

ifa ECP Monitor Country Report

Taiwan

ifa ECP Monitor Country Report

1. External cultural policy objectives in geopolitical context

Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, was founded in 1912 in China. After losing the civil war, the Kuomintang (KMT) government relocated to Taiwan, an island 180 kilometers east of China with an area slightly bigger than Belgium. Although the ROC was democratic in its constitution, the KMT government enforced martial law from 1949 to 1987, banning the formation of any new political parties and authorizing the military with wide censorship powers. However, rapid industrialization in the 1960s and 1970s soon led to Taiwan's economic success, challenging martial law. Over the next decade, Taiwan's "political miracle" matched its earlier "economic miracle," creating a vibrant liberal democracy, and a new national identity developed.

Table 1: The geopolitical and geo-economic position

	2019	2015	
Hard power rank	22 nd (2021)	n/a	-
World trade rank (\$ million)	17 th (Export & Import) / 618,000	17 th (Export), 18 th (Import) / 523,000	↑
Soft power rank	5 th (out of 10 Asia Soft Powers) / 48.11	n/a	-
Diplomacy rank	32 nd	n/a	-

The U.S. supported Taiwan's post-war export-oriented economic development based on Cold War bipolarity that favored the KMT as a bulwark against communist China's expansion. After the Cold War, Taiwan lost its strategic value to the U.S., and Taiwanese embassies were no longer permitted in the U.S. Following Taiwan's de-recognition by the U.S., cultural diplomacy became a political lifeline for Taiwan to access audiences and engage in unofficial diplomacy to generate wider support and recognition (Bourke, 2019). Today, Taiwan is considered a *de facto* independent country, which fulfills all criteria for statehood but has not been recognized by the international community as a state (Kaczorowska-Ireland, 2015). To gain international legitimacy became one of Taiwan's primary policy goals, including public diplomacy.

Table 2: Economy of Taiwan

	2019	2015
Population (millions) / ranking	23.60 / 56 th	23.49 / 54 th
GDP ranking	21 st (2021)	n/a
GDP per capita (\$)	25,941	22,780
Cultural economy (%GDP)	0.10	0.09
Education economy (%GDP)	4.82	5.02
R&D economy (%GDP)	3.49	3.00
Media economy (%GDP)	n/a	n/a

Sources: MOC, World Bank

Taiwan's Ministry of Culture (MOC) is relatively young and was established in May 2012 as an upgrade from the Council for Cultural Affairs. Following its strategy to internationalize Taiwanese culture, the MOC launched its first integrated policy plan for cultural diplomacy.¹ The four-year 'Global Outreach Action Plan,' from 2013 to 2016, aimed to enhance Taiwan's cultural diplomacy by creating more opportunities for Taiwan-based artists and groups to showcase their works to a global audience and offering consultation and sponsorship. In this regard, the MOC's role in international cultural promotion is still more of a passive grant giver rather heavy-handed diplomatic pusher. The new Global Layout Action Plan 2017-2020 Phase II International and Cross-Strait Exchange Medium-range Plan (文化部全球佈局行動方案2017-2020年第二期國際及兩岸交流中程計劃) comes with a budget of €9.21 million.

Table 3: Government spending on ECP fields as a % of total outlays

	2019	2015
Culture	1.5	1.6
Education	13.9	12.6
R & D	5.5	5.5
Media	n/a	n/a

Sources: Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics, Executive Yuan.

In 2016, as Taiwan elected its new President Tsai Ing-wen, the new Southbound Policy (NSP) was introduced. The guideline for the NSP was set out at a meeting on international economic and trade strategy hosted by President Tsai on August 16, 2016.² It aims to strengthen Taipei's relationships with eighteen countries—most of which are within Taiwan's extended region—and leverage Taiwan's cultural, educational, technological, economic assets to deepen its regional integration. These countries include the ASEAN countries, six South Asian countries (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan), Australia, and New Zealand.

The NSP follows similarly named policies initiated under President Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shui-bian. The primary goal of these NSP's was to diversify Taiwan's outbound investment away from mainland China and into Southeast Asia. However, the previous leaders' implementation of the "Go South" Policies disregarded China's strong market advantages and led only to limited success (Sun & Zhao, 2016). The overall budget for Tsai's NSP in 2017 and 2018 was NT\$4.45 billion (€ 142 million) and NT\$7.26 billion (€ 231 million) respectively. The Ministry of Education has dedicated 23.5% of the budget, which is NT\$1.7 billion (€ 54.1 million) (CSIS, 2018).

Compared to its predecessors, Tsai's NSP is more strategic and comprehensive, and its focus is no longer only on economic benefits. The core of the NSP is a desire to weave Taiwan into a "people-centered" community of nations. However, Taiwan's long-term gains, both

¹ The Ministry will strive to achieve this goal through its international promotion policies — i.e. to create more opportunities for Taiwan-based artists and groups to showcase their works to a global audience. By offering consultations and sponsorships as well as tapping into overseas networks, the Ministry hopes to continue nurturing Taiwan's growing cultural influence in the international sphere.

² https://www.roc-taiwan.org/bn_en/post/644.html

economically and diplomatically, are still debatable, given its geopolitical situation in the region. It faces competition and pressure not only from mainland China but also from Japan and South Korea, which likewise seek to expand their influence in Southeast Asia.³

2. External cultural policy: an overview

The central pillar of Taiwan's ECP is its liberal-democratic political culture as a Chinese-speaking state. Another significant part of Taiwan's soft power lies in the activism of civil society and the vibrant discussions about major policy issues that occur each day in multiple public spaces (Rawslny, 2016).

Since the lift of martial law in 1987 and democratization movements in the 1990s, Taiwan's domestic and international NGO participation has flourished. Today Taiwan has over 40,000 NGOs, some 2,100 of which operate internationally. Many of Taiwan's non-governmental representatives are warmly received abroad, especially in humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, health aid, and environmental activities. This also gave Taiwan a degree of access to organizations and countries it otherwise would be denied (Rajczyk, 2019).


After Ma Ying-jeou's election in 2008, the KMT embarked on a domestic and international project to restore a more traditional Chinese and Taiwanese political and cultural identity that included a renewed emphasis on Confucian values and teachings (Bourke, 2019). Under Ma's Administration, there was a shift in emphasis to cultural diplomacy as a policy instrument capable of redefining Taiwan's international role and extending its diplomatic space, especially with the establishment of the Taiwan Academy in 2011 and the creation of the Ministry of Culture in 2012. Tsai's move to expand the New Southbound Policy into culture and education has further consolidated this trend.

Even though Taiwan's ECP has a strong strategic dimension, it still faces external and internal challenges. Externally, Taiwan is caught up in a 'double bind' between fearing China yet being compelled to integrate economically with its much larger neighbor. Within Taiwan, the government still has to actively communicate its external cultural policies with the foreign public, especially in sight of the growing party schism and the dissolution of Taiwan's previous main public diplomacy agency, the Government Information Office (GIO).

³ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/19/south-korea-beyond-northeast-asia-how-seoul-is-deepening-ties-with-india-and-asean-pub-85572>

Table 4: Key ECP Statistics for Taiwan

	2019
Number of countries with ECP activities	over 58
Total number of institutions abroad	over 198
Total number of FTE staff engaged in ECP activities	-
ECP freelance & local contract staff	-
Government financial support (€ million)	Ministry of Foreign Affairs: 9.82 Ministry of Education: 69.6
Financial scale of all ECP activities	-
Comparative ECP ranking	medium

Figure 1: Institutional map of Taiwan's ECP

3. Fields of ECP

Several key players involved in ECP include the Ministry of Culture (MOC), National Palace Museum, the Ministry of Education (MOE), Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC), as well as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA).

Non-governmental organizations, student societies, and other forms of activities extending from Taiwan's civil society are another major part of Taiwan's public diplomacy. The International Cooperation and Development Fund of Taiwan should be mentioned here as a unique example of non-government organizations involved in public diplomacy. As an independent organization with the status of a consortium of juridical persons, it develops international cooperation in areas of agriculture, education, environment, information, and communication technology. MOFA has also financially supported some of its projects.

3.1. Culture and the arts

Table 5: Key statistics on culture and the art

	2019	2015
Number of countries present	13 ⁽²⁰²¹⁾	n/a
Number of institutes	Taiwan Academy: 3 Cultural centers and offices of Ministry of Culture: 16	Taiwan Academy: 3
Number of FTE staff	-	-
Budget (€ million)	34.72	n/a

According to the reports prepared by the 2018 National Conference on Cultural Governance, the MOC's budget in 2019 "will for the first-time account for over 1% of the central government's annual budget, while the budget for supporting the cultural agencies of local governments is set to grow by 300%" (Rawslny, 2016). As of 2021 November, the MOC has 16 cultural centers and offices across the world.

In 2019, the Taiwan Creative Content Agency (TAICCA) was established. Modeled after the Korea Creative Content Agency (KOCCA), the TAICCA seeks to promote Taiwan's culture and export its creative content to the global market. In 2019 and 2020, it has raised a total of NT\$328.75 million (US\$11.8 million) of investment in the content industry and made a trading volume of US\$48.76 million. Currently, the TAICCA is in cooperation with the European Union and ten major cultural powers, such as China, Germany, France, Japan, and the U.S.

3.2. Language

Table 6: Key figures on language promotion

	2019	2015
Number of countries	4	-
Number of institutes (Taiwan Centre for Mandarin Learning)	18 ⁽²⁰²¹⁾	-
Number of students	-	-
Number of candidates for Chi- nese language qualifications	24,232	16,259

The main institution that promotes the Chinese language abroad is the Taiwan Academy, and it originated as a core electoral campaign promise within Ma Ying-jeou's overarching cultural agenda. According to the 2008 Cultural Policy White Paper, the Taiwan Academy is a cross-departmental platform that integrates resources from entities like the MOC, National Science

Council (now known as the Ministry of Science and Technology). The cultural vision from the MOC attempted to ground Taiwan’s international presence in traditional Chinese culture and promote so-called “Chinese culture with Taiwanese characteristics.”

During Ma’s presidential campaign in 2008, the Taiwan Academy was styled as a moral and cultural authority on Chineseness. This set Taiwan’s Chinese culture in direct competition with the PRC and its associated Confucius Institutes. Although Ms. Lung Ying-tai, the first Minister of Culture in Ma’s administration, later clarified Ma’s statement and pointed that Taiwan Academies and Confucius Institutes had different missions. The comparison between the two, however, was unavoidable in political discourse (Wei, 2017).

So far, Taiwan Academies have opened in New York, Los Angeles, and Houston, while contact points have been set up in 64 countries, according to the MOFA report in 2013.⁴ While New York has the strategic position as the cultural capital of the U.S., Los Angeles is the home to the largest population of overseas Taiwanese. Mobilizing the U.S.-based Taiwanese diaspora is important to Taiwan in managing its relationship with the U.S. and stabilizing U.S.-China relations (Steinberg, 2020). Unlike MOC’s own cultural centers overseas, Taiwan Academies and their resource centers are charged with promoting Taiwan’s education and cultural offerings on a broader scale and networking with higher education institutions to create new contact points. However, because the Taiwan Academy is barred from charging for its programs in the U.S. for political reasons, it is often implemented on a limited central budget.

In 2021, Taiwan’s Overseas Community Affairs Council (OCAC) launched the TCML Establishment Program and approved the establishment of eighteen Taiwan Centers for Mandarin Learning (TCML), with fifteen in the U.S. and three in the U.K., Germany, and France. This initiative is part of the U.S.-Taiwan Education Initiative, a memorandum of understanding signed by the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) and the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in December of 2020.

3.3. Primary and secondary education

Table 7: Key figures on primary and secondary education

	2019	2015
Number of countries	3	3
Number of schools	5	5
Number of students	1,971 ⁽²⁰¹⁸⁾	2,978
Number of staff / teachers	247 ⁽²⁰¹⁸⁾	252
Budget (€ million)	2.86	1.92

⁴ https://en.mofa.gov.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=1303&s=31818

The Department of International and Cross-strait Education is a critical player in Taiwan's educational diplomacy, and it is responsible for Taiwan's overseas schools together with subsidizing business schools in mainland China. Its other duties include academic exchange, Chinese language promotion, counseling and administration for international students, etc. The budget for the department in 2019 is €69.6 million.⁵

Domestically, education for the children of Southeast Asian immigrants is another focus for Taiwan to build partner networks. Of the almost 200,000 children of immigrants registered in Taiwan's primary and secondary schools in 2016, 58 percent (114,247 people) had at least one parent originally from an NSP target country (CSIS, 2018). In June 2016, Taiwan's National Immigration Agency (NIA) launched a series of programs for second-generation Southeast Asian immigrants entitled the "New Immigrant Second-Generation Empowerment Programs (NISGEP)." They not only encourage ethnically Southeast Asian children to visit their countries of origin and learn the native languages, but these programs also subsidize their education at all levels.⁶

3.4. Tertiary education and science

Table 8: Key figures on tertiary education and science

	2019	2015
Number of countries <small>(Taiwan Fellowship)</small>	41	59
Number of universities / colleges abroad	n/a	n/a
Number of students		
Number of foreign students	Inbound (Mainland Chinese): 28,743	Inbound (Mainland Chinese): 26,649
	Inbound (Total): 116,175	Inbound (Total): 110,182
	Outbound: 41,559	Outbound: 38,166
Number of government schol- arships awarded ⁷	Taiwan Scholarship and Huayu Enrichment Scholar- ship Program: 1,609	-
	Taiwan Fellowship: 126	Taiwan Fellowship: 234
Number of teachers dispatched	146 ⁽²⁰¹⁸⁾	104
Budget (€ million) <small>(Taiwan Scholarships and Fellowships)</small>	13.76	10.76

⁵ Refer to pp. 265 to 270 of the annual budget MOE 2019.

⁶ <https://www.immigration.gov.tw/5385/7445/7451/7457/7493/>

⁷ Refers to the total number of Fulbright grants to foreign nationals.

In October 2016, the Ministry of Education published the New Southbound Talent Development Plan, which outlines the government's strategy to foster bilateral talent exchanges.⁸ The plan has three goals: 1) attract students from NSP target countries; 2) sponsor Taiwanese students to study and work in those countries; 3) improve access to high-quality education for the children of Southeast Asian immigrants. In 2019, the total MOE budget for NSP was NT\$1.57 billion (€ 49.9 million).⁹

In 2015, 110,182 international students studied at tertiary institutions in Taiwan, with 28,492 students from NSP target countries. The NSP seeks a 20% growth per year in the number of students from New Southbound countries (NSC) coming to Taiwan for study/research (including international cooperation classes in industry and education), and the target in 2019 is 48,300 students. In 2017, it allocated NT\$1 billion (€ 31.8 million) towards this effort, which included funding for scholarships, recruitment programs, and subsidies for universities. According to the Department of Statistics' announcement of the number of international students in 2019, the number of students from New Southbound countries studying and researching in Taiwan is 51,970.

Additionally, the NSP policy intends to send at least 2,000 young domestic students to New Southbound countries for internships every year. As of December 2019, 2,204 college students were subsidized by the Ministry for internship training in enterprises or organizations in NSC.¹⁰ Meanwhile, MOFA continues to offer Taiwan Scholarships and Taiwan Fellowships, with a total of 126 foreign scholars arriving in 2019 to research in Taiwan.

Table 8: Key figures on science

	2019	2015
Number of countries	Over 41	-
Number of institutes	12	0
Number of international cooperation agreements and MoUs	Over 123 ⁽²⁰²¹⁾	-
Number of projects	98	130
Number of scientists in exchange programs	Inbound: 559	Inbound: 758

To align with the New Southbound Policy (NSP), the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST) has been providing funding for academic institutions in Taiwan and their counterparts in South and Southeast Asian countries to establish "Science and Technology Innovation Centers (STICs)." Since 2017, twelve STICs have been set up in 10 countries, including Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Cambodia, and Myanmar. In 2019, with a "people-oriented" focus, MOST highlighted basic science research and facilitated the international flow of research professionals.

⁸ <https://www.edunbsp.moe.gov.tw/>

⁹ Refer to pp. 155 of MOE Annual Budget 2019.

¹⁰ <https://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/3/relfile/8717/79323/3e461ab2-7a71-4fe2-8972-b7651fcac3f4.pdf>

3.5. Foreign Media

Table 9: Key figures on foreign media

	2019	2015
Radio: Radio Taiwan International		
Number of countries broadcasted to	-	-
Number of languages	13	-
Number of channels	-	-
Audience / weekly (million)	-	-
Digital & social media audience (million)	-	-
New Media		
Social networks following	Page views: 16,260,057 times Number of Internet radio listeners: 509,808 times Cumulative number of new media users: 218,969	-
Audience / unique visitors (monthly / million)	-	-
Budget (€ million)	-	-

As Taiwan's national radio station and its only international radio broadcaster, Radio Taiwan International (RTI) serves as the "voice of Taiwan." One of its primary goals is to promote Taiwan's democracy and culture through news and programs in 13 languages. The Radio Taiwan International, with 260 employees, made a total of 3,396 hours of production and 5,495 hours of broadcast in foreign languages in 2019.¹¹

4. Challenges and future outlook

After Tsai's election in 2016, a "participatory revolution" of Taiwanese cultural policy ensued. Its core aim is to make culture policymaking in Taiwan a bottom-up process, as explained in the 2018 Cultural White Paper.¹² This may indicate that Taiwan's cultural diplomacy has taken a big step to move beyond visibility in the Indo-Pacific region since this lengthy project also intends to welcome Southeast immigrants into Taiwan, which will pose new

¹¹ <https://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/201908/909dd2a9-534e-4dd5-abc1-9c176a3a82ca.pdf>;
<https://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/202101/1cdfdf32-0af4-45b9-b05f-1f89fe14b1b4.pdf>

¹² <https://labgov.city/theurbanmedialab/taiwan-a-participatory-process-for-the-new-cultural-policy/>

challenges to Taiwan's capacities for inclusivity and intercultural communication.¹³ At the same time, the majority ruling party as of 2022, the Democratic Progressive Party, also shifted Taipei's cultural diplomacy focus to enhance the island's cultural exchange efforts in South-east Asia with the new NSP.

However, soft power will remain a complicated conversation in Taiwan not only because of its relationship with the PRC externally, but also because of internal political schisms regarding national and cultural identity – there is no consensus on what constitutes Taiwanese cultural soft power (deLisle, 2014). As a result, the evolution of soft power discourse has been uneven, tending to ideologically reorient with every administrative handover between parties (Bourke, 2019).

The “Taiwan question” will continue to be a matter of national relevance for mainland China. While it will become more urgent the more intense the US-China relationship gets and the more the Chinese government is pressured into adopting increasingly aggressive nationalist policies,¹⁴ the “New Cold War” can be a risk as well as an opportunity for Taiwan's ECP, especially with the newly established fifteen Taiwan Centers for Mandarin Learning filling the gaps left by the Confucius Institutes in the U.S. Still, the Cross-Strait relations shall continue to dominate Taiwan's political, social, and economic development over the following years.

All in all, leveraging Taiwan's advantages in soft power, such as its democratic values and vibrant civil society, will still be central to the success of the NSP and its overall ECP. In 2014, Taiwan has seen massive protests led by students that led to a complete reshuffling of the political landscape. This event that became known as Sunflower Movement has inspired a bout of youth activism that encourages the government to in key issues including education and nuclear power.¹⁵ In 2019, Taiwan became the first Asian country to legalize gay marriage. In sight of its recent achievements, Taiwan should fully use these sources of soft power and actively promote its culture and its successful model of democracy.

¹³ <https://taiwaninsight.org/2019/01/17/inclusivity-new-policies-on-taiwans-cultural-diplomacy-in-the-culture-white-paper-2018/>

¹⁴ <https://bti-project.org/en/reports/country-report/TWN#pos21>

¹⁵ <https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/08/02/activist-legacy-of-taiwan-s-sunflower-movement-pub-76966>

References

- Bourke, H. (2019). Taiwan in Their Hands: cultural soft power and translocal identity making in the New York Taiwan Academy. Retrieved from <https://minerva-access.unimelb.edu.au/handle/11343/251799>
- DGBAS (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics). (2019). *Central Government General Budget by Category 2019 (中央政府總預算案 歲出政事別預算總表)*. Retrieved from Central Government General Budget by Category 2019. Retrieved from <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas01/108/108Btab/108B%E6%AD%B2%E5%87%BA%E6%94%BF%E4%BA%8B%E5%88%A5%E9%A0%90%E7%AE%97%E7%B8%BD%E8%A1%A8.PDF>
- DGBAS (Directorate General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics). (2015). *Central Government General Budget by Category 2015 (中央政府總預算案 歲出政事別預算總表)*. Retrieved from <https://www.dgbas.gov.tw/public/data/dgbas01/104/104Btab/104B%E6%AD%B2%E5%87%BA%E6%94%BF%E4%BA%8B%E5%88%A5%E9%A0%90%E7%AE%97%E7%B8%BD%E8%A1%A8.PDF>
- Glaser, B.S., Kennedy S., and Mitchell D. (2018). *The New Southbound Policy: Deepening Taiwan's Regional Integration*. Center for Strategic and International Studies
- Kaczorowska-Ireland, A. *Public international law*. (Fifth ed.). Abingdon: Routledge. Retrieved from <https://www.worldcat.org/title/public-international-law/oclc/912319256>
- Liu, S. *Cultural Diplomacy Strategies and Techniques: a case study of Taiwan Academy (文化外交策略與技巧—以臺灣書院為例)*. Retrieved from <https://report.nat.gov.tw/ReportFront/ReportLatest/list>
- MOC (Ministry of Culture). (2019). *2019 Budget of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of China (中華民國108年文化部單位預算)*. Retrieved from <https://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/201902/bf16c256-f83e-4775-8729-7b208ad6709d.pdf>
- MOC (Ministry of Culture). (2019). *2019 Final accounts of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of China (中華民國108年文化部單位決算)*. Retrieved from <https://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/202008/489de985-cb8d-4ef6-8d4d-b3538ead25a7.pdf>
- MOC (Ministry of Culture). (2015). *2015 Final accounts of the Ministry of Culture of the Republic of China (中華民國104年文化部單位決算)*. Retrieved from <https://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/201608/ae883bc7-0a09-4028-bc31-4fac57f9ab63.pdf>
- MOC (Ministry of Culture). (2019). *Radio Taiwan International Settlement Report for FY 2019*. <https://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/202101/f97d5c7e-0e5c-4488-b71b-e51a39f2cd63.pdf>
- MOC (Ministry of Culture). (2015). *Radio Taiwan International Settlement Report for FY 2015*. Retrieved from <http://mocfile.moc.gov.tw/files/201605/a682f4ea-1723-49a4-a7eb-3a1b0dbf2430.pdf>

- MOE (Ministry of Education). (2018). *Statistics on the number of students in overseas Taiwan schools by academic system over the years (歷年海外臺灣學校各學制學生人數統計)*. Retrieved from <https://ws.moe.edu.tw/Download.ashx?u=C099358C81D4876CC7586B178A6BD6D5C1694E51409E5F2827E6A6C7C521E0B0A5FEA6C43005DF20A770467095909BCEE79BB6E3A9A11D8F68B926EE258DA09CC79A7E2ED57FB8D5A881C1A6FD601DA7&n=4B132473EE5DF3E05EC63621B58025E806262962AF28629409AF624A35D213C6F67D596C72BD7A9D6073A72D6FA2FA603DA3AED512534190A7CD87A1CF762E0A&icon=..pdf>
- MOE (Ministry of Education). (2019). *Number of applicants for the Chinese Language Proficiency Test by year (各年度華語文能力測驗報考人次)*. Retrieved from https://depart.moe.edu.tw/ed2500/News_Content.aspx?n=A773ACB48CA2E5C3&sms=A0F09EEC2F3F1501&s=94202FF1CC5EF99F
- MOE (Ministry of Education). (2019). *Ministry of Education 2019 Annual Governance Performance Report*. <https://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/3/relfile/8717/79323/3e461ab2-7a71-4fe2-8972-b7651fcac3f4.pdf>
- MOE (Ministry of Education). (2015). *Ministry of Education 2015 Annual Budget*. Retrieved from [https://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/14/RelFile/7105/19934/104%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E9%83%A8%E6%B3%95%E5%AE%9A%E9%A0%90%E7%AE%97\(pdf%E6%AA%94\).pdf](https://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/14/RelFile/7105/19934/104%E5%B9%B4%E5%BA%A6%E6%95%99%E8%82%B2%E9%83%A8%E6%B3%95%E5%AE%9A%E9%A0%90%E7%AE%97(pdf%E6%AA%94).pdf)
- MOE (Ministry of Education). (2019). *Ministry of Education 2019 Annual Budget*. Retrieved from <https://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/14/relfile/8348/64965/cf360f9f-972e-420d-916d-625ccc163bd1.pdf>
- MOE (Ministry of Education). (2018). *Eight-Year Plan to Become a Great Exporter of Chinese Language Education Industry (2013-2020) (邁向華語文教育產業輸出大國八年計畫(102-109))*. Retrieved from <https://ws.moe.edu.tw/001/Upload/7/relfile/6648/57459/01438e4a-a6d9-454c-b42d-43a3b8f86ade.pdf>
- MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). (2019). *The Republic of China 2019 Central government total budget Ministry of Foreign Affairs unit budget (中華民國2019年度中央政府總預算外交部單位預算)*. Retrieved from <https://ws.mofa.gov.tw/Download.ashx?u=LzAwMS9VcGxvYWQvT2xkRmlsZS9SZWxGaWxlLzIxNjEvMTY5MzA3L2U0MTllZDcwLWYzOTItNDFjNC1hMGE5LWQ0MTgzMjljMDA3Ni5wZGY%3d&n=MTA45Zau5L2N6aCQ566XKOazleWumueJiCkucGRm>
- MOFA (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). (2015). *The Republic of China 2015 Central government total budget Ministry of Foreign Affairs unit budget (中華民國2015年度中央政府總預算外交部單位預算)*. Retrieved from <https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/2161/147138/8d0a7890-a13a-45eb-a0e8-922938ee2c86.pdf>
- MOST (Ministry of Science and Technology). (2019). *Annual Report 2019*. Retrieved from <https://web.most.gov.tw/yearbook/108/bookc/index.html>
- Rawnsley, G. D. (2019). *Cultural Diplomacy: What is it? What is it not? And why should Taiwan care?* Retrieved from https://backend.univie.ac.at/fileadmin/user_upload/k_tsc_conference/documents/2019_10_culturaldiplomacy/files/Cultural_diplomacy_Gary_Rawnsley.pdf
- Rawnsley, G. D. (2014). Taiwan's Soft Power and Public Diplomacy. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 43:3 (pp. 161-174). doi: <https://doi.org/10.1177/186810261404300307>

- Steinberg, J. B. 2020. *What Are the Right and the Wrong Ways for the U.S. to Support Taiwan?* Retrieved from <https://www.chinafile.com/conversation/what-are-right-and-wrong-ways-us-support-taiwan>
- Sun, Y. and Zhao, K. (2016). *An Analysis of the Prospects of Taiwan's Foreign Relations after Tsai Ing-wen Takes Power* (蔡英文上台后台湾对外关系前景分析). Retrieved from <https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/323952161.pdf>
- TAICCA (Taiwan Creative Content Agency). (2019). *TAICCA Annual Report*. Retrieved from https://en.taicca.tw/uploads/userfiles/0629_TAICCA%20Annual%20Report_Download%20Version.pdf
- Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Brunei Darussalam. (2016). *The guidelines for "New Southbound Policy."* Retrieved from https://www.roc-taiwan.org/bn_en/post/644.html
- TTTCP (Think Tank for Taiwan Cultural Policy). (2018). *The Culture White Paper 2018*. Retrieved from https://tttcp.ntua.edu.tw/uploads/project_file/file/5c6260648bef1c587c002f77/2018%E6%96%87%E5%8C%96%E6%94%BF%E7%AD%96%E7%99%BD%E7%9A%AE%E6%9B%B8.pdf
- Wei, C. (2017). *Taiwan's Cultural Diplomacy and Cultural Policy: A Case Study Focusing on Performing Arts (1990-2014)*. Retrieved from https://research.gold.ac.uk/id/eprint/22358/6/CCE_thesis_Chun-YingW_2017.pdf

Imprint

The External Cultural Policy Monitor

Developed by Helmut K. Anheier, Hertie School & UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, and ifa Competence Centre. Supervised by Helmut K. Anheier. Coordinated by Sarah Widmaier for ifa.

Preferred citation

Yang, Yuqing (04/2022). "Taiwan. Country Report," in: Helmut K. Anheier and ifa (eds.). The External Cultural Policy Monitor. Stuttgart: ifa.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ifa.

Publisher:

ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)
Charlottenplatz 17,
70173 Stuttgart,
Postfach 10 24 63,
D-70020 Stuttgart

www.ifa.de

© ifa 2022

Author: Yuqing Yang

Copy-editing by:

ifa's Research Programme "Culture and Foreign Policy"

Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International (CC BY-SA 4.0)



DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17901/ecp.2022.026>