

ifa ECP Monitor Fact Sheet

# China

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## 1. Key Indicators

		2019	2015
<b>Population</b>	Number/rank	1,398 billion/1 <sup>st</sup>	1,371 billion/1 <sup>st</sup>
<b>GDP per capita</b>	Rank/number	2 <sup>nd</sup> / 9,164	2 <sup>nd</sup> / 7,168
<b>Cultural economy<sup>1</sup></b>	As share of GDP	4.5	3.8
<b>Education economy<sup>2</sup></b>	As share of GDP	4.2	4
<b>R&amp;D economy<sup>3</sup></b>	As share of GDP	2.2 (2018) <sup>4</sup>	2.1 (2016) <sup>5</sup>
<b>Media economy</b>	As share of GDP	-	-
<b>Geopolitical position</b>	Hard power rank <sup>6</sup>	2	3
	World trade rank <sup>7</sup>	1	2
	Soft power rank <sup>8</sup>	27	30
	Diplomacy rank <sup>9</sup>	1	3

Sources: Eurostat, Worldbank

## 2. Overview of External Cultural Policy

	2019
Number of countries present	171
Number of institutions abroad	~1,500
FTE staff	min. 85,000
Freelance and local staff	-

<sup>1</sup> Statista (n.d.). Retrieved from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/555243/china-cultural-industry-share-of-gdp/#:~:text=In%202018%2C%20China's%20cultural%20industry's,3.48%20percent%20share%20in%202012.>

<sup>2</sup> UNICEF (n.d.). Retrieved from: <https://www.unicef.cn/en/figure-826-government-expenditure-education-and-its-percentage-gdp-19922017#:~:text=Since%202012%2C%20China%20has%20achieved,lower%20than%20the%20world's%20average.>

<sup>3</sup> Expressed as Gross Domestic Expenditure on R&D (GERD) (Eurostat).

<sup>4</sup> Huang. (2019). "China's spending on research and development up 11.8 per cent to US\$275 billion in 2018." *South China Morning Post*. Retrieved from: [https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3025268/chinas-spending-research-and-development-118-cent-us275.](https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/article/3025268/chinas-spending-research-and-development-118-cent-us275)

<sup>5</sup> UNESCO. (2015). Retrieved from: [https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga\\_184821.pdf](https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_184821.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> 2019 Military Strength Ranking. (2020).

<sup>7</sup> Share of world trade expressed as export market shares by items - % of world total (Eurostat).

<sup>8</sup> Soft Power 30. (2020).

<sup>9</sup> Global Diplomacy Index. (2020).

	2019
Financial scale	-
Government support	~9 billion <sup>10</sup>
Comparative ECP ranking	global

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### MAIN ECP OBJECTIVES

- Establish its own global system and ideology as an alternative to the US-led global order, seeking common ground in some aspects but reserving differences in others
- Help shape international discourse and generate an attractive image and understanding of Chinese culture, particularly in developing countries
- Counter and refute negative narratives about the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with the aim of bolstering influence and image to a domestic audience

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### POLICY CONTEXT

- Decline of US/Western hegemony, opening of multipolar space, especially in wake of Western mismanagement of COVID-19 pandemic
- Hardening of Western political opposition, even as economic ties remain strong
- Expanding reach of infrastructural and economic ties, including Africa, Latin America, Belt and Road Initiative countries


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### REGIONAL FOCUS AND INSTITUTIONAL EMPHASIS

- Africa
  - Southeast Asia
  - Latin America
  - Peripheral Western nations
  - Confucius Institute (CI) and Confucius Classroom (CC) partner strategy,
  - Global media approach
- 

<sup>10</sup> The Economist. (2019). "China's \$10bn annual spending on soft power has bought little of it." Retrieved from: <https://www.economist.com/graphic-detail/2019/05/24/chinas-10bn-annual-spending-on-soft-power-has-bought-little-of-it>.

## Institutional Map



## 3. Fields of External Cultural Policy

	2019	2015
<b>Culture and the Arts</b>		
Number of countries present	154	135
Number of institutes	Confucius Institute: 548 Confucius Classroom: 1,193	~500 ~1.000
Number of FTE staff	Confucius Institute: 46,200	-
Budget (€ million)	-	Confucius Institute: 452 <sup>11</sup>
Government support (€ million)	- <sup>12</sup>	240
<b>Language</b>		
Number of countries courses offered	154	135
Number of students enrolled	-	1.4 million <sup>13</sup>
Number of candidates for language qualifications	-	6 million

<sup>11</sup> Xiao. (2017). "Confucius institutes in the US: Platform of promoting China's soft power." *Global Chinese*. 3:1. DOI: <https://doi.org/10.1515/glochi-2017-0002>.

<sup>12</sup> Hanban states it spent more than \$2 billion on Confucius Institutes worldwide from 2008 to 2016; starting in 2017, it no longer reports spending on the programme.

<sup>13</sup> Xiao. (2017).

	2019	2015
Budget (€ million)	-	452
<b>Education - Primary &amp; Secondary</b>		
Number of countries present	1	N/A
Number of schools	1 official (2.000 unofficial) <sup>14</sup>	N/A
Number of students	201	N/A
Number of staff / teachers	38 <sup>15</sup>	N/A
Government financial support (€ million)	Unknown. Set to rise substantially in the future	N/A
<b>Education - Tertiary</b>		
Number of universities / colleges abroad	2.332 joint ventures <sup>16</sup>	-
Number of domestic universities / colleges abroad <sup>17</sup>	2,668	2,560
Number of foreign students <sup>18</sup>	~500,000	396,531
Number of outbound students	900,000	819,524
Number of government scholarships awarded	63,000 <sup>19</sup>	-
Budget (€ million)	424 (2018)	-
Government financial support (€ million)	400 <sup>20</sup>	-
<b>Science and Research</b>		
Thousand Scholars Program <sup>21</sup>	-	-

<sup>14</sup> The first official Chinese school was opened in Dubai in 2019. More are set to follow in Brazil and Malaysia. Jie. (2020). "China's first overseas 'public school' to be the model for country's 'education going out' strategy." *The Global Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1200553.shtml>.

<sup>15</sup> Sircar. (2020). First Chinese School Opens in Dubai. *Khaleej Times*. Retrieved from: <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/uae/dubai/first-chinese-school-opens-in-dubai>.

<sup>16</sup> Xinhua. (2020). "China's education goes international from 2016 to 2020." Retrieved from: [http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/23/c\\_139611486.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2020-12/23/c_139611486.htm).

<sup>17</sup> Statista. (n.d.) "Number of Universities in China." Retrieved from: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/226982/number-of-universities-in-china/>.

<sup>18</sup> Data based on Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students | UNESCO UIS. (2020). Retrieved 2 September 2020, from <http://uis.unesco.org/en/uis-student-flow>.

<sup>19</sup> 10k reserved for BRI countries. 30k for Africa. Lo & Pan. (2020). "The internationalisation of China's higher education: soft power with 'Chinese characteristics'." *Comparative Education*. <https://doi.org/10.1080/03050068.2020.1812235>.

<sup>20</sup> Fedasuik. (2020.) "The China Scholarship Council: An Overview." Center for Security and Emerging Technology. Retrieved from: <https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/CSET-China-Scholarship-Council.pdf>.

<sup>21</sup> There is also the prestigious Changjiang Scholarship, which is designed primarily for outbound scholars. Jia. (2020). "Chinese academics who work abroad are slower to win major honour." *Nature*. Retrieved from: <https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586-019-03772-1>.

	2019	2015
Number of countries present	Worldwide	Worldwide
Number of scientists in exchange programmes	10,000 total across all programmes <sup>22</sup> from 2008-20	667 (YTTP) 211 (YCKSP) 400 (SFEDYS) 198 (NSFDYS) <sup>23</sup>
Government financial support (€ million)	Varied based on seniority, overall budget unavailable <sup>24</sup>	-
<b>Media<sup>25</sup> (CGTN)</b>		
Number of countries broadcasted to	171	N/A (Previously CCTV, which had 140)
Number of languages	6	N/A
Number of channels	6	N/A
Audience / weekly (million)	~ 50 million <sup>26</sup>	~45 million (2017)
Digital & social media audience (million)	Twitter: 14 million YouTube: 2.2 million Facebook: 115 million	N/A
Budget (€ million)	~2,000 <sup>27</sup>	1,800
<b>Radio: CRI</b>		
Number of countries broadcasted to	161	160
Number of languages	65	65
Number of channels	50	-
Audience / weekly (million)	-	-
<b>China Daily (newspaper)</b>		

<sup>22</sup> Barry and Kolata. (2020). "China's Lavish Funds Lured U.S. Scientists. What Did It Get in Return?" New York Times. Retrieved from: <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/chinas-lavish-funds-lured-us-scientists-what-did-it-get-in-return.html>

<sup>23</sup> For descriptions and full statistics, see: Cao (2017). "China's Approaches to Attract and Nurture Young Biomedical Researchers." Retrieved from: [https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga\\_184821.pdf](https://sites.nationalacademies.org/cs/groups/pgasite/documents/webpage/pga_184821.pdf).

<sup>24</sup> "A lump sum of 1 million RMB of research grants will also be granted upon selection, together with 3 to 5 million RMB of additional research grants to experts conducting scientific basic research." Tech Talent UK. (2020). "List of Active Chinese programmes targeting foreign citizens." Retrieved from: <https://techtalentsuk.com/2020/11/25/list-of-active-chinese-programmes-targeting-foreign-citizens/>.

<sup>25</sup> The Chinese government has pledged nearly 6 billion EUR per year (from 2019 onward) for foreign media. Lim and Bergin. (2020). "Inside China's audacious global propaganda campaign." *The Guardian*. Retrieved from: <https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/dec/07/china-plan-for-global-media-dominance-propaganda-xi-jinping>.

<sup>26</sup> Flew. (2017). "CGTN: China's Latest Attempt to Win Friends and Influence People." *The Asia Dialogue*. Retrieved from: <https://theasiadialogue.com/2017/05/01/cgtn-chinas-latest-attempt-to-win-friends-and-influence-people/>.

<sup>27</sup> Varrall. (2020). "Behind the News: Inside China Global Television Network." Lowy Institute. Retrieved from: <https://www.lowyinstitute.org/publications/behind-news-inside-china-global-television-network>.

	2019	2015
Countries with activities	180	150
Readership	~150 million	-
Employees	~500	-

## 4. Current Issues and Developments

- Rapid expansion through cooperation with partner institutions, despite incoherence and a lack of a clear direction through the overall ECP strategy
- Backlash to Chinese influence in the West pre-COVID and fears of a parallel world order led by China
- Rapid recovery from the pandemic, but declining perceptions around the world even as Chinese response proves more successful than Western one

## 5. Contributions to multilateral cultural organisations

	2019	Change since 2015
UNESCO (€ million) <sup>28</sup>	16	-
Other	-	-

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<sup>28</sup> Assessed contributions to UNESCO are mandatory contributions due from States by virtue of their membership.

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## Imprint

The External Cultural Policy Monitor

Developed by Helmut K Anheier, Hertie School & UCLA Luskin School of Public Affairs, and ifa Competence Centre. Supervised by Helmut K Anheier. Coordinated by Sarah Widmaier for ifa.

This paper is a summary of the respective Country Report.

Preferred citation

Knudsen, Edward (11/2021). "China. Factsheet," in: Helmut K. Anheier and ifa (eds.). The External Cultural Policy Monitor. Stuttgart: ifa.

The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the ifa.

Publisher:

ifa (Institut für Auslandsbeziehungen)

Charlottenplatz 17,

70173 Stuttgart,

Postfach 10 24 63,

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[www.ifa.de](http://www.ifa.de)

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Author: Edward Knudsen

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DOI: <https://doi.org/10.17901/ecp.2021.011>