU selbst sieht sich als treibende Kraft in diesem Prozess zur Reduzierung der weltweiten Armut und versucht ihren eigenen Ansprüchen mittels Initiativen auf allen Ebenen gerecht zu werden. Die EU-Kommission nimmt hierbei eine tragende Rolle ein, die sie nicht zuletzt durch zahlreiche, nachdrücklich formulierte Mitteilungen an den Rat und das Parlament untermauert. Dieser engagierten Haltung steht jedoch das schleppende Nachkommen der einzelnen EU-Mitgliedsstaaten gegenüber, die der seit langem vereinbarten Aufstockung der durchschnittlichen Entwicklungshilfe auf 0,7 Prozent des BSP nur in wenigen Fällen nachkommen. Diese Tendenz bestätigt sich insbesondere dann, wenn man die bisherigen armutsrelevanten EU-Initiativen in Relation zu den einzelnen Millenniumszielen stellt: Ambitionierte Vorhaben wurden in umfangreichem Maße in Angriff genommen und erfahren zum Teil regelmäßige Ausbesserungen, doch sind längst nicht alle Potentiale ausgeschöpft. Hierzu sind vor allen Dingen höhere Finanzmittel notwendig, die bislang noch nicht in angepasster Form von Seiten der Mitgliedsländer zur Verfügung gestellt wurden. Der Kommission als entwicklungspolitische Initiativkraft sind somit oftmals die Hände gebunden. Eine längerfristige Besserung der Lage scheint nicht in Sicht, wie auch die Resultate des G8-Gipfels in Gleneagles und der im September in New York abgehaltenen UN-Konferenz belegen. Ohne ein sichtbares Einlenken der EU-Staaten und anderer Industrienationen dürften – allen optimistischen Einschätzungen der Kommission zum Trotz – die MDGs nicht annähernd erreicht werden. Gerade dem afrikanischen Kontinent, der in allen armutsrelevanten Feldern deutliche Fortschritte vermissen lässt, helfen keine halbherzigen Zusagen. Vor diesem Hintergrund steht nicht nur die Glaubwürdigkeit und Funktionsfähigkeit der EU-Entwicklungspolitik, sondern auch des internationalen Systems auf dem Spiel. Die Europäische Union als selbsternannte Vorreiterin bei diesem Unterfangen will und muss daher – ihrer weltpolitischen Rolle entsprechend – mit gutem Beispiel vorangehen und zumindest die selbst auferlegten Kriterien zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung einhalten.

In einer allgemeinen Transformationsphase befindet sich die Europäische Union nicht zuletzt auch seit ihrer Osterweiterung. Für die EU-Entwicklungspolitik stellt sich das Problem, dass durch die letzte Erweiterungsrunde vom 1. Mai 2004 zehn neue osteuropäische Staaten der Union beigetreten sind, die sich in ihren entwicklungspolitischen Kapazitäten und Strategien erheblich voneinander unterscheiden. Eine vornehmlich armutsorientierte Ausrichtung der Entwicklungspolitik und – daran anknüpfend – die Ausarbeitung eines breit angelegten Rahmenkonzepts fehlen dabei in allen zehn neuen Mitgliedsstaaten. Vor diesem Hintergrund steht die EU-Entwicklungspolitik vor der schwierigen Aufgabe, einerseits ihre formulierte Entwicklungsstrategie entsprechend den Beitrittskriterien auf die neuen Mitgliedsstaaten zu übertragen, andererseits aber auch die spezifischen Kenntnisse und Erfahrungen der EU-10 – insbesondere im Bereich der Transformationsforschung – in die eigenen Entwicklungskonzeptionen einfließen zu lassen. Folglich muss eine grundsätzliche Neuausrichtung des entwicklungspolitischen Engagements der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten erfolgen, wobei die EU-15 und die Kommission diese Reformbestrebungen unterstützen sollten. Gerade bei der Politikformulierung und der Einführung neuer entwicklungspolitischer Ansätze kann auf die erfolgreichen der bereits bestehenden Initiativen der alten Mitgliedsstaaten zurückgegriffen werden, wobei eine entsprechende Modifizierung dieser Maßnahmen in Berücksichtigung der vorhandenen Kapazitäten und Potentiale der neuen Mitgliedsstaaten erfolgen muss. Nur auf diese Weise kann ein realistisches und funktionsfähiges Entwicklungskonzept zustande kommen, dem alle EU-Mitgliedsstaaten entsprechend ihren jeweiligen Kapazitäten gerecht werden können.

Will man diese Einschätzungen auf wenige, zentrale Aussagen resümieren, so ergibt sich folgendes Bild: Die Konzeptionialisierung der EU-Entwicklungspolitik geht weit über die Tendenzen hinaus, die in den 1990er Jahren unter dem Schlagwort der Politisierung sichtbar wurden. Dabei wird die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zunehmend stärker in Verbindung mit der Debatte um die Ausrichtung der Europäischen Union als internationaler Akteur diskutiert. In diesem Zusammenhang steht die Frage im Raum, ob dieser Prozess zu einer generellen Auf- oder Abwertung der entwicklungspolitischen Zielsetzungen führt. Die seit Anfang der 1990er Jahre bestehende Sorge, dass die für die Zusammenarbeit mit den AKP-Staaten vorgesehenen Mittel zugunsten der Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas verringert würden, bestand nicht zu Unrecht und ist nach wie vor legitim. Allerdings weicht sie zunehmend der Befürchtung, dass durch die Verschiebung der EU-Außengrenzen die traditionellen Bindungen mit den AKP-Staaten ins Abseits gedrängt werden und neue sicherheitspolitische Schwerpunkte in den Vordergrund treten. Die Formel „Entwicklung braucht Sicherheit“ wird daher immer mehr zu

einem entwicklungspolitischen Paradigma. Dieses bringt nicht nur neue Konzepte und Handlungsweisen, sondern auch institutionelle Veränderungen mit sich. So wurde in den letzten Jahren auf EU-Ebene die bisherige strikte Trennung von entwicklungspolitischen und militärischen Maßnahmen nicht nur in der Theorie, sondern auch in der Praxis gelockert. Die im Dezember 2003 verabschiedete Europäische Sicherheitsstrategie unterstreicht den Ansatz, die gesamten EU-Außenbeziehungen – einschließlich der Entwicklungspolitik – systematisch zu verknüpfen. Ein deutlich sichtbares Zeichen für diese Bestrebungen war bereits die Zusammenlegung des eigenständigen Entwicklungsrates mit dem Rat für Allgemeine Angelegenheiten. Insgesamt hat die Europäische Union mit den Zielen der Armutsbekämpfung und der nachhaltigen Entwicklung den Maßstab zur Bewertung ihres auswärtigen Handelns hoch angelegt. Die Aufrechterhaltung einer eigenständigen Entwicklungspolitik in Abgrenzung zur Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik – wie von vielen entwicklungspolitischen Einrichtungen und NROen oftmals gefordert – wird dabei nicht ausreichen, um den entwicklungspolitischen Anliegen zu einem höheren Stellenwert zu verhelfen. Schlussendlich ist es die außenpolitische Orientierung des internationalen Akteurs EU, die dazu beiträgt, dem Querschnittsanliegen in allen auswärtig relevanten Politikfeldern der Union und ihrer Mitgliedsstaaten die notwendige Bedeutung beizumessen.

Aller positiven und negativen Entwicklungen zum Trotz soll an dieser Stelle nochmals ausdrücklich darauf hingewiesen werden, dass Entwicklungspolitik – wie sehr Anspruchsdenken und politische Realitäten auch oftmals auseinanderdriften mögen – ein unverzichtbares Element für eine weltweite Friedenspolitik und eine globale nachhaltige Entwicklung darstellt. Die ihr in regelmäßigen Abständen attestierten Bankrotterklärungen beruhen in erster Linie darauf, dass die Entwicklungspolitik überfordert wird, insbesondere dann, wenn sie auf den Bereich der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit reduziert wird und sich selbst durch eine ständige Erweiterung ihres Aufgabenkatalogs überfordert. Sie soll mit einer Mittelausstattung, die kaum den Umfang des EU-Agrarhaushalts erreicht, alle nur denkbaren Weltprobleme lösen oder doch zumindest entschärfen. Die überzogenen Erwartungen basieren zweitens noch oft auf dem grundsätzlichen Irrtum, dass Entwicklung ausschließlich durch Geldspritzen von außen herbeigeführt werden könne. Längst ist jedoch klar, dass ohne wirtschaftliche, gesellschaftliche und politische Strukturreformen und ohne Verhaltensänderungen der häufig korrupten Führungsschichten externe Hilfe eher kontraproduktive Wirkungen haben kann. Drittens ignoriert die Pauschalkritik unbestreitbare entwicklungspolitische Teilerfolge. So hat die internationale Hilfe zumindest dazu beigetragen, dass in einigen Armutsregionen auch positive Tendenzen hinsichtlich der Lebenserwartung, der Alphabetisierungsrate sowie der Mütter-

und Kindersterblichkeitsrate zu verzeichnen sind. Allerdings kann die Entwicklungshilfe nur punktuell die Benachteiligungen ausgleichen, die in vielen Entwicklungsländern aufgrund der weltwirtschaftlichen Arbeitsteilung entstehen und entstanden sind. Daher muss eine globale Strukturpolitik die vielschichtigen Entwicklungsprobleme umfassender anpacken: durch eine Reform der Handelspolitik, durch den Abbau der untragbaren Schuldenbürde, durch den gezielten Aufbau von Problemlösungsfähigkeiten (*capacity building*), durch die Förderung rechtsstaatlicher und zivilgesellschaftlicher Strukturen und durch den Umbau der oligarchischen Machtverhältnisse in der Weltpolitik.

Es ist jedoch auch unbestreitbar, dass die Entwicklungspolitik mehr hätte erreichen können, wenn sie ihre eigenen Konzepte und Strategien entschlossener in Taten umgesetzt hätte. So bekam die Armutsbekämpfung im Verlauf der 1990er Jahre den zentralen entwicklungsstrategischen Stellenwert, den sie immer beanspruchte, aber in der Folgezeit praktisch nie erfüllte. Dies liegt weniger an einem Mangel an durchdachten Konzepten (z.B. *poverty reduction strategy papers*) als vielmehr am fehlenden politischen Willen. Dieser Willen schien augenblicklich durch den Schock des 11. September geweckt worden zu sein und durch alle politischen Reihen hindurch verfestigte sich die Einsicht, dass nur eine gerechtere Welt dem internationalen Terrorismus den Nährboden entziehen könnte. Eilfertig forderten sie eine massive Aufstockung des Entwicklungsetats, ohne sich zwingend der tief liegenden Ursachen bewusst zu werden. Die Erfahrung zeigt jedoch, dass Lehren aus Katastrophen nur in den geringsten Fällen nachhaltige Wirkungen erzielen. Es besteht sogar die Gefahr, dass nur der „Krieg gegen den Terror“ die Erinnerung wach hält, dass die westliche Welt von den Krisen und Konflikten in weit entfernten Regionen durch die zunehmende Globalisierung nicht verschont bleibt. Dann allerdings würde sich die aus dem Schock des 11. September erwachsene Einsicht, dass es keine globale Sicherheit ohne globale Gerechtigkeit geben kann, schnell wieder verflüchtigen.

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Analysen und Stellungnahmen 5/2013

AKP-EU-Beziehungen nach 2020: Auf der Suche nach einer europäischen Haltung

Zusammenfassung

Das Partnerschaftsabkommen von Cotonou (CPA), das die Beziehungen zwischen der AKP-Gruppe (Afrika, Karibik und Pazifik) und der Europäischen Union (EU) regelt, läuft im Jahr 2020 aus. Obwohl die drei Säulen des Abkommens – politischer Dialog, Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Handel – nach allgemeiner Einschätzung ihren Zweck gut erfüllt haben, gibt es deutliche Zeichen, dass signifikante Veränderungen innerhalb der AKP-Gruppe, der EU und der weiteren internationalen Landschaft eine Neubestimmung der Beziehungen erfordern.

Unter den Europäern besteht stillschweigende Übereinkunft, dass der Ball im Feld der AKP liegt, wenn es um darum geht, ihre Zukunft als Gruppe und ihre Beziehung gegenüber der EU als solche zu bestimmen. Für die kommende Überarbeitung des Cotonou-Abkommens 2015 muss jedoch ein Momentum mit Blick auf ein glaubwürdiges Nach-2020-Szenario geschaffen werden. Dabei muss die EU ebenfalls ihre Wünsche und Prioritäten für die Zusammenarbeit benennen. Die Erkenntnis wächst, dass das CPA derzeit das wesentliche funktionierende Vehikel ist, das die Beziehungen zwischen EU und Afrika lenkt.

Gründe, die AKP-EU-Partnerschaft abzuschaffen:

- Es gibt keine guten Gründe einen gemeinsamen Rahmen für diese sehr verschiedenen Regionen aufrechtzuerhalten, zumal es kaum Anzeichen gibt, dass sich eine AKP-Identität oder ein Intra-AKP-Handel entwickelt.
- Die Bedeutung der ehemaligen Kolonialbeziehungen nimmt ab, insbesondere im Kontext der erweiterten EU, aber auch allgemein durch den starken Fokus des Abkommens auf offizieller Entwicklungshilfe.
- Schlechte Erfolgsbilanz bei der Gestaltung gemeinsamer Positionen und Interventionen auf internationalen Foren.

Elemente der Partnerschaft, die als erhaltenswert betrachtet werden:

- Die Rechtsverbindlichkeit begünstigt den politischen Dialog sowie die Berechenbarkeit und die Strategie-*Ownership* in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.
- Ein relativ erfolgreicher Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF) im Vergleich zu anderen Instrumenten der EU-Entwicklungszusammenarbeit in Kombination mit seinem *Multi-Stakeholder*-Ansatz bei der Entwicklung und dem Management von Entwicklungsstrategien.
- Potenzielle Bündnisse bei der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter.

Obwohl es bisher weder von der EU noch ihren Mitgliedsstaaten eine offizielle Position gibt, was nach dem Auslaufen des CPA geschehen soll, scheinen Europäische Akteure (Europäische Kommission, Europäisches Parlament, Mitgliedsstaaten) bei den Außenbeziehungen der EU zu einem stärker regionalen Ansatz zu tendieren und dabei die nützlichen Aspekte der derzeitigen Struktur erhalten zu wollen. Auch wenn das abnehmende strategische Interesse der EU an der Karibik und insbesondere des Pazifik kein Geheimnis ist, könnte eine allzu ablehnende Haltung gegenüber dem Rahmenabkommen für Zusammenarbeit durch die EU-Mitgliedsstaaten der Förderung ihrer Werte und Interessen in Afrika schweren Schaden zufügen.

Die EU scheint derzeit am meisten geneigt, die Schlüsselelemente des CPA in einer *Light Version* des aktuellen AKP-EU-Abkommens zu erhalten, indem diese in separate EU-Regionalstrategien gegenüber Afrika, dem Karibik- und Pazifikraum überführt werden. Diskussionen zur europäischen Politik in dieser Sache sind angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Vorbereitungen für die dritte Überarbeitung des CPA 2015 eine wesentliche „Aufwärmphase" für die Verhandlungen über die Zeit nach 2020 sein werden, seit langem überfällig. Die EPA-Verhandlungen haben in jüngerer Zeit den AKP-EU-Beziehungen schwer geschadet und könnten, wenn sie so fortgeführt werden, auch die EU-Position und den Handel mit Afrika mittel- und langfristig beeinträchtigen.

Eine lange Beziehung auf dem Prüfstand

Das Cotonou-Partnerschaftsabkommen, das die Beziehungen zwischen der Gruppe der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Länder und der Europäischen Union regelt, läuft im Jahr 2020 aus und muss deshalb überdacht werden. Seit der Unterzeichnung der Römischen Verträge 1957, die die überseeischen Länder und Gebiete an die Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft „assoziierte", hat die EU einen formalen Rahmen privilegierter Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern Afrikas, der Karibik und des Pazifik. Die AKP-Gruppe, von ihren Mitgliedern 1972 geschaffen, umfasst heute 80 Länder; seit 2000 wird ihre Zusammenarbeit mit der EU durch das Cotonou-Partnerschaftsabkommen geregelt. Das Abkommen baut auf den Geist und den Acquis der vorangegangenen Lomé-Abkommen auf und läuft bis 2020. Im Zentrum steht das Ziel, *„im Einklang mit den Zielen der nachhaltigen Entwicklung und der schrittweisen Integration der AKP-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft die Armut einzudämmen und schließlich zu besiegen"* (Art. 1). Um dieses Endziel zu erreichen, konzentriert sich das CPA auf drei Dimensionen: politischer Dialog, wirtschaftliche und handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit und Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Diese einzigartige Struktur macht das CPA zur umfassendsten Nord-Süd-Partnerschaft – dies umso mehr, als es sowohl staatliche wie nicht staatliche Akteure einschließt.

Derzeit zeigen europäische Kreise gegenüber dem Status quo der Beziehung eine Mischung aus mäßig positiver Bewertung und offensichtlichem Desinteresse. Trotz der großen Ambitionen der Partnerschaft und der Rechtsverbindlichkeit des CPA stimmt die europäische Wahrnehmung darin überein, dass wesentliche Aspekte der Partnerschaft in den vergangenen zwölf Umsetzungsjahren wenig genutzt worden sind; Fortschritte seien nur langsam erzielt worden. Man ist der Ansicht, dass die Partnerschaft auch dazu beigetragen hat, der gesamten Entwicklungspolitik der EU und ihrer Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Regionen eine Richtung zu geben, sowie Elemente einzuführen, die die Pariser Erklärung zur Wirksamkeit der Entwicklungshilfe vorwegnehmen.

Veränderungen in der EU selbst haben sich in der zunehmenden geopolitischen Priorität für die osteuropäische Nachbarschaft niedergeschlagen; gleichzeitig haben die aktuellen Entwicklungen in der arabischen Welt zunehmende Aufmerksamkeit auf sich gezogen. Der Schwenk der EU in Richtung stärkerer regionaler oder kontinentaler Ansätze bei der Behandlung der einzelnen AKP-Komponenten – Afrika, Karibi und Pazifik – und die laufenden Verhandlungen über Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen für die meisten AKP-Regionen drängen die Akteure weiter darüber nachzudenken, wie die AKP-EU-Beziehungen nach 2020 aussehen könnten. Unterdessen gehen die Diskussionen über eine neue Deadline für den Abschluss der Verhandlungen über Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (EPA) weiter, die die AKP-EU-Beziehungen jüngst stark belastet haben. Wenn die Verhandlungen von der EU weiterhin dogmatisch und unflexibel geführt werden – im Kontrast zu eher pragmatischen Ansätzen der Vereinigten Staaten und der Schwellenländer bei der wirtschaftlichen Kooperation mit Afrika –, ist dies in niemandes Interesse.

EU-Wahrnehmung des AKP-EU Rahmenabkommens

Auf Seiten der EU ist vom Europäischen Auswärtigen Dienst und der Europäischen Kommission (durch ihre Generaldirektion Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit – EuropeAid) eine gemeinsame informelle Arbeitsgruppe gebildet worden, die die Perspektiven der künftigen Kooperation reflektieren soll. Interviews mit europäischen Beamten erlauben uns eine Reihe von kritischen Punkten zu benennen, bei denen sich ein Konsens abzuzeichnen scheint.

Gründe für EU-Akteure, das Cotonou-Abkommen nicht über 2020 hinaus zu verlängern:

AKP/CPA-Gründe. Europäische Akteure neigen dazu, die AKP-Länder eher als lose Gruppe zu sehen, die weder die gleiche Relevanz wie in der Vergangenheit hat, noch gemeinsame Interessen repräsentiert. Viele Gesprächspartner aus Mitgliedsstaaten, die der EU in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten beigetreten sind, sehen das Abkommen als historisches Relikt. Die vorherrschende Ansicht sieht kaum Anzeichen einer sogenannten AKP-Identität oder von gemeinsamen Interessen innerhalb der Gruppe – abgesehen von der gemeinsamen Abhängigkeit von den Mitteln des EEF und Handelspräferenzen (besonders der *Everything But Arms*-Politik). Die drei regionalen Komponenten des Abkommens, also Afrika, Karibik und Pazifik, werden häufig als zu unterschiedlich betrachtet, um effektiv durch ein einziges Abkommen behandelt zu werden. Das sich verändernde globale Umfeld und das jüngste Wachstum ressourcenreicher afrikanischer Länder haben diese Unterschiede noch verstärkt. Die weit verbreitete Überzeugung ist, dass die Zusammenarbeit unter den AKP-Ländern gerade wegen dieser unterschiedlichen wirtschaftlichen Ausstattung und Interessen gering geblieben ist.

Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Ein weit verbreitetes Gefühl innerhalb der EU ist, dass die Zusammenarbeit mit der AKP-Gruppe nicht mehr der beste Weg ist, die aktuellen Herausforderungen der Entwicklungspolitik anzugehen. Während sich Entwicklungszusammenarbeit von einem Verständnis entfernt, das auf der bloßen Bereitstellung von offizieller Entwicklungshilfe beruht, bleibt die Arbeit im AKP-Rahmen im Allgemeinen auf eine Geber-Empfänger-Logik beschränkt. Dies wird angesichts des Wirtschaftswachstums in vielen AKP-Ländern zunehmend infrage gestellt. Unter den europäischen Beamten herrscht deshalb die verbreitete Ansicht vor, das CPA werde in AKP-Hauptstädten im Wesentlichen als eine Möglichkeit gesehen, Finanzierung sicherzustellen. Einige EU-Gesprächspartner erwarten, dass in Brüssel ansässige AKP-Akteure sich jedem echten Wandel der AKP-EU-Partnerschaft widersetzen werden, wenn es nicht genügend Garantien für eine vergleichbar privilegierte Behandlung durch die EU

gibt. In Wirklichkeit macht die EEF-Finanzierung jedoch im Allgemeinen keinen großen Anteil an den Ausgaben der AKP-Regierungen aus. Dies zeigt Abbildung 1, die die EEF-Auszahlungen 2009 mit den AKP-Regierungsausgaben vergleicht.

Abb. 1: EEF -Auszahlungen als Anteil der Regierungsausgaben 2009



Quellen: European Commission; IMF; eigene Berechnungen (Länder mit fehlenden Daten sind nicht berücksichtigt)

Gemeinsame Institutionen. Mit Bezug auf AKP-Staaten und gemeinsame AKP-EU-Institutionen äußern sich EU-Akteure insgesamt kritisch über das Zentrum für Unternehmensentwicklung, während das Technische Zentrum für die Zusammenarbeit in der Landwirtschaft und im ländlichen Bereich positiver bewertet wird. Die Paritätische Parlamentarische Versammlung (PPV) wird ambivalent betrachtet. Auf der einen Seite betrachten europäische Beamte sie als ein nützliches Forum zur Stärkung des politischen Dialogs, der die parlamentarischen Werte demokratischer Kontrolle und Überwachung fördert. Da Regional- und Länderstrategien in der Paritätischen Parlamentarischen Versammlung diskutiert werden, wird ihr auch eine Rolle bei deren Überwachung zugeschrieben – allerdings ohne Folgen. Sie erlaubt es Parlamentariern der AKP-Länder theoretisch, sich an der Debatte zu beteiligen und ihre eigenen Parlamente zu informieren. Doch angesichts der Tatsache, dass die Wirkung der PPV schwer zu messen ist, fragen viele, ob man eine teure und zeitraubende Struktur wie die PPV bei der geringen Anwesenheit europäischer Parlamentarier nur aus dem Grund aufrechterhalten sollte, dass es interessante Diskussionen gibt. In diesem Punkt sind die Vertreter des Europäischen Parlaments eine Ausnahme, denn sie neigen dazu, die Rolle der PPV sehr positiv zu sehen.

Elemente der Partnerschaft, die EU-Akteure als erhaltenswert betrachten:

Rechtsnatur und politischer Dialog. Für EU-Entscheidungsträger ist der rechtliche Rahmen des Cotonou-Abkommens häufig das erste, mit dem sie in Berührung kommen, wenn sie sich mit einem AKP-Land befassen. Einige EU-Beamte mit Erfahrungen in Delegationen und Botschaften meinen jedoch, dass sowohl der politische Dialog als auch die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit mit den Partnerländern nicht vom Rechtsrahmen abhänge und unberührt bleiben würde, wenn der Rechtscharakter des Rahmenabkommens verschwände. Diese Meinung scheint durch die Existenz fruchtbarer politischer Dialoge mit einer Reihe von Nicht-AKP-Ländern und gescheiterte Dialoge mit Signatarstaaten des Cotonou-Abkommens untermauert zu werden. Politischer Dialog in Schlüsselbereichen wie Migration, Menschenrechte, Demokratie, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und Good Governance zählen zu den anderen Elementen eines Acquis, der im Allgemeinen als erhaltenswert betrachtet wird.

Starke Bilanz der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eine recht verbreitete Auffassung unter EU-Beamten ist, dass das CPA potenziell zu einem höheren Maß an *Ownership* und einem stärkeren Partnerschaftsgeist führen kann, da es Vertragscharakter hat und Sanktionen oder Strategien zwischen EU und AKP-Ländern einvernehmlich vereinbart werden müssen. Darüber hinaus betrachten viele den EEF als ein nützliches Arbeitsinstrument für die Kommission, weil es stabile und vorhersehbare Finanzierung erlaube – ein wichtiger Faktor für die effektive und effiziente Nutzung von Mitteln der Entwicklungshilfe. Andere zeigen sich dagegen von dessen negativen Effekten enttäuscht: die Macht der Behörden der Partnerländer, unter Projekten und Programmen auszuwählen, was häufig zu ineffizienter Allokation führe und ein Hindernis für eine stärkere Zusammenarbeit mit Organisationen der lokalen Zivilgesellschaft sei. Obwohl sie vom Zweck her positiv gesehen wird, scheint *Ownership* durch gemeinsame Programmplanung mit Partnerländern in der Praxis mit erheblichen Herausforderungen verbunden zu sein, was vor allem auf die komplexen und hierarchischen Verfahren des EEF zurückzuführen ist.

Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter. Ein Punkt, der von EU-Beamten immer wieder genannt wird, ist, dass wenn die AKP-Länder in der Lage wären, sich untereinander und mit der EU in Fragen der Bereitstellung globaler öffentlicher Güter auf internationalen Foren zu verständigen, das CPA angesichts der großen Stimmenzahl der AKP-Länder für die EU einen Mehrwert hätte. Die allgemeine Wahrnehmung ist jedoch, dass dies höchst unwahrscheinlich ist, da es in der Vergangenheit in dieser Hinsicht sehr wenig Zusammenarbeit gab. Tatsächlich wird vielfach darauf hingewiesen, dass die EU- und AKP-Positionen auf derartigen internationalen Treffen häufig eher gegensätzlich waren. Eine Ausnahme ist jedoch die jüngste Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen zur nachhaltigen Entwicklung in Rio de Janeiro im Juni 2012 (Rio+20), wo die AKP-Gruppe und die EU einen gemeinsamen Vorschlag vorlegten.

Beteiligung der Zivilgesellschaft. Die Cotonou-Arbeitsgruppe der *European NGO Confederation for Relief and Development* (CONCORD) betont auch, dass das Abkommen nirgendwo seinen grundlegenden Prinzipien und dem Geist der Zusammenarbeit entspricht. Die Arbeitsgruppe

betont weiter die Gefahr einer Marginalisierung von Cotonou und plädiert vor allem für eine bessere Nutzung von Artikel 12 des Abkommens, der es den AKP-Ländern erlaubt, in einen Dialog über EU-Politiken zu treten, die ihre Entwicklung beeinflussen könnten.

Welche Zukunft hat die AKP-EU-Zusammenarbeit?

Das vorherrschende Gefühl unter EU-Akteuren ist, dass es nach 2020 weder Cotonou noch möglicherweise die AKP-Gruppe in ihrem derzeitigen Format geben wird. Im Allgemeinen wird eine Verschiebung vom AKP-EU-Abkommen in Richtung auf individuelle regionale Partnerschaften als natürlicher und wahrscheinlicher Weg ins Auge gefasst. Diese Option war eine unter verschiedenen, die in einer vom AKP-Sekretariat in Auftrag gegebenen und vom Entwicklungsprogramm der Vereinten Nationen finanzierten Studie untersucht wurde. Allerdings wurden vom AKP-Sekretariat und den AKP-Botschaftern dem Vernehmen nach andere Szenarien präferiert, die sich für eine Konsolidierung der AKP-Gruppe aussprachen.

Obschon die EU-Akteure eine Präferenz für das Szenario der Regionalisierung zu haben scheinen, in dem Schlüsselelemente des Acquis von Cotonou in Partnerschaften mit Afrika, der Karibik- und der Pazifik-Region überführt werden, machen sie im Allgemeinen einen wichtigen Vorbehalt, dass nämlich der Rechtscharakter des politischen Dialogs und die Entwicklungsfinanzierung beibehalten wird – was möglicherweise nicht unkompliziert ist. Es scheint auch Konsens zu sein, dass ein solches Ergebnis erst 2020 möglich ist, obwohl es nach den Bestimmungen des Vertrags vor diesem Jahr diskutiert und erreicht werden sollte.

Empfehlungen

Obwohl es für feste Ansichten über die AKP-EU-Zusammenarbeit nach 2020 noch zu früh ist, scheint es beträchtlichen Konsens zugeben, dass der Mehrwert des CPA angesichts seines Auslaufens und einer möglichen Überarbeitung 2015 kritisch überprüft werden sollte. Eine solche Überprüfung benötigt erhebliche Zeit und Investitionen und müsste bald beginnen. Das übergeordnete Thema dieser Prüfung bestünde in dem Ziel, die AKP-EU-Zusammenarbeit über die traditionelle Geber-Empfänger-Beziehung hinauszuführen. EU-Akteure sind der Auffassung, dass die Aufrechterhaltung des Status quo für die Zeit nach 2020 keine Option ist und die beiden Parteien im Hinblick auf die breiter angelegten Diskussionen über die Zukunft der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit nach 2015 aufgerufen sind zu bestimmen, welche Elemente der Partnerschaft für sie am wertvollsten und er-haltenswert sind. Dies erfordert, bevor eine Diskussion ein-zelner Szenarien begonnen wird, eine detaillierte und beleg-gestützte Reflektion bisheriger Ergebnisse und des Potenzi-als der Partnerschaft. Wenn die EU ihre privilegierten Partner ernst nimmt, wird sie die weitere Reflektion zu diesem The-ma in den kommenden Monaten fördern und selbst aktiver daran teilnehmen.

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Impuls oder Hindernis für Entwicklung?

Das Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Union und Westafrika

ANNETTE LOHMANN
Juli 2015

- Im Juli 2014 wurde nach Jahren des Widerstands vieler westafrikanischer Länder das Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen – Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) – zwischen der EU und der Regionalgemeinschaft ECOWAS vereinbart. Die westafrikanischen Länder müssen ihre Märkte in den nächsten zwanzig Jahren um bis zu 75 Prozent für europäische Importe öffnen. Im Gegenzug wird ihnen weiterhin zollfreier Zugang zum europäischen Markt gewährt.

- Die Regierungen Westafrikas haben unterschiedliche Positionen: Während die Côte d'Ivoire das Abkommen sehr stark befürwortet, lehnt Nigeria es vehement ab.

- Zwei Drittel der nationalen Parlamente müssen das Abkommen nun ratifizieren, damit es Gültigkeit erlangt. Bislang hat es das Abkommen in vielen Ländern jedoch nicht auf die Tagesordnungen der Parlamente geschafft – nicht zuletzt aufgrund der Kritik von zivilgesellschaftlichen und politischen Akteuren.

- Das Abkommen wird die notwendige Entwicklung der Region weder automatisch vorantreiben, noch muss es diese zwangsläufig ausbremsen. Politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklungen liegen in erster Linie in den Händen der westafrikanischen Regierungen selbst. Erforderlich sind hierfür die Förderung der Infrastruktur, der Ausbau des intraregionalen Handels und vor allem der Aufbau von Industrien, um Wertschöpfungsketten zu schaffen.

Im Juli 2014 wurde nach Jahren des Widerstands vieler westafrikanischer Länder das Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen – Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) – zwischen der Europäischen Union (EU) und der Regionalgemeinschaft ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) vereinbart. Mit Ausnahme von Nigeria, Togo, Gambia, Sierra Leone und Mauretanien haben die Staats- und Regierungschefs der ECOWAS das Abkommen im Dezember 2014 unterzeichnet.[1]

Ebenfalls Mitte Dezember 2014 unterzeichnete der Rat der EU Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen mit der ECOWAS sowie dem östlichen (Eastern African Community, EAC) und südlichen Afrika (South African Development Community, SADC), die allerdings noch ratifiziert werden müssen. Die Abkommen mit Zentralafrika sowie den Ländern des östlichen und südlichen Afrikas (Eastern and Southern Africa, ESA) stehen noch aus.

Mit dem EPA sind nun erstmals *gegenseitige* Handelspräferenzen und damit eine Teilöffnung der westafrikanischen Märkte für Importe aus der EU vorgesehen. Die im September 2002 begonnenen Verhandlungen sollten ursprünglich bis Anfang 2008 abgeschlossen werden, da die Handelskomponente des Cotonou-Abkommens bezüglich unilateraler Handelspräferenzen zu diesem Zeitpunkt auslief. Aufgrund großer Differenzen war der Verhandlungsprozess sowohl mit der Region Westafrika als auch mit den anderen Regionen zeitweise blockiert. Erst nach zwölf Verhandlungsjahren konnte zwischen der EU und Westafrika eine Einigung erfolgen, die jedoch nicht von allen westafrikanischen Staaten mitgetragen wird. Der teilweise von heftigem Widerstand seitens afrikanischer Akteure – mit Unterstützung europäischer Aktivist_innen – gekennzeichnete Verhandlungsprozess belastete die europäisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen über Jahre und beschädigte das Vertrauen. So forderte das Europäische Parlament in einer Resolution von 2009 die Kommission auf, das beschädigte Vertrauensverhältnis zwischen den AKP-Staaten und der EU wiederherzustellen und die AKP-Staaten als gleichwertige Partner anzuerkennen.

Die Notwendigkeit für ein Nachfolgemodell der Handelskomponente des Cotonou-Abkommens war entstanden, weil die unilateralen Handelspräferenzen für Produkte der AKP-Staaten, und damit der einseitige Marktzugang, den die EU u. a. den afrikanischen Staaten jahrelang gewährt hatte, nur per Ausnahmegenehmigung der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) mit dem internationalen Handelsrecht vereinbar war. Dagegen klagten bereits im Jahr 1995 u. a. Guatemala, Honduras und Mexiko als Produzenten von Bananen bei der WTO. Eine Klage Indiens im Jahr 2002 gegen das seit Anfang der 1970er-Jahre existierende Generalised Scheme of Preferences (GSP) der EU, das Exporte von Entwicklungsländern mit keinen oder nur geringen Zöllen belegt, unterstrich zudem die Notwendigkeit einer Neuregelung. Das EPA sollte die Handelsbeziehungen zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten dementsprechend wechselseitig und damit konform zum WTO-Handelsregime regeln.

Bisherige Wirtschaftsabkommen

Das Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der EU und den Staaten Westafrikas ersetzt das Cotonou-Abkommen aus dem Jahr 2000, das bislang unilaterale Handelspräferenzen für Produkte der AKP-Staaten (Gruppe der afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten) auf dem europäischen Markt gewährte. Zuvor wurden Handelsfragen zwischen den AKP-Staaten und der damaligen europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) vom Lomé-Abkommen aus dem Jahr 1975 geregelt .

Erhalt des freien Marktzugangs in der EU – aber zu welchem Preis?

Das EPA legt fest, dass die westafrikanischen Länder ihre Märkte in den nächsten zwanzig Jahren um bis zu 75 Prozent für europäische Importe öffnen und dazu schrittweise Zölle und Gebühren abschaffen müssen. Im Gegenzug wird ihnen weiterhin zollfreier Zugang zum europäischen Markt gewährt.

Für die Mehrheit der Länder Westafrikas existierte der zollfreie Zugang zum europäischen Markt bereits vor dem Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen. Als sogenannte »Least Developed Countries« (LDC) – also die weltweit unterentwickeltsten Länder – gewährt ihnen die EU seit 2001 unter der »Everything But Arms«-Initiative (EBA) als Teil des GSP einen bevorzugten Marktzugang ohne Zölle und Quoten.

1. Unterzeichnet haben der Senegal, Mali, Benin, die Elfenbeinküste, Niger, Burkina Faso, Kap Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau und Liberia.

Afrikanische Verhandlungsblöcke

Für die Verhandlungen wurden verschiedene Subregionen definiert, sodass in Afrika fünf »Verhandlungsblöcke« entstanden: Westafrika (alle Mitgliedstaaten der Regionalgemeinschaft ECOWAS plus Mauretanien); Zentralafrika; das südliche Afrika (SADC); die ostafrikanische Gemeinschaft (EAC) sowie die Länder des östlichen und südlichen Afrikas (ESA).

Nach langer Blockade in den Verhandlungen um das EPA erhöhte die EU 2014 den Druck auf die AKP-Staaten durch die Drohung, zum 1. Oktober 2014 die einseitigen Handelspräferenzen des Cotonou-Abkommens abzuschaffen. Damit wäre der Marktzugang für alle Länder bzw. Regionen, die bis zu diesem Zeitpunkt kein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen beschlossen bzw. ratifiziert hätten, automatisch nach den Kriterien des GSP geregelt worden, welches weniger vorteilhafte Handelspräferenzen als das Cotonou-Abkommen vorsieht. Allerdings hätte dies in Westafrika lediglich die Côte d'Ivoire und Ghana als »Nicht-LDCs« negativ betroffen. Nigeria, das im Gegensatz zu Côte d'Ivoire und Ghana in der Zwischenzeit kein bilaterales Übergangsabkommen mit der EU ausgehandelt hatte, fällt bereits seit einigen Jahren unter das GSP. Ebenso Kap Verde, dem als viertes westafrikanisches »Nicht-LDC« seit 2011 Präferenzen im Zuge von »GSP+« insbesondere beim Export von Fischprodukten in die EU zugestanden werden. Die restlichen Länder Westafrikas wären als LDCs nicht von einem Verlust des freien Zugangs zu den EU-Märkten betroffen gewesen, da die EBA-Initiative weiter Bestand hat.

Dennoch wurden mit der Drohung der EU auch die zwölf LDC-Länder in Westafrika unter Druck gesetzt: Im Falle einer Unterzeichnung des EPA durch die vier Nicht-LDCs – nicht aber durch die zwölf LDCs – hätten aufgrund der Handelsregelungen der ECOWAS zollbegünstigte EU-Produkte künftig über die Nicht-LDCs der Region – Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire sowie Kap Verde – in die LDCs schwappen und dort Druck auf Produzenten ausüben können. Somit hätten Kontrollen aufgebaut bzw. verstärkt werden müssen, was dem Prozess der regionalen Integration in der ECOWAS zuwidergelaufen wäre.

Das Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der EU und Westafrika bedeutet somit für die Mehrheit der westafrikanischen Länder zunächst den Erhalt des Status quo hinsichtlich eines freien Zugangs zu europäischen Märkten bei gleichzeitiger gradueller Öffnung ihrer Märkte für europäische Importe über einen Zeitraum von zwanzig Jahren. Einschränkend muss jedoch hinzugefügt werden, dass das EPA in Bezug auf die Handelspräferenzen für die LDCs insofern vorteilhafter als die EBA-Initiative ist, als das Abkommen aufgrund seines Vertragscharakters ein höheres Maß an Verbindlichkeit zusichert als eine freiwillige unilaterale Initiative, die auch widerrufen werden kann.

Trotz der bislang bereits eingeräumten unilateralen Handelspräferenzen ist der Export afrikanischer Produkte in die EU auf eine enge Palette von (unverarbeiteten) Rohstoffen beschränkt geblieben; zu einer Diversifizierung der Wirtschaft und einer eigenen Wertschöpfung ist es nicht gekommen. So machte beispielsweise im Zeitraum von 2010 bis 2012 der Export von Treibstoffen aus Ländern der ECOWAS in die EU im Schnitt 58 Prozent der Gesamtexporte aus. Gleichzeitig exportierte die EU eine breite Palette an bereits verarbeiteten Produkten nach Westafrika.

Ursprünglich hatte die EU einen freien Marktzugang nach Westafrika von 80 Prozent binnen 15 Jahren gefordert. Die National Association of Nigerian Traders (NANTS) sowie das in Genf ansässige South Centre schätzen, dass auch das jetzige Verhandlungsergebnis den westafrikanischen Ländern hinsichtlich der Importwerte faktisch eine höhere Liberalisierung als die vereinbarten 75 Prozent abverlangt. Für Nigeria berechnen sie in den nächsten zwanzig Jahren 81 bis 86 Prozent, für den Senegal ebenfalls bis zu 86 Prozent und für Ghana 80 Prozent. Damit hätte die EU de facto ihre ursprüngliche Forderung durchgesetzt.

Positiv ist anzumerken, dass es gelungen ist, die landwirtschaftlichen Produkte Westafrikas zu schützen sowie Produkte des täglichen Konsums, die in Westafrika produziert werden, von der Liberalisierung auszunehmen. Die EU hat zudem zugesichert, keine subventionierten Produkte zu exportieren. Dies ist für die Wirtschaften Westafrikas, die stark von der Landwirtschaft geprägt sind, enorm wichtig und vorteilhaft. Den westafrikanischen Verhandlungsdelegationen ist es gelungen, hier im Zuge der Verhandlungen Erfolge zu erzielen.

Zudem werden Maschinen und Ausrüstungen aus Europa aufgrund der schrittweisen Senkung der Zölle künftig

billiger und können somit eine technologische Modernisierung sowie eine wirtschaftliche Transformation beschleunigen. Gerade die technologische Modernisierung ist erforderlich, da eine nachhaltige Entwicklung auch einer steigenden Arbeitsproduktivität bedarf. Hier entsteht jedoch ein Zielkonflikt: Auf der einen Seite ist eine steigende Produktivität erforderlich, um das wirtschaftliche Wachstum zu befördern. Gleichzeitig benötigen viele Länder Subsahara-Afrikas dringend eine Antwort auf die bereits hohe und weiter steigende (Jugend-) Arbeitslosigkeit. Aus diesem Grund werden explizit arbeitsintensive Programme aufgelegt, um möglichst viele Menschen zu beschäftigen, selbst wenn bestimmte Arbeiten sich mithilfe von Maschinen produktiver verrichten ließen. Somit fällt die für eine wirtschaftliche Entwicklung notwendige Produktivitätssteigerung gering aus, dafür profitieren hiervon aber relativ viele Beschäftigte (auf niedrigem Niveau).

Der graduelle Wegfall von Zöllen bei der Einfuhr aus Europa bedeutet für die Staaten Westafrikas einen erheblichen Einnahmeverlust. Diverse Studien haben die potenziellen Verluste an Zolleinnahmen mit dem Wegfall der Einfuhrzölle in die EU gegengerechnet und sind zu dem Schluss gekommen, dass die afrikanischen Länder unter dem Strich mit Einnahmeeinbußen rechnen müssen. Allerdings sind diese künftigen Einbußen nicht eindeutig bestimmbar – eine genaue Prognose, wie sich die Wirtschaften Westafrikas entwickeln und welche Exportvorteile entstehen könnten, ist nicht zu erstellen. Zudem stellen die Zolleinnahmen nicht in allen Ländern die wichtigste staatliche Einnahmequelle dar. So ist beispielsweise im Senegal die Steuerbasis recht breit, sodass die Steuereinnahmen die Zolleinnahmen übertreffen.

Zur Abfederung der zu erwartenden negativen Auswirkungen – insbesondere in Hinsicht auf Ausfälle bei den Zolleinnahmen, die Erhöhung der Produktionskapazitäten, die Entwicklung des intraregionalen sowie internationalen Handels sowie die Stärkung der Infrastrukturen – hat die EU Anpassungshilfen (Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme, EPADP/PAPED) angeboten, die den Entwicklungscharakter des Abkommens unterstreichen sollen. Hierfür sind im Zeitraum von 2015 bis 2020 sechseinhalb Milliarden Euro vorgesehen. Kritiker_innen bemängeln allerdings, dass es sich hierbei größtenteils um bereits existierende Zusagen für verschiedene Programme handele.

Die Länder der Region sind durch die Meistbegünstigungsklausel des Abkommens gezwungen, künftig alle Handelsvorteile, die sie einem anderen Handelspartner einräumen, im Sinne einer gleichen Behandlung auch der EU zu gewähren. Dies begünstigt eine Ausweitung der Handelsliberalisierung zwischen der Region Westafrika und der EU. Potenzielle Freihandelsabkommen mit anderen Partnern verlieren somit jedoch an Wert, da die Verhandlungsposition der westafrikanischen Länder geschwächt ist.

Tatsächlich hat die EU in den letzten Jahren an Relevanz als Handelspartner für die Länder Subsahara-Afrikas verloren; machten die Exporte in die EU im Jahr 2000 noch 36 Prozent aus, so sank der Anteil im Jahr 2013 auf 25 Prozent. Die künftigen Handelsbeziehungen mit anderen Partnern außerhalb der EU, die potenziell an Relevanz zunehmen könnten, werden sich aufgrund der Meistbegünstigungsklausel für die westafrikanischen Länder jedoch schwierig gestalten.

Durch die Aufnahme sogenannter »WTO+-Themen« in der Rendezvous-Klausel legt das Abkommen den Grundstein künftiger Liberalisierungen über den Warenhandel hinaus (u. a. in Bezug auf Investitionen, Wettbewerbsrecht und öffentliche Aufträge), welche den politischen Spielraum westafrikanischer Regierungen erheblich einschränken würden. Die künftige Liberalisierung von Dienstleistungen, wie beispielsweise Banken und Versicherungen, die bislang noch nicht Teil des Abkommens sind, wird voraussichtlich der nächste Schritt sein. Dies ist für die EU wesentlich vorteilhafter als die Liberalisierung des Warenverkehrs.

Entgegen den Beteuerungen der EU bezüglich des Entwicklungscharakters des Abkommens kann insgesamt von einem Paradigmenwechsel in den europäisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen gesprochen werden, da diese künftig sehr viel stärker von Wirtschafts- und Handelsinteressen geprägt sein werden.

Durch das EPA besteht zudem die Gefahr, dass künftige Importe aus der EU andere, regionale Anbieter von den Märkten verdrängen könnten und der ohnehin schwache intraregionale Handel somit leidet – nur zehn bis sechzehn Prozent des Handels der ECOWAS-Mitglieder findet innerhalb der ECOWAS statt. Das Verdrängungsrisiko ist vor dem Hintergrund der kürzlich neu eingeführten, regionalen Zollunion größer geworden.

Eine neue gemeinsame westafrikanische Zollunion

Zum 1. Januar 2015 ist die neue westafrikanische Zollunion – Tarif Extérieur Commun (TEC) – in Kraft getreten. Diese ersetzt sowohl die entsprechenden nationalen Gesetzgebungen als auch die seit dem Jahr 2000 bestehende Zollunion der Wirtschafts- und Währungsunion UEMOA (Union économique et monétaire de l'Afrique de l'Ouest). Allerdings ist hierfür eine Übergangsfrist von fünf Jahren vorgesehen, um Anpassungen auf den nationalen Ebenen zu ermöglichen.

Der Eindruck eines kohärenten Vorgehens zwischen dem Abschluss des EPA und der gemeinsamen westafrikanischen Zollunion täuscht. Wäre die gemeinsame Zollunion vor dem Abkommen eingeführt, evaluiert und bei Bedarf angepasst worden, hätte eine Kohärenz erzeugt werden können. Tatsächlich existieren nun beide Instrumente ohne Abstimmung nebeneinander. Dabei kann dieser Mangel an Kohärenz zu konkreten Behinderungen im intra-afrikanischen Handel führen: So liegt beispielsweise der Zoll für Getreide aus Europa – eines der Produkte, das im Zuge des EPA liberalisiert werden soll – deutlich unter dem vorgesehenen Zoll der westafrikanischen Zollunion für Produkte, welche aus afrikanischen Ländern eingeführt werden, die nicht der ECOWAS angehören. Somit steigt die Wahrscheinlichkeit, dass europäische Produkte künftig afrikanische vom westafrikanischen Markt verdrängen werden.

Transformation durch Industrialisierung erforderlich

Einer Studie der afrikanischen Entwicklungsbank vom Oktober 2014 zufolge gehören mittlerweile 34 Prozent der Afrikaner_innen, d. h. etwa 370 Millionen Menschen, einer neu entstehenden, wachsenden Mittelschicht an. Kritiker_innen bemängeln jedoch, dass mit der Wahl der Begrifflichkeit »Mittelschicht« ein falsches Bild suggeriert wird. In vielen Fällen handle es sich vielmehr um Teile der Bevölkerung, die gerade nicht mehr unter die offizielle Armutsgrenze von 1,25 US-Dollar pro Tag fallen. Die Spanne von 2,20 bis 20 US-Dollar pro Tag als Bemessungsgrundlage ist so weit gefasst, dass die entstehenden statistischen Mittelwerte über die ungleiche Verteilung von Einkommen hinwegtäuschen, die für viele Länder Subsahara-Afrikas typisch ist. Viele Angehörige der neuen »Mittelschicht« sind weiterhin mit prekären und instabilen Lebensbedingungen konfrontiert.

Für eine umfassende, nachhaltige wirtschaftliche und soziale Transformation, einschließlich einer soliden Mittelschicht, sind die Wirtschaften Subsahara-Afrikas bislang nicht aufgestellt. Die konsumierten Güter sind häufig importierte westliche und chinesische Produkte; die Nachfrage nach afrikanischen Produkten ist schwach. Dieses Modell des Konsums importierter Produkte bildet jedoch keine Grundlage für die Entwicklung der afrikanischen Volkswirtschaften. Es besteht die Gefahr, dass diese Abhängigkeit von Importen durch das EPA weiter steigen wird und die Anreize zur Entwicklung einheimischer Industrien weiter sinken werden. Lokale Produzent_innen gehören damit zu den potenziellen Verlierern des EPA, zahlungskräftige Konsumenten zu den Gewinnern. Auch abhängig Beschäftigte könnten zu Verlierern werden bzw. die ständig wachsende Masse an jungen Menschen, die auf einen Arbeitsmarkt drängen, der sie nicht adäquat absorbieren kann. Ein Anstieg der bereits hohen Arbeitslosigkeit und der Verlust von (formalisierten) Beschäftigungsverhältnissen könnten die Folgen sein.

Darüber hinaus wird der Frage nach einer Industrialisierung Afrikas häufig zu wenig Bedeutung beigemessen. Eine nachhaltige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung von einer überwiegenden Agrarwirtschaft hin zu einer Dienstleistungsindustrie ist ohne den Zwischenschritt einer klassischen Industrialisierung kaum möglich. Hierfür müssen Industriepolitiken entwickelt und mehr Investitionen in Wertschöpfungsprozesse gefördert werden. Das Entstehen afrikanischer Industrien wird jedoch nicht nur durch das EPA und eine zu erwartende Verdrängung durch europäische Produkte behindert; auch die Konkurrenz der bereits seit Jahren nach Afrika exportierten chinesischen Billigwaren behindert den Aufbau und die Entwicklung eigener Produktionen.

Eine gespaltene Region

Die Staats- und Regierungschefs der Länder Westafrikas vertreten teilweise sehr unterschiedliche Positionen bezüglich des EPA: Der ivorische Präsident Alassane Ouattara gilt als größter Anhänger des Abkommens; auf der anderen Seite lehnte der ehemalige Präsident Ni-

gerias, Goodluck Jonathan, das EPA vehement ab. Sein Nachfolger, der neu gewählte Präsident Muhammadu Buhari, hat sich bislang nicht öffentlich geäußert. Beobachter_innen gehen aber davon aus, dass er das Abkommen ebenfalls ablehnen wird.

Die Gegner_innen des Abkommens betonen die Notwendigkeit von Schutzzöllen, um durch die Verarbeitung von Rohstoffen einen Mehrwert zu schaffen. Zudem ist Nigeria nicht nur an einem Handel mit Europa, sondern auch mit China und Indien interessiert. Die Meistbegünstigungsklausel erschwert Freihandelsabkommen mit anderen Partnern jedoch deutlich. Ein interministerieller Ausschuss in Nigeria kam zu dem Schluss, dass die negativen Auswirkungen im Falle einer Nichtunterzeichnung geringer ausfallen würden als im Fall einer Unterzeichnung – selbst wenn alle anderen westafrikanischen Länder unterzeichnen sollten. Eine Studie des South Centre aus dem Jahr 2012 unterstützt diese Analyse: Der Verlust an Zolleinnahmen wäre höher als die Vorteile, die durch den Wegfall von Einfuhrzöllen in die EU entstehen würden.

Für die stark exportorientierte ivorische Wirtschaft ist die EU wiederum weiterhin einer der wichtigsten Außenhandelspartner. So hatte die Côte d'Ivoire als einziges Land der Region 2008 ein bilaterales Übergangsabkommen mit der EU ausgehandelt, das jedoch nie in Kraft getreten ist. Der weiterhin privilegierte Zugang zum europäischen Markt ist für die ivorische Wirtschaft von großer Bedeutung. Der ivorische Premierminister verwies darauf, dass im Falle eines Scheiterns des Abkommens 41 Prozent der ivorischen Exporte von europäischen Zöllen betroffen wären, was zu einem Verlust von 772 Milliarden FCFA führen würde (dies entspricht ca. 1,1 Milliarden Euro). Weder in der ivorischen Zivilgesellschaft noch im Parlament oder in der Presse wird eine Debatte über das EPA geführt.

Der senegalesische Präsident Macky Sall hat als Verhandlungsführer der ECOWAS seit Oktober 2013 die Unterzeichnung des EPA maßgeblich mit vorangetrieben und ist zugleich mit wachsendem innenpolitischem Widerstand in Politik und Zivilgesellschaft konfrontiert. Auch in anderen Ländern der Region regt sich Widerstand. So beklagen zivilgesellschaftliche Akteure einen Mangel an Transparenz ihrer Regierungen, die sich teilweise bis heute nicht öffentlich zum Abkommen und der umstrittenen Unterzeichnung äußern bzw. auf Nachfrage die erfolgte Unterzeichnung gar leugnen. Widerstand kommt auch vonseiten privatwirtschaftlicher Akteure, von Gewerkschaften und Industrieverbänden sowie von internationalen NGOs.

Letzte Hürde: Die nationalen Parlamente

Im Anschluss an die abgeschlossenen Verhandlungen folgen nun in allen Ländern der Region nationale Ratifizierungsprozesse. Zwei Drittel der nationalen Parlamente müssen das Abkommen ratifizieren, damit es Gültigkeit erlangt. Das Abkommen wird jedoch nur in den Ländern in Kraft treten, die es auch tatsächlich ratifiziert haben.

In den meisten Ländern reicht hierfür eine einfache Mehrheit, nur in der Côte d'Ivoire und in Gambia muss eine Zweidrittelmehrheit im Parlament zustimmen. In der Côte d'Ivoire hat es das Abkommen bislang jedoch nicht auf die parlamentarische Tagesordnung geschafft; weder gibt es einen Termin für eine parlamentarische Debatte noch für eine Abstimmung über die Ratifizierung. Allerdings besitzen die Regierungsparteien RDR und PDCI eine klare Mehrheit im Parlament. Die Regierung beabsichtigt aber, die Ratifizierung der anderen Staaten abzuwarten, bevor man 2016 selbst ratifiziert.

Im Senegal steht eine mögliche Ratifizierung durch das Parlament ebenfalls in weiter Ferne. Da hier auch Teile der Regierungskoalition große Bedenken haben – und mit einem zunehmenden Druck aus der Zivilgesellschaft konfrontiert sind –, schiebt das Parlament die Entscheidung erst einmal auf.

Auch in Nigeria, bislang der größte Kritiker des Abkommens in der Region, ist eine baldige Ratifizierung durch das Parlament nicht in Sicht.

In den »Durchführungsbestimmungen zu den Regelungen der Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen« der EU von 2007 wird von einer Ratifizierung »innerhalb eines angemessenen Zeitraums« gesprochen – ohne diesen allerdings näher zu präzisieren. Inzwischen hat die EU als neue Frist für den Abschluss der nationalen Ratifizierungsprozesse den 1. Oktober 2016 festgesetzt. Andernfalls würden – wie bereits für den Oktober 2014 angedroht – die einseitigen Handelspräferenzen abgeschafft. Dies würde in Westafrika die Côte d'Ivoire und

Ghana als Nicht-LDCs mit Exporten in die EU hart treffen – somit haben diese beiden Länder auch am meisten zu verlieren. Nigeria und Kap Verde fallen wiederum bereits seit einiger Zeit unter das GSP bzw. GSP+ und sind hiervon nicht betroffen.

Die Nichtratifizierung durch ein Land – wie beispielsweise Nigeria – würde jedoch nicht dazu führen, dass das Abkommen für die anderen nicht in Kraft tritt, solange es durch zwei Drittel der Parlamente der Region ratifiziert wird. Insofern könnte es zu einer Art Flickenteppich kommen. Da die westafrikanische Zollunion aber gleichzeitig verabschiedet wurde, dürfte es für die Nicht-Unterzeichner zunehmend schwerer werden, ihre Märkte gegen EU-Importe zu schützen, die über andere Länder in die Region eingeführt und dann weitertransportiert werden.

Chance oder Risiko?

Die Frage, ob das westafrikanische Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen die Entwicklung der Region eher befördern oder behindern wird, kann zu diesem Zeitpunkt nicht abschließend beantwortet werden. Bezüglich der Zölle wirken potenzielle Verluste für die westafrikanischen Staaten gegenwärtig sehr viel realistischer als die Chancen, welche auf den europäischen Märkten entstehen könnten. Eine automatisch negative oder positive Entwicklung wird es jedoch keinesfalls geben. Vielmehr wird vieles von den jeweiligen Regierungen abhängen. Die graduelle Teilöffnung der westafrikanischen Märkte über einen Zeitraum von zwanzig Jahren bietet einen Anlass sowie Rahmen zur aktiven Gestaltung von Wirtschafts- und Industriepolitiken der westafrikanischen Länder, um nicht nur den anstehenden Wandel besser abzufedern, sondern ihn – trotz aller Schwierigkeiten – als Chance zu nutzen und zu gestalten.

Politische, wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklungen liegen in erster Linie in den Händen der westafrikanischen Regierungen selbst. Erforderlich sind hierfür die Förderung der Infrastruktur, der Ausbau des intraregionalen Handels und vor allem der Aufbau von Industrien, um Wertschöpfungsketten zu schaffen sowie die Abhängigkeit von Rohstoffexporten und Preisschwankungen zu reduzieren. Ziel muss die Schaffung eines nachhaltigen Wachstums sein, das die Abhängigkeit der Wirtschaften von fossilen Brennstoffen verringert und ausreichend Arbeitsplätze schafft.

In vielen Ländern Westafrikas hat im Zuge der Verhandlungen das Vertrauen in die Regierungen gelitten. Dieses Vertrauen muss wieder hergestellt werden, auch um die Mechanismen pluralistischer Demokratien zu stärken. Bisher mangelt es an offenen, kritischen Debatten zwischen den Regierungen und Akteuren der Zivilgesellschaft über das EPA. Eine kritische Öffentlichkeit ist entstanden – es ist nun an den Regierungen, diese ernst zu nehmen.

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Dietmar Nickel

Was kommt nach Cotonou?

Die Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und den Afrika-, Karibik- und Pazifikstaaten

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Was kommt nach Cotonou?
Die Zukunft der Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und den Afrika-, Karibik- und Pazifikstaaten

Ende 2020 wird das Cotonou-Abkommen, das die Beziehungen der EU zu den afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Staaten (AKP-Staaten) regelt, seine Gültigkeit verlieren: Nach Artikel 95, Absatz 4 des Abkommens sollen 18 Monate vor Ablauf der Geltungsfrist Verhandlungen zwischen den Vertragspartnern aufgenommen werden, um die zukünftigen Beziehungen neu zu regeln. Der letzte Satz dieses Absatzes mahnt ausdrücklich an, Übergangsmaßnahmen zu treffen, bevor das neue Abkommen in Kraft tritt. Es mehren sich allerdings die Zeichen dafür, dass es nach 2020 überhaupt kein gemeinsames Abkommen mehr zwischen der Gesamtheit der AKP-Staaten und der Europäischen Union (EU) geben könnte:

- Im Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union in der Fassung des Lissabonner Vertrags (AEUV) ist im neuen Artikel 209 der bisherige Absatz 3 von Artikel 179 des EG-Vertrags (EGV) gestrichen, der lautete: »Dieser Artikel berührt nicht die Zusammenarbeit mit den Ländern Afrikas, des Karibischen Raumes und des Pazifischen Ozeans im Rahmen des AKP-EG-Abkommens.« Diese Streichung erscheint als konsequente Umsetzung einer Empfehlung der Arbeitsgruppe Außenbeziehungen des Europäischen Verfassungskonvents, die sich für eine Vergemeinschaftung des Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF) ausgesprochen hatte. Die Streichung diente sicher nicht der Absicht, die Bedeutung der Beziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten in Frage zu stellen. Dennoch ist sie auf Seiten der AKP-Staaten und in Kreisen von Entwicklungspolitikern als Herabstufung der jahrzehntelang privilegierten Beziehungen interpretiert worden.
- Der Regelungsbereich des Cotonou-Abkommens, die Kooperation zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten, wird mehr und mehr von bilateralen und regionalen Partnerschaften und Abkommen überlagert. Es ist durchaus vorstellbar, dass sämtliche Elemente, die gegenwärtig im Cotonou-Abkommen niedergelegt sind, in gleicher oder besserer Form von anderen Strategien, Partnerschafts- oder Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (WPA) oder auch von der allgemeinen Entwicklungspolitik der EU abgedeckt werden.

- Der neu geschaffene Europäische Auswärtige Dienst (EAD) sah zunächst keine Direktion oder Einheit vor, die sich explizit mit den AKP-Staaten befassen sollte. Vielmehr wurden die drei regionalen Komponenten ihren jeweiligen Kontinenten zugeteilt (die afrikanischen Staaten zu Afrika, der Pazifik zu Asien, die Karibik zu Amerika). Heute umfasst das Management Directorate (Generaldirektion) VI des EAD, Globale und Multilaterale Angelegenheiten, in der Direktion VI.A. für multilaterale Beziehungen und globale Governance ein Referat VI.A.3 für Entwicklungszusammenarbeit unter der Leitung von Felix Fernández-Shaw. Die Kombination von Afrika, Karibik und Pazifik könnte als ein überholtes Relikt der Geschichte erscheinen, das einer neuen und rationaleren Gliederung der europäischen Außen- und Entwicklungspolitik nach funktionalen bzw. politikbereichsspezifischen Kriterien Platz machen sollte. Die zufälligen historischen Faktoren, die darüber entschieden haben, ob eine vormalige Kolonie dem AKP-Verbund beitrat oder nicht, wären damit überwunden. Dies würde die Auflösung der spezifischen Verbindung der EU mit den AKP-Staaten bedeuten. Ob ein solches Ergebnis aus der Sichtweise beider Seiten erstrebenswert ist, hängt unter anderem davon ab, ob andere, bereits in Kraft befindliche oder noch abzuschließende Verträge konzeptionell, institutionell und instrumentell so umfassend ausgestaltet werden können, dass der über Jahrzehnte gewachsene materielle Inhalt des AKP-EU-Abkommens durch die neuen Verträge gesichert bleiben kann.

Strategische Entscheidungen haben lange Vorlaufzeiten. Insofern ist bei einer kritischen Sichtung der Inhalte des Cotonou-Abkommens bereits heute – und nicht erst 2018 – zu fragen, ob und wie diese Inhalte von alternativen Strategien, Partnerschaftsabkommen oder im Rahmen der allgemeinen Entwicklungspolitik abgedeckt werden können. Selbst wenn alle Anforderungen an Effizienz und Legitimation erfüllt werden sollten, wäre zu prüfen, ob es einen darüber hinausgehenden spezifischen Mehrwert der AKP-EU-Zusammenarbeit gibt, den es zu bewahren lohnt. Natürlich können beide Partner in ihren Analysen der Zukunft ihrer Beziehungen zu unterschiedlichen Ergebnissen kommen. Sie werden am Ende dennoch aufeinander eingehen und auch der Weltpolitik Rechnung tragen müssen, die sich um sie herum entwickelt. EU und AKP-Staaten könnten schließlich zu der Einsicht gelangen, dass eine Revision des Cotonou-Abkommens als interregionale »Block-zu-Block«-Vereinbarung über das Jahr 2020 hinaus notwendig ist, um eine gemeinsame Plattform für die Bearbeitung der gesellschafts- und sicherheitspolitischen Anforderungen zu definieren, mit denen sie global konfrontiert sind.

Das Abkommen von Cotonou: Hinter- und Beweggründe

Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik liegt seit der Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft (EWG) im Jahr 1957 in der »parallelen Zuständigkeit« der Mitgliedstaaten und der europäischen Ebene. Dies bedeutet, dass beide Ebenen handeln können und mit entsprechenden politischen und budgetären Instrumenten ausgestattet sind. Mit dem ersten Abkommen von Yaoundé aus dem Jahr 1963 kam ein intergouvernementales Instrument hinzu, das bei weitgehender Nutzung der Gemeinschaftsorgane ein Auffangbecken für die Beziehungen der ehemaligen Kolonien der Mitgliedstaaten zur EWG bot.

Als das bis heute geltende AKP-EG-Partnerschaftsabkommen am 23. Juni 2000 in Cotonou[1] unterzeichnet wurde, schien eine mehr als dreißigjährige Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten[2] in eine dauerhafte Form gebracht zu sein, die ein gedeihliches Miteinander in ruhiger, gemeinsamer Arbeit versprach, ausgerichtet auf das stets gleichbleibende Ziel: die Bekämpfung und schließliche Beseitigung der Armut durch nachhaltige Entwicklung und allmähliche Integration der AKP-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft (Artikel 1, Absatz 2 des Abkommens). Nach den bescheideneren Abkommen von Yaoundé (I, Geltungsfrist von 1963 bis 1969, und II, Geltungsfrist von 1969 bis 1975) folgten vier Lomé-Abkommen, mit einer letzten Verlängerung, die wie ein fünftes Abkommen wirkte (insgesamt von 1975 bis 2000). Mit der Unterzeichnung des Cotonou-Abkommens lag gemäß Artikel 95, Absatz 1 ein Zeitraum von zwanzig Jahren vor den Partnern. Die vereinbarte Laufzeit von zwei Jahrzehnten sollte neue Stabilität gewährleisten und wurde als Ausdruck gegenseitigen Vertrauens gewertet.

Das Cotonou-Abkommen trat am 1. April 2003 in Kraft. In der ersten der vorgesehenen fünfjährigen Revisionsperioden (Artikel 95, Absatz 3 des Abkommens) wurde am 25. Juni 2005 ein weiterentwickelter Text unterzeichnet, der genau genommen nur auf eine Erfahrungszeit von zwei Jahren reagieren konnte. Die zweite Revision kam am 19. März 2010 zustande.[3] Es wird damit gerechnet, dass die Ratifizierungen Ende 2012 abgeschlossen sind. Der Text wird gegenwärtig, der gängigen Praxis entsprechend, vorläufig angewandt. Die Möglichkeit einer Revision binnen fünf Jahren entspricht dem Bedürfnis, flexibel auf die sich schnell ändernden internationalen Umfeldbedingungen der AKP-EU-Beziehungen reagieren zu können.[4] Das Verfahren ist somit vom Bestehen eines relativ dauerhaften Rahmens gekennzeichnet, kombiniert mit einer kurzfristigeren Anpassungsmöglichkeit.

1 »Partnerschaftsabkommen zwischen den Mitgliedern der Gruppe der Staaten in Afrika, im Karibischen Raum und im Pazifischen Ozean einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits, unterzeichnet in Cotonou am 23. Juni 2000«, in: *Amtsblatt der Europäischen Gemeinschaften* (ABl.) L 317 vom 15.12.2000, S. 3–286, und die revidierte Fassung vom 25. Juni 2005, ABl. L° 247 vom 9.9.2006, beide zitiert nach der konsolidierten Ausgabe des Amtes für amtliche Veröffentlichungen, Luxemburg 2006, ISBN 92-79-00567-7.

2 Mittlerweile ist die Zahl der Staaten auf 78 angestiegen. Kuba, der 79. AKP-Staat, ist nicht in die institutionelle Verbindung zur EU integriert. Mit dem angekündigten Beitritt des neuen Staates Südsudan wird die Zahl auf 80 steigen. Von diesen 80 sind dann 49 aus Afrika südlich der Sahara, 16 (inklusive Kuba) aus der Karibik und 15 aus dem Pazifischen Raum.

3 Der Sudan hat wie bei der ersten Revision angekündigt, den Text nicht zu ratifizieren. Als Konsequenz ist ihm der Zugang zum 10. Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF) versperrt.

4 Mit dem Inkrafttreten des Vertrags von Lissabon verändern sich die Möglichkeiten des Europäischen Parlaments erheblich, bei der Aushandlung der dritten Revision Einfluss zu nehmen: Gemäß Artikel 218, Absatz 10 AEUV wird das Europäische Parlament »in allen Phasen des Verfahrens unverzüglich und umfassend unterrichtet«. Es bleibt abzuwarten, was das Parlament und insbesondere sein in dieser Frage federführender Entwicklungsausschuss mit diesen neuen Möglichkeiten anfangen werden, die ihnen für die Vorbereitung der letztendlich zu erteilenden Zustimmung zur nächsten Revision offenstehen.

Stand der Dinge: Die Inhalte des Cotonou-Abkommens

Ganz allgemein regelt das Cotonou-Abkommen die wirtschaftliche und finanzielle Kooperation zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten.

Als Rahmen der *politischen* Zusammenarbeit wird gemäß Artikel 8 ein flexibler Dialog zwischen den Partnern eingerichtet, in den der gesamte institutionelle Apparat bis hin zur Paritätischen Parlamentarischen Versammlung AKP-EU (PPV) einbezogen werden kann. Themen des Dialogs sind sowohl Menschenrechte als auch demokratische Grundsätze, Rechtsstaatlichkeit und gute Regierungsführung. Dieser institutionalisierte Dialog nach Artikel 8 stellt eine – in dringlichen Fällen zu überspringende – Vorstufe zu den Konsultationen nach Artikel 96 und 97 dar, die bei Nichteinhaltung der Abkommensgrundsätze bis zur Suspendierung eines Partners führen können.

Bei der *wirtschaftlichen* Zusammenarbeit sah das Cotonou-Abkommen in Artikel 36 der Fassung von 2000 vor, dass die einseitigen Handelspräferenzen, die durch die Abkommen von Yaoundé und Lomé eingeführt worden waren, durch die Vereinbarung von Handelsregelungen ersetzt werden, die mit den Bestimmungen der Welthandelsorganisation (WTO) kompatibel sein sollten. Bis zur jetzt vollzogenen zweiten Revision sah das Abkommen in Artikel 37 für den Zeitraum vor dem Auslaufen der WTO-Ausnahme[5] Ende 2007 folgende Schritte vor: Im Jahre 2002 sollten Verhandlungen über den Abschluss von Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen (WPA) der EU mit den Staaten der AKP bzw. ihren jeweiligen regionalen Zusammenschlüssen beginnen und spätestens Ende 2007 – also mit dem Auslaufen der Ausnahmegenehmigung der WTO – beendet sein.

Die Abkommensbestimmungen zur *finanziellen* Zusammenarbeit regeln die Bedingungen der Finanzierbarkeit von Projekten und Programmen, die Verfahren für das Zusammenwirken der Partner und hierbei insbesondere die Rolle der Kommission und deren Kontrollen. Die Anhänge I, IA und IB enthalten die Finanzprotokolle zum Abkommen, deren effektive Umsetzung durch den Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF) sichergestellt wird. Für den Zeitraum von 2008 bis 2013 ist dies gemäß Anhang Ib der 10. EEF, der sich auf 21,966 Milliarden Euro beläuft. Aus demselben Anhang Ib ergibt sich, dass darüber hinaus bis zu 2 Milliarden Euro von der Europäischen Investitionsbank als Darlehen zur Verfügung gestellt werden.

5 Siehe World Trade Organization (WTO), *DOHA WTO Ministerial 2001: THE ACP-EC Partnership Agreement*, WT/MIN (01)/15, 14.11.2001, <www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_acp_ec_agre_e.htm> (eingesehen am 20.4.2012). Es handelt sich um eine Ausnahme von den Verpflichtungen der EG aus Artikel 1, Absatz 1 des General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), wonach die Einräumung einseitiger präferenzieller Zolltarife verboten ist.

Alternativen zu Cotonou

Andere Partnerschaften

Das AKP-EU-Partnerschaftsabkommen wird durch eine wachsende Zahl von anderen Partnerschaften, die die EU mit Regionen oder einzelnen Staaten der AKP eingeht, nicht nur geographisch, sondern in zunehmendem Maße auch funktional überlagert.

An erster Stelle steht hier die Strategische Partnerschaft Afrika-EU, eine Gemeinsame Strategie der Staats- und Regierungschefs Afrikas und der EU aus dem Jahr 2007, die den afrikanischen Kontinent mit Ausnahme Marokkos[6] umfasst. Bereits früher hatte die EU eine Strategische Partnerschaft mit Südafrika geschlossen, das infolgedessen in drei interregionalen Kooperationsrahmen mit der EU verbunden ist.[7]

Im Blick auf die Staaten der Karibik erarbeitet die EU derzeit eine Strategie für eine Partnerschaft mit dem Caribbean Forum (CARIFORUM).[8] Der Abschluss einer Gemeinsamen Strategie mit den Inselstaaten der pazifischen Region steht unmittelbar bevor.[9]

Handelskooperation

Seit September 2002 verhandelt die EU mit den sieben[10] AKP-Regionen über den Abschluss von Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen. Das Datenkorsett, das sich auf die Artikel 36 und 37 des Cotonou-Abkommens stützt, wurde auf äußeren Druck festgelegt: Zum 31. Dezember 2007 lief die Ausnahmegenehmigung der Welthandelsorganisation für den präferenziellen Zugang der AKP-Staaten zu den EU-Märkten ohne Gegenseitigkeit aus (siehe oben, bei Fn. 5).[11] Zu diesem Zeitpunkt war aber noch kein WPA abgeschlossen.[12] Insofern bestand die Gefahr, dass die EU die AKP-Staaten auf Druck der WTO in einen handelspolitischen Rahmen »entlassen« musste, der ihnen jedweden privilegierten Zugang zum EU-Markt untersagte. Erst seit dem 29. Dezember 2008 wird das WPA EG-CARIFORUM, das am 15. Oktober 2008 in Bridgetown (Barbados) unterzeichnet wurde, vorläufig angewendet. Sämtliche übrigen WPA-Verhandlungen haben allenfalls zum Abschluss von Interimsabkommen mit einzelnen Ländern oder Ländergruppen

6 Die Demokratische Arabische Republik Sahara ist Vollmitglied der Afrikanischen Union (AU). Am 27. Februar 1976 rief die Polisario in Bir Lehlu die Demokratische Arabische Republik Sahara (DARS) auf dem Gebiet der ehemaligen spanischen Kolonie Westsahara aus. Marokko annektierte darauf hin etwa zwei Drittel des nördlichen Westsahara-Gebiets, während Mauretanien das südliche Drittel beanspruchte. Nachdem sich Mauretanien 1979 aus der Westsahara zurückgezogen hatte, annektierte Marokko auch das südliche Drittel. Aufgrund dieses Konflikts ist Marokko nicht Mitglied der AU.

7 Council of the European Union, *The South Africa-European Union Strategic Partnership Joint Action Plan*, 9650/07 (Presse 105), Brüssel, 15.5.2007.

8 Auswärtiges Amt, *Die Beziehungen der EU zu Lateinamerika und der Karibik (LAK)* <www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Europa/Aussenpolitik/Regionalabkommen/LateinAmerika_node.html> (eingesehen am 18.1.2012).

9 *Joint Communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions »Towards a Renewed EU-Pacific Development Partnership«*, JOIN (2012) 6 final, 21.3.2012.

10 Ursprünglich waren es sechs Regionen: Karibik, Pazifik, Westafrika, Zentralafrika, Südafrika sowie Ost- und Südafrika (ESA). Mit der Abspaltung der fünf Länder der Ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft (EAC) von der letzteren Region erhöhte sich die Zahl auf sieben.

11 Dies ist so, obwohl die WTO-Genehmigung erst nach Abschluss der Cotonou-Verhandlungen erteilt wurde. Der EU und den AKP-Staaten ist die Ausnahmegenehmigung mit Verspätung erteilt worden. Vgl. dazu Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu/Francis Shasha Matambalya, »Contextualising the Debate of the Africa-EU Trade Relations beyond the Cotonou Agreement«, in: Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu/Francis A. S. T. Matambalya (Hg.), *Trade Relations between the EU and Africa: Development, Challenges and Options beyond the Cotonou Agreement*, London/New York 2010, S. 3–10 (7).

12 Um denjenigen AKP-Staaten, die ein Interim-WPA paraphiert oder unterzeichnet hatten, den Marktzugang für eine weitere Übergangszeit zu sichern, erließ der Rat der EU eine entsprechend formulierte Verordnung, Nr. 1528/2007 vom 20.12.2007, die Ende 2013 ausläuft. Siehe hierzu James Nyomakwa-Obimpeh, *Time for a New Generation of Trade Agreements between the EU and ACP Countries?*, Brüssel: Trans European Policy Studies Association (TEPSA), 15.2.2012 (TEPSA Brief).

geführt, die regelmäßig auf den Warenverkehr beschränkt sind.[13]

Dass die laufenden Verhandlungen schwierig und teils sogar festgefahren sind, wurde insbesondere auf dem 3. Afrika-EU-Gipfel am 29./30. November 2010 in Tripolis sichtbar. Die EU wurde bei dieser Gelegenheit massiv wegen ihres Drängens auf den Abschluss weiterer Abkommen angegriffen, obwohl die Kommission bewusst darauf verzichtet hatte, einen neuen Fahrplan vorzulegen, weil sie daraus kein eigenes Gipfelthema machen wollte. Die Hoffnung der Kommission, die EU aus der Schusslinie nehmen zu können, ging nicht in Erfüllung. Trotz der Angriffe dürfte die Union weiter auf den Abschluss der Abkommen dringen. So hatte es auch bereits der Rat Außenbeziehungen in seiner Sitzung am 10. September 2010 beschlossen. Der Einsatz neuer Elemente wie einer zeitlichen Befristung der Verhandlungen und des zollfreien Marktzugangs für AKP-Länder[14] sollte beschleunigend wirken.

Gegenwärtig scheint völlig offen zu sein, ob und wann es zum Abschluss weiterer WPAs kommt. Ungeachtet dessen wird hier angenommen, dass die Frage bis 2020 in einer Weise geklärt sein wird, die wenigstens den Zugang der AKP-Staaten zum EU-Markt entsprechend den Minimalvorgaben der WTO verbindlich absichert.[15] Im Rat war am 10. September 2010 unter dem Eindruck der drohenden Befristungen auch für einen verstärkten Dialog und mehr Flexibilität gegenüber den AKP-Ländern geworben worden. Zur im Ton härteren Gangart gehört der Vorschlag der Kommission vom 30. September 2011, die Marktzugangsmöglichkeiten über 2013 hinaus nur für jene Staaten aufrechtzuerhalten, die die notwendigen Schritte zur Ratifizierung ihres WPA unternähmen.[16]

Symptomatisch für den anhaltenden Willen zum Abschluss von WPAs könnten die Formulierungen im Dokument der Zweiten Überprüfung des Cotonou-Abkommens sein, die am 19. März 2010 vereinbart wurden: Darin wird im geänderten Artikel 37 nur noch von den fortlaufenden Verhandlungen gesprochen; zur Umsetzung der einmal geschlossenen Abkommen wird ein Weg eröffnet, den Mehrjahresfinanzrahmen des EEF zu nutzen.

Insgesamt wird somit zum Ende der selbstgesetzten Frist Anfang 2014 – und das sind immerhin sechs Jahre nach dem Ablaufen der Ausnahmegenehmigung der WTO – ein vollständiger Überblick darüber möglich sein, welche WPAs zustande gekommen sind und welche sich noch im Verhandlungsprozess oder Ratifikationsverfahren befinden. Zu den AKP-Staaten gehören 45 der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder (Least Developed Countries, LDCs), die durch das im allgemeinen Zollpräferenzsystem der EU integrierte Programm »everything but arms« weiterhin unbeschränkten Zugang zum EU-Markt haben und haben werden.[17] Für sie gibt es folglich kaum einen Anreiz, ein WPA abzuschließen. Dies muss bei der Gesamtbewertung berücksichtigt werden. Der Versuch der Verfasser des Cotonou-Abkommens, WPAs an die Stelle des GATT-widrigen einseitigen präferenziellen Marktzugangs zu setzen, mag sich angesichts der großen Zahl der vermutlich außen vor bleibenden LDCs als verfehlt erweisen. Sechs Jahre vor Ablauf des Cotonou-Abkommens wird es möglich sein, daraus die notwendigen Schlüsse zu ziehen.

Eine neue europäische Entwicklungspolitik?

Die Kommission hat mit ihrem Grünbuch vom 10. November 2010 »EU-Entwicklungspolitik zur Förderung eines breitenwirksamen Wachstums und

13 Einen Überblick mit Stand vom Dezember 2010 bieten Bettina Rudloff/Clara Weinhardt, *WPAs der EU mit den Afrika-, Karibik- und Pazifikstaaten: Verhandlungsstand, Konflikte, Lösungen*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Dezember 2010 (SWP-Aktuell 85/2010). Eine juristische Analyse der auftretenden Probleme findet sich bei Amin Alavi, »EPAs, Cotonou and the WTO: Legal Dimensions«, in: Ngangjoh-Hodu/Matambalya (Hg.), *Trade Relations between the EU and Africa* [wie Fn. 11], S. 185–198 (185). Zum heutigen Stand siehe unten die tabellarische Übersicht in Anlage I, S. 22ff.

14 Siehe oben, Fn. 12.

15 So auch Yenkong Ngangjoh-Hodu, »Development Agenda in the WTO Regional Processes: The EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreement in Context«, in: Ngangjoh-Hodu/Matambalya (Hg.), *Trade Relations between the EU and Africa* [wie Fn. 11], S. 19–39 (32).

16 KOM(2011) 598, 30.9.2011, und die Darstellung in: *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council and the European Economic and Social Committee »Trade, Growth and Development: Tailoring Trade and Investment Policy for Those Countries Most in Need«*, COM(2012) 22 final, 27.1.2012, S. 8.

17 Verordnung (EG) Nr. 416/2001 des Rates vom 28. Februar 2001 zur Änderung der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2820/98 über ein Mehrjahresschema allgemeiner Zollpräferenzen für den Zeitraum 1. Juli 1999 bis 31. Dezember 2001 zwecks Ausweitung der Zollbefreiung ohne mengenmäßige Beschränkungen auf Waren mit Ursprung in den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern. Die Regeln zugunsten der LDC wurden zuletzt integriert in die Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2501/2001 des Rates vom 10. Dezember 2001 über ein Schema allgemeiner Zollpräferenzen für den Zeitraum vom 1. Januar 2002 bis 31. Dezember 2004.

einer nachhaltigen Entwicklung – Für eine EU-Entwicklungspolitik mit größerer Wirkung«[18] ein öffentliches Konsultationsverfahren begonnen. Am Ende des Verfahrens soll ein umfassender Vorschlag für eine Revision der Entwicklungspolitik stehen. Vielerorts wurde erwartet, dass die Kommission die Integration des Cotonou-Abkommens in die EU-Entwicklungspolitik oder zumindest die Integration des EEF in den allgemeinen Haushalt der EU – die sogenannte Budgetisierung – vorschlagen werde, um einer europäischen Entwicklungspolitik aus einem Guss näherzukommen. Immerhin hatte sie sich in der Vergangenheit der wiederholten Forderung des Europäischen Parlaments (EP) nach Einstellung des EEF in den allgemeinen EU-Haushalt angeschlossen.[19] Wie oben (S. 5) bereits dargestellt, folgte auch die Arbeitsgruppe Außenbeziehungen des Europäischen Verfassungskonvents zur Zukunft der EU diesem Konzept.[20] Ein entsprechender Vorschlag im Rahmen der Kommissionsvorlage für den mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen hätte zur Konsequenz gehabt, dass der Aufbringungsschlüssel für den EEF in die Verhandlungen über den nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen der EU eingegangen wäre. Da der bislang auf den EEF angewandte Schlüssel für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland angeblich günstiger ist als der Berechnungsschlüssel für den allgemeinen Haushalt der EU, stand man diesem Vorhaben in Deutschland bis vor einigen Jahren argwöhnisch gegenüber.

Bei näherem Hinsehen zeigt sich allerdings, dass der Unterschied nicht allzu erheblich ausfällt: Der Beitragsschlüssel für die Zusammenarbeit mit den AKP-Staaten ist letztmalig im Dezember 2005 vom Europäischen Rat festgelegt worden. Danach beträgt der deutsche Anteil 20,5 Prozent. Im Vergleich dazu ist die Finanzierung des jährlichen Haushalts der EU etwas unübersichtlicher: Laut Finanzbericht der Kommission zum EU-Haushalt 2009 hatte der ausgeführte Haushalt 2009 ein Volumen von 112,1 Milliarden Euro (nicht identisch mit dem im Dezember 2008 abgestimmten Haushalt oder den Einnahmen). Aus Deutschland abgeführte Eigenmittelbeiträge beliefen sich auf 17,6 Milliarden bzw. 20,5 Milliarden Euro, wenn man die traditionellen Eigenmittel wie Agrarabschöpfungen, Zucker- und Isoglukoseabgabe und sonstige Zölle hinzurechnet (von denen wiederum die von Deutschland einbehaltenen Verwaltungskosten abgezogen werden müssten). Anteilig ergibt das einen deutschen »Haushaltsbeitrag« von 19,7 Prozent (17,6 Mrd. Euro) bzw. 23 Prozent (20,5 Mrd. Euro). Legt man für die Berechnung sämtliche Einnahmen (117,6 Mrd. Euro) und nicht den ausgeführten Haushalt der EU zugrunde, verringert sich der »Beitrag« Deutschlands auf 18,6 bzw. 18,8 Prozent.

Der Beitrag zum EEF liegt also je nach der Zahl, die man zum Vergleich mit dem allgemeinen Haushalt heranzieht, mal niedriger, mal höher. Er ist jedoch nie so dramatisch viel größer, dass nicht vorstellbar wäre, in einer Verhandlung über ein Gesamtpaket zu einem für Deutschland tragbaren Ergebnis kommen zu können. Der Koalitionsvertrag von CDU/CSU und FDP aus dem Jahre 2009 hat sich diese Erkenntnis zu eigen gemacht und kam der Aufforderung des Europäischen Konvents zur Zukunft Europas (siehe oben, S. 5) nach, indem er Folgendes vorsah: »Wir werden [...] im Rahmen einer neuen Finanziellen Vorausschau auf die Integration des 11. EEF in den Haushalt der EU hinarbeiten.«[21]

Die Kommission hat in ihrer Mitteilung vom 29. Juni 2011 zu einem Haushalt für Europa 2020[22] die Budgetisierung des EEF zumindest jetzt noch nicht vorgeschlagen. Im Hinblick auf das Auslaufen des Cotonou-Abkommens 2020 und eine zukünftige Integration des EEF in den allgemeinen Haushalt erwägt sie vielmehr, den EEF-Schlüssel zunächst dem Berechnungsschlüssel für den EU-Haushalt anzunähern.[23] Damit vermeidet die Kommission zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt eine Konfrontation mit denjenigen Mitgliedstaaten, die weiterhin an der Beibehaltung des für sie vorteilhafteren EEF-Schlüssels interessiert sind.[24] Auch gelingt es der Kommission, die Gesamt-

18 KOM(2010) 629 endg.

19 Sie blickt in dieser Hinsicht auf eine lange Tradition zurück: Ihre ersten Vorschläge zur Budgetisierung stammen von 1973 und 1979 – Mitteilungen der Kommission an den Rat SEK (73) 2149 endg. bzw. KOM(79) 4 endg. –, ein neuerer Vorschlag von 2003: KOM(2003) 590 endg.

20 Abschlussbericht der Arbeitsgruppe VII, CONV 459/02; siehe Bernd Martenczuk/Andreas Zimmermann, »Artikel 179 [Maßnahmen; AKP-EG-Abkommen]«, in: Jürgen Schwarze (Hg.), *EU-Kommentar*, 2. Aufl., Baden-Baden 2009, Rn. 11.

21 »Entwicklungszusammenarbeit im Koalitionsvertrag von CDU/CSU und FDP«, *ONE*, <www.one.org/c/de/politische_analysen/3129/>.

22 Europäische Kommission, *Ein Haushalt für Europa 2020*, KOM(2011) 500 endg., Teil 1, Brüssel, 29.6.2011.

23 Ebd., Ziffer 5.8.1.

24 Frankreich scheint ebenfalls zu einer Integration in den allgemeinen Haushalt der EU zu neigen, weil der Schlüssel sich dadurch aus seiner Sicht verbessert. Siehe Assemblée Nationale, sur *Aide au développement: quel équilibre entre multilatéralisme et bilatéralisme?*, Rapporteure Mme Nicole Ameline, Rapport d'information par la Commission des affaires étran-

summe der Finanziellen Vorausschau optisch bescheidener wirken zu lassen, indem sie den EEF-Betrag ausklammert, wie sie das auch in anderem Kontext zum Beispiel durch die Herausnahme der ITER-Finanzierung[25] und einer Reihe anderer Ausgabenposten tut.[26] Das Manöver ist allerdings so durchsichtig, dass es in den Verhandlungen über den nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen keine Rolle spielen wird.

Die weiteren Bausteine zur Revision der Entwicklungspolitik legte die Kommission am 13. Oktober 2011 in Form von zwei Mitteilungen vor.[27] Wer allerdings Aussagen über die Beziehungen der EU zur AKP erwartet, wird enttäuscht. Selbst den Terminus AKP sucht man vergeblich.[28] Vielmehr wird neben den WPAs und den strategischen Partnerschaften nebulös auf bestehende Rechtsrahmen verwiesen. Gerade diese Abwesenheit eines expliziten Bezugs deutet darauf hin, dass die Kommission sich für die Zukunft von Cotonou alle Türen offenhalten möchte. Angesichts dessen kann es nicht verwundern, wenn die AKP-Staaten und einige europäische Entwicklungspolitiker daran zweifeln, dass die Kommission eine Weiterführung der Partnerschaft nach dem Modell von Cotonou über das Jahr 2020 hinaus unterstützen wird.

Eine neue europäische Entwicklungspolitik könnte nach 2020 die 78 bisherigen AKP-Staaten in Partnerschaften umfassen, die zwei Ebenen aufweisen: eine generelle Ebene analog der Afrika-Strategie und eine vorwiegend handelspolitisch ausgerichtete wie in den WPAs. Es ist bezeichnend, dass die afrikanische Kritik an den Verhandlungen zu den WPAs auf dem 3. Afrika-EU-Gipfel in Tripolis aufbrach, obwohl dieser Gipfel im Rahmen der Afrika-Strategie auf einer rechtlichen Grundlage und mit einem Teilnehmerkreis stattfand, die von jenen der kritisierten Verhandlungen abwichen.

gères, no. 3074, S. 168. Nach Gerüchten soll sich auch das Vereinigte Königreich offen für die Budgetisierung gezeigt haben. Sollte dies zutreffen, würde die argwöhnische Vermutung Auftrieb erhalten, dass es den Mitgliedstaaten doch um eine Verringerung der Dotation geht. Das EP hat, um dieser Sorge entgegenzutreten, stets darauf bestanden, dass die EEF-Mittel bei einer Budgetisierung nicht angetastet werden dürfen (»ringfencing«).

25 ITER (International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor) ist ein gemeinsames Forschungsprojekt zur Entwicklung eines Fusionsreaktors, an dem neben der Europäischen Atomgemeinschaft auch Japan, Russland, die Volksrepublik China, Südkorea, Indien und die USA beteiligt sind.

26 Vgl. Europäische Kommission, *Ein Haushalt für Europa 2020* [wie Fn. 22], Ziffer 2.

27 *Für eine EU-Entwicklungspolitik mit größerer Wirkung: Agenda für den Wandel*, KOM(2011) 637 endg., und *Der künftige Ansatz für die EU-Budgethilfe an Drittstaaten*, KOM(2011) 638 endg., beide vom 13.10.2011.

28 Sie folgt damit dem Modell des Vertrags von Lissabon, der die Erwähnung der AKP-EU-Konvention in Artikel 179, Absatz 3 des EU-Vertrags in der Fassung von Nizza bei der Überführung in Artikel 209 des AEUV ersatzlos wegfallen ließ. Siehe bereits oben, S. 2. Diese Streichung war ein psychologisch bedeutendes Element, siehe z. B. bei Mirjam van Reisen, *The Old Man and the Seas: The Future of the EU-ACP Relationship*, Leiden, Juni–Juli 2011 (The Broker, Nr. 25, Special Report), S. 6 und S. 9. Siehe auch Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, *Strategy for Renewal and Transformation 2011–2014*, Brüssel, April 2011, Paragraph 24, und *Renewal and Transformation, Elements of the ACP Secretariat's Strategic Plan 2011–2014*, Brüssel, 8.11.2010, Paragraph 9.

Ein Verzicht auf Cotonou?

Gibt es einen spezifischen Mehrwert des Cotonou-Rahmens, der nicht in der einen oder anderen Form ersetzt werden kann? Um diese Frage zu beantworten, werden zunächst die vertraglichen Inhalte und die Praxis des Cotonou-Abkommens mit ihren Entsprechungen verglichen, die sich in den Strategien, Partnerschaftsabkommen und den WPAs bereits abzeichnen. Auch muss berücksichtigt werden, dass die Frist von 2012 bis 2020 noch hinreichend Zeit zur Auffüllung von Lücken und für weitere Verbesserungen bietet.

Die Wertebindung

Das Cotonou-Abkommen nimmt in der Präambel umfassend Bezug auf völker- und menschenrechtliche Dokumente. Das Spektrum reicht von den Grundsätzen der Charta der Vereinten Nationen über die Allgemeine Erklärung der Menschenrechte und spezifische internationale Konventionen bis hin zur Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention, der Afrikanischen Charta für Menschen- und Bürgerrechte und selbst der Amerikanischen Menschenrechtskonvention. Artikel 9 führt in denkbar positiven Formulierungen das Bekenntnis zu Menschenrechten und Grundfreiheiten, zu den demokratischen Grundsätzen, zum Rechtsstaat und zur guten Regierungsführung auf.

Die Strategische Partnerschaft Afrika-EU enthält zwar nicht so viele spezifische Verweise auf internationale Konventionen, steht dem Cotonou-Abkommen in der Auflistung konkreter Werte aber nicht nach. Die entsprechenden Textabschnitte der Karibik- bzw. Pazifik-Assoziationsabkommen und -Strategien leisten Ähnliches oder werden dies tun. Das WPA mit den CARIFORUM-Staaten bezieht sich direkt auf das Cotonou-Abkommen, führt aber gleichwohl die Achtung der Menschenrechte, der demokratischen Grundsätze und des Rechtsstaatsprinzips noch einmal gesondert auf.

Eine detaillierte Analyse würde in den Formulierungen der Wertebezüge Unterschiede zwischen den diversen Instrumenten herausarbeiten. Diese werden allerdings durch weitreichende Querverweise ausgeglichen. In den Abweichungen kommt zum Teil die Entwicklung der Grundwertebeschreibung über die Zeit zum Ausdruck. Deutlich erkennbar ist jedenfalls der Wille, keine Differenzen in der Wertebindung sichtbar werden zu lassen. Dass die Vertragsparteien gleichlautende Begriffe unterschiedlich interpretieren, ist damit nicht ausgeschlossen. Die Behandlung von Homosexualität beispielsweise kann bei identischen Menschenrechtsbezügen entscheidend divergieren. Wie oben aufgeführt,[29] hat der Sudan beschlossen, auch die zweite Revision des Cotonou-Abkommens nicht zu ratifizieren. Ausschlaggebend dafür ist die Tatsache, dass der Sudan den Wert der universellen Rechtsverfolgung, wie er durch den internationalen Strafgerichtshof und seine Arbeit zur Geltung kommt, grundsätzlich anders einschätzt.

Eine Verschlechterung gegenüber dem System von Cotonou ist somit insgesamt gesehen nicht zu erkennen oder zu erwarten.

Das Institutionengefüge

Die Gemeinsamen Organe des Cotonou-Abkommens und ihre Aufgaben sind in den Artikeln 15 bis 17 beschrieben:

Der *Ministerrat* (Artikel 15) umfasst einerseits die Mitglieder des Ministerrats der EU und Mitglieder der Kommission und anderseits ein Regierungsmitglied jedes AKP-Staats. Er tritt mindestens einmal pro Jahr zusammen.

Der *Botschafterausschuss* (Artikel 16) besteht einerseits aus den Ständigen Vertretern der Mitgliedstaaten der EU und einem Vertreter der Kommission und anderseits aus den Leitern der bei der EU akkreditierten Missionen jedes AKP-Staats. Der Botschafterausschuss tagt regelmäßig.

Die *Parlamentarische Versammlung AKP-EU* (PPV; Artikel 17) setzt sich zusammen aus einer gleichen Anzahl von Mitgliedern des EP (MdEPs) und von Abgeordneten aus den Parlamenten jedes AKP-Staates. Gegenwärtig hat die Versammlung 156 Mitglieder, davon sind 78 MdEPs und 78 Abgeordnete der AKP-Staaten. Die Versammlung tagt zweimal pro Jahr, abwechselnd in der

29 Siehe Fn. 3.

EU und in einem AKP-Staat. Sie veranstaltet zudem regionale Treffen in den verschiedenen AKP-Regionen, an denen je ein AKP-Abgeordneter pro Staat aus der Region und eine entsprechende Zahl von Mitgliedern des EP teilnehmen. Diese Regionaltreffen finden seit einiger Zeit zweimal jährlich statt und erfreuen sich wegen des konzentrierten Austausches, den sie ermöglichen, großer Beliebtheit.

Der PPV hat drei Ausschüsse – für politische Angelegenheiten; für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung, Finanz- und Handelsfragen; für soziale Angelegenheiten und Umweltfragen –, die viermal im Jahr tagen, zweimal in Brüssel und zweimal anlässlich der Plenarsitzungen. Schließlich organisiert die Versammlung gelegentlich gemeinsame Wahlbeobachtungen und »fact finding missions«. Ihre Arbeit in den AKP-Staaten erreicht auf diese Weise eine nicht unerhebliche Dichte, was im Hinblick auf die gute Regierungsführung in den betroffenen Staaten von einiger Bedeutung ist. Die intensive Zusammenarbeit europäischer MdEPs mit Abgeordneten aus den Parlamenten der AKP-Staaten fördert nicht nur das gegenseitige Verständnis. Sie hat auch zur Folge, dass die europäischen Abgeordneten dank dieses Verständnisses zu den besten Anwälten der Interessen der AKP-Parlamentarier werden. Durch diese Zusammenarbeit können die AKP-Parlamentarier im Gegenzug auch einen gewissen Einfluss auf die Arbeiten im EP nehmen.

Im Rahmen der Strategischen Partnerschaft Afrika-EU findet seit dem Treffen in Lissabon im Jahre 2007 alle drei Jahre ein Gipfel auf Ebene der Staats- und Regierungschefs statt, der von den Ministern vorbereitet wird. Zwischen den Gipfeln treffen sich in regelmäßigen Abständen die Präsidenten des EU- und AU-Ministerrats, des Europäischen und des Pan-Afrikanischen Parlaments (PAP) und der Europäischen und der Afrikanischen Kommission zum sogenannten Hexalog. Die jeweiligen Vertretungen der EU in Addis Abeba und in Brüssel fördern den institutionellen Kontakt. Die im Aufbau befindlichen WPA-Strukturen werden dabei bereits einbezogen. Zweimal pro Jahr finden Afrika-EU-Troika-Sitzungen statt, an denen auf der einen Seite die amtierende und die zukünftige Ratspräsidentschaft der EU, die Europäische Kommission und das EU-Ratssekretariat (jetzt wohl der EAD) und auf der anderen Seite die amtierende und die zukünftige Ratspräsidentschaft der AU, die AU-Kommission und federführende Staaten mit hochrangigen Vertretern teilnehmen. Auch Außenministertreffen beider Seiten sollen zweimal pro Jahr auf Troika-Ebene organisiert werden, im Wechsel in Afrika und der EU. Die beiden Kommissionen werden auf verschiedenen Ebenen kontinuierlich zusammenarbeiten und einmal pro Jahr ein Treffen der Kollegien abhalten.

Auf parlamentarischer Ebene wird der Dialog zwischen dem EP und dem PAP geführt. Das EP hat eigens eine interparlamentarische Delegation für die Beziehungen zum PAP geschaffen, die zwölf Abgeordnete umfasst. Die gemeinsamen Sitzungen finden in der Regel einmal pro Jahr statt, abwechselnd in der EU und in Afrika. Insbesondere versucht die Delegation des EP an den zweimal jährlich stattfindenden Plenarsitzungen des PAP teilzunehmen. Gemeinsam organisieren EP und PAP jeweils unmittelbar vor den Gipfeln der Staats- und Regierungschefs parlamentarische »Vorgipfel«, in denen man durchaus den Vorläufer einer Parlamentarischen Versammlung EU-AU sehen kann. Schließlich ist ausdrücklich eine Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschuss der EU und dem Wirtschafts-, Sozial- und Kulturrat der AU vorgesehen.

Die institutionellen Bestimmungen des WPA CARIFORUM finden sich in den Artikeln 227 bis 232. Diese etablieren einen Gemeinsamen Rat CARIFORUM-EU, der mindestens alle zwei Jahre zusammentritt. Auch hier ist die Kommission ebenso Teil der EU-Delegation wie die EU-Ratsmitglieder. Der Gemeinsame Rat wird von einem Handels- und Entwicklungsausschuss (sic!) unterstützt, der sich in der Regel aus hohen Beamten zusammensetzt. Der Parlamentarische Ausschuss CARIFORUM-EU besteht aus je 15 Abgeordneten des EP und 15 Abgeordneten aus den 15 CARIFORUM-Staaten (einer pro Staat). Das EP hat diese vergleichsweise kleine Zahl durchgesetzt, damit nach dem Zustandekommen aller geplanten WPAs die überschaubare Zahl von 78 Mitgliedern nicht überschritten wird, die gegenwärtig die Delegation zur PPV bilden. Die Treffen dieses Ausschusses finden zweimal jährlich statt, abwechselnd in einem der CARIFORUM-Staaten und in der EU. Schließlich existiert ein beratender Ausschuss, der eine breit angelegte Vertretung aller Interessengruppen gewährleisten soll.

Extrapoliert man diese heranwachsenden Strukturen und projiziert sie auf das Jahr 2020, in dem die Laufzeit des Cotonou-Abkommens endet, ergibt sich folgendes Bild:

Falls zu diesem Zeitpunkt WPAs mit allen sieben AKP-Regionen abgeschlossen wurden, die auch von der überwiegenden Mehrheit der in der jeweiligen Regionalorganisation vertretenen AKP-Staaten ratifiziert worden sind, werden vor allem die Kontakte der Exekutiven eine sehr hohe Dichte aufweisen. Zugespitzt

ließe sich fragen, ob die nationalen Regierungen nicht überfordert sein werden, wenn sie Minister für die vielen regelmäßigen Treffen abstellen sollen,[30] zumal die allermeisten EU-Staaten weder über eigenständige Entwicklungshilfe- noch über eigenständige Handelsministerien verfügen. Folglich obläge die Vertretung der mitgliedstaatlichen Interessen den Außen- oder Wirtschaftsministerien, die ihrerseits in EU-interne Ministerratsstrukturen mit überdurchschnittlich hohen Sitzungsfrequenzen eingebunden sind. Auch für die Vertreter der Kommission auf den verschiedenen Ebenen dürfte der Terminkalender sehr eng werden. Eine Lösung könnte in der verbleibenden Zeit darin gesucht werden, die Partnerschaften den Bedürfnissen der Praxis anzupassen, indem man ihre Strukturen auf der Seite der Exekutive schlanker gestaltet.

Auf der parlamentarischen Seite hingegen ergäbe sich im Vergleich zur heutigen Situation mit dem Wegfall der PPV und ihrer Ausschüsse eine Dezimierung. Dies würde einen erheblichen Verlust an parlamentarischer Aktivität und damit an Exekutivkontrolle – und auch an parlamentarischer Legitimierung der Exekutive – darstellen, zumal die nationalen Parlamente der EU-Mitgliedstaaten keine entsprechenden Anstalten zur Kontrolle ihrer Regierungen in den angesprochenen Institutionen und deren Foren erkennen lassen. Auch würde der nicht zu überschätzende Beitrag zur Verbreitung parlamentarischer Gepflogenheiten entfallen, eine wesentliche Komponente der guten Regierungsführung. Gewiss könnte das EP durch eine intensivierte Zusammenarbeit mit den regionalen Parlamenten wie dem PAP die parlamentarischen Gremien vergrößern und die Frequenz ihrer Treffen erhöhen. Dies wäre aber nur eine einseitige parlamentarische Aktivität außerhalb der abzuschließenden Abkommen, der eine völkerrechtliche Rechtsgrundlage – wie sie gegenwärtig das Cotonou-Abkommen liefert – fehlen würde. Dies wiederum würde die Legitimation des parlamentarischen Gremiums verringern und damit ihren Beitrag zur Legitimierung der Exekutive schmälern. Eine Lösung, die zumindest das heutige Niveau aufrechterhalten würde, könnte folgendermaßen aussehen:

- Die Parlamentarischen Ausschüsse der WPAs könnten die Funktion der heutigen Regionaltreffen der PPV AKP-EU übernehmen. Die Gefahr einer zu engen handelspolitischen Ausrichtung dürfte insofern nicht bestehen, als die Praxis des einzigen in Kraft gesetzten WPA (CARIFORUM-EU) ein sehr weites Verständnis von Handelspolitik erkennen lässt. Dies belegen auch die Bezeichnung und das Mandat seines Handels- und Entwicklungsausschusses.
- Die Strategischen Partnerschaften (eine besteht mit der AU, weitere werden zukünftig mit CARIFORUM und den pazifischen Staaten geschlossen) müssten über eine vollwertige parlamentarische Komponente verfügen, die die gegenwärtige rechtliche Absicherung der Delegation des EP für die Beziehungen zum PAP deutlich übertrifft: In einem eigenständigen Völkerrechtsdokument als Teil oder Grundlage jeder Partnerschaft sollte dazu eine paritätische parlamentarische Vertretung mit je einem Abgeordneten aus jedem Staat der Partnerorganisation vorgesehen werden, also zum Beispiel mit 54 (nach vollzogenem Beitritt des Südsudans 55) AU-Abgeordneten und 54 (bzw. 55) Mitgliedern des EP. Diese Versammlung sollte in halbjährlichem Rhythmus Tagungen abhalten und das Recht haben, sich eine Geschäftsordnung zu geben. Dies wiederum würde es der Versammlung erlauben, Ausschüsse einzusetzen, die für eine effiziente parlamentarische Arbeit auf Augenhöhe mit den Exekutivgremien unverzichtbar sind. Den Partnerschaften bzw. Assoziationen mit dem Pazifik und mit Zentralamerika inklusive der Karibik fehlt noch eine adäquate parlamentarische Begleitung mit eigener Rechtsgrundlage. Die bestehenden bilateralen Delegationen sind insofern ebenso unzureichend wie die Parlamentarische Versammlung Europa-Lateinamerika (EuroLat). Das EP könnte heute schon klarstellen, dass es Partnerschaftsabkommen ohne eigenständige parlamentarische Komponente in Zukunft seine Zustimmung verweigern wird. Das geltende Partnerschaftsabkommen mit der AU müsste um entsprechende Regeln erweitert werden, wenn man vermeiden will, dass mit dem Auslaufen des Cotonou-Abkommens die parlamentarische Mitwirkung beschnitten wird.[31]

30 Bereits im Rahmen der gegenwärtigen AKP-EU-Beziehungen ist dies nach Aussage von Teilnehmern ein ernstes Problem: Mangels Teilnahme einer hinreichenden Zahl kompetenter Minister ist der Gemeinsame Rat in seinen Sitzungen häufig nicht in der Lage, Entschließungen zu dringlichen Fragen auszuarbeiten und anzunehmen, geschweige denn für ihre Umsetzung zu sorgen.

31 Siehe in Anlage II (S. 26) ein Schaubild, das die möglichen Überlagerungen der bestehenden und geplanten Partnerschaften schematisch darstellt.

Die AKP-Solidarität

Selbst wenn die beschriebenen Forderungen erfüllt würden, entfiele nach einem ersatzlosen Wegfall des Cotonou-Abkommens ein Faktor, der in der Vergangenheit eine wichtige Rolle gespielt hat: das Element der kontinentsübergreifenden, horizontal wirkenden Solidarität, sei es zwischen Ministern, sei es zwischen Abgeordneten. Diese Solidaritätsbildung hat auf europäischer Seite gewöhnlich keine große Freude ausgelöst, weil es sich in aller Regel um eine Solidarität zwischen den Vertretern der AKP-Staaten handelte, die sich gegen ein Ansinnen der europäischen Seite richtete. Die Lehre, dass eine geschlossene Front auch die EU-Vertreter beeindruckt, die in den Augen manches AKP-Staates übermächtig zu sein schienen, hat beispielsweise in der Geschäftsordnung der PPV ihren Niederschlag in der Möglichkeit gefunden, Abstimmungen nach getrennten Häusern zu beantragen. Damit existiert eine unüberwindliche Schranke, die sich nutzen lässt, um unerwünschte Ergebnisse zu vermeiden. Diese Form der Solidaritätsbildung ist jedoch nicht notwendigerweise an eine Mehrheit vertretener Kontinente gebunden. Auch in drei voneinander unabhängigen parlamentarischen Organen lassen sich diese Solidaritätsnetzwerke organisieren, wenn man dies denn will.

Die kontinentsübergreifende Solidarität mit der damaligen Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft war der vielleicht ausschlaggebende Faktor für das Zustandekommen der AKP-Gruppe, die mit dem Gründungsabkommen von Georgetown (Guyana)[32] ins Leben gerufen wurde. Im Verhältnis zur heutigen EU mag die Empfindungslage der AKP-Staaten ähnlich sein. Es ist also durchaus möglich, dass die AKP-Staaten bei ihrer Vorbereitung auf 2020 zu dem Ergebnis kommen, dass es weiterhin in ihrem Interesse liegt, über eine kontinentsübergreifende Struktur zu verfügen. Die EU wird sich hierauf einzustellen haben.

32 *The Georgetown Agreement on the Organization of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States*, 1975, <www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/regeco_treaties/details.jsp?group_id=24&treaty_id=220> (eingesehen am 20.1.2012).

Initiativen zur Weiterentwicklung der AKP und Überlegungen zur Vertiefung des Dialogs mit der EU

Die AKP-Seite hat auf Vorschlag ihres Generalsekretärs Mohamed Ibn Chambas einen Ausschuss auf Botschafterebene eingesetzt, der die Interessen der AKP-Staaten eruieren und Vorschläge für eine Weiterentwicklung der Gruppe machen soll.[33] Aktueller Vorsitzender des siebenköpfigen Gremiums ist Botschafter Patrick I. Gomes aus Guyana.[34] Mit Mirjam van Reisen wurde eine international angesehene Expertin beauftragt, ein Gutachten auszuarbeiten,[35] das vom United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) finanziert und am 9. April 2012 vorgelegt wurde.[36] Eine Veröffentlichung steht noch aus. Der Ministerrat der AKP-Gruppe wird in Vanuatu auf seiner Sitzung vom 10. bis 15. Juni dieses Jahres das Ergebnis des Gutachtens beraten und auch den Stand der Verhandlungen zu den WPAs und dem EEF überprüfen. Schließlich wird das neue Konzept einer AKP-Handels- und -Investitionsbank auf dem Tisch liegen. Es soll sich hierbei um ein gemeinsam mit der EU zu errichtendes Unternehmen handeln. Die AKP-Gruppe würde 51 Prozent der Anteile halten, eine Beteiligung von Privaten soll möglich sein. Ein Gipfeltreffen der AKP-Staats- und -Regierungschefs in Äquatorialguinea im Dezember 2012 soll wiederum die Ergebnisse dieser Zusammenkünfte beraten und Beschlüsse zur Organisation der AKP-Seite fassen. Die Gipfelteilnehmer könnten darüber hinausgehend aber auch Vorschläge für die Neuordnung der Beziehungen zur EU oder, noch weitergehend, zur Neuordnung des weltweiten Rahmens machen. Was 2012 noch nicht abgearbeitet wird, soll spätestens beim nächsten AKP-Gipfeltreffen 2014 erledigt sein, um es den Partnern in der Welt, alten und neuen, vorlegen zu können.

Der Botschafterausschuss scheint gegenwärtig folgende vier Optionen zu untersuchen:[37]

1. Zusammenarbeit mit neuen strategischen Partnern jenseits der EU,
2. Öffnung der AKP-Gruppe für alle am wenigsten entwickelten Länder sowie für kleine und verletzliche regionale Wirtschaftsräume,
3. Öffnung der AKP-Gruppe für die nordafrikanischen Staaten, um künftig den gesamten afrikanischen Kontinent zu repräsentieren,
4. Regionale A-K-P-Pfeiler unter einem AKP-Schirm, die dazu dienen könnten, sich auf regionale Bedürfnisse zu konzentrieren, aber auch um allgemeine Anliegen zu bearbeiten, die alle Regionen betreffen.

Viele Beobachter stellen das Spektrum möglicher Szenarien anders dar:[38]

1. Weitermachen wie bisher,
2. die AKP-Konfiguration aufgeben,
3. die AKP-Gruppe verstärken, wobei an die Staaten Nordafrikas, Nepal und eventuell auch Staaten wie Brasilien zu denken wäre,
4. Gründung einer AKP-Zollunion.

33 European Centre for Development Policy Management, *A Blog on the Challenges of the EU's International Cooperation*, <www.ecdpm-talkingpoints.org/the-acp-and-europe> (eingesehen am 20.1.2012).

34 Das Gremium zu den »Future Perspectives for the ACP Group« war im Januar 2010 eingesetzt worden, als erster Vorsitzender amtierte Botschafter Sutiawan Gunessee aus Mauritius; siehe Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, *Strategy for Renewal and Transformation 2011–2014* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraph 216.

35 Mirjam van Reisen ist Professorin an der Universität Tilburg und gleichzeitig Direktorin von Europe External Policy Advisors (EEPA), einem Brüsseler Think Tank. Siehe auch van Reisen, *The Old Man and the Seas* [wie Fn. 28], und weitere einschlägige Veröffentlichungen von ihr wie *EU »Global Player«. The North-South Policy of the European Union*, Utrecht 1999, und ihre im Laufe vieler Jahre publizierten Darstellungen in: Judith Randel/Tony German (Hg.), *The Reality of Aid. An Independent Review of International Aid*, London: Earthscan, for International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), EUROSTEP, verschiedene Jahrgänge (1996–2002).

36 Diese und die nachfolgenden Informationen stammen aus einem Interview mit Obadiah Mailafia, dem Kabinettschef des AKP-Generalsekretärs, am 9. März 2012.

37 Siehe Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, *Renewal and Transformation* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraph 52, sowie *Strategy for Renewal and Transformation 2011–2014* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraphen 213–219. Siehe auch *Global Changes, Emerging Players and Evolving ACP-EU Relations: Towards a Common Agenda for Action?*, ECDPM 25th Anniversary Seminar, September 2011, S. 32ff, <www.ecdpm.org/Web_ECDPM/Web/Content/Download.nsf/0/DE1C420CB6DEC0B2C12579260037AA45/$FILE/PMR19-uk.pdf> (eingesehen am 26.5.2012).

38 Wiedergabe nach dem in Fn. 36 genannten Interview mit Obadiah Mailafia.

Die zuletzt genannte dritte Option, eine Verstärkung der AKP-Gruppe, ist die bei den AKP-Botschaftern überwiegend diskutierte.[39] Diese und andere als realistisch eingeschätzte Optionen beruhen sämtlich auf der Annahme, dass die AKP-Gruppe fortbesteht, in mehr oder weniger veränderter Form. Dabei lassen sich die Optionen durchaus miteinander kombinieren. Um Erfolg zu haben, werden in jedem Falle folgende Änderungen notwendig sein: Das AKP-Sekretariat in Brüssel muss eigenständige Befugnisse erhalten, die ihm bislang weitgehend fehlen; ein zur Ausübung dieser Befugnisse geeigneter Generalsekretär ist mit dem notwendigen Mandat und der erforderlichen Unabhängigkeit auszustatten, und die AKP-Zentrale muss von der EU-(Mit-)Finanzierung unabhängig gemacht werden. Damit würde ein international handlungsfähiger Ansprechpartner geschaffen, mit dem die EU oder andere Partner in effizienter Weise zusammenarbeiten könnten. Um diese Änderungen zu vollziehen, müsste in jedem Fall das Abkommen von Georgetown revidiert werden. Es gibt auch die sehr weitreichende Vorstellung, aus der AKP-Gruppe eine selbständige, aus ihrer Fixierung auf die EU gelöste internationale Gemeinschaft zu machen. Diese könnte den Bereich ihrer Zuständigkeiten erweitern und global mit wechselnden Partnern verhandeln, unter denen die EU nur einer wäre.

Die erste Phase der WPA-Verhandlungen, die alle AKP-Staaten gemeinsam betrafen und die vom damaligen einflussreichen Generalsekretär Goulongana maßgeblich geprägt wurde, könnte als beispielgebend für eine mögliche Arbeitsorganisation der Zentrale angesehen werden. Durch eine Aufwertung der Zentrale wäre eine Politisierung des gesamten AKP-Verbundes erreicht, die sein Gewicht in der Welt neu definiert.

Sollten die AKP-Signale in diese Richtung weisen, wird es für die EU kaum möglich sein, das Instrumentarium zu zerschlagen, das die Partner auf der anderen Seite beibehalten wollen. Auf europäischer Seite sollte die Zeit genutzt werden, Überlegungen anzustellen, ob aus diesem weltweit einzigartigen Nord-Süd-Zusammenwirken mehr zu machen ist. Eine Kooperation von heute bereits 106 Staaten mit globaler Ausdehnung könnte einen Zusammenhang darstellen, der sich weit über die bislang im Zentrum stehenden Fragen der Entwicklungspolitik hinaus nutzen ließe.[40] Das Misstrauen, mit dem beispielsweise die USA die Aktivitäten dieser Organisation beobachten, der sie nicht angehören und auf die sie keinen direkten Einfluss haben, spricht Bände. Hier könnte ein nicht unerhebliches und bislang wenig genutztes Potenzial liegen. Der EAD könnte das geeignete Forum sein, entsprechende Überlegungen anzustoßen und in die Tat umzusetzen, auch wenn er dafür seine gerade erst geschaffenen Strukturen weiter anpassen müsste.

Zwei Ereignisse sollten der EU zu denken geben:

- Nach dem Inkrafttreten des Lissabon-Vertrags unternahm die Europäische Union einen Versuch, ihren Status zu verbessern und vor allem ihre Rechte zur Vertretung der EU in der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen zu erweitern. An dem Widerstand vor allem der Caricom-Gruppe wäre der Vorstoß im Jahr 2010 beinahe gescheitert. Das Vorhaben wurde dann verschoben und erst ein Jahr später, nach besserer Vorbereitung, von Erfolg gekrönt.[41]
- Nach dem Scheitern des Klimagipfels in Kopenhagen im Dezember 2009, bei dem die EU vergeblich die Zusammenarbeit mit den USA, China und Indien in den Vordergrund gestellt hatte, gelang im Dezember 2011 bei der 17. Conference of the Parties in Durban fast so etwas wie ein Durchbruch, der weitgehend der erfolgreichen Vorbereitung mit den Entwicklungsländern zu verdanken war. Es ist allerdings bezeichnend, dass die »Allianz« von Durban nicht aus direkten Verhandlungen der EU mit der AKP-Seite hervorging, sondern erst in zahlreichen, mühsamen Einzelabsprachen geschmiedet werden musste.[42] Dies erklärt sich sowohl aus dem Fehlen eines Verhandlungspartners, der befugt

39 Dies tut ansatzweise auch der Blog des European Centre for Development Policy Management, *A Blog on the Challenges of the EU's International Cooperation* [wie Fn. 33].

40 Dies klingt auch in den beiden zitierten Dokumenten des AKP-Sekretariats an. Darin wird zusätzlich auf die moralische Autorität der AKP-Gruppe hingewiesen, die sich aus der Tatsache ergibt, dass mit 45 LDCs die Mehrheit der ärmsten Länder der Welt versammelt ist: Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, *Renewal and Transformation* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraphen 19, 20, sowie *Strategy for Renewal and Transformation 2011–2014* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraph 224.

41 United Nations General Assembly, *Resolution 65/276 on Strengthening of the United Nations System: Participation of the European Union in the Work of the UN*, New York, 3.5.2011.

42 Siehe zum Ablauf der Konferenz *Agence Europe* vom 1. und 13. Dezember 2011, S. 14 bzw. S. 15. Eine analytische Darstellung liefert Susanne Dröge, *Climate Talks in Durban. Successful Diplomacy but No Progress on Climate Protection*, Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Februar 2012 (SWP Comments 6/2012), S. 3. Die Autorin macht unter anderem deutlich, dass die »Durban alliance« eine Allianz zwischen vielen betroffenen Entwicklungsländern und der EU ist und nicht auf einer institutionellen Verbindung zwischen EU und AKP beruht.

gewesen wäre, für die AKP-Seite zu sprechen, wie aus der Position des Gastgebers Südafrika, der eher geneigt war, die Position eines Schwellenlandes einzunehmen, vergleichbar derjenigen von Indien.

Weitere Themen für eine vertiefte Zusammenarbeit auf Weltniveau sind vorhanden: zum Beispiel die Verbesserung der Effektivität geleisteter Hilfe, die Lebensmittelsicherheit, der Kampf gegen die Verbreitung von Landminen und die Bemühungen um deren Entsorgung, der Klimaschutz, die nachhaltige Rohstoffgewinnung und -verarbeitung, der Tourismussektor, die Reform der internationalen Regierungsführung und der globalen Finanzarchitektur.[43] Im Jahr 2015 wird eine Bilanz der Bemühungen um ein Erreichen der Millenniumsziele der Vereinten Nationen gezogen. In einer multilateral organisierten Welt wird es auch und gerade nach 2015 nicht an Themen mangeln, bei denen sorgfältige Vorbereitung und Zusammenarbeit einer so großen Zahl von Staaten in dem einzigartigen Nord-Süd-Dialog, wie er zwischen EU und AKP geführt wird, von größtem Interesse ist.

Eine erste konkrete Maßnahme hat die EU bereits vollzogen. Im Entwicklungsausschuss des EP löste die Frage an den Vertreter des EAD, welche Stelle in seinem Dienst für Fragen der AKP zuständig sei, noch vor geraumer Zeit betretenes Schweigen aus.[44] Mittlerweile teilt sich ein Mitarbeiter des EAD mit der zuständigen Bediensteten der Kommission den Vorsitz einer im September 2011 eingesetzten informellen Arbeitsgruppe zu dem hier behandelten Themenbereich. Weitere Mitglieder werden von der Kommission und dem Ratssekretariat abgestellt.[45]

43 Siehe Secretariat of the African, Caribbean and Pacific Group of States, *Renewal and Transformation* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraph 25, sowie *Strategy for Renewal and Transformation 2011–2014* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraph 139.

44 Der ursprüngliche Zuschnitt des EAD wurde vom AKP-Sekretariat in dem Dokument: *Strategy for Renewal and Transformation 2011–2014* [wie Fn. 28], Paragraphen 25–27, kritisch dargestellt, weil er zur Verunsicherung beitrug. Die Umorganisation kann als Reaktion auf die zitierte Kritik wie auch auf das Unverständnis des Entwicklungsausschusses des EP gesehen werden. Das EAD-Referat hat für die Hohe Vertreterin in ihrer Funktion als Vorsitzende des Rats für Außenpolitische Angelegenheiten, der auch die frühere Ratsformation Entwicklungspolitik umfasst, erhebliche Bedeutung.

45 Interview mit Elisabeth Pape, Bedienstete der Kommission in der Generaldirektion Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit (Development and Cooperation, DEVCO), am 28.11.2011. Sie ist die von der Kommission eingesetzte Co-Vorsitzende der genannten Arbeitsgruppe. Das Ratssekretariat hat mit der Schaffung des EAD die Aufgaben auf diesem Feld eigentlich an den EAD abgegeben. Dennoch bestanden die Mitgliedstaaten offensichtlich auf einer Beteiligung des Ratssekretariats.

Fazit und Empfehlungen

Man könnte das Auslaufen des Cotonou-Abkommens 2020 auf sich beruhen lassen, wenn in den verbleibenden Jahren eine qualitativ ebenbürtige Struktur an seine Stelle gesetzt würde. Auf diese Weise könnte die historisch gewachsene und weitgehend zufällige Organisation der Beziehungen zwischen der EU und einigen der ehemaligen Kolonien von EU-Mitgliedstaaten auf eine neue Grundlage gestellt werden, die im Hinblick auf die Ziele und Kompetenzen der EU logischer und geographisch besser geordnet wäre.

Um eine gleichwertige Struktur zu erreichen, müssten folgende Schritte eingeleitet werden:

- Im Rahmen der Verhandlungen über den nächsten mehrjährigen Finanzrahmen sollte der Europäische Entwicklungsfonds in den Haushalt der EU eingestellt werden (ohne dies als Vorwand für Mittelkürzungen zu missbrauchen).
- Die Beziehungen zu Afrika, der Karibik und den Pazifischen Inseln werden durch zweistufige Abkommen geregelt. Als genereller Rahmen dienen abzuschließende bzw. auszubauende strategische Partnerschaften, als spezifische Ergänzung die im Verhandlungsstadium befindlichen WPAs (die den Regeln der Welthandelsorganisation entsprechen sollten).
- Die strategischen Partnerschaften und die Handels- und Assoziationsabkommen müssen mit einer adäquaten parlamentarischen Komponente ausgestattet werden, die dem gegenwärtig erreichten Niveau der Arbeiten der Paritätischen Parlamentarischen Versammlung AKP-EU mindestens gleichkommt.

Die aktuelle Entwicklung in den Staaten südlich des Mittelmeers verweist beispielhaft auf die Notwendigkeit, historisch überkommene Strukturen permanent auf den Prüfstand zu stellen. Die nordafrikanischen und arabischen Revolutionen und Aufstände erfordern eine rasche, nachhaltig wirkende politische Reaktion Europas. Die Zukunft des Cotonou-Abkommens könnte auch von der Neuorganisation der Beziehungen der EU zu diesem Teil der Welt beeinflusst werden.

Es sprechen aber auch andere Gründe aus weniger dramatischem Anlass für eine Revision der Beziehungen zu den AKP-Staaten. Eine solche Revision muss in jedem Fall die Sichtweise der AKP-Seite berücksichtigen und sollte nach europäischem Verständnis bislang ungenutzte Potenziale einbeziehen. Dabei müssen die klassischen Ziele der Armutsbekämpfung und der Integration in die Weltwirtschaft natürlich weiterverfolgt werden. Die EU könnte durch eine vertiefte Zusammenarbeit mit einer umgestalteten AKP-Gruppe auf der Weltbühne an Relevanz gewinnen. Eine neu fundierte globale Zusammenarbeit der EU mit einer reformierten AKP-Gruppe, die in der Lage wäre, auf internationaler Ebene mit handlungsfähigen und autorisierten Vertretern zu agieren, würde zahlreiche neue Felder weltweiter Zusammenarbeit erschließen.

Eine erfolgreiche Reform der AKP-Gruppe liegt mithin im Interesse der EU. Eine Unterstützung der Reformbemühungen darf keinen Rückfall in paternalistische oder gar koloniale Strukturen bedeuten. Mit der Vergangenheit muss insoweit abgeschlossen und manch belastende Erfahrung durch das Angebot einer echten Partnerschaft überwunden werden. Vorbereitung und Wahl des Zeitpunkts für ein solches Angebot sind delikate Angelegenheiten. Zusätzlich zu den fortbestehenden Aufgaben und Zuständigkeiten der Kommission für Entwicklungs-, Handels- und weitere Politiken würde auch der Europäische Auswärtige Dienst seinen Platz erhalten, um die globale und allgemeinpolitische Ebene der zu leistenden Arbeit zur Geltung zu bringen. Sollten die gegenwärtigen Anstrengungen auf Seiten der AKP nicht ohnehin in naher Zukunft eine Intensivierung der EU-Aktivitäten bewirken, die über die begleitende Vorarbeit der informellen Arbeitsgruppe hinausgeht, könnte ein politischer Vorstoß das Engagement der EU dynamisieren. Den Anstoß dazu könnte das Europäische Parlament geben.

Anhang

Abkürzungen

AEUV	Vertrag über die Arbeitsweise der Europäischen Union
AKP	Afrikanische, karibische und pazifische Staaten
AU	Afrikanische Union
Caricom	Caribbean Community
CARIFORUM	Caribbean Forum
DARS	Demokratische Arabische Republik Sahara
EAC	East African Community
EAD	Europäischer Auswärtiger Dienst
ECDPM	European Centre for Development Policy Management
EEF	Europäischer Entwicklungsfonds
EEPA	Europe External Policy Advisors
EG	Europäische Gemeinschaften
EP	Europäisches Parlament
ESA	Eastern and Southern Africa
EU	Europäische Union
EuroLat	Parlamentarische Versammlung Europa-Lateinamerika
EWG	Europäische Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICVA	International Council of Voluntary Agencies
ITER	International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MdEP	Mitglied des Europäischen Parlaments
PAP	Pan-Afrikanisches Parlament
Polisario	Frente Popular para la Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro
PPV	Paritätische Parlamentarische Versammlung AKP-EU
SADC	Southern African Development Community
TEPSA	Trans European Policy Studies Association
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
WPA	Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen
WTO	World Trade Organization

Anlage I – Stand der Wirtschaftspartnerschafts-(Interims-)Abkommen

Titel und Partnerstaaten	Verhandlungsstand	Kommentare und Umsetzungsmaßnahmen
Interim-WPA EG/SADC-Staaten Botsuana, Lesotho, Mosambik, Namibia, Swasiland	▸ »Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zum Abschluss des Interim-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und den SADC-WPA-Staaten andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 124–128 ▸ »Interimsabkommen zum Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und den SADC-WPA-Staaten andererseits«, ABl. L 319 vom 4.12.2009, S. 3–658	*Nichtlegislative Entschließung mit Mindestanforderungen des EP im Hinblick auf den Abschluss eines endgültigen WPA:* »23. [...] ein umfassendes WPA [muss] auch Bestimmungen für allseits akzeptierte Definitionen von verantwortungsvoller Staatsführung, Transparenz der öffentlichen Ämter und Menschenrechten umfassen [...], die den Artikeln 11b, 96 und 97 des Cotonou-Abkommens entsprechen und insbesondere Bestimmungen zu den besonders gefährdeten Gruppen wie lokale landwirtschaftliche Kleinerzeuger und Frauen enthalten müssen.«
WPA EG/CARIFORUM Antigua und Barbuda, Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Dominikanische Republik, Grenada, Guyana, Haiti, Jamaika, St. Christoph und Nevis, St. Lucia, St. Vincent und die Grenadinen, Suriname, Trinidad und Tobago	▸ »Legislative Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zu dem Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Rates über den Abschluss des Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen den CARIFORUM-Staaten einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 256 ▸ »Beschluss des Rates vom 15. Juli 2008 über die Unterzeichnung und die vorläufige Anwendung des Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen den CARIFORUM-Staaten einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits (2008/805/EG)«, ABl. L 289 vom 30.10.2008, S. 1–1012	*Zustimmungsbeschluss des EP* *Umsetzung* ▸ »Beschluss Nr. 1/2010 des Gemeinsamen Rates CARIFORUM-EU [...] vom 17. Mai 2010 zur Annahme der Geschäftsordnungen des Gemeinsamen Rates CARIFORUM-EU, des Handels- und Entwicklungsausschusses CARIFORUM-EU und der Sonderausschüsse«, ABl. L 247 vom 21.9.2010, S. 66–75 ▸ »Beschluss Nr. 2/2010 des Gemeinsamen Rates CARIFORUM-EU [...] vom 17. Mai 2010 zur Annahme der Geschäftsordnung für die Streitbeilegung und des Verhaltenskodex für Schiedsrichter und Vermittler«, ABl. L 247 vom 21.9.2010, S. 76–84 ▸ »Aufruf an akademische Einrichtungen zur Interessenbekundung – Beteiligung am Beratenden Ausschuss CARIFORUM-EG [...]«, ABl. C 312 vom 25.10.2011, S. 10 ▸ »Aufruf an Nichtregierungsorganisationen zur Interessenbekundung – Beteiligung am Beratenden Ausschuss CARIFORUM-EG [...]«, ABl. C 312 vom 25.10.2011, S. 11 *Initiativstellungnahme des Europäischen Wirtschafts- und Sozialausschusses:* »Die Auswirkungen der Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen auf die Regionen in äußerster Randlage (Karibik)«, ABl. C 347 vom 18.12.2010

Titel und Partnerstaaten	Verhandlungsstand	Kommentare und Umsetzungsmaßnahmen
Interim-WPA EG/Côte d'Ivoire	▸ »Legislative Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zu dem Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Rates über den Abschluss des Interim-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen Côte d'Ivoire einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 257 ▸ »2009/156/EG: Beschluss des Rates vom 21. November 2008 über die Unterzeichnung und vorläufige Anwendung des Interim-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen Côte d'Ivoire einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, ABl. L 59 vom 3.3.2009, S. 1–2, sowie ▸ »Interims-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen Côte d'Ivoire einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, ABl. L 59 vom 3.3.2009, S. 3–273	
Interim-WPA EG/Zentralafrika Kamerun	▸ »Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zum Interim-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und Zentralafrika andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 141–146 ▸ »Beschluss des Rates vom 20. November 2008 über die Unterzeichnung und vorläufige Anwendung des Übergangsabkommens für ein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Vertragspartei Zentralafrika andererseits (2009/152/EG)«, ABl. L 57 vom 28.2.2009, S. 1, sowie ▸ »Übergangsabkommen für ein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und der Vertragspartei Zentralafrika andererseits«, ABl. L 57 vom 28.2.2009, S. 2–360	*Nichtlegislative Entschließung mit Mindestanforderungen des EP im Hinblick auf den Abschluss eines endgültigen WPA:* »40. [...] die WPA [sollten] erweiterte Kapitel über die Entwicklung enthalten [...], die auf die Verwirklichung der Millennium-Entwicklungsziele sowie auf die Förderung und Stärkung grundlegender sozialer Rechte und der Menschenrechte ausgerichtet sind«.

Anlage I – Stand der Wirtschaftspartnerschafts-(Interims-)Abkommen (Fortsetzung)

Titel und Partnerstaaten	Verhandlungsstand	Kommentare und Umsetzungsmaßnahmen
Interimsabkommen zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für ein WPA EG/Partnerstaaten der Ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft Burundi, Kenia, Ruanda, Tansania, Uganda	▸ »Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zum Abkommen zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für ein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und den Partnerstaaten der Ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 135–140 ▸ »Beschluss des Rates über die Unterzeichnung und die vorläufige Anwendung des Abkommens zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für ein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und den Partnerstaaten der Ostafrikanischen Gemeinschaft andererseits«, Rat der EU, Dok. Nr. 17462/08 vom 3.4.2009	*Nichtlegislative Entschließung mit Mindestanforderungen des EP im Hinblick auf den Abschluss eines endgültigen WPA:* »24. [...] bei der Aushandlung eines umfassenden WPA [ist auf] die transparente Bewirtschaftung der natürlichen Ressourcen einzugehen und die bewährten Verfahren aufzuzeigen, die erforderlich sind, damit die AKP-Staaten den größtmöglichen Nutzen aus diesen Ressourcen ziehen können« und »25. [...] jedes umfassende WPA [muss] auch Bestimmungen zur verantwortungsvollen Regierungsführung, zur Transparenz bei öffentlichen Ämtern und zu Menschenrechten enthalten«.
Interimsabkommen zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für ein WPA EG/Staaten des östlichen und südlichen Afrikas Komoren, Madagaskar, Mauritius, Sambia, Seychellen, Simbabwe	▸ »Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zu dem Interimsabkommen zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für ein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen den Staaten des östlichen und südlichen Afrikas einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 129–134 ▸ »Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Rates über den Abschluss des Interimsabkommens zur Festlegung eines Rahmens für ein Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommen zwischen Staaten des östlichen und des südlichen Afrika einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, KOM(2008) 861 endg., 16.12.2008 – AVC 2008/0251	*Nichtlegislative Entschließung mit Mindestanforderungen des EP im Hinblick auf den Abschluss eines endgültigen WPA:* »17. [...] bei der Aushandlung von umfassenden WPA [ist auf] die transparente Bewirtschaftung der natürlichen Ressourcen einzugehen und bewährte Verfahren aufzuzeigen, die erforderlich sind, damit die AKP-Staaten den größtmöglichen Nutzen aus diesen Ressourcen ziehen sowie gegen Geldwäsche vorgehen können« und »31. [in das umfassende WPA ist] ein Kapitel über die Entwicklungszusammenarbeit [...] aufzunehmen, durch das die Zusammenarbeit in den Bereichen Warenhandel, angebotsorientierte Wettbewerbsfähigkeit, geschäftsfreundliche Infrastrukturen, Handel mit Dienstleistungen, handelsbezogene Angelegenheiten, Aufbau institutioneller Kapazitäten und finanzpolitische Anpassungen abgedeckt wird«.

Titel und Partnerstaaten	Verhandlungsstand	Kommentare und Umsetzungsmaßnahmen
Interim-WPA EG/Ghana	▸ »Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zum Abschluss des Interim-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen Ghana einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten andererseits«, ABl. C 117E vom 6.5.2010, S. 112–117 ▸ »Vorschlag für einen Beschluss des Rates über den Abschluss des Interim-Wirtschaftspartnerschaftsabkommens zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten einerseits und Ghana andererseits«, KOM (2008) 441 endg., 10.7.2008 – AVC 2008/0137	*Nichtlegislative Entschließung mit Mindestanforderungen des EP im Hinblick auf den Abschluss eines endgültigen WPA:* »31. [...] ein umfassendes WPA [muss] auch Bestimmungen über die verantwortungsvolle Staatsführung, die Transparenz politischer Organe und die Menschenrechte enthalten«.
Interims-Partnerschaftsabkommen zwischen der EG und den Pazifikstaaten Papua-Neuguinea und Republik Fidschi	▸ »Entschließung des Europäischen Parlaments vom 25. März 2009 zum Abschluss des Interim-Partnerschaftsabkommens zwischen den Pazifikstaaten einerseits und der Europäischen Gemeinschaft andererseits« ▸ »Beschluss des Rates über die Unterzeichnung und die vorläufige Anwendung des Interims-Partnerschaftsabkommens zwischen der Europäischen Gemeinschaft einerseits und den Pazifik-Staaten andererseits«, Rat der EU, Dok. Nr. 5558/09 vom 8.5.2009	*Nichtlegislative Entschließung mit Mindestanforderungen des EP im Hinblick auf den Abschluss eines endgültigen WPA:* »15. [...] bei der Aushandlung umfassender WPA [ist] der transparenten Bewirtschaftung der natürlichen Ressourcen umfassend Rechnung zu tragen und die bewährten Verfahren aufzuzeigen, die notwendig sind, damit die betroffenen Länder den größtmöglichen Nutzen aus diesen Ressourcen ziehen können« und »43. [...] das umfassende WPA [sollte] eine Revisionsklausel enthalten und eine allgemeine Folgenabschätzung vorsehen [...], die innerhalb von drei bis fünf Jahren nach Unterzeichnung des Abkommens vorgenommen werden sollte, um die sozioökonomischen Auswirkungen des Abkommens einschließlich der mit seiner Umsetzung verbundenen Kosten und Folgen festzustellen; [...] das Europäische Parlament und die Parlamente der Pazifikstaaten [werden] an einer eventuellen Überarbeitung des Abkommens beteiligt«.

Anlage II – Schaubild
EU–AKP: Überlagerungen der bestehenden und geplanten Partnerschaften



Arbeitspapiere
zu Problemen
der Internationalen Politik
und der Entwicklungsländerforschung

Mir A. Ferdowsi (Hrsg.)

Vom Enthusiasmus zur Ernüchterung?
Die Entwicklungspolitik der Europäischen Union

Nr. 27/1999

FORSCHUNGSSTELLE DRITTE WELT

am Geschwister-Scholl-Institut
für Politische Wissenschaft der
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München

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Mir A. Ferdowsi

Die europäische Entwicklungspolitik- Eine retrospektive Betrachtung

1. Einleitung

Seit der Unterzeichnung des ersten Vertrages zwischen der EG und 46 Staaten des afrikanischen, karibischen und pazifischen Raumes (AKP-Staaten) im Februar 1975 in Lomé, der Hauptstadt von Togo, wurde dieser Vertrag nicht nur von EG-Staaten als „die bisher umfassendste und konkreteste Antwort auf Forderungen der Entwicklungsländer im Nord-Süd-Dialog“ bezeichnet.[1] Auch seitens der Repräsentanten der AKP-Staaten wurde der Vertrag als „eine wichtige Etappe auf unserem Weg in die Richtung auf die Schaffung einer weltweiten wirtschaftlichen Neuordnung“ gepriesen.[2] Diese politisch wie publizistisch hochgespielten Erwartungen waren allerdings auch begleitet von sehr kritischen Stimmen: Sie reichten von der Bewertung des Vertrages als „Alter Wein in neuen Schläuchen“ oder als „ein Schluck Wasser, der die neokoloniale Pille besser runter schlucken läßt“ bis hin zu dem Vorwurf, bei dem Vertrag handele es sich ausschließlich um einen „Übergang von kolonialem Bilateralismus zum neokolonialen Multilateralismus“.

Im folgenden sollen zunächst die Vorläufer der Lomé-Verträge schlaglichtartig skizziert werden. In einem zweiten Abschnitt werden jene internationalen politischen Rahmenbedingungen erläutert, die nicht unwesentlich zum Abschluß des ersten Lomé-Vertrages beigetragen haben. In einem dritten und abschließenden Teil sollen die Schwerpunkte der bisherigen vier Abkommen kurz dargestellt werden.

2. Von Jaunde I zur Arusha II - Die Politik der Assoziierung

Obgleich der Beginn einer gemeinschaftlichen Entwicklungspolitik gemeinhin erst später angesetzt wird, wurde die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EWG und den „überseeischen Ländern“ schon 1957 in der Präambel des EWG-Vertrages verankert und in sechs Artikeln (131-136) grundsätzlich bestimmt.

Anlaß war die Tatsache, daß zu Beginn der Vertragsverhandlungen über die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft die westeuropäisch-afrikanischen Beziehungen von kolonialer Herrschaft und mehr oder weniger offen ausgetragenen Kämpfen der

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[1] So der damalige Bundesminister für wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit, Rainer Offergeld, zitiert nach Entwicklungspolitik. Materialien Nr. 66, Bonn 1980, S. 5.

[2] So der senegalesische Ministerpräsident Abdou Diouf, zitiert nach der Rede des senegalesischen Finanz- und Wirtschaftsminister Babaca Ba, amtierender Präsident des Ministerrates der AKP-Länder, am 28. Februar 1975 anläßlich der Unterzeichnung des Vertrages in Lomé, in: Entwicklungspolitik. Materialien Nr. 48, Bonn 1975, S. 72.

afrikanischen Kolonien um ihre politische Unabhängigkeit gekennzeichnet waren.[3] Frankreich, Belgien, Italien und die Niederlande besaßen noch Kolonien und Treuhandgebiete. Der größte Teil dieser überseeischen Gebiete waren allerdings französische Kolonien, die von der Assoziierung mit Frankreich abhängig waren. Der ökonomische Hintergrund bestand darin, daß die Kolonien selbst die mit Frankreich vereinbarten Aufwendungen für Infrastruktur und Landwirtschaft nicht erbringen konnten, so daß der französische Staat die notwendigen Mittel bereitstellen mußte[4]. Die Kosten des Kolonialhandels erwiesen sich allerdings als zu hoch für das durch die Kolonialkriege in Indochina und Algerien ohnehin stark belastete französische Budget.

Die Vorteile einer Assoziierung der afrikanischen Kolonien mit der EWG waren für Frankreich offenkundig einseitig, da

- mit der Einrichtung eines Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds zusätzliche Finanzierungsmittel für die Entwicklung der Überseegebiete bereitgestellt würden;
- aus der Erweiterung der Absatzmärkte für die kolonialen Rohstoffe und Agrarprodukte ein höheres Devisenaufkommen für die Franc Zone, d.h. für Frankreich resultieren würde und schließlich,
- weil die geschützten Absatzmärkte der französischen Industrien in den Überseegebieten aufgrund ihrer guten kommerziellen und kulturellen Beziehungen für die französische Industrie erhalten bleiben würden.

Vor allem aus diesem Grunde standen insbesondere die Niederlande und die Bundesrepublik diesem Vorschlag Frankreichs reserviert gegenüber:

- Die Niederlande, weil sie eine Diskriminierung der eigenen Kolonialgebiete befürchteten;
- Die Bundesrepublik, weil zum einen ihre Handelsprioritäten in der Dritten Welt bei Lateinamerika und Asien lagen und zum anderen sie auch nur den Anschein einer Unterstützung der französischen Kolonialpolitik zu vermeiden suchte. Außerdem hätte eine solche Regelung ihr damaliges Prinzip gefährdet, die Vergabe von Entwicklungshilfe gemäß der Hallstein-Doktrin an politisches Wohlverhalten der Empfängerländer in der Frage der deutschen Wiedervereinigung und der Nichtanerkennung der DDR zu binden.

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[3] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe u.a. Wolfgang Dietrich: Periphere Integration und Frieden im Weltsystem. Ostafrika, Zentralamerika und Südostasien im Vergleich, Wien 1998.

[4] Siehe hierzu Stefan Brüne: Die französische Afrikapolitik. Hegemonialinteressen und Entwicklungsanspruch, Baden-Baden 1995.

Nur die Einigung der europäischen Regierungen darüber, daß den afrikanischen Reformpolitikern der Rücken gestärkt und den Revolutionären der Wind aus den Segeln genommen werden sollte, ließ letztlich die ökonomischen Erwägungen in den Hintergrund treten. Als Ergebnis der Assoziierungsverhandlungen wurden Handelspräferenzen vereinbart und ein europäischer Entwicklungsfonds eingerichtet. Über das zukünftige Verhältnis heißt es in Art. 131, Abs. 2,3:

> „Ziel der Assoziierung ist die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung der Länder und Hoheitsgebiete und die Herstellung enger Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen ihnen und der gesamten Gemeinschaft. Entsprechend den in der Präambel dieses Vertrages aufgestellten Grundsätzen soll die Assoziierung in erster Linie den Interessen der Einwohner dieser Länder und Hoheitsgebiete dienen und ihren Wohlstand fördern, um sie der von ihnen erstrebten wirtschaftlichen, sozialen und kulturellen Entwicklung entgegenzuführen“.

Dieses Ziel sollte vornehmlich durch die Öffnung des westeuropäischen Marktes sowie durch finanzielle und technische Hilfeleistungen erreicht werden. Die einzelnen Bestimmungen wurden am 25. März 1957 in einem Durchführungsabkommen niedergelegt, das für die Zeit zwischen dem 1. Januar 1958 und dem 31. Dezember 1962 gelten sollte. Als am 31. Dezember 1962 das Durchführungsabkommen auslief, hatte sich auch der politische Hintergrund erheblich verändert. Fast alle der EWG-assoziierten Gebiete - die meisten lagen in Afrika - waren inzwischen unabhängige Staaten geworden. Sie waren – abgesehen von Neuguinea - an einer Fortsetzung der Assoziierung interessiert.

Auch unter den EWG-Staaten selbst bestand weitgehende Einigkeit über die Fortsetzung der Assoziierungspolitik, wenn auch auf einer neuen vertraglichen Grundlage. Ein Assoziierungsabkommen schien dabei die beste Möglichkeit zu sein, die ökonomischen Bindungen zu stabilisieren und den afrikanischen Staaten gleichzeitig die Gelegenheit zur Bestätigung ihrer Souveränität und Unabhängigkeit zu geben. Aus der Blickrichtung der europäischen Gemeinschaft kam es nicht darauf an, neue Einflußzonen zu schaffen, sondern alte Einflußbereiche ohne künftige politische Bevormundung bestehen zu lassen.

Die Verhandlungen über ein neues Assoziierungsabkommen hatten 1961 mit einer Botschafter-Konferenz begonnen und endeten am 20. Juli 1963 in Jaunde (Kamerun), das auch den Namen für den Vertrag gab, der zwischen der EWG, Madagaskar und 18 afrikanischen Staaten (AASM-Staaten)[5] unterzeichnet wurde, am 1. Juni 1964 in Kraft trat und für 5 Jahre gelten sollte. Wie 1957 spielte Frankreich auch jetzt die dominierende

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[5] Der „Association of African States and Madagaskar“ (AASM) gehörten folgende Staaten an: Burundi, Dahomey, Demokratische Republik Kongo (Brazzaville), Elfenbeinküste, Gabun, Kamerun, Madagaskar, Mali, Mauretanien, Niger, Obervolta, Ruanda, Senegal, Somalia, Togo, Tschad und die Zentralafrikanische Republik.

Rolle, was sich vor allem aus seiner dreifachen Funktion als Vertreter eigener Interessen, inoffizieller Berater der Assoziierten sowie Vermittler zwischen den afrikanischen Staaten und den anderen EWG-Mitgliedern erklären läßt.

Zur Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung der assoziierten Staaten während der fünfjährigen Laufzeit wurde ein Betrag von 730 Mio. Dollar zur Verfügung gestellt: Davon sollten über den EEF 620 Mio. in Form nichtrückzahlbarer Zuschüsse, 46 Mio. in Form von Darlehen zu Sonderbedingungen und 64 Mio. in Form von Darlehen durch die Europäischen Investitionsbank gewährt werden.

Ein bedeutendes Merkmal des neuen Assoziierungsabkommens bestand darin, daß diese finanzielle Hilfe für Maßnahmen verwendet werden sollte, die direkt zur Verbesserung der Wettbewerbsfähigkeit der Mitgliedstaaten beitragen sollte, z.B. die Finanzierung von Maßnahmen, die der Rationalisierung dienen. Außerdem sollten Vorschüsse geleistet werden, um die Folgen von zeitweiligen Weltmarktpreisschwankungen auszugleichen.

Am 29. Juli 1969 wurde in Jaunde ein neues Abkommen zwischen der EWG und den 18 AASM-Staaten unterzeichnet (Jaunde II). Sein Inkrafttreten verzögerte sich bis zum 1. Januar 1971. Als Ziel wird in den Leitlinien des Vertrages[6] von den Vertragsparteien gefordert

- die Stärkung der Eigenverantwortlichkeit ihrer Entwicklung,
- die Förderung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit in Afrika,
- die Einleitung von Maßnahmen zur Förderung des Handels und
- die Verbesserung und Stabilisierung der Regelungen zur Einfuhr von Agrarerzeugnissen der AASM in die EWG.

Die EWG stellte den assoziierten Staaten für die Laufzeit des Abkommens einen Betrag von 900 Mio. Dollar zur Verfügung, davon 748 Mio. als Zuschüsse, 80 Mio. als Sonderdarlehen und zusätzlich 90 Mio. als Normaldarlehen des Europäischen Investitionsbank.

Waren bei Jaunde I und II vor allem die frankophonen Staaten Afrikas der EWG assoziiert worden, begannen Mitte der 60er Jahre auch afrikanische, dem Commonwealth angehörende Staaten, sich um engere Beziehungen zur EWG zu bemühen. So kam es am 26. Juli 1968 in Arusha (Tanzania) zur Unterzeichnung eines Abkommens mit den drei Staaten der afrikanischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft Kenia, Tanzania und Uganda. Da es zeitlich mit dem Jaunde II-Vertrag gekoppelt war, mußten allerdings im Juli wieder neue

[6] Abgedruckt in European Yearbook, Vol. XVII/1969, Den Haag 1971, S. 521-587.

Verhandlungen aufgenommen werden. Am 24. September 1969 kam es in Arusha erneut zur Unterzeichnung eines Vertrages - Arusha II -, der am 1. Januar 1971 in Kraft trat und für 5 Jahre gelten sollte.

Es würde den Rahmen sprengen wollte man hier ausführlicher auf die inhaltliche Ausgestaltung der Verträge und deren Ergebnisse eingehen. Festzuhalten bleibt aber, daß die Bilanz dieser Vorläufer der Lomé-Verträge aus der Sicht der afrikanischen Länder eher enttäuschend ausfiel:[7]

Weder hatten sich aufgrund der Verträge die Exporte in die EWG-Staaten erhöht, noch hatte sich an der Handelsstruktur zwischen den Staaten Westeuropas und Afrikas etwas geändert.

Insgesamt konnten die Staaten zwar ihre Exporte in die EWG bis 1974 von 914 Mio. im Jahr 1958 auf eine Summe von 3,3 Mrd. Dollar erhöhen, doch es muß berücksichtigt werden, daß allein 50% der Exporte in die EWG aus Zaire und der Elfenbeinküste kamen, während Tschad, Obervolta und Mali zusammen insgesamt nur einen Anteil von 2% an diesen Exporten aufweisen konnten.

Auch die gewährten Zollpräferenzen führten nicht zu einer Erhöhung der Importe der assoziierten Staaten in die EWG, ganz im Gegenteil. Hatte deren Anteil im Jahr 1960 noch 12,6% betragen, so verringerte er sich 1972 auf 9,06% und betrug 1974 ganze 7,47%.

Auch die finanzielle und technische Zusammenarbeit hinsichtlich der Diversifikation der Exportstruktur und Abbau von Monokulturen blieben ohne Folgen. Noch bis 1972 bestand der Export der assoziierten Staaten bis zu 62,8% aus Agrarerzeugnissen, der Rest setzte sich vor allem aus Kupfer, Eisenerz, Rohholz und Phosphaten zusammen.

Dasselbe gilt für die handelspolitischen Effekte der gewährleisteten Gegenpräferenzen für EWG-Waren. Zwar exportierte die EWG 1974 Waren im Wert von 2,178 Mrd. in die afrikanischen Staaten, doch ging der Anteil dieser Staaten am Gesamtexport der EWG in Entwicklungsländer von 12% 1958 auf 8,4% 1974 zurück.

Schon lange vor Ablauf der auf 5 Jahre befristeten Abkommen von Jaunde II und Arusha II waren innerhalb der EWG wiederum Entwicklungen eingetreten, die eine gründliche Neuordnung der Assoziierungspolitik notwendig machten.

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[7] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe Hella Gerth-Wellmann: Die AKP-EG-Abkommen von Lomé. Bilanz und Perspektiven, München 1979, S. 107-117.

Am 22. Januar 1972 war die Gemeinschaft durch den Beitritt Großbritanniens, Dänemarks und Irlands erweitert worden. Insbesondere der Beitritt Englands legte eine Neufassung der Assoziierungspolitik nahe, da ein Kooperationsmodus für die dem Commonwealth angehörenden Entwicklungsländer gefunden werden mußte. Die rechtliche Grundlage hierfür war das Protokoll 22 des Beitrittsvertrages der drei neuen Mitglieder, das weiteren 20 ehemaligen Kolonien Großbritanniens in Afrika, in der Karibik und im Pazifik die Aufnahme in das Assoziierungssystem der EWG grundsätzlich ermöglichte. So kam es, daß bei der Aufnahme der Verhandlungen über eine Verlängerung von Jaunde- und Arusha-Verträgen im Juli bzw. Oktober 1973 die Vertreter von 9 EG-Staaten 46 AKP-Staaten gegenüber saßen. Doch der äußere Anschein trügt: Formal waren es nur zwei Parteien, die miteinander verhandelten, da beide Seiten mit jeweils einheitlichen Verhandlungspositionen auftraten. Das aber bedeutete, daß parallel zu den Hauptverhandlungen beide Seiten jeweils in gesonderten Treffen ihre Verhandlungsführung abstimmen mußten - ein Problem vor allem für die 46 AKP-Staaten, die dafür zwischen Januar und Juli 1975 493 Sitzungen auf Botschafter- bzw. Expertenebene benötigten.[8]

So zeitraubend eine solche Prozedur auch war, sie hatte doch den Vorteil, daß die einzelnen AKP-Staaten nicht gegeneinander ausgespielt werden konnten. Allerdings war das AKP-Lager keineswegs durch Einigkeit geprägt, sondern durch

- Bedenken der 18 afrikanischen Staaten und Madagaskar (Jaunde-Staaten), durch die Vergrößerung der Assoziierung ihre „Vorteile“ einzubüßen;
- Vorbehalte einiger afrikanischer Commonwealth-Staaten gegen das „neo-koloniale Jaunde-Modell“ und
- Befürchtungen einiger Staaten, infolge einer Sonderbeziehung zur EG den eigenen politischen und wirtschaftlichen Spielraum einzuschränken und sich unsolidarisch dem Rest der Entwicklungsländer gegenüber zu verhalten.

Aufgrund diese Bedenken und der Interessendisharmonie innerhalb der AKP verliefen die Verhandlungen schleppend, bis es am 25./26. Juli 1974 auf der gemeinsamen Ministerkonferenz in Kingston (Jamaika) zum politischen Durchbruch und am 1. Februar 1975 zur endgültigen Einigung kam. Der Vertrag wurde am 28. Februar 1975 in Lomé unterzeichnet.

Daß es den AKP-Staaten gelang, den EG-Staaten wichtige Zugeständnisse abzuringen, lag nicht zuletzt an der allgemeinen internationalen Wetterlage, die sich Ende 1973 wieder

[8] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe Peter J. Opitz: Die Verträge von Lomé, in: Mir A. Ferdowsi (Hrsg.): Die Verträge von Lomé zwischen Modell und Mythos, München 1983, S. 38-40.

verschärft hatte. Für eine solche Interpretation spricht, daß, wie der damalige Staatsminister im Auswärtigen Amt, Jürgen Wischnewski, in einer Rede am 12. Februar 1975 in Bonn beteuerte, ein solches Ergebnis wie es 1975 zustande kam, keineswegs von Beginn an intendiert bzw. absehbar war. Denn zur Diskussion standen drei verschiedene Möglichkeiten:

- der Anschluß der neuen Commonwealth Länder an die bestehende Assoziation á la Jaunde;
- der Abschluß eines besonderen Assoziationsvertrages;
- oder schlicht ein Handelsvertrag. [9]

3. Die Krise der „Entwicklungspolitik“ und die Forderung nach der Errichtung einer „Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung“

Eine Reihe von Indizien deutet darauf hin, daß insbesondere die Verabschiedung der Erklärung und des Aktionsprogramms zur Errichtung einer neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung durch die 6. Sondergeneralversammlung der Vereinten Nationen mit Stimmenmehrheit der Dritt-Welt-Staaten – sie enthielt einige der für eine Reorganisierung der Weltwirtschaft notwendigen Maßnahmen -[10] erheblich zum Umdenken hinsichtlich der vertraglichen Ausgestaltung der EU-AKP-Beziehungen beigetragen hat. Betrachtet man den historischen Zusammenhang, in dem die Diskussion um die NWWO stattfand, so treten die folgenden Faktoren deutlich hervor: Noch bei Erlangung der Unabhängigkeit herrschte zunächst allenthalben der Glaube, daß viele Probleme der jungen Staaten vornehmlich eine Funktion ihrer bisherigen politischen Abhängigkeit gewesen waren und sich mit Erreichen der Unabhängigkeit, der vollen Teilnahme an den internationalen Wirtschaftsbeziehungen und mit Unterstützung einer Reihe regionaler und internationaler Entwicklungsprogramme die wirtschaftliche Situation rapide verbessern würde. Am Ende der sechziger Jahre hatten sich diese Hoffnungen zerschlagen.

Trotz der florierenden Weltwirtschaft sowie bi- und multinationaler Hilfsprogramme hatte sich nicht nur das Wohlstandsgefälle zwischen den Industrieländern und der Masse der Entwicklungsländer vertieft, die wirtschaftliche Lage der Entwicklungsländer blieb weiterhin katastrophal. Die regionalen und internationalen Entwicklungsprogramme und generell die Mechanismen des internationalen Wirtschaftssystems hatten nicht das erreicht, was sie zu

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[9] Zitiert nach Entwicklungspolitik. Materialien Nr. 48, Bonn 1975, S. 60.

[10] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe u.a. Volker Matthies: Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung. Hintergründe – Positionen – Argumente, Opladen 1980 sowie Mir A. Ferdowsi: Die Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung (NWWO), in: Helmut Volger (Hrsg.): Lexikon der Vereinten Nationen, München 1999 (i.E.).

versprechen schienen: Die 1961 mit hohen Erwartungen von der Generalversammlung der Vereinten Nationen verkündete erste Entwicklungsdekade erwies sich ebenso als Fehlschlag wie die im August 1961 von der Kennedy-Administration mit großem Enthusiasmus kreierte „Allianz für den Fortschritt“ zwischen den Vereinigten Staaten und Lateinamerika. Die Handels- und Entwicklungskonferenz der Vereinten Nationen machte nach einem vielversprechenden Anfang im Jahre 1964 während der folgenden zweiten Konferenz (1968) kaum Fortschritte und erhöhte nur noch die Frustration der Entwicklungsländer.[11]

Nicht nur bei den jungen Staaten verbreitete sich die Einsicht, daß die internationalen Mechanismen und Strukturen, durch die die Staaten der Dritten Welt mit den Industrieländern verbunden waren, sich als unfähig erwiesen hatten, ihren spezifischen Interessen gerecht zu werden. Insbesondere die sich verschlechternden Austauschverhältnisse infolge der stetig sinkenden Rohstoffpreise einerseits und steigender Preise für Industriegüter andererseits (terms of trade) weckten die Kritik am bestehenden Weltwirtschaftssystem. Bei den neuen Staaten begann sich daher die Ansicht zu verfestigen, daß dieses System nicht für, sondern gegen sie arbeitete oder sie zumindest als die wirtschaftlich Schwächeren erheblich benachteiligte.

Die Folge war, daß die Forderungen nach grundlegenden Eingriffen und Umstrukturierungen zugunsten der Entwicklungsländer im Rahmen einer noch zu schaffenden Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung immer vernehmbarer wurden.

Dem wachsenden Selbstbewußtsein der Länder der Dritten Welt und der Durchsetzung der Erklärung zur Errichtung einer NWWO im Rahmen der VN gingen allerdings eine Reihe von politischen Entwicklungen und Gruppenbildungen innerhalb der Dritten Welt voraus. Hierzu gehört sicherlich die Entstehung der „Gruppe der 77“[12], die in den folgenden Jahren zum Wortführer dieser Forderungen avancierte.

Ihren Forderungen schloß sich Anfang der 70er Jahre auch die „Bewegung der Blockfreien“ an, die sich seit dem Treffen von Bandung 1955 und ihrer offiziellen Gründung in Belgrad 1961 zu einer der einflußreichsten Interessenvertretungen (pressure groups) der Dritten Welt entwickelt hatte.[13]

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[11] Siehe hierzu Mir A. Ferdowsi: UN-Konferenz für Handel und Entwicklung (UNCTAD), in: Volger, (Anmerkung 10).

[12] Siehe hierzu Mir A. Ferdowsi: Die Gruppe der 77, in: Volger, (Anmerkung 10).

[13] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe Volker Matthies: Die Blockfreien. Ursprünge. Entwicklung. Konzeption, München 1985.

Die hervorstechende Manifestierung dieses Wandels findet sich wohl in der „ Erklärung über Blockfreiheit und wirtschaftlichen Fortschritt“[14] der 3. Gipfelkonferenz der Staats- und Regierungschefs der Blockfreienbewegung in Lusaka/Sambia 1970 und die Verpflichtung der Teilnehmerstaaten

> „(i) den Geist der Self-Reliance zu pflegen und zu diesem Zweck eine entschiedene Politik zur Organisation des eigenen sozio-ökonomischen Fortschritts einzuschlagen und ihr den Rang eines vorrangigen Aktionsprogramms einzuräumen; (ii) ihre Rechte zur Sicherung der bestmöglichen Ausnutzung der natürlichen Ressourcen in ihren Hoheitsgebieten und den angrenzenden Meeren voll auszuüben und ihre Verpflichtung dazu für die Entwicklung ihrer Völker zu erfüllen; (iii) die wirtschaftlichen Beziehungen zu den anderen Nationen auszubauen und zu diversifizieren, um so eine echte Interdependenz zu fördern“. Ferner „die gegenseitige Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Entwicklungsländern zu fördern, um deren nationalen Bestrebungen um Stärkung ihrer Unabhängigkeit Kraft zu verleihen; ... Kooperations und Integrationsbewegung zwischen den Entwicklungsländern auf subregionaler und interregionaler Ebene im größtmöglichen Ausmaß, zu intensivieren und auszuweiten.“[15]

Daß es allerdings erst im Jahre 1974 zur Präsentation einer konzeptionell kompakten und politisch massiven Forderung der Staaten der Dritten Welt nach einer Neuordnung der Weltwirtschaft kam, hängt mit einer Reihe ökonomischen wie politischen Faktoren zusammen, deren wesentlichster zum einen die Energiekrise 1973/74 und der Erfolg der OPEC war, Erdöl als Instrument zur Erlangung wirtschaftlicher und politischer Macht einzusetzen. Zum anderen trug auch die Gewichtsverlagerung innerhalb der VN weg von den Fragen des Ost-West-Konflikts hin zu der Nord-Süd-Problematik dazu bei. Denn im Zuge der Dekolonisation weiter Teile Asiens und Afrikas in den sechziger Jahren traten immer mehr junge Staaten der Dritten Welt den Vereinten Nationen bei und machten diese in wachsendem Maße zu einem politischen Forum, auf dem sie ihre spezifischen Interessen und Anliegen diskutierten und verhandelten. Nach dem Prinzip des „Ein Staat - Eine Stimme“ konnte insbesondere die VN-Vollversammlung im Laufe der Zeit von den Staaten der Dritten Welt dominiert werden.

Ungeachtet der unterschiedlichen Bewertungen dieser Entwicklungen ist unbestreitbar, daß die sogenannte „Ölkrise“ den Zeitpunkt für die Forderung nach einer NWWO mitbestimmte. Denn im Gegenzug zu der von den USA für Februar 1974 in Washington einberufenen Energiekonferenz forderte der amtierende Präsident der Blockfreien Bewegung, der algerische Staatschef Boumedienne die Einberufung einer Sonderkonferenz der VN-Generalversammlung über Rohstoffe und Entwicklung, die dann als 6. Sondergeneralversammlung der Vereinten Nationen vom 9. April bis 2. Mai 1974 abgehalten und bei der die Erklärung und das Aktionsprogramm zur Errichtung einer

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[14] Abgedruckt in: Khan M.Khushi/Volker Matthies (Hrsg.): Collective Self-Reliance: Programme und Perspektiven der Dritten Welt. München/London 1978, S. 77-88.

[15] Ebd., S. 78.

neuen internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung[16] verabschiedet wurden. Die wesentlichsten Forderungen der „Erklärung“ (E) und des „Aktionsprogramms“ (A) lassen sich wie folgt zusammenfassen:

- „souveräne Gleichheit der Staaten, Selbstbestimmung aller Völker, Unzulässigkeit des Gebietserwerbs durch Gewalt, territoriale Unversehrtheit und Nichteinmischung in die inneren Angelegenheiten anderer Staaten“ (E: 4 a);
- „jedes Land hat das Recht, das wirtschaftliche und soziale System anzunehmen, das es für seine eigene Entwicklung als am besten geeignet erachtet; es darf deshalb nicht diskriminiert werden“ (E: 4 d);
- „volle und ständige Souveränität jedes Staates über seine natürlichen Hilfsquellen ... einschließlich des Rechts der Verstaatlichung ... oder der Eigentumsübertragung an seine eigenen Staatsangehörigen“ (E: 4 e);
- „Regelung und Überwachung der Tätigkeit transnationaler Gesellschaften durch Maßnahmen im Interesse der Volkswirtschaft der Länder, in denen derartige Gesellschaften tätig sind, und zwar auf der Grundlage der uneingeschränkten Souveränität“ (E: 4 g; A: V, a-e);
- „gerechte und faire Relationen zwischen den Preisen von Rohstoffen ... die von Entwicklungsländern ausgeführt werden und den Preisen von Rohstoffen, Grundstoffen .... die von ihnen eingeführt werden“ (E: 4 j; A: I.1.d);
- „Ausdehnung der aktiven Hilfe an Entwicklungsländer ... ohne irgendwelche politischen oder militärischen Bedingungen“ (E: 4 k);
- „präferentielle und nicht auf Gegenseitigkeit beruhende Behandlung von Entwicklungsländern“ (E: 4 n);
- „Zugang zu den Errungenschaften der modernen Technologie für die Entwicklungsländer ... und Schaffung einer einheimischen Technologie ... nach Verfahren, die ihren Volkswirtschaften entsprechen“ (E: 4 p; A: IV. a-e);
- „Stärkung ... der wirtschaftlichen, kommerziellen, finanziellen und technischen Zusammenarbeit der Entwicklungsländer hauptsächlich auf der Grundlage von Präferenzen“ (E: 4 s; A:VII 1. a-h);
- „Zulassung von Rohstofferzeugerkartellen“ (E: 4 t; A: I.1.c);
- „Beschleunigte Ausarbeitung von Grundstoffabkommen..., um die Weltmärkte für Roh- und Grundstoffe soweit erforderlich zu regulieren und zu stabilisieren (A: 1.1. a iii) und

[16] Abgedruckt in: Rainer Jonas/ Manfred Tietzel (Hrsg.): Die Neuordnung der Weltwirtschaft, Bonn-Bad Godesberg 1976, S. 214-232.

Ausarbeitung eines integrierten Gesamtprogramms für eine umfassende Reihe von Grundstoffen, an denen die Entwicklungsländer ein Exportinteresse haben“ (A: I.3. a iv);

- „Errichtung von Marktausgleichslagern (buffer stocks) im Rahmen von Grundstoffabkommen... mit dem Ziel der Begünstigung der erzeugenden und verbrauchenden Entwicklungsländer und der Leistung eines Beitrags zur Erweiterung des Welthandels insgesamt“ (A: I.3. a xi);
- Verbesserung des Zugangs zu den Märkten in den entwickelten Ländern durch schrittweise Beseitigung von tarifären und nicht-tarifären Hemmnissen und restriktiven Geschäftspraktiken (A: I.3. a ii);
- Reform des Welternährungssystems (A: II. 1. a-i);
- „Maßnahmen zur Entwicklungsfinanzierung und zur Überwindung der Zahlungsbilanzkrisen der Entwicklungsländer ...“ (A: II. 2. a-i);
- Förderung der „Industrialisierung der Entwicklungsländer“ (A: III. a-d);
- „Stärkung der Rolle der Vereinten Nationen bei der internationalen wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit. ...“, insbesondere der „Tätigkeit der Konferenz der Vereinten Nationen für Handel und Entwicklung ...“ (A: IX 1-8).

„Erklärung“ und „Aktionsprogramm“ enthalten ferner in einem Sonderprogramm (Teil X) eine Reihe von Forderungen hinsichtlich der am wenigsten entwickelten (und am schwersten betroffenen) Länder (LLDC) etwa die nach:

- Warenhilfe einschließlich Nahrungsmittel (3.c);
- langfristigen Lieferkrediten zu günstigen Bedingungen (3.d);
- Herstellung einer Verbindung (link) zwischen der Schaffung von Sonderziehungsrechten und der Entwicklungshilfe (3.g);
- Übereinkünften über Schuldenerlaß, Moratorien oder Umschuldung (3.i).

Die Forderung nach einer NWWO war für die Industrieländer zweifellos eine gewichtige politische und wirtschaftliche Herausforderung, weil sie in Kern auf eine Änderung des überkommenen Nord-Süd-Verhältnisses zugunsten der Interessen der Entwicklungsländer abzielte und damit die althergebrachte Privilegien der Industrieländer in Frage stellte.

Ohne hier näher auf die entwicklungspolitische und ökonomische Solidität diese Forderungen eingehen zu können[17], läßt sich hinsichtlich der EG-Dritte-Welt-Beziehungen

[17] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe u.a. Johan Galtung: Arme Länder gegen reiche; arme Menschen gegen reiche: Wem wird die Neue Weltwirtschaftsordnung nützen? In: Dieter Senghaas (Hrsg.): Kapitalistische Weltökonomie. Kontroversen über ihren Ursprung und ihre

feststellen, daß die EG-Staaten versuchten, im Rahmen der bereits seit Juli 1973 laufenden eigenen Verhandlungen dieser Tendenz entgegen zu wirken, zugleich jedoch den Forderungen der Dritten Welt ein wenig entgegen zu kommen. Ob dabei auch Motive wie „divide et impera“ eine Rolle gespielt haben, kann hier nicht diskutiert werden.[18] Festzuhalten bleibt, daß das nach zweijährigen Verhandlungen im Februar 1975 schließlich erzielte Ergebnis mit 46 AKP-Staaten - laut Präambel des Lomé I-Abkommens „ein Schritt in die Richtung einer gerechteren Weltwirtschaftsordnung“ - im wesentlichen in Vereinbarungen über Handels-, industrielle und wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit bestand.

4. Die Verträge von Lomé

4.1. Handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit

Angesichts der Tatsache, daß ein großer Teil der Exporte der AKP-Staaten in die EG geht, sollten über handelspolitische Zusammenarbeit gemäß der Vorstellung „Hilfe durch Handel“ Entwicklungsimpulse gegeben werden. Diese Entwicklungsimpulse sollten durch dreierlei Maßnahmen gewährleistet werden:

- Allen Produkten aus den AKP-Staaten, mit Ausnahme jener landwirtschaftlichen Produkte, für die die EG gemeinsame Marktordnungen beschlossen hatte (dies waren Zucker, Bananen, Rum, Rindfleisch und Reis), wurde freier Zugang gewährt. Insgesamt könnten nach Darstellungen der Kommission 99,4 bis 99,6% aller Exporte aus den AKP-Staaten zoll- und kontingentfrei importiert werden. Hierbei würde auch auf Gegenpräferenzen verzichtet; statt dessen galt das Prinzip der Meistbegünstigung, d.h. Handelsvereinbarungen der AKP-Staaten mit Dritten dürften nicht günstiger sein als die Regelungen, die für die Importe aus der EG bestanden;
- Die zweite Maßnahme und neu gegenüber den Jaunde-Verträgen war der sogenannte kumulative Ursprung. Diese Maßnahme sollte verschiedene Bearbeitungsstufen eines Produkts in verschiedenen Staaten der AKP ermöglichen. Sie diente ferner zur Förderung und Intensivierung der Süd-Süd-Beziehungen. Ferner gehören hierzu eine Reihe von Maßnahmen zur Ausbildung von Fachkräften für den Außenhandel, die Verbreitung von Handelsinformationen sowie die Beteiligung der AKP-Staaten an Fachausstellungen und Messen.

Entwicklungsdynamik. Frankfurt am Main 1979, S. 337-375 sowie Rainer Tetzlaff: Perspektiven und Grenzen der Neuen Weltwirtschaftsordnung, in: Dieter Nohlen/Franz Nuscheler (Hrsg.): Handbuch der Dritten Welt, Band 1: Unterentwicklung und Entwicklung: Theorien – Strategien – Indikatoren. Hamburg 1982, S. 273-291.

[18] Siehe hierzu Wolfgang Dietrich (Anmerkung 3, S. 43-94) der das Vertragswerk von Lomé als „Enkel“ der Berliner Konferenz“ ansieht.

- Ein weiterer Schwerpunkt in diesem Bereich - von Beobachtern, aber auch von Politikern, als Glanzstück des Abkommens und zugleich als eine wesentliche Neuerung in den Beziehungen zwischen Industrie- und Entwicklungsländern gewürdigt- ist das sog. System der Exporterlösstabilisierung (STABEX), das als Ersatz für das als zu dirigistisch empfundene Rohstoffprogramm der NWWO dienen sollte.

Wohl auf Drängen des tanzanischen Präsidenten Julius Nyerere gegenüber dem deutschen Bundeskanzler Helmut Schmidt kam es zur Aufnahme eines weiteren Systems, das die Sicherung der Exporterlöse einiger Bergbauerzeugnisse - Kupfer, Phosphate, Mangan, Bauxit, Aluminiumoxyd, Zinn, Schwefelkiesabbrände und Eisenerz - zur Aufgabe hatte, kurz SISMIN oder MINEX genannt. Das System dient sowohl den Versorgungsinteressen der Gemeinschaft wie auch jenen AKP-Staaten, die, wie etwa die Kupferproduzenten Zaire und Sambia, besonders stark auf die Ausfuhr mineralischer Rohstoffe angewiesen sind.[19]

4.2. Industrielle Zusammenarbeit

Ziel der Zusammenarbeit im Industriebereich war, darauf hinzuwirken, den Anteil der AKP-Staaten an der Weltindustrieproduktion von damals 7% auf 25% im Jahre 2000 zu steigern.[20] In diesem Bereich wurden fast alle Forderungen der Dritte-Welt-Staaten innerhalb des Nord-Süd-Dialogs im Rahmen von UNCTAD und UNIDO mit aufgenommen und in dem Vertrag als Grundlage der Zusammenarbeit festgeschrieben. Die Ziele umschreibt Art. 26 wie folgt:

- Ausbau und Diversifizierung der Industrien der AKP-Staaten,
- Förderung neuer Beziehungen im industriellen Bereich,
- Ausbau der Verbindungen zwischen der Industrie und den übrigen Wirtschaftsbereichen,
- Erleichterung des Technologietransfers und Hilfe bei der Entwicklung angepaßter Technologien,
- Förderung der industriellen Exporte der AKP-Staaten auf die Auslandsmärkte.

Art. 66 des Vertrages enthielt ferner eine

> „Erleichterung der allgemeinen industriellen Entwicklung der AKP-Staaten, vor allem ihrer Fertigwarenprodukte, durch angemessene Berücksichtigung ihres

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[19] Ausführlich zu beiden Systemen siehe den Beitrag von Kappel in diesem Band.

[20] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe Hella Gerth-Wellmann/Dorothee Kayser: Die industrielle Zusammenarbeit zwischen der EG und den AKP-Staaten im Rahmen der Lomé-Politik. Empirische Analyse und Versuch einer Einschätzung, Köln 1980.

spezifischen Bedarfs bei der Formulierung der Politik zur Anpassung der Industriestrukturen der Gemeinschaft an weltweite Veränderungen."

4.3. Landwirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit

Obgleich in allen AKP-Staaten der größte Teil der Bevölkerung auf dem Lande lebt, und insbesondere in den zahlreichen afrikanischen Staaten die Nahrungmittelversorgung überaus prekär war, fand im Lomé I-Abkommen der landwirtschaftliche Bereich keine spezielle Erwähnung.

Erst der Lomé II-Vertrag erhielt einen eigenen Titel über landwirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit erhielt. Es scheint, daß die sich dramatisch verschlechternde Ernährungssituation in vielen Teilen der Welt ebenso wie die von Weltbankpräsident McNamara initiierte Diskussion über Grundbedürfnisse und integrierte ländliche Entwicklung auch in den EG-Staaten zu der Überzeugung geführt hatte, daß eine langfristig erfolgreiche Entwicklung nur auf der Grundlage einer gesunden Landwirtschaft möglich ist. Dieser Teil des Vertrages enthielt einen Katalog von Maßnahmen, die insbesondere auf bäuerliche Familienbetriebe und Genossenschaften abgestellt sein sollten, und die über Bewässerungsvorhaben, Maßnahmen im Bereich der angewandten Ackerbau- und Tierzuchtforschung bis hin zum Vorhaben zur Verbesserung der sozialen Infrastruktur reichen (Art. 84). Ebenso wie bei der industriellen Zusammenarbeit wurde hier auch die Errichtung eines technischen Zentrums für Zusammenarbeit in der Landwirtschaft und im ländlichen Bereich vereinbart, das sich um die Verbreitung von Information sowie um Forschung, Ausbildung und Innovation kümmern soll.

4.4. Förderung von Menschenrechten

Obwohl bei den Verhandlungen zu Lomé II besonders die Vertreter der Niederlande die Menschenrechte als entwicklungspolitischen Aspekt in das Abkommen einbringen wollten, scheiterte dieses Anliegen sowohl am Widerstand der auf ein Recht auf Entwicklung fixierten AKP-Vertreter als auch am Desinteresse von Frankreich und Deutschlands, die den Vertrag damals noch als reines Handelsabkommen formalisiert wissen wollten und angesichts der permanenten Probleme bei der Interpretation und Quantifizierung von Menschenrechtsverletzungen vorerst eine operative Menschenrechtsklausel ablehnten. Die Diskussion über die Menschenrechte hätte beinahe zum Abbruch der Verhandlungen geführt, weshalb das Thema letzlich ausgeklammert und erst im Rahmen der Lomé III-Verhandlungen (1985-1990:61 AKP-Staaten)[21] zumindest in die Präambel des

[21] Zu einer umfassende kritische Analyse siehe Deutsche Welthungerhilfe (Hrsg.): Lome´III. Kritische Analysen zum Verhältnis der Europäischen Gemeinschaft gegenüber der Dritten Welt, 2 Bände, Bonn 1984/85.

Vertragswerkes aufgenommen wurde.[22] Ein eigenes Kapitel wurde der Achtung der Menschenrechte erstmals in die Lomé IV-Vertrag (1990-2000:69 AKP-Staaten, mit der Möglichkeit einer Halbzeitrevision) gewidmet. Es sah allerdings keinerlei Sanktionsmöglichkeiten vor. Erst im Rahmen der am 4. November 1995 in Mauritius unterzeichneten Halbzeitrevision des Lomé IV-Abkommens wurde die Achtung der Menschenrechte, der demokratischen Grundsätze und des Rechtsstaates als wesentliches Element der EU-AKP-Beziehungen besonders gewürdigt und zu einem essentiellen Element des revidierten Abkommens erklärt. Im neu eingefügten Artikel 366a Abs. 3 schuf sich die EU darüber hinaus das Recht zur vollen Suspendierung der „Zusammenarbeit" für den Fall, daß der politische Dialog mit einem diesbezüglich unbotmäßigen AKP-Staat ergebnislos blieben.

5. Ausblick

Die Staats- und Regierungschefs der damals zwölf Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft haben zwar im Februar 1992 im Vertrag von Maastricht der „Entwicktungszusammenarbeit" einen eigenen Abschnitt („Titel XVII") gewidmet, in dem es unter anderem heißt:

> „Art. 130 u [Ziele der Gemeinschaft] (1) Die Politik der Gemeinschaft auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, die eine Ergänzung der entsprechenden Politik der Mitgliedstaaten darstellt, fördert
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> - die nachhaltige wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung der Entwicklungsländer, insbesondere der am meisten benachteiligten Entwicklungsländer;
> - die harmonische, schrittweise Eingliederung der Entwicklungsländer in die Weltwirtschaft;
> - die Bekämpfung der Armut in den Entwicklungsländern.
>
> (2) Die Politik der Gemeinschaft in diesem Bereich trägt dazu bei, das allgemeine Ziel einer Fortentwicklung und Festigung der Demokratie und des Rechtsstaats sowie das Ziel der Wahrung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten zu verfolgen ...
>
> Art. 130 v [Ausstrahlung auf andere Politiken] Die Gemeinschaft berücksichtigt die Ziele des Artikels 130 u bei den von ihr verfolgten Politiken, welche die Entwicklungsländer berühren können...
>
> Art. 130 x[Abstimmung innerhalb der Gemeinschaft; internationale Zusammenarbeit] (1) Die Gemeinschaft und die Mitgliedstaaten koordinieren ihre Politik auf dem Gebiet der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und stimmen ihre Hilfsprogramme, auch in internationalen Organisationen und auf internationalen Konferenzen, ab. Sie können gemeinsame Maßnahmen ergreifen. Die

[22] Ausführlicher hierzu siehe Gabriele Oestreich: Menschenrechte als Elemente der dritten AKP-EWG-Konvention von Lomé, Berlin 1990.

> Mitgliedstaaten tragen erforderlichenfalls zur Durchführung der Hilfsprogramme der Gemeinschaft bei ...“[23]

Doch bislang hat sich die Hoffnung, daß eine Europäisierung der Entwicklungspolitik[24] dazu beitragen könnte, die AKP-Staaten in die Weltwirtschaft einzugliedern, nicht erfüllt. Ganz im Gegenteil: Angesichts der veränderten weltpolitischen Großwetterlage deuten eine Reihe von Indizien darauf hin, daß die im September 1998 begonnenen Verhandlungen für die AKP-Staaten unter keinem besonders günstigen Stern stehen.

So hat die EU-Kommission im Vorfeld der Verhandlungen zwischen der EU und 71 AKP-Staaten über die Verlängerung der Lomé-Konvention 1996 in ihrem Grünbuch[25] vier Varianten vorgeschlagen:

- ein Status quo Szenario: Dies würde die Fortschreibung eines Globalabkommens mit kleinen Änderungen bedeuten. Die entwicklungspolitischen Instrumente würden etwas ausdifferenziert, so daß etwa „reiche“ AKP-Staaten mit der Aufhebung der Präferenzen zu rechnen hätten;
- ein Globalabkommen, das durch bilaterale oder regionale Abkommen ergänzt wird. Das Globalabkommen hätte dabei nur den Charakter einer Rumpfkonvention für gemeinsame Entwicklungsziele;
- die Auflösung des Lomé-Vertrags in einzelne Regionalabkommen und damit verbunden die Regionalisierung der Entwicklungsinstrumente. Bei dieser Variante könnten auch neue Länder der jeweiligen Region miteinbezogen werden;
- der Abschluß eines auf die ärmsten Länder zugeschnittenen Abkommens, das einseitige Handelspräferenzen erhalten, aber auch für Länder Asiens und Lateinamerikas geöffnet werden müßte[26].

Obgleich sich die Staats- und Regierungschefs der AKP-Staaten im November 1997 in Liberville/Gabun nachdrücklich für den Fortbestand der AKP-Gruppe in ihrer aktuellen Gestalt und auch für eine Fortführung des bestehenden Lomé-Abkommens aussprachen,

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[23] Thomas Läufer (Bearb.): Europäische Union – Europäische Gemeinschaft. Die Vertragstexte von Maastricht, Bonn 1997, S. 218-219.

[24] Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Die Politik der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit bis zum Jahr 2000. Konsequenzen des Vertrages von Maastricht, Brüssel 1992; Wissenschaftlicher Beirat beim BMZ: Europäisierung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, BMZ aktuell, Bonn 1993; Michael Dauderstädt/Christiane Kesper: Zwischen Lomé und Maastricht: Neue Wege der EU-Südpolitik, herausgegeben von der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (Eurokolleg 27), Bonn 1994.

[25] Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Grünbuch über die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den AKP-Staaten an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert – Herausforderungen und Optionen für eine neue Partnerschaft, Luxemburg 1996.

[26] Zitiert nach Wolfried Telkämper, MdEP: EU und AKP auf der Kippe. Zur Reform des Lomé-Vertrags, herausgegeben von „Die Grünen im Europäischen Parlament“, Freiburg 1998, S. 18.

präferierte die Kommission in ihren „Orientierungslinien für die Aushandlung neuer Kooperationsabkommen mit den Ländern in Afrika, im karibischen Raum und im pazifischen Ozean (AKP)“ vom 29.10.1997 für ein globales Abkommen „mit differenzierten, auf die regionalen Besonderheiten und die Integrationsperspektiven zugeschnittenen Modalitäten“[27].

Es bleibt abzuwarten, in welcher Form und mit welchem Ergebnis die Verhandlungen zu einem „Post-Lomé-IV-Abkommens“ zu Ende gehen werden. In jedem Fall haben sie in vielfacher Hinsicht bereits heute jene Befürchtungen und Ängste bestätigt, die seit den „historischen Umwälzungen“ in Mittel- und Osteuropa 1989, der Beendigung des Ost-West-Konfliktes 1990 und nicht zuletzt dem Zerfall des Sowjetimperiums 1991 in den Staaten der „Dritten Welt“ geäußert wurde. Diese Entwicklungen könnten nämlich dazu führen,

- daß Hilfsgelder spärlicher fließen und sie in einen „haushaltspolitischen Verdrängungswettbewerb“ mit jenen osteuropäischen Staaten treten müssen, deren wirtschaftliche und gesellschaftliche Entwicklung aus dem Entwicklungshilfeetat bestritten wird;
- daß die ehemals „sozialistischen“ Industrieländer zu Konkurrenten bei der wirtschaftlichen Kooperation mit den westlichen Industrieländern werden. Dafür spricht nicht nur die geographische Nähe östlicher Nachbarländer, sondern auch die vertraute Mentalität, eine ähnliche Kultur und ihre bessere Ausbildung;
- daß durch den politischen Niedergang des „real (nie) existierenden Sozialismus“ der Modellcharakter der westlichen Industriegesellschaft dominierend und sich ihr Handlungsspielraum zur Entwicklung und Erprobung eigener Entwicklungswege infolgedessen erheblich einengen wird;
- daß mit dem Ende des Ost-West-Konfliktes zwar für die „Geber“ ein wesentliches Motiv entfällt, außen- und sicherheitspolitische Interessen als entscheidende Triebkräfte in der Entwicklungskooperation einzusetzen, doch daß damit für die „Nehmer“ zugleich die Trumpfkarte an politischem Gewicht verliert, zur Durchsetzung ihrer Forderungen die antagonistischen Blöcke gegeneinander ausspielen zu können.

Vor allem für einen überwiegenden Teil der afrikanischen Staaten deutet einiges darauf hin, daß sie nicht nur durch die Beendigung des Ost-West-Konfliktes das geliebte taktische Druckmittel der ideologischen Alternative, sondern vielmehr auch durch den Globalisierungsprozeß ihre Stellung als wesentliche Rohstoffquelle Europas verloren

[27] Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament, (Kom(97) 537 endg.), Brüssel 1997.

haben. Verbindet man das mit der Tatsache, daß weite Teile Afrikas aufgrund der geringen Kaufkraft im Vergleich zu Lateinamerika oder Südostasien auch keine potentiellen Märkte zu bieten haben, auf denen die EU seinen Bedarf nach Absatz industrieller Exportgüter stillen könnte, so geben die Zukunftsperspektiven hinsichtlich der im Vertrag von Maastricht verankerten Zielsetzungen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit keineswegs Anlaß zum Optimismus.

Robert Kappel

Die Entwicklungskooperation zwischen Europa und den AKP-Staaten – Eine Bewertung der entwicklungspolitischen Folgen des Lomé-Modells

1. Einleitung

Die Tatsache, daß nach Jahrzehnten internationaler Zusammenarbeit immer noch mehrere hundert Millionen Menschen nicht die Mindestanforderungen für das tägliche Überleben decken können, machte in den letzten Jahren Armutsbekämpfung in nationalen und internationalen Strategien der Entwicklungspolitik zu einer der wichtigsten Zielsetzungen. Auch die Europäische Union (EU) hat sich zu Beginn der Kooperation mit den AKP-Ländern diesem Ziel verpflichtet. Über einen sehr langen Zeitraum hatte sie die Ziele der Kooperation jedoch offenbar aus strategisch-politischen und ökonomischen Gründen aus den Augen verloren.

In diesem Beitrag soll eine Bewertung der im Rahmen der Lomé-Kooperation eingesetzten Instrumente insbesondere in Bezug auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung erfolgen, während die Fragen von Menschenrechten, Zivilgesellschaft und Demokratie nicht weiter diskutiert werden. Ausgeklammert werden auch die Fragen von Partizipation und dezentraler Kooperation, die wichtige Bausteine der Lomé-Kooperation darstellen.[28] Die Analyse konzentriert sich vor allem auf die Makro-Ebene und behandelt die Folgen der ökonomischen Steuerung im Kooperationsmodell. Dieses Modell gilt vielen Beobachtern immer noch als Vorzeigemodell. Vor allem von Nicht-Regierungsorganisationen werden die Vorzüge der Kooperation zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten betont.[29] In den letzten Jahren haben jedoch zahlreiche Experten aus unterschiedlichen Motiven für eine Veränderung des Modells plädiert. Einige sehen in der Lomé-Konvention eine Verfestigung einer post-kolonialen Kooperation, die lediglich den Interessen der EU diene, andere sehen zu viele planerische Elemente, die dringend einer Liberalisierung bedürfen. Insgesamt ist das Modell jedoch in eine Krise hineingeraten, weil die AKP-Länder an überkommenen Ausgleichsmaßnahmen festhalten und die EU durch die neuen Herausforderungen in Osteuropa, im Mittelmeer sowie vor allem im Globalisierungsprozeß neue Handlungsspielräume erschließen möchte. Die AKP-Länder sind trotz aller Kooperations-Rhetorik zu einem lästigen Partner für die EU geworden. Lästig, weil diese Länder, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, nur geringe wirtschaftliche Fortschritte

[28] Vgl. hierzu Peter Ay/ Robert Kappel: Armutsbekämpfung in der Europäischen Entwicklungspolitik (unv. Gutachten), Bonn 1999.

[29] Vgl. etwa Jean Bossuyt: The future of EU-African development cooperation. With or without the Lomé Convention?, ECDPM Working Paper 95-2, Maastricht 1995.

gemacht haben, und die Armutsbekämpfung nicht vorangekommen ist. Insbesondere Afrika befindet sich in einer Spirale von Gewalt und Unterentwicklung, ohne daß positive Perspektiven – auch bei verstärkten Kooperationsanstrengungen – abzusehen sind.[30] Dazu hat die EU nicht zuletzt, so die These dieses Beitrages, durch ihre falschen Weichenstellungen selbst beigetragen.

2. Grundlegende Entwicklungsprobleme in AKP-Staaten

Bevor wir eine Analyse der derzeitigen EU-Entwicklungskooperation vornehmen, soll versucht werden, die grundlegenden wirtschaftlichen Probleme der AKP-Länder zu beschreiben. Dabei werden wir uns auf zentrale Aspekte der Unterentwicklung und Armut in Afrika konzentrieren. Diese lassen sich folgendermaßen zusammenfassen:

- *Afrika wird im internationalen Handel weiter marginalisiert:*
  Afrikas Ökonomien sind meistens durch einen hohen Anteil der Exporte und Importe am Bruttoinlandsprodukt (BIP) gekennzeichnet. Aber dieser Anteil hat sich in den letzten dreißig Jahren aufgrund hoher Protektion durch Zölle und nicht-tarifäre Handelshemmnisse sowie durch Terms-of-Trade-Verluste verringert.[31] 1960 war die Einbindung Afrikas in den Weltmarkt größer als 1998. Durch die Liberalisierungsmaßnahmen stieg der Anteil des Außenhandels am BIP wieder an (1997: 32%), aber Afrikas Bedeutung im Welthandel geht weiter zurück (1990: 2% und 1997: 1,6%).

- *Afrikas Aus- und Einfuhrstruktur hat sich kaum diversifiziert:*
  Afrikas Ökonomien sind durch einseitige Aus- und Einfuhrstrukturen, die nach wie vor das typische koloniale Spezialisierungsmuster aufweisen, gekennzeichnet. Die Struktur der Importe ist seit vielen Jahrzehnten relativ konstant geblieben. Von herausragender Bedeutung sind Fertigwaren, Investitionsgüter, Öl und Nahrungsmittel. Bei der Ausfuhr dominieren landwirtschaftliche, mineralische und fossile Rohstoffe. Zahlreiche strukturelle Benachteiligungen existieren gerade bei dieser Exportstruktur. Nur wenige Länder konnten die Dutch Disease vermeiden bzw. verringern. Fast kein afrikanisches Land ist in globale Wertschöpfungsketten eingebunden. Einige haben in Nischen reüssiert. Die Lomé-Konvention hat einseitige strukturelle Abhängigkeiten durch

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[30] Vgl. Robert Kappel: Ursachen der afrikanischen Entwicklungskrisen und Chancen der Wirtschaftsreformen, in: Mir A. Ferdowsi (Hrsg.): Afrika zwischen Agonie und Aufbruch, München 1998, S. 79-121 sowie derselbe: Stabex et fluctuations des marchés mondiaux. Politique commerciale et politique d'aide, in GEMDEV (Hrsg.): La Convention de Lomé en question, Paris 1998, S. 183-216 und ders.: Die anhaltende Unterentwicklung Afrikas, in: Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft, 1/1999, S. 38-55.

[31] Vgl. Dirk Hansohm/ Robert Kappel: Schwarz-weiße Mythen. Afrika und der entwicklungspolitische Diskurs, Münster/ Hamburg 1994.

Subventionsfonds für landwirtschaftliche Produkte und Rohstoffe vertieft. Dennoch weisen einige Staaten positive Wachstumsraten in der verarbeitenden Industrie auf. Der Außenhandel wird vor allem mit Ländern der Europäischen Union abgewickelt. Dieser Anteil ist sogar noch gestiegen (1993: 58%). Die EG liefert seit 1975 mehr als zwei Drittel der Importe. Die Erweiterung der EU auf 15 Mitgliedstaaten ist nur zu einem geringen Teil an diesem Anstieg beteiligt. Der Anteil des regionalen Handelsaustausches am Gesamtaußenhandel ist nach wie vor sehr niedrig (weit unter 10%). Die Wachstumspotentiale regionaler Integration sind zwar nicht ausgeschöpft, aber sie sind auch nicht zu hoch zu bewerten.

- *Die Liberalisierung des Welthandels marginalisiert die meisten Länder Afrikas noch weiter:*

Berücksichtigt man die Effekte der Liberalisierung der WTO und die der Lomé-Handelsbeschlüsse, die Liberalisierung der Meistbegünstigungstarife, die Senkung der Präferenzen und die Reduktion von Subventionen, sowie die Agrarliberalisierung und auch die Beendigung des Multifaserabkommens (Abschaffung der Quoten) während der nächsten zehn Jahre, so zeigt sich, daß die Handelsperspektiven für die meisten Länder nicht sehr positiv zu bewerten sind. Die Beschlüsse der Uruguay-Runde heben die asymmetrischen Entwicklungstendenzen kurz- und mittelfristig nicht auf. Erst durch große Anpassungsanstrengungen ließen sich die meist negativen Folgen verringern. Einige Länder, die Emerging African Economies (EAE) – Côte d'Ivoire, Mauritius, Botswana, Südafrika, Senegal und Ghana[32] werden möglicherweise profitieren. Als Kriterien für deren Wirtschafts- und auch Außenhandelserfolg lassen sich Strukturfaktoren wie eine niedrige Inflationsrate, ein niedriges Budgetdefizit/BIP, die Nichtabweichung von offiziellem Wechselkurs und Parallelwechselkurs und der Grad der Anpassung an ausländische Konkurrenz heranziehen.

- *Die Terms-of-Trade-Schocks stellen ein ungünstiges makro-ökonmisches Umfeld für wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung dar:*

Besonders deutlich wird die Krise der außenwirtschaftlichen Beziehungen Afrikas an der Entwicklung der gesunkenen bzw. stark schwankenden Commodity Terms-of-Trade (TOT) und der Income TOT. Oft gingen sinkende Preise für die Rohstoffe einher mit sinkenden Gesamtausfuhren (von 1980-1994). Bis 1993 lagen die Ein- und Ausfuhren unterhalb des Niveaus von 1980, was u.a. auf den Ölpreisverfall und die

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[32] Vgl. Patrick Guillaumont/ Sylviane Guillaumont Jeanneney/ Aristomène Varoudakis: Economic policy reform and growth prospects in emerging African economies, OECD Development Centre Technical Papers 145, Paris 1999 sowie David F. Gordon/ David C. Miller/ Howard Wolpe: The United States and Africa. A post-war perspective, New York/ London 1998.

sinkenden Öleinnahmen zurückzuführen ist. Länder mit hohen Anteile an Rohstoffexporten und landwirtschaftlichen Produkten werden auch zukünftig von TOT-Schocks betroffen sein. Die TOT-Schocks[33] tragen zu erheblichen Beeinträchtigungen des Wachstums bei. Der damit häufig verbundene Rückgang der Exporte korreliert in vielen Ländern mit einer massiven Reduzierung der Importe, was Produktionsengpässe verursachte. Da Afrika aufgrund nicht vorhandener Kapitalgüterproduktion auf die Importe von Maschinen, Fabriken, Vorprodukten etc. angewiesen ist, sind sinkende TOT besonders gravierend. Exporte können unter solchen Umständen nur dann ausgedehnt werden, wenn die entsprechenden Importe finanziert werden können. Zur Kapazitätserweiterung und Expansion der Exportsektoren sind Devisen zu erwirtschaften, die zum Erwerb von Kapitalgütern, die nicht lokal produziert werden können, dienen. Auswirkungen dieser Schocks zeigen sich auch in den Schwankungen des BIP und damit des Pro-Kopf-Einkommens der Bevölkerung. Die Wachstum und Entwicklung behindernden Commodity TOT sind nicht nur Ausdruck einer von Afrika kaum beeinflußbaren Preisbildung, sie beruhen auf fehlgeleiteten Handelspolitiken, die Exporte besteuerten und Exportdiversifizierung nicht gerade stimulierten. Industrieunternehmer und Farmer wurden durch die Besteuerung ihrer Produkte, durch die Überbewertung der Währungen und auch durch staatliche Aufkauf- und Exportmonopole daran gehindert, sich den Anforderungen des Weltmarktes anzupassen.

- *Ausländische Direktinvestitionen und Portfolioinvestitionen meiden Afrika mehr oder weniger:*

Daß fast alle afrikanischen Länder weltwirtschaftlich gesehen weiter isoliert sind, zeigt sich insbesondere am niedrigen Niveau interner und Auslandsinvestitionen. Die durchschnittliche Investitionsquote beträgt gerade 15%. In den letzten Jahren haben die Zuflüsse in die Entwicklungsländer insgesamt erheblich zugenommen, Afrika aber hat davon kaum profitiert. So ist die Entwicklungshilfe mit ca. 18 Mrd. Dollar im Jahr (1990-1996) ungleich höher als die durchschnittlichen privaten Kapitalzuflüsse mit ca. 3 Mrd. Dollar (ohne Südafrika). Zwar hat es in den letzten Jahren einen gewissen Aufschwung an Portfolio-Investitionen in Afrika gegeben, dieser ist aber vor allem auf die Anlegerinteressen in Südafrika zurückzuführen (d.h. ca. 90% der Portfolio-Investitionen in Afrika). Die ausländischen Investitionen konzentrierten sich auf die ölexportierenden Länder Angola, Kongo, Kamerun, Gabun und Nigeria. Von den als

[33] Paul Collier/ Jan Willem Gunning: Explaining economic performance, Centre for the Study of African Economies WPS/97-2, Oxford 1997; vgl. auch World Bank: Global economic prospects and the developing countries, Washington D.C. 1999, S. 172.

am wenigsten entwickelten eingestuften Ländern (32 von 48) haben zahlreiche überhaupt keine ausländischen Direktinvestitionen zu verzeichnen.

- *Geringe Kommunikationsentwicklung und hohe Transportkosten verhindern Entwicklung:*

Afrika ist tendenziell vom Weltmarkt auch deshalb ausgegrenzt, weil Kommunikation und Information sowie eine Transportinfrastruktur nur in unzureichendem Ausmaß vorhanden sind. Es ist teuer, relevante Informationen zu erhalten und Güter zu transportieren. Was die moderne Kommunikationstechnologie betrifft, hat Afrika einen sehr hohen Rückstand gegenüber allen anderen Weltregionen zu verzeichnen. Dieser läßt sich kaum aufholen, denn mangelnde technische Kompetenz und wenig innovative Regierungen stellen eine strukturelle Barriere dar, die auch durch das Überspringen von Technologiestufen (zum Beispiel Satellitentelefon anstatt Kabel) nicht zu überwinden sind.

- *Grundlegende strukturelle Faktoren der Unterentwicklung behindern die Entwicklung. Folgende Probleme sind zu nennen:*

1. Die schwache industrielle Basis ist eine ungünstige Voraussetzung für Afrikas Weltmarktintegration und für regionalen Handelsaustausch.

2. Die Verschuldungssituation der meisten afrikanischen Länder ist weiterhin prekär. Die Gesamtschulden Afrikas südlich der Sahara sind auf ca. 260 Mrd. Dollar (Ende 1997) angewachsen.

3. Niedrige Produktivitäten stellen schon seit Jahrzehnten ein besonderes Problem afrikanischer Ökonomien dar. In vielen Ländern ist die Arbeitsproduktivität gesunken und der Abstand zu Ländern in Asien und Lateinamerika größer geworden. Das Wachstum der totalen Faktorproduktivitäten (TFP) ist im Durchschnitt der letzten 25 Jahre sogar negativ. Allerdings gibt es auch Länder mit Fortschritten in der Produktivitätsentwicklung wie Mauritius und Botswana. Niedrige Arbeitsproduktivitäten und TFP machen deutlich, weshalb immer noch behauptet werden kann, Afrika sei eine der teuersten Produktionsregionen der Welt, obwohl die Lohnkosten niedrig sind. Afrika fungiert bis heute aufgrund niedriger Produktivitäten sowie hoher Kosten für Kommunikation und Transport weder als ausgelagerte Werkbank noch als Standort einer internationalen Wertschöpfungskette.

4. Das extrem niedrige Niveau der „human resources“ ist ein zentrales Hindernis für Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung. Insbesondere der sehr starke Rückstand bei ausgebildeten Ingenieuren und technologischer Kompetenz zeigt, daß ein Take-Off nur sehr schwer möglich ist. Wenn Afrika Wachstum und Entwicklung langfristig vertiefen

und Armut beseitigen will, muß es verstärkte Anstrengungen zur Hebung der Qualität, der technischen Ausbildung und Forschung und auch der beruflichen Bildung unternehmen. Hier kommt es vor allem auf ein Umdenken der Entscheidungsträger aber auch der internationalen Gebergemeinschaft an.

5. Braindrain und Kapitalflucht haben negative Auswirkungen. Ingenieure, Ärzte, Professoren, Handwerker, Lehrer und viele Kulturschaffende haben Afrika den Rücken gekehrt und sind nun vor allem in Europa, in den Ölförderländern des Nahen Ostens und den USA tätig. Diese könnten im Lande zu verbesserten Anpassungsleistungen beitragen, sie wählen aber statt dessen die Exit-Option, wodurch die Innovationsfähigkeit afrikanischer Gesellschaften weiter geschwächt wird.

Grundlegende Variablen für Wachstum und Entwicklung sind in Afrika, mit Ausnahme der EAE, negativ bzw. nur schwach ausgeprägt.[34] Diese Erkenntnisse werden durch neue theoretische Diskussionen untermauert, etwa durch die neue Raumtheorie und die endogenen Wachstumstheorien. Sie sehen in der Wissensakkumulation und Innovation, in der Humankapitalbildung, in der Arbeitskräftespezialisierung und im Arbeitskräftewachstum entscheidende Determinanten für Wachstum. Technische Kompetenz ist derzeit in Afrika kaum existent (Ausnahme Südafrika). Unterentwicklung kommt auch durch mangelnde Ausschöpfung von Wissenspotentialen zustande.

Afrika hat im Globalisierungsprozeß größere Probleme zu bewältigen als je zuvor in seiner Geschichte. Globalisierung fördert die doppelte Denationalisierung des Staates, die Schwächung von staatlichen Institutionen und damit der Potentiale eines Entwicklungsstaates. Schwache Institutionen, Rentenorientierung der Staatseliten, politische Instabilität und „informelle Wertemuster“ vereiteln flexible Anpassungsstrategien. Hohe Transaktionskosten entstehen. Die Folgen dieser Schwächen zeigen sich in Informalität, Illegalität und Kriminalität. Die Strukturanpassungsprogramme verstärken diese Prozesse auf der einen Seite durch die Schwächung des Rentenstaates, auf der anderen Seite jedoch tragen sie zu einem Prozeß der schnellen Veränderung - mit neuen Wachstumspotentialen - bei. Der Anpassungsdruck auf Afrika wächst, aber es besteht nur geringe Hoffnung auf tiefgreifende Veränderung. Krisenverstärkende wie krisenmildernde Entwicklungen kristallisieren sich heraus. Aus wachstumstheoretischer Sicht läßt sich begründen, daß die meisten Länder Afrikas nicht vor einem Take-Off stehen. Entwicklungszusammenarbeit wird also einspringen, um bestenfalls einige negative Folgen abzumildern - falls keine gravierenden Fehler gemacht werden.[35] Aus

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[34] Vgl. Kappel: Die anhaltende Unterentwicklung Afrikas (Anmerkung 3).

[35] Wie die Studie der Weltbank zur Entwicklungshilfe darlegt, hat diese jedoch häufig gravierende Schwächen, vgl. World Bank: Assessing Aid, Oxford/ New York 1999.

raumtheoretischer und auch aus handelstheoretischer Sicht läßt sich die weitere Marginalisierung Afrikas ableiten. Es fehlt die Nähe zu den OECD-Märkten, es fehlt die Produktpalette, und hohe Transport- und Kommunikationskosten lassen eine verbesserte Weltmarktintegration Afrikas als mittelfristig aussichtslos erscheinen. Komparative Vorteile bestehen bei den traditionellen Export- und einigen Nischenprodukten. Positive Wirkungen für das Wirtschaftswachstum durch Auslandsdirektinvestitionen transnationaler Konzerne, Portfolioinvestitionen und verbesserte Information und Kommunikation erweisen sich bei näherem Hinsehen als trügerische Hoffnungen. Eher wird sich eine weitere Marginalisierung einstellen. Wachstumseffekte entstehen kaum. Afrikas Ökonomien sind insgesamt durch strukturelle Faktoren, exogene Schocks und Informalität von Staat und Gesellschaft derzeit kaum in der Lage, im Globalisierungsprozeß flexibel zu reagieren und sich im Wandel anzupassen. Liberalisierung und Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen haben bislang nur wenigen Ländern Anstöße geben können. Entwicklungshilfe begünstigt die Rentenaneignung und scheint vielfach eher die Informalität von Staat und Gesellschaft zu stärken als abzumildern. Die Lomé-Kooperation bildet keine Ausnahme.[36]

3. Europas Kooperation mit den AKP-Ländern

3.1. Vom römischen Vertrag zum Grünbuch

Die Entwicklungskooperation der Europäischen Gemeinschaft (EG) bzw. der EU ist mit Ausnahme Deutschlands aus dem kolonialen Nachlaß der einzelnen EG-Staaten entstanden. Insbesondere Frankreich spielt in der postkolonialen Phase eine Rolle als Verfechter der Kooperation mit den afrikanischen Staaten im eigenen Interesse. Aus dieser Zeit stammen beispielsweise die später im Lomé-Vertrag angewendeten Preisstabilisierungsfonds.[37] Das Jahr 1957 markiert den Beginn der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft, die am 25.3.1957 in Rom den EWG-Vertrag schloß. In diesem Vertrag wurde bereits das Grundkonzept der Entwicklungskooperation festgeschrieben. Teil IV des Römischen Vertrages, Artikel 131, behandelt die Assoziierung der überseeischen Gebiete der Mitgliedstaaten und sieht „die Förderung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Entwicklung der Länder und Hoheitsgebiete und die Herstellung enger Wirtschaftsbeziehungen zwischen ihnen und der gesamten Gemeinschaft“ vor.

Der EWG-Vertrag von 1957 ging noch von abhängigen Ländern aus, die mit der EWG assoziiert wurden. Von achtzehn außereuropäischen Ländern und Hoheitsgebieten waren

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[36] Vgl. Louk Box/ Joachim von Braun/ Jean-Jacques Gabas: Was kommt nach Lomé IV? Die Politik muß sich noch stärker an der Praxis orientieren, Maastricht 1999.

[37] Vgl. Stefan Brüne: Die französische Afrikapolitik, Baden-Baden 1995.

vierzehn ehemals französisch, und wurden als AASM (Assoziierte Afrikanische Staaten und Madagaskar) bezeichnet. 1961 war das Geburtsjahr des Europäischen Entwicklungsfonds (EEF), der aus der Diskussion zwischen den EWG-Ländern entstand. Die Finanzierung der EEF wird bis heute aus den nationalen Beiträgen gespeist. Formal werden die Mittel des EEF als nicht zurückzahlende Zuschüsse, als Beteiligungskapital oder als Darlehen vergeben. Nicht zurückzahlende Zuschüsse waren die ausschließliche Finanzierungsform während des ersten EEF. In den nachfolgenden EEF gab es Beteiligungskapital (Darlehen der EIB) und rückzahlbare Zuschüsse, wobei es sich vor allem um „soft loans“ handelte (Laufzeit bis zu 40 Jahren, tilgungsfreie Zeit von 10 Jahren und ermäßigter Zinssatz). Dazu kamen Mittel für Stabilisierungskassen, um Preisschwankungen auf dem Weltmarkt abfedern zu können. Sie wurden auf den Betrag der rückzahlbaren Zuschüsse angerechnet. Die Finanzhilfen wurden zur Verbesserung der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Infrastruktur sowie zur Produktions- und Diversifizierungshilfe eingesetzt.

Das von der EWG und den AASM am 20.7.1963 unterzeichnete Jaunde I-Abkommen war ein bedeutender Schritt in Richtung einer europäischen Entwicklungspolitik, die zwölf Jahre später in die Lomé-Konvention mündete (28. Februar 1975 das erste Abkommen von Lomé). 1975 waren 46 AKP-Länder (1999: 71) und neun EG-Länder (1999: 15 EU-Länder) beteiligt. Es ist damit das größte und am längsten existierende Kooperationsmodell zwischen Nord und Süd. Der Abschluß des Vertrages wurde von den Vertragsparteien euphorisch als Wendepunkt in den internationalen Beziehungen bezeichnet. Der „Geist von Lomé“ verband die Partner in der „gemeinsamen Suche nach einem Höchstmaß an Zusammenarbeit“ und in dem Wunsch, etwas „zu der schwierigen Genese einer neuen internationalen Wirtschaftsordnung beizutragen“ (Kommission). Lomé sollte „ein neues Modell für die Beziehungen zwischen entwickelten Staaten und Entwicklungsstaaten“ (so die Präambel des Lomé-I-Vertrages) werden. Ein Konzept zur Bekämpfung der Armut war nicht vorgesehen.

Das Lomé-Modell entwickelte sich entgegen der ursprünglichen Absichten immer mehr zu einem Entwicklungshilfemodell. Der Anteil der Entwicklungshilfe aus der EG am Bruttosozialprodukt bzw. an den Exporten stieg an. Das Pisani-Memorandum von 1982 unterstrich die Notwendigkeit der Ernährungssicherung der Bevölkerung und des Kampfes gegen die Armut. Landwirtschaftliche Entwicklung sollte zu einem sektoralen Schwerpunkt werden. Lomé III hatte aber außer der Projekthilfe noch eine andere entscheidende Veränderung erfahren. Unter der Leitlinie „Politikdialog“ wurde vom Prinzip der Eigenverantwortung der AKP-Staaten abgegangen; Konditionalitäten wurden eingeführt (politische Konditionalität und wirtschaftliche Strukturanpassungsprogramme). Beide

wurden im Lomé IV-Abkommen fixiert. Die Verhandlungen zu Lomé IV wurden von der EG mit dem Ziel eingeleitet, eine „3-K-Politik“ - im Politik-Dialog mit den AKP-Staaten durchzuführen: Koordinierung der EG-Entwicklungshilfe mit der bilateralen Hilfe; Kohärenz der Entwicklungspolitik und der Instrumente; Konzentration der Mittel auf wesentliche Sektoren.

Die entwicklungspolitische Diskussion in der Europäischen Union (EU) hat sich seit 1989 gewandelt. Als am 15. Dezember 1989 das vierte Lomé-Abkommen geschlossen wurde, hatten sich die weltpolitischen Bedingungen bereits erheblich verändert. Mit den Verhandlungen für die Fortsetzung der Kooperation 1998 sind die Konturen einer neuen Entwicklungspolitik deutlich auszumachen. Verfahren wird nach den Maastrichter-Verträgen, die in Artikel 130 u bis 130 y die Kooperationsziele umreißen: (a) Die Demokratie solle gefördert werden - (b) Die Dritte Welt solle harmonisch in die Weltwirtschaft integriert werden - (c) Die Armut solle vorrangig bekämpft werden - (d) Nachhaltige wirtschaftliche Entwicklung sei erforderlich. Im „Grünbuch“ von 1996[38] werden zahlreiche Optionen für den Verhandlungsdialog mit den AKP-Staaten vorgelegt. Da die Kooperation mit den AKP-Staaten als nicht sehr erfolgreich angesehen wird, wird ein grundlegender Wandel empfohlen.[39] Das neue Verhandlungsmandat stellt Überlegungen zu den Rahmenbedingungen in den Mittelpunkt. Sie folgt damit neueren Erkenntnissen, wonach die wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen (Good Governance, Institutionelle Reformen, sowie wirtschaftliche Liberalisierung) entscheidende Parameter für eine Neuordnung auch der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit darstellen. Die wirtschaftlichen und politischen Rahmenbedingungen sollen dazu dienen, daß Wirtschaftsakteure, politische Organisationen und gesellschaftliche Gruppen die geschaffenen Handlungsspielräume nutzen, um Entwicklung herbeizuführen und Armut zu beseitigen. Führen Länder miteinander Krieg, wie zahlreiche Länder in Afrika, sind dies ungünstige Bedingungen für Entwicklung. Frieden stellt also eine erste grundlegende Kategorie für Entwicklung dar. Natürlich ist dies nur eine der Voraussetzungen, die erfüllt sein müssen, damit wirtschaftliche und soziale Entwicklung überhaupt möglich ist. Weitestgehend folgt die EU den Gedanken der Weltbank, die in zahlreichen Dokumenten deutlich macht, welche Rolle die Rahmenbedingungen für Entwicklung spielen.[40] Ausgehend von zu schaffenden positiven Rahmenbedingungen können auch die

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[38] Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Grünbuch über die Beziehungen zwischen der Europäischen Union und den AKP-Staaten an der Schwelle zum 21. Jahrhundert – Herausforderungen und Optionen für eine neue Partnerschaft, Luxemburg 1996.

[39] Vgl. insgesamt GEMDEV: La convention de Lome en question, Paris 1998 und GEMDEV: Quel espace ce cooperation entre l‘Europe et les pays ACP, Paris 1999.

[40] World Bank 1998, (Anmerkung 8).

Instrumente der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit eingesetzt werden. Dabei verfolgt die EU drei Prinzipien:

1. Der Partnerschaftsgedanke betont, daß nur über gemeinsame Abstimmungen der Politik sowie über das Commitment und „Ownership" der AKP-Regierung positiv agiert werden kann. Der Partnerschaftsgedanke schlägt sich auch in einer verstärkten Einbindung des Konzepts der dezentralisierten Kooperation (KDK) nieder.
2. Über die Rationalisierung der Instrumente soll eine langfristige Programmierungsfazilität bei Zusammenfassung aller Instrumente des EEF geschaffen werden. Ziel ist es, die Mittel des Nationalen Indikativplans (NIP) in einem Base-Case festzulegen. Für Länder mit Commitment werden die Mittel erhöht (High-Case). Unter den High Case fallen auch Mittel aus Stabex, sobald Probleme bei den Exporterlösen auftreten. Zusätzlich kann auch Nothilfe gegeben werden. Die Investitionsfazilität soll über die Europäische Investitionsbank koordiniert werden.

Was den Handelsbereich betrifft, strebt die EU ein Rahmenabkommen an, das auf ein Freihandelsabkommen hinausläuft. Als Zwischenschritt werden REPA (Regionale ökonomische Partnerschaftsabkommen) mit vier Regionen in Afrika und je einer Region in der Karibik und im Pazifik empfohlen.[41]

In allen Ländern soll alle zwei Jahre eine Überprüfung der Leistungsfähigkeit erfolgen. Prinzipien wie Commitment, Good Governance und Ownership, werden von der EU als zentral angesehen.

3.2. Die Lomé-Instrumente und ihre Wirkungen

3.2.1. Makro-Ebene

Im folgenden wird auf einige besonders wichtige Ergebnisse der Entwicklungskooperation der Makro-Ebene eingegangen:

Handel: Die Zollregelung, die seit 1975 in Kraft ist, begünstigt Waren mit Ursprung in den AKP-Ländern durch Zoll- und Abgabenfreiheit. Trotz des präferentiellen Zollsystems ist der Anteil der Importe aus den AKP-Ländern an den EU-Gesamtimporten zurückgegangen. Freiwillige Exportbeschränkungen und die Ursprungsregeln behindern die Diversifizierung

[41] Matthew McQueen: The impact studies on effects of REPAs between the ACP and the EU, ECDPM Discussion Paper No. 3, Maastricht 1999.

der AKP-Staaten. Das Handelspräferenzabkommen ist der Veränderung der Produktions- und Exportstruktur in Richtung Diversifizierung der industriellen Produktion und der Exporte nicht förderlich gewesen. Verschiedene Vorschläge zur Begünstigung der Exportdiversifizierung wurden unterbreitet, wie Verbesserung der tarifären Präferenzen, Aussetzen von Importquoten und zusätzliche Entwicklungshilfe zur Produktionsdiversifizierung. Diese Instrumente werden den Diversifizierungsprozeß jedoch nicht beschleunigen können, weil das Problem der AKP-Produzenten nicht der Marktzugang ist, sondern die zu teure Produktion, zu niedrige Produktivität, die unzureichenden Kenntnisse der Nachfragemärkte, die schwach entwickelte Produktpalette und die Behinderung der exportorientierten verarbeitenden Industrie durch reformunfähige Staaten. Nur bei wenigen Produkten (abgesehen von den Rohstoffen) haben Unternehmer aus den AKP-Staaten komparative Wettbewerbsvorteile erzielen können (z.B. Kleidung, Kunstgewerbe). Die Beschlüsse der Uruguay-Runde und der WTO haben die Weltmärkte noch weiter liberalisiert, so daß die meisten Lomé-Länder im Handel noch weiter Anteile verlieren werden (Ausnahme EAE). Das Präferenzabkommen ist umstritten, zum einen weil es die Diversifizierung behindert hat, zum anderen weil es den WTO-Beschlüssen widerspricht. Über kurz oder lang wird das Lomé-Präferenzabkommen Gegenstand erneuter Beratungen zwischen WTO und der EU sein. Das Präferenzmodell erweist sich heute als eines der zentralen Entwicklungshemmnisse der meisten AKP-Staaten. Die Strategie, Armut über präferentiellen Handel zu beseitigen, hat ihr Ziel verfehlt. Die von der EU präferierten REPA sind indes kaum geeignet, die Exportfähigkeit zu verbessern.

Finanzielle und technische Kooperation: Angesichts von Armut und Unterentwicklung spielen Entwicklungshilfegelder der EU neben den nationalen Maßnahmen in den einzelnen EU-Staaten grundsätzlich eine sehr wichtige Rolle. Die Entwicklungshilfe der EU im Rahmen der Lomé-Vereinbarungen wurde seit 1975 stark ausgeweitet. Die gesamte Finanzhilfe der EU[42] umfaßte in Lomé IV/2 (1995-2000) ein Volumen von 14,8 Mrd. ECU. Seit dem siebten EEF werden die Mittel ausschließlich als nicht-rückzahlbare Zuschüsse vergeben. Lediglich für die Mittel der Europäischen Investitionsbank (EIB) treten Zinsbelastungen auf, so daß der Zuschußanteil des 7. EEF bei ca. 92% lag. Die Auszahlungen aus dem EEF sind seit 1994 rückläufig, was vor allem mit der späten Ratifizierung des 8. EEF durch die EU- und AKP-Mitgliedstaaten zu tun hat. Der 8. EEF trat erst am 1.6.1998 in Kraft, obwohl die Laufzeit die Jahre 1995 bis 2000 abdeckt. Wie stark die Verausgabung der Mittel verschoben ist, zeigen auch die Auszahlungen des 6.

[42] Hinzu kommen die bilateralen Mittel der einzelnen EU-Staaten.

und 7. EEF (1985-1995), von denen ca. 4,5 Mrd. ECU bislang nicht in Anspruch genommen wurden.[43]

Regional verteilt sich die gesamte EU-Hilfe (Mittel aus der bilateralen Entwicklungshilfe plus EEF) zu 45% auf Afrika (1980 ca. 60%) und 26% auf den Nahen Osten (1980 noch ca. 12%). Es ist somit eine eindeutige Gewichtsverschiebung zuungunsten Afrikas und der AKP-Staaten festzustellen. Der Anteil des EEF am Gesamtvolumen ist von 50% (1990) auf ca. 39% (1993) gefallen. Die Auszahlungen von 1997 beliefen sich gerade auf knapp 15%, sie werden sich jedoch bereits 1999 wieder stark erhöhen, wenn die entsprechenden Verträge des 8. EEF zwischen der EU und den AKP-Staaten unterzeichnet werden und der Mittelabfluß möglich ist.

Die EU unterscheidet in ihrer Entwicklungshilfe grundsätzlich zwischen Programmhilfe und nicht-programmierbarer Hilfe. Die Mittel der Programmhilfe werden zu Beginn des Lomé-Abkommens zwischen den EU-Mitgliedsstaaten, dem entsprechenden AKP-Staat und der EU ausgehandelt und im sog. nationalen Richtprogramm (bzw. Nationales Indikativprogramm, NIP) festgehalten. Die Programmhilfe umfaßt Entwicklungshilfeprojekte, die Förderung der regionalen Zusammenarbeit für sieben Regionen in den AKP-Staaten, Programme in den Bereichen Gesundheit und Aids-Bekämpfung, Hilfe für Mikroprojekte, industrielle Zusammenarbeit, Entwicklung des Handels und des Fremdenverkehrs, kulturelle Zusammenarbeit, Bildung und Ausbildung und Strukturanpassungsprogramme. Der Anwendungsbereich der programmierten finanziellen und technischen Zusammenarbeit erstreckt sich auf alle genannten wirtschaftspolitisch relevanten Bereiche. Dazu kommen ferner sektorale Entwicklungs- und Einfuhrprogramme. Hierbei handelt es sich zumeist um indirekte Budgethilfen, die den Ländern Deviseneinsparungen bei notwendigen Importen ermöglichen. Die nicht-programmierbare Hilfe beinhaltet die Mittel für Sonderdarlehen, Risikokapital, STABEX und SYSMIN. Sie betrifft alle Ausgaben, die zu Beginn der Kooperation nicht geplant werden können. Der Stabilisierungsfonds für landwirtschaftliche Exportprodukte (STABEX-System) und der Sonderfonds für Bergbauerzeugnisse (SYSMIN) sind wesentliche Bausteine des Kooperationsabkommens zwischen der EG und den AKP-Ländern.

Das *STABEX-System* umfaßt im Lomé IV-Abkommen 51 landwirtschaftliche Rohstoffe (Lomé I: 29 Produkte; Lomé III: 48 Produkte) und soll Mindereinnahmen bei den Exporterlösen (z.B. infolge von Preissenkungen) in gewissen Umfang ausgleichen (vgl. Kasten 1). Die Mittel betrugen in Lomé IV/2 1,8 Mrd. ECU. Die EU hat in Lomé IV eine stärkere Kontrolle über die Verwendung der Mittel durchgesetzt, wobei diese insbesondere

[43] Vgl. NDGO-EU Liaison Committee 1998, S. 6.

zur Diversifizierung eingesetzt werden sollen. Bis 1990 wurden die ausgezahlten Mittel teilweise für andere Zwecke als die vorgesehenen ausgegeben. Den Bauern kamen sie nicht zugute. Die hauptsächlich begünstigten Länder waren 1991: Côte d'Ivoire (18% der Mittel), Kamerun (18%), Äthiopien (12%), Uganda (9%), Sudan (8%), Papua-Neuguinea (4%) und Madagaskar (4%).

Kasten 1: Anwendung von STABEX

1. Die STABEX-Regelung kann für Waren in Anspruch genommen werden, auf die im Jahr vor der Inanspruchnahme des Systems 5% der vom jeweiligen Land im Exportgeschäft mit sämtlichen Bestimmungsländern insgesamt erwirtschafteten Ausfuhrerlöse fallen (4% im Falle von Sisal).
2. Jedes Land kann die Stabex-Regelung in Anspruch nehmen, in dem gemessen am Durchschnitt der sechs dem Jahr der Inanspruchnahme des Systems vorausgegangenen Jahre ein Rückgang der Ausfuhrerlöse um mindestens von 4,5% festgestellt wird, wobei weder der niedrigste noch der höchste Jahreswert berücksichtigt wird (für die am wenigsten entwickelten AKP-Staaten sowie die AKP-Binnen- und AKP-Inselstaaten ist der Anteil in beiden Fällen auf 1% festgelegt).

Obwohl das STABEX-Subventionssystem einen Beitrag zum Ausgleich von Erlösminderungen leistet und damit auf den ersten Blick als sinnvolles Instrument angesehen werden könnte, sind die langfristigen Wirkungen eher negativ, zumal es auch einige wesentliche Schwächen hat: a) Die Gesamtzahlungen sind auf bestimmte Plafonds begrenzt, so daß extreme Erlössenkungen nicht aufgefangen werden konnten. 1993 wurden beispielsweise Transferansprüche in Höhe von 473 Mio. ECU gestellt, jedoch standen nur Mittel in Höhe von 285 Mio. ECU zur Verfügung. b) Die Zahl der einbezogenen Produkte ist begrenzt, es fehlen die Agrarprodukte, die durch die EG-Marktordnungen gestützt werden. c) Durch die Festlegung einer Abhängigkeitsgrenze (5%) besteht kaum ein Anreiz zur Diversifizierung. Die von STABEX begünstigten Länder konzentrieren sich noch stärker auf die Produktion der STABEX-Güter und verfestigen damit monokulturelle Strukturen. Länder, die die Abhängigkeitsschwelle durch die Diversifizierung ihrer Produktpalette unterschreiten, werden faktisch bestraft. d) Die Auszahlung der Mittel ist zum Teil sehr schleppend, weil zwischen den AKP-Ländern und der EU zunächst eine Rahmenvereinbarung der gegenseitigen Verpflichtung geschlossen werden muß. e) STABEX-Transfers stellen einen Einkommenstransfer an die Regierung dar, sie sind Entwicklungshilfe ohne Lieferbindung. Sie sind in den AKP-Ländern besonders willkommen, weil sie nicht konditioniert sind. Insgesamt sind die Wirkungen von STABEX-Zahlungen eher schwach und begünstigt nur wenige Länder, die zumeist eher zu

den Middle Income Countries (Ländern mit höheren durchschnittlichen Pro-Kopf-Einkommen) gehören. Da STABEX sich an Waren ausrichtet und nicht an den Kriterien für Unterentwicklung, wie etwa dem Pro-Kopf-Einkommen des jeweiligen Landes, ist die Lomé-IV-Reform eher ein Beitrag zur Verbesserung der Lage der Länder mit mittleren Einkommen.

Erstmals kam es im Rahmen von Lomé II zur Errichtung eines Sonderfonds für Bergbauerzeugnisse (SYSMIN). Länder, die hauptsächlich mineralische Rohstoffe exportieren (wie Zaire, Zambia, Mauretanien, Liberia, Jamaika, Papua-Neuguinea) waren vom Ausgleichssystem ausgeschlossen. Die Einrichtung des Fonds geht vor allem auf das Interesse der EU zurück, eine möglichst reibungslose Zufuhr an Rohstoffen zu sichern. Er stellt im Lomé IV/2-Abkommen bei Erlösausfällen für neun mineralische Rohstoffe 575 Mio. ECU zur Verfügung. Die SYSMIN-Mittel stellen ein Anreizsystem für höhere Produktion von SYSMIN-Produkten dar. Sie wirken somit nicht in Richtung Diversifizierung (siehe Kasten 2).

STABEX und SYSMIN wurden bislang als heilige Kühe der Kooperation angesehen, bedürfen aber einer grundlegenden Reform. Kritische Bewertungen legen sogar die Streichung dieser Instrumente nahe, da die positiven Auswirkungen für relativ wenige Länder, die von dem Instrument Gebrauch machen können, die langfristig negativen Wirkungen nicht aufheben können.[44]

[44] Vgl. Kappel: Stabex et fluctuations des marchés mondiaux (Anmerkung 3) sowie ders.: Europäische Entwicklungspolitik im Wandel, INEF-Report 17, Duisburg 1996.

Kasten 2: Anwendung von SYSMIN

Die Fazilität dient dazu, die nachteiligen Auswirkungen vorübergehender schwerer Störungen des Bergbausektors auf die Einnahmen dieser Länder abzufangen. Ein Land kann einen Antrag auf Inanspruchnahme von SYSMIN stellen, wenn der Anteil der fraglichen Erzeugnisse an den Gesamtausfuhren vier Jahre in Folge im Schnitt mehr als 15% (10% im Falle der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder) oder der Anteil der Ausfuhrerlöse für sämtliche Bergbauerzeugnisse 20% oder mehr ausmacht (12% im Falle der am wenigsten entwickelten Länder sowie der Binnen- und Inselstaaten). Seit Lomé IV werden nicht-rückzahlbare Zuschüsse vergeben. SYSMIN ist im Unterschied zu STABEX kein System zur Erlösstabilisierung, obwohl Erlösminderungen ausgeglichen werden. SYSMIN verfolgt den Zweck, die Zufuhr von Rohstoffen für die rohstoffarme EG zu sichern. SYSMIN-Gelder werden zur Verfügung gestellt, um der Gefahr von Stillegungen der Bergbauproduktion durch sinkende Rohstofferlöse zu entgehen. Diversifizierungsmaßnahmen sind nicht vorgesehen. Vier Länder, Sambia, Zaire, Guinea und Guyana, erhielten von 1980-1990 mehr als zwei Drittel aller zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel (siehe Tabelle 6). SYSMIN ist durch strenge Konditionalität geprägt. Die EU beteiligt sich an den Modernisierungs- und Rehabilitationsmaßnahmen und nimmt Einfluß auf die effiziente Verwendung der Mittel.

Industrieförderung: In Artikel 17 des Lomé-IV-Vertrages wird als Ziel der Industrialisierung ein sich selbst-tragendes Wachstum und eine ausgewogene und vielfältige Entwicklung genannt. Insbesondere unterstützt werden soll die vertikale und horizontale Diversifizierung der Volkswirtschaften. Für diese Zielsetzung werden jedoch immer weniger Mittel zur Verfügung gestellt. Die Kooperation konzentriert sich konzeptionell auf den modernen Sektor. Daran ändern auch die Mittel für Mikroprojekte, die zum Teil in die Förderung der Klein- und Mittelindustrie gehen, nur wenig.

Regionale Kooperation: Die Unterstützung der regionalen Kooperation spielte bereits seit Lomé-I eine große - und wachsende - Rolle. In Lomé-IV wurden 1,25 Mrd. ECU für regionale Kooperation zur Verfügung gestellt. Das Schwergewicht der Förderprogramme liegt in der Verbesserung der Infrastruktur. Für die sieben Regionen innerhalb der AKP-Staatengemeinschaft stehen regionale Indikativprogramme zur Verfügung, die länderübergreifende Programme und Projekte finanzieren. Trotz einiger Fortschritte durch die Fördermaßnahmen im Rahmen von Lomé ist die regionale Kooperation zu wenig auf konkrete Förderung gerichtet, weil vor allem ein traditioneller Projektansatz verfolgt wird.

Strukturanpassungsprogramme: Die EU reagierte auf die Strukturanpassungsprogramme (SAP) mit einem Sonderprogramm zugunsten hochverschuldeter und armer AKP-Länder. Dieses Programm finanzierte seit 1988 rasch auszahlbare und nicht projektgebundene Hilfen. Die Inanspruchnahme von Mitteln des EU-Sonderprogramms ist an die Bedingung geknüpft, daß SAP durchgeführt werden. Die Mittel werden in enger Abstimmung mit der Weltbank und dem IWF vergeben. Insgesamt zielen die Mittel auf weniger drastische SAP mit gewisser Berücksichtigung sozialer Komponenten. Zudem sollen sie auf regionaler Ebene koordiniert werden, um den Handel zwischen den AKP-Staaten zu vergrößern. Die im Rahmen der EU-SAP gebildeten Gegenwertmittel (siehe Kasten 3) sollen schrittweise in die makro-ökonomische Konzeption der betreffenden Länder integriert werden. Der Einsatz der Gegenwertmittel reicht aber bei weitem nicht zur Kompensation der negativen Folgen der SAP aus.

Kasten 3: Ziele der Strukturanpassung der Lomé-Konvention

Gemäß den Leitlinien der Entschließung des Rates vom Mai 1992 verfolgt die EU zusammen mit den Bretton Woods-Institutionen folgende vier Ziele:

1. SAP-Maßnahmen zur Absicherung langfristiger Entwicklung, Anpassung des Tempos der Reformen an die politischen und sozialen Sachzwänge und Kapazitäten der einzelnen Länder und Berücksichtigung der regionalen und sozialen Dimensionen der Strukturanpassung.
2. Kohärenz mit anderen Lomé-Instrumenten (Nahrungsmittelhilfe und STABEX).
3. Einblick in die öffentlichen Finanzen der AKP-Länder, um die Aufstellung und Verwaltung des Haushaltes zu unterstützen und um zu gewährleisten, daß die AKP-Staaten ihren Haushaltsverpflichtungen nachkommen und die Hilfe zweckbestimmt eingesetzt wird.
4. Engere Koordinierung mit anderen Gebern (IWF, Weltbank und Mitgliedstaaten der EU). Insgesamt stehen in Lomé IV/2 1,8 Mrd. ECU für die EU-SAP zur Verfügung.

Die EU-SAP werden in Form von allgemeinen Einfuhrprogrammen gewährt, so daß den Wirtschaftsbeteiligten Devisen zur Verfügung stehen. Im Rahmen der SAP werden Gegenwertmittel gebildet. Die Gegenwertmittel werden zur Deckung der öffentlichen Ausgaben für Verwaltung und/oder Investitionen in den wichtigsten Sozialleistungen und der wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Infrastrukturen eingesetzt.

Die AKP-Länder und die EU pflegen eine historisch gewachsene Netzwerkbildung, die allerdings strukturelle Heterogenitäten, Asymmetrien und Blockierungen gefördert hat. Die Kooperation sollte sich zum Ziel setzen, das Abgleiten der AKP-Staaten in die weitere Marginalisierung zu verhindern. Dies ist mit den Instrumenten der Makro-Ebene der Lomé-Kooperation nicht gelungen, weil die Instrumente nur eine eingeschränkte Wirkung hatten. Wo sie griffen, wurden teilweise falsche Signale und Anreize gegeben, die zur Verfestigung von Asymmetrien und struktureller Heterogenitäten beitrugen. Die selbst-gesteckten Ziele - Beseitigung der Armut, Begünstigung sich-selbst-tragender Wirtschaftsstrukturen und Beförderung von demokratischen Strukturen - wurden bestenfalls ansatzweise avisiert. Zwar haben einzelne Projekte und Programme und in extremen Krisensituationen Nothilfe- und Nahrungsmittelhilfe sowie auch die Stabilisierungsfonds zur Linderung von Problemen beigetragen, dies rechtfertigt jedoch nicht die Fortsetzung der derzeitigen Lomé-Konvention. Zu sehr spielen in der Entwicklungskooperation im Rahmen von Lomé klientelistische Beziehungen, strategische und wirtschaftliche Interessen hinein, die dem Entwicklungskonzept, der Armutsbekämpfung, der Begünstigung von Industrialisierungsprozessen und der Herstellung kohärenter Strukturen entgegenstehen.

3.2.2 Armutsbekämpfung im Lomé-Vertrag

Unterschiedliche Quellen geben einen unterschiedlichen Anteil der in die Armutsbekämpfung gehenden Mittel der EU an. Manche vermuten ca. 15%, andere meinen, es seien ca. 25%. Die Lomé-Konventionen enthalten verstreut vorzufindende Hinweise auf Armutsbekämpfung. Insgesamt jedoch existiert bis heute kein kohärentes und konsistentes Armutsbekämpfungskonzept. Erst mit dem Maastricht-Vertrag von 1992 wird Armutsbekämpfung als zentrale Maßnahme anerkannt. Danach gibt es einige Dokumente, die die Rolle der Armutsbekämpfung stärker berücksichtigen. Ausgehend von einer Mitteilung der Kommission[45] wird in der am 2.12.1993 angenommenen Europarat-Entschließung zur Armutsbekämpfung in den Entwicklungsländern dieses Thema als prioritär definiert. Dies schlägt sich auch in der besonderen Berücksichtigung der Frauen in den Fördermaßnahmen nieder, denn „der Anteil der Frauen an der armen Bevölkerung (ist) unverhältnismäßig hoch."[46] Die Überwindung der ungleichen Möglichkeiten für Geschlechter wird als zentral angesehen. In einer weiteren Entschließung des Rates der

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[45] Kommission der Europäischen Gemeinschaften: Horizont 2000: Ermittlung der prioritären Bereiche für die Koordinierung der Politik der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit zwischen der Gemeinschaft und ihren Mitgliedstaaten anhand einer Überprüfung der vom Entwicklungsrat seit 1991 verabschiedeten Texte, Kom(93) 123 endg., Brüssel 24. März 1993.

[46] Europäische Union. Der Rat: Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat und das Europäische Parlament – Mikrofinanzierung und Armutsbekämpfung, Kom(98) 527 endg., Brüssel 5.10.1998, S. 4.

EU über menschengerechte und soziale Entwicklung wird dann erneut die Notwendigkeit bekräftigt, die Themenbereiche Armut und Gleichstellung der Geschlechter in die allgemeine Entwicklungspolitik zu integrieren. 1997 erfolgte eine weitere Mitteilung der Kommission an den Rat,[47] in der die Bedeutung von arbeitsplatzschaffendem Wirtschaftswachstum, Armutsbekämpfung und Integration der Entwicklungsländer in die Weltwirtschaft bekräftigt wird. Als wichtigste Aktionsbereiche der Verringerung von Armut nennt die Kommission der EU: Unterstützung des Sozialsektors, Programme für Mikroprojekte, Nahrungsmittelhilfe , Mikrofinanzierung, Frauenförderung, Umweltschutz und Dezentralisierte Kooperation, einschließlich der Kofinanzierung von Nichtregierungsorganisationen.

Das Grünbuch betont Armutsbekämpfung durch Wirtschaftswachstum. Dieses müsse mindestens 5% betragen, damit Armut nicht weiter steigt. Ergänzend sei erforderlich, den Zugang zu Basissozialdiensten zu erweitern und die Rolle der Frauen stärker zu betonen. Zudem sei es notwendig, „den Zugang zu den Produktivressourcen (Bildung, Ausbildung, Landbesitz, Vermögen und Kredit usw.)“ zu sichern. Interessant ist der Hinweis auf den „informellen Sektor", der nach Ansicht des Grünbuchs zwar „erstaunlich dynamisch" (S. 35) sei, doch könne er nicht zu einer dauerhaften Verbesserung der Lebensumstände der Menschen beitragen.

Schließlich meint die EU-Kommission im Grünbuch, daß „Armutsbekämpfung ... bereits ein Kernelement der derzeitigen Kooperationspolitik" sei (S. 67) und entsprechende Orientierungen gegeben worden seien. Es komme aber darauf an, daß die EU und die AKP-Partnerländer eingehend erörtern, „wie die Kooperationspolitik der Gemeinschaft in Zukunft noch wirksamer zur Armutsbekämpfung beitragen könnte" (S. 68). Ein indirektes Eingeständnis, daß die Armutsbekämpfung weder konzeptionell noch in der konkreten Umsetzung kohärent gewesen ist, zeigt auch der Hinweis des Grünbuchs, wonach die Kommission für ein „strategischeres Vorgehen" plädiere (S. 68). Dazu gehören folgende Maßnahmen:

- Zugang zu produktiven Ressourcen, Beschäftigung und Humanressourcen durch Aktionen in folgenden Bereichen:
    - Verbesserung der Fähigkeit zur Analyse und Erarbeitung strategischer Konzepte für die Schaffung von Arbeitsplätzen im Produktionssektor

[47] European Commission: Guidelines for the negotiation of new cooperation agreements with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, EU-COM(97)537 final, 29.X.97, Brüssel 1997.

  - Unterstützung von Reformen, die den Zugang zu den produktiven Ressourcen erleichtern (Bildung, berufliche Bildung, Kredite, Landbesitz) und damit Einkommensmöglichkeiten schaffen helfen
  - Unterstützung von Arbeitsmarktpolitiken zur Förderung der Qualifikation, Mobilität und Motivation der Arbeitskräfte.
- Unterstützung der Sozialpolitik. Ziel ist es, eine allgemeine Strategie zu entwickeln, die die Projekthilfe ersetzt und schließlich auch eine größere Effizienz der Hilfe gewährleisten soll. Sinnvoll seien:
  - Ein Dialog über Sozialpolitik, um Prioritäten festzulegen
  - Finanzielle Hilfe zur Abdeckung der laufenden Ausgaben in den prioritären Sektoren - in enger Abstimmung mit den Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen. Indirekt wendet sich die EU gegen die 20:20-Regelung, sie empfiehlt eher ein globales und flexibles Konzept. Bei der Vergabe von Mitteln soll "verantwortungsvolle Staatsführung" ("Good Governance") als Konditionalität eingebunden sein. "Selektivere Vergabe der Hilfe" (S. 69) sei notwendig.

Damit ist prinzipiell durchaus ein Wandel in der Armutskonzeption zu konstatieren, denn bislang haben sich europäische Agenturen in ihrem Fokus auf die Armut auf Ad-hoc-Projekte, die die Masse der Mittel absorbierten, gestützt: „European agencies were weakest in their efforts to understand the country-poverty situation."[48]

In dem Verhandlungsmandat der EU mit den AKP-Ländern tauchen diese neuen Ansätze stärker fokussiert auf. Sie nimmt die Ideen der Konferenzen von Kopenhagen, des Human Development Reports und auch neue Konzepte der Weltbank auf, ohne allerdings deren Konsistenz erreichen zu können. Im Mandat der EU (vom 29.10.1997) werden die Konturen der Armutsbekämpfung an verschiedenen Stellen herausgestellt. So wird als zweiter Baustein erklärt, daß Armutsbekämpfung zum Meilenstein der neuen Partnerschaft zwischen EU und AKP werden müsse. Notwendig sei eine Wachstumsstrategie, die den lokalen Märkten, der Region und der Integration in den Weltmarkt neuen Schwung gibt. Das private Unternehmertum müsse entwickelt werden. Unternehmen im formellen und informellen Sektor („the poor people's economy") seien essentiell für Wachstum und Beschäftigung (und damit Armutsbekämpfung). Dies könne am besten funktionieren, wenn die Märkte entwickelt würden und wenn institutionelle und regulatorische Hemmnisse abgebaut werden. Diese hätten sich in der Vergangenheit oft als größtes Handikap von Entwicklung erwiesen und Investitionen behindert. Notwendig sei auch die Einbindung und Partizipation der gesellschaftlichen Gruppen, damit deren Kapazitäten besser genützt

[48] Aidan Cox/ John Healey: Promises to the Poor: the Record of European Development Agencies, in: ODI Poverty Briefing 1, November 1998.

werden könnten. Insbesondere wird auch auf die wichtige Rolle der Frauen im Entwicklungsprozeß verwiesen. Als Voraussetzung für erfolgreiche Armutsbekämpfung sei zudem Frieden notwendig. Deshalb soll der Konfliktprävention größere Priorität eingeräumt werden.

Die EU sieht auch in den von ihr mit zu verantwortenden internationalen Rahmenbedingungen Handlungsbedarf. Die Lomé-Zusammenarbeit bedürfe einer konsistenten Fischerei- und Agrarpolitik, die in den letzten Jahren von Seiten der Nichtregierungsorganisationen, aber auch von Institutionen innerhalb der EU-Staaten, auf Kritik gestoßen war. Allerdings bleibt das Verhandlungsmandat insgesamt ziemlich vage, und es steht zu befürchten, daß es kaum Fortschritte geben wird. Ein Indiz dafür sind die Verhandlungen mit Südafrika, in denen eine ziemlich eigennützige EU-Position vertreten wird.[49]

4. Vorschläge für eine neue Reform der EU-Entwicklungspolitik

Reformvorschläge sollten grundsätzlich mit einbeziehen, daß über Entwicklungskooperation allein Armutsbekämpfung und Entwicklung nicht zu erreichen ist. Kooperation kann einen positiven aber auch einen negativen Beitrag leisten. Es geht bei den Reformvorschlägen vor allem darum, die Negativeinflüsse zu reduzieren und die Instrumente und aktive Umsetzung der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit möglichst so zu reformieren, daß sie ihre positive Kraft entfalten können. Die Erfahrungen der Schwellenländer machen deutlich, daß Entwicklungskooperation die eigenen Anstrengungen nicht ersetzen kann. Aus der Marginalisierung der AKP-Staaten in der Weltwirtschaft werden die AKP-Länder nur durch eigene Anstrengungen herausfinden können. In den Lomé-Verhandlungen setzten die AKP-Staaten auf höhere Hilfeleistungen und zusätzliche Präferenzen. Die Vorschläge der EU für eine Reform sind von stärkerer Konditionalität geprägt. Wir gehen im folgenden von einem grundlegenden Reformbedarf aus. Insgesamt geht es darum, Tendenzen der Asymmetrie aufzuheben und die Reform so zu gestalten, daß die Lomé-Kooperation positiv im Sinne von Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung wirken kann.

Im Interesse langfristiger Entwicklung und Armutsbekämpfung sollten alle Anstrengungen über die EU auch Hand in Hand mit bilateraler Entwicklungskooperation gehen. Die Entwicklung endogener Potentiale sollte als Leitidee für die Beseitigung von Armut und

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[49] Christopher Stevens/ Jane Kennan: Areas of Potential Competition Between South Africa and the ACP and EU Member States, Brighton 1995.

Unterentwicklung dienen. Der Ansatz besteht darin, daß die AKP-Staaten nur über eigenes Entwicklungsengagement (Commitment) aus der Krise herausfinden können. Entwicklungskooperation kann nur unterstützend wirken. Deshalb sollten kontraproduktive Instrumente neu konzipiert bzw. abgeschafft werden. Folgende Umsteuerungsmaßnahmen werden auf der Makro-Ebene empfohlen:

- Die Subventionssysteme SYSMIN und STABEX sollten abgeschafft *werden*: Ausgehend von der Tatsache, daß die Transfers tendenziell zur Verfestigung von einseitigen Produktionsstrukturen beitragen und nicht der Diversifizierung der Produktion dienen, sollten die Subventionen reduziert werden. Bei einer Nachfrageelastizität von kleiner 1 der meisten von Afrika gehandelten Exporte im Stabex- und Sysmin-Regime, ist eine weitere Subventionierung nicht zu vertreten. Nur über die Entwicklung einer Diversifizierungsstrategie, insbesondere aber durch die Entfaltung endogener industrieller Strukturen in den AKP-Ländern, lassen sich neue wirtschaftliche Perspektiven gewinnen.
- Weitaus erhöhte Mittel sollten speziell in einen Fonds zur Förderung des Privatsektors (unter Einschluß der Aktivitäten des CDI und der EIB), wobei insbesondere die Landwirtschaft und die Klein- und Mittelindustrie gefördert werden sollten, einfließen. Durch die Entwicklung der arbeitsintensiven Landwirtschaft und der Unternehmen des informellen Sektors wären am effektivsten Beschäftigung zu sichern und auch die Einkommen zu steigern. Damit würde auch ein Beitrag zur Armutsbekämpfung geleistet werden.
- Die Aktivitäten des CDI und der EIB sollten in Kooperation mit den regionalen Entwicklungsbanken, der African Development Bank und nationalstaatlichen Wirtschaftsfördereinrichtungen und Banken ihre Aktivitäten dezentralisieren und lokalisieren. CDI kann so besser einen Beitrag zur Industrialisierung und zur industriellen Entwicklung leisten. Die Aktivitäten von CDI waren bislang aufgrund der äußerst bescheidenen Mittel sehr eingegrenzt. Hier ist dringend Abhilfe notwendig. CDI könnte vor allem auch beim Aufbau, der Vermittlung von Expertise zum Aufbau nationaler und regionaler Industrieförderkonzepte tätig werden.
- *Ein* Neues Handelsregime ist nötig. Eine grundlegende Reform ist für das Handelspräferenzabkommen vorzunehmen. Dies ist zum einen aufgrund der Beschlüsse der World Trade Organisation sowieso notwendig. Zum anderen auch deshalb, weil die Präferenzen weiter erodieren. Lediglich für LLDCs wird es noch Sonderregelungen geben. Diese sogenannte Waiver-Systeme sind mittelfristig nur noch für LLDCs durchsetzbar. Aber da der wirtschaftliche Aufstieg nach allen Erfahrungen nicht über Präferenzabkommen und Sonderbehandlungen erfolgt, sollten die AKP-Staaten nicht länger auf das Waiver-System setzen. Die nicht-reziproken

Handelsbeziehungen haben die Erosion beispielsweise des afrikanischen Handels nicht verhindern können. Die Asymmetrie ist im Gegenteil noch stärker geworden. Die nicht-reziproke Handelskooperation der AKP-Länder mit Europa ist derzeit unilateral von der EU abhängig. Hier liegt das Hauptproblem des Handels. Die existierende Diskriminierung anderer Staaten durch den Lomé-Vertrag ist einerseits abgebaut worden, andererseits werden die Kooperationsbeziehungen zwischen der EU und Staatengruppen in der Dritten Welt vertieft. Diese Tendenzen bergen große Gefahren für die Handelsperspektiven. Wenn die EU ihr Interesse an der AKP-Staatengruppe verliert, verliert diese nicht nur ihren gegenwärtigen Präferenzstatus sondern auch den Rahmen für reziproke Handelsbeziehungen. Für die meisten Länder hingegen besteht das Problem nicht in zu geringen Präferenzen sondern in zu niedrigen Produktivitäten und einer, von wenigen Ausnahmen abgesehen, nicht wettbewerbsfähigen Produktpalette. Die Herausbildung einer international wettbewerbsfähigen Industrie und Landwirtschaft wurde im übrigen in den CFA-Ländern durch die beständig überbewertete Währung (bis 1994, und seit 1998 wiederum) strukturell behindert bzw. unmöglich gemacht. Langfristig sollte die Bildung einer Freihandelszone zwischen EU und AKP-Staaten avisiert werden.

Welche Konsequenzen sollten die AKP-Länder daraus ziehen?

- Neuorientierung der Entwicklungskooperation mit der EU auf reziproker Basis, d.h. Liberalisierung afrikanischer Märkte. Die Reduzierung der quantitativen Importbeschränkungen und der Übergang zu einem System moderater Zölle gehört ebenso dazu wie eine weitergehende Zollreform und die Liberalisierung der Devisenmärkte.
- Als zweite Stufe sollten afrikanische, karibische und pazifische Staaten jeweils eine gemeinsame Zollunion auf den Weg bringen, die schließlich
- eine Zollunion (Freihandelszone) mit der EU bildet. Die Gründung der REPA scheint hingegen wenig sinnvoll zu sein.

Institutionelle Regelungen zwischen der EU und den AKP-Ländern sollten gemeinsam festgelegt werden. Vier Vorteile hätte die EU-AKP-Freihandelszone: 1. Die Beteiligung daran ist vollkommen freiwillig. 2. Die institutionellen Regelungen werden regional festgelegt und nicht von außen auferlegt. 3. Die Glaubwürdigkeit der AKP-Handelspolitik (und damit auch der Investitionspolitik) würde sich erhöhen. 4. Als Vorbild der Zollunion könnte das Modell der CFA-Zone dienen. Eine (freiwillige) Anbindung an den stärkeren Handelspartner EU (wie sie beispielsweise auch von EFTA-Ländern und einigen Ländern Osteuropas praktiziert wird) erfolgt.

Reziproke Handelsbeziehungen und die Schaffung einer afrikanischen (bzw. karibischen und pazifischen) Zollunion sind zwar eine notwendige aber noch keine hinreichende Voraussetzung für afrikanische (bzw. karibische und pazifische) Wege aus der Entwicklungssackgasse. Je nach Entwicklungsstand, je nach Fortschritt in den Wirtschaftsreformen, je nach Industrialisierungsgrad sind unterschiedliche national-staatliche Entwicklungswege zu beschreiten. Südafrika wird eine stärker exportorientierte und regionale Strategie mit Lokomotivfunktion für das südliche Afrika einschlagen. Die rohstoff-exportierenden Länder werden ihre komparativen Vorteile weiter verfolgen. Für fast alle Länder gilt, daß sie nur über die systematische Steigerung der Produktivität der Landwirtschaft, der ländlichen Industrialisierung und der Diversifizierung der Produktion, der Klein- und Mittelindustrie ihre endogenen Potentiale entwickeln können.

Gerhard Grohs

Die Europäische Union und die Menschenrechte in Afrika

1. Einleitung

Die Mitgliedstaaten der EU sind gleichzeitig Mitglieder der Vereinten Nationen. Sie erkennen deshalb die UN-Erklärung der Menschenrechte von 1948 an, als Unterzeichner unterstützen sie außerdem die europäische Menschenrechtskonvention von 1950 sowie die beiden internationalen Menschenrechtspakte von 1966.

Man sollte denken, daß eine so klare Stellungnahme für die Menschenrechte auch in den Lomé-Verträgen mit den Staaten Afrikas, der Karibik und des Pazifik, den AKP-Staaten, ihren Niederschlag finden würde. Tatsächlich ist es so, daß diese Verträge bisher als reine Wirtschaftsabkommen angesehen und deshalb die Menschenrechte nicht berücksichtigt wurden.

2. Die Verankerung der Menschenrechte in den Lomé-Konventionen

Mit der Überwindung des Ost-West-Gegensatzes, aber auch des einseitig technisch-wirtschaftlichen Verständnisses von Entwicklungspolitik hat sich die Auffassung über die Lomé-Verträge verändert. Es ist nicht mehr möglich, soziale und politische Aspekte aus dem Entwicklungsbegriff auszuklammern. Dies schlug sich zunächst in dem Begriff „politischer Dialog“ nieder, der schon in den Vorbereitungen des dritten Lomé-Vertrages auftauchte. Man wollte damit sagen, daß die Partner des Vertrages nicht nur über streng wirtschaftliche Probleme diskutieren dürfen, sondern auch über Fragen der Demokratisierung, der Sozialpolitik, des Rechtswesens, da alle diese Faktoren Einfluß auf die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung eines Landes haben. Zentral in diesem politischen Dialog zwischen den Partnern tauchten die Menschenrechte auf, da deren Verletzung in einigen Vertragsstaaten, wie z.B. Nigeria, Liberia, Ruanda und Burundi, ein weltweites Medienecho finden und nicht nur im europäischen Parlament immer wieder zu der Frage veranlaßte, ob man einem Land, das fortlaufend eklatant die Menschenrechte verletzt, noch im Rahmen des Lomé-Vertrages Hilfe leisten sollte. Das führte nach hartem Ringen dazu, daß in das Lomé-III-Abkommen (1985-1990) in die Präambel, „der Glaube an die Grundrechte des Menschen“ eingebracht wurde. Es hatte zwar zunächst keine praktischen Konsequenzen, ebnete aber den Weg zu präziseren Formulierungen.[50]

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[50] G. Oestreich: Menschenrechte als Element der Dritten AKP-EWG Konvention von Lomé, Berlin 1990.

Die Folge dieser Diskussion war es, daß endlich in den Text des Lomé IV-Abkommens von 1990 ein Artikel aufgenommen wurde, der ausdrücklich die Menschenrechte erwähnt. In Artikel V des Vertrages heißt es u.a.:

> „Die Zusammenarbeit soll auf Entwicklung gerichtet sein, die sich auf den Menschen konzentriert, den Hauptvertreter und Nutznießer von Entwicklung, was somit den Respekt und die Förderung aller Menschenrechte einschließt“. „AKP – EU – Zusammenarbeit soll dazu helfen die Hindernisse, die Individuen und Völker daran hindern, voll ihre wirtschaftlichen, sozialen, politischen und kulturellen Rechte zu genießen, abzuschaffen.“ „Praktische Schritte, ob öffentlich oder privat, Menschenrechte und Demokratie, besonders im juristischen Bereich, können mit Organisationen, die international anerkannten Sachverstand auf diesem Gebiete besitzen, unternommen werden."

Am 29. Juni 1991 beschloß der Europarat eine Menschenrechtserklärung, in der die Menschenrechte zum grundlegenden Prinzip für alle zukünftig von der Gemeinschaft oder der Mitgliedsstaaten abgeschlossenen Verträge gemacht wurden. Dem folgte am 28.11.1991 eine Entschließung des Europäischen Rates und seiner Mitgliedsstaaten über „Menschenrechte, Demokratie und Entwicklung“. In dieser Erklärung werden Rechtsstaatlichkeit, Beachtung der Menschenrechte und politische Institutionen, die der Öffentlichkeit rechenschaftspflichtig sind und demokratische Legitimität genießen, gefordert (§ 1). Weiterhin werden repräsentative Demokratie, soziale Gerechtigkeit und „good government“ herausgestellt. Im Falle „schwerer und anhaltender Verstöße gegen die Menschenrechte oder einer bedenklichen Unterbrechung des Demokratieprozesses“ können „angemessene Reaktionen“ erwogen werden (§ 6). Artikel 367 der Lomé-Konvention sieht außerdem vor, daß die Konvention durch jeden EU- oder AKP-Staat mit einer sechsmonatigen Frist gekündigt werden kann.

Sehr umstritten ist, ob man wegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen oder einer bedenklichen Unterbrechung des Demokratisierungprozesses Entwicklungshilfe kürzen darf. Ich bin mit Franz Nuscheler der Meinung, daß es durchaus legitim ist, wegen Menschenrechtsverletzung eine solche Kürzung vorzunehmen, da die Menschenrechte klar definiert und universal gültig sind. Allerdings ist das bei einer „Unterbrechung des Demokratisierungsprozesses“ kaum möglich, da die Definition von „Demokratie“ umstritten ist, und Demokratie nicht durch direkte Interventionen von außen gefördert werden kann, sondern sich im Lande entwickeln muß. So formuliert die „Stockholm-Initiative für globale Sicherheit und Weltordnung“:[51] „Demokratie entwickelt sich nicht auf Befehl von außen, sondern muß sich infolge einer internen `Nachfrage` herausbilden. Demokratie wird nicht von oben nach unten verordnet, sondern muß sich von der Basis aus entwickeln“. Wenn

[51] Gemeinsame Verantwortung in den 90er Jahren. Die Stockholmer Initiative für globale Sicherheit und Weltordnung. Die deutsche Fassung ist abgedruckt in: Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik, Heft 6 und 7/ 1991, S. 743-756 und 883-893.

das richtig ist, ist Nuschelers Vorschlag zu folgen: „Es wäre klüger und glaubwürdiger, die Kriterien der politischen Konditionalität enger zu fassen (d.h. auf menschenrechtliche Kernbestände zu verdichten), aber konsequenter anzuwenden.“[52] Es wäre allerdings zu fragen, was unter „menschenrechtlichen Kernbeständen“ zu verstehen ist. Im Westen werden traditionell darunter die bürgerlichen und politischen Rechte verstanden, also Religionsfreiheit, Pressefreiheit, Schutz des Eigentums, Schutz vor Folter, willkürliche Verhaftung usw. Im Osten und in der Dritten Welt wurde der Akzent auf die sozialen und kulturellen Rechte gelegt. Inzwischen ist jedoch auch im Westen bei den Völkerrechtlern das Verständnis dafür gewachsen, daß das Recht auf Ernährung, Sicherheit, Schulbildung und Gesundheitsversorgung sowie auf eine Wohnung Rechte sind, die nicht einfach als „nicht justiziabel“ ausgeklammert werden können.

Michael Windfuhr hat in einer verdienstvollen Studie auf diese Veränderung der internationalen Diskussionslage hingewiesen.[53] Er schlägt vor, daß das Komitee für wirtschaftliche, soziale und kulturelle Menschenrechte der UN die Berichte der Staaten daraufhin überprüft, inwiefern die Erfolge oder Defizite im Bereich der Menschenrechte Grundlage für Politikdialog und Konditionalitätsüberlegungen sein können.

In dem Beschluß vom 28.11.1991 verpflichten sich die Mitgliedsstaaten:

- in alle Kooperationsabkommen Menschenrechtsklauseln aufzunehmen
- im Rahmen der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit regelmäßige Gespräche über Menschenrechte und Demokratie zu führen (§ 10) und einen Jahresbericht über die Umsetzung der Entschließung der Menschenrechte Demokratie und Entwicklung vorzulegen.[54]

Sowohl Artikel V des Lomé-III-Vertrages als auch die Entschließung von 1991 haben zu zahlreichen Aktivitäten geführt, die Robert Kappel in einem 1996 erschienenen Artikel aufgezählt hat:[55]

- Stellungnahme des europäischen Parlaments und des Ministerrates zu Menschenrechtsvorlagen in Afrika und anderen Regionen.

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[52] Franz Nuscheler: Menschenrechtsschutz durch Konditionierung der Entwicklungshilfe?, in: Lothar Brock (Hrsg.): Menschenrechte und Entwicklung, Hannover/Frankfurt 1996.

[53] Michael Windfuhr: Soziale Menschenrechte in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit. Eine Herausforderung für die Kirchen, Hamburg 1997.

[54] Wolfgang Heinz: Demokratie und Menschenrechte, in: E + Z 3/1996, S. 79f.

[55] Robert Kappel: Europas Entwicklungspolitik im Wandel, in: Nord-Süd Aktuell, 2/1996, S. 268–274.

- Offene Diskussion über Menschenrechte in „The Courier“ und anderen Publikationen der EU
- Reduzierung der Hilfe für den Sudan aus menschenrechtlichen Gründen
- Unterstützung von nationalen Konferenzen
- Kooperation mit Menschenrechtsorganisationen und Nichtregierungsorganisationen.

Auch die Unterstützung der Wahlen durch technische Hilfe und Wahlbeobachter insbesondere in afrikanischen Ländern gehört zu den Maßnahmen, die die Demokratisierung und die Beachtung der Menschenrechte fördern sollen. Es wurden, was wichtig ist, auch die Mittel für die Unterstützung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten zur Verfügung gestellt: Im Jahr 1992 14 Mio., 1993 16 Mio. und 1994 14 Mio. ECU. Allerdings kann man nicht sagen, daß die Beachtung der Menschenrechte in gleichem Maße von den Partnerländern erwartet wird. So wird immer wieder kritisiert, daß Länder mit großem politischem Gewicht und geopolitischer Bedeutsamkeit wie China oder die asiatischen Schwellenländer nicht in gleichem Maße zur Beachtung der Menschenrechte gedrängt werden wie kleinere, weniger bedeutendere Länder. Der Sudan wurde konsequent wegen seiner Menschenrechtsverletzungen sanktioniert. Sehr viel weniger geschah das im Falle von Nigeria, da dieses Land als wichtiger Öllieferant für Europa von großer Bedeutung ist. Ebenso wurde die milde Politik gegenüber Indonesien immer wieder im Europäischen Parlament kritisiert. Franz Nuscheler hat mit Recht von einem „Doppelstandard“ der Menschenrechtspolitik gesprochen.[56] Auch die AKP-Länder sehen die neue Menschenrechtspolitik der EU kritisch, allerdings aus entgegengesetzten Gründen als das Europäische Parlament. Sie betonen in einem Memorandum von 1994, daß es ihnen vor allem auf höhere Entwicklungshilfe und bessere Zusammenarbeit im Handel und weniger auf Demokratie und Menschenrechte ankommt. Sie lehnen auch Kürzungen wegen Menschenrechtsverletzungen ab und schlagen statt dessen einen „effektiven Mechanismus der Konfliktlösung“ vor.

Robert Kappel hat in dem schon zitierten Aufsatz davor gewarnt, der Illusion einer schnellen nachholenden Demokratisierung anzuhängen.[57] Er regt an, in den Dialog mit der AKP-Gruppe auch die Nichtregierungsorganisationen aus Europa und den AKP-Ländern einzubeziehen. Das scheint Sinn zu machen, da es die Nichtregierungsorganisationen waren, die auf den Weltkonferenzen für Umwelt (1992), für Bevölkerung- und Entwicklung (1994), aber auch für Menschenrechte (1993), dafür gesorgt haben, daß alte Positionen verlassen und neue Ziele verfolgt werden. Kappel fragt zurecht, wie eigentlich

[56] Franz Nuscheler: Menschenrechtliche Doppelstandards in der Menschenrechtspolitik, in: Rainer Tezlaff (Hrsg.): Menschenrechte und Entwicklung, Bonn 1993.

[57] Kappel, (Anmerkung 6), S. 286.

Menschenrechtsverletzungen und der Stand der Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte in einem Lande ohne die Hilfe der Nichtregierungsorganisationen bewertet werden sollen.

3. Die Afrikanische Menschenrechts-Charta

Diese Fragen führen zu der Anregung, daß man die 1986 in Kraft getretene „Afrikanische Charta der Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker“ sehr viel stärker in die Überlegungen einbeziehen sollte, als das bisher der Fall war. Man hat manchmal den Eindruck, daß diese bewußt sowohl von den Vertretern der AKP-Staaten als auch von den Repräsentanten der EU ausgeklammert wird. Warum das so ist, ist unklar.

Das Besondere der Afrikanischen Charta ist, daß sie nicht nur die bürgerlichen und die politischen Rechte, sondern auch die sozialen und wirtschaftlichen Rechte und darüber hinaus die Gruppenrechte und Pflichten der einzelnen Bürger enthält. Damit beantwortet sie die Frage nach dem Umfang der Menschenrechte in einem weiten Sinne.

Im Artikel 1 der Charta verpflichten sich die Staaten, „gesetzgeberische oder auch andere Maßnahmen zur Anwendung der Pflichten und Rechte der Charta zu ergreifen“. Artikel 2 enthält ein allgemeines Diskriminierungsverbot, das sowohl die Diskriminierung von Ethnien als auch die der Frauen verbietet. Beides hat weitreichende Folgen, wie noch an einigen Fällen erläutert wird. Im Artikel 3, Pkt. 5 wird der Gleichheitsgrundsatz, die Unverletzlichkeit der Person, Recht auf Leben, Verbot der Folter, der Sklaverei und unmenschlicher und erniedrigenderer Strafen festgelegt. Gegen diese Grundsätze ist immer wieder, nicht nur in der Kolonialzeit, verstoßen worden. Allerdings ist die Todesstrafe nicht in Artikel 4 verboten worden. Artikel 6 ist sehr schwach formuliert: In ihm heißt es, daß niemanden die Freiheit entzogen werden darf „außer aus Gründen und Bedingungen, die vorher gesetzlich bestimmt waren“[58] Ebenso schwach formuliert ist das Recht auf ein faires Gerichtsverfahren (Artikel 7). Die Afrikanischen Menschenrechtskommission hat 1992 eine Liste von Bestimmungen aufgestellt, die noch berücksichtigt werden müßten, wie etwa das Recht schnell vor einen Richter zu kommen, das Recht auf kostenlose Zurverfügungstellung eines Übersetzers, sowie Informationen über Anklagepunkte und Haftgründe usw.. All diese Rechte werden in Afrika immer wieder verletzt.[59]

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[58] Vgl. Wolfgang Benedek: The African Charter and Commission on Human rights and Peoples Rights: How to make it more effective, in: Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights, 1/1993, S. 26.

[59] Vgl. Michael Graf: Die Afrikanische Menschenrechts-Charta und ihre Bedeutung für einschlägiges innerstaatliches Recht am Beispiel Tanzanias, Hamburg 1997.

Auch die Meinungsfreiheit wird in Artikel 9 nur „im Rahmen von Recht und Gesetz“ gewährt. Das Recht auf Eigentum (Artikel 14) ist nicht näher bestimmt, da in Afrika das individuelle Eigentumsrecht traditionell nicht sehr stark ausgebildet ist. Eine Entschädigung für Enteignung, die nach Artikel 14 möglich sind, ist nicht vorgesehen. Interessanterweise folgen dann gleich die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen und kulturellen Rechte, also das Recht auf Arbeit (Artikel 15), auf Gesundheit (Artikel 16), auf Bildung (Artikel 17). Manche afrikanische Juristen, die sich mit der Charta beschäftigt haben, sind der Ansicht, daß diese Rechte nicht so justiziabel seien wie die individuellen Rechte.[60]

Die Rechte von *Völkern*, die in der Afrikanischen Charta aufgeführt sind, sind eine völkerrechtliche Neuerung und deshalb höchst umstritten, da befürchtet wird, daß sie auf Kosten der Individualrechte wirken könnten. Sie gehören zu den Rechten der „dritten Generation“, wenn man die Individualrechte als erste Generation, die wirtschaftlichen und sozialen Rechte als zweite Generation ansieht. Leider wird in der Charta nicht definiert, was unter „Völkern“ verstanden wird. Die allgemeine Ansicht der Juristen ist, daß es sich um die nationale Gemeinschaft insgesamt handelt, nicht um Ethnien oder andere Gruppen.

Michael Graf bezieht sich auf eine Differenzierung des Begriffes, die der nigerianische Jurist Richard N. Kiwanuka vorgenommen hat und die dann auf verschiedene Rechte zu beziehen ist. Demnach sind vier Begriffe denkbar:

1. Alle Personen innerhalb einer politischen Einheit, die noch nicht die Unabhängigkeit erreicht hat,
2 jede Bevölkerungsgruppe mit bestimmten gemeinsamen Eigenschaften (z.B. Sprache, Religion), die in einem Gebiet wie in Ziffer 1 oder in einem Staat als Minderheit leben
3 Staat und Volk als Synonyme betrachtet und
4 alle Personen innerhalb eines Staates.[61] Das Recht auf Selbstbestimmung könnte dann von einem Volk gemäß Ziffer 1, das Recht auf saubere Umwelt vom Volk im Sinne von Ziffer 3 wahrgenommen werden. Allerdings ist eine Sezession einer

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[60] Vgl. Obinna Okere: The Protection of Human Rights in Africa and the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, in: Human Rights Quarterly, 6 /1984, S. 141–159; Wolfgang Benedek: Durchsetzung von Rechten der Menschen und Völker Afrikas auf regionaler und nationaler Ebene, in: Zeitschrift für Ausländisches und Öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 54/1994, S. 172.

[61] Richard N. Kowanuka: The Meaning of „People“ in the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, in: American Journal of International Law, 80 /1998, S. 100ff.

Ethnie aus einem Staate nicht möglich. Sie verstößt schon gegen die Satzung der OAU, die die Menschenrechts-Charta formuliert hat.

Eine sehr umstrittene Neuerung ist auch das Recht auf Entwicklung, das durch verschiedene UN-Resolutionen anerkannt wurde. Es ist bis heute unklar, gegen wen es sich richtet, wer dieses Recht in Anspruch nehmen kann, und welchen Inhalt es hat. Wolfgang Benedek ist der Ansicht, daß auf nationaler Ebene das Recht von vernachlässigten Regionen und Bevölkerungen gegenüber dem Staat in Anspruch genommen werden könnte und auf internationaler Ebene von den armen Ländern gegenüber den reichen Ländern.[62] Bisher gibt es auf internationaler Ebene keine Durchsetzungsmöglichkeiten dieses Rechts. Auch auf nationaler Ebene müßte sich das erst noch herausstellen, hier könnte es allerdings sinnvolle Ansätze dafür geben.

Das in Artikel 24 verankerte Recht auf eine saubere Umwelt hat eine unmittelbare Beziehung zum Recht auf Leben (Artikel 4) und zum Recht auf Gesundheit (Artikel 16). Dieses Recht ist bereits justiziabel, z. B. bei der Verhinderung der Abladung von toxischem Müll aus Industriestaaten in Afrika. Einige Staaten haben bereits entsprechende Gesetze beschlossen. Unterentwickelt ist noch die Möglichkeit, dieses Recht gegenüber der eigenen Regierung einzuklagen. Die in der Charta vorgesehenen Pflichten der Bürger sind in Artikel 27 (Pflichten gegenüber der Familie, Gesellschaft, dem Staate, der internationalen Gemeinschaft), Artikel 28 (Pflicht zur Toleranz gegenüber den Mitmenschen) und besonders in Artikel 29 geregelt. Er listet folgende Pflichten auf:

- Die Pflicht, der nationalen Gemeinschaft körperlich und geistig zu dienen (Abs. 2),
- die Sicherheit des Staates nicht zu gefährden (Abs. 3),
- die gesellschaftliche und nationale Solidarität zu schützen (Abs. 4),
- die nationale Unabhängigkeit und territoriale Integrität des Staates zu schützen und zur Landesverteidigung beizutragen (Abs. 5),
- im Rahmen seiner Möglichkeiten zu arbeiten und Steuern zu bezahlen (Abs. 6),

Michael Graf und andere sehen in diesem Pflichtenkatalog die Gefahr, „daß Individualbeschwerden über Rechtsverletzungen durch den Staat durch diesen gekontert werden mit dem Hinweis auf Pflichten, die der einzelne möglicherweise verletzt hat" (Ziffer 8). Auf einer Juristenkonferenz 1985 wurde einstimmig die Ansicht vertreten, daß, wenn ein Individuum seine Pflichten verletzt habe, kein Verfahren vor der Kommission möglich

[62] Wolfgang Benedek, in: Konrad Ginther und W. Benedek (Hrsg.): New Perspectives and Conceptions of International Law, Wien/New York 1983, S. 147–161; vgl. auch Armin Barthel: Entwicklung und Menschenrechte. Das Recht auf Entwicklung als Menschenrecht, Aachen 1986.

sei, weil diese sich nur mit Verletzungen durch Staaten zu beschäftigen habe.[63] Damit kommen wir zu den Aufgaben der Afrikanischen Menschenrechtskommission.

4. Die Afrikanische Kommission der Rechte der Menschen und Völker als Instrument zur Durchsetzung der in der Charta formulierten Rechte

Artikel 30 bestimmt, daß eine afrikanische Kommission für die Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker eingerichtet werden soll, „um die Menschenrechte und die Rechte der Völker zu fördern und ihren Schutz in Afrika zu gewährleisten“.

Im Jahre 1987 wurden die elf Mitglieder der Afrikanischen Menschenrechtskommission von der Vollversammlung der OAU gewählt. Erst 1993 wurde auch eine Frau in die Kommission gewählt. Sitz der Kommission ist Banjul (Gabun). Sie ist jedoch finanziell vollständig von der OAU und ihrem Generalsekretär abhängig. Dieser hat nach der Geschäftsordnung der Kommission auch weitreichende Rechte. Er kann die vorläufige Tagesordnung der Kommission festsetzen, den Sekretär der Kommission ernennen und muß die Kommuniqués der Kommission veröffentlichen. Die Kommission hat vier Aufgaben:

1. Förderung der Rechte der Menschen und Völker
2. Schutz dieser Rechte
3. Interpretation der Charta
4. Weitere Aufgaben, die ihr von der OAU übertragen werden können. Die Kommission kann nur Empfehlungen geben. Die Vollversammlung der OAU entscheidet auch darüber, ob Berichte der Kommission veröffentlicht werden oder nicht. Die Kommission kann nicht von sich aus Untersuchungen über Menschenrechtsverletzungen einleiten, wohl aber aufgrund der Beschwerde eines Staates, eines Individuums oder einer Gruppe. Es gibt keinen Menschenrechtsgerichtshof wie im europäischen und amerikanischen Menschenrechtsschutz. Darüber wird aber zur Zeit heftig diskutiert und ein Expertentreffen, das 1995 in Kapstadt organisiert wurde, hat vorgeschlagen, durch

[63] Michael Graf, (Anmerkung 10), S. 45; vgl. auch Philip Amoah: The African Charter on Human Rights – an Effective Weapon for Human Rights?, in: Revue Africaine de Droit International et comparé, 4/1992, S. 226–240.

einen Zusatz im Protokoll einen afrikanischen Menschenrechtsgerichtshof einzusetzen.[64]

Solange es diesen Gerichtshof aber nicht gibt, ist die Kommission das einzige Durchsetzungsinstrument in der Charta. Vor ihr können nach Artikel 47- 49 die Staaten Beschwerden einlegen. Entweder wendet sich der beschwerdeführende Staat direkt an einen anderen Staat und informiert den Generalsekretär der OAU oder er wendet sich direkt an die Kommission. Wenn sich im ersten Fall die Staaten nicht innerhalb von drei Monaten einigen, kommt die Beschwerde vor die Kommission. Nach Artikel 50 der Charta muß aber der innerstaatliche Weg erschöpft sein, was in diktatorischen Staaten kaum möglich ist. Deshalb kann die Kommission auch bei unangemessener Länge des Verfahrens oder Fehlens von Rechtsmitteln eingreifen. Bis 1995 gab es aber noch keine Staatenbeschwerde. Das trifft übrigens auch auf die europäische und amerikanische Staatenbeschwerde zu.[65]

Individualbeschwerden sind nicht ausdrücklich in der Charta geregelt, werden aber in Artikel 55 zugelassen, der von „anderen Mitteilungen, die nicht von Vertragsstaaten der Charta ausgehen“ spricht. Es können also auch Nichtregierungsorganisationen für Individuen Beschwerden einlegen. Bis Juni 1997 hat die Kommission 200 solche Mitteilungen empfangen und 119 endgültig entschieden.[66] Es gibt eine Diskussion darüber, wie weit die Kommission gehen kann, um die Individualbeschwerden zu berücksichtigen. Wolfgang Benedek sieht wenige Möglichkeiten.[67] Odinkalu und Christensen legen die entsprechenden Bedingungen der Charta sehr viel extensiver aus und berufen sich dabei auf die Artikel 45,46, 56 und 57 der Charta.[68]

Schließlich muß die Kommission alle zwei Jahre aufgrund von Berichten der Staaten über die Maßnahmen zum Schutz der in der Charta enthaltenen Rechte und Pflichten berichten. Dafür hat die Kommission „Guidelines“ entwickelt, in denen die Rechte auch interpretiert werden. So wird z. B. Artikel 17,1, der das Recht auf Bildung regelt als Recht auf „compulsery and free primary education“ präzisiert. Es gibt leider keine Sanktionen, wenn

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[64] Report of the Governments Experts Meeting on the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples Rights 6 – 12. September 1995, Cape Town S.A., OAU Dokument.; vgl. auch: Michael Graf, (Anmerkung 10), S. 173.

[65] Henning Boekle: Die Vereinten Nationen und der Internationale Schutz der Menschenrechte, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichet, B 46-47/1998, S. 5.

[66] Vgl. Chidi Anselm Odinkalu/ Camilla Christensen: The African Commission on Human Rights and Peoples Rights: The Development of Non-State Communication Procedures, in: Human Rights Quarterly, 20 /1998, S. 335–280.

[67] Wolfgang Benedek: The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples Rights, in: Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 1/1997, S. 25–40.

[68] Odinkalu/ Christensen, (Anmerkung 17), S. 239ff.

Staaten ihrer Berichtspflicht nicht nachkommen. Michael Graf schlägt vor, wenigstens auf einer Liste zu veröffentlichen, welche Staaten ihren Berichtspflichten nachgekommen sind.

Für die Durchsetzung der Menschenrechte in Afrika sind die Individualbeschwerden von besonderer Bedeutung. Doch die Kommissionen haben bisher noch vergleichsweise wenige erreicht. Die Gründe sind vielfältig:

- Das Verfahren dauert zu lange. Von der Einreichung bis zur Kommissionsentscheidung vergeht mindestens ein Jahr.
- Es fehlt den Beschwerdeführern meistens an finanziellen Mitteln.
- Die Möglichkeit, eine Beschwerde an die Kommission zu richten, ist in den meisten Ländern überhaupt nicht bekannt.
- Die Bürgerrechtstradition in Afrika ist zu wenig entwickelt und die Vertraulichkeit des Verfahrens verhindert, daß die Öffentlichkeit einen Beschwerdeführer schützt. Allerdings kann die Kommission die Regierung um einen Aufschub von Maßnahmen gegen die Beschwerdeführer bitten, was sie schon einige Male mit Erfolg getan hat.[69]

Von besonderer Bedeutung ist die Rolle der Nichtregierungsorganisationen. Sie können nach Artikel 55 und 56 der Charta Mitteilung an die Kommission richten. Dieses Recht wird ihnen in der Geschäftsordnung Artikel 114 ausdrücklich zugebilligt. 1995 gab es 153 NGOs, denen Beobachterstatus eingeräumt wurde, d. h. sie können auch an den öffentlichen Sitzungen der Kommission teilnehmen. Dazu gehören nicht nur internationale Organisationen wie Amnesty International und die Internationale Juristenkommission in Genf, sondern auch afrikanische Menschenrechtsorganisationen. Claude E. Welch, der sich schon seit vielen Jahren mit den Menschenrechten in Afrika befaßt, hat mit Recht darauf hingewiesen, daß zwar die Arbeit von Amnesty International, Afrika Watch und der internationalen Juristenkommission unerläßlich ist, daß aber die Hauptarbeit für den Menschenrechtsschutz in Afrika von Afrikanern selbst geleistet werden muß.[70]

5. Einflüsse der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta auf die staatliche Gesetzgebung.

Da es wenig sinnvoll ist, den Einfluß der Charta auf Staaten zu schildern, die sich als Einparteiendiktatur oder als Militärregime ohnehin nicht um Menschenrechte kümmern, soll am Beispiel Tanzanias, eines Landes, das seit kurzem eine Mehrparteiendemokratie

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[69] Michael Graf, (Anmerkung 10), S. 96.

[70] Claude E. Welch: The African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights: A Five Year Report and Assessment, in: Human Rights Quarterly, 14/1992, S. 43–61.

eingeführt hat und schon unter dem Präsidenten Julius Nyerere einen vergleichsweise guten Ruf in Menschenrechtsfragen genoß, gezeigt werden, welchen Einfluß die Charta auf die staatliche Gesetzgebung haben kann. Tanzania hat 1985 eine Bill of Rights in die Verfassung aufgenommen, die Nyerere seinerzeit als überflüssig abgelehnt hatte. Das ist sicher auf die Existenz der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta zurückzuführen, aus der verschiedene Bestimmungen übernommen wurden. Ursprünglich wollte man vor der Anwendung der Bill of Rights alle Gesetze daraufhin überprüfen, ob sie mit ihr und der Afrikanischen Charta übereinstimmen. Es erwies sich aber als so aufwendig, daß die Regierung es vorzog, diese Überprüfung den Gerichten von Fall zu Fall zu überlassen. Dies wurde von den Gerichten - wenn auch widerwillig- akzeptiert. So wurde die Deportation von 156 Personen aufgrund eines Gesetzes aus dem Jahre 1921 vom High Court als verfassungswidrig und das Gesetz für null und nichtig erklärt.[71] Ein anderes Gesetz war der Government Proceeding Act von 1967, der vorsah, daß eine Klage gegen die Regierung nur zulässig ist, wenn der Generalstaatsanwalt dem zustimmt. Das ist ein klarer Verstoß gegen Artikel 7, 1 a der Afrikanischen Charta. Zwei solcher Fälle kamen vor den High Court Tanzanias: Ein Bürger Tanzanias war von einem Polizisten festgenommen und schwer mißhandelt und verletzt worden und wollte den Staat auf Schadenersatz verklagen. Im zweiten Fall wollte ein Lehrer den Direktor seiner Schule verklagen, weil dieser ihn beschuldigte Geld von Schülern gestohlen zu haben. In beiden Fällen[72] begründete der Generalstaatsanwalt seine Ablehnung mit Artikel 30, Abs. 1 und 2 der Bill of Rights, da die Klage gegen das öffentliche Interesse verstoße. Dieser Artikel 30 wurde von Juristen als „Horrorkatalog“ bezeichnet, da nach ihm dann kein Widerspruch zu den Rechten und Freiheiten der Bill of Rights besteht, wenn die Maßnahmen oder das Gesetz

- sicherstellt, daß die Rechte anderer oder das öffentliche Interesse durch Mißbrauch der individuellen Rechte und Freiheiten nicht beeinträchtigt werden;
- den Verteidigungsinteressen, der öffentlichen Sicherheit, der öffentlichen Ordnung, der öffentlichen Moral, der öffentlichen Gesundheit, der ländlichen und städtischen Entwicklung und Nutzung der mineralogischen Ressourcen oder der Entwicklung oder Nutzung jeglichen anderen Eigentums dient, in einer Weise, die den öffentlichen Nutzen fördert;
- die Ausführung eines Kriegsurteils oder einer gerichtlichen Anweisung, die in Zivilrechts- oder Strafverfahren getroffen oder gegeben wurde, sicherstellt;
- den Ruf, die Rechte und Freiheiten anderer oder das Privatleben von Personen schützt, welche an jedwedem Gerichtsverfahren beteiligt sind; die Enthüllung von

[71] Michael Graf, (Anmerkung 10), S. 120.

[72] Ebd., S. 135.

vertraulichen Informationen verbietet oder die Würde, Autorität und Unabhängigkeit der Gerichte bewahrt;

- der Errichtung, Leitung und Arbeitsweise von Vereinigungen und privaten Unternehmungen im Land Einschränkung auferlegt, sie überwacht und kontrolliert;
- die Ausführung jeder anderen Angelegenheit ermöglicht, welche allgemein das nationale Interesse fördert, steigert oder schützt.[73]

Trotz dieses Katalogs erkannte der Richter die Berufung auf das öffentliche Interesse nicht an und wies auf Artikel 17 Abs.1 der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta hin, in der keine Einschränkung des Zugangs zu Gerichten vorgesehen ist. Außerdem sei in einem Teil Tanzanias, in Sansibar, diese Einschränkung nicht vorgesehen und deshalb ein ungleiches Recht in Tanzania möglich, wenn man dem Einspruch des Generalstaatsanwaltes nachgebe.

Sehr wichtig ist die Afrikanische Menschenrechts-Charta für die Rechte der Frauen geworden. Hier stehen die traditionellen Rechtsauffassungen, die besonders auf dem Lande noch herrschen, dem Diskriminierungsverbot von Artikel 18 Abs. 3 der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta entgegen, das auch von der tanzanischen Bill of Rights in Artikel 13 übernommen wurde.

Im Haya Customary Law von 1963, das staatlich anerkannt wurde, heißt es: „Women can inherit, except for clan land, which they may receive in usufruct but may not sell.“ In einem vom Gericht verhandelten Fall ging es um eine alte Frau, die 1988 das von ihrem Vater geerbte Land verkaufte und dadurch in einen Rechtsstreit mit den Clan-Mitgliedern geriet. Der Richter erklärte diese Bestimmung des Haya-Rechts für verfassungswidrig, da sie gegen Artikel 18, Abs. 2 der Afrikanischen Charta und Artikel 13, Abs. 4 der Bill of Rights Tanzanias verstoße.[74]

Florence Buteywa hat in einem 1994 erschienenen Artikel darauf hingewiesen, daß in vielen afrikanischen Ländern die Witwen vom Erbe des Mannes ausgeschlossen sind oder nur dann erben, wenn der Mann ausdrücklich ein Testament in diesem Sinne gemacht hat. Das geschieht jedoch in den seltensten Fällen.[75]

Auch das Recht der Frauen, gegen Gewalt in der Ehe zu klagen, ist äußerst beschränkt. Die Gerichte halten sich streng an das Erfordernis, Zeugen zu benennen, die die

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[73] Ebd., S. 151f.

[74] Ebd.

[75] Florence Buteywa: Using the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights to secure Women’s Access to Land in Africa, in: Rebecca J. Cook (Hrsg.): Human Rights of Women, Philadelphia 1994, S. 495.

Behauptung der Klägerin unterstützen. Sexualverbrechen werden in Tanzania außerdem öffentlich verhandelt. Das verstößt zwar nicht gegen die Afrikanische Menschenrechts-Charta, wäre aber sicherlich eine zu überprüfende Regelung im Lichte des Menschenrechtsverständnisses. In allen diesen Fällen stehen die Richter vor der Wahl entweder auf die afrikanischen Traditionen zu rekurrieren (Art. 18,1 und 2) oder Art. 60/61 zu zitieren, die die UN-Menschenrechtserklärung und die UN-Konventionen zur Leitlinie machen.[76] Artikel 60 lautet:

> „Die Kommission läßt sich leiten vom internationalen Recht auf dem Gebiet der Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker, insbesondere von den Bestimmungen der verschiedenen afrikanischen Dokumente über Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker, ebenso von der Charta der Vereinten Nationen, der Charta der OAU, den Allgemeinen Erklärungen der Menschenrechte und anderer von den Vereinten Nationen und von afrikanischen Staaten verwandten Dokumenten auf dem Gebiet der Menschenrechte und Rechte der Völker sowie von den Bestimmungen der verschiedenen UN-Sonderorganisationen, bei denen die Vertragsstaaten dieser Charta Mitglieder sind."

Dieser Artikel kann als eine Generalklausel angesehen werden, die die Charta für das „Humanitäre Völkerrecht" öffnet und so wirken könnte wie die salvatorische Klausel bei der Übernahme des römischen Rechts in Deutschland, die im Zweifel das römische und nicht das deutsche Recht wirksam werden ließ.

6. Zusammenfassung und Ausblick

Blickt man zurück auf die Geschichte der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta und die Schwierigkeit ihrer Anwendung, so zeigt sich zunächst ein Widerspruch: Einerseits hat die Charta mit dem Recht auf Entwicklung, Art. 22, auf eine saubere Umwelt Art. 24 und auf Asyl Art. 12 und 23 Abs. 2 Neuland beschritten, andererseits hat sie viele Rechte nicht oder nur eingeschränkt berücksichtigt, die andere Menschenrechtsregelungen anerkennen. Fatsah Ouguergouz, ein algerischer Jurist, hat das umfassendste Werk in französischer Sprache über die Afrikanische Menschenrechts-Charta vorgelegt.[77] Darin zählt er die Rechte auf, die die Charta nicht geregelt hat, obwohl sie sie hätte regeln können und sollen:[78]

- Das Recht auf den Schutz des Privatlebens;
- Das Recht, den Ehepartner auszusuchen;

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[76] Uwe Tonndorf: Menschenrechte in Afrika, Freiburg 1997, S. 122 ff.

[77] Fatsag Ougouergouz: La Chartre Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples, Paris 1993.

[78] Ebd., S. 128.

- Das Recht des Kindes auf Namen und Nationalität;
- Das Recht auf soziale Sicherheit;
- Das Recht der Frau und des Kindes auf besonderen Schutz;
- Das Recht auf einen Mindestlebensstandard;

Ob die in der Charta gegebenen Rechte mehr eingeschränkt werden als in anderen Menschenrechts-Katalogen ist umstritten. In einem Vergleich mit den beiden anderen Menschenrechtskonventionen kommt Michael Graf zu dem Ergebnis, daß die Einschränkung in der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta nicht größer sind als in den anderen Menschenrechtsregelungen.[79]

Sehr viel gravierender für die Praxis ist allerdings die schlechte Ausstattung der afrikanischen Menschenrechtskommission mit Personal- und Sachmitteln, die vielfach beklagte Abhängigkeit von der OAU und die bisher geringe Zahl von Individualbeschwerden und Staatsbeschwerden, die bei der Kommission eingehen. Hier müßte die Kommission vor allem die in Artikel 45, 1 a gegebenen Möglichkeiten ausschöpfen:

> „Die Kommission hat die Aufgabe, ... Dokumente zu sammeln, Studien und Untersuchungen über afrikanische Probleme auf dem Gebiete der Rechte der Menschen und der Völker durchzuführen, Seminare, Kolloquien und Konferenzen zu veranstalten, Informationen zu verbreiten, Einrichtungen, die sich auf nationaler und lokaler Ebene mit den Rechten der Menschen und der Völker befassen, zu ermutigen und ggf. gegenüber den Regierungsstellungnahmen abzugeben und Empfehlungen auszusprechen."

Das alles kann sie nur in enger Zusammenarbeit mit den Kräften in Afrika tun, die sich seit langem für die Menschenrechte einsetzen. Das sind Schriftsteller, Journalisten, Rechtsanwälte und ihre Verbände, Studenten, Frauen und ihre Verbände und die christlichen Kirchen. Die Unterstützung ausländischer NGOs wie Amnesty International und die Internationale Juristenkommission ist positiv zu bewerten und wichtig, aber auch gleichzeitig bedenklich, da daraus Abhängigkeiten entstehen können. Wolfgang Benedek stellte fest, daß von den 46 bis zur 14. Sitzung von der Kommission abgeschlossenen Mitteilungen 29 von NGOs kamen, davon 17 von internationalen oder regionalen NGOs, von denen wiederum die meisten von Anmesty International, Pen International und die Internationale Juristenkommission verfaßt wurden.[80]

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[79] Michael Graf, (Anmerkung 10), S. 49 und Anhang III, S. 223.

[80] Vgl. Wolfgang Benedek: Durchsetzung von Rechten der Menschen und Völker in Afrika auf regionaler und nationaler Ebene, in: Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, 1/ 1994, S. 165.

Besonders wichtig sind vor diesem Hintergrund öffentlichkeitswirksame Aktionen: Die Friedrich Ebert Stiftung unterstützte in Tanzania zum Beispiel ein Projekt, bei dem die für die Frauen wichtigen Artikel der Afrikanischen Charta in die einheimischen Sprachen übersetzt und den Frauen in den Städten und auf dem Lande erläutert wurden. Man hat außerdem Rechtsanwältinnen zur Verfügung gestellt, die den Frauen helfen, Klagen zu formulieren. Auch in Burkina Faso und Senegal setzen sich Frauenverbände und Organisationen von Rechtsanwälten für solche Projekte ein.

Doch muß der Menschenrechtsschutz auch dadurch gestärkt werden, daß ein Menschenrechtsgerichtshof, wie ihn die europäische Menschenrechts-Charta vorsieht, eingerichtet wird. Die Stimmen in Afrika, die das fordern mehren sich, so insbesondere die Menschenrechtskonferenz von Gabarone, die 1993 stattfand und an der Vertreter aus den SADC-Staaten und Südafrika teilnahmen und die schon erwähnte Konferenz in Kapstadt 1995 und die Konferenz in Nouakschott (Mauretanien) 1997. Diese Diskussion zeigt, daß die Existenz der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta zu weitreichenden Diskussionen Anlaß gegeben hat. Sie darf nicht als Abschluß eines Prozesses angesehen werden, sondern als sein Beginn.

Nimmt man die Afrikanische Menschenrechts-Kommission so ernst wie hier vorgeschlagen wurde, so sollte sich die Menschenrechtspolitik der EU an folgenden Punkten orientieren:

- Direkte und indirekte Unterstützung der Menschenrechts-Kommission der Afrikanischen Charta. Das ist möglich durch Bereitstellung von Informationen, Finanzierung der technischen Ausstattung der Kommission und Unterstützung der von der Kommission anerkannten und zugelassenen NGOs.
- Unterstützung aller Bemühungen, einen afrikanischen Menschenrechtsgerichtshof einzurichten.
- Berücksichtigung der Staaten-Berichte, die der Afrikanischen Menschenrechtskommission übergeben werden. Dafür ist es notwendig die OAU zu überzeugen, daß die Vertraulichkeit der Berichte insofern aufgehoben wird, als sie den Gremien der EU-AKP-Konvention zur Verfügung gestellt werden.
- Finanzielle Unterstützung der in Artikel 45 der Charta vorgesehenen Aufgaben der Menschenrechtskonvention, Bildungsprogramme zur Menschenrechtspraxis und Ausbildungsprogramme für Verwaltung, Justiz, Polizei und Militär zu initiieren und anzubieten. Allerdings genügt die Ausbildung von Richtern nicht, wenn der politische

Wille fehlt, eine unabhängige Justiz aufzubauen. In diesen Fällen müssen NGOs unterstützt werden, die die Rechtsprechung kritisieren.[81]

- Qualitative Analyse aller Berichte über die Einhaltung der Menschenrechte, die die Vereinten Nationen, regionale Menschenrechtskommissionen, Amnesty International, das US-Außenministerium, die US-Menschenrechtsorganisation und vor allem die Afrikanischen Menschenrechtsorganisationen vorlegen. Das ist eine Hauptforderung, die Wolfgang S. Heinz in seinem Bericht: „Positive Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten als Aufgabe der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit" stellte.[82]

- Unterstützung der von einigen afrikanischen Regierungen, wie Uganda, Marokko und Kenia durchgeführten Gründung von nationalen Menschenrechtskommissionen, an die sich die Bürger mit Beschwerden werden können. Es ist interessant, daß ein von der DFG gefördertes Forschungsprojekt[83] zu dem Ergebnis kommt, daß die Wirkung der Zusammenarbeit von nationalen und internationalen Nichtregierungsorganisationen mit der nationalen Opposition dazu führen kann, daß widerstrebende Regierungen wie in Marokko, Uganda und Kenia dazu gebracht werden können, Menschenrechtsstandards zu akzeptieren, auch wenn kein Wirtschaftswachstum und keine Liberalisierung zu beobachten ist. Das widerlegt die von einigen Autoren, wie Lipset und kürzlich Rainer Tetzlaff vertretene Auffassung, daß ein notwendiger Zusammenhang zwischen anhaltendem Wirtschaftswachstum, der Entwicklung städtischer Mittelschichten und politischen Transitionsprozessen besteht.[84]

Zuletzt noch ein Wort zu dem in der Erklärung des Europäischen Rates vom 28.11.1991 vorgesehen Sanktionen bei schweren und anhaltenden Verstößen gegen die Menschenrechte. Eines der Ergebnisse des eben zitierten DFG-Projektes ist, daß Sanktionen dann, wenn repressive Regierungen noch über hinreichende innergesellschaftliche Legitimation verfügen, zu nationalistischen Gegenreaktionen führen können. Dagegen können diese dann, wenn die innenpolitische Opposition bereits mobilisiert ist, oft einen entscheidenden Beitrag dazu leisten, daß das Regime zur ersten taktischen Zugeständnissen gezwungen wird. Der Druck von unten verstärkt die Zwangsmaßnahmen von oben und die Möglichkeit in einem internationalen Dialog z.B. mit

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[81] Peter Waller: Positivmaßnahmen und politische Konditionalität, in: E + Z 3 / 1996, S. 77.

[82] Wolfgang S. Heinz: Positive Maßnahmen zur Förderung von Demokratie und Menschenrechten als Aufgabe der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit, Berlin 1994, S. 53.

[83] Hans-Peter Schulz/ Anja Jetschke/ Thomas Risse: Die Macht der Menschenrechte. Zur innenpolitischen Durchsetzung internationaler Normen, in: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 46-47/1998, S. 43–53.

[84] Seymour M. Lipset: The social requisits of Democracy revisited, in: American Sociological review, 59/1994, S. 1 – 22; vgl. auch Rainer Tetzlaff: Demokratisierung unter Armutsbedingungen, in: Der Bürger im Staat, 46/ 1996, S. 201.

der EU einzutreten wird größer, da die Regierung an der Beendigung der internationalen Kritik einerseits und der innenpolitischen Konflikte andererseits interessiert sein wird

Die zukünftige Politik der EU gegenüber den AKP-Staaten muß, so läßt sich resümierend feststellen, zwei Aspekte in den Mittelpunkt stellen:

- Die Einbeziehung der Afrikanischen Menschenrechts-Charta in die Menschenrechtspolitik der EU steht bisher noch aus und bietet viele Ansatzmöglichkeiten, aus der bisher noch unklaren Situation heraus zu kommen.
- Sowohl die Menschenrechtspolitik der EU als auch die der europäischen Mitgliedsstaaten ist Teil der internationalen Menschenrechtspolitik und kann ohne die Einbeziehung nationaler und internationaler Nichtregierungsorganisationen und internationaler Menschenrechtsinstrumente, wie sie die UN-Konventionen bieten, nicht zum Erfolg führen. Hier ist eine stärkere Vernetzung notwendig. Die Besonderheit jeder Menschenrechtspolitik besteht darin, daß sie nicht auf die Regierung setzen kann, sondern auf die Menschen, die für ihre Rechte oft gegen die Regierung kämpfen müssen. Paul Valery hat einmal gesagt: „Politik ist die Kunst, die Leute daran zu hindern, sich um das zu kümmern, was sie angeht.[85] Menschenrechtspolitik – und das ist ihre Paradoxie – muß das Gegenteil sein.

[85] Paul Valery: Windstriche, Stuttgart 1959, S. 32.